Hate Speech Jeremy Waldron PDF

Harvard Law Review Association
DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION: THE VISIBILITY OF HATE

Author(s): Jeremy Waldron
Source: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 123, No. 7 (MAY 2010), pp. 1596-1657
Published by: Harvard Law Review Association
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2009 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES
DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION: THE VISIBILITY OF HATE
Waldron
Jeremy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1597
I. Why Call Hate Speech Group Libel? 1600
A. The Connotationsof "Hate Speech" 1600
B. The Terminology
of "GroupLibel" and "GroupDefamation" 1601
C. Civil VersusCriminalLibel 1602
D. Can a Groupbe Libeled?: Beauharnais v. Illinois 1605
E. WaysofAssaultingGroupReputation 1609
F. The Emphasis on DignityRatherthan Offense 1612
G. Beauharnaisand Libel in LightofNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan 1614
H. Who Needs ProtectionAgainstLibel? 1615
II. What Does a Well-Ordered Society Look Like? 1617
A. The Look ofHate 1618
B. Hatred and Law in a Well-Ordered
Society 1621
C. Political Aesthetics 1623
D. Assuranceand Security 1626
E. Public Goods 1630
F. The Role ofLaw and theRole ofIndividuals 1632
G. Transitionand Assurance 1633
III. Libel and Legitimacy 1635
A. The ObjectionfromAutonomy 1635
B. ViewpointDiscrimination 1638
C. Ronald Dworkin'sArgument AboutLegitimacy 1639
D. Legitimacy:A DifferenceofDegree 1642
E. Timeand Settlement 1646
F. The Owens Case in Saskatoon 1650
G. Islamophobia 1652
H. Distrustof Government 1654
1596
2009 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES
DIGNITYAND DEFAMATION:THE VISIBILITY OF HATE
Waldron*
Jeremy
In his three200c Holmes Lecturespublishedhere,ProfessorWaldronseeks to describe
and defendlaws forbiddinggroupdefamation- what we commonlyreferto as "hate
speech"- as affirming the basic dignityof each memberof society. Part I defendsthe
characterizationofhate speechas groupdefamation.It arguesthat hate speech impugns
its victims' standing as equal membersof society. Part II describes hate speech
regulationas the protectionof a fragile public good: the assurance offeredby each
memberof societyto all of its membersthat theycan livefree offear, discrimination,
violence,and the like. Part III defendsthe views articulatedin Parts I and II from
variouscriticisms,particularlythoseofProfessorRonald Dworkin. Dworkinarguesthat
forbiddinghate speechmay resultin a loss of democraticlegitimacy for otherlaws. But
ProfessorWaldronargues that with sufficientsafeguardsthe loss is vanishinglysmall,
and well worththe concomitantgains. As well,prohibitionson hate speech should only
extend to issues that are "settled,"such as race, ratherthan issues that are currently
controversial,which should furtherallay concerns that hate speech regulationwill
foreclosefreedomor democraticdebate.
Introduction
Abouttwo yearsago, I publisheda shortpiece in the New York
ReviewofBooks,reviewing a bookbyAnthony LewiscalledFreedom
for the Thought that We Hate.1 In it, expressedsome misgivings
I
aboutthearguments commonly used in Americato condemnwhatwe
- legislation
call hate speechlegislation of the sortyou will findin
England,Canada, France,Denmark,Germany, New Zealand,and in
some of the statesof Australia,prohibiting "by whicha
statements
of
group people are threatened, insulted or degraded accountof
on
*
UniversityProfessor,New York University.I am most gratefulto TimothyGarton Ash,
Rebecca Brown, WinfriedBrugger,Ronald Dworkin,David Dyzenhaus,Noah Feldman,James
Fleming,Charles Fried, SanfordKadish, Frances Kamm, George Kateb, Henning Koch, Chris-
tineKorsgaard,David Kretzmer, Mattias Kumm,Rae Langton,Charles Lawrence,AnthonyLew-
is, CatherineMacKinnon,JohnManning,Jane Mansbridge,LeightonMcDonald, Frank Michel-
man, Martha Minow, Peter Moinar, Glyn Morgan, Liam Murphy,Thomas Nagel, Gerald
Neuman, Robert Post, Michael Rosen, Nancy Rosenblum, Michael Sandel, Carol Sänger,
TM. Scanion, RobertSilvers,JosephSinger,GeoffStone,Mark Tlishnet,RobertoUnger,Ajume
Wingo, and the late C. Edwin Baker for their criticisms,suggestions,and (in some cases)
encouragement.
1 JeremyWaldron,Free Speech & theMenace ofHysteria,N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 29, 2008,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2i452(reviewingANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE
Thought that We Hate (2007)).
1597
1598 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
theirrace,colour,nationalor ethnicorigin. . . ."2 I said thatI thought

therewas perhapsmoreto be said in favorofthislegislation thanAn-
thony Lewis had suggested. But I did notmake anyverystrongasser-
tion. I said: "It is not clearto me thatthe Europeansare mistaken
whentheysay thata liberaldemocracy musttakeaffirmative respon-
for the
sibility protecting atmosphere of mutual respectagainstcertain
formsofviciousattack."3AndI endedthepiecewitha reminder that:
[T]he issueis notjust our learningto toleratethoughtthatwe hate- we
the FirstAmendment lawyers,forexample.. . . Maybe we shouldadmire
some[ACLU] lawyerwho says he hateswhat the racistsays but defends
to the death his rightto say it, but . . . [t]he[real]questionis about the
directtargetsof the abuse. Can theirlives be led, can theirchildren
be broughtup, can theirhopes be maintainedand theirworstfearsdis-
pelled,in a social environmentpollutedby thesematerials?Those are the
concernsthatneed to be answeredwhen we defendthe use of the First
Amendmentto strikedown laws prohibitingthe publicationof racial
hatred.4
I thoughtthat soundedverymeasuredand moderate. UntilI
openedmyinboxa fewweeksafterthepiecewas publishedto findan
emailwhosesubjectline screamed, "YOU ARE A TOTALITARIAN
ASSHOLE." "You are thetypeof humanexcrement thatshouldbe
dealtwithIF thelaws thatyou proposeeverbecomereality.We do
not[sic] a strongstateto supportworthless littlesubsidizedparasites
likeyou."5The emailleftme a littlebruised,so I decidedthatin the
lectureson whichthisArticleis based - lecturesdedicatedto the
memory ofOliverWendellHolmes,whohimself at one timeor anoth-
er tookbothsideson mostfreespeechissues- I wouldtaketheop-
portunity to explainmyself.
My purposeis notto makea case fortheconstitutional acceptabili-
ty hatespeechlaws in theUnitedStates. I thinkthatis nowmore
of
or lessan impossibility(thoughnot,as I shallargue,forgoodreasons).
I will referto the Americandebate occasionally, mostlysuggesting
waysin whichit mightbe enrichedby morethoughtful consideration
of alternativepositions.Mostly,whatI wantto do is offera charac-
terizationof the laws we findin Europeand in the otheradvanced
democracies oftheworld,and also as we havefoundthemin America
fromtimeto time.It is important to remember thatoppositionto hate
speechregulation in thiscountry by no meansunanimous.Apart
is
2 This is the language used in section 266b(i) of the Danish Penal Code. See THE PRIN-
CIPAL DANISH CRIMINAL ACTS 64 (Malene Frese Jensen,Vagn Greve,GitteHoyer,& Martin
Spencereds., DJOF Publ'g 3d ed. 2006).
3 Waldron,supra note 1.
4 Id. (emphasisadded) (footnoteomitted).
5 Email fromMike Hardestyto author(July2, 2008, 14:51 EST) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
2010] DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION 1 5 99
fromthelegalacademy,whichis dividedon thematter, thereis divi-

sionamongour lawmakers.Therewerestateand municipallaws to
be struckdowninR.A.V.v. CityofSt. Paul,6in Virginia v. Black,7and
in Collinv. Smith,8and therewas a statelaw to be upheldin Beau-
harnaisv. Illinois.9Noteveryone in Americais happywiththeconsti-
tutionaluntouchability of race leafletsin Chicago,Nazi bannersin
Skokie,and burning crossesin Minnesota.Therehas beenan honora-
ble impulseamongsomelawmakers in Americato deal withthisprob-
lem, and what we have always needed - beforerushingto constitu-
tionaloutrage on behalf of the FirstAmendment - is to understand
thatimpulse. Outside the United States,we know thatlegislation of
thiskindis common and widelyaccepted(though it is certainly not
uncontroversial). For us, thatgivesriseto a questionaboutwhatthe
Europeanor Canadian or New Zealand legislatorsthinktheyare
doingwiththeselaws. Whyhavemostliberaldemocracies undertaken
to prohibit thesemanifestations ofhatred,thesevisibledefamations of
socialgroups?How do theyunderstand thislegislation, how do they
defendit,and howdo theypositionit in relationto concerns - which
-
theyalso profess aboutfreedom ofexpression?
In PartIII, I willfocuson one verypowerful Americanargument
againstlegislation ofthiskind:an argument madebyProfessor Ronald
Dworkinand othersabouttheeffectthatrestrictions on freeexpres-
sionmayhaveon thelegitimacy ofotherlaws thatwe wantto be in a
positionto enforce.10 I thinkthatcritiquecan be answered,though
notwithoutdifficulty. In PartsI and II, however, myargument will
be less defensive.In PartII, I willconsiderwhatpeopleoughtto be
able to draw fromthe visibleenvironment of theirsocietyso faras
dignity,security,and assurance are concerned, as theylead theirlives
and go abouttheirbusiness.I shallarguethathatespeechregulation
can be understood as theprotection ofa certainsortofpreciouspublic
good: a visibleassurance offered by societyto all of itsmembers that
they will not be subject to abuse, defamation, humiliation, discrimina-
tion,and violenceon groundsofrace,ethnicity, religion, gender, and in
somecasessexualorientation. I willnottryto makethecase thathate
speechlawsactuallyreducediscrimination, violence,and so on,orthat
they make it more likely that hatemongers will giveup theirbigotry
and becomegood,tolerant citizens.I hopethatwillhappen,and hate
speechlaws mayworkas partofa broadercampaignforequalityand
6 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

7 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
» 578 F.2d 1197 (7thCir. 1978).
9 343 U.S. 250(1952).
10 Ronald Dworkin,Forewordto EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, at v, vm-ix (Ivan
Hare & JamesWeinsteineds., 2009).
l600 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
toleration.But I am goingto arguethatthemostimportant aim of

theselawsis moreimmediate.The aimis simplyto diminish thepres-
enceofvisiblehatredin societyand thusbenefit members ofvulnera-
ble minorities the
by protecting public commitment to their equal
standing in societyagainstpublicdenigration. In PartI oftheArticle,
I will sketchsomebackground forthisaim,arguingthatit helpsto
viewhatespeechlaws as protecting vulnerableminoritiesagainstthe
evilofgroupdefamation.These dayswe tendto thinkofdefamation
as a tort.But I willarguein PartI thathistorically thelaw ofcrimi-
nal libelhas beenusedto supportand expressa collective commitment
on thepartof societyto upholdthefundamentals of people'sreputa-
tionsas members ofsocietyin goodstanding - vindicating,as I shall
say, the rudiments of theircivic dignityas a necessaryingredient of
public order.
I. Why Call Hate Speech "Group Libel"?

Whatwe call a thingtellsus something aboutourattitude towards
it,howwe see it as a problem, whatourresponseto it mightbe,what
difficulties
our responseto it mightbringto light. So it is withthe
phenomenon thatwe call in America"hatespeech,"whichcan cover
thingsas diverseas cross-burnings, racialepithets,insultsto religion,
bestialand otheroffensive depictionsof vulnerableminorities in leaf-
lets,posters,or on theinternet, broad-brush of
ascriptions criminality
or dangerousness, callsto uniteagainstthemembers ofa hatedgroup,
and neo-Nazismarching in Americansuburbswithswastikasand pla-
cardssaying"Hitlershouldhavefinished thejob."
A. TheConnotations of"HateSpeech"
Whenwe call thesephenomena "hatespeech,"we bringto thefore
a numberofconnotations thatare notentirely neutral.If we say we
are interested in restrictions
on hatespeech,we conveytheidea that
thelaw is proposing to interferewiththespokenword,withconversa-
tion,and perhapswithvocabulary, withour use of racial or ethnic
slursor epithets- stammered out, as JusticeJacksononce put it,
"whenthespiritsare highand theflagonsare low."11Speech,in the
senseofthespokenword,can certainly be wounding.12 But I believe
thatthe expressions of hatredthatshouldconcernus includemost
prominently thosethatare printed, published, pastedup, or posted,or
in someotherformbecomepartof thevisibleenvironment in which
ourliveshaveto be lived. No doubta speechcan resonatelongafter
11 Kunz v. New York,340 U.S. 290, 299 (1951) (Jackson,J.,dissenting).

12 See, e.g.,Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: RegulatingRacist Speech on
Campus,1990 Duke L.J. 431, 455.
2010] DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION l6oi
the spokenwordhas died away,but to mymindit is the enduring

presence ofthepublished wordthatis particularly damaging.
The kindof speechwe say we are interested in regulating is hate
speech, and that word "hate" can be distractingtoo. It suggestswe are
interestedin lookingat and regulating thepassionsand emotions that
lie behinda particular speech act.13 The word "hate" emphasizesthe
subjective attitudes of the personexpressing the views or publishing
themessagein question.It soundsas thoughit locatestheproblemas
an attitudinal one and focuseson whatmotivates thespeechin ques-
tion.14(It is likethephrase"hatecrimes"in thisrespect,and people
maybe excusedforthinking thatthecontroversy overhatecrimes-
overtheuse ofmentalelements likemotivation as an aggravating fac-
torin criminal law - is directly relevant to thecontroversy overracial
expression.)15 The word"hate"suggests- I thinkmisleadingly -
thatthetaskoflegislation thatrestricts hatespeechis to tryto change
people'sattitudes orcontrol theirthoughts.
The restrictionson hatespeechthatinterest me are notrestrictions
on thinking; they are restrictions on more tangibleformsofcommuni-
cation. The issueis publication and theharmdoneto individuals and
the
groupsthrough disfiguring of our social environment by visible,
public,and semi-permanent announcements to the effectthatin the
opinionofone groupin thecommunity, members ofanothergroupare
notworthy ofequal citizenship.
B. TheTerminology of"GroupLibel"and "GroupDefamation"
In manycountries, a different termor setoftermsis used byjur-
ists:"grouplibel"or "groupdefamation."Sometimes thisis how the
legislationdescribes itself;it is the terminology used, forexample,in
section130 of Germany's Penal Code, prohibiting "attackson human
dignityby insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming part of the
13 It can also bogus downin a futileattempt to define"hate."Hatredis notan easyidea to

define;RobertPosthas a valiantstabat defining "hate"in Hate Speech,in EXTREMESPEECH
ANDDEMOCRACY, supranote10,at 123,becausehe thinksthecrucialissuesare determining
when"otherwise appropriate emotions becomeso 'extreme' as todeservelegalsuppression," id. at
123,and"distinguishing] hatredfrom ordinary dislikeordisagreement," id. at 125.
14 Actually, if"hatred"is relevantat all,itis relevant (inmanyofthestatutory formulations)as
thepurposeoftheoffending speech,notas itsmotivation. The International Covenanton Civil
andPoliticalRights, adoptedDec. 16,1966,999U.N.T.S.171,requires signatory statestoprohibit
"advocacyofnational, racialor religioushatred," id. at art.20(2),whiletheBritishPublicOrder
Act,1986,c. 64,§ 18(1),statesthat"[a]personwhousesthreatening, abusiveorinsulting wordsor
behaviour, ordisplaysanywritten material whichis threatening, abusiveor insulting, is guiltyof
an offence if... (a) he intendsthereby to stirup racialhatred, or(b) havingregardto all thecir-
cumstances racialhatredis likelytobe stirred up thereby."
15 See, e.g.,HeidiM. Hurd& MichaelS. Moore,Punishing Hatredand Prejudice,56 STAN.
L. Rev. i 08i (2004).
l602 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
population."16 In othercountries,"grouplibel"and "groupdefama-

tion"aretermsusedinjudicialdoctrine and amonglawyersto describe
ofthekindwe wouldcall hatespeechrestrictions.
restrictions
The term"grouplibel" also used to be commonin the United
States,and it was alludedto bytheSupremeCourtin characterizing a
statelaw thatwas upheldin 1952in Beauharnaisv. Illinois.17"Justa
littlemorethana decadeago,"wroteHarryKalvenin 1964,"we were
all concerned withdevisinglegalcontrols forthelibelingofgroups."18
Five yearsbeforeBeauharnais,some scholarsat Columbiatriedto
debateby publishing
crystallize a modelgrouplibelstatutein theCo-
lumbiaLaw Review.19It is worthremembering, too,that- as its
namesuggests - theJewishAnti-Defamation Leaguetookas itsorig-
inal mission"to stop,by appeals to reasonand conscience,and if
necessarybyappealsto law,thedefamation oftheJewishpeople."20
C. Civil VersusCriminalLibel
JamesWeinstein saysthattheidea ofgrouplibelis constructed by
analogy with the tort ofdefamation; but,as he notes,thisanalogyis an
oversimplification.21 Libel maybe bestknowntodayas a tort,butin
thepastit has oftenbeenunderstood also as a criminal offense.Crim-
inal libellaws camein variousflavors.I supposethebestknownare
thelaws againstseditiouslibel- ofwhich,forus,themostnotorious
exampleis theSeditionAct,passedby Congressin 1798,makingit a
criminaloffense to publish"false,scandalous,and maliciouswriting"
the
bringing president or Congressintodisrepute or "to exciteagainst
them... thehatredof thegood peopleof theUnitedStates."22This
spectacularly ill-considered pieceoflegislation has givencriminallibel
a bad namein theUnitedStateseversince.
Or considerblasphemous libel. WilliamBlackstoneobservedthat
"blasphemy the
against Almighty, . . . denying hisbeingor providence;
or ... contumelious reproaches of our saviour Christ... [is an offense]
punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment, or otherinfam-
ous corporalpunishment: forChristianity is partof thelaws of Eng-
16 Strafgesetzbuch
[StGB][PenalCode]§ 130,' 1,sentence2. In France,article29 oftheLaw
ontheFreedom ofthePressof29July1881alsoprohibits groupdefamation.
17 343 U.S. 250,253-54(I952); see also JosephTanenhaus,
GroupLibel,35 CORNELLL.Q.
261(1950)(fora general
discussion
ofthisconcept).
18 Harry Kalven, Jr.,The Negro and the First Amendment 7 (1965).
19 Note,StatutoryProhibitionofGroupDefamation,47 COLUM. L. REV. 595 (1947).
20 Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-
discrimination 326 (SandraColivered., 1992)(emphasisadded)(internal
quotationmark
omitted).
21 James Weinstein,ExtremeSpeech, Public Order and Democracy,in EXTREME SPEECH
and Democracy, supranote10,at 23,58-59.
22 AlienandSedition
Actsof1798,ch.74,§ 2, 1 Stat.596(expired1801).
2010] DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION 1603
land."23Blasphemouslibelwas heldto be a commonlaw offense in

theUnitedKingdomas late as 1977,whena privateprosecution was
broughtsuccessfully by Mary Whitehouseagainstthe publishersof
Gay News fora poemthatdescribednecrophiliac actsperformed upon
thebodyofJesusafterhiscrucifixion.24 In 1823,a manwas jailed for
threemonthsin Massachusetts forpublishing an essayin theBoston
Investigatorthat denied the existenceof God, affirmedthefinalityof
death, and declared that "the whole storyconcerning[JesusChrist]is
as mucha fableand a fiction as thatofthegod Prometheus."25 There
was also obscenelibel- an offense thatcoveredthe publicationof
virtuallyanyobscenematter.EdmondCurlwas foundguiltyin Eng-
land in 1727in respectof a book called Venusin theCloister,about
lesbianlovein a convent.26
Noticethat,in thesesensesof libel,we are notreallydealingwith
offensesthathave a wholelot to do withdefaming people. Some of
theprosecutions undertheSeditionActinvolved defamation of those
in power.27But othersinvolvedgeneralsubversion ofgovernment. In
UnitedStatesv. Crandell,28 an indictment was laid againstReuben
Crandellfor"publishing libelstendingto exciteseditionamongthe
slaves."29Oftenthetermjust goesback to theneutralmeaningofthe
Latinlibellus,a "littlebook." For muchofitshistory "libel"couldbe
usedto referto anypublishedpamphlet, withoutconveying anyjudg-
mentaboutitscontent.30
Whenwe do focuson defamation, whatis consistentlyemphasized
betweencalumniesthatare putaboutin spokenform,
is thedistinction
as speech,through gossip,rumor, or oraldenunciation,and thosethat
have themoreenduring presenceof something published"bywriting,
23 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *S9-

