271 Phil.

51

BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision[*] rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of a violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation
to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila, Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that
he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary
for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)

"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by
two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box
was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).

"Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(propietor and husband of Anita Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the
gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents
thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Underscoring supplied).

"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).

"He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987.
He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went
to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).

"Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside
the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers
(tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Underscoring supplied).

"The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that
the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).

"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited
by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory
examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED

AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED

FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION." (Appellant's Brief,
p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2
and 3. Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence
(Sec. 3 [2], Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

"Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

"(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows.:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment[*] to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367
US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383
[1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1
[1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973
Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present
with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon,
66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]: Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987];
See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably
procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government
agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly
claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated
otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]):

"1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included an which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. xxx

"xxx There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. xxx" (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966]
and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Underscoring supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 574; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
"(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served."
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who
searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge
and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals, (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal.App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr. 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965):
State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Barnes v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:

"The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen - the owner of a motel
in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence[*] complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to
the authorities.

"The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure
of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two ways. In both instances, the
argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection
of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr.
Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of
Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same
to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly,
the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of
accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into
a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559,, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California
374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken
into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made
by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query
which he himself posed, as follows:

"First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder." (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas; Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986;
Underscoring supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the
present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained
in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the
evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,
Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of
the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13
[October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed
against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant
that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of the Rights should also be construed as an act
of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure
equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were
not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit. We have carefully examined the records of the case and found
nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or
that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that
appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso
of the NBI. Thus:

"Fiscal Formoso:

"You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?

"WITNESS:

"Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir." (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-
examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave
uncounseled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment
of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under
custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of
error is therefore misplaced.

3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not
the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German
national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila; that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation. Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN,
pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving
and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger
struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell
out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without
first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust
contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of
P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply
accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on
his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant
failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571
[1989]; People v. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on
January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national,
was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in
Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p.
93).

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg.
130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]);
Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask
Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment
(Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and
shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Bache & Co Inc vs. Ruiz

GR L-32409, 27 February 1971

Facts:

On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and
Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera’s letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio
subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by
him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that
time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court
to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.

After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge
asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without
legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.

The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. Search Warrant 2-
M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served
the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal.

The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded
6 boxes of documents.

On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera,
Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally,
damages and attorney’s fees.

After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the
search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax
assessments on the corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized.

The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Issue:

Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office.

Held:

The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme
Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and
seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of
them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers
therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case, only the
officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched and
seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and
whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner.

On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination
conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio).

The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for
determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The
participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was
thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the
commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be
consider a personal examination.

Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued
for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72
and Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of
Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).

The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the
violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output
actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced
in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and
209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).

Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-
70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for
the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation,
which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and
void.

Stonehill v Diokno

Facts:

Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the corporations of
which they were officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the petitioners and/or their
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized.
Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having contravened the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books and
things to be seized PARTICULARLY.

Issue:

Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.

Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.

Held:

The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a) those found and seized in
the offices of the corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners.

The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This is
because corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their
officers, directors and stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal cannot
be availed by third parties.

As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the
answer is no, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners.

The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches and seizure. Two points
must be stressed in connection to this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if
based upon probable cause determined personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and (2)
the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with particularly.

In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application. The averments of the
offenses committed were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine the
existence of probable cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the issuance of a
valid search warrant.

The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with particularity. This is to eliminate
general warrants.

The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of petitioners are null and void.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City],
issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be
in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were
seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and
to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the
articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of
search warrants.

Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a
statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars
as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

(AAA vs. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007)

In a rape case, private complainant failed to appear 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand
in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.

Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that
the complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”

Is Judge Carbonell correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant
and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses.

“We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon, where we held that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In
doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.”

fellester.blogspot.com It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of
probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not
mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of
probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that
he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely
solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, we stressed that the judge
should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court
by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with the
supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted.

G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA
ABAD, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also
zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall thus be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens; for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.1

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,2 dated 22
September 2010, and Resolution,3 dated 11 March 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 77703. The CA affirmed the Omnibus Order,4 dated 10 May 2002, of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified Search Warrant No. 01-118.

THE FACTS

On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan
(SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant5 before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63,
for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and Rufina
Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received
confidential information that respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of
their employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-
based company by purchasing shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a
transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were actually purchased. Instead, the
money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to respondentPastrana's personal account; 32% to the
sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales;
and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only
constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).6

In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed H. Alghurairi,
one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia;7 the affidavits of respondents' former employees who actually
called clients abroad;8 the articles of incorporation of domestic corporations used by respondents in their
scheme;9 and the sketch of the place sought to be searched.10

On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati
City, issued Search Warrant No. 01-118, viz:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Search Warrant No. 01-118

For: Violation of R.A. 8799

-versus- (The Securities Regulation Code) and Estafa (Art. 315, RPC)
 AMADOR PASTRANA AND

RUFINA ABAD of 1908 88

Corporate Center, Valero St.,

Makati City

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath the applicant NBI [Special
Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his witnesses RONNIE AROJADO and
MELANIE O. BATO, that there is probable cause to believe that AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA
ABAD have in their possession/control located in [an] office premises located at 1908 88 Corporate
Center, Valero St., Makati City, as shown in the application for search warrant the following documents,
articles and items, to wit:

Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their personal files;
incorporation papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales agreements with clients; copies of
official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from the clients; copies of credit advise from the
banks; clients['] message slips; company brochures; letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal
assets of Amador Pastrana; list of clients and other showing that these companies acted in violation of
their actual registration with the SEC.

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day of the premises above-
described and forewith seize and take possession thereof and bring said documents, articles and items to
the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their search within the validity of the warrant.

This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this date.11
Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino
and Gerardo Derma, Chief Security Officer and Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate
Center. Pursuant to the Return,12 dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI
and the SEC were able to seize the following:
1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:

a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;

b. List of brokers and 201 files;

c. Sales agreements;
 d. Official receipts;

e. Credit advise;

f. Fax messages;

g. Clients message slips;

h. Company brochures;

i. Letterheads; and

j. Envelopes.

2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;

3. Offshore incorporation papers;

4. Lease contracts; and

5. Vouchers/ledgers.
On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in
connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC,
which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are
to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Further,
Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.14

On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the search warrant, respondent
Abad moved for the inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of three (3) months
without action on the motion to quash clearly showed Judge Salvador, Jr.'s aversion to passing judgment
on his own search warrant.15

In an Order,16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.
Hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.

The Regional Trial Court Ruling

In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void
because it violated the requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific
offense only. It added that the SRC alone punishes various acts such that one would be left in limbo
divining what specific provision was violated by respondents; and that even estafa under the RPC
contemplates multifarious settings. The RTC further opined that the search warrant and the application
thereto as well as the inventory submitted thereafter were all wanting in particularization. The falloreads:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, 2001 is hereby QUASHED and
NULLIFIED. All documents, articles and items seized are hereby ordered to be RETURNED to
petitioner/accused. Any and all items seized, products of the illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in
evidence and cannot be used in any proceeding for whatever purpose. The petition to cite respondent SEC
and NBI officers for contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal before the CA.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search
Warrant No. 01-118 clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which prohibits the
issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense, because the application failed to specify
what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type of estafa was committed by respondents. The
appellate court observed that the application for search warrant never alleged that respondents or their
corporations were not SEC-registered brokers or dealers, contrary to petitioner's allegation that
respondents violated Section 28.1 of the SRC which makes unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks
in a dealer or broker capacity without the requisite SEC registration.

The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed to pass the test of particularity. It
reasoned that the inclusion of the phrase "other showing that these companies acted in violation of their
actual registration with the SEC" rendered the warrant all-embracing as it subjected any and all records of
respondents inside the office premises to seizure and the implementing officers effectively had unlimited
discretion as to what property should be seized. The CA disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Omnibus Order dated May 10,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated 11
March 2011. Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL

COURT'S ORDER WHICH QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 CONSIDERING
THAT:
I.

READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT GAERLAN'S APPLICATION FOR

A SEARCH WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 SHOW THAT SAID
WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799.

II.

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED

THEREIN WHICH SHOW A REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING AS
STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LICENSE FROM THE SEC. THE IMPUGNED
STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF ITEMS DID NOT INTEND
TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE
"SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL
REGISTRATION WITH THE SEC."19
Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined that the
punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including or are necessarily included in the
other; that operating and acting as stockbrokers without the requisite license infringe Section 28.1 of the
SRC; that these specific acts of defrauding another by falsely pretending to possess power or qualification
of being a stockbroker similarly constitute estafa under Article 315 of the RPC; and that both Section
28.1 of the SRC and Article 315 of the RPC penalize the act of misrepresentation, an element common to
both offenses; thus, the issuance of a single search warrant did not violate the "one specific offense
rule."20

Petitioner further contends that the subject search warrant is not a general warrant because the items listed
therein show a reasonable nexus to the offense of acting as stockbrokers without the required license from
the SEC; that the statement "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual
registration with the SEC" did not render the warrant void; and that the words "and other" only intend to
emphasize that no technical description could be given to the items subject of the search warrant because
of the very nature of the offense.21

In their comment,22 respondents counter that the lower court was correct in ruling that the subject warrant
was issued in connection with more than one specific offense; that estafa and violation of the SRC could
not be considered as one crime because the former is punished under the RPC while the latter is punished
under a special law; that there are many violations cited in the SRC that there can be no offense which is
simply called "violation of R.A. No. 8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes of estafa which
could be committed through at least 10 modes, each one of them having elements distinct from those of
the other modes.

Respondents assert that Search Warrant No. 01-118 does not expressly indicate that the documents,
articles, and items sought to be seized thereunder are subjects of the offense, stolen or embezzled and
other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense; that it is a general warrant because it enumerates every conceivable document that may be found
in an office setting; that, as a result, it is entirely possible that in the course of the search for the articles
and documents generally listed in the search warrant, those used and intended for legitimate purposes may
be included in the seizure; that the concluding sentence in the subject warrant "and other showing that
these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" is a characteristic of a general
warrant; and that it allows the raiding team unbridled latitude in determining by themselves what items or
documents are evidence of the imputation that respondents and the corporations they represent are
violating their registration with the SEC.23

In its reply,24 petitioner avers that the validity of a search warrant may be properly evaluated by
examining both the warrant itself and the application on which it was based; that the acts alleged in the
application clearly constitute a transgression of Section 28.1 of the SRC; and that the nature of the offense
for which a search warrant is issued is determined based on the factual recital of the elements of the
subject crime therein and not the formal designation of the crime itself in its caption.

THE COURT'S RULING

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal liberty and
security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations
of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers
of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted.25
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill),26 the Court stressed two points which must
be considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined personally by the judge; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularlydescribe the things to be seized.27 Moreover, in Stonehill, on account of the seriousness
of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants involved in that case, the Court
deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."

The search warrant must be issued for one specific offense.

One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based
on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent the
issuance of a scatter-shot warrant.28 In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.29

In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which were issued for "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"
stated:
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as alleged in the aforementioned
applications - without reference to any determinate provision of said laws; or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted-to
outlaw the socalled general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.30
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez,31 the Court further ruled:
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether an offense exists to
justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the personal properties that may be subject
of the search warrant are very much intertwined with the "one specific offense" requirement of probable
cause. The only way to determine whether a warrant should issue in connection with one specific offense
is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements of the offense that
are alleged to support the search warrant.

xxxx

The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search warrant
should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of applying for a search
warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the search
warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence presented
by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this specific offense for which the
warrant is sought and issued. x x x32
In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33

First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said
law such as manipulation of security prices,34 insider trading,35 acting as dealer or broker without being
registered with the SEC,36 use of unregistered exchange,37 use of unregistered clearing agency,38 and
violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers39 among others. Even the
charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the said
crime: ( 1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts;
or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by
means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be easily
discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.

Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the validity of search warrants issued for violation
of R.A. No. 6425 or the then Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In Olaes v. People,40 even though the search
warrant merely stated that it was issued in connection with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Court did not
nullify the same for it was clear in the body that it was issued for the specific offense of possession of
illegal narcotics, viz:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof
that [t]here is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Cornia
St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, [have] in their possession and control and custody of
marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific section of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.41 (emphasis supplied)
In People v. Dichoso,42 the search warrant was also for violation of R.A. No. 6425, without specifying
what provisions of the law were violated. The Court upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants' contention thaUhe search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1) offense, hence,
in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic
juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and
illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following
this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu,
the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.43(emphases supplied)
Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit,44 the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), the Court held that while "illegal possession of firearms is penalized
under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3
thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession
of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property
are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866."45

The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its failure to specify what
particular provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01-118 also
covered estafa under the RPC. Even the application for the search warrant merely stated:
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees scattered throughout their numerous
companies call prospective clients abroad and convince them to buy shares of stocks in a certain company
likewise based abroad. Once the client is convinced to buy said shares of stocks, he or she is advised to
make a telegraphic transfer of the money supposedly intended for the purchase of the stocks. The transfer
is made to the account of the company which contacted the client. Once the money is received, the same
is immediately withdrawn and brought to the treasury department of the particular company. The money
is then counted and eventually allocated to the following: 42% to Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7%
for the redeeming clients (those with small accounts and who already threatened the company with
lawsuits), 10% for the cost of sales and 8% goes to marketing. No allocation is ever made to buy the
shares of stocks.46
Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a codification of various
rules and regulations governing securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation
between use and possession of illegal drugs, the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped
together in categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was
violated.

Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118, petitioner insists that the warrant
was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall engage in the business
of buying or selling securities in the Philippines as a broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an
associated person of any broker or dealer unless registered as such with the Commission." However,
despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a provision of the SRC which respondents allegedly violated,
Search Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null and void. The allegations in the application for search
warrant do not indicate that respondents acted as brokers or dealers without prior registration from the
SEC which is an essential element to be held liable for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC. It is even
worthy to note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to
Quash,47dated 5 April 2002.

In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was specified in the application for
search warrant, there could have been no finding of probable cause in connection with that offense.
In People v. Hon. Estrada,48 the Court pronounced:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases
where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the
absence of a license required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor
during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a
search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his
home and personalities.49 (emphasis supplied)
Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the license to
operate as brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the
application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what offense to charge respondents with.

Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined
with each other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense rule,
the two offenses are entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other. An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be
said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.50

The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused the offended party or third person.51 On the other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC penalizes the act
of performing dealer or broker functions without registration with the SEC. For such offense, defrauding
another and causing damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation are not essential elements.
Thus, a person who is found liable of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may, in addition, be convicted
of estafa under the RPC. In the same manner, a person acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC is malum prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafais malum
in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.

Finally, the Court's rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA (Columbia)52 and Laud v. People
(Laud)53even militate against petitioner. In Columbia, the Court ruled that a search warrant which covers
several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, viz:
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered
several contraband items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to be confused with the number of
offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.54
In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it was issued only for one specific offense -
that is, for Murder, albeit for six (6) counts.

In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state one specific offense. It
included violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several penal provisions and estafa,
which could be committed in a number of ways.

Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one specific
offense.

Reasonable particularity of the description of the things to be seized

It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to:
(1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and
(2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however, required that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities.55

In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,56 it was pointed out that one of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described
are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.57

In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal property may be the subject of a search
warrant: (i) the subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or intended to be used as
the means of committing an offense.58

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense alleged
committed by respondents. Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing judge as well as
the applicant for the search warrant to determine that the items sought to be seized are connected to any
crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and items enumerated in the search warrant failed the test of
particularity. The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents
pertaining to the transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the
phrase "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the
SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was indeed issued for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations' certificate of
registration with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers or dealers.

In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one offense and
for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2010 Decision and 11 March 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703 are AFFIRMED.

Soliven vs Makasiar
Post under Immunity from Suit , Political Law Case Digests , Warrant of Arrest

● While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. The
privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.

● Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is
that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

● What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses.

Facts:

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends
that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that
he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says
that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

Issues:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held:

(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact
that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in
effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not
require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time,
also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as
a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling
effect” point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City
of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services
Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated
from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later
burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the
Constitutionalguarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for
issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of
plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The
Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC
ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and
that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by
it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and
to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure,
by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved
on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;

Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin G.R. No. L-45950, June 20, 1938 65 Phil 68 (1938)

Facts: Anti Usury Law

Issue: Whether the issuance of the warrant of search and seizure was valid

Held: No, In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but
by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did
not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. instead, they were turned over to the
respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against the petitioner. Considering that
at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the
warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The lower court is, therefore,
correct in reaching the conclusion that the search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace
of Tarlac, Tarlac.

213 Phil. 348

DE CASTRO, J.:
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by
petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the
application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully it is
alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was
allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance
of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under
PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took
and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any
authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned."[1]
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the
same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent
Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to
the records.
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the Court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to
that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately
to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records.[2] Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order having been denied, he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this
Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as
inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge
must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
The judge's insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner's
claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of
the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not
attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the
complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return
of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the
Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise
claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also
the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge's own
admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the
deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which
will be open and public",[3] such that, according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may,
there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the
statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man,
woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her
action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it
more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court
room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe
any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the
word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding advance of
the trial or hearing upon oral examination.[4] A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in
writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to
interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses.[5] The searching questions
propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon
the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the
secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely
routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and
must be in writing.
The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the
legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Herrera:
"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
in difference to the basic principles of government."[6]

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution
and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution.[7] No
presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.[8]
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In
Castro vs. Pabalan,[9] it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the
things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the motion to
annul the search warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration
are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality,
the things seized under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao" tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money;
control pad or "masiao" numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot
be returned as sought by petitioner. No costs.
Del Castillo v People

FEBRUARY 13, 2017JEFF REY

G.R. No. 185125 January 30, 2012

Ruben Del Castillo

vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at
the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del
Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a
small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his
men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of
Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned
with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425
and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.

Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere
presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?
Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the
nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as
the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials,
the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs
in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure
to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on
the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT

FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu, and the
second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to
search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a witness
Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.

The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in QC to
serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left
unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began to force their way
inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the
finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.

Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to review the purported warrant
that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and took his cash and
valuable, as well as canned goods.

The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit appealed the said
decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence
against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana seized
from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the
operatives employed unnecessary force in executing the warrant.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was inadmissible in evidence
against him.
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain view
doctrine.

HELD:
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain view when it
was seized.

RATIO:
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.
Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The
warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be
noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two different provisions in
the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does
not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize
marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to
indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on record,
there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives,
it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting the
other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities
of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away
from Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times.
These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting
with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama
St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama
crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag
of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of
the chapel.

The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags ofmarijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126,
Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
stems from the fact that their knowledgerequired from the surveillance was insufficient to
fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as
PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission
of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones
conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano
(Reyes) assailing the Decision2 dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated January 11, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821, which affirmed the Decision4 dated June 16, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12-0627 finding
Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,5otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion
of which states:

That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having
been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in her
custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet which substance was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, which
is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a group of
police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jefferson Monteras (PO1
Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers
approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just
bought shabu in Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who
matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if she
bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng
babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something out from her breast area and held a small
plastic sachet on her right hand.8 PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the
police station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents,
conducted the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles.9 Thereafter, PO1
Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the seized item for
examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed10 that the
substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.11

For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5, 2012 and not
November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to board a jeepney, when a man
approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney
until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali.
The latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She
was then brought to the police station where the police officers extorted from her the amount of
P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police officers took
her to Taytay for inquest proceedings.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated June 16, 2014, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
Accordingly, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00, with an order for her immediate arrest.14

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and thereupon,
found to be in possession of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to the police officers upon her
arrest. Likewise, it observed that the chain of custody of the seized item was sufficiently established
through the testimony of PO1 Monteras, which was not ill-motivated.15

Aggrieved, Reyes appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated May 20, 2016, the CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime charged.18 It held
that the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet of shabu was valid as she was caught in
flagrante delicto in its possession and was legally arrested on account thereof.19 The CA likewise found
substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated item were properly preserved.20

However, it corrected the quantity of shabu stated in the RTC's dispositive portion to 0.04 gram in order
to conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza and accordingly, modified the penalty imposed to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum.21

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and,
thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.22 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over
the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."23

"Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become] 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
(2),25 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.26

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest.27In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed.28

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a general rule – be complied
with:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based
on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped
from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.29

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.30

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
essential. [The scenario under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
[contemplates that] the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, [the
officer] knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed."31

Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test, showing that
"the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that [she] was
in possession of illegal drugs at the time [she] was apprehended."32 Absent any overt act showing the
commission of a crime, the warrantless arrest is rendered invalid, as in a case where a person was
apprehended for merely carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney without acting
suspiciously.33 Similarly, in People v. Racho,34 a search based solely on a tip describing one of the
passengers of a bus was declared illegal, since at the time of apprehension, the said accused was not
"committing a crime in the presence of the police officers," nor did he commit a crime or was about to
commit one.35

In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do anything as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just committed, was committing, or was about
to commit a crime when she was just passing by.36 During cross-examination, PO1 Monteras revealed:

[Atty. Cynthia D. Iremedio]: Mister Witness these two youngsters, the only information that they gave
you is that there is a woman with a tattoo?

[PO1 Monteras]: Yes ma'am.

Q: No further description regarding this woman was given to you?

A: Long haired and with tattoo on the left arm ma'am.

Q: And no description of the tattoo on her left hand?

A: None ma'am.

COURT: What is the tattoo on her left arm?

A: I think it was a Dragon sir.

Q: These two persons did not mention to you the name of the accused?

A: Yes ma'am.

Q: Aside from those description, you will agree with me that this long hair and a dragon tattoo can be
possessed by any other person aside from the accused?

A: Yes ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now Mister Witness you did not conduct further investigation on these two persons?

A: Not anymore ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now, Mister Witness, can you describe to us when you saw this accused?

A: While we were at the corner of the Diversion Road we saw a female persons (sic) coming towards us
who fits the description given by the two teenagers ma'am.
Q: And despite the description, this accused merely passes in front of you and did nothing wrong
against you?

A: Yes ma'am.

xxxx

Q: But when you greeted her "good evening" there is nothing unsual with this accused?

A: She smelled of liquor ma'am.

Q: She was not holding anything or acting in a suspicious manner which will elicit a response from
you?

A: None ma'am.

x x x x37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras
himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except
that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while
reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.39

Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, particularly,
that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that the accused
had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined from the testimony of the witnesses that
there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the
Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a
crime."41 In this case, records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime
had been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers'
tip and that, everything happened by "chance."42 Surely, to interpret "personal knowledge" as to
encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch
the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the rigorous
requisites under Section 5 (b), Rule 113.43

Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the subject item as
lacking in credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the testimony of PO1 Monteras, claimed
that when the police officers asked Reyes if she purchased shabu, she turned her back and voluntarily
showed the plastic sachet containing the same which she retrieved from her brassiere. According to
jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of a witness's testimony is determined by its conformity with
knowledge and consistency with the common experience of mankind.44 As the Court observes, it is rather
contrary to ordinary human experience for a person to willfully exhibit incriminating evidence which
would result in his or her conviction for a crime, absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt
him or her to do so.

In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the sachet of shabu to the police officers.
In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that at the time of arrest, Reyes was so intoxicated that she "simply
let her senses down" and showed the shabu to PO1 Monteras;46 but later, in the same Comment, the OSG
argued that Reyes was actually "in her right senses when she reminded the police officers" that they were
not allowed to frisk a woman.47 These material inconsistencies clearly render suspect the search
conducted on Reyes's person and likewise, destroy the credibility of the police officers who testified
against Reyes.48 In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities
expressly ask, and in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the
consent thereof established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown in this case.

In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes on
account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be
acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

Besides, the Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed
chain of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, through their admission that only the
Barangay Captain was present during the marking and inventory of the seized items.51 Records are further
bereft of any showing that efforts were made by the police officers to secure the presence of the other
necessary personalities under the law or provide any justification for their absence, which could have
excused their leniency in strictly complying with the said procedure.52 Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,
prior to its amendment by RA 10640,53 requires, among others, that the apprehending team
shall immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.54 It is well-settled that unjustified non-compliance
with the chain of custody procedure would result in the acquittal of the accused,55 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution dated
January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause her immediate release, unless she is being
lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

Umil vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991

SEPTEMBER 13, 2018

FACTS:

These are 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that their detention is unlawful on
two grounds: (1) they were arrested without warrant; and (2) no prior preliminary investigation was
conducted.

Rolando Dural’s petition

Dural shot 2 CAPCOM Soldiers. He was charged with double murder without bail. Later, Bernardo Itucal
was included as defendant. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, and Renato Villanueva. Umil and Villanueva were charged for violating the Anti-subversion Act
but subsequently posted bail and were released. The double murder case filed against Dural and Itucal
proceeded to trial. The two were found guilty and were serving their sentences at the time the petition was
filed. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to Dural.

Amelia Roque’s petition

Rogelio Ramos was a former NPA member but surrendered to the authorities. He informed the military
regarding Communist Party’s operations in Manila. He even identified several NPA members and pointed
to Renato Constantino’s house as a safe house by the CPP-NPA. A search warrant was issued, where
numerous firearms, ammunition, and other communications equipment were found. Constantino was
apprehended and brought to the CIS headquarters where he admitted being a member of the CPP-NPA.

On the same evening, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at Constantino’s house to deliver letters to the rebels.
He also had a piece of paper with the jumbled telephone number of Amelia Roque’s sister. Buenaobra
was also apprehended and upon questioning, admitted to being a member of the CPP-NPA. Amelia
Roque was also found using the leads the military got. Her house was searched where subversive
documents, ammunition and a fragmentation grenade were found. Roque and her companions were taken
to Camp Crame. However, Roque admitted that the articles belonged to her and her companions were
consequently released. Buenaobra and Roque were charged of violating the Anti- subversion Act. Roque
was also charged of violating PD 1866. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on their behalf, but
Buenaobra later withdrew his petition and preferred to stay in Camp Crame.

Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple’s petition

Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were both members of the NUFC-CPP. They were apprehended
at Constantino’s house after having been caught carrying a bag of subversive materials. They also carried
unlicensed firearms. They were charged of violating PD 1866 where no bail was recommended. A
petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed on their behalf of the two alleging that they were
unlawfully arrested and that there was no preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information.
The two, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. They also failed
to request for a preliminary investigation after the filing of informations against them.

Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera’s petition

The PC search the house of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. The PC found subversive documents and
ammunition in Ocaya’s car. She was charged with violation of PD 1866. No preliminary investigation
was conducted because Ocaya refused to waive the Provisions of Article 125. Rivera, however, was
released since he committed no crime. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on their behalf.

Deogracias Espiritu’s petition

Deogracias Espiritu was the General Secretary of PISTON. He was arrested without warrant in his home
and brought to Western Police District where he was detained. The respondents argued that Espiritu was
lawfully arrested because of a prior offense he committed. He allegedly urged drivers and operators to go
on a nationwide strike to force the government to give in to their demands in November 1988. He was
invited for questioning. Later, an information was filed against him for violating Art 142 of the RPC. He
filed for a petition for habeas corpus, which was denied because his warrantless arrest was in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Ramil Regala’s petition

Ramil Regala was one of the suspects in the killing of Romulo Bunye II for which he was arrested. Upon
questioning, he identified Narciso Nazareno as his conspirator in killing Bunye. Relying on this
admission, the police, without warrant, invited Nazareno for questioning. Later, an information charging
Nazareno, Regala and two others for killing of Bunye was filed with the RTC Makati. Nazareno filed a
motion to post bail, which was denied. A petition for habeas corpus was then filed on his behalf, which
was also denied in light of the cases filed against him.

Arguments

Ocaya, Anonuevo, Caiple and Roque assert that the subversive documents found in their possession were
planted by the military. The People argued that they failed to substantiate their claim. There was also no
evil motive on the part of the respondents to falsely accuse the petitioners. The People also points out that
the arrest of the petitioners was not a a “witch-hunt” but borne out of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safe houses.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless arrests of the petitioners were valid – YES

RATIO:

In all the cases above, criminal charges have been filed against the petitioners. Hence, habeas corpus is
not be allowed.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ
of habeas corpus will not issue.

The court refused to abandon its ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile, where it was held that the writ of habeas
corpus is not allowed after an information has been filed. The remedy would be that the Court inquires
into every phase of detention and that all cases of deprivation of liberty be brought to the courts for
immediate scrutiny and disposition.

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

 vs

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G. R. No. 197788,

February 29, 2012

Doctrine of the Case:The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation
of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented
without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

FACTS:

 On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was
then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle, he invited the
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place is almost in front of the said sub-station.

 He was alerted of the accused’s uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket, as the latter may have a weapon inside it; the accused obliged and slowly put
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about
two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one
(1) Swiss knife; upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; after the accused
opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to
be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.

 The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are
positive of methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

 Upon a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful
arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of
the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented
to the search conducted upon him.

ISSUE:

Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist,pursuant to a routine traffic stop can be considered a
formal arrest.
RULING:

There was no valid arrest. When the petitioner was flagged down for committing a traffic violation,
he was not, by the fact itself (ipso facto) and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a
warrantless search is allowed:

(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(ii) search of evidence in “plain view;”
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.

None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to
this case.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very concrete
evidence (corpus delicti) of the crime illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.[1] A mere tip
from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes
without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are instances where arrests
and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right
against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at bar.
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the June 13, 2011
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the October 25, 2006
Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Virac, Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos.
3463 and 3464, convicting both petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1602 as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9287, otherwise known as "An Act Increasing the Penalties for
Illegal Numbers Games Amending Certain Provisions of PD 1602 and for Other Purposes." Petitioner
Martin T. Villamor (Villamor) was convicted as a collector of bets in the illegal numbers game of
"lotteng" under Section 3(c) of RA 9287, while petitioner Victor G. Bonaobra (Bonaobra) was convicted
as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) of the said law. The RTC sentenced
Villamor to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine
(9) years as maximum, while Bonaobra was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10)
years and one (1) day as minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum.
Factual Antecedents
Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an
illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a
cellphone, and cash. The charge stemmed from the following Information:[4]
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused
with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously engage,
collect [and] solicit x x x bets for illegal numbers game locally known as "Lotteng" by having in his
possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money and lotteng paraphernalias.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Another Information[5] was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused
with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously maintain
and operate illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" while in possession of gambling
paraphernalias, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, list of various numbers and cash in the amount of
P1,500.00 representing collection of bets.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reinvestigation, which were both granted by the RTC.
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued separate Resolutions both dated September
13, 2005 amending the Informations in both cases.
In the Amended Information, the phrase "acting as a collector" was included to charge Villamor as a
collector in an illegal numbers game. The Amended Information[6] provides:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused acting as a collector with intent [to] gain thru illegal means[,] did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously engage, collect and solicit bets for illegal numbers game locally known as
"Lotteng" by having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and money and
lotteng paraphernalias.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On the other hand, Bonaobra was charged as a manager or operator in the Amended Information,[7] the
incriminatory paragraph of which states:
That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused acting as manager and operator with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there,
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously maintain and operate illegal numbers game locally known as
"lotteng" while in possession of gambling paraphernalia, such as [a] calculator, cellphone, lists of various
numbers and cash in the amount of P1,500.00 representing collection of bets.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

When separately arraigned, Villamor, on October 4, 2005 and Bonaobra, on November 29, 2005, both
pleaded not guilty to the respective charges filed against them. After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial
on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Domingo Tejerero (Tejerero), Provincial Director,
Police Superintendent Francisco Peñaflor (PD Peñaflor), SPO4 Severino Malasa, Jr., and PO1 David
Adrian Saraspi (PO1 Saraspi). Culled from the records were the following facts:
On June 17, 2005, at around 9:00a.m., PD Peñaflor received a call from an informant regarding an
ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of
Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO1 Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset
proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report.
Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by
bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside. According to the
police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar,"
which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing
bet numbers, and counting money bets.
When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and
confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00 in different
denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to
Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was
filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented six witnesses, namely Villamor, Bonaobra, Demetrio Bonaobra, the brother of
Bonaobra, Florencio Bonaobra (Florencio), the father of Bonaobra, Juan Vargas, and Jonah Bonaobra
(Jonah), the wife of Bonaobra. Their testimonies are summarized below.
On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to the
latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Florencio inside their house.
Villamor gave Bonaobra P2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra then went
outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later identified as PD
Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the
act ka!" Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men entered
the house and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service vehicle and
brought in for investigation at the police headquarters.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 25, 2006, the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as
''lotteng," a variant of the game Last Two,[8] respectively as a collector or agent under Section 3(c), and as
a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287.
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught
in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng," a variant of Last
Two. The RTC held that petitioners were seen by the arresting officers in the act of counting bets before
the arrest was made inside Bonaobra's compound. The petitioners were also caught holding "papelitos,"
which contained the three rows of two-number combinations. Since the winning combination in "lotteng"
is taken from the first two numbers of the winning combinations in the daily draw of the lotto in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, the RTC held that the number combinations shown in the "papelitos"
were meant to correspond to the lotto results.
The RTC further held that Villamor's participation in the illegal numbers game was that of a collector
since he brought bet money to Bonaobra while the latter was that of a coordinator, controller, or
supervisor after it was shown that he received the money from Villamor.
The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby SENTENCES Martin
Villamor to suffer a penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to nine (9)
years as maximum, and Victor Bonaobra to suffer a penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum
to e1even (11) years as maximum. Likewise, the money amounting to P1,500.00 and the other personal
properties used as gambling paraphernalia, like the calculator, ballpen and cellular phone are confiscated
in favor of the state.
SO ORDERED[9]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 13, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA brushed aside Bonaobra's argument that
his right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime different from that with which he
was charged. The CA held that the classification of a maintainer, manager, or operator includes a
coordinator, controller or supervisor.[10] The CA ratiocinated that to hold a maintainer guilty of the lesser
offense of acting as a coordinator will not be violative of his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of his accusation since the graver offense of acting as a maintainer necessarily includes being a
coordinator.
With respect to Villamor, the CA gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the arresting
officers who were presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions. The CA
held that Villamor's denials cannot prevail over the positive assertions of the police officers who caught
him in the act of revising and counting bets.
The CA disposed the case as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence, this Petition.

Issue
The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or
agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) for
Bonaobra, should be upheld.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition meritorious.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire "case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision
[based on] x x x grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors."[12]
The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated
by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or
a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure,
none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible
against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of
probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the said
warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any
evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[13] "Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree."[14]
In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or caught in
the act of committing an offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers claim that petitioners were
committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were arrested without a warrant.
We are not persuaded.
Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even without a warrant
of arrest in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer."[15]
After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless
arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established petitioners had just committed, or were actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the
arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some
15 to 20 meters away from petitioners. PO1 Saraspi's testimony during cross examination reveals the
following:
ATTY. SAMONTE:
While you were outside the compound of Bonaobra, what was your distance to accused Martin
Q
Villamor and Victor Bonaobra?
A More or less fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters.
Q Is it not that the compound of Bonaobra is surrounded with fence?
A Yes, sir.
Q Bamboo fence, right?
A Yes, sir, without a gate.
Q Are you sure it's without a gate?
A Probably it was open.
Q Can you determine the height of the fence?
A Between 5'7" to 5'9".
Q More than your height?
A Yes, sir.
Can you tell us whether you can see what the person is doing inside the compound while you are
Q
outside?
The fence is made up [sic] of bamboo and there were gaps as far as the fence is concerned that is why
A
when we alighted from the Frontier we saw what was inside the compound.
Q And the space of each bamboo, can you determine [sic]?
A One and half to two inches apart.
Q When you were already outside the compound what were the accused doing?
A They were sitting and they were revising.
Q Were they seated with [sic] a table?
A They were sitting and Victor Bonaobra was without a shirt.
Q What were they holding?
A 'Papelitos'.
Q What else?
A While they were holding 'papelitos' the monies were just on the table.
Q At the distance of 15 to 10 meters can you determine the contents of the 'papelitos'?
A No, sir.
Q So you are not sure whether those are gambling paraphelnalia?
A No, sir.
Because you do not know the contents of that and you are not sure whether those are gambling
Q
paraphernalia you went inside, is that right?
A After we introduced ourselves that we are [sic] police officers we entered the compound.
Q Meaning to say you were outside the compound and saying you are policemen?
A We entered first and we introduced ourselves.
Q Which is first, going inside or introducing yourselves?
A While entering we were also introducing ourselves simultaneously.
Q When you reached inside, what did you determine?
A We determined that there were lotteng paraphernalia on the table.
Q That is the only time that you determined that those were gambling paraphernalia?
A No, even on the [sic] outside we identified it already.
A while ago you said at a distance of 15 to 10 meters you can determine whether they were in
Q
possession of the illegal gambling paraphernalia?
What I am trying to say is that I cannot identify those that are written on the 'papelitos' at the distance
A
and I saw the calculator, the money bets.
Q So what you saw within a distance of 15 to 10 meters are calculators, money and cellphone?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you consider money gambling paraphernalia?
A Yes, sir.
Q So every time you see money you will consider that a gambling paraphernalia?
A In other situations.
Q How about calculator, do you consider calculator gambling paraphernalia?
A Yes, sir.
When you go to a department store there are calculators, do you consider those calculators gambling
Q
paraphernalia?
A If you are going to consolidate all these items in a table all of these are gambling paraphernalia.
So when you consolidate these items and papers and calculators, if you see those items at Century
Q
Trading, will you consider those as gambling paraphernalia?[16]
Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners,
the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was
ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delictowarrantless arrest and a search incidental to
a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded by a
bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the
compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD
Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually
being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the
police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately
preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could
not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and
money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias.
On the part of PD Peñaflor, he likewise admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could
not determine the activities of the persons inside. It was only after he had illegally entered the compound,
since he was not armed with a warrant, that he supposedly saw the gambling paraphernalia. PD Peñaflor's
testimony in this regard is as follows:
Can you tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness, the distance of the house of Victor Bonaobra to that
Q
place where you parked your vehicle when you arrived in the vicinity?
When I parked my vehicle in front of the compound because that is a street, the distance from the
A street to that place where there is an on-going 'revisar' of 'lotteng', more or less 15 to 20 meters, I
believe, from the gate.
Q So, you did not immediately go inside the compound of Victor Bonaobra?
A Yes, sir. I verified first if there is really [sic] persons in the compound.
So, at that distance of 15 to 20 meters, you were able to verify what they were doing on the particular
Q
time, Mr. Witness?
A No, sir.[17]
During his direct examination, Bonaobra testified that he was only answering his cellphone when PD
Peñaflor barged into his compound and arrested him. The relevant portions of his testimony reveals the
following:
ATTY SAMONTE:
Q At around 9:00 a.m. of June 17, 2005, what were you doing if you still remember?
I stood up and I went out and made [sic] three steps from the door to answer the cellphone and later
A
on I was surprised when the police whom I could not identify, kicked the door.
Q Mr. Witness, which door [are you] referring to [that] was kicked by the police?
A A The gate outside of our fence.
xxxx
Q You said a while ago that the policeman kicked the door of your fence x x x who was that policeman,
 if you know him?
A Provincial Director Peñaflor.
Q Who was with PD Peñaflor on [sic] that particular time, if any, Mr. Witness?
A Two (2) persons in civilian clothes.
xxxx
Q After PD Peñaflor kicked the door of your fence, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A He held my hand and he seized my cellphone.
xxxx
Q After PD Peñaflor seized your cellphone, what else did he do?
A He said, "caught in the act."
Which comes first, Mr. Witness, the utterance made by PD Peñaflor that you were caught in the act
Q
or the utterance made by your father whether they had a warrant?
A When my father asked them whether they have a warrant.
Q And what was the answer of PD Peñaflor when your father asked that question?
A He said, "caught in the act."
Q And what was the reply of your father?
A My father said that what you are doing is wrong, that is prohibited.
Q And what did PD Peñaflor answered [sic] to your father?
A He shouted at my father, "Di na kailangan yan"(That is not needed).[18]
From the circumstances above, it is highly suspect that PD Peñaflor had witnessed any overt act
indicating that the petitioners were actually committing a crime. While PD Peñaflor claims that he caught
the petitioners in the act of collecting bets and counting bet money, this observation was highly
improbable given the distance of the police from the petitioners and the fact that the compound was
surrounded by a bamboo fence.
For his part, Villamor claimed that he was at the Bonaobra compound to repay his loan to Jonah. The
prosecution, through Prosecutor Tañon, even admitted this fact during Jonah's direct examination. The
following exchange between the prosecution and the defense was quite revealing:
ATTY. SAMONTE:
Your Honor, please, [may] I respectfully offer the testimony of Jona[h] Bonaobra to show that she is
the wife of Victor Bonaobra; that at around 8:30 a.m. of June 17, 2005 she was inside their residence
at Bonaobra's compound, Francia, Virac, Catanduances and on that particular time and date, Martin
Villamor arrived to pay his debt and she personally witnessed the unlawful act committed by the
policemen who entered their dwelling on that particular time and date and such other matters relative
thereto, Your Honor.
COURT:
Any comment from the prosecution?
PROS. TAÑON:
We will admit that she is the wife of Victor Bonaobra; that on June 17, 2005 at 8:30 in the morning
she was inside the residence of Bonaobra's compound; that accused Martin Villamor arrived to
pay his debt. We are to contest on that she personally witnessed the unlawful act.
ATTY. SAMONTE:
To clarify that, the prosecution is admitting the fact that Martin arrived to pay the loan on that
particular day?
PROS. TAÑON:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Okay, so that we can proceed to the other matter.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
From the exchange above, it is clear that the prosecution admitted that Villamor went to Bonaobra's house
to pay his loan to Jonah. Thus, at the exact moment of the arrest, neither Bonaobra, who was answering
his cellphone, nor Villamor, who was paying his loan, was performing any overt act constitutive of a
crime.
Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same does not
satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and seizure of the
effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could be no valid search
incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's house is inadmissible for
being a fruit of the poisonous tree.
The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before
arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest
especially when the accused actively participated during trial as in this case. However, we have clarified
that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence
seized during an illegal arrest. In People v. Racho,[20] the Court held that:
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree', hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, 'any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding'.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant's conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of illegal
gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor
under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said law, a collector or agent is "any person who collects,
solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in
possession of gambling paraphernalia."[21] On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or supervisor is
defined as, "any person who exercises control and supervision over the collector or agent."[22] The
prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the
house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the offense.
All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since
it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal
gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which
affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 in Criminal Case
Nos. 3463 and 3464 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Martin Villamor y Tayson and
Victor Bonaobra y Gianan are ACQUITTED and are ordered to be immediately RELEASEDfrom
detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report
to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. GERENTE
July 11, 2013

GR No. 95847-48, March 10 1993

FACTS:

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren,
started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant. She overheard the three men
talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their
plan to kill Clarito Blace . Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing as follows: Fredo Echigoren
struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him
twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the
victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.

Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.

Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There
they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were
informed by Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men
who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out
of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found
a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. Only the appellant,
Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still
at large.

Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for
Violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for Murder. The trial court convicted
him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the
absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.]
HELD:
The appealed decision was affirmed.

ARREST

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found
the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

SEARCHand SEIZURE

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first

CONSPIRACY

When there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy
was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his
companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood
and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness
for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit".

CRIMRPO
Title GR No. 136267
PEOPLE VS CUBCUBIN Date: July 10, 2001
Ponente: J. Mendoza
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- FIDEL ABRENICA CUBCUBIN, JR., accused-
appellee appellant
SUMMARY
The accused was charged with the murder of a tricycle driver. In his defense, he contended that the arrest
was not valid, given that the arrest violated his right to due process. The court ruled in his favor, stating
that there was no personal knowledge of the arresting officers to begin with, and that the statements of the
prosecution were contradicting.
DOCTRINE

For a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an offense and, second, the
arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion

Nature of the case: Automatic review of the decision dated October 5, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel AbrenicaCubcubin, Jr. guilty of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
FACTS
 According to the prosecution (from the 8 witnesses presented):
o A desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been
shot near the cemetery
o A police team, responded to the call, and found that he victim was last seen together with the
accused coming out of Sting Café, the café server confirmed such, but did not know if they left
together as she was serving other customers
o The policemen went to the accused’s house, identified themselves and informed him that he was
being sought in connection with the shooting near the cemetery. Accused denied involvement, so
the police asked permission to enter and look around
o SPO1 Malinao notices a white shirt which was bloodied, and when he picked it up, two spent .38
caliber shells fell.
o They also found on top of a drum a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver, without
a serial number
o After an evaluation of the evidence, SPO4 Pilapil formally filed a criminal complaint for murder
o NBI conducted a ballistics examination which showed that the evidence bullets were fired from
the subject firearm. No photographs were taken. The empty shells recovered were no longer
examined.
o Also, the bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt and the blood sample of the victim yielded positive
results for human blood belonging to blood type O

 Meanwhile, the defense presented:

o Accused admitted knowing the victim whom he addressed as Kuya.
o He and some friends played tong-its after which he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he had
some drinks Piamonte arrived and had drinks with him. the victim left as a passenger was
waiting, but came back and had another bottle the victim again left to transport another
passenger, but did not come back anymore
o Accused said he was sleeping on the sofa when he was awakened by the arrival of three
policemen, who pointed their guns at him and told him to lie face down. He was handcuffed
while they searched his room
o Before leaving, the policemen took from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son
Denver.
o Accused-appellant said that he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he was
afraid they would maltreat him and denied that the white t-shirt had blood stains.
o He claimed that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest when they
took him into custody, nor did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to
be assisted by counsel.

 TC found the accused guilty of murder, based on the prosecution’s evidence and rejected the
accused’s alibi. The Court then received a letter from the mother of accused, with an attached
affidavit of desistance executed by Marilou B. Piamonte, widow of the victim, stating that accused-
appellant had been mistakenly identified, however, not being formally offered before the trial court,
has no probative value.

ISSUE/S
I. WHETHER THE ARREST WAS VALID. NO.
RATIO
  Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid:
o first, the offender has just committed an offense and,
o second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it

 In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The
question, therefore, is whether there was probable cause for the arresting officers, to believe that
accused committed the crime.
o It was held that there was none. The two did not have personal knowledge, as they based
it trough someone who called the PNP station and reported that a man had been killed.
Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by
others.
 Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused to be guilty
of the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber revolver, and
two spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time accused-appellant was arrested, he was not
doing anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came after his
arrest. Moreover, as will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized from accused-
appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
 Also, the server really did not know if they left together. There is thus serious doubt as to whether
accused-appellant was really the last person seen with the victim. Her testimony is insufficient.
Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accused-appellant. Finally,
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. quibbled but in the process committed more contradictions.

Notes:
Mentioned din sa case na: But the accused cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a
warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned.
Regarding the issue of search and seizure:
 To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly.
 A waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
 The courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration or regard
for the supremacy of the law. (PasionVda de Garcia v. Locsin)

 Even assuming the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident
thereto.
 A valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
 The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying
evidence or from using the weapon against his captor.
 The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
 against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
 Here, the search of accused-appellants house was illegal and, consequently, the things obtained as
a result of the illegal search, are inadmissible in evidence against him. The gun was purposely
sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it.
 Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white Hanes t-shirt placed on top of the
divider in plain view as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would lead
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute evidence of a crime
RULING
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel
AbrenicaCubcubin, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder, is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being held for some other
lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the Court the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
(FELICIANO)

PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with
ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don,
herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana was
given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a
team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused.
During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe
among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of
ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the
prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.

Held: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification
that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person
posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated
accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances
wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to
a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have
justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time.
Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first
secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the
identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as
evidence againstappellant:

CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced
therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against
the appellant were the following items:

One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:

Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting topscontained inside a transparent
plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seedscontained inside a white
colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a
total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in
the house of Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana
leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to
rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of
the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do
so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted

G.R. No. 74189 May 26, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO ENRILE Y VILLAROMAN and ROGELIO ABUGATAL Y MARQUEZ, accused-
appellants.

CRUZ, J.:

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
Antonio Enrile faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for convicting him.1 His co-accused,
Rogelio Abugatal, was killed in an attempted jailbreak and this appeal is dismissed as to him.2 We deal
here only with Enrile.

The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past six in the evening of October 25, 1985, a
buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police
informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer.3

In their separate testimonies,4 both policemen said that on the occasion they saw Polines hand over to
Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money
and returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then
approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object.
Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops weighing 22 grams.5

The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera
Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile
came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon
the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers
the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No. PJ966425.6

At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above narration.7 Enrile
refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer.

In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police officers, who he
said simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him. He stoutly denied any knowledge
of the marijuana. He claimed that at the time of the alleged incident, he was attending, as a dental
technician, to a patient whom he was fitting for dentures.8 The supposed patient, Alicia Tiempo,
corroborated him.9

Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling marijuana and that he had a pending
application for probation. He suggested that this could be the reason the policemen sought to implicate
him in the new charge and thus weaken his application.10

Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on the stand that he had not sold any
marijuana to Polines. What really happened, he said, was that two male teenagers approached him that
evening and told him to buy marijuana, giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said he did not have
any marijuana and did not know where to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile's house and to give him
the marked money. He did so because they had a knife. Enrile handed him a plastic bag which was later
found to contain dried marijuana fruiting tops.11

Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of Abugatal, considering
that it was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation, including the right to
the assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not follow the ruling of this
Court in Morales v. Enrile,12promulgated on April 26, 1983, as reiterated in People v.
Galit,13 promulgated on March 20, 1985, where Justice Hermogenes Concepcion laid down the correct
procedure, thus:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
 person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on February 14, 1986, long after the above-
cited decisions had become effective.

Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if Abugatal's confession without the assistance of
counsel could have been sustained. It was not enough then to inform the suspect of his constitutional
rights. The trial court had to ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood the import and
consequences of his confession and had the intelligence and mental capacity to do so.14 There is no
showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in the decision that Abugatal had been
informed of his rights and had validly waived the assistance of counsel.

If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was it admissible against
Enrile.

The prosecution rejected Abugatal's testimony that he was forced to go to Enrile's house and buy
marijuana from him, insisting instead on the extrajudicial confession. With that confession outlawed and
the testimony disowned by the prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all against Enrile to tie him with
Abugatal.

It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to
Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the
policemen to Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this
to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search.

Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a
warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances :

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen
who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of marijuana.

According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the
marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and
immediately arrested him.15
What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information
supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful,
arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently
disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught
in flagrante delicto.

The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana.
The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively
validate the warrantless search and seizure.

The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that a man's house is his
castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may violate. There were measures available
under the law to enable the authorities to search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was found in
possession of prohibited articles. The police did not employ these measures.

What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the slightest heed to the
injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the tactics of the police state, where the
minions of the government place little value on human rights and individual liberties and are obssessed
only with the maintenance of peace and punishment of crime.

These are laudible objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be pursued at the cost of
dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the individual from overzealous law-enforcers
who mistakenly believe that suspected criminals have forfeited the safeguards afforded them by the
Constitution. Law-enforcers are not licensed to themselves break the law to apprehend and punish law-
breakers. Such a practice only leads to further defiance of the law by those who have been denied its
protection.

In the light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is not convinced that there is enough
evidence to establish Enrile's guilt beyond the shadow of doubt. The paucity of such evidence only
strengthens the suspicion that the marked money was really "planted" on Enrile by the police officers who
were probably worried that their earlier efforts in securing Enrile's conviction as a drug pusher would be
thwarted by his application for probation.

Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal's sworn statement implicating Enrile is inadmissible
against Enrile, and so is the marked money allegedly found on him as a result of the illegal search. The
only remaining evidence against the appellant is Abugatal's testimony, but this has been questioned and
discredited by the prosecution itself. Its case against Enrile is thus left without a leg to stand on and must
therefore be dismissed.

Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm in the discharge of their duties is not
enough to build a case against a person charged with a crime. They should build it with painstaking care,
stone by stone of provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the accused, before they can
hope to secure a conviction that can be sustained in a court of justice.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be released immediately. It is so ordered.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

 PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts:

The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by
name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he descended from
the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI
forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against
Aminnudin.

Issue:

Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Ruling:

The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not
justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been
committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be
secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of
his arrival was certain. And from the information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had
determine on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.

The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.

ACQUITTED

G.R. No. 99050

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused Conway B. Omaweng was originally indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in a criminal
complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September
1988.[1] Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so,
the court declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause
against the accused, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court.[2]
On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an Information
charging the accused with the violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
"That on or about September 12, 1988, at Dantay, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispatch in transit or transport in a Ford Fiera, owned and driven by
him, 10¼ kilos of processed marijuana in powder form contained in 41 plastic bags of different sizes
which were placed in a travelling bag destained (sic) and intended for delivery, disposition and sale in
Sagada, Mountain Province, with full knowledge that said processed marijuana is (sic) prohibited drug or
from which (sic) prohibited drug maybe manufactured.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[3]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 713.

After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal,[4] the accused entered a plea of
not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989.
During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses. The accused did not present
any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of
prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod.
On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment[5] convicting the accused of the crime of
transporting prohibited drugs penalized under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon the accused herein the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos.

Pursuant to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the aforecited special law, the drugs subject of the crime are ordered
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government. Accordingly, it is further directed that such drugs so
confiscated and forfeited be destroyed without delay per existing rules and regulations on the matter.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED."[6]

Hence, this appeal.

In the Appellant's Brief, accused imputes upon the trial court the commission of the following errors:
"I
x x x IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II
x x x IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JOINT CLARIFICATORY STATEMENT OF THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACCUSED IS NOT THE OWNER OF THE PROHIBITED
DRUG SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.

III
x x x IN NOT RULING THAT THE CONTRABAND SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH (sic) AND
SEIZURE."[7]

The appeal is without merit. The decision appealed from must be upheld.
After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence, We find to have been fully proven the following
facts as summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee.[8]
"In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the Mt. Province PC
Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per
instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads,
one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 3-4). They stopped and
checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint (TSN, April 5, 1990, p. 12).

At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged
down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and
headed towards Baguio (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5, 8). The vehicle was driven by appellant and
had no passengers (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5).

Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant acceded to the request
(TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5). When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling
bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the
vehicle (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 6, 10, 11).

Layong and his companions asked permission to see the contents of the bag (TSN, November 9, 1989, p.
6). Appellant consented to the request but told them that it only contained some clothes (TSN, November
9, 1989, p. 6). When Layong opened the bag, he found that it contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of
different sizes containing pulverized substances (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7, 9).

Layong gave a packet to his team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff
concluded that it was marijuana (TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 16).

The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter's Ford Fiera and proceeded to the Bontoc
poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7-8). The
prohibited drugs were surrendered to the evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling (TSN, November 9,
1989, pp. 7-8).

Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, who has
conducted more than 2500 professional examinations of marijuana, shabu and cocaine samples,
conducted two chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the plastic packets taken from
appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana (TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 3, 5-81)."[9]

Anent the first assigned error, the accused contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he is the
owner of the marijuana found inside the travelling bag which he had in his vehicle, a Ford Fiera. Proof of
ownership is immaterial. Accused was prosecuted for the dispatching in transit or transporting of
prohibited drugs pursuant to Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. This section does not
require that for one to be liable for participating in any of the proscribed transactions enumerated therein,
he must be the owner of the prohibited drug. It simply reads:
"SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. -- The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed."

This section penalizes the pusher, who need not be the owner of the prohibited drug. The law
defines pusher as "any person who sells, administers, delivers, or gives away to another, on any terms
whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in transit or transports any dangerous drug or who acts as a broker
in any of such transactions, in violation of this Act.[10]
In People vs. Alfonso,[11] where the accused was charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana
under the aforesaid Section 4, this Court ruled that ownership is not a basic issue.
The facts, as proven by the prosecution, establish beyond cavil that the accused was caught in the act of
transporting the prohibited drug or, in other words, in flagrante delicto. That he knew fully well what he
was doing is shown beyond moral certainty by the following circumstances: (a) the prohibited drug was
found in a travelling bag, (b) he is the owner of the said bag, (c) he concealed the bag behind a spare tire,
(d) he was travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera in which he loaded the bag was under his absolute
control; pursuant to Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court (on circumstantial evidence), the
combination of all these circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Such
circumstances, unrebutted by strong and convincing evidence by the accused, even gave rise to the
presumption that he is the owner of the prohibited drug.[12]
The second assigned error is devoid of merit. The declaration in the joint clarificatory sworn statement
executed by the apprehending officers, that the marijuana subject of the case was surreptitiously placed by
an unknown person in the bag of the accused, is not supported by evidence. Said sworn statement cannot
be used as a basis for exoneration because the very same officers who signed the same reiterated on the
witness stand their statements in their original affidavit implicating the accused; both the criminal
complaint before the Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc and the information in this case were based on this
original affidavit. No probative value could be assigned to it not only because it was procured by the
defense under questionable circumstances, but also because the affiants therein merely expressed their
personal opinion. The trial court's correct exposition on this point, to which nothing more may be added,
deserves to be quoted, thus:
"From the portions of the 'Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement' of prosecution witnesses Layong and
Fomocod cited (Exhs. "I" to "I-C"; p. 155, Record), the defense would want this Court to draw the
inference that the accused Conway Omaweng is innocent as confirmed by no less than the persons who
apprehended the suspect in flagranti (sic). In other words, that the said accused is not the owner of the
contraband confiscated but someone else; that to (sic) mysterious individual placed the prohibited articles
inside the travelling bag of the accused without the knowledge and consent of the latter; and that the
identity of this shadowy third person is known by the PC/INP investigators. The isolated declarations,
albeit under oath are much too asinine to be true and do not affect the credibilities of the witnesses --
affiants and the truth of their affirmations on the stand. As gleaned from parts of the record of the re-
investigation of this case conducted by the Provincial Fiscal (Exhs. "G" and "D"; pp. 158 and 161,
Record), it appears that Layong and Fomocod were prevailed upon to affix their signatures to (sic) the
document styled as 'Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement' by interested persons in a vain ploy to extricate
the accused from the morass he got himself into. Testifying in open court, the same witnesses maintained
the tenor of their original affidavit supporting the filing of the criminal complaint in the lower court (Exh.
"C"; p. 2, Record). No additional information was elicited from said witnesses during their examination
from which it can reasonably be deduced that a third person instead of the accused is the culprit and that
the suspect is being framed-up for a crime he did not commit. Nonetheless, granting arguendo that the
declarations of Layong and Fomocod now the bone of contention, are on the level, the same are but mere
opinions and conclusions without bases. Any which way, to believe that any person in his right mind
owning several kilos of hot hashish worth tens of thousands of pesos would simply stash it away in the
travelling bag of someone he has no previous agreement with is a mockery of common sense. And to
think further that the PC/INP agents know of such fact yet they kept the vital information under
'confidential Status' (whatever that means in police parlance) while an innocent person is being
prosecuted and practically in the shadow of the gallows for the offense would be stretching human
credulity to the snapping point. By and large, the fact remains as the circumstances logically indicate that
the accused Conway Omaweng has knowledge of the existence of the contraband inside his vehicle and
he was caught red-handed transporting the hot stuff."[13]

The third assignment of error hardly deserves any consideration. Accused was not subjected to any search
which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[14] If one had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the
citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the
Court."[15] He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his
vehicle and travelling bag. Prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
"PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:

Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.

Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A He said 'you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).'

Q When he said that, what did you do?

A We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q When you said that, what did he tell you?

A He said 'you can see it.'

Q And when he said 'you can see and open it,' what did you do?

A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was contained in the
bag.

Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it to
my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana."[16]

This testimony was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by the accused for he chose not to testify
on his own behalf.
Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. As this Court stated
in People vs. Malasugui:[17]
"x x x When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of (sic) his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol.
I, page 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly."

Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the
officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said packages were
identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on formally offered in evidence, the accused did not raise
any objection whatsoever. Thus, in the accused's Comments And/Or Objections To Offer of
Evidence,[18] We merely find the following:
"EXHIBIT COMMENTS AND/OR OBJECTIONS

"A" The bag was not positively identified to be the same bag allegedly found inside the
vehicle driven by the accused. The arresting officers failed to show any identifying marks; thus, said
bag is an irrelevant evidence not admissible in court;

"A-1" to "A-40" Objected to also as irrelevant as the 40 bags now being offered are not the
same bags alleged in the information which is 41 bags. The prosecution failed to proved (sic) beyond
reasonable doubt that Exhibit "A-1" to "A-40" are the same bags allegedly taken from inside Exhibit "A"
because what is supposed to be inside the bag are 41 bags and not 40 bags."

x x x

WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province of
21 March 1991 in Criminal Case No. 713 finding the accused CONWAY B. OMAWENG guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused.
Spouses Veroy v. Layague, G.R. No. L-95630, 210 SCRA 97, June 18, 1992

"Qualified consent"
The permission to enter a house and search for persons and effects may be qualified, and the searching
officer may not act in excess of the authority granted to him.

Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the
subjects may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary in the
context of this case.

 The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City to a caretaker who had keys to the
kitchen only. The Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house.
 Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding
there.
 With the help of caretakers, they were able to enter only up to the yard since the owner was not
around and they did not have a search warrant.
 They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the house was reportedly being used as a hideout
and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to search the house with the
condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time family friend, must be there during the search.
 Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the children’s room,
and confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the basis of the charge of illegal
possession of firearms against them.
 Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them, petitioners
voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS
that initiated the complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them on the ground that his office has
not yet received copies of their warrants of arrest.
 The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence for being obtained in violation of
their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
 Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was merely for
the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include
the authority to conduct a room to room search inside the house. The items taken were, therefore,
products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in
evidence against them.
 The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless search. The
reason for searching the house is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for
rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the yard, he did not enter the house because he did
not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the
need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys
to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter the house but only to
ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
 Under the circumstances the police officers had time to procure a search warrant but they did not.
 The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A
search warrant is still necessary.
 The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as
evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.

People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, 212 SCRA 547, August 12, 1992
"Maid allowed entry into the house"

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right.

The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to
do so in his or her behalf.

 The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan
City.
 They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they
earlier arrested.
 They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with
Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant.
 Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a
helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house.
 The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter
was absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. In one of the rooms,
they saw subversive materials which they confiscated. They likewise brought the persons found in the
house to the headquarters for investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the
house and owned the items confiscated.
 Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
 The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search
and seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is present in this case.
 Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
 In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz, his alleged
helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz was
indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to
open his house in his absence.
 Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation
of her employer.
 Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is
inadmissible.
 274 Phil. 45

 CRUZ, J.:
 The accused-appellant is questioning his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the trial
court erred in giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution, in violating his constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and in not according him the presumption of
innocence.

Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on July 12, 1985, at about nine o'clock in the evening, at Real
Street in Dumaguete City, by elements of the Narcotics Command stationed in that city. His
arrest was the result of a "buy-bust" operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer
while the other team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. Quindo
approached the accused-appellant, who was with a group of friends in front of the Gamo
Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran
immediately produced two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously marked
P5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested
Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17
more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team members, namely, M/Sgt.
Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they boarded Kalubiran
to take him to the police station.

The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they
were analyzed, with positive results, as reported and later testified on by Forensic Chemist Myrna
Arreola. The above-named Narcotics agents all testified and corroborated each other in narrating
the "buy-bust" operation.
As might be expected, the defense had a different version of the accused-appellant's arrest.
Kalubiran said he and his friends were in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic that evening of July
12, 1985, when a jeep stopped in front of them and several persons alighted. One of them -
whom he subsequently identified as Quindo - approached and frisked him. Finding nothing on
him, Quindo went back to the jeep, and he for his part left for his house. However, he was called
back by another person he later came to know as Villamor. He was told at gunpoint to board the
jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was released the following day
with the help of a lawyer his girl friend, Norma Diez, had contacted. He denied having sold
marijuana and insisted that the 19 sticks of marijuana and the marked bill never came from him.

Norma Diez corroborated Kalubiran. So did the other defense witness, Bob Reloj, except that he
testified he was also frisked and likewise taken to PC headquarters and later to the police station,
where he and Kalubiran were detained for three days.

After examining and evaluating the evidence of the parties, Judge Enrique C. Garrovillo found in
favor of the prosecution, declared Kalubiran guilty as charged, and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a P20,000.00 fine and the costs. It is from this judgment that Kalubiran has
filed this appeal.

This Court places much reliance upon the factual findings of the trial judge, who has the
advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and to gauge by their demeanor
whether they are being true to their oath or lying in their teeth. Such an opportunity is not
available to the appellate judge, who must depend on the inanimate record that cannot reveal the
tell-tale signs by which the truth may be discerned and the falsehood exposed. Lacking any
showing of arbitrariness - and there is none in the case at bar - such findings of the trial court
cannot be faulted by this Court.

There are indeed some inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses but we do
not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration of Kalubiran's
arrest as it actually happened. We have said often enough that such imperfections may in fact
bolster rather than emasculate a person's credibility as one cannot be expected to remember a
particular incident with unerring accuracy in every minute detail.

It is the defense evidence that in fact suffers from the defects it would impute to the prosecution.
While it has not been shown that the Narcotics agents were acting with ulterior motives rather
than merely pursuing their duties, Norma Diez's testimony is reasonably suspect as she is the girl
friend of Kalubiran and can be expected to be loyal to him, to the point of even lying for him. As
for Reloj, his inconsistency with Kalubiran's testimony is not merely insignificant but loudly
proclaims its own falsity. It is noted that Reloj said he was also arrested with the accused-
appellant and the two of them were detained at the police station for three days. The accused-
appellant said he was the only one arrested and that he was released the following morning.

The defense argues that Kalubiran would not have sold marijuana at a public place and in plain
view of the people as this would be contrary to human nature and caution. We are not
impressed. The people he was with at the time were his own group, friends who were probably
aware of his unlawful trade and did not care much what he did. Moreover, it is to be expected
that he did not sell the marijuana openly or with reckless fanfare but with appropriate furtiveness,
as befitted his shameful trade.

At any rate, we have already observed in People v. Paco[1] that:

Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes that may
be committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is
made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a
public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing
their illegal trade as these factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has
sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billard hall
(People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No.
72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People v. Khan, supra) along a
street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and
in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).

The defense posture that Kalubiran's arrest and search violated the Bill of Rights demonstrates an
unfamiliarity with the applicable rules and jurisprudence. The accused-appellant was arrested in
flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a crime. The search
was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116.
In addition to the aforecited Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches
and seizures under the conditions established in this case.[2]

The argument that the marijuana and the marked money were not sufficiently identified must also
be rejected. The exhibits were placed in a steel cabinet by Villamor for safekeeping before he
personally took the marijuana to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. It was also Villamor
who had also earlier initialed the P5.00 bill and later identified it at the trial as the money paid to
the accused-appellant in exchange for the two sticks of marijuana.

The Court notes that Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two sticks of marijuana under
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also have been charged with possession of
the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be
held to answer for the second offense because he has not been impleaded in a separate
information for violation of Section 8 of the said law.

It is futile for Kalubiran to invoke the constitutional presumption of innocence because it has
been overcome with overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt. His defense is not only weak;
what is worse for him is that the prosecution is clearly strong and has proved his offense beyond
the whisper of a doubt.

Persons like the accused-appellant deserve the severe sanctions of the law for the misery they
spread among our people, especially the youth, many of whom have forfeited their future because
of the evil influence of drugs. The strong arm of the law must never weaken against the
onslaughts of this terrible affliction.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

ESPANO VS CA
RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998

Facts:

Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to
confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person.
After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked
him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they
found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where
he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense . . . “

Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result of
a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner handling over something to an
alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His
arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being fruits of the crime.
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN [184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]
Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found
marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further
investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.

Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest
a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and
can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case
poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed
to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers
had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

PAPA VS. MAGO

Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the goods was
intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity of the search conducted by them since it was made
without any search warrant and whether the BOC has jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.

Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

Held:

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant
in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view,
therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority
under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within
their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had
been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in
charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or
merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought
into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and
forfeiture

ANG YU ASUNCION v. CA, GR No. 109125, 1994-12-02

Facts:
On July 29, 1987 a Second Amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ann Yu Asuncion
and Keh Tiong, et al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 31, Manila in Civil Case No. 87-41058, alleging,... among others, that plaintiffs are
tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants described as Nos. 630-638
Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila; that they have occupied said spaces since 1935 and have been
religiously paying the rental and complying with... all the conditions of the lease contract; that on several
occasions before October 9, 1986, defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the
premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same; that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu
Unjieng offered a price... of P6-million while plaintiffs made a counter offer of P5-million; that plaintiffs
thereafter asked the defendants to put their offer in writing to which request defendants acceded; that in
reply to defendants' letter, plaintiffs wrote them on October 24, 1986 asking that they... specify the terms
and conditions of the offer to sell; that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter
dated January 28, 1987 with the same request; that since defendants failed to specify the terms and
conditions of the offer to sell and because of... information received that defendants were about to sell the
property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property to them.
Issues:
Buen Realty can be held bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, carried over
on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the... latter's purchase of the
property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs.
Ruling:
We affirm the decision of the appellate court.
An obligation is a j... uridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The obligation
is constituted upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or
juridical tie which is the efficient... cause established by the various sources of obligations (law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the object which is the prestation or conduct, required to be
observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subject-persons... who, viewed from the demandability
of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.
Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code), which is a meeting of minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render
some service (Art. 1305, Civil Code). A contract undergoes various... stages that include its negotiation or
preparation, its perfection and, finally, its consummation. Negotiation covers the period from the time the
prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the... time the contract is concluded
(perfected). The perfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements
 thereof. A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established upon a mere meeting of minds,
i.e., the... concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the cause thereof. A contract which
requires, in addition to the above, the delivery of the object of the agreement, as in a pledge or
commodatum, is commonly referred to as a... real contract. In a solemn contract, compliance with certain
formalities prescribed by law, such as in a donation of real property, is essential in order to make the act
valid, the prescribed form being thereby an essential element... thereof. The stage of consummation
begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract culminating in the
extinguishment thereof.
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding
juridical relation. In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the case at bench belongs,
the contract is perfected when a person, called the... seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver
and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the buyer, over which the latter agrees.
Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or
its equivalent.
"A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional."
Principles:

PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA (1994) |SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

February 8, 2017

G.R. No. 102009, 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994

Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was being
committed, and had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts, the same
constituted an exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches.
Facts:
1. Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged coup d’état in
December 1989 against the Government.
2. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of December 1, 1989, which
surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the
RAM-SFP as communication command post.
3. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo
when a group of 5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car. Maj. Soria
ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, then 5 men
drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the
surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire.
4. Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and
confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and molotov.
5. Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain Col. Matillano,
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping though door.
6. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much
disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and
 there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the
courts were consequently closed.
Issue:
 Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Held:
 YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
 It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant at that time. It was
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by
the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the
military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite
requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office.
 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal
which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in
the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained.
 In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closedand, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted.
 Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5,
1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

 PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON


 Facts:
 Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her possession more than
500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a gate in the airport.
The security personnel felt something hard in respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she
said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation. Unconvinced, the security personnel
went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent, packets of shabu
were seized from her.
 Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
 In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her was not valid and that
her constitutional rights were infringed when such search was conducted.

 Issue: WON a valid search was made.

 Held:
 The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
  (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and…
 The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b)
of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation
is far from being accurate.[18]
 The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
 Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of
the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures.
 The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant
herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante
delicto.

MARCELO G. SALUDAY, Petitioner

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26 June 2014 1 and
the Resolution dated, 15 October 20142 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099. The Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the Sentence dated 15 September 2011 3 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Criminal CaseNo. 65, 734-09, finding petitioner Marcelo G.
Saluday (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high-powered firearm,
ammunition, and explosive under Presidential Decree No. 1866,4 as amended (PD 1866).

The Antecedent Facts

On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco
(Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while
allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and
intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack
bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its
small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white
shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag.
Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that
petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board
the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an
improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live
ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked
petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any,
petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City. In its
Resolution dated 7 May 2009,5 the latter found probable cause to charge him with illegal possession of
high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD l 866. The Information dated 8 May 2009
thus reads:

That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, with intent to
possess, had in his possession and under his custody an improvised high powered firearm caliber .30
carbine bearing Serial No. 64702 (made in Spain) with one (1) magazine loaded with three (3) live
ammunitions and one (1) "'cacao" type hand grenade explosive, without first securing the necessary
license to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP Daniel Tabura (Tabura), a
representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police, and SCAA
Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification dated 5 November 20097 attesting that petitioner was "not
a licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from records." Meanwhile, SCAA
Buco identified petitioner and the items seized from the bag, and testified on the details of the routine
inspection leading to the immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA Buco further
elaborated on the search conducted:

Atty. Mamburam

Q And that check point, which was conducted along llang [R)oad,

Davao City, was by virtue of a memorandum?

A Yes, Your Honor.

 xxxx

Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to intercept a Metro Shuttle passenger
bus and you requested all passengers to alight?

A Yes.

Q passengers were left inside?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes of the passengers in the bus?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black gray colored pack bag which was
placed at the back portion of the bus?

A Yes.

Q You said that the hag was heavy?

A Yes.

Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s inside the bus and that was the only
thing or item inside the bus which was heavy. Is that correct?

A There were many bags and they were heavy. When l asked who is the owner of the bag because it was
heavy but the bag was small. when I asked, he said the content of the bag was a cellphone. But 1 noticed
that it was heavy.

xxxx

Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?

A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)

Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that one male passenger you pointed
as the accused kept looking at you'?

A Yes.
Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male passengers were not looking at you?

A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the] window looking towards his bag.

xxxx

Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested him to open the bag'?

A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it.

Q And, when he opened it?

A I saw the handle of the firearm. 8 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On direct examination, petitioner
denied ownership of the bag. However, he also admitted to answering SCAA Buco when asked about its
contents and allowing SCAA Buco to open it after the latter sought for his permission:

ATTY. MAMBURAM

Q x xx After the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force that you and your brother were
seated at the back of the bus. can you please tell us what happened next'?

A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag and what were the contents of the bag.

Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?

A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.

Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task force?

A I told him it was only a cellphone.

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?

A My elder brother.

Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the task force when, in fact, you were
not the owner of the bag?

A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my brother who were seated at the back.

xxxx

Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably the content of the bag was cellphone,
what happened next?
A He asked if he can open it.

Q And what was your reply?

A I told him yes, just open it.

xx xx

Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that bag was your brother, what is the
name of your brother?

A Roger Saluday.

Q Where is your brother Roger now?

A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009.9 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by the conductor when the latter
was asked who owned the bag. Petitioner also admitted that he never disclosed he was with his brother
when he boarded the bus:

PROS. VELASCO

Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of saving yourself considering you
don't own the bag> did you not volunteer to inform them that [the] bag was owned by your brother?

A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my brother because I was also afraid
of my brother.

Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you had a brother at that time
when you were boarding that bus, correct?

A No, sir, I did not.

Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but you confirm now that it was the
conductor of that bus who pointed you as the owner of the bag, correct?

A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at the back. 10 (Emphasis supplied)

The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the right to present rebuttal evidence.
Upon order from the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The Decision of the Trial Court

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him to be in actual or
constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or license. Consequently, in the
dispositive portion of the Sentence dated 15 September 2011, petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding Marcelo Gigbalen
Saluday GUILTY of illegal possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and explosive. For the
offense of illegal possession of high powered firearm and ammunition, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of prision mayor in its minimum period. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00.
For the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of
₱50,000.00.

SO ORDERED. 11

On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal. 12

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the alleged misappreciation of evidence
by the trial court and the supposed illegality of the search. 13 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) argued that the warrantless search was valid being a consented search, and that the factual
findings of the trial court can no longer be disturbed. 14

In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and
affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification:

WHEREFORE. the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence dated September 15, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 65, 734-09,
finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high powered
firearm, ammunition and explosive is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:

(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition, he is imposed an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional maximum, as the minimum term, to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in addition to the fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00);
and

(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 to which the OSG filed its Comment. 17 In its
Resolution dated 15 October 2014, 18 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

The Issue

Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to warrant his
conviction for the offenses charged.

The Ruling of this Court

We affirm.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.19 As a result, the Court, on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh and sift through the evidence
presented during trial. 20Further, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are accorded great respect, even finality. 21

Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition
under PD 1866, and illegal possession of explosive under the same law. The elements of both offenses are
as follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the
firearm, ammunition or explosive; and (3) lack of license to own or possess.22 As regards the second and
third elements, the Corn1: of Appeals concurred with the trial court that petitioner was in actual or
constructive possession of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the requisite
authority. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 reads in pertinent part:

In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant has no license or permit to own
or possess the firearm, ammunition and explosive by presenting NUP Daniel Tab[u]ra (Tab[u]ra), a
representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) of the PNP. He identified the Certification
issued by the Chief. Records Section. FED of the PNP, stating that appellant "is not a licensed/registered
holder of any kind and caliber per verification from records of this office."

Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to testify on the veracity or truthfulness of the
Ce1tification. He claims that the officer who issued it should have been the one presented so he would not
be denied the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

There is no merit to petitioner's claim. The following is pertinