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Introduction
Importance of Topic
Methodology
Historiographical Arguments
Scholarly Explanations
My Take
Historiographical Arguments
At the beginning of the semester I began this class with a simple question: why is
America still stuck in Afghanistan? This was supposed to be a short lived war in a country
unable to put up much of a fight. Ten years later the original assessment of a quick and easy
operation seems laughable. As I began reading further into the history of Afghanistan it became
apparent that this was not the first time that this barren, backward, poverty stricken country
has succeeded in stifling much more powerful and prosperous nations’ forces. Thus, the scope
of my question widened. Whether it was the ancient Romans, the British in the 1800’s, the
Soviet Union in the 1980’s, or America currently; Afghanistan has become a sort of graveyard
for powerful empires. How is this possible? How is a nation of such little resources and no
military to speak of able to bog down, frustrate, and even defeat such overwhelming forces?
This question became the central theme for all of my readings and will be the focus of this
paper.
Importance
This topic, and my question in general, is of the utmost importance for anyone
interested in the welfare of both America and the world in general. The Middle East in general
is essential to a growing global economy and oil plays a large role in that importance. Although
in the case of Afghanistan oil has never been linked as a reason for invasion, interest in the
region in general typically stems from the need for cheap resources. America entered
Afghanistan in 2001 on a mission to avenge the fallen of 9-11, root out the Taliban who was
harboring al-Qaeda, and kill Osama bin Laden. In the 13 years that followed, American lessons
in Afghanistan have come at a great cost. Between 2001, when Operation Enduring Freedom
began and 2012 over 2000 American soldiers have been killed in combat1. Although counting
the exact toll in civilian casualties has proven to be a difficult task it is estimated that between
18,000 and 20,000 Afghan civilians have been killed in that same time period2.
And what exactly has been accomplished? Over 13 years have passed and little progress
has been seen. The Taliban is as resilient as ever, drug production has skyrocketed, the
international community is losing the political will to remain, transitioning to Afghan security
forces has been slow and bumpy, the government in place is shaky at best and still has many
rule of law issues to resolve, America has overstretched and overused its military and put a
major strain on its economy at home, and al-Qaeda is flourishing both in the Hindu-Kush region
as well as other countries like Syria, Libya, etc. America has spent over $641.7 Billion on the war
since 2002 with over $198 Billion being spent in the last two years alone3. Sure Osama bin-
Laden is dead but was one man worth the extreme cost? I would hope that every American has
a keen interest in both how and why this has happened in the hopes that it can be avoided in
Beyond the ramifications for America, Afghanistan and the Afghan people, in the age of
terrorism the concept of “blowback” is frighteningly real. As ex-CIA spook Chalmers Johnson
puts it, “”Blowback" is a CIA term first used in March 1954 in a recently declassified report
1
"U.S. Death Toll." USA Today, n.d., Newspaper Source Plus, EBSCOhost (accessed May 7, 2014).
2
Dreyfuss, Bob, and Nick Turse. "America's Afghan Victims." Nation 297, no. 14 (October 7, 2013): 1-14. Political
Science Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed May 7, 2014).
3
Cordesman, Anthony. "The US Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013." Center for Strategic and International
Studies. N.p., 14 May 2012. Web. 07 May 2014.( https://csis.org/publication/us-cost-afghan-war-fy2002-fy2013)
that have been kept secret from the American people. The suicidal assassins of September
11, 2001, did not "attack America," as our political leaders and the news media like to
maintain; they attacked American foreign policy. Employing the strategy of the weak, they
killed innocent bystanders who then became enemies only because they had already
become victims. Terrorism by definition strikes at the innocent in order to draw attention to
the sins of the invulnerable.4” This is not to excuse the actions of those taken on 9-11 but
instead tries to explain the logic behind their methods. It is important that Americans
understand that the world is a much smaller place than it once was. An ocean no longer
affords the protection it once did and actions taken abroad can very quickly and lethally
effect the homeland. And as the world’s only remaining superpower, having an aggressive
foreign policy places a giant target right on America’s back. “Blowback” is important when
discussing any use of force that a country decides to take. The people we embrace today can
quickly become our biggest threat tomorrow, as is the case with America and the Mujahedeen
they armed to fight the Soviet’s in the 1980s. What would be called by many our greatest
victory in the Cold War came full circle on 9-11, the most horrific case of “blowback” in
American history.
answer, and that technology and money is not always the determining factor in a conflict. The
Soviets had overwhelming force, advanced technology, and an iron fist. It helped led to the
downfall of the entire Soviet Communist system as they spent a decade stuck in the sand. To
understand Afghanistan is also to begin to understand human nature. The will to fight can out
match an overwhelming force and advanced weaponry, as Americans should well know from
4
Johnson, Chalmers. "Blowback." The Nation. N.p., 15 Oct. 2001. Web. 07 May 2014.
<http://www.thenation.com/article/blowback>.
their own story of independence. This is especially so if those you are fighting against are well
trained from years of constant warfare and believe that they are doing the will of God (Islamic
extremists) or are defending their homeland (political factions vying for power or Afghan
security forces). Whether Americans like it or not many around the world see them as a large,
aggressive, empirical power that only holds its own interests at heart.
Wars of aggression, (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) no matter how well intentioned,
typically do not help to change this view and can very well increase the chances of more
terrorism in the future. What kind of “blowback” are we creating with our actions in
Afghanistan today? And will we look back and say it is worth it? These are questions that
demand answers. Far too often history repeats itself either because humans do not learn from
the past, or even worse they learn the wrong lessons from it. To learn the correct lesson you
first have to start with the right question. That question for me, which I hope to shed light on
with the rest of this paper is: what lessons can be learned from both the Soviet and American
experience in Afghanistan, what does America need to do going forward to avoid more
Methodology
The history of Afghanistan is rich, full of violence, and extremely long; something that I
would not dare to tackle in one relatively short paper. The scope of my topic is also rather large,
which unfortunately leaves very little historiographical work directly dealing with my question.
Thus, during the course of the semester I have broken it into three main historical time periods:
first, pre-WWI Afghanistan and the “Great Game” era; second, the Soviet communist era; and
third, the post 9-11 era. I chose to do this because each of the last two eras are both closely
intertwined and very recent, while the first one helps to establish a broader historical context
Although both the Soviet and American experiences have their own historiographical
arguments for as to why the results were what they were, I believe that there are themes and
similarities between the two that will be quite illuminating and will help to guide my final
analysis. As such, the structure of this paper will be: first, examine the historiographical
arguments for why the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan; second, to examine the current
American conflict in Afghanistan and evaluate the arguments for why it has not gone as
expected; third, look at the broader historical and cultural arguments for why Afghanistan is the
way it is; and finally, I will try and garner any themes or similarities between the two most
recent conflicts, put them in historical context with the larger Afghan history and try to provide
Russian interest in Afghanistan extends back long before the Soviet Union was ever
formed. During the 1800’s the Russia Tsars and the British Empire continually fought over the
region both clandestinely and openly during a period known as “The Great Game”. It was not so
much Afghanistan itself that held interest for either nation, but instead the British hoped to
maintain the area as a buffer against any invasion of its colony India. The idea of being
important only for their ability to be used would become a theme of Afghanistan and its people
Between 1919 and 1978 Afghanistan was constantly weighing the balance between its
immediate neighbors and major foreign powers such as Britain, Germany, and the United States.
Its proximity to the Soviet Union and other Soviet satellite states led to a normalization of
relations between the two countries, and eventually in April of 1978 a “leftist band of Soviet-
trained officers” overthrew the ruling government and established the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan. They immediately became the newest client state of the Soviet Union and made
sweeping changes to the country that ran opposite of the popular culture5. The communists
who seized power spent more time fighting with each other for power than actually
implementing socialist reforms in the country. As such, in order to consolidate power and stop
the infighting, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev decided military intervention was the
only means of controlling their new government proxy6. With such a large and powerful military
Initially the Soviets sent 30,000 troops into the country but that number would
eventually grow to over 100,000. Immediately a force from both within the country and from
neighboring Arab states began to fight back. Known as the Mujahedeen, these fighters would
find external support from places like the USA, China, and Saudi Arabia. Although much smaller
in numbers and outdated in technology they were able to resist the Soviets over the course of
5
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), xxii.
6
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), xxiii.
10 years. So much so that the Soviets were forced to withdraw in 1988. In 1992 the puppet
government in Kabul fell and the country was thrown into the throes of civil war.
Historiographical Arguments
As with any historical event, or any event really, there are multiple explanations as to
why the outcome was the way it was. Each explanation has its merits as well as its faults and
none tend to ever explain the whole truth of the matter. In almost all cases what is the “truth”
is often dependent upon who is telling it. In the case of major historical events there are
typically the same sorts of people who will tend to see things in relatively the same way. In the
cases I will be looking at there are similar categories of thought. In this case I have divided the
categories into: scholarly explanations, the Soviet explanation, and the American explanation
The Soviet General Staff, which wrote the book The Soviet Afghan War: How a
Superpower Fought and Lost ascribes the loss to both a lack of political support for the war at
home as well as a disregard for Afghan history and culture. They believe that their forces were
seen as complete outsiders and because of this could never garner the support of the people
for the cause of socialism nor for the Communist leadership either in Kabul or Moscow. As they
wrote “It is now clear that the Afghans, whose history includes many centuries of warfare with
various warring groups, could not see these armed strangers as anything but armed invaders.
And since these strangers were not Muslim, a religious factor was added to the national
enmity.7”
Further adding to this problem was the decision to use a large amount of Central Asian
forces in their divisions. The high counsel had hoped that being neighbors and also ethnic
minorities within Afghanistan that they would be less likely to be seen as outsiders and be able
to bridge the cultural gap8. It is the determination of the General Staff that this actually
compounded the problem because the pushtans in charge of the resistance in Afghanistan had
They go on further to claim that the war they were fighting was not a typically defined
war. It had no front lines per se, the Afghans had no military vehicles, no aircraft, and used
guerilla tactics that the Soviet military structure was ill suited to combat. The rugged terrain as
well as the need for quick deployment, fighting, and extraction, placed a heavy burden on the
Soviet’s helicopter force. Which according to the staff “disclosed serious shortcomings in pilot
training and the capability of the aircraft to perform adequately in Afghanistan. Further analysis
disclosed very weak preparation of combined arms commanders and staffs in organizing and
7
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 304.
8
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 305.
9
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 308.
Lastly they blame the political will of both the people and commanders in Soviet Russia.
High rates of casualties with very little, hard to define successes sapped the nation of its will to
fight in Afghanistan over the time period. Although the staff claims the morale of troops in and
returning home from Afghanistan was high, this is unsupported by the suicide rates of returning
In general the Russians tended to blame their own military structure, supply lines, the
new type of warfare and lack of political support for the war for their failure. They note that the
commanders neither knew nor cared for the culture or history of the Afghans and tactically it
hurt them. However, they fail to mention how that culture and history perhaps prepared the
Afghans to fight a much more powerful force. They also do not give any credence to the fact
that by the end of the war exterior forces were at work in Afghanistan both funding and arming
the rebel fighters. It is also important to note that in their assessment they would be required
to inform their leaders, which were apt to “kill the messenger” if things were not explained
delicately or “spun” in the correct way. Because of this it is hard to decipher what is spin and
If you ask any fan of Ronald Reagan, or most politicians at the time, the Soviet withdraw
from Afghanistan had very little to do with the might and power of the Soviets, or their lack of
ability to supply their troops. Nor was it due to the ethnic cleavages that helped to provide an
10
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 309.
unstable country to try and build on in the first place. If you ask a politician in the early 90’s why
the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan it was because of Charlie Wilson, the Mujahedeen, and
the politicians responsible for supporting these “freedom fighters”. Of course this is how all
politicians tend to spin things. When things are great they take all of the credit and when things
are bad they try and deflect all of the blame. However, it is my job to inspect the validity of this
set of arguments.
Officially the United States began helping to fund Afghan rebels after the Soviets
Security Adviser, it actually began in July of 1979 prior to the invasion. Although it was not an
overt attempt to draw the Soviets into military action in the country it was designed to help
After the invasion support for the Mujahedeen was fairly limited. It consisted mostly of
monetary support funneled through Pakistan’s ISI intelligence service, as well as some small
amounts of specialized training. America was interested in seeing the Soviet Union experience a
Vietnam type of moment but were hesitant to dip more than even a silent toe into the action.
They did not want to risk a hot war breaking out over a country they didn’t have all that much
personal interest in. Although they were keen to give the Soviet Union their own version of
Vietnam.
Although the Carter administration started the funding, it wasn’t until President Reagan
was into his second term that support would dramatically increase. Unlike the Iran/Contra
11
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan." Centre for Research on Globalisation. N.p., Jan.
1998. Web. 07 May 2014. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html>.
situation, Congress was fairly supportive of both Afghan self-determination and supporting the
rebels monetarily12. In 1984 congress even passed legislation supporting Afghan rebels and
called for material aid for the rebels although they were still hesitant to ship American made
weapons in directly. In October of 1984 CIA director William Casey made a trip to Afghanistan
to inspect Mujahedeen training camps where he “watched Mujahedeen rebels fire heavy
weapons and learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic explosives and detonators13.” “By
1987 the US was providing nearly $700 million in military assistance a year14.”
Although casualty rates for the Soviets remained fairly low and the casualty rates of the
rebels were high, they were able to survive and thus draw the war out ever longer. It was
thought by many that more was needed to push the Soviets over the edge. Although there was
some fear in both Congress and the CIA that the introduction of high-end, American, anti-
aircraft technology (namely the Stinger Missile System) to the Afghan may have unintended
consequences (“blowback”). Senators like Charlie Wilson and Gordon Humphrey, who had
both been consistently hawkish on the issue, forced the CIA’s hand and in 1986 the
For many politicians and some American scholars, American assistance was the biggest
reason that the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, and the Stinger system was
the final straw that broke the camel’s back. Although the Soviets had been in a stalemate with
12
Galster, Steve. "Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War." Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War. The National
Security Archive, 9 Oct. 2001. Web. 07 May 2014.
<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html>.
13
Coll, Steve. "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War." Global Issues. N.p., 19 July 1992. Web. 07 May
2014. <http://www.globalissues.org/article/258/anatomy-of-a-victory-cias-covert-afghan-war>.
14
Galster, Steve. "Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War." Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War. The National
Security Archive, 9 Oct. 2001. Web. 07 May 2014.
the Afghans for years many believe that it was the introduction of the Stinger that finally tipped
the scales. Most politicians at the time would agree that American support had protracted the
war and was bleeding the Soviets dry slowly, and this does seem to be the case. However the
ability for Mujahedeen forces to be able to effectively neutralize the Soviet Hind helicopter,
which was extremely effective at cutting casualties for the Soviets, was the tipping point in the
war15.
Although I tend to agree with many of these assessments I think it is a little bit Amara-
centric in its view of history. Yes, America was partially responsible for helping to support, fund,
and train these fighters, but they did not create the fighters themselves. They also did not
create the rocky terrain and difficult to maintain supply lines that hindered the Soviet efforts.
There is much more to the story than just technology and monetary support. The will of the
Afghan fighters to hold on for over 7 years before any major support would come from exterior
forces is a testament to their will. The ability to use the terrain and geography of the country
side, especially in the Afghan-Pakistan border region was a huge key in being able to sustain
their guerilla operations. The American explanation also does not take into account the geo-
political timing of the Soviet withdraw and the political climate within the Soviet Union which
15
The Russian General Staff. The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Trans. Lester Grau and
Michael Gress. (Lawrence, KS: 2002), 305.
Although not all scholars agree of course, and some explain the Soviet loss through a
combination of both of the above explanations. They tend to agree that American support for
the Mujahedeen prolonged the war and seriously weakened both the Soviet resolve and ability
to operate on the battlefield effectively. They also tend to agree that the Soviets ability to fight
this sort of war was less than perfect. Beyond that though they tend to put the Soviet Afghan
By 1985 social reform was becoming a much more important issue at home in the Soviet
Union than external conquest. “Moscow began to pull back from costly and failing ventures, to
cut losses abroad and attempt to achieve political settlements16.” Détente was becoming to be
the new Soviet foreign policy and Afghanistan was a sticking point between the two nations
that the Soviets felt they could relinquish. “Guns gave way to butter as the Soviet’s economy
Domestic economic issues were causing the population in Soviet Russia to change their
mind about socialism and communism in general. Blue jeans, rock music, American pop culture,
and the prosperity they saw in Western Europe all effected the willingness of the Russians at
home to spend what little they had maintaining an empire abroad. The morale of the troops
coming home was also an issue as it spread the distaste for the war even further. The economic
situation of course was not solely due to Afghanistan. Years of Cold War, corruption in
leadership, conquest, and military expansion had worn down the Soviet economy to a breaking
16
Rogers, Tom. The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan: Analysis and Chronology. London: Greenwood Press,
1992, 3.
17
Rogers, Tom. The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan: Analysis and Chronology. London: Greenwood Press,
1992, 4.
point. Keeping up with American technology in both the space race and the atomic arms race
took a huge economic toll as well. The Americans had given them their Vietnam to be sure, but
it was not just the protracted war in Afghanistan that doomed the Soviets.
Although I do like most of the scholarly arguments that I have read, it seems that very
few reverence is given to Afghanistan itself for the win. In the game of geo-politics the Afghan
people were the pawns and the two kings had dueled using them. Their arguments put this
conflict in the larger Cold War paradigm they still tend to focus on solely the issue of east versus
west. Though they do tend to give credence to the fact that Afghanistan, due to its social
cleavages, ethnic makeup, and long history of guerilla war, they tend to overlook them when
explaining why either the Soviets failed or the Americans won. Neither of these explanations
really account for the will of the Afghans as well as foreign fighters who flocked to their cause.
They also don’t take into account the actual fighting of the war and the tactics required to win a
guerilla style conflict. The Soviet army was built to fight wars against major powers on the
planes of Europe, not tiny hit and run forces in an extremely disperse, mostly barren, dry and
rocky, Afghanistan.
My Take
As with any major military conflict there are hundreds of thousands of individual events
that slowly shape the course of the war. Even the most well laid plans have to endure the “fog
of war” where everything you planned no longer matter as situations on the ground change. So
to try and ascribe one direct cause for the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan is both impossible and
foolhardy. Many factors came in to play but I think a few are most important.
In general though, the Soviets found themselves in an artificially limited war. In a total
war your nation is fully invested in the outcome and the war typically effects the entire society.
World War One and Two were both examples of total warfare. These types of wars tend to pit
nations against other nations, have large uniformed armies, and your entire nation’s existence
was dependent upon the outcome. Natural limitations to war include things that are out of
your control, such as terrain, climate, population, economic development of the country, etc. In
an artificially limited war there are limits placed on the amount of effort, money, manpower,
and political will that will be expended in achieving the wars overall objectives.
The Soviets did not want to draw America into direct conflict over Afghanistan,
especially in the early to mid-80s when détente became the focus of their foreign policy with
America. As such, they limited themselves on what they were willing to do to ultimately win in
Afghanistan. Initially they did not want to occupy the country with thousands of troops as
ultimately happened. Typically, in an artificially limited war, you end up fighting a protracted
defensive war of attrition, and if you come into it with little political will in the first place, that
will can dry up rather quickly. If you start out playing not to lose, how do you ever expect to win?
This is one of the biggest problems with fighting any artificially limited war.
In the case of Afghanistan the objectives were fairly limited for the Soviets. They initially
did not want to occupy the country by force at all. The proximity to Russia made it natural that
they would hold distinct interests in the region and as such they wanted another satellite state,
both increasing their power in the region as well as providing more of a buffer against Islamic
radicals (as found in Iran and Pakistan). They believed that they could install a Communist ruler
who was already in Afghanistan, control them from Moscow, and institute sweeping social
reforms in the country. They quickly found out that local and regional issues would make this a
The Communist party in Kabul squabbled and fought over power and who would rule to
the point that a direct Soviet invasion was required. This should have been the first clue that
working with the Afghans was going to be extremely difficult. Afghanistan is a diverse yet
extremely religious country, with deep ethnic differences that make it extremely hard for even
local rulers to govern. Socialism and Soviet Communism is a completely foreign concept to a
country full of devout and sometimes extreme Muslims. Trying to make this change, I believe,
Added to the ethnic makeup of the population is the complications that the countryside
itself offers. It is completely landlocked and is mostly desert or extremely rocky mountainous
terrain. Supplying a large army was inevitably going to be a serious challenge. The Soviet army
was ill equipped to deal with this, which their generals readily admit. The terrain also made it
very difficult to stop guerilla fighters from making quick strategic strikes and retreating to the
mountains where large amounts of troops and bulky tanks could not be effective. What is more,
the Mujahedeen was mainly comprised of Pashtuns who were also found in bordering Pakistan.
Thus their ability to both safely retreat into and recruit from Pakistan (and many other Middle
Eastern nations) was something that the Soviets could do little about. The Soviet strategy
seemed to hinge upon the Hind helicopter and its ability to quickly move troops from one brush
fire to another. Because these attack helicopters were well armored and able to deliver their
payload from distances that the small arms of the Mujahedeen could not reach they were fairly
effective.
This is where I believe the Americans were most helpful. Although they had been
supporting the Mujahedeen for years with training and money, it was not enough to overcome
the Hind helicopter. The Afghan and foreign fighters were fierce in their resolve and it is to be
commended. Many in the Islamic world saw the Soviet takeover as a threat to both the region
as a whole and Islam itself, and thus they flocked to Afghanistan to help kick them out. They
had made great progress in stalemating the second most powerful nation on earth, but the
Hind was proving to be extremely effective at limiting Soviet casualties and increasing rebel
casualties.
Finally American politicians convinced the CIA and DOD that if they wanted to really
give the Soviets their own Vietnam, America had to provide more than just small arms and
money. They needed to give them a weapon that could counter the Hind. The introduction of
the Stinger missile system to the Mujahedeen increased the cost of continuing the war in
underestimated the challenges that the ethnic and religious makeup of Afghanistan would
create in both installing a Communist ruler and later occupying the country; second, their army
was ill equipped for the terrain and geography of Afghanistan; third, the terrain was built for
guerilla fighting and the mountainous region that bordered Pakistan made it easy for
Mujahedeen to both recruit and seek haven; fourth, and this may be the most important, if you
fight in a defensive war of attrition, which is what Afghanistan became, you need either
extremely high political will to win or you must accomplish your goals quick enough that what
will you have is not spent completely; fifth, geopolitically the Soviets were already beginning to
draw their empire back as reforms at home focused their attention more internally, which
ultimately made Afghanistan expendable; and finally, I believe that the Americans helped to
ensure that the war was drawn out long enough that what little will to win the Soviets did begin
In the years that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the country fell into
civil war. America had stopped actively supporting the Mujahedeen and was for the most part
ignoring Afghanistan in the aftermath of the proxy war they had just ostensibly won. The power
vacuum left by the retreating Soviets would eventually be filled by the Taliban. Ironically, it was
the Soviet-Afghan war that helped to create this violent brand of Islamic fundamentalism.
Refugees from this conflict migrated to Pakistan where they were taught a violent and extreme
view of Islam, and by 1996 they had secured power in Afghanistan. They maintained this
control in brutal fashion but America still had no more than a passing interest in the country.
The story does not have to be told in great detail to any American who was old enough
to have memories of that day. America had just experienced the greatest instance of terrorism
in its history and it was searching for both answers and culprits. It quickly became apparent that
those we had helped to create in the 1980’s had come back to haunt us.
Within a few days it was determined that Islamic fundamentalists were behind the
attacks, namely Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda, and Afghanistan was their main refuge. When
America demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama and end any support for terrorism they
were giving, the Taliban refused. With the entire world behind them and their cause, America
Although it was technically an invasion and could be considered a war of aggression, this
was not the same as the Soviet invasion in the 80’s. While the Soviets were looking to expand
their influence in the region and add another satellite state to their union, the American
invasion was based upon moral principle and bringing justice to those who had attacked them
on 9/11. They went in with a broad coalition of other nations and had the moral high ground in
America along with Northern Alliance forces were able to capture Kabul in less than a
month. It took less than a month for the NA to capture almost all of northern Afghanistan and it
seemed militarily victory would come fairly easy. By December NA and American forces had
pushed the Taliban all the way to the edge of Pakistan in the Tora Bora region. It is during the
fight for Tora Bora that Osama bin-Laden was able to slip into the mountainous region on the
border of Pakistan and escape coalition forces. This would prove to be a major failure that
By the end of 2001 an interim government had been sworn in and the reconstruction of
the country could begin. It was at this point that the war turned from offense and trying to rout
out the obvious enemy, to a war against insurgents still left in the country after the Taliban left.
limited in that you are not going to target everyone in the country. In fact, your enemy is fairly
hard to define and find because they slink back into the shadows as soon as their attacks are
done.
Americans faced challenges both in the cities with insurgents as well as near the
Pakistan border with al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters who were using the same tactics they had to
defeat the Soviets. In March of 2002 America and their allies launched Operation Anaconda,
which was the largest anti-Taliban and al-Qaeda operation since the Battle for Tora Bora.
Although America would claim numerical victory, in the end it did very little to stop what was
By 2003, with progress being seen for Afghanistan’s new government and their security
situation, America decided to invade Iraq. This turned a lot of attention and manpower away
from Afghanistan at what might have been a very critical time for stabilizing the country.
During this time the Taliban was able to regroup and increase their own ability to strike at the
new Afghan government fairly well unchecked. Terrorist attacks were becoming the norm in
Afghan cities during 2003-2006 and eventually America would have to turn its attention back to
this growing problem. A problem that persists to this very day, and has made Afghanistan
Historiographical Arguments
Let us make no mistake in terms of casualties inflicted and sustained, territory taken,
and what most people would consider military objectives in Afghanistan, America won the
“war”. What they lost was the peace. After over a decade in Afghanistan the situation is just as
precarious as it ever was. The elected government still has issues with the Rule of Law,
terrorism, the Taliban, and finding a way to rebuild a country that has been in constant rebuild
mode for the last 200 years. How is it that once again a major power has been thwarted in such
a backwards nation? America had the world behind them when the initially invaded
Afghanistan, and more importantly they had the moral high ground in the situation. How then
were they able to be strung out in the desert for over a decade while seeing relatively little
progress in the meantime? If their only goal had been to find and capture or kill Osama bin-
Laden how did it take them 10 years to do so? I have some explanations of my own but there
seems to be a few schools of thought on why America has struggled to secure the peace, which
Most of the military explanations I have seen for why America has been bogged down in
Afghanistan typically revolve around counter-insurgency war strategy. Take for example Donald
Wright’s book A Different Kind of War in which he and the US Contemporary Operations Study
Team attempt to analyze the American efforts in Afghanistan. Although this was printed in the
early part of the war they paint an optimistic picture of how the US could win it. This is to be
expected as coalition forces had quickly taken the country. It was their assessment that the
Americans had to be seen as liberators and not occupiers, which is what the Soviets had been
and was part of the reason for their failure. To do so they had to secure the country as fast as
squandered early opportunities to secure the country, had there been more troops on the
ground, they believe that the Taliban and al-Qaeda could have been crushed in the Battle of
Tora Bora. The author calls it a bit of a paradox because too many troops and you look more
like invaders, but not enough and you risk allowing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to escape and
begin a guerilla war that could last years. Which is exactly what happened.
Tactically, the reason that America has had so much trouble remains fairly the same as
the Soviets in the 1980’s. Although better trained and equipped for guerilla warfare, the terrain
was still much more conducive to those taking the offensive in this war than those on the
strategic defense. Tora Bora, which Operation Anaconda focused solely on, is still hard to take
because the rocky, cave strewn, mountains do not allow for heavy armor or bombardment to
be effective. Because the Americans relied heavily on air power and technology instead of men
It is also the argument of many in the military/political class that Iraq was a distraction
at just the wrong time. Because the country had shown signs of progress prior to 2003, America
thought it was able to take its eye off the ball and thus allowed the progress to regress. In
addition to allowing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to regroup and rearm, it increased war fatigue
within the American populace. It is hard for any nation to fight two major wars, both
economically and mentally. The will to fight is of utmost importance when you are dealing with
insurgency and guerilla warfare, and Iraq drained that will even further than Afghanistan. So by
the time America turned its attention back to Afghanistan a lot of the progress that had been
made was lost, and there was even less interest at home to correct it. As well the invasion of
Iraq eroded the moral high ground that America had relied upon to gather such a large coalition
of forces in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, once again America found itself in an extremely artificially limited war,
which they have never had great success in. They had to walk a very tight rope between
securing the nation itself, rooting out who the enemy was, stop terrorism, and all the while be
seen as liberators and not occupiers. 10 years later it is hard to convince a people that you are
liberating them.
Scholarly Explanations
In his book In the Graveyard of Empires, Seth Jones of the foreign policy think-tank
RAND Corporation offers an explanation for why the insurgency has been so hard to counteract.
He believes that America had both the technological and economic means to both depose and
problems plagued them in implementing their strategy. First and foremost he lays blame with
the Afghan government itself. Hamid Karzai was not perfect by any means and he blames both
corruption and incompetence for a lack of good governance after the Taliban fell. Because of
this lack of strong leadership it created discontent in rural areas which became a ready supply
of guerilla fighters willing to conduct terrorist attacks inside the cities. Supply is only half of the
equation though. The second half is demand, which was provided for by religious zealots in
both al-Qaeda and the Taliban who helped to convince already angry rural Afghans that they
Another explanation is offered by Steve Cole, Pulitzer prize winning journalist and the
author of Ghost Wars, which looks at America’s relationship with Afghanistan beginning just
prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979. He doesn’t believe that the US ever really respected the
ethnic and religious makeup of the country, nor the long history of military intervention in that
country. They thus underestimated the amount of resistance any force, no matter how well
supported internationally and how morally justified, would create. It is his contention that
because Afghanistan has been a “laboratory for political and military visions conceived abroad
and imposed by force,19” that they were a culture that would automatically be resistant to
This is made especially true by who America was choosing to rely on for intelligence and
support, namely Pakistan and their ISI. Pakistan, which had provided America assistance during
the Soviet-Afghan war was tapped once again. The problem this time though was they were
harboring the same enemy they were supposedly helping America to root out and stop. Even
worse, many of the Taliban had deep roots in Pakistan and the Tora Bora region in particular.
Pakistan has never been a true ally of America. They are a regional power who stand to gain by
either a weakened Afghanistan or even better a Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Thus it is Mr.
Cole’s belief that Pakistan, which is where the Taliban originated, never really tried to stop
forces from fleeing through Tora Bora into their territory and constantly played on both sides of
18
Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. Xxix.
19
Cole, Steve. Ghost Wars. New York: Penguine Press, 2004. 569.
the fence when it came to the Taliban and America. Because America was keen to keep
whatever shaky alliance they had with Pakistan intact America never really addressed this
Still another explanation is offered by British historian and author of Breeding Ground,
Deepak Tripathi. He maintains that the reason both the Soviet Union and America failed in
Afghanistan is much larger than any alliance, tactics, or strategy. Instead he believes that after
centuries of violence that the culture itself is almost impossible to impose exterior reforms on.
Afghanistan is said by many to have little to no national identity, and is divided deeply by its
ethnic and religious differences. Tripathi argues instead that the only national identity that they
do have is the ability to withstand foreign invasions and use of force to change their society.
Because of the massive amount of violence that has been imposed on this country for the
entirety of its existence he believes that violence has become the norm. As such, any change
either culturally or politically has to be achieved through the use of violence. The west, not
having a culture based on this sort of violence does not have the capacity to comprehend this,
As an explanation of what he means I think you can look at who have been able to
assert control in Afghanistan and how they were able to maintain it over any amount of time.
The Taliban was a ruthlessly brutal regime. In a “culture of violence” as Tripathi calls it, only the
threat of even greater violence can force compliance. Americans do not have the stomach
(rightfully so) to provide the amount of violence needed to control this sort of culture. Another
example that helps to further this theory is the insurgency that has plagued Iraq. Sadaam was
just as brutal as the Taliban in many regards but he was able to maintain control because those
who opposed him feared him enough to still be compliant. While the US could establish some
sort of security while trying to implement some form of constitutional democracy, culturally
they are unable to be brutal enough to gain complete compliance. In a country born and bred in
violence that has gone through a Communist coup and invasion, ten years of brutal civil war,
another five years of Taliban extremism, and a second invasion in the course of just 40 years it
is hard to argue that violence and warfare are not deeply engrained in their pshycie. Because of
this, he maintains, that America had no chance at making any lasting change.
My Take
America went into Afghanistan with the world behind them and what most would
consider the moral high ground. Unlike the Soviet Union, they were not supposed to be going in
to occupy the country. Had the goal of Operation Enduring Freedom been to merely depose the
Taliban and kill Osama bin Laden I believe that America could have succeeded rather quickly.
The problem is when you get rid of the Taliban you create a power vacuum which inevitably
must be filled. Because of this America had an obligation to not just oust the Taliban, but to put
in its place a government that would be friendly to the American cause as well as work for the
Afghan people. It is this third mission that has made it so difficult to leave.
The arguments above provide a fairly good assessment of what has gone wrong for
America in Afghanistan. Tactically we did not have enough boots on the ground to properly root
out l-Qaeda and the Taliban when they were forced all the way to the Tora Bora region.
America, as it seems to always do, relied on superior firepower and technology in hopes that it
would accomplish the missions goals. However, the terrain and climate of the Pakistan/Afghan
border does not allow for Americas superior force to translate. Much like the Soviet Union they
were unable to project their power, which in many cases is much more vital than actually
they ran into another problem, namely Pakistan. Pakistan is and it isn’t an ally of the United
States. When most people thing of a nation-state they think of a centralized western style
government that has control over the territory it has staked out. This is not the case with either
Afghanistan or Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan this became extremely troubling because those
who America called allies were unable (or perhaps even unwilling) to take the steps necessary
to stop Afghan rebels from crossing into their territory. Much like Cambodia and Laos in the
Vietnam war, guerilla fighters were able to safely reach Pakistan, where they knew America was
Beyond the tactical difficulties that America faced on the battlefield they also had the
hard task of winning “the other war,” as many have called it. To be able to both reconstruct and
secure Afghanistan at the same time America would needed the cooperation of the Afghan
people. At first, with such sudden success, they were able to get the support needed and
progress was shown. The Taliban was a brutal regime that most the country was glad to be rid
of. However, corruption and incompetence within the Afghan leadership quickly bogged down
the progress that America was able to make. Eventually America stopped looking like liberators
only was America working to both secure and rebuild Afghanistan, they were suddenly trying to
do it in two countries. If, as some of the arguments above outline, the issue of boots on the
ground and manpower was a major cause for America’s struggles in Afghanistan, adding
another war to the mix only made it worse. Although many in the military and political class
believe that America is capable of fighting two wars simultaneously it has been proven
otherwise. Resources that could have been used to secure the Pakistan/Afghan border now
found themselves fighting the same sort of insurgency war in another country. America is a
great and powerful nation to be sure, but the task at hand in Afghanistan was a lot larger than
many were willing to admit at first, and could never have been done with America’s resources
spread so thin.
Finally, and I think this has been proven numerous times now (the biggest example
being Vietnam), America is not good at fighting a protracted defensive war of attrition. The
American culture of war, the way most Americans believe that war should be fought, is not to
be on the defensive. General Patton in one sentence described exactly how Americans feel
about war when he said “I don't want any messages saying 'I'm holding my position.' We're not
holding a goddamned thing. We're advancing constantly and we're not interested in holding
anything except the enemy's balls.” Although the language is a bit course for most readers, the
attitude remains the same. America, and Americans, do not see themselves as those who sit
and wait for an enemy; they march foreward, find them, kill them, and keep marching. Thus the
entire idea of an artificially limited defensive war of attrition is a foreign concept to most
Americans. As such, the political will to fight this kind of warfare is quick to vanish. At the outset
of Operation Enduring Freedom the American populace was completely onboard and gung hoe
to go and kick the Taliban out and find Osama; 13 years later that will has vanished as yet