24 See CorinnaAdam, ProtectingOur Lord, New STATESMAN,July15, 1977,at 74, available
at http://www.newstatesman.com/200602130044. Gay News was fined1000 pounds and its pub-
lisherwas givena nine-monthsuspendedprisonsentence. When a challengewas broughtunder
the European Conventionon Human Rights,the European Commissionof Human Rightsfound
that prohibitionson blasphemouslibel could constitutea reasonable restriction on freespeech.
See Gay News Ltd. v. UnitedKingdom,5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 (1982).
25 Commonwealthv. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, 207 (Mass. 1838). The Blackstonepositionon
blasphemouslibel was also adopted explicitlyby a judge in Pennsylvaniain 1824: "Christianity,"
he said, "generalChristianity, is, and always has been, a part of the commonlaw of Pennsylva-
nia." Updegraphv. Commonwealth,11 Serg.& Rawle. 394, 400 (Pa. 1824).
26 R. v. Curl, (1727) 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B.). See also Colin Manchester,A Historyof the
CrimeofObsceneLibel, 12 J.LEGAL HIST. 36, 38-40 (1991).
27 See UnitedStates v. Haswell, 26 F. Cas. 218 (C.C.D. Vt. 1800) (No. 15,324);Lyon's Case, 15
F. Cas. 1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8646). I discussedthesecases in Waldron,supra note 1.
2» 25 F. Cas. 684 (C.C.D.C. 1836) (No. 14,885).
29 Id. at 685.
30 See The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 880 (2d ed. 1991) (listingthe first
definition of"libel"as "[a] littlebook; a shorttreatiseor writing").
l6O4 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.123:1596
printing, picture,or otherfixedrepresentation

effigy, to the eye."31
"Whatgivesthestingto thewriting," said a New Yorkcourtin 1931,
"is itspermanence ofform.The spokenworddissolves,butthewrit-
tenone abidesand ' perpetuates thescandal.'"32I believethisdistinc-
tionis helpful forourinquiry.Muchofwhatwe call hatespeechregu-
lationis notdirectedat theimmediate flare-upof insultand offense.
The conceptof"grouplibel"addressesthepossibility of racialor reli-
gious defamation becoming established as a visiblefeatureoftheenvi-
ronment - partofwhatyoucan see in realspace(orvirtualspace)as
youlookaroundyou.33
Untilrecently, manycountries had laws of criminallibeltouching
ordinary individuals. The New Zealand CrimesActusedto specify a
year'simprisonment as the for
penalty any "matter published,without
lawfuljustification orexcuse. . . designedto insultanypersonor likely
to injurehis reputation by exposinghimto hatred,contempt, or ridi-
cule. . . ."34 Now why,youmayask,wouldthecriminallaw concern
itselfwithdefamation at all,whentherewas no publicissueofsedition
orobscenity orblasphemy?Whynotleaveitto privatelaw?
One possibility is thatcertainformsofdefamation mightbe seenas
an attackon publicorder.It was a matter ofkeepingthepeace,avoid-
ingbrawlsand so on,in thecontext ofegregious libelflowing overinto
fighting words. But public order is a complicated idea,and preventing
fighting or violencefrombreakingout - thatverynarrowsenseof
keepingthepeace- is onlyone ofitsdimensions.Publicordermight
also comprise society'sinterest in maintaining amongus a propersense
of one another'ssocialor legalstatus. In an aristocratic society,this
meantsecuring thedignity of greatmenor highofficials withlaws of
31 Philip Wittenberg, Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of Libel 7

(1947)
(quotinga Californiastatutethat,in its currentversion,defineslibel as somethingpublished"by
writing,printing,picture,effigy, or otherfixedrepresentation to the eye,"CAL. ClV. CODE § 45
(West2007)). The phraseseemsto come originallyfromOdgers on Libel. See Staub v. Van Ben-
thuysen,36 La. Ann. 467, 468-69 (La. 1884) ("A libel is any publicationwhetherin writing,print-
ing, picture,effigy, or otherfixedrepresentation to the eye which exposes any personto hatred,
contempt,ridicule,or obloquy,or which causes him to be shunnedor avoided, or which has a
tendencyto injurehim in his occupation.")(citingODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 7, 20 (ist ed.
1881)).
32 Ostrowev. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1931) (quotingHarman v. Delany,(1729) 94 Eng.
Rep. 743 (K.B.) ("Wordspublishedin writingare actionable,whichwould not be so froma bare
speakingof the same words,because a libel dispersesand perpetuatesthescandal.")).
33 In the case of/?,v. Curl,(1727) 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B.), thiswas crucialto an understand-
ing of whythisobscenitywas a matterforthe temporalcourtsratherthan fora spiritualtribunal
set up by a bishop. "The SpiritualCourts punishonlypersonalspiritualdefamationby words;if
it is reducedto writing,it is a temporaloffence.. . . This is surelyworsethanSir CharlesSedley's
case, who onlyexposed himselfto the people thenpresent,who mightchoose whethertheywould
look upon himor not;whereasthisbook goes all over the kingdom."Id. at 850-51.
34 Crimes Act 1961, 1961 S.N.Z. No. 43, §211 (N.Z.), repealed by Defamation Act 1992,
§ 56(2), 1992 S.N.Z. No. 105 (emphasisadded).
scandalummagnatum^to protectnoblesand greatmenfromoutra-

geousimputations on theirbreeding, theirstatus,theirhonor,or their
office.The UnitedStatesabolishedtitlesofnobility in 1787,butit did
notnecessarily abolishthatsortofconcernforstatus.36A democratic
republicmightequallybe concernedwithupholdingand vindicating
important aspectsof legal and social status- onlynow it wouldbe
theelementary dignity ofevenitsnon-officials as citizens- and with
protecting thatstatus (as a matterof publicorder)frombeingunder-
minedby variousformsof obloquy. And thatis whatI thinkis the
concernoflaws regarding groupdefamation.Theyare setup to vin-
dicatepublicorder, notjustbypre-empting violence,butbyupholding
against attacka shared,public sense of the basicelements ofeach per-
and
son's status,dignity, reputation as a citizenor member of society
-
in good standing particularly againstattackspredicatedupon the
ofsomeparticular
characteristics socialgroup.
D. Can a GroupBe Libeled?:Beauharnaisv. Illinois
EarlierI mentioned that the characterization of hate speechas
group libel is not unknown in the United States. In 1952,whatwe
wouldcall a hate speechlaw (datingfrom1917) was describedand
upheldby theSupremeCourtas a law of criminallibel.37The peti-
tionerwas one JosephBeauharnais,President, Founder,and Director
of theWhiteCircleLeague ofAmerica,who had distributed a leaflet
on Chicagostreetcorners to
urgingpeople protect thewhite racefrom
being"mongrelized" and terrorizedby the "rapes,robberies, knives,
gunsand marijuanaof thenegro."38The leaflethad as its headline:
"Preserveand ProtectWhiteNeighborhoods! FromtheConstantand
ContinuousInvasion, Harassment and Encroachment by the Ne-
groes."39It said: "WE ARE NOT AGAINST THE NEGRO! WE
ARE FOR THE WHITE PEOPLE! We must awaken and protect
our whitefamiliesand neighborhoods beforeit is too late."40But,it
stated,"The whitepeopleof ChicagoMUST take advantageof this
opportunity to becomeUNITED. If persuasionand theneedto pre-
ventthewhiteracefrombecomingmongrelized by thenegrowillnot
35 For a discussionof scandalum magnatum,see JohnC. Lassiter,Defamationof Peers: The

Rise and Decline of the Actionfor Scandalum Magnatum,14Q7-1773,22 Am. J. LEGAL HIST.
216 (1978); and Edward Veitch,Scandalum MagnatumIs Aliveand Wellin Canada?, 11 NAT'L J.
Const. L. 169(1999).
-50bee JeremyWaldron,Dignity ana Kann, 4» £AJR.j. sociology 201 ^2007;; james '¿.
Whitman,"Human Dignity" in Europe and the United States: The Social Foundations, in
European and U.S. Constitutionalism 108 (GeorgNolte ed., 2005).
37 Beauharnaisv. Illinois,343 U.S. 250, 253-57 (1952).
38 Id. at 252.
39 Id. at 276 (appendixto opinionof Black, T.,dissenting).
40 Id.
l6o6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
uniteus, thentheaggressions[,] . . . rapes,robberies,knives,gunsand

marijuana of the negro, SURELY WILL."41 The leafletprovideda
tear-offapplication form,which, if submitted witha dollar,woulden-
able the senderto becomea memberof the WhiteCircleLeague of
America(providedhe promisedto tryand secureothermembersas
well).42
On March6, 1950,Beauharnaiswas chargedunderan Illinoisstat-
ute prohibiting thepublication or exhibition of anywriting or picture
the
portraying "depravity, criminality, or
unchastity, lack ofvirtue ofa
class of citizens,of any race,color,creedor religion."43 He was con-
victedbya juryand fineda sumof$2oo.44His conviction was upheld
on appeal in Illinoisand upheldtoo by a 5-4 majority oftheU.S. Su-
premeCourt.
JusticeFrankfurter, writing fortheU.S. SupremeCourt,accepted
theSupremeCourtofIllinois's description ofthestatuteas "a formof
criminallibel law."45 Frankfurter thoughtcharacterizing Beauhar-
nais's leafletas criminallibel placed it beyondthe protection of the
FirstAmendment: "[l]ibelousutterances," he wrote,are not"withinthe
area of constitutionally protected speech."46But he did not restthe
decisionon a purelyformalcharacterization. He notedthat,as a mat-
terofpublicorder,thestatemighthavea reasonablegroundforbeing
concerned aboutthistypeoflibel:
Illinoisdid not have to look beyondher own bordersor await the tragic
experienceof the last threedecades to concludethatwilfulpurveyorsof
falsehoodconcerning racial and religiousgroupspromotestrifeand tend
powerfully to obstructthemanifoldadjustments requiredforfree,ordered
lifein a metropolitan,
polyglotcommunity.47
That putit mildly.JusticeDouglas,evenin dissent,
notedthatthe
Nazis werean exampleof"howevila conspiracy couldbe whichwas
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 250(majority
opinion)
(internal markomitted).
quotation
44 Id. at 251.
45 Id. at 253(quoting
Peoplev. Beauharnais, 97 N.E.2d343,346(111.
1951))(internal
quotation
markomitted).
46 Id. at 266.
47 Id. at 258-59(footnote
omitted).Professor NadineStrossencautionsthatbeforewe gettoo
enthusiasticabouttheordinanceupheldinBeauharnais, we shouldremember thatpriortoitsuse
againstthiswhitesupremacist group,it "was 'a weaponforharassment of theJehovah'sWit-
nesses,'whowerethen'a minority . . . verymuchmorein needofprotection thanmost.'" Na-
dine Strossen,RegulatingRacist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE LJ. 484,
520(quoting Joseph Tanenhaus, GroupLibel,35 CORNELLL.Q. 261,279-80(1950))(alteration
in
original).In fact,theJehovah'sWitnesses
wereprosecuted forwhata federal
courtdescribed as
"bitter
and virulent attacksupontheRomanCatholicChurch"and "accusations whichin sub-
stanceand effect werechargesoftreasonable Bevinsv. Prindable,
disloyalty." 39 F. Supp.708,
710(E.D. 111.1941).
aimedat destroyinga race by exposingit to contempt,derision,and

obloquy."48JusticeDouglas also wrotethat he "would be willingto
concedethatsuchconductdirectedat a race or groupin thiscountry
couldbe made an indictableoffense."49Like two of the otherthree
he
dissenters, had no problem with the idea that grouplibel laws
enactedto protectthe publicpeace were compatiblewiththe First
Amendment.50 OnlyJustice BlackdisputedFrankfurter's premiseout-
and
right, forhimthe problem was the"group"aspect grouplibel:
of
[A]s "constitutionallyrecognizedf,]" [criminallibel] has provided for
punishment of false,malicious,scurrilouschargesagainstindividuals,not
againsthuge groups. This limitedscope of the law of criminallibel is of
no smallimportance.It has confinedstatepunishment of speechand ex-
pressionto thenarrowest of areas involvingnothingmorethanpurelypri-
vate feuds.51
I thinkthiswas a mistake. And I would like to considerJustice
Black's objectionin detail,beforeaddressing a different criticismthat
could be made after1964- namely,thatthe decisionin New York
TimesCo. v. Sullivan52 has removedthewholecategory of libelfrom
thelistofexceptions to FirstAmendment protection.53
In myview,JusticeBlack's claimthatcriminallibelprovidesonly
forthe"punishment of false,malicious,scurrilous chargesagainstin-
dividuals,"54not for the punishment of similar chargesagainstlarge
groups,is misleading fora numberof reasons.To beginwith,it neg-
lects an important difference betweenthe concernforpersonalized
reputationin civil cases and a broadersocial concernforthefunda-
mentalsofanyone'sreputation or civicdignity as a memberofsociety
in good standing. Unlikecivil libel,criminallibel has traditionally
been concernednotwiththeintricate detailof each person'sreputa-
tionand its movement up or down the scale of socialestimation, but
withits foundation.Indeed,it has sometimes been arguedthatthe
civillaw oflibeland thecriminallaw oflibelworktogether, to cover
thefieldas itwere. In thecase ofa civilactionforlibel,theremustbe
a defaming of a particular person,or of a groupso confined thatthe
48 Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

49 Id.
50 JusticeReed in his dissentassumed "the constitutional power of a state to pass group libel
laws to protectthepublic peace." Id. at 283 (Reed, J.,dissenting).His objectionwas based on the
vaguenessof the termsof the ordinance. Id. JusticeJacksonnotedthat"[m]orethan fortyState
Constitutions,while extendingbroad protectionsto speech and press,reservea responsibility for
theirabuse and implicitlyor explicitlyrecognizevalidityof criminallibel laws." Id. at 292 (Jack-
son,J.,dissenting).
51 Id. at 271-72 (Black, J.,dissenting).
52 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53 See infrasectionI.G, p. 1614-15.
54 Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 272 (Black, J.,dissenting).
l6o8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.123:1596
allegationdescendsto particulars.But- so theargument goes- this

does not mean that the law is unconcerned withdefamation on a
broaderfront, only that the problemnow becomes theconcern of the
criminallaw.
Certainlythatis what one would concludefroma publicorder
perspective.55Considertheeighteenth- centuryEnglishcase,R. v. Os-
borne.56Osbornewas chargedwithpublishing a pamphletentitled"A
trueand surprizing Relationof a Murderand Crueltythatwas com-
mittedby theJewslatelyarrivedfromPortugal;shewinghow they
burnta Womanand a newbornInfantthelatterEnd ofFebruary, be-
causetheInfantwas begotten by a Christian."57
There was an objec-
tionat thetrialthat"theChargewas so generalthatno particular Per-
sonscouldpretend to be injuredbyit."58But thecourtresponded:
This is not by way of Information fora Libel thatis the Foundationof
thisComplaint,but fora Breach of the Peace, in incitinga Mob to the
Distructionof a wholeSet of People;and tho' it is too generalto make it
fall withinthe Descriptionof a Libel, yet it will be perniciousto suffer
suchscandalousReflections to go unpunished.59
Otherreports ofthesamecase say thatit was decidedas a matter
of criminallibel,but agreedthatthepublicorderdimension was key
to thatcharacterization.60We findthe same approachtakenin an
Americancase from1868. Palmerv. CityofConcord61 concernedac-
cusationsof cowardicemade againsta companyof soldierswho had
beenengagedin theCivil War. The SupremeJudicialCourtof New
Hampshire saidthis:
As thesechargesweremade againsta bodyof men,withoutspecifying in-
dividuals,it may be that no individualsoldiercould have maintaineda
privateactiontherefor.But the questionwhetherthe publicationmight
not afford ground for a public prosecution is entirely differ-
ent.. . . Indictmentsforlibelare sustainedprincipallybecausethepublica-
tionof a libel tendsto a breachof thepeace, and thusto thedisturbance
of societyat large. It is obviousthata libellousattackon a bodyof men,
thoughno individualsbe pointedout, may tend as much,or more,to
createpublicdisturbances as an attackon one individual.62
55 See Tanenhaus,supra note 17, at 266 ("Since criminallibel is indictableat commonlaw be-
cause it tendsso to inflamemen as to resultin a breachof the peace, thereis no rationalbasis for
the exclusionofgroupdefamersfromliabilityto prosecutionin commonlaw jurisdictions.").
56 (1732) 25 Eng. Rep. 584.
57 Id. at 584-85.
S» Id. sit585.
59 id.
60 For an acceptanceof thiscase as grouplibel,see Anonymous,(1732) 94 Eng. Rep. 406 (K.B.)
and R. v Osborn,(1732) 94 Eng. Rep. 425 (K.B.). For an ambiguousaccountof thesame case, see
In re BedfordCharity,(1819) 36 Eng. Rep. 696, 717.
61 48 N.H. 211(1868).
62 Id. at 215 (emphasisadded).
That seemsto me a viable,or at leastarguable,position.But Justice

Black'sdissentin Beauharnaistakesthepointin exactlythewrongdi-
rectionwithits perverseimplication thatthe verylargenumberof
people defamed in the White Circle League's leafletmeantthatthe
leafletcouldnotbe subjectto anysortof regulation at all, becauseit
enjoyed constitutional in
protection waya that the defamation of a
singleperson would not.
E. WaysofAssaulting GroupReputation
How does one libela group?Whataspectsofgroupreputation are
we trying to protectwithlaws againstracialor religiousdefamation?
The firstthingto noteis thatitis notthegroupas suchthatwe areul-
timately concerned about- as one mightbe concerned abouta com-
munity, a nation,or a culture(as distinctfrom itsmembers). The con-
cernin theend is individualistic. But,as I have alreadysaid,group
defamation laws do notconcernthemselves withparticularized indi-
vidualreputation.Theylook insteadto thebasicsof socialstanding
and to theassociationthatis madein thehatespeech,in thelibel,
in the defamatory pamphletor poster- betweenthe denigration of
thatbasicstandingand somecharacteristic associatedmoreor less as-
criptively withthegroupor class. I do notmeanthatgroupmember-
ship is in and of itselfa liability.But groupdefamation setsout to
makeit a liability by denigrating group-defining characteristicsor as-
sociating them with bigoted factual claims that are fundamentally
defamatory.A prohibition on groupdefamation, then,is a way of
blocking thatenterprise.
So, let me countthewaysin whicha groupmightbe libeled. In
the firstinstance,the associationof defamation with an ascriptive
group characteristic might take the form of a factual claim. That
was important in the Beauharnais pamphlet, with its imputation
that"rapes,robberies, knives,guns and marijuana"were somehow
typicalof"thenegro."63 Andit is likelyto be important, too,in broad-
brushdescriptions of Arab-Americans and Muslims as supporters of
terrorism.
Secondly,grouplibel ofteninvolvescharacterizations thatdelib-
eratelyset out to denigrate - that
people characterizations probably
fallon theopinionratherthanfact side of thedistinction sometimes
made in Americandefamationlaw. A common examplein racist
speechis thecharacterization of minority members as animals. I re-
memberseeinga racistagitator sentenced to a short prisontermin
Englandin thelate 1970sforfestooning the streetsofLeamington Spa
63 Beauharnais v. Illinois,343 U.S. 250, 276 (1952) (appendix to opinionof Black, J.,dissent-
ing);see suprapp. 1605-06.
l6lO HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
withpostersdepicting BritonsofAfricanancestry as apes.64Afterhis

conviction the
by jury, he was sentenced a
by crusty old Englishjudge,
who (one mighthave imagined)would have littlesympathy forthis
hate
newfangled speechlegislation. But the judge gave the defendant
a sternlectureto theeffectthatwe cannotruna multiracial society
undermodernconditions ifpeoplearefreeto denigrate theirfellowcit-
izensin bestialterms. Therewas someshoutingfromthe galleryas
thedefendant was takenaway. The case madea deep impression on
me.
Thirdly,thereare libelsthatgo even beyondopinionbut which
denigrate by embodying noticesor instructions whichcan onlybe un-
derstoodas degradingthoseto whomtheyare addressed.Thus,for
example,a groupand itsmembers can be libeledby signageassociat-
with
ing groupmembership prohibition or exclusion:"No blacksal-
lowed." In 1944,Ontario'sRacial Discrimination Act65prohibited the
or of
publication display "anynotice,sign ... or other representation
indicating ... an intention to discriminate againstany. . . classofper-
sons. . . becauseof the race or creedof such. . . class of persons."66
That was quiteapartfromtheprohibition on discrimination itself.I
was interested to learn that in the earlydays of the JewishAnti-
Defamation Leaguein theUnitedStates,oneoftheLeague'saimswas
to puta stopto thepoisoning ofthesocialenvironment by published
declarations of racial and religiousexclusion.Whenthe ADL cam-
paignedforlegislation preventing storesand hotelsfromrefusing to do
businesswithJews,it was notjust thediscrimination theywantedto
counter, it was the signage:"Christians only." What concernedthe
ADL was thedangerthatanti-Semitic signagewouldbecomean estab-
lishedfeatureofthelandscapeand thatJewswouldhaveto lead their
livesin a community whosepublicaspectwas permanently disfigured
in thisway.67
Singlyor together, thesereputational attacksamountto assaults
upon the dignityof the personsaffected - dignity, in the senseof
thesepersons'basicsocialstanding, ofthebasisoftheirrecognition as
socialequals,and oftheirstatusas bearersofhumanrights and consti-
tutionalentitlements. The moralimperative ofrespectforhumandig-
nityis increasingly understood as a crucialfoundation of basic rights
64 I discussed this incidentat the beginningof JeremyWaldron,Boutique Faith, LONDON

REV. BOOKS, July20, 2006, at 22, 22 (reviewingJOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE
Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition (2005)).
05 1944 S.O., eh. 51-1 (Ont).
66 Id.
67 See Evan P. Schultz,GroupRights,AmericanJews,and the Failure
of GroupLibel Laws,
1Q13-1Q52,66 Brook. L. Rev. 71, 95-96 (2000).
2010] DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION l6ll
and equality.68 The UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsbeginsits

preamble with the strongassertionthat"recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rightsof all members of the
humanfamilyis thefoundation of freedom, justice and in
peace the
world,"69 and theInternational Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
followsup on thatby statingthattherightsit protects "derivefrom
theinherent dignity ofthehumanperson."70 Legal and politicaltheo-
ristsarefinding thatdignity provides a usefuland compelling perspec-
tiveon thefoundations ofconstitutional and also on thefoun-
rights,71
dationsofidealssuchas democracy and theruleof law.72As wellas
thesebroadideals,dignity is also increasingly appealedto on particu-
lar issuesin legalcontroversy - on thedeathpenalty(whereitsuse is
well known),73 on antidiscrimination law,74on issuesrelatingto abor-
tion,75and - as we shallsee - in scholarlycontroversies on thismat-
terofhatespeech.76
Dignityis a complexidea, withphilosophical as well as political
In
and legalresonances. thesense I am the
using term,dignity is not
just a Kantianphilosophical conception oftheimmeasurable worth of
humansconsidered as moralagents.77It is a matterofstatus - one's
68 There is an excellentdiscussionand critiqueof the legal conceptof humandignityin Chris-

topherMcCrudden,Human Dignityand Judicial Interpretationof Human Rights, 19 EUR. J.
Int'lL. 655 (2008).
69 UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights,Preamble,G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., ist píen,mtg.,U.N. Doc. A/810(Dec. 10, 1948).
70 InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights,Preamble,adopted Dec. 16, 1966,999
U.N.T.S. 171.
71 See, for example, the fine discussionin Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United
States ConstitutionalLaw, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS: LlBER Amicorum Spi-
ROS SlMITIS 249 (DieterSimon & ManfredWeisseds., 2000).
72 I pursuedthe themeof the relationbetweendignityand the rule of law in my 2009 Tanner
Lectures at Berkeley. See JeremyWaldron,Dignity,Rank, and Rights,in 29 THE TANNER
Lectures on Human Values (Suzan Young ed., forthcoming2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=i46i22o; see also JeremyWaldron,The Conceptand theRule ofLaw, 43
GA. L. REV. 1, 28, 36 (2008).
73 See, e.g.,Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also HUGO ADAM BEDAU, KILLING
as Punishment Reflections on the Death Penalty in America i i 0-4 i (2004) (ar-
guingfora dignitarianinterpretation of the EighthAmendment).
74 See, e.g.,Denise G. Réaume,Discriminationand Dignity,63 LA. L. REV. 645 (2003).
75 See Planned Parenthoodof Se. Pa. v. Casey,505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992) (pluralityopinion);
see also Carol Sanger,Decisional Dignity:TeenageAbortion,Bypass Hearings,and the Misuse of
Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409 (2009); Reva B. Siegel,Dignityand thePolitics ofProtec-
tion:AbortionRestrictionsUnderCasey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008).
76 See generally,e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity (2008);
AlexanderTsesis, Dignityand Speech: The RegulationofHate Speech in a Democracy,44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 497 (2009). For an expressionof concernabout the use of "dignity"in thiscon-
nection,see Guy E. Carmi,Dignity- The Enemyfrom Within:A Theoreticaland Comparative
AnalysisofHuman Dignityas a Free SpeechJustification, 9 U. PA.J.CONST. L. 957 (2007).
77 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 42-43
(MaryGregor Univ.Press1998)(1785).
trans.& ed.,Cambridge
l6l2 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
statusas a memberof societyin goodstanding.It validatesthelegal

positionoftheordinary individualbothas an equal and (paradoxical-
ly) as the possessorof a veryhigh-ranking status.78And it generates
demandsforrecognition and treatment thataccordwiththatstatus.
Philosophically we maysaythatdignity is inherent in thehumanper-
son- and so it is. No law or socialpracticecan takeit away. But as
a socialand legalstatus,dignity has to be nourished and maintained
by society and the law, and thisas I argue in PartII - is a costly
and difficult businessand something in whichwe are all requiredto
playa part. At theveryleast,we are requiredin ourpublicdealings
notto act in a waythatundermines one another's dignity in thissocio-
legal sense- and that is the obligation that is beingenforced whenwe
enactand administer lawsagainstgrouplibel.
F. TheEmphasison DignityRatherthanOffense
This bringsme to an important distinction.Thereis a big differ-
encebetweenprotecting individualdignity fromdefamation (basedon
somedenigration of groupcharacteristics) and protecting peoplefrom
evenwhentheoffense
offense, goesto theheartofwhattheyregardas
theidentityoftheirgroup. The argument I wantto makeis notcon-
cernedwithoffense.It is concerned withwhathappensto thestand-
ingofpersonsand groupsin society, notwithanyelementoftheirdis-
tressunconnected withthat.
This distinctionis particularlyimportant forunderstanding laws
hate
prohibiting speechagainstreligious minorities.79Consider,for
example, worriesabout of
expressions Islamophobia. The groupofall
Muslimsin society, thegroupof all followers of Islam,is a groupof
peoplecommitted to theone God,to hisProphet, Mohammed, and to
theholywritings oftheKoran. On theaccountthatI am developing,
individualMuslimsare entitledto protection againstdefamation, in-
cludinggroup defamation as Muslims. A publishedallegation,for ex-
ample,thatall Muslimsare terrorists or are properlysuspectedofin-
volvement withterrorism wouldrightly fallfoulof well-draftedhate
speechlegislation.But that does notmean thatthe law should aim to
protectthefounders of the or
religion, the reputationof God as Mus-
limsunderstand Him,or thecreedalbeliefsofthegroup.80The civic
78 See Waldron,supra note36, at 215-19.

79 See, forexample,Public OrderAct, 1986,c. 64, Part 3A (Eng.), amendedby Racial and Re-
ligiousHatred Act, 2006, c. 1 (Eng.), which prohibitsthe publicationof threateningmaterialin-
tendedto stirup religioushatred. I discussthisprovisionfurther in Part III.
80 Earlier I mentionedthe 1977 prosecutionin England of Gay News forblasphemouslibel
againstJesus. See supra note 24 and accompanyingtext. It is no partof my argumentthathate
speech law should supportthissortof prosecution.That examplewas offeredsimplyto illustrate
thediversityof historicuses of"libel"in thelaw.
dignity ofthemembers ofa groupstandsseparately fromthestatusof

theirbeliefs,howeveroffensive an attackupon the Prophetor even
upontheKoranmayseem.81The specificconcernaboutgrouplibel
doesnotencompass thesethings.
In general,a dignitarian rationaleforlaws againstgroupdefama-
tiondiffers froman approachbased on theoffense thatmaybe taken
by the members of a groupagainst some criticism or attack. If space
permitted, I would want to rehearse arguments I made a long time
ago, in relation to the work of John Stuart Mill and in relation to the
SalmanRushdieaffair{TheSatanic Verses)thatbeingdisturbed by a
shocking attack on one's views, even one's deepest and most cherished
religious convictions, is notsomething peoplehavean interest in being
protected against.82 For the purposes ofthe present Article, mejust
let
say this:it is an advantage of the "group libel"formulation thatit con-
veys this distinction. Libel and defamation generally are never orga-
nizedto protect peoplefrombeingoffended: theyare organized to pro-
tect the dignityand reputationof the personsthemselves, not to
impose an aura of untouchability around theirconvictions.
I do notdenythatthedistinction is a delicateone. And I do not
meanto conveyindifference to thesubjectiveor feltaspectofassaults
on dignity.Civic dignityis notjust decoration; it is sustainedand
upheldfora purpose.It is an important partofmyargument in Part
II thatthesocialupholding ofindividualdignity furnishes thebasisof
a generalassuranceofdecenttreatment and respectas peoplelivetheir
livesand go abouttheirbusinessin public. And an assaulton indi-
vidualdignity is boundto be experienced as wounding and distressing;
unlesswe understandthat distresswe do not understandwhat is
wrongwithgroupdefamation and whyit is appropriate to prohibit it
bylaw.
Not onlythat,butin anyone'sreactionto anyparticular incident of
hatespeech,thereare goingto be a wholelot offactorsall mixedup.
The phenomenology ofthissortofassaultis complexand tangled.83 It
is noteasyto differentiate theoffense fromtheinsult,or theimmediate
wounding ofan epithetfromtheperception ofa threat, or theoutrage
fromthehumiliation, or theangerfromtheshameofhavingto explain
81 I do notmeanto denyhowdistressing
an attackon (say)theKoranmightbe. The delib-
erateinfliction mightbe wrongand unlawful
ofthatdistress in othercontexts,
forexampleas a
wayofabusingdetaineesinthewaragainstterrorism.
See Jeremy Waldron,WhatCan Christian
63 THEOLOGY TODAY 330, 341 (2006).
TeachingAdd to theDebate AboutTorture?,
82 See JeremyWaldron,Mill and the Value of Moral Distress,35 POL. STUD. 410 (1987), re-
printedin JeremyWaldron, Liberal Rights 115(2003);Jeremy TooImportant
Waldron,
in Wal-
forTact,Times Literary Supplement, Mar. 10-16,1989,at 248,260,reprinted
dron, LIBERALRIGHTS,supra,at 134(discussingtheSalmanRushdieTheSatanicVersesaf-
fairina chapter
entitled
RushdieandReligion).
83 See Waldron, Liberal Rights, supranote82,at 115-16.
to one's childrenwhatis goingon. The reactionsare all mixedup,

and it will oftenseemthatthelaw,in responding to one set of phe-
nomena, is also responding to others.I think thisis likelyto be trueof
hatespeechalso. Whena racialgroupis hatefully denigrated,there
willbe fear,hurt,vehement disapproval to the of
point outrage, humil-
iation,shame,anger,offense, and so on. Andit willbe hardto disen-
tangle;oftentherewillbe no pointin doingso.
But it is important in thiscontextto try.In Americandiscussions
of hate speech,it is oftenassumedthat hate speech laws are an
attemptto protectpeoplefromtheimmediate woundingeffect of vi-
ciousslursand epithets.I have no doubtthatthewoundingeffect of
slursand epithetsis considerable.Professor CharlesLawrencehas
donea tremendous amountto conveythetraumathatsuchwounding
words- assaultivehatespeech- mightcause,84and I can imagine
an honorablelegislativeattemptto protectpeoplefromthisand to
prohibittheinfliction ofthisharm. But thatprojectis different from
thedignity and reputation rationalethatI am considering here.
G. Beauharnaisand Libelin Lightof
New YorkTimesCo. v. Sullivan
I wantto return nowto Beauharnaisv. Illinois,wherewe leftit in
sectionI.D. It is remarkable thatin thehalfcentury sinceit was de-
cided, Beauharnais has never explicitlybeen overturned by the Su-
preme Court. In a few cases, lower courts have expresseddoubts
abouttheprecedent,85 and amongFirstAmendment scholarsthereis
considerabledoubtwhetherthe SupremeCourtwouldnowadaysac-
cepttheidea of grouplibelas an exception to FirstAmendment pro-
tection.Manyjurists- betterinformed thanI am in thewaysofthe
Justices- saytheyprobably wouldnot.86
Someattribute faultyreasoning to theJustices in makingthispre-
diction.(Thatofcoursedoesnotmeantheprediction is falseas a pre-
diction.)Anthony Lewis says that the basis of Beauharnaiswas un-
dermined bythe1964SupremeCourtdecisionin New YorkTimesCo.
v. Sullivan,87
wheretheCourtheldthatpublicfigures cannotrecover
84 See Lawrence,supra note 12,at 452-56.

85 See, e.g., Dworkinv. HustlerMagazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989); Collin v.
Smith,578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Handler,383 F. Supp. 1267, 1277-78
(D. Md. 1974); see also Garrisonv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent 83-86 (1996). But see Smithv. Collin,439
U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun,J.,dissentingfromdenial of certiorari)(providinginteresting and
not unfavorablecommentsabout theBeauharnais precedent).
80 ProfessorLaurence Tribe,forexample,has observedthat "subsequentcases seem to have
sapped Beauharnais of much of its force." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL Law 926 (2d ed. 1988).
87 376 U.S. 254(1964).
2OIO] DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION 1615
damagesforlibelunlesstheycan provethata falsestatement of fact

was made maliciously or recklessly.88The Courtarguedthatrobust
discussion ofpublicissues,to whichtheUnitedStateshas "a profound
nationalcommitment," is bound to include"vehement, caustic,and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attackson government publicoffi-
and
cials."89The idea was thatwhentheytake on publicresponsibilities,
stateand federalofficials have a dutyto developa thickskinand suf-
ficientfortitude to shrugoffpublicattacks. Lewis is rightthatthe
Court no longerregardslibel per se as an exceptionto the First
Amendment. But it is notat all clearwhythereasoning in New York
TimesCo. shouldprotect the defendantin the Beauharnais case. The
AfricanAmericanslibeled collectively in Beauharnais's "obnoxious
leaflet"90werenotpublicofficials whohad takenon theburdenofof-
fice.Theywereordinary citizenswhomayhavethought thattheyhad
a rightto be protected fromscattershot allegationsof themostsevere
criminalmisconduct - the"rapes,robberies, knives,gunsand mari-
juana ofthenegro."91
Still,as an empiricalmatter, thenaysayers are probablyright:Jo-
sephBeauharnais 's conviction wouldnotbe upheldtoday92Lewis's
fallaciousreasoning is common, and ifconstitutional
scholarsaretaken
in byit,thereis no reasonto supposethepresent Justices are immune.
But myargument in thisArticleis notaboutthedesirability ofusing
the grouplibelidea as a constitutional strategyin theUnitedStates,
butaboutwhatmightbe involvedas a matterofprinciple in thinking
thatgroupdefamation is a problem, and whatinsight maybe available
fromthischaracterization forthosewillingto taketheriskof appear-
ingthoughtful in these matters.
H. WhoNeedsProtection AgainstLibel?
In theNew YorkReviewof Books piece thatI mentioned at the
outset,I asked:Whatis it thatwe believenowthatwe did notbelieve
in thedayswhenwe had laws againstblasphemous libeland seditious
libel? Andhowmuch(ifany)ofthatchangeofbeliefon thattopicin
laws protecting
to also disqualify
factcarriesthrough thereputationof
groups,lawsofthekindI havebeendiscussing in thisArticle?93
We knowthatprosecutions forattackson Christianity fadedaway
muchmorequicklythanprosecutions forpoliticalspeech.The logicof
88 See id. at 279-80;seealsoLEWIS,supranote1,at 159.

89 NewYorkTimesCo.,376U.S. at 270.
90 Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343U.S. 250,287(1952)(Jackson,
J.,dissenting).
91 Id. at 252(majority opinion).
92 See, e.g.,Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Con-
troversy 77-100(1994).
93 See supranote1 andaccompanying text.
l6l6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.123:1596
prosecutingatheistsalwayssat uncomfortably withtheAmerican posi-

tionon religion.Christianbeliefmightappearvulnerableto public
denunciations;it mightseemin needof thelaw's support;but it was
notclearthatthiswas supportthatthe law was constitutionally en-
titledto give. Oftenthe concernswerenot so muchfreespeechas
anti-establishment considerations.94SinceChristianitycouldno longer
be seenas partoftheorganizedapparatusofsocialcontrol, then,vul-
nerableor not,it wouldjust haveto fendforitselfin theunrulymar-
ketplaceofsacredand profane ideas.
So faras politicalspeechis concerned, thereis a differentstoryto
be told.95In 1798,federalauthority lookedprecarious; it was at the
mercyofpublicopinionand publicopinionwas lookingwell-nigh un-
governable. Public led
agitation to violence
political and briefupris-
ingsin someof thestates. GeorgeWashington was denouncedas a
thiefand a traitor;96JohnJaywas burnedin effigy;97 Alexander Ham-
iltonwas stonedin thestreets ofNew York;98 a Connecticut Federalist
was attackedwithfiretongsin the House of Representatives;99 and
Republican militias armed and drilled openly,ready to stand against
Federalistarmies.100Over everything, like a specter,hungfearsof
theJacobinterror in France.101It was by no meansobviousin those
-
years though it seems obviousto us - thattheauthorities couldaf-
fordto ignorevenomousattackson thestructures and officersofgov-
ernment, or leave thesecritics'publications unmolested in the hope
thattheywould be adequatelyansweredin due coursein the free
marketplace of ideas. That government could survivethe published
vituperationsofthegovernedseemedmorelikea recklessact offaith
thanbasiccommonsense.
However,in thetwocenturies sincethenwe havelearnedthatthe
statedoes not need legal protection againstcriticism.It is strong
enoughto shrugoffourattacks,strongenoughto dismissourdenun-
94 See, e.g.,State v. West,263 A.2d 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
95 See generallyJohn R. Howe, Jr.,Republican Thoughtand the Political Violenceof the
1790S,19 AM. Q. 147 (1967).
96 See Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic,
1789-1815,at 198 (2009); cf.JamesD. Tagg, Benjamin FranklinBache's Attackon GeorgeWash-
ington,100 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 191 (1976) (notingthat an effigyof Jay was guillo-
tined,filledwithgunpowder,and exploded).
97 See WOOD, supra note 96, at 198; Matthew Schoenbachler,Republicanismin the Age of
DemocraticRevolution:The Democratic-Republican Societies of the 1790s, 18 J. EARLY REPUB-
LIC 237, 254 n.25 (1998).
98 See WOOD, supra note 96, at 198; MonroeJohnson,Washington Period Politics, 12 Wm. &
Mary C. Q. Hist. Mag. 159, 162 (1932).
99 See WOOD, supra note 96, at 229; Eric M. Uslaner,Comityin Context:Confrontation in
HistoricalPerspective,21 BRIT.J.POL. SCI. 45, 66 (1991).
100 See Howe, supra note95, at 147.
101 See generallyWOOD, supra note96, at 239-75.
ciationsas notworththeeffort of suppression (thoughstrongenough

to maketheeffort if it wants). In 1919, thejuristforwhomthelec-
tureson whichthisArticleis based are namedbegansupporting free
speech ideas. In hisseminal dissent in Abrams v. United States,102
Jus-
ticeHolmespredicated hispositionon thederisory impotence ofwhat
he calledthedefendants' "pronunciamentos"103 and on a greaterconfi-
dencein thestate'sabilityto resisttheirdestructive effect.a[N]obody,"
he said,"can supposethatthesurreptitious publishing ofa sillyleaflet
by an unknown man, without more, would presentany immediate
danger thatits opinions would hinder the success of the government
arms "104
So whataboutgroupdefamation?Prosecutions forseditiouslibel
began to seem inappropriate when we realized that the government
had becomeso powerful thatit did notneed thesupportof thelaw
againstthe punydenunciations of the citizenry.Does thatapplyto
vulnerable minorities? Is theirstatus as equal citizensin thesociety
now so well assuredthattheyhave no need of the law's protection
againsttheviciousslursofracistdenunciation? Prosecutionsforblas-
phemouslibel began to seem inappropriate when religioncame to
be regardedas a privatematter.Is thattrueofthestatusofembattled
minorities?Is theirpositionin society- the respecttheyreceive
fromfellowcitizens- a matterof purelyprivatebelief,withwhich
thelaw shouldhave no concern?The stateand its officials maybe
strong enough,thick-skinned enough,wellenougharmed,or sufficient-
lyinsinuated alreadyintoeveryaspectofpubliclifeto be able to shrug
offpublicdenunciations. But thepositionofminority groupsas equal
members ofa multiracial, multiethnic, or religiously society
pluralistic
is notsomething thatanyonecan takeforgranted.It is a recentand
fragileachievement in theUnitedStatesand theidea thatlaw can be
indifferentto publishedassaultsupon thisprincipleseemsto me a
quiteunwarranted extrapolation fromwhatwe have foundourselves
able totoleratein thewayofpoliticaland religious dissent.
II. What Does a Well-Ordered Society Look Like?

I choseas thetitleof thesecondof myHolmesLecturesa rather
technicalphilosophical societylook
question:whatdoes a well-ordered
like? The idea ofa well-ordered is
society "a highly abstrac-
idealized"
tionfromthephilosophy ofJohnRawls.105Rawls wantsto consider
the possibilityof a societywhose basic structureis regulated(and
102 250 U.S. 616(1919).

103Id. at 626(Holmes,
J.,dissenting).
104Id. at 628.
105John Rawls, Political Liberalism 35 (1996);seealsoid. at 46.
knownto be regulated)by principlesof justice and inhabitedby

peoplewithan effective senseofjustice;he wantsto positthisconcep-
tionforthe purposeof askingcertainquestionsabout such an im-
aginedpossibility- forexample,whether it couldexiststablyunder
conditionsof religiousand philosophicaldiversity wherethereis no
of
body deep foundational ideas affirmed
by all ofits citizens.106
I am not goingto go intoany of the technicaldetailof Rawls's
theory.InsteadI wantto use one centralelementofhisconception of
a well-orderedsociety- an element thatI shall call assurance- to
castsomelighton ourproblemofwhatto do abouthatespeech,par-
whenittakestheformofgroupdefamation.
ticularly
A. TheLookofHate
A societywhichpermits suchpublications maylookquitedifferent
froma societythatdoes not. Its hoardings and itslamp-posts maybe
plastered with depictions of members of racial minorities,characteriz-
ingthemas bestialor subhuman.Theremaybe postersproclaiming
thatmembers of theseminorities are criminals,perverts, or terrorists,
or leafletssayingthatmembers ofa certainraceor followers of a cer-
tainreligionare threatsto decentpeopleand thattheyshouldbe de-
portedor madeto disappear.Theremaybe swastikascelebrating the
genocidalcampaigns of the past. There be
may signsindicating that
the membersof someminority are notwelcomein certainneighbor-
hoodsor in politesocietygenerally, or flaming symbolsintended to in-
timidatethemif theyremain. That is whata societymaylook like
whengroupdefamation is permitted. Andmyquestionis: is thatwhat
a well-ordered societylooks like?
I ask becauseit is assumedby manyliberalconstitutionalists, par-
ticularly in the UnitedStates,thata freesocietywitha constitution
will notpermitlaws prohibiting speechlikethis,on the groundthat
any such prohibition precludedby our commitment
is to the First
Amendment offreespeech. Theymayacknowledge
principle thatthe
socialenvironment thatresultsfromtheirtoleration of hatespeechis
likelyto lookunpleasant; theymaysaythattheydo notlikethelookof
thesebillboards,placards,or flamingcrossesany morethanwe do.
But,theysay,thesocietythatpermits themmaystillbe wellordered,
eventhoughit presents thisuglyappearance,precisely becausetheso-
ciety is one in which racists are allowed to speak their mindslike
everyone else.107Some go further and are inclinedto celebratethedi-
versity and unruliness of the various messages and speechesmilling
106 See id. at 35-40.

1U/òee, e.g.,Dworkin,supra note 10, at vi-vn. I discussDworkins argumentat greatlengthin
sectionsIII.C-III.E.
aroundin themarketplace ofideas. Theylove thisrichness and unti-

diness:let a thousandflowersbloom,theysay,even the poisonous
ones. For ofcoursesomeoftheideas are fouland distasteful.But if
you bluryoureyesa bit,you can abstractaway fromthedistasteful
content, and whatyou see is a glorioussplashof moving,variegated
color- ideas interacting openlyand unpredictably withone another.
Andthat,theysay,is surelya featureofa well-ordered society(evenif
themen,women,and children whoare thetargetsofthefouland dis-
tasteful messageshavedifficulty maintaining thisloftyperspective).
Of course,if theracistappearancescorrespond to a racistreality,
everything is different. If the signssaying "Christians only"are ac-
companiedby discriminatory if
practiceagainstJews, Muslimsare
in
beatenup thestreet, minorityif members are notprotected against
the discrimination advocated racistposters,or if thosein power
in
treatpeoplein theunequaland degrading waysthattheracistleaflets
call for- thenthereis something to worryabout. And thatwould
showthatthesocietyis notwellordered.But ifit is just signage,they
say,thereis no causeforconcern.
That is thepositionI wantto test,by focusing on thisissueofap-
pearances.My question- whatdoesa well-ordered societylooklike?
- is nota coy way of askingwhatmakesa societywell orderedor
whata well-ordered societyis like. I am interested in howthingslit-
erallylook,the visibleenvironment.How important is the look of
things?Is it unimportant comparedto howthingsactuallyare? Or is
it an important partofhowthingsactuallyare? Andifit is an impor-
tantpartof how thingsare,whatin particular shouldwe be looking
for? The colorful, unrulydiversity of a freemarketin ideas? Or the
absenceof visiblefeaturesthat are at odds with the fundamental
commitment to justicewithwhicha well-ordered societyis supposed
to be imbued?
If it is thelatter, thencan we use thisas a wayofunderstanding re-
strictions on hatespeechand groupdefamation?In our interpretive
characterization of theselaws wheretheyexist,can we say thatthey
are amongthewaysin whichreal-world societies,in Europeforex-
ample,try to make themselves more well ordered (betterordered)than
they would otherwise be?
My questionis notaboutRawlstheman.108I wantto makeuse of
a Rawlsianidea,butrunwithit in a direction thatmaybe quitedif-
108 I am notaskingthisRawlsian questionin orderto getat JohnRawls's own views in the free
speech-hatespeech debate. What Rawls says about freespeech,set out mainlyin a lectureen-
titledThe Basic Libertiesand TheirPriority,RAWLS,supra note 105, at 289-371, is not particu-
larlyinteresting forour purposes. It does not address the specificissue of hate speech or group
libel at all. And it does notfollowup on the implicationsof Rawls's own characterizationof pub-
lic knowledgeand assurancein a well-orderedsocietyin the way thatI want to. Also, it is a bit
IÓ20 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
ferent fromthedirection in whichRawlswouldhave run. Nor am I

askingwhether thosewho enacthatespeechlegislation are appealing
to Rawlsian ideas. I am askingwhetherhate speech regulation
amountsin effect to an embraceofone elementofRawls's conception
ofa well-ordered society- an elementon whichI am goingto focus
continuallyin this Part. That elementis theidea ofassurance- the
assuranceof supportand dignitarian vindication thata well-ordered
society offers
to all ofits members, especiallythemost vulnerable.
One of the mostimportant thingsthat Rawls says about a well-
orderedsocietyis that"everyone accepts,and knows thateveryone else
the
accepts, very same of
principles justice."109"[T]hisknowledge," as
he putsit,"is publiclyrecognized."110 That is whatI wantto concen-
trateon: theassuranceofa generalized commitment to thefundamen-
tal elementsofjusticeand dignitythata well-ordered societyis sup-
posed to furnish to its citizensas part of "the public cultureof a
confusingbecause unlike almost everythingelse in Political Liberalism, the chapteron "The

Basic Libertiesand Their Priority"is focusedon real-worldconstitutions, withall theirflawsand
messiness,ratherthan on the moreUtopianabstractionof a well-orderedsociety. Rawls says that
one possiblemethodfordevelopinga listof basic libertiesis to "surveythe constitutions of demo-
cratic states and put togethera list of libertiesnormallyprotected,and . . . examine the role of
these libertiesin those constitutions which have workedwell." Id. at 292-93. In the contextof
freespeech,then,his analysisis groundedin the actual role of thisconceptin constitutional doc-
trine. See id. at 340-63. Rawls draws mainlyupon the Americanexperience,thoughhe has ac-
knowledgedelsewherethat,as thingsstand,the United States certainlycannot be regardedas a
well-orderedsociety. See JOHN RAWLS, Kantian Constructivismin Moral Theory,in COL-
LECTED Papers 303, 355 (Samuel Freemaned., 1999).
There is some speculationin Rawlsian literatureon what Rawls's view on hate speech
mighthave been,or what the implicationsare forthisissue or othermoreabstractviews thathe
did hold. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,Four ObservationsAbout Hate Speech, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 368 (2009); RichardH. Fallón,Jr.,Individual Rightsand thePowers
of Government, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343, 351-52 (1993); T.M. Scanlon,AdjustingRightsand Balancing
Values,72 FORDHAM L. Rev. 1477, 1484-86 (2004); R. GeorgeWright,Dignityand Conflictsof
ConstitutionalValues: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection,43 SAN DIEGO L. Rev.
527) 553-54 (2006). But thatdiscussionis mostlyinconclusive.
The closestRawls getsto the issue of hate speech is in a discussionof seditiouslibel,where
he insists- in line with Americanfreespeech orthodoxy- that a well-orderedsocietywill be
one in whichanythingand everything may be published,even thingswhich tend to questionthe
basic principlesof a given society. Subversiveadvocacy,he says, mustbe permitted.But I am
not sure whetherhe thinksthisshould extendeven to advocacy againstthe fundamentalsof jus-
tice - forexample,to public advocacy forthe exclusionor subordinationof a given group,or
theirdisenfranchisement, segregation,enslavement,concentration, or deportation.Rawls does not
considerthe statusof speech thatin its contentand tone runscounterto the assurancesthatciti-
zens are supposed to have of one another'scommitment to equality. I suspecthe would not have
dissentedfromFirst Amendmentorthodoxyin this regard;certainlythat is what his expressed
admirationof the work of Harry Kalven, see RAWLS,supra note 105, at 342-44, intimates
(thoughit has to be said thatKalven's own discussionof grouplibel in KALVEN,supra note 18, at
7-64,is nuanced,thoughtful, and complicated).
109 RAWLS,supra note 105, at 35.
110 Id. at 66 ("[Citizens accept and know thatotherslikewiseaccept those principles,and this
knowledgein turnis publiclyrecognized.").
2010] DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION IÓ2I
democratic society."111 I wantto take themeasureof thisassurance

and, to the extent that it is important, considerhow comfortable we
shouldbe withpublicand semi-permanent manifestations of racial
and ethnichatredas visibleaspectsofthecivicenvironment.
B. Hatredand Law in a Well-Ordered Society
Willhatespeechbe tolerated bylaw in a well-ordered society?We
have alreadyconsidered one response:yes,it willbe tolerated as part
oftheenergizing diversity ofa freemarketin ideas. Another response
mightgo as follows:a societycannotbe wellorderedifpeopleare ad-
vocatingracialand religious hatred.The idea ofa well-ordered socie-
tyis theidea of a societyfullyand effectively governedby a concep-
tionofjustice. In technical terms, it is strictcompliance theory rather
thanpartialcompliance theory.112 On thisaccount,a societywithsuf-
ficientrancorand divisionto generatehatespeechcannotbe a well-
orderedsociety.
ComparewhatRawlssaysaboutilliberalreligions.Intolerant reli-
gions, Rawls says,"will cease to existin the well-ordered of
society po-
liticalliberalism."113 A societycannotbe wellorderedunlessreligions
thatdemandthesuppression ofotherreligions, religionsthatinsiston
or
establishment,religions that demand the of
adoption comprehensive
conceptions of thegoodby thewholesocietyhave,so to speak,died
out. So the questionof what to do about such religionsin a well-
orderedsocietywillnotarise. Andsimilarly, a societycannothavebe-
comewell-ordered unlessbigotsand racistshave givenup theirmis-
sion and acceptedthe basic principlesof justiceand equal respect.
Thus,thequestionofwhatto do abouthatespeechand groupdefama-
tionin a well-ordered societydoes not arise. A well-ordered society
will definitelynotlook racist;it will notpresentor exhibittheoffen-
sivemanifestations thatI spokeaboutearlier.But thiswillnotbe on
accountof prohibitory laws. It will be becausecitizenshave no wish
to expressthemselves in theseterms.
Takingthisresponseone stepfurther, our well-ordered respondent
maysay:so, even if it is true thatRawls 's ideal societywouldnotbe
festoonedwith racial signage,Islamophobicleaflets,and ethnically
prejudicedbillboards, nothing ofinterest followsforthedebatewe are
A
conducting. well-ordered society would notneedsuchlaws. Maybe
for
thelesson us, in our much-Zess-than-well-ordered is thatwe
society,
musthope that hate speechjust withers away, not because of coercive
111 RAWLS,Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,supra note 108, at 355.

112 For theseterms,see JOHNRAWLS,A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (rev.ed. 1999). For the idea
of well-orderedsocietyas partof strictcompliancetheory, in
see RAWLS,Kantian Constructivism
Moral Theory,supra note 108, at 355.
113 RAWLS,supra note 105, at 197.
IÓ2 2 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
laws limiting freedomof speech,but becauseof changesof attitude

and changesofheart,including - notleast- changesbrought about
by effective answers to hate speech in thefree marketplace of ideas.
I thinkthatthisresponse- I am notblamingit on anyonein par-
ticular- is misconceived at a numberof levels. Consideragain the
case ofintolerant religions.Theydo notfeaturein a well-ordered so-
ciety.Why? Presumably because they have died out. But Rawls says
a littlemorethanthat;he saysthatthebasic institutions of a just so-
ciety"inevitably encouragesomewaysoflifeand discourage others, or
evenexcludethemaltogether."114 That is an ambiguousformulation:
whatdoes"discourage" meanhere,in termsoftheoperation ofinstitu-
tionalarrangements? And whatdoes it meanto excludecertainways
oflifealtogether?
One thingis forsure. We shouldnotthinkofa well-ordered socie-
ty as a Utopianfantasy, in which laws are unnecessary because every-
one's attitudes are nowutterly just. No one supposesthatlaw can be
eliminated froma well-ordered societyor thatwe can dropthelaws
aboutmurderor burglary because,by definition, no one in sucha so-
ciety would ever be motivated in
to engage thosecrimes.Rawls's so-
cietyis notUtopianin thatfantasy sense;it is steadfastly
locatedin the
circumstances ofjustice,whichincludeamongotherthingsthesubjec-
tive circumstances of anxietyand limitedstrength of will amongits
citizens.115Rawlshimself givesa fineaccountin A TheoryofJustice
oftheroleoflaw in a well-ordered society:
[E]ven in a well-orderedsocietythecoercivepowersof government are to
somedegreenecessaryforthestability ofsocialcooperation.For although
menknowthattheysharea commonsenseofjusticeand thateach wants
to adhereto the existingarrangements, theymay nevertheless lack full
confidence in one another.. . . [T]he existenceofeffective
penal machinery
servesas men'ssecurity to one another.116
Maybe in a well-ordered society"sanctions . . . neverneed to be
imposed."117 But thatdoes not mean that their existence or thelaws
providingfor them are unnecessaryor redundant. Apartfromany-
thingelse,laws have an important
expressive as well as coercivefunc-
and
tion; one would expectthatexpressivefunction to be at theforein
a well-orderedsociety, in
particularly connection with the publicand
114 Id. at 195.

115 For a discussionof thecircumstancesofjustice,see RAWLS,A THEORY OF JUSTICE,supra
note 112, at 109-112.
116 Id. at 211.
117 Id.
visibleassuranceofjust treatment thata societyis supposedto pro-

videto all ofitsmembers.118
In anycase,evenifa well-ordered societycoulddispensewithlaws
prohibiting groupdefamation, it would be spectacularly dumbto infer
fromthisthatthe societieswe knowmustbe preparedto dispense
withthoselaws as a necessary way of becoming well-ordered.Socie-
tiesdo notbecomewell orderedby magic. The expressiveand dis-
ciplinary workoflaw maybe a necessary ingredient forthechangeof
hearton thepartof itsracistcitizensthata well-ordered societypre-
supposes. And anyway,as withall issuesofjustice,thenecessity of
suchlawsis a matter ofthegoodsto be securedand thelikelihood that
theycan be securedin theabsenceof legalintervention. If, as I am
to the
going argue, good to be secured is a publicgood, generaland
a
diffuseassuranceto all the inhabitants of a societyconcerning the
mostbasic elementsof justice,thenit is naturalto thinkthatlaw
wouldbe involved- bothin its abilityto underpintheprovisionof
publicgoodsand in itsDurkheimian abilityto expressand communi-
catecommoncommitments. Thisis particularly likelyto be truein the
case of societies,likeEuropeansocieties(and I thinkalso theUnited
States),whichhave notyetentirely shakenoffhistories ofmurderous
racistoppression.
C. PoliticalAesthetics
Whatshoulda well-ordered societylooklike? I supposewe could
ask, with equal sense: what should a well-ordered societysoundlike?
We mighthaveourpositiveimpression: say, theflatsteadydroneofan
interminable butwell-ordered exerciseofwhatRawlscalls publicrea-
son - respectful and mutuallycomprehensible speechin mattersof
commonconcern, witheverythirdwordbeing"autonomy," "equality,"
or "liberty."And we mightcontrastthat impressionwith darker
sounds:thetreadofmarching feetand ominouschants,or perhapsthe
genocidal radio broadcasts of Radio TélévisionLibre des Mille Col-
lines(RTLM) in RwandathatmyNYU colleague,Professor Ted Me-
ron, American representative on the International Criminal Tribunal
forRwanda,soughtto privilege as freespeechin hisdissenting opinion
in theNahimanacase.119
118See Roger Cotterrell, Emile Durkheim: Law in a Moral Domain 152(1999).

of Durkheim
For an application 's conception in relationto hatespeech,see THOMASDAVID
Jones, Human Rights: Group Defamation, Freedom of Expression and the Law
of Nations 88-89(1998).
119See Nahimanav. Prosecutor,Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, PartlyDissentingOpinionofJudge
Meron'' 4-5,9-21(Int'lCrim.Trib.forRwandaTrialChamber I Nov.28,2007).Butcf.Susan
Benesch, Vile Crimeor Inalienable Right:DefiningIncitementto Genocide,48 VÀ. J. Int'L L.
485 (2008) (articulatinga morecomplexview).
I said in PartI thatan emphasison speechis an emphasison the

ephemeral.ThereI had in mindtheoccasionalangryand politically
incorrectuse ofone or anotherracialepithet,and I contrastedthat-
the
using figure of slanderversus
libel- with the relativelyenduring
expression ofpublicsignageor thepublishedword. But it is true,on
theotherhand,thattheacceptedvocabularyofa culturecan become
partofitsestablished environment.Andcertainly thebroadcastword
can be as mucha matterofenduring concernas theprintedword,es-
peciallywhenit insistently and repeatedly demonizesa minority as
cockroaches and vermin.
So thereis the visibleand the audible. We mightroundout the
picturewiththe emphasisby Professors RichardDelgado and Jean
Stefancicon tangibleaspectsof a society'sself-presentation. Their
book Understanding WordsthatWoundhas a chapterentitled "When
Hate Goes Tangible:Logos,Mascots,Confederate Flags, and Monu-
ments."Andtheauthorssaythis:
[S]tatues,monuments, and the like. . . perhapsbecause theyare intended
to be seen by a largeaudience,. . . contributeto a climateof opinionthat
is injuriousto membersof the groupsingledout.. . . [TJangible symbols
have a qualitythatwords- at leastofthespokenvariety- do not:They
are enduring.Wordsdisappearas soon as theyare spoken. They may
resonatein themindof thevictim,causinghimor herto recallthemover
and overagain. But a flag[or a] monument ... is alwaysthereto remind
membersofthegroupit spotlights ofitsunsolicited message.120
Delgado and Stefancicdo not advancethe discussionmuchbeyond
thisin theirshortbook;but I shalltryto proceedin thespiritof the
concerns thattheyraise.
A generalconsideration of whata well-ordered societylookslike,
soundslike,smellslike,and feelsliketo thetouch,mightbe an exer-
cise in politicalaesthetics.It is thesortof thingwe findin Edmund
Burke's observation that"[t]omakeus love our country, our country
oughtto be lovely"121 and in his talk about "thepleasingillusions,
which[make]powergentle,and obedienceliberal,. . . thesuperadded
ideas,furnished fromthewardrobeofa moralimagination, whichthe
heartowns,and theunderstanding as necessary
ratifies, to coverthe
defectsofournakedshivering nature,and . . . raiseit to dignityin our
own estimation."122 Politicalaestheticsinviteus to thinkaboutsuch
thingsas monuments, cenotaphs,publicstatues,publicarchitecture,
flagsand banners,and theceremonies (coronations, inaugurations, ar-
120 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words that Wound
142 (2004).
121Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 78 (L.G. Mitchell
ed.,OxfordUniv.Pressiqqq) (i7Qo).
122Id. at 77.
2010] DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION 162 5
misticedays,and thelike)forpublicor politicaleventsand theirset-

tings,choreography, and costumes.That is politicalaesthetics - and I
thinkwe needto pay moreattention to thistopicin politicalphiloso-
phythanwe do.123
NoticethattheexamplesI have mentioned are mostlya matterof
officialor publiclysponsoredappearances. But in the case of hate
speech,it is appearancessponsoredby privatepersons,notthestate,
thatwe are concernedabout. Thereis of coursesometimes a messy
interfacebetweenpublicand private,whichshowsup (forexample)in
theUnitedStatesin theFirstAmendment jurisprudence ofchurchand
state:I meanissuesaboutthepresenceofreligious symbols - crosses,
crèches,menorahs, depictions of the Ten Commandments - in the
townsquareon publicproperty. We knowthatit is possiblefora so-
cietyto look religious, withoutin any officialor governmental sense
beingreligious.124 There be
may temples, steeples,churches, mosques,
and synagogues as faras theeye can see, and manyof us thinkthis
can be so withoutany messagebeingconveyedthatthe societyas a
wholeis committed to anyparticular religion.All thismaybe compat-
ible witha societybeingwellorderedin thesenseof beingreligiously
neutral.
Balancingprivatereligiousexpression withsociety'sperceiveden-
dorsement is nota simplematter.Someliberalsexpressconcernabout
the appearancein public of privateindividualsdressedin certain
ways;thinkofthecontroversy in countries likeFranceaboutMuslim
womenappearingin publicwithheadscarves or veiledor withthefull
coveringoftheburqa.125President NicholasSarkozyand otherswho
call fora ban on the burqa are also interested in our theme:what
shoulda well-ordered societylook like? For them,theinterest is the
appearancethatpeoplepresent to one another.It is as thoughtheyare
usingtheold idea ofsumptuary laws:peoplemustdressin a waythat
connotesthedignity ofa freeperson,notin a waythatintimates their
subordination. (The burqa mightbe comparedto a portableprivate
realmcartedaroundin public- likean Edwardianbathingmachine
- as thoughwomenmayappearin publiconlybyremaining in effect
in theprivaterealm.)I am nota supporter oftheproposalto ban the
burqa. But thearguments thatare used on theotherside are nota
123 For a fineaccount of the presenceand importanceof monumentsin modernsociety,see

generallyAJUMEH. WlNGO, VEIL POLITICS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATES (2003).
124 This paradox was notedin Karl Marx, 'On theJewishQuestion (1844), reprintedm NON-
SENSE upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke, and Marx on the Rights of Man 137, 137-38
(JeremyWaldroned., 1987).
125 Doreen Carvajal quotes PresidentNicholas Sarkozy as saying,"The burqa ... is a sign of
the subjugation,of the submission,of women.... I want to say solemnlythat it will not be wel-
come on our territory."Doreen Carvajal, Sarkozy Backs Drive To Eliminate the Burqa, N.Y.
Times,June23,2009,at A4.
IÓ2Ó HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1596
millionmilesfromthe argumentthatI am pursuingin thisArticle.

Whatindividualsdo, how theypresentthemselves,
can add up to an
thatmatters:
impression maybenottheburqa,buttheappearanceof
large numbersof masked men in white sheets and pointyhats
is a problem,protestationsabout purely private dress codes
notwithstanding.
D. Assurance
and Security
Whydoesitmatter whata well-ordered societylookslike? Whydo
appearancescount? I believethe answerhas to do withassurance,
withconveying to peoplea senseofsecurity in theenjoyment oftheir
mostfundamental rights. And this is what I want to draw from
Rawls's account. Rawls insiststhroughout his work that a well-
orderedsocietyis one "in whicheveryoneaccepts,and knowsthat
everyoneelse accepts,the verysame principlesof justice."126That
sharedknowledge playsan important rolein everyone'slife.
The content oftherelevant assurancesmayvary.In Rawls'sphilo-
sophicalideal, a well-ordered societyis definedby reference to the
wholedetailedarrayof principles thatcharacterize his conceptionof
justice as fairness:what people know and assure each otherof,
people'sjointallegianceto thedifference principle,thedetailsof the
firstprinciple,theexactformulation of thesecondprinciple, thebal-
ance betweenthedifference principleand theequal opportunity prin-
ciple,and thevariouspriority rules. Rawls is of courserightto note
thatone ofthereasonswhywe cannotdescribetheUnitedStatesas a
well-orderedsocietyis thatthereis nothingapproaching a consensus
aboutjusticeat thislevelofdetail. But in therealworld,whenpeople
call forthesortofassuranceto whichhatespeechlaws mightmakea
contribution,it is noton thecontroversial detailsofjustice. Instead,it
is on someofthemostelementary fundamentals - thatall areequally
humanand havethedignity ofhumanity, thatall have an elementary
entitlementto justice,and thatall deserveprotection fromthe most
egregiousformsof violence,exclusion,and subordination.127 Hate
126 Rawls, supra note 105, at 35.

127 My referencehere to the fundamentalsof justice is similarto, but not quite the same as,
Rawls's idea of "constitutionalessentials."Id. at 214, 227. The idea is thatsome claimsofjustice
are based on or presupposeothers;some representcontroversial developmentsof or extrapolations
fromothers. The fundamentalsofjustice are the claims thatlie at the foundationsof thesederi-
vationsand controversies.They includepropositionsestablishingeveryone'srightto justice and
elementarysecurity,everyone'sclaim to have theirwelfarecounted along with everyoneelse's
welfarein the determination of social policy,and everyone'slegal statusas a rights-bearing mem-
ber of society. They also include repudiationsof particularclaims of racial, sexual, and religious
inequalitythathave historically providedgroundsfordenyingtheserights.See JeremyWaldron,
Basic Equality (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal TheoryResearchPaper Series,Work-
ing Paper No. 08-61,2008),available at http://ssrn.com/abstractsi311816 (discussingbasic equali-
speechor groupdefamation involvestheexpressdenialof thesefun-

damentals so faras somegroupin societyis concerned.It seemsto me
thatif we are imagining a societyon the way to becomingwell or-
dered, these fundamentals mustbe securedin people'smindsbypublic
guarantees, even if we are notyetin a positionto securea morede-
tailedconsensus onjustice.
I referred earlierto politicalaesthetics, the"decentdrapery"cele-
bratedby EdmundBurke.128But when we talk about the public
manifestation of a society'scommitment to fundamental principlesof
justice,we are not just talking about justicedisplayed forthe sake of
an impressive or pretty show(in theway thata societymightdisplay
themightof its military resources, thesplendorof its culture,or the
pride of itsathletes). We are talkingabouta displaythatmatters prac-
ticallyto individuals. It matters to themin theirrelianceon theprin-
ciplesofjusticein theordinary courseoftheirlives,and in thesecurity
withwhichtheyenjoythatreliance.In a well-ordered where
society,
are
people visiblyimpressed by signs of one another'scommitment to
can
justice,everyone enjoy a certainassurance as theygo about their
business.Peopleknowthatwhentheyleavehomein themorning they
can reasonably counton notbeingdiscriminated against,humiliated,
or terrorized. Theyfeelsecurein thebasic rightsthatjusticedefines;
they can face social interactions withouttheelemental risksthatinter-
actionwouldinvolveifonecouldnotcounton othersto actjustly.
We can putthesamepointsnegatively.Whena societyis defaced
withanti-Semitic signage,burningcrosses,or defamatory racialleaf-
lets,that sortof assurance A
evaporates. vigilantpoliceforceandJus-
tice Departmentmay stillkeep people frombeingattackedor ex-
cluded,but people no longerhave the benefitof a generalpublic
assuranceto thiseffect, providedand enjoyedas a publicgood,fur-
nishedto all byall. Thereis security in suchpublicknowledge forthe
-
properpride holdingone's head upright - thatwe associatewith
humandignity.President LyndonJohnsononce gave thisreasonfor
themoralnecessity oftheCivil RightsAct:"A manhas a rightnotto
be insultedin frontof his children."129 The security thatpeoplelook
foris security againstthesoul-shriveling humiliationthataccompanies
the manifestation of injusticein society.In the landmarkCanadian
case,R. v. Keegstra,130 ChiefJusticeBrianDicksonsaid thisaboutthe
effectthatpublicexpressions ofhatredmayhaveon people'slives:
ty,as distinct
fromvariousegalitarian policies).Forfurther
discussion
ofthisidea ofthefunda-
mentals ofjustice,seeinfrapp. 1646-47.
128See suprap. 1624.
129David Bromwich, Politics by Other Means: Higher Education and Group
THINKING157(1992)(internal quotationmarksomitted).
130[i99o]3S.C.R. 697(Can.).
IÓ28 HARVARDLAWREVIEW [Vol.123:1596
and abuse encouragedby hatepropaganda. . . have

The derision,hostility
a severelynegativeimpacton theindividual'ssenseof self- worthand ac-
ceptance. This impactmay cause targetgroup members to take drastic
measuresin reaction,perhapsavoidingactivitieswhichbringtheminto
contactwithnon-groupmembersor adoptingattitudesand posturesdi-
rectedtowardsblendingin with the majority. Such consequencesbear
heavilyin a nationthatpridesitselfon toleranceand . . . respectforthe
manyracial,religiousand culturalgroupsin oursociety.131
The pointof the visibleself-presentation of a well-ordered society,
then,is notjustaesthetic;it is theconveying ofan assuranceto all citi-
zensthattheycan counton beingtreatedjustly.
This assuranceis connectedin important ways to the values of
dignity and reputationthatwerediscussedin PartI ofthisArticle.A
person'sdignityis notjust a decorative factabouthimor her. It is a
matterofstatus,and as such,it is in largepartnormative: it is some-
thingabouta personthatcommandsrespectfromothersand fromthe
state. Moreover, one holdsa certainstatusnotjust whenone happens
to havea givensetofrights or entitlements, butalso whentherecogni-
tionofthoserightsor entitlements is basicto howoneis treated.So it
is withthefundamentals ofsocialreputation.We accordpeopledigni-
tyon accountofthesortsofbeingshumanindividuals are,and we are
gravelyconcerned whenit is said publiclythatsomepeople,by virtue
oftheirmembership in a racial,ethnic,or religious group,are notreal-
lybeingsofthatkindand so arenotentitled tothatdignityin oneway
or another.Such hatefulclaimsare notjust anthropological specula-
tion:theyintimate thatpeopleshouldexpectto be treatedin a degrad-
ing mannerif the personmakingthe hatefulclaim (and the fellow
travelersthathe is appealingto)havetheirway.
Does thismean thatindividualsare requiredto accordequal re-
spectto all theirfellowcitizens,thattheymaynotesteemsomeand
despiseothers?That proposition seemscounterintuitive. Muchofour
moraland politicallifeinvolvesdifferentiation of respect.Peoplere-
spectthosewhoobeythelaw and do goodwhilewithholding theirre-
spect from those as
theyregard wrongdoers. Democrats respectPresi-
dent Barack Obama, while some conservatives despise him; most
Republicans have a great deal of respectfor former President George
W. Bush,whilesomeof his politicalopponentswanthimtriedas a
war criminal.Manypeopledespisebankersaftertherecentfinancial
crisis.Arewe nowsayingthatthesedistinctions ofrespectare imper-
missibleand thateveryone has a dutyto respecteverybody else? Are
we sayingthatno one is permitted to expresshis or hercontempt for
anyone else? Not quite. It is important to between
distinguish two
sensesofrespectthatmightbe in playhere:whatStephenDarwallhas
131 Id. at 746.
called"appraisalrespect"(in whichone's estimation of peoplevaries

by theirmerits, their virtues and vices, their crimes, their views,and so
on) and "recognition respect"(which is fundamental to the dignityof
persons and invariant in the face of differential merit, evencommand-
ing how people are to be treatedwhen theyare guiltyof terrible
crimes).132It is recognition respectthatwe aretalkingabouthere;and
thefactthatin privatewe mightsubscribeto varyingestimations of
differentpersons as a matter of -
appraisalrespect something the
government is also entitledto do - does notshowthatwe maynot
reasonably be requiredto playourpartin societybyaccording theba-
sicsofrecognition respect to each person.
How exactlyis this assurancethat we seek to provideforone
anotherconveyed?I do notthinkRawls imaginesthattherewill be
billboardsproclaiming thedifference principle or thelistofbasicliber-
ties. The creepytotalitarian flavorof that makes us uneasy,and
rightlyso. Theremaybe someaffirmative I thinkofthepublic
efforts:
proclamation of a new constitution, like the South AfricanConstitu-
tion,seeking to focus everyone's attention on the fact thattheynow
have certainrights;or just the mundanebusinessof pamphletsand
advertisements ensuringthat people know theirrightsand how to
claimthem.I saw a signrecently on theNew Yorksubway,in English
and Spanish,tellingpeoplethattheydo nothave to put up withun-
wantedsexualtouching in a crowdedsubwaycar.
Mostly, however, assuranceis implicit,
the as thoughtheunderlying
statusofeach personas a citizenin goodstanding goeswithout saying.
Variousforums ofsocial,political,and commercial interaction arejust
open to all as a matterof course;no one has to say "MuslimsWel-
come"or "African- Americans Allowed."It is tremendously important
thattheassurancebe conveyedin thisimplicitand ubiquitousway so
thatit can be effortlessly acceptedand thatpeoplewho mightother-
wisefeelinsecure, unwanted, or despisedcan putthatinsecurity outof
theirmindsand concentrate on whatmatters to themin socialinterac-
tion- itspleasuresand opportunities.
At thesame time,theimplicitness of thisassurancemakesit tre-
mendously vulnerable.Forexample,supposea spateofdiscriminatory
signsappear- maybetheyintimate a realintention to discriminate or
maybetheydo not- butsuddenlythestakeshave changedforthose
to whomtheyare directed. This helpsus see what hate speechis
about. The pointof thehatefuldisplaysthatwe wantto regulateis
notjustautonomous self-expression on thepartofthebigots.The dis-
132See Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint Morality, Respect,

AND ACCOUNTABILITY 122-23 (2006). See generallyStephenL. Darwall, TwoKinds ofRespect,
88 Ethics 36 (1977).
playstargettheassuranceon whichmembers ofvulnerable minorities

are supposedto be able to rely. Theirpointis to negatetheimplicit
assurancethata societyoffers to themembers ofvulnerable groups-
to undermine it,call it in and
question, taint
it withvisibleexpressions
ofhatred, exclusion, and contempt.Andso it begins:whatwas implic-
itlyassuredis now visiblychallenged, and now thereis a wholenew
set of calculationsfora minority membersettingout to take a walk
withhisfamily.
E. PublicGoods
ProvisionoftheassurancethatI am talkingaboutis likea public
good,albeita silentone. It is implicitratherthanexplicit, but none-
thelessreal- a pervasive, diffuse, ubiquitous, general,sustained, and
reliableunderpinning of people's basic dignityand social standing,
providedby all forall. A well-ordered society, it seemsto me,has an
interestin theprovision ofthispublicgood,thatis,in thefurnishing of
thisassuranceand in therecognition and upholding ofthebasicdigni-
tyon whichit is predicated.It is a publicgoodand partofthepublic
order,butit is notultimately a communal good,enjoyedcollectively.133
Instead,likestreetlighting, it is a publicgoodwhosebenefit redounds
ultimately to individuals- thosewhosedignity is affirmed whenits
social underpinnings might be otherwise in question; those who rely
implicitly on a sense that there does not have to be anything specific
on whichto rely.But unlikestreetlighting, whichcan be providedby
a centralutility company, thepublicgoodofassurancedependson and
arisesout ofwhatthousandsor millionsofordinary citizensdo singly
and together. It is,as Rawlsputsit,a productof"citizens'jointactivi-
ty in mutualdependenceon the appropriate actionsbeingtakenby
others."134 It maynotaffirmatively require greatdeal oftheordinary
a
citizen;that is part of what it means thatthisis an implicit good. But
just because assurance is a low-keybackground thing, primere-
the
sponsibility for its provision that fallsupon the ordinary citizenis to
refrain fromdoinganything to undermine it or to makethefurnishing
ofthisassurancemorelaboriousor moredifficult. Andthatis theob-
ligation that hate speech laws or groupdefamation are enforcing.
laws
Those who publishor postexpressions of contempt and hatredof
theirfellowcitizens,thosewho burncrosses,and thosewho scrawl
swastikasaredoingwhattheycan to undermine thisassurance.Their
actionsmaynotseemall thatsignificant in themselves; an isolatedin-
133 For the distinctionbetween public goods whose ultimatepayoffis collectiveand public
goods thatbenefitindividuals,see JeremyWaldron,Can CommunalGoods Be Human Rights?,in
Liberal Rights, supra note82, at 339, 354-59. Some public goods may have bothaspects. See
JeremyWaldron,Safetyand Security,85 Neb. L. Rev. 454, 500-02 (2006).
134 Rawls, supra note 105,at 204.
cidenthere,a forlorn Nazi processionthere,some rattylittleracist

leaflet.But preciselybecausethepublicgoodthatis underattackis
providedin a general,diffuse,and implicitway,theflare-upof a few
particularincidentscan have a disproportionate effecton thequality
ofassurancein society.I willsaya littlemoreat theconclusion ofthis
Partaboutthesocialand historical context.But considerthisobserva-
tionbyWilliamPeirceRandel,a historian oftheKu KluxKlan,about
isolatedinstancesofcross-burning:"Suchis thesymbolic powerofthe
fierycross that in
people manyparts of the country talkin sub-
still
duedvoicesaboutthecrossthatwas burnedonenightyearsago in the
fieldacrosstheroad or on a local hilltop."135
Randelalso added this
abouttheisolatedinstancesoftheburning cross:
What[a cross-burning] is commonlytakento mean is thatneighborsone
sees everyday includesome who are Klan members,and that Klaverns
supposedlyextinctare onlydormant, readyto regroupforactionwhenthe
Klan sensesthatactionis needed. It castsa shadowon manya neighbor-
hood to know thatit harborsa potentially hostileelementwhichat any
momentmaydisrupttheillusionofpeace.136
Hate speechdoes notjust seek to undermine the publicgood of
implicitassurance.It also seeksto establisha rivalpublicgoodas the
wolvescall to one anotheracrossthepeace of a decentsociety.The
publicationof hate speech,the appearanceof these symbolsand
scrawlsin placesforall to see,is a wayofproviding a focalpointfor
the proliferation and coordination of the attitudesthattheseactions
express, a publicmanifestation ofhatredbysomepeopleto indicateto
othersthattheyare notalonein theirracismor bigotry.FrankCollin,
theleaderoftheNazis whosoughtto marchthrough Skokie,said,"We
wantto reachthegoodpeople- getthefierceanti-Semites whohave
to liveamongtheJewsto comeoutofthewoodworkand standup for
themselves."137 Accordingly,hate speechregulation aims notonlyto
the of
protect publicgood dignity-based assurance, also to block
but
theconstruction ofthisrivalpublicgood.
Some objectthatsuchlaws simplydrivehate underground.But
thatis thewholepoint- to conveythesensethatthebigotsare iso-
lated,embittered ratherthanto permitthemto contact
individuals,
and coordinate withone anotherin theenterprise of undermining so-
ciety'smost fundamental principles.True, thereis a cost to this:
such
laws maydriveracistsentiment intospaceswhereit cannoteasilybe
engaged. As I shallsuggestin PartIII, however,hatespeechlaws op-
eratebestin an environment whenthetimeforactivedebateon an is-
135 William Peirce Randel, The Ku Klux Klan: A Century of Infamy 224 (1965).
136 Id.
137 Philippa Strum, When the Nazis Came to Skokie: Freedom for Speech We
Hate 15 (1999) (internalquotationmarksomitted).
sue is overand so thebenefits

ofengagingwiththeracists(exceptfor
redemptive purposes)arelow.138Thus,whileisolatingracistsentiment
frompublicdiscourseis a potentialproblem,introducinghatespeech
at
legislation thepropertimecan helpto this
mitigate concern.
F. TheRole ofLaw and theRole ofIndividuals
I have said thatthe good of dignity-based assuranceis a public
goodprovidedto all byall and thatunlikethebenefit ofstreetlighting
it cannotbe providedbya centralutility.I am suresomereaderswill
balk at thisand say thatit is a mistakeforme to saddleprivateciti-
zens withwhat is surelya responsibility of government.Is not the
manifestation of commitment by government muchmoreimportant
thanthemanifestation of theattitudes of citizensto one another?If
lawsagainstdiscrimination are upheldand ifpeopleare confident that
theywill be upheld,whatdoes it matterwhatsignscitizensdisplay?
If lawsprotecting peoplefrombeingdrivenoutoftheirneighborhoods
are upheldand ifpeopleare confident thattheywillbe upheld,what
does it matterwhether theodd crossis burnedon somebody'slawn?
If the laws protecting peopleagainstviolenceand mass murderare
upheldand if peopleare surethattheywill be upheld,whatdoes it
matterwhatit sayson theplacardsthatneo-Naziscarrythrough Jew-
ish neighborhoods in an Illinoissuburb? It is law enforcement that
matters, notthecardboardsigns:thatis theobjection.
But thisobjectionis basedon a falsecontrast.In no societyis the
stateable to offer
theseguarantees on itsownwithouta complementa-
ry assurancethat ordinarycitizenswill play theirpart in the self-
applicationof thelaws.139Thinkof theadministration of antidiscri-
minationlaws. The law does not have the resourcesto providean
armedescortforeveryminority memberwho wantsto approachand
entera school,or university, or otherpublicaccommodation without
fearof beingturnedaway and humiliatedon racial grounds. The
spectacleof the NationalGuard beingturnedout to desegregate a
schoolin LittleRock,Arkansas,in 1957showedus exactlywhatsuch
an escortwouldlooklike. Statesdo nothavethecoerciveresources to
do thisin any but a veryfewcases,and anyway,to proceedunder
armedescortis hardlya satisfactory indication ofassurance.Military
enforcement cannotbe thebasis oftheeffortless, and perva-
implicit,
siveassurancethatpeopleneedfortheconductoftheirordinary lives.
Even routineenforcement efforts bytheDepartment ofJusticeagainst
138 See sectionIII.E, pp. 1646-49.

139 For a discussionof the idea of self-application,
see HENRY M. HART,Jr. & ALBERT M.
Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
LAW 120-22 (WilliamN. Eskridge,Jr.& Philip P. Frickeyeds., 1994).
routinediscrimination can handleonlya handfulof cases. By and

large, the law has to relyin thisarea - as in almosteveryarea - on
self-application by ordinary citizens.And thatmeansthatanycitizen
whoreliesuponthelaw is relying indirectly on thevoluntary coopera-
tionoffellowcitizens.
Conversely, partoftheconcernaboutthepublicexpression ofrac-
istattitudes is thattheseexpressions are intimations thatcertainmem-
bersofthepublic(and thosetheyare trying to influence)willnotplay
theirnecessary part in the administration of the if
laws, theycan get
away with it. What is more, as I said in the previoussection,theyare
a
playing competing assurance game,usingpublicand semi-permanent
displays to assure those who are inclinednot to play theirpart in
upholding laws against violence and discrimination thattheyare not
alone, that there are plenty of others likethem.
RonaldDworkintakesthe view thatall thisis a matterforthe
government to handle. The government is theentitythatis required
to displayequal concernand respectforall itscitizens.But,he says,
the citizensthemselves do not sharean identicalobligation: on most
occasionstheyare permitted to showrespectforsomeand concernfor
others- respectfortheirparentsand concernfortheirchildrenthat
differ fromtheconcernand respectthattheymanifest to strangers.140
in
Theremaybe something thisdivisionofprivate publicrespon- and
sibility.But as statedit is too simple. Government is notan entity
separatefromthepeople,notin theformation ofitspoliciesor in the
enactment ofitslaws,and certainly notin thedischargeofitsdistinc-
tiveresponsibilities. The discharge ofsomegovernmental responsibili-
tiesis impossible without thewhole-hearted cooperation ofmembers of
thepublic,and thedischarge ofotherpublicresponsibilities is vulner-
able to whatprivatepeopledo in public. The responsibility ofprovid-
ingthedignity-based assurancethatRawlstellsus willbe a featureof
a well-ordered societyis ofthelattersort. We mustnotbe misledinto
treating hatespeechand groupdefamation as essentiallyprivateacts
withwhichgovernments are perversely trying to interferein thespirit
of mind-control. Hate speechand groupdefamation are actionsper-
formedin public,witha public orientation, aimed at undermining
publicgoods. We mayor maynotbe opposedto theirregulation, but
we needat leastto recognize themforwhattheyare.
G. Transitionand Assurance
In thisPartoftheArticle,I havetakenup Rawls's suggestion that
themembersof a well-ordered societyoughtto be able to relyupon
publicassuranceofone another'scommitmentstojusticeand thatthis
140 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 295-301 (1986).
IÓ34 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.123:1596
relianceshouldbe publicknowledge, publiclyconveyed.I have ar-

gued that one of
way thinking of the purposeof groupdefamation
lawsis thattheyprotect thisassuranceagainstegregious formsofden-
igration and coordinated defiance. People need this assurance,and
they need to be protected againstdisplays and manifestations whose
point is to undermine the assurance and to beginconstructing as-an
suranceof exactlythe opposite- an assurancethat,whateverthe
Constitution and thelawssay,thosewhodiscriminate orthosewhotry
to driveminorities outofmajority neighborhoods be in goodcom-
will
I
pany. argue that people have a responsibility to participate in the
provision of these goods, at least to the extent of not participating in
undermining them, and that certainly is
society permitted to enforce
thatresponsibility to protectthisvitalgood.
I suspectthatone couldmakea case alongtheselines,in theab-
stract,foranysociety.In anysociety, peoplearelikelyto standin need
of theassuranceswhich, on Rawls's account,it is thetaskof a well-
orderedsocietyto provide.But the case becomesparticularly pressing
whenwe thinknotjust oftheabstractions ofpoliticalphilosophy, but
also of the prospectsof real-worldsocietiesbecominganything like
wellordered.For us,theissueis notonlytheabstractneedforassur-
ance thatpeoplemighthave evenin thebestof socialcircumstances,
butalso a needforassurancein relationto thehistory ofa societythat
has beenfarfromwell ordered- indeedhideouslyill ordered- so
faras thebasicelements ofjusticeand dignity areconcerned.
It is oftensaid thatthereis a historical reasonwhyEuropeancoun-
triesare morereceptive to laws prohibiting groupdefamation thanthe
UnitedStateshas been. Thisis halftrue:Europeanpeoplesdo haveto
thinkaboutthesemattersagainstthebackground of Nazismand the
Holocaust(whichis stillwithinlivingmemory).But it is falseifthis
rationaleis supposedto suggestthatAmericans have no suchburden.
Quitethecontrary: theUnitedStateshas historic memory withinthe
lasttwocenturies ofone ofthemostviciousregimes ofchattelslavery
theworldhas everknown,whichwas upheldbytheveryConstitution
thatpurported thenand stillpurports to guaranteeindividualrights;
livingmemoryof institutionalized racism,segregation, and denialof
civilrightsin manyofitsstates;livingexperience - hereand now-
of shamefulpatternsof discrimination and racial disadvantage;and
above all livingmemoryof racial terrorism - lynching, whipping,
churchbombing,cross-burning, and all the paraphernaliaof Klan
symbolism - fromtheendoftheCivilWarto thepresent.
This history is thebackground againstwhichmembers offormerly
subordinated minorities have to situatepublicmanifestations of race
hate,grouplibel,and thelike. It is notmerelythatthetoneand con-
tentofsuchmanifestations are at oddswiththeguarantees supposedly
afforded as publicgoodsby themembers of a well-ordered societyto
eachother.The worryis thatthesemanifestations intimate a return to
theall-too-familiarcircumstances ofmurderous injusticethatpeopleor

theirparentsor grandparents experienced.Such intimations are di-
rectlyat odds with the assurances thata well-orderedsocietyis sup-
to
posed provide. Those assurancesare sought onlyin the ab-
not
stract,but also in relationto the
precisely history thatthesedisplays
nightmarishly summon up.
III. Libel and Legitimacy
It is timenow to considersomeobjections.For all theirgoodin-
tentions, forall thefineworkthattheymaydo in protecting theassur-
ancesthata goodsocietywillprovideto its mostvulnerablecitizens,
statutory provisions of the kindI am talkingabout are designedto
stoppeople from printing, publishing, and postingthings
distributing,
thattheywouldliketo say,thingsthattheywouldlikeothersto read
or hear. Thereis no getting aroundthisfact. Such regulations make
thepublicexpression ofideas lessfree- in thestraightforward nega-
tivesenseofmoreconstrained141 - thanit wouldotherwise be. Some
defenders ofhatespeechrestrictions toywiththeidea that,sincehate
speech tends to silenceminorities or to excludethemfromthepolitical
process, the net effect of censoring maybe to empowermorein the
it
of
way expression than it denies.142I do notwantto ruleoutthatpos-
sibility;but I believe many countries wouldupholdtheirhatespeech
lawsevenifthatwerenotthecase - thatis,eveniftheharmdoneto
minorities werenotprimarily theirexclusion frompublicdiscourse.
A. TheObjection fromAutonomy
I have neverbeenconvincedby an objectionthatbases itselfsim-
plyon autonomy.It is truethatlaws of the kindwe are discussing
makethepublicexpression ofideas less freein a way thatmattersto
individuals.143 Oftenwhatracistsor Islamophobesare punishedfor
expressing in publicis theverything,outofall themessagesa person
couldconvey,thatmattersmostto them. For them,otheraspectsof
politicalexpressionpale intoinsignificancecomparedwiththeirleaf-
letslibelingMuslimsas terrorists
or theirpublicportrayals ofpeopleof
otherracesas apes or gibbons.It is notexactlytruethattheythem-
141 For the notionof negativefreedom,see ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122-
31 (1969).
142 See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 76, at 499-501 ("Hate speakers seek to intimidatetargeted
groupsfromparticipatingin the deliberativeprocess. Diminishedpoliticalparticipationbecause
of safetyconcerns,in turn,stymiespolicy and legislativedebates." Id. at 499.). For a more
nuanced discussionof thispoint,see generallyFrank Michelman,Universities, Racist Speech and
Democracyin America:An Essayfor theACLU, 27 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 339 (1992).
143 See C. Edwin Baker,Autonomyand Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOC-
RACY,supra note 10,at 139, 143.
selvesare silenced- theycan say whattheylikeas theylikeon in-

numerable othertopicsof publicconcern.But it seemsto matterto
themthattheybe freeto expressracistideasin a hatefulform;and the
questionis whetherwe shouldsay,on thisground,thathate speech
regulations compromise theirautonomy.144
The fact,however, thathatefulexpression liesat thevaluedcoreof
freespeechso faras theracistis concerned doesnotbyitselfshowthat
it shouldnotbe restricted,anymorethanthispositionis furthered by
the highvalue someonemayplace on postingchildpornography on
theinternet.Thereare all sortsofexceptions to thefreespeechprin-
ciple. Andthereare all sortsofotherexpressions ofautonomy, central
to people'sidiosyncratic values (rangingfromtheuse of narcoticsto
crueltyto animals),thatare also legitimately restricted.Or thinkof
thevariouswaysin whichwe regulatereligious whichis at
activity,145
to
leastas central worshippers' autonomy as hateful ofrac-
expressions
ismareto theautonomy ofbigots.
The questionis whetherthe particular modeof autonomousself-
expression a
thatis at stakeherehas specialsignificance thatgoes
- I
beyondthesimplepointthatthelaw forwhat thinkareverygood
reasons- is stopping peoplefromdoingwhattheywant. It does not
helptheautonomy objectionthateventhosewho maketheobjection
acknowledge thewrongness and thesocialundesirability ofthespeech
theyare protecting, and thesuffering (ifnottheharm)thatit inflicts
uponothers.In othercircumstances, theymightbe tempted to use the
old distinctionbetweenlibertyand license to characterizehate
speech.146 RonaldDworkin,forexample,makesextensive use ofthat
distinctionelsewhere in his politicalphilosophy whenhe suggeststhat
we distinguish betweena flatsenseofliberty in itself,
that"carries, no
suggestion of endorsement," and a normative senseof thewordthat
identifiesa value,virtue,or ideal thatwe endorseand are concerned
about.147In theformer sense,he says,someonemaysaythatliberty is
reducedbylaws prohibiting murder;148 butthatwouldbe a preposter-
ous objectionto thelaws againstmurder.But ouruse of"liberty" in
the lattersenseindicatesthatwe have alreadycalculatedthe impor-
tanceof peopledoingwhattheyplease in a certainarea and found
144 See C. Edwin Baker,Autonomyand InformationalPrivacy,or Gossip:The CentralMeaning

ofthe FirstAmendment, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, July2004,at 215, 225-26; Charles Fried,The New
FirstAmendment Jurisprudence: A Threatto Liberty,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992).
145 See, e.g.,EmploymentDiv. v. Smith,494 U.S. 872 (1990).
146 See, e.g.,JOHNLOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 270 (PeterLaslett ed., Cam-
bridgeUniv. Press 1988) (1690) (observing,concerningthe stateof nature,that"thoughthis be a
State ofLiberty,yetit is nota State ofLicence'*).
147 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equali-
ty 125 (2000).
148 Id.
thatthisbenefit outweighs or trumpsconsiderations ofthedangersor

harmsthatmightaccruefromsuchbehavior.Dworkinuses thisdis-
tinction to show,forexample,thatthereis no real objectionon the
groundsofliberty to thepursuitofeconomicequality.149 The question
I findinteresting is whyDworkinand otheropponents ofhatespeech
regulation do not take thatapproachto the libertyclaimedby the
hatemongers; whytheydo notsay thatwhetherthisis libertyworth
for
fighting dependsprecisely on its potentialforharmto individuals
and thesocialorder.
Alternatively, whatwe need is an accountof whythe libertyat
stakein thecontroversy about hate speechdeservesour specialcon-
cern, in a way that entitlesus to forgocalculationsof harmfulness.
Professor Ed Baker took the view in
thattheelementofself-disclosure
hate speechis what makesit special. The keyvalue, accordingto
Baker,is individualautonomy.For autonomyto be respected, said
Baker,a person"musthave a generalrightoverthevalue-expressive
uses of herself - herown body."150 In somecircumstancesa person
maynotbe permitted to act on hervalues(iftheyare thought to be
harmful to othersor destructive ofthesocialorder).But she mustbe
permitted at leastto discloseand expresshervalues,ifonlyso thatshe
can presentherself to othersand in publicas thevalue-bearing person
shewantsto be (orwantsto be regardedas). Bakerargued:
[T]he law mustnot aim at eliminating or suppressingpeople'sfreedomto
make decisionsabout behavioror values. These requirements have clear
implicationsforspeech,namely,thata personshouldbe able to decidefor
herselfwhat to say.. . . This view centrallyidentifiesthe person with
agency,withaction,and withthe possibility of choice. In a sense,thisis
an activityviewofpersonhood: it favorsa person'sactivityof speechover
thestatusofbeingunknown.151
That viewoffers a plausibleaccountofwhatmightmakespeechspe-
cial, an accountthat mightperhapsexplainan inclination to protect
hatespeechagainstregulation.
But I am notsurewhether theargument works.Baker'sargument
as I
depends, said, on a between
distinction actionsthatdisclosea per-
son'svaluesand wordsthatdisclosea person'svalues. Regulating the
former on Baker'saccount,but regulating
is permissible, thelatteris
not. However,thatdistinction mustassumethatwhatit categorizes as
merewordscannotbe destructive ofindividuallyor sociallyimportant
valuesin theway thatactioncan; a reference to autonomy cannotby
itselfexplainwhywe want to immunizeself-disclosing wordsfrom
149 See id. at 128-39.

150 Baker,supra note 143,at 142. Baker further
arguesthat"[a] personis not treatedas formal-
ly autonomousifthelaw deniesherthe riehtto use herown expressionto embodyherviews." Id.
151 Baker,supra note 144,at 225-26.
regulation,because actions mightbe equally importantfor self-

disclosure.Now,thewholetenorofmyargument in PartII is to show
thatwords,especiallywhentheyare expressedin a publiclyvisible
and enduringform, undermine
can seriously socialvaluesthatare im-
for the and
portant sustaining dignity reputation of vulnerableindi-
viduals. That effectdoes notevaporateas soonas theword"autono-
my"is mentioned,152 and unlessBaker and otherswho make this
argument want to suggestthatanything thatdisclosesa person'sval-
ues mustbe immunized fromregulation no matterhowdangerous itis,
thenwe cannotregardautonomyas a conclusiveobjectionin the
presentcontext.
B. ViewpointDiscrimination
I am also not convincedby arguments thatcomplainthat hate
speech legislationrestrictsfree expressionon the groundsof the
contentor theviewpoint I knowthisidea is one of
beingexpressed.153
the centralpillarsof Americanfreespeechdoctrine.154 Indeed,not
only does my argumentin favorof the regulationof hate speech
confrontthe doctrinethatprohibits viewpointdiscrimination,it also
confrontswhat seem to be the mostcompelling reasonsbehindthe
doctrine.In the view of Professor Geoffrey Stone,"[b]ydefinition,
content-based restrictionsdistortpublicdebatein a content-differen-
tial manner.. . . Such a law mutilates'the thinkingprocessof the
community.'"155
152 Of course, those who make the autonomyargumentoftendispute the impact that hate
speech is said to have on others,and no doubt theywill disputethe claims about the importance
of assurance and the claims about the impact of hate speech upon assurance that I have made
in Part II of this Article. They may or may not be rightabout this,but it is odd to thinkthat
thisposition- whichis essentiallyan empiricalclaim - should be nourishedby the claim about
autonomy. No doubt those who make the autonomyclaim want it to be true that hate speech
does not have a deleteriousimpact,but certainlythe claim about autonomydoes not give any
reason forthinkingthatthatis true. On the contrary, wherean exerciseof freedomin Dworkin's
"flat sense," see supra p. 1636, is challenged on groundsof the social harm that it produces,
that challengemust be evaluated beforewe decide that the exerciseof freedomis entitledto an
elevateddesignationsuch as autonomy.The autonomydesignationcannotbe used to brushaside
thechallenge.
153 I shall treatthesetwo ideas - content-basedregulationand viewpoint-basedregulation-
as synonymous.
154 Americanfreespeech doctrinerestson the principlethat an impositionon the freedomof
speech may not be based on the viewpointof the speakers,the particularcontentof what is said,
or the distancebetweenwhat is said and some officialorthodoxyto whicheveryonein societyis
supposed to subscribein public. For a helpfuldiscussionof the analyticdifficultiessurrounding
thisdistinction, see generallyR. George Wright,Content-Basedand Content-Neutral Regulation
ofSpeech: The Limitationsofa CommonDistinction,60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333 (2006).
155Geoffrey
R. Stone,Content-Neutral 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46,55 (1987)(quoting
Restrictions,
Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of
the People 27 (i960)).
Now,wordslike"distort" and "mutilate" begthequestion,privileg-

ing what publicdebate would be like without intervention.It is worth
askingwhy we should the
privilege unregulated process itsoutput.
or
Defenders offreespeechsometimes drawan analogyto freemarkets in
theeconomicsphere. Leftto themselves, freemarketsmaygenerate
efficientoutcomesby processesthateconomists say theyunderstand.
And analogously, it is said (thoughwithoutany analogousexplana-
tion),in thelongrunthefreemarketplace ofideas willgeneratetruth
or theacceptanceoftruthifit is leftto itsowndevices. Actuallythis
is moreof a superstition thananalogy. Economistsunderstand why
economicmarketsare capableofproducing somegoodthingsand not
others;theymay produceefficiency, but theymay not producedis-
tributive or
justice theymay undermine justice. In the
distributive
of
case ofthemarketplace ideas, is truththe analogueofefficiency or
of
is ittheanalogue justice?
Stoneis surelyrightto pointoutthatrestrictions on groupdefama-
tionor hatespeechare intendedto modify thecharacterof publicde-
bate. Thatis thewholepoint.Theyare designedto havesuchan im-
pact in circumstances whereit is reasonableto believethatwithout
regulation publicdebatewillhaveeffects thatthegovernment has rea-
son to be concerned about. We enactand enforcerestrictions on the
economicmarketforthisreasonall thetime,prohibiting certaintrans-
actionsand regulating others.We do thisin themarketplace ofideas,
too,as withtherestriction ofchildpornography.
C. RonaldDworkiris Argument AboutLegitimacy
The objectionsI seekto dismissmaygaintractionby beingasso-
ciatedwitharguments abouttherelationship betweenfreeexpression
and thepoliticalsystem.A democracy is supposednotonlyto respect
theautonomy ofitsvoters,butalso to be responsive to theviewsthat
they hold. And the is
politicalprocess supposed to be governed bythe
expression of views of the not
citizens, rigged in advance to privilege
someviewpoints overothers.
Thereare a numberof arguments in the literature thatlinkthe
protection of free speech to the of
flourishing self-government in a de-
mocracy. Some say littlemore than it
that,thoughtheysay sonorously
and at greatlength.156 In a fewofthesearguments, however, theposi-
tionis advancedbeyonda generalconcernforthedemocratic process.
It is sometimes said thata freeand unrestricted publicdiscourseis a
sinequa nonforpoliticallegitimacy in a democracy.157
156 See generally,e.g.,MEIKLEJOHN,supra note 155.

157 See, e.g., JamesWeinstein,ExtremeSpeech, Public Order,and Democracy,in Extreme
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY,supra note 10, at 23, 28, 38. ProfessorRobertPost also makes this
Some make the pointeven morestronglythanthatand suggestthat

the politicallegitimacyof certainspecificlegal provisionsand institu-
tional arrangementsmay be imperiledby the enactmentand enforce-
mentof hate speech laws. The mostpowerfulargumentof thiskind is
presentedby Ronald Dworkin.158 Accordingto ProfessorDworkin,
freedomto engage in hate speech or groupdefamationis the price we
pay for enforcingthe laws that the haters and defamersoppose (for
example, laws forbiddingdiscrimination).Here's how the argument
goes:
Dworkin agrees that it is importantforthe law to protectpeople,
particularlyvulnerableminorities, from,forexample,discrimination or
"unfairnessand inequalityin employmentor educationor housing."159
He is as committedto these laws as any proponentof racial equality.
Now, everyoneknows thatif we adopt such laws, oftenit will have to
be over the oppositionof people who favordiscrimination.In the face
of such opposition,we usuallysay thatit is sufficient thatsuch laws be
a
supportedby majority of voters or elected representatives,provided
of course that the opponentsof the bills are not disenfranchised from
that process. They must have a chance to vote against it or vote for
candidateswho oppose it,just as we have the chance to vote in its fa-
vor. But actually,says Dworkin,thisis not all thatis required:
Fairdemocracy requires. . . thateach citizenhavenotjust a votebut
a voice:a majoritydecisionis notfairunlesseveryone has had a fair
opportunity to expresshis or her attitudesor opinionsor fearsor
tastesorpresuppositions or prejudicesor ideals,notjustin thehopeof
influencingothers(thoughthathopeis cruciallyimportant), but also
just to confirmhis or herstandingas a responsible agentin, rather
thana passivevictimof,collective action.160
Opponents of antidiscrimination laws must have the opportunityto
voice theiropposition,and the groundof theiropposition,in public;
otherwisethe politicalprocessby which theiroppositionis defeatedis
unfair. Free expression,says Dworkin,is a necessaryconditionof po-
litical legitimacy:"The majorityhas no rightto impose its will on
someonewho is forbiddento raise a voice in protest. . . beforethe de-
cision is taken."161If we want legitimatelaws againstviolenceor dis-
crimination, we mustlet theiropponentsspeak. And thenwe can legi-
timizethoselaws by voting.
argument. See RobertC. Post,Racist Speech, Democracy,and the First Amendment,

32 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 267, 279-83 (1991).
158 Dworkin,supra note 10,at v-ix.
1S9 Id. at viii.
160 Id. at vii.
!6i Id.
Now,someopponentsof antidiscrimination laws will have no de-

sireto expresstheiropposition hatefully. But some may;forthem,de-
the
faming groups thatthese laws are supposed protectis the es-
to
senceoftheiropposition.Dworkin 's positionis thatit does notmatter
howfouland viciousthehatemonger's contribution to politicaldebate
is. He mustbe allowedhissay. Otherwise no legitimacy willattachto
thelawsthatare enactedoverhisopposition.It does notevenmatter
thatthehatemonger's speechis notcouchedas a contribution to politi-
cal debateat all. "A community's and
legislation policy," saysDwor-
kin, "are determined more by its moral and cultural environment, the
mixof its people'sopinions,prejudices, tastes,and attitudesthan by
editorialcolumnsor partypoliticalbroadcastsor stump political
speeches."162 Whether themessageis scrawledon thewalls,smeared
on a leaflet,paintedup on a banner,spat out ontotheinternet, or il-
luminated by the glareof a burningcross, it must be allowed to make
its presencefeltin themaelstrom of messagesthatpopulatethemar-
ketplaceofideas.
And so, Dworkin'slegitimacy argumentboils down to this:we
wantto protectpeoplewithlaws againstdiscrimination and violence,
and it is naturalto wantto legislatealso againstthecausesofdiscrim-
inationand violence.163 But,forDworkin,thereis onlyso muchwe
can do aboutthosecauseswithout forfeiting legitimacy forthelawswe
mostcare about. Perhapswe can legislateagainstincitement.But,
Dworkinwouldsay:
[W]e mustnottryto intervene furtherupstream, by forbiddingany
expressionof the attitudesor prejudicesthat we think nour-
ish... inequality,because if we intervenetoo soon in the process
through whichcollectiveopinionis formed, we spoiltheonlydemo-
we haveforinsisting
craticjustification thateveryone obeytheselaws,
eventhosewhohateand resentthem.164
The structureof the positionis interesting.Dworkinrecognizes
thatarguments abouthatespeechofteninvolvetwosortsoflaws,not
one. On theone hand,thereare thehatespeechlaws themselves (or
re-
the proposalsthatpeoplewould like to see enacted):regulations
stricting
expressionsof racial or hatred,
religious groupdefamation,
and so on. On theotherhand,thereare otherlawsin placeprotecting
162 Id. at viii.

163 In addition,Dworkin has doubts about some of the causal claims made by defendersof
hate speech laws. Id. at vi. That is a separate argument,though,as I observed,see supra note
152, it is perhaps not surprisingthat opponentsof hate speech legislationhope that the causal
claims are false. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW:THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICANCONSTITUTION 219 (1996) (commentingon the causal claims of anti-pornography
campaigners).
164 Dworkin,supra note 10, at viii.
thepeoplewho are supposedly by hatespeechlaws -

also protected
laws againstdiscrimination,
hatecrimes,and so on. FollowingDwor-
kin's metaphor,I am goingto call theseupstreamlaws and down-
streamlaws.165
Those who supporttheupstream laws oftensay thattheyare nec-
essary in orderto address the causes of violationsof thedownstream
laws. If we leave hate speechalone,theysay,thenwe are leaving
alonethepoisonthatleads to violenceand discrimination. Dworkin
turnsthetableson thisargument by saying that ifyou coer-
interfere
civelyupstream then you undermine politicallegitimacy downstream
- and that,he thinks, is a costthateventhedefenders ofhatespeech
legislationshouldnotbe willing to incur.
D. Legitimacy:A DifferenceofDegree
The firstthingto say in responseto Dworkin 's argument is that
thereis a questionaboutwhat"spoiling thelegitimacy" ofthesedown-
streamlaws amountsto.166In socialscience,legitimacy oftenmeans
littlemorethanpopularsupport. Dworkinmeansit, however,as a
normativeproperty: eitherthe existenceof a politicalobligationto
obeythelawsor theappropriateness ofusingforceto upholdthem.167
Whichever of thesehe means,thereis a questionabouthow literally
we shouldtaketheclaimthatlegitimacy is spoiledbytheenforcement
ofhatespeechlaws. I knowthatDworkindoes notmeanthatracists
are entitledto riseup in revoltagainsta societythatenforceshate
speechregulation: it is nota loss oflegitimacy in thatdrasticsense.168
Butthenwhatsortoflossoflegitimacy arewe talkingabout?
At worstitis supposedto be a lossoflegitimacy in relationto these
particular downstream laws, rather than a catastrophic loss of legiti-
macy for the legal and politicalsystemgenerally. But even withthat
the
limitation, position seems counterintuitive ifit is taken In
literally.
Britain, there are laws the
forbidding expression of racial hatred.169
Thereare also laws forbidding racial discrimination, not to mention
laws forbidding racial and ethnicviolenceand intimidation,170 and
laws againstcriminaldamage protecting mosques and synagogues
fromdesecration; thesearethedownstream laws,thelawswhoselegit-
imacyDworkinbelievesis hostageto theenforcement of hatespeech
165 id.
166 It will be obvious in what followsthatI am greatlyindebtedto ProfessorDworkinfordis-
cussingwithme theideas in thisand thefollowingsections.
167 See DWORKIN,supra note 140,at 190-92.
168 Email fromRonald Dworkinto author(Oct. 4, 2009, 21:34 EST) (on filewiththe Harvard
Law School Library).
lõy Public OrderAct, 1986,c. 64, §§ 3, 3A.
170 Race RelationsAct, 1976,c. 74, § 70.
regulation.Shouldwe reallybelievethatin Britaincitizenshave no

obligationto obeythesedownstream laws? Shouldwe reallybelieve
thattheenforcement ofthesedownstream laws is morallywrongand
thattheuse offorceto upholdthemis just likeanyotherillegitimate
use of force? A landlorddiscriminates againstEnglishfamiliesof
SouthAsiandescentin a waythatis prohibited bytheRace Relations
Act. Do we reallywantto say thathe has no obligation to obeythe
antidiscrimination law and thatno actionshouldbe takenagainsthim,
at leastso longas the statutebook also containsprovisions banning
himfrompublishing virulentanti-Pakistani views? Some skinheads
beatup a Muslimminicabdriverin thewakeofthe7/7atrocities.Is it
wrongforthepoliceto pursue,arrest,and indicttheseassailantsbe-
cause Britainhas religioushate speechlaws, whichdeprivedown-
streamlaws forbidding thissortof assaultof theirlegitimacy?Must
thepolice stand by and notintervene, becauseanyintervention would
be wrong? On a literal
account, that is what of
"deprived legitimacy"
means. It is notjust Britain.Almosteveryadvanceddemocracy has
hatespeechlaws,which,according to Dworkin,spoilthelegitimacy of
anyantidiscrimination laws thattheyhave.171It wouldseemthatthe
onlyadvanceddemocracy entitled to haveand enforce suchlawsis the
UnitedStates. Can thatbe right?That is Americanexceptionalism
witha vengeance.
Dworkinbelievesthathatespeechlaws may"spoiltheonlydemo-
craticjustificationwe haveforinsisting thateveryone obey[thedown-
stream]laws."172But I do notthinkhe reallymeansus to takethis
phrasein theliteralsenseconsidered in thepreviousparagraph.Any
argument will look sillyif "it is pushedto an extreme."173 So let us
considersomemoremoderatepossibilities.One possibility is thatthe
enforcement of hate speechlaws undermines the legitimacy of some
downstream laws and notothers:perhapsit undermines thelegitimacy
of laws forbidding discrimination but notthe legitimacy of laws for-
biddingviolence. Afterall, laws of thelattertypehave independent
reasonsin theirfavorquiteapartfromthedebateoverrace. But this
positionwillbe hardforDworkinto maintainin lightofhismoreho-
listicobservations abouttheimportance forlegitimacyofspeechthatis
justpartoftheculturalenvironment, evenwhenitis notintended as a
contribution toformaldiscussion ofanyparticular law.174
171 See Dworkin,supra note 10, at viii.

u¿ Id.
173 Cf.John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 26 (CurrinV. Shields ed., 1956) (1859) ("Strangeit
is thatmen should admit the validityof the argumentsforfreediscussion,but object to theirbe-
ing 'pushed to an extreme,'not seeingthatunless the reasonsare good foran extremecase, they
are notgood forany case.").
174 See supra p. 1641.
A second possibility(compatiblewiththe first)is thatthe legitima-

cy any given law is itselfa matterof degreeand that,on the mod-
of
erate versionof D workingsargument,the enforcement of hate speech
laws diminishesthe legitimacyof downstreamlaws withoutdestroying
it altogether.I will addressthispointin detailin a moment.
A thirdpossibility(also compatiblewiththe othertwo) is that legi-
timacyis relativeto persons. ProfessorRobert Post has suggesteda
versionof this:"If the statewere to forbidthe expressionof a particu-
lar idea, the governmentwould become, with respectto individuals
holdingthatidea, heteronomousand nondemocratic."175 In Dworkin's
argument one mightsay the downstream law becomes legitimatelyun-
enforceableas against the person silenced by the upstreamlaw even
though it may be legitimatelyenforceableagainst others. But this
third possibilitygets tangled up in issues about generality. Hate
speech laws are presentedin quite generalterms:theyforbidanyone
fromhatefuldefamationof racial, ethnic,and religiousgroups. Even
if theyonlyhave to be enforcedagainst a fewisolatedextremists, they
have (and are intendedto have) a chillingeffecton everyone'sspeech.
The second moderatepositionseems the mostplausible: legitimacy
is not an all-or-nothing matter;the existenceof hate speech laws di-
minishesthe legitimacyof downstreamlaws but does not eliminateit
altogether.Dworkinputs it thisway:
[T]here is somethingmorallyto regretwhen we enforcegeneralnon-
discriminationlaws againstracistswho werenot allowedto influencethe
formaland informalpoliticalcultureas theywishedto do. On balance
Britainis entitledto enforcesuch laws,I think,but we are leftwitha def-
icitin legitimacy- something to regretunderthattitle- becauseof the
censorship.176
So it is all a matterof degree:177the "somethingto regret"mightbe
moreor less considerable;the "deficitin legitimacy"mightbe largeror
smaller.
However, if we are going to recognizedifferencesof degree, we
should recognizethemon the otherside of the equation as well. Let
me explain. On a given issue - say the desirabilityof an antidis-
criminationlaw - an individual,X, may have a rangeof views:
(1) X may oppose it because he thinkshe will be worse offunder
the law;
(2) X may oppose it because he thinksit will generateperverseeco-
nomicincentives,undermining economicefficiency;
175 Post,supra note 157,at 290 (emphasisadded).

176 Email fromRonald Dworkinto author,supra note 168.
177 For a generalacknowledgement thatlegitimacyis a matterof degree,see RONALD DWOR-
KiN, Is Democracy Possible Here? 97 (2006).
(3) X may oppose it because he distruststhe bureaucracynecessary

to administerit; and
(4) X may oppose it because he denies that the intendedbeneficia-
riesof thelaw are worthyof the protectionthatit offersthem.
Let us focus particularlyon (4). It may be expressedin various
ways:
(4a) X may simplyexpresshis dissentfromthe broad abstractprin-
ciple that governmentsmust show equal concernand respectto all
membersof the community;
(4b) X may expoundsome racial theorythathe thinksshows the in-
feriority of certainracial or ethnicgroups;
(4c) may expressthe view that the citizenswho are intendedto
X
be protectedby the antidiscrimination law are no betterthan animals;
and
(4d) X may say in a leafletor on the radio thatthesecitizensare no
betterthan the sortof animals we would normallyseek to exterminate
(like ratsor cockroaches).
Out of all thesevarious views and expressions,laws regulatinghate
speech or group defamationare almost certainto restrict(4d), quite
likelyto restrict(4c), and maybetheywill restrictsome versionsof (4b)
dependingon how hatefullytheseviews are expressed.
On the otherhand, mostsuch laws bend over backwardsto ensure
that thereis a lawful way of expressingsomethinglike the proposi-
tionalcontentof views thatbecomeobjectionablewhen expressedpub-
liclyas vituperation.They ofteninsiston certainadverbial character-
isticsas a conditionof restriction: in Britain,forexample,racisthate
speech that is not expressedin a way that is "threatening, abusive, or
insulting"is not to be restricted.178 Some such laws also tryaffirma-
tivelyto definea legitimatemode of roughlyequivalent expression,a
sortof "safe haven" forthe moderateexpressionof the gistof the view
whose hatefulor hate-inciting expressionis prohibited.The mostgen-
erous such provisionI have seen is in the AustralianRacial Discrimi-
nationAct, whichsays thatits basic ban on actionsthatinsult,humil-
iate, or intimidatea groupof people done because of theirrace, color,
or nationalor ethnicorigin"does not renderunlawfulanythingsaid or
done reasonablyand in good faith:... in the courseof any statement,
publication,discussionor debate made or held for any genuine aca-
demic,artisticor scientificpurposeor any othergenuinepurposein the
178 Britain prohibits the display of "any written material which is threatening, abusive or in-
sulting" if its display is associated with an intention "to stir up racial hatred," but says that no of-
fense is committed if the person concerned "did not intend ... the written material, to be, and
was not aware that it might be, threatening, abusive or insulting." Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64,
§ i8(i)(a).
publicinterest."179 The purposeofthesequalifications is preciselyto

limittheapplicationoftherestriction to thebottomend ofsomething
likea (4a)-(4d)spectrum.
Now ifwe adoptthebasicframework ofD workings positionand if
we acceptthatlegitimacy is a matterof degree,we maywantto say
thata law thatprohibited theexpression of(4a) and (4b) as wellas (4c)
and (4d) wouldhave a worseeffect on downstream legitimacy thana
law thatmerely forbadesomething like(4d). Andifwe had a law that
was specificallytailoredto prohibit onlyexpression at theviciously vi-
tuperative end of this it
spectrum, might be an openquestion whether
itwouldhaveanything morethana minimaleffect on legitimacy.
Partofourestimation oftheeffect on legitimacy wouldsurelyalso
dependupon the reasonableness and importance the objectivesof
of
therestrictiveupstream laws. We see something similarwithregardto
wöwcontent-based restrictions on speech(laws restricting time,place,
and mannerofpoliticaldemonstrations, forexample).If suchrestric-
tionsare arbitrary or motivated by onlyveryminorconsiderations of
publicorder,we mightsay thattheygravelyimpairthelegitimacy of
collectivedecisionson thematters thatthedemonstrators wantto ad-
dress. But ifthemotivation is basedon seriousconsiderations ofsecu-
we mightbe moreunderstanding.
rity, Something similarmaybe true
in thecase ofhatespeechlaws. A motivation orientedpurelyto pro-
tectpeople'sfeelings againstoffense is one thing.But a restriction on
hatespeechoriented to protecting thebasic socialstanding - theele-
mentary dignity,as I have putit - ofmembers ofvulnerablegroups,
and to maintaining theassurancetheyneedin orderto go abouttheir
livesin a secureand dignified manner,mayseemlike a muchmore
compelling objective. And the complaintthatattempting to secure
thisdignitydamagesthe legitimacy of otherlaws maybe muchless
credibleas a result.
E. Timeand Settlement
We wouldnotdo justiceto D workings argumentwithout discussing
onemuchmoredifficult and challengingresponseto it. If theproposal
wereto ban peoplefromexpressing contemptibleviewsaboutwelfare
recipientsor aboutdemocratic socialism,thenI thinktherewouldbe a
case to be madealongthelinesofD workings argument - a case that
suchsuppression wouldput in questionthelegitimacy of our pursuit
of policiesbased on premisesthatpeoplewerebeingfinedor put in
jail fordenying.But, as I said in PartII, we are talkingaboutthe
fundamentals of justice,not its contestable
elements.180 By the fun-
179 Racial DiscriminationAct, 1975,§ 18D.

180 See supra note in and accompanyingtext.
damentalsofjustice,I meanthingslikeelementary racialequality, the

basic equalityofthesexes,thedignity of thehumanperson,freedom
fromviolenceand intimidation, and so on. Thesematters are founda-
tionalin two senses. On the one hand,theyrepresent thingsthat
on and
peoplerely comprehensively diffusely in almost everyaspectof
theirdealingswithothers.If one cannotexactrespectforone's basic
statusas a rights-bearing individual, thenalmosteverything is thrown
intoquestion. On the otherhand,theyare also fundamental in the
sensethattheyrepresent relatively settled or
points premises mod-of
ernsocialand legalorganization.181 I do notmeanthatthereis literal
unanimity aboutthem- thehatemongers showthat. Still,thesemat-
tersare moreor less settledin our laws and Constitution and so it is
notjustmorally butit is also quitereasonablenowforus to
necessary,
treatthemas foundations foran awfullot else thatwe do. A debate
can be overin thesensethatintelligent opinionhas settledthematter
and it is inconceivable thatpublicpolicycouldproceedon anyother
basis,and yettherecan stillbe dangerousenclavesof politically pow-
erlessbut sociallydestructive outlierswho do what theycan to un-
dermine thefurnishing ofassurancesbasedon thesesettlements.
So banninghatespeechshouldnotbe understood as a way of in-
fluencing thegreatnationaldebateaboutracialor sexualequalityor
religioustolerance, norshouldit be seen as a way of contributing to
theendingofthatdebate(as thoughwithouttheintervention ofthese
laws the racistsmightwin). The argumentabout assurancethatI
madein PartII presupposes thatthedebateis moreor lessover. The
evilthatit seeksto remedy is nottheeviloftheracists'thinking or be-
lievingcertainthings.Rather,it is theevil of theseraciststrying to
createtheimpression thattheequal positionofmembers ofvulnerable
minorities in a rights-respectingsocietyis less securethanimpliedby
thesociety'sactualfoundational commitments.
Maybetherewas a timewhenwe had to have a greatnationalde-
bateaboutrace- aboutwhether thereweredifferent kindsofhuman
beings, inferior and superior lines of human descent,rankedhierar-
chiesofcapability, and
responsibility, authority.182 But I thinkitis fat-
uousto suggestthatwe are in thethroesofsucha debatenow- a vi-
tal and ongoingdebateof a sortthatrequiresus to endurethe ugly
invectiveofracialdefamation as a contribution in our continuing de-
liberation on a moreor less openquestion.Thereis a sensein which
thedebateaboutraceis over,won,finished.As I said,thereare outly-
ingdissenters; butwe are movingforwardas a societyas thoughthis
181 For a helpfulcharacterization - in relationto racial equality- see David

of thissettlement
Kretzmer, FreedomofSpeech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. Rev. 445, 447 (1987).
182 See, e.g.,Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West 277-368
(1996).
wereno longera matterof seriousor considerable contestation. And

thebasison whichwe moveforward is thatthesettling ofthisdebate
is fundamental to almosteveryaspectofthewellbeing, dignity,and se-
of
curity formerly vulnerable minorities. On issueslike affirmative ac-
tion, we continue to debate of
ways moving forward on the basis of
the settledconviction thatracismis wrong,but we are no longerin
needofa continuing debateaboutthepremises ofthatargument.
If anything like this is true,thenthereis something odd about
D workings legitimacy argument. The he
impression givesis thatthe
discourseto whichracisthatemongers offertheir"contributions" is a
living element of publicdebate, on which we divide temporarily into
majorities and minorities, butin respectto whichno majoritarian laws
can be legitimate unlessthereis someprovision forthisimportant de-
bate to continue, so thatthelosers(theracistsand thebigots)have a
fairopportunity to persuadethe majorityof theirpositionon these
fundamentals thenexttimearound. D workings positionseemsto as-
sumethatdebatesare timelessand thatconsiderations of politicalle-
gitimacy relative to public debate must be understood in a waythatis
to
impervious progress and settlement.
I understand thedelicacyof any claimthata debateis overand
finished and thatanyfurther attempt to challengethewinning position
shouldnow be suppressed.183 To clarify:I am notputtingthisclaim
forward as an all-purpose licenseforthesuppression ofdissentor un-
popularviewsor evenas an all-purpose responseto objectionsto the
regulation ofhatespeech. I am usingtheidea ofa debatebeingover
onlywithreference to thisquestionofhowseriously we shouldregard
theDworkinian alarmaboutlegitimacy, particularlyin lightofDwor-
kin'sownacknowledgment thattheeffect ofhatespeechlawson legit-
imacyis a matterof degree. The legitimacy-impact of restricting de-
bateaboutan issuethatis liveand openseemsto me quitea different
matterfromthe legitimacy-impact of restricting continueddebate
abouta foundational issuethatwas settledeffectively decadesago.
I am mindful ofJohnStuartMill's pointabouttheimportance of
sustaining a "livingapprehension" of the truthson whichour social
systemis organized, evenwhencertaindebatesare forall intentsand
purposessettled.Mill worriedin hisessayOn Libertythatthesettled
foundations of our social philosophy mightbecomestale unlesswe
keptalive a senseofwhatneededto be said to theirmostdetermined
and persistent opponents.184 Mostofus, however, partcompanywith
Millwhenhe seemsto suggestthatitmightbe appropriate to cultivate
183 j would notlike to see such a claim in the hands of someonewho thought,forexample,that
thedebate about socialismwas over.
184 See MILL, supra note 173, at 48-55.
oppositionin orderto enlivenour deepestconvictions.185

We might
agreewithMill when he says:
As mankind improve[s],the number of doctrineswhich are no longer dis-
puted . . . will be constantlyon the increase; and the well-being of man-
kind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths
which have reached the point of being uncontested. The cessation, on one
question afteranother,of serious controversyis ... as salutary in the case
of true opinions as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are er-
roneous.186
Yet we neednotaccepthis claimthatthiscessationofcontroversy
bringswithit a certaincost- namely, "[t]heloss of so important an
aid to the. . . livingapprehension of a truthas is afforded by thene-
cessityof... defending it againstf]
opponents."187 Mill concedesthat
thelossoflivelydebateis notsufficient to outweigh thebenefit ofthe
universalrecognition ofsometruth, buthe saysit is "no trifling draw-
back."188 He evensuggests thatifwe did nothavelocalraciststo keep
our egalitarianism alive and jumping,we mighthave to invent
them.189 Mostpeople,I think,are verycharyofthatratherdaftsug-
gestion,and rightly so whenmanufacturing or empowering a "dissen-
tientchampion"190 has an effect notonlyon theliveliness ofthedebate
butalso (and destructively) on thedignity-based assuranceofvulnera-
ble members ofsociety.
Let me emphasizeagainthattheargument ofthissectionis devel-
oped, not as a freestanding position,but as a responseto Professor
D workings argument aboutlegitimacy.I thinkwe are now past the
stagewherewe are in needofsucha robustdebateaboutmatters like
racethatwe oughtto bearthecostsofwhatamountto attackson the
dignity and reputation of minority groups- or,moreimportantly, to
requireindividualsandfamilieswithinthosegroupsto bearthecosts
of suchhumiliating attackson theirdignity and socialstanding- in
theinterests ofpublicdiscourseand politicallegitimacy. I believewe
are wellpastthepointwherewe wouldsacrifice thelegitimacy ofour
antidiscrimination laws or thelaws prohibiting racialviolenceby not
permitting peopleto defameoneanotherin thesetermsand withthose
effects.
185See id. at 53-55.

186/¿.at 53.
187 Idm
188 Id.
189 See id. at 54.
!90 Id.
1650 HARVARDLAWREVIEW [Vol.123:1596
F. TheOwensCase in Saskatoon
This distinctionbetweendebatesthatare overand debatesthatare
notis illustratedbya recentCanadiandecision.In 1997,a corrections
officer in SaskatchewannamedHugh Owens offered forsale in the
SaskatoonStarPhoenixnewspapera bumperstickerdesignedto pro-
claimwhat he believedto be the Christianmessageconcerning gay
marriageand perhapshomosexualrelationsin general. He said that
theadvertisement was a Christian responseto GayPrideWeek.191 Af-
tera complaint bythreegaymen,whofeltthattheadvertisement be-
littledthemand subjectedthemto publichatred,Owenswas hauled
beforea one-person board of inquiry,set up by the Saskatchewan
HumanRightsCommission in Saskatoon.192He and the newspaper
wereorderedto pay $1500to thecomplainants.193 A courtin Saska-
toonupheldthedecision,194 butwhenOwensappealedto theSaskat-
chewanCourtofAppeals,it reversed thedecision.195The courtofap-
peals recognized that "[p]artof the context whichmust informthe
meaning of Mr. Owens' advertisement is thelonghistory discrimi-
of
nationagainstgay,lesbian,bisexualand trans-identified peoplein this
country and elsewhere."196But it also said this:
thattheadvertisement
[I]t is significant . . . was published... in themid-
dle ofan ongoingnationaldebateabouthow Canadian legal and constitu-
tional regimesshould or should not accommodatesexual identities. ...
Parliamentwould not pass legislationto make government programsand
benefitsavailableon an equal basis to gay and lesbiancouplesuntilthree
yearsafterthe advertisement appeared. WhenMr. Owens' messagewas
the
published judicial sanctioning of same-sexmarriagein Saskatchewan
was still seven years in the futureand its sanctioningby the Supreme
CourtofCanada was eightyearsin thefuture.This does notmeanthata
newlywon rightto be freefromdiscrimination shouldbe accordedless
191 Anti-gaysAd Draws Protests,THE RECORD (Kitchener- Waterloo,Ont), July4, 1997,at A6

("Regina residentHugh Owens said he placed the ad in responseto an ad announcingGay Pride
Week in Saskatoon. He said he was notcondoninggay-bashingbut 'as a Christian,I feltI had to
respondin some way.'").
192 I shouldexplainthatCanada employswhat is in myview a verysillyarrangementutilizing
human rightscommissions,which seem to have the power to summoncitizensto appear before
themand issue injunctionsand penalties,and initiatesome hate speechproceedingsin responseto
privatecomplaints. Under the Canadian Human RightsAct, 2010 S.C., ch. H-6, the Human
RightsCommissionadministersthe hate speech and otherprovisionsofthe statute. In manyoth-
er countries,similarlaws are administeredmuch more carefully, oftenwith a requirementthat
prosecutionsnot proceedwithoutthe specificauthorizationof the AttorneyGeneral in his or her
nonpartisancapacity. See, e.g.,Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 27(1) (statingthat"[n]o proceed-
ings foran offenceunderthisPart may be institutedin England and Wales exceptby or withthe
consentof theAttorneyGeneral").
193 Hellquistv. Owens,[2001]40 C.H.R.R. D/197,para. 34 (Sask. Bd. Inq.) (Can.).
194 Owens v. Human RightsComm'n,[2002] 228 Sask. R. 148 (Sask. Q.B.) (Can.).
195 Owens v. Human RightsComm'n,[2006] 279 Sask. R. 161 (Sask. Ct. App.) (Can.).
196 Id. at 177.
vigorousprotection than similarrightsbased on morehistorically estab-

lishedgrounds.... But,forpurposesofapplyinga provisionlike[this],it
is importantto considerMr. Owens' advertisement in the contextof the
timeand circumstances in whichit was published.That environment fea-
turedan activedebateand discussionabouttheplace of sexualidentity in
Canadian society.. . . Seen in thisbroadercontext,Mr. Owens' advertise-
menttendsto takeon thecharacterofa positionadvancedin a continuing
public policydebate ratherthan... a messageof hatredor ill will ....
Both the Board of Inquiryand the Chambersjudge erredby failingto
giveanyconsideration to thiswidercontext.197
Manyconservative Christiansin Canada seemto havethought that
Owens's speechshouldhavebeenprotected becauseall he did was cite
Bible passages.198But thatwas nottheargument ofthecourtof ap-
peal, and rightly so. If someonehad set up an equivalentbumper
stickerwitha citationofGenesis9:18-29and an equals signand a de-
pictionof slavery, the factthatit was a Bible quotationwould not
help. Equally,had Owensproduceda bumperstickercitingthesame
passageswiththemessageconveyedin a bumper stickerin Queens-
'
land,Australia,"UnderGod's law the only rights'gayshave is the
rightto die,"199he mightwell have beenliableto penalty.Our com-
mitment to theprincipleof humandignityhas advancedbeyondthe
pointwherethatsortof vituperation is tolerable.For,whateverthe
stateof theongoingdebateaboutgaymarriageand theaccommoda-
tionof sexualidentities, Canada has committed itselfas a societyto
theproposition thatthebasicdignity and socialstanding ofindividuals
- theirbasic entitlement to recognitionand respectin the sensede-
finedbyKeegstra- is unimpaired by whateverwe thinkabouttheir
sexualactivityand aboutcivilrecognition or nonrecognition ofvarious
of
types relationships.
I am consciousthatthismayseeman inadequatepositionto those
whoare impatient withprolonging thedebateaboutgaymarriage.It
may seem like a grudging sort of toleration: we respectthe person,
evenwhilewe disagree- and are permitted to expressdisagreement
- aboutthelegalaccommodation oftheirsexuality and relationships.
But I am notpresenting thispositionas a generaltheoryoftoleration
or of thecivilrightsof gaysand lesbians. It is presented onlyas an
accountof whenprosecution forhatespeechmayor maynotbe ap-
197Id. at 177-78(citations
omitted).
198See ReligiousTolerance.org, Discriminate:
FreedomofCanadianstoReligiously A Canadian
Civil RightsRulingDealing withAnti-GayHate Versesin the Bible, http://www.religious
t0lerance.org/bibLhate3.htm(lastvisitedMar.27,2010).
199See SomebodyThinkof the Children,Anti-GayBumperSticker:Free Speech,Hate
Speech?(Sept. 24, 2008),http^/www.somebodythinkofthechildren.com/anti-gay-bumper-sticker-
(discussing
free-speech-hate-speech/ a Queensland thatled to a conviction
bumpersticker under
hatespeechlegislation).
propriate,and - likeeverything I said in theprevioussection- it is

developed as a response to the Dworkin positionthateverything must
be leftfreeand completely up for grabs. It illustrates
Dworkin 's posi-
tionthattheremaybe a seriousloss of politicallegitimacy ifreal de-
batesare closeddowntooquickly;butI believemyexamplealso illu-
minatesbycontrast thepointI havemade,thatsomesuchdebates-
aboutthebasisofindividualdignity, forexample- mustbe treatedas
over,
essentially at leastso far as the implications ofthelegitimacyar-
gument are concerned.
G. Islamophobia
Everything I havesaid in theselectures is conditioned bya number
of important distinctions: (1) a distinction betweenthebasicsand the
contestable detailsofsocialjusticeand individualidentity, so faras the
restriction ofhatespeechis concerned; (2) a distinction betweenhate-
ful and moderatemodesof expressing essentially the same message,
whichmosthate speechstatutesadmit;(3) a distinction betweenthe
legitimacy implications of regulating speech(forthe sake of dignity
and assurance)whenthespeech"contributes" to a debateaboutfun-
damentalsthatis essentially over and the legitimacy implications of
regulating speech thatcontributes to a debate that is alive and ongo-
ing;(4) a distinction betweenspeechthatundermines thesocialenter-
priseofsecuring dignityand assuranceand speechthatmerely offends;
and finally(5) a distinction betweenattackson a personand attacks
on a positionthattheyholdor thecontent ofa setofbeliefstheyiden-
tify with or a that
lifestyle they are wedded to.
Let me add one wordaboutthatlastdistinction. In manypeople's
minds, there is a connection between Islam, as a religion, and jihadist
terrorism. Indeedthereis a robustdebategoingon insidetheIslamic
community about how substantialor inevitablethis connectionis.
Andthereis a similardebategoingon in theworldat large. Like the
debateaboutgaymarriage, thisdebatetoo is notsettled.To thede-
bate abouttheIslam-terrorist connection, I suspectthatMark Steyn's
infamous piece in Macleans in
magazine Canada,TheNew WorldOr-
and
der,200 maybe even the Danish cartoons(portraying the prophet
Mohammedas a bomb-throwing terrorist)201 make some sort of
twistedcontribution; and I believetheyshouldbe tolerated as such.
I do notmeanthatthesecontributions are admirable.In myview
thereis something foulin the self-righteousness withwhichWestern
liberalshave clamoredforthe publicationand republication of the
200 Mark Steyn,The New WorldOrder,MACLEANS,Oct. 23, 2006,at 30.

201 The cartoons were originallypublished in the Danish newspaperJYLLANDS-POSTEN,
Sept. 30, 2005,at 3.
Danishcartoonsin country aftercountry and forumafterforum.Of-

tenthebesttheycouldsayforthiswas thattheywereupholding their
to
right publish the cartoons. But a right does not give the right-
bearera reasonto exercisetherightone wayor another, norshouldit
insulatehimagainstmoralcriticism.202 My viewis thattheexerciseof
this rightwas unnecessary and offensive; but as I have now said
severaltimes,offensiveness by itself is not a good reasonforlegal
regulation.
However,wherewe are concerned withlaw and prosecutions, it is
also important to distinguish an attackon religious tenetsand evenan
attackon thefounder ofa religion froman attackon thedignity ofthe
believers.It is important notto let one's critiqueof a religious or ec-
or clericalpositionrolloverintothedenigration
clesiastical ofthebe-
lievers'basic social standing, committed as they are to a givenfaith,
church,and religious practicein theirordinary lives. Theyare notto
be defamed, eveniftheirreligiousbeliefsare fairgame. We findthis
distinctionembodiedin statutesprohibiting religioushatred,forexam-
ple in thePublicOrderAct203 in theUnitedKingdom.Section29Q1)
ofthatstatutesaysthat"[a] personwho publishesor distributes writ-
tenmaterialwhichis threatening is guiltyof an offence if he intends
thereby to stirup religious hatred."204 But section29Jinsiststhatthis
shall not "be read... in a way whichprohibitsor restricts ... ex-
pressionsofantipathy, dislike,ridicule, insultor abuseofparticular re-
ligionsor thebeliefsor practicesoftheiradherents."205 No doubtthis
provisionfailsto giveMuslimcommunities thelegal protections that
theywant- namely, protection forIslamor punishment fordefaming
itsfounder - justas thedecisionin theOwenscase in Canada failsto
givethe gay community whatit wants. I have used theseexamples
nevertheless to illustratedistinctions thatI thinknecessarily accompa-
nyanyregulation basedon theconsiderations thatI haveemphasized.
Somewillsaythattheseare hardlinesto draw. So theyare. ButI
do notinferfromthisthatwe shouldtherefore giveup theposition.
Legislativepolicyis oftencomplicated and requiresnuanceddrafting
and carefuladministration, and outsidethe UnitedStatesthe world
has accumulated someexperience ofhowtodrafttheseregulations and
howto administer thesedistinctions. Somepeoplebelievethatno po-
sitioncan be validin thesematters ofconstitutional concernunlessit
is presented withrule-like clarity, is uncontroversially administrable,
and requiresnothing in theway offurther moraljudgmentor careful
202 See generallyJeremyWaldron,A Right To Do Wrong,92 ETHICS 21 (1981), reprintedin

WALDRON,supra note82, at 63.
203 Public OrderAct, 1986,c. 64, amendedby Racial and ReligiousHatred Act,2006,c. 1.
204 Id. § 2oC(i).
205 Id. § 29J.
IÓ54 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.123:1596
thought and discretion.I do notbelongto thatschool. I belongto a

schoolof thoughtthatacceptsthatthe tasksassignedto courtsand
administratorsin matters of fundamental right(forexample,rightsto
freeexpression and to dignity)will oftenbe delicateand challenging,
ofteninvolvebalancingdifferent goodsand essayingdifficult value-
I
judgments. belong to that school,which in other contextsis asso-
ciatedwiththe workof Ronald Dworkin:the moralreadingof the
Constitution.206And I don't thinkpeople shoulddefectfromthis
schoolofthought just becausetheyperceivesomeadvantagein doing
so fortheirpositionin thehatespeechdebate.
H. DistrustofGovernment
I am consciousthatI havenotevencomecloseto addressing all the
arguments thatthereare againsthatespeechlegislation.Forexample,
I have notsaid anything in theselecturesto addressthegeneralmis-
trustof government that many people thinkunderliesall First
Amendment concernsand that explainswhy manyAmericanlegal
scholarsare so opposedto hatespeechlaws.207Let me say something
aboutthatnow.
As I understand it,theidea is thatgovernment interferenceis al-
wayslikelyto be motivatedby officials'lustforpower,theirvanity,
theirmisguided insecurity, or theirundueresponsiveness to majoritar-
ian prejudice,anger,or panic. Officials may not alwaysgetit wrong,
butthereis a standingdangerthattheywill. Whythisdangeris felt
in theparticular area of speech(as opposedto government actionsin
general) and indeed in the even more particularizedarea of content-
basedrestriction on speech,I am notquitesure. Thereis something to
I
it, guess, when the best explanation of some of the prosecutions un-
der the 1798 SeditionAct is the woundedvanityof highofficials or
whenthebestexplanation of someof thetwentieth-century prosecu-
tions- culminating in the 1951decisionabouttheapplicationofthe
SmithAct in Dennisv. UnitedStates208 - has moreto do withthe
unpopularity of a view held a
by minority (members oftheCommunist
for
Party, example) than with any real-worlddangerthatit posesto
thestate. But whywouldanyonethinkthiswas trueof hatespeech
legislationor laws prohibiting groupdefamation?Whyis thisan area
wherewe shouldbe especiallymistrustful of our lawmakers?The
worry about majoritarianism seems particularlystrange. No doubt
thereare caseswheremajorities for
legislate their owninterests to the
206See DWORKIN, supranote163,at 7-12;see also RonaldDworkin,

Comment, in ANTONIN
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 115,120-24(AmyGutmann ed.,1997).
207I am grateful
toGeoffrey
Stoneforpressing thispoint.
™ 341 U.S.494(I9SI).
disadvantageof vulnerableminorities: the legacyof segregation laws

and anti-immigration laws remindsus of that. But hatespeechlaws
represent almostexactlythe opposite:a legislativemajoritybending
over backwardto ensurethat vulnerableminorities are protected
against hatred and discrimination thatmight otherwisebe endemicin
society.
I haveheardpeoplesaythatit is notsurprising thatI opposecon-
stitutionalrestrictions on hate speechlaws,sinceI am in generalan
opponentofjudicialreviewoflegislation.However,it is notquiteas
simpleas that. Many countries thatregulatehate speechalso have
strongjudicial review: Germany Canada are examples.But in a
and
broadersense this speculationis right. I have long believedthat
Americanconstitutional jurisprudence exaggerates thelikelihoodthat
majoritarian will
legislation simplypromote the ofthemajori-
interests
ty at theexpense of vulnerable minorities, who thereforeneedprotec-
tionby the courts. And I have writtenabout thisincessantly, some
wouldsayincorrigibly.209
But hatespeechis an area where,againstall odds,majorities prove
us wrong.In everyadvanceddemocracy wheretheyare giventheop-
portunity,majorities legislateto putthissortofprotection in placebe-
causetheycareabouttheplightofminority communities. Andbyand
largetheselaws are administered responsibly.Certainly theydo not
seemto havebeentransformed intovehiclesforthepromotion ofma-
jorityinterestsin thewaythata generaldistrust ofgovernment inter-
ference wouldsuggest.
You maysay,"Wellthat'sbecauseyou are focusing on thewrong
minority.The relevantminority here is not the African-American,
Muslim,or gaycommunity. The realminorities disadvantaged byhate
speechprohibitions are theunpopularracistsand bigotsand virulent
Islamophobeswhose beliefsare detestedby thosewho make these
laws. Attacking thoseunpopulargroupsis justas muchan instanceof
thetyranny ofthemajority as an attackon Communists or atheists."I
am afraidI haveno patienceat all forthatrecharacterization. It cer-
tainlydoesnotaffect thepointthathatespeechlawsreallyare enacted
forthebenefit ofvulnerableracial,ethnic,and religious to
minorities,
upholdtheirreputation and theirdignity.At most,it just introduces
an additionalminority intothepicture.And it is a desperatemaneu-
ver:one mightas well say thatDWI laws represent an attackon the
discreteminority ofdrunkdrivers.In bothcases,we havean account
of a serioussocialharmthatcertainactivities, iftheyare leftunregu-
209See JeremyWaldron, Law and Disagreement 211-312(1999);Jeremy

Waldron,
The Core of the Case AgainstJudicial Review, 115 YALE LJ. 1346 (2006); JeremyWaldron,A
Right-BasedCritiqueofConstitutionalRights,13 OXFORD J.LEGAL Stud. 18 (1993).
lated,are likelyto cause. In bothcases we have a minority ofpoten-

tial victimsof thatharmto considerand a minority of potentialof-
fenders.We can playwordgameswith"majority" and "minority"un-
til theend oftime,butthefactremainsthathatespeechlaws do not
involveputting theinterestsofthemajority abovethoseofvulnerable
groups.
A more respectableconcernis that even if hate speech laws
represent legislative
majorities goingout of theirway to protectvul-
nerableminorities, thereis no wayofensuring thatan exception made
forthissortoflegislation willnotbe a TYojanhorseforothermajori-
tarianspeechrestrictions thatare less benign.And I agree:it is hard
to see howtheexception couldbe definedor cabinedin ourconstitu-
tionallaw. "Grouplibel"was one possiblecategory, butas we saw in
PartI, manyAmericanconstitutionalists havedonetheirbestto make
thatcategory unusable.It is as thoughwe havegonedowna blindal-
ley in our FirstAmendment jurisprudence,committing ourselvesto a
particular visionof whatacceptableexceptions mustbe like- non-
content-based, orientedto clearand presentdangerof physicalharm
or violence,and so on - and thereis nowhereto turnand no way
back thatwouldnotunravelthewholescheme,makingit "opensea-
son"on speechofeverykind. It is as goodan exampleofpathdepen-
dencyas youcouldwishfor.
Othersocietiesare notin thispredicament.Theirexperience has
notbeenthathatespeechlaws pave theway formorecomprehensive
restrictions on speech.210Theybeganquiteearlyon withtheconvic-
tionthatspeechofthissort- defaming vulnerable and in-
minorities
citinghatredagainstthem- was sui generis,and thatit had to be
regulatedif any speechwas. Theyworkwitha muchmoresensible
and explicitrubricfordeveloping limitations
to rightsthanwe have(I
mean the idea of restrictions imposedby law thatare demonstrably
necessary in a freeand democratic Theyhavebeenable to
society211).
210 What may be trueis that othercountries'opennessto otherrestrictions on speech (forex-

ample, generalrestrictions on defamationor generalrestrictions on journalismthat are likelyto
prejudicea fairtrial)has meantthattheyhave not been blindedto the importanceof hate speech
laws as AmericanFirstAmendmentideologueshave been. But thatis not the Trojan Horse hy-
pothesis;thecausalityworksin theotherdirection.
211 Article10 of the European Conventionon Human Rightssays thatthe rightof freeexpres-
sion "maybe subjectto such . . . conditions,restrictions
or penaltiesas are prescribedby law and
are necessaryin a democraticsociety,in the interestsof national security,territorialintegrityor
public safety,forthe preventionofdisorderor crime,fortheprotectionof healthor morals,forthe
protectionof the reputationor the rightsof others." Conventionforthe Protectionof Human
Rightsand FundamentalFreedoms,Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 10, '2. The Canadian
Constitutionsays thisin Article1 about all the rightsand freedomsset out in the Charter:they
may be subject"to such reasonablelimitsprescribedby law as can be demonstrably justifiedin a
freeand democraticsociety."Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,beingSchedule B to the Cana-
da Act 1982,ch. 11, § 1 (U.K.).
draw on each others'experiences in drafting and formulating these

laws. And theyhave been bolsteredin thisenterprise by a senseof
theirinternational obligations,which include an obligation to ensure
that"[a]nyadvocacyofnational,racialor religious hatredthatconsti-
tutesincitement to discrimination,hostilityor violenceshall be pro-
hibitedbylaw."212
I said at thebeginning thatit was notmyintention to makea con-
stitutional argument.213 I can offer no way out of the FirstAmend-
mentlabyrinth.I havetakensomeAmericanarguments on thismat-
ter seriously,but mostlymy purpose has been to presentan
interpretation of theenactment and upholdingof theselaws in other
countries (and of the impulse to enactand upholdthemheretoo,to the
extentthatthatexists).My methodhas beenDworkinianinterpreta-
tion:214let us maketheimpulseto enactthemthebestthatit can be;
letus tryto makesenseofthereasonsbehindthemand thelimitations
and exceptionsthat such laws embody. I am not sayingthat we
shouldblindlyimitatethe formsof regulation thatwe findin other
advanceddemocracies.215 But in muchofthediscussion thatI hearin
thiscountry, the impression is giventhatif we were to enact hate
speechlawswe wouldhaveto reinvent thewheel- and howon earth
wouldwe do it?wherewouldwe start?howwouldwe phraseit?what
groupswouldwe privilege? and how wouldwe controlit?- and we
recoilfromtheassignment on thatgroundalone,quiteapartfromour
substantive reasonsforopposition.Whilewe have been addingnew
culs-de-sacto our FirstAmendment jurisprudence, othercountries
havebeenworking awayquietlyon thisissueand aredoingquitewell.
Even if we do notproposeto followthem,we shouldhave a better
understanding of whattheyare doingso thatwe can givean intelli-
gentaccountofourpositionthatis responsive to thebestthatcan be
said againstit.
212 InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, '2, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. See also InternationalConventionon the Eliminationof All Forms of Racial Dis-
criminationart. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969). The United
Statesenteredreservations againstbothprovisionsat thetimeof its ratificationof thesetreaties.
213 See suprap. 1599.
214 See DWORKIN,supra note 140, at vii-ix.
215 See Dieter Grimm,FreedomofSpeech in a Globalized World,in EXTREME SPEECH AND
DEMOCRACY,supra note 10, at 11, 19-22. But forthe damagingexternalitiesof Americanex-
ceptionalism,particularlywith regardsto othercountries'attemptsto respondto hate speech on
the internet,see AlexanderTsesis, Hate in Cyberspace:RegulatingHate Speech on the Internet,
38 San Diego L. Rev. 817, 853-58 (2001).

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Harvard Law Review Association

DIGNITY AND DEFAMATION: THE VISIBILITY OF HATE

DIGNITYAND DEFAMATION:THE VISIBILITY OF HATE

theirrace,colour,nationalor ethnicorigin. . . ."2 I said thatI thought

fromthelegalacademy,whichis dividedon thematter, thereis divi-

6 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

toleration.But I am goingto arguethatthemostimportant aim of

I. Why Call Hate Speech "Group Libel"?

11 Kunz v. New York,340 U.S. 290, 299 (1951) (Jackson,J.,dissenting).

the spokenwordhas died away,but to mymindit is the enduring

13 It can also bogus downin a futileattempt to define"hate."Hatredis notan easyidea to

population."16 In othercountries,"grouplibel"and "groupdefama-

land."23Blasphemouslibelwas heldto be a commonlaw offense in

23 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *S9-

printing, picture,or otherfixedrepresentation

31 Philip Wittenberg, Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of Libel 7

scandalummagnatum^to protectnoblesand greatmenfromoutra-

35 For a discussionof scandalum magnatum,see JohnC. Lassiter,Defamationof Peers: The

uniteus, thentheaggressions[,] . . . rapes,robberies,knives,gunsand

aimedat destroyinga race by exposingit to contempt,derision,and

48 Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

allegationdescendsto particulars.But- so theargument goes- this

That seemsto me a viable,or at leastarguable,position.But Justice

withpostersdepicting BritonsofAfricanancestry as apes.64Afterhis

64 I discussed this incidentat the beginningof JeremyWaldron,Boutique Faith, LONDON

and equality.68 The UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsbeginsits

68 There is an excellentdiscussionand critiqueof the legal conceptof humandignityin Chris-

statusas a memberof societyin goodstanding.It validatesthelegal

78 See Waldron,supra note36, at 215-19.

dignity ofthemembers ofa groupstandsseparately fromthestatusof

to one's childrenwhatis goingon. The reactionsare all mixedup,

84 See Lawrence,supra note 12,at 452-56.

damagesforlibelunlesstheycan provethata falsestatement of fact

88 See id. at 279-80;seealsoLEWIS,supranote1,at 159.

prosecutingatheistsalwayssat uncomfortably withtheAmerican posi-

ciationsas notworththeeffort of suppression (thoughstrongenough

II. What Does a Well-Ordered Society Look Like?

102 250 U.S. 616(1919).

knownto be regulated)by principlesof justice and inhabitedby

106 See id. at 35-40.

aroundin themarketplace ofideas. Theylove thisrichness and unti-

ferent fromthedirection in whichRawlswouldhave run. Nor am I

confusingbecause unlike almost everythingelse in Political Liberalism, the chapteron "The

democratic society."111 I wantto take themeasureof thisassurance

111 RAWLS,Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,supra note 108, at 355.

laws limiting freedomof speech,but becauseof changesof attitude

114 Id. at 195.

visibleassuranceofjust treatment thata societyis supposedto pro-

118See Roger Cotterrell, Emile Durkheim: Law in a Moral Domain 152(1999).

I said in PartI thatan emphasison speechis an emphasison the

misticedays,and thelike)forpublicor politicaleventsand theirset-

123 For a fineaccount of the presenceand importanceof monumentsin modernsociety,see

millionmilesfromthe argumentthatI am pursuingin thisArticle.

126 Rawls, supra note 105, at 35.

speechor groupdefamation involvestheexpressdenialof thesefun-

and abuse encouragedby hatepropaganda. . . have

131 Id. at 746.

called"appraisalrespect"(in whichone's estimation of peoplevaries

132See Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint Morality, Respect,

playstargettheassuranceon whichmembers ofvulnerable minorities

cidenthere,a forlorn Nazi processionthere,some rattylittleracist

sue is overand so thebenefits

138 See sectionIII.E, pp. 1646-49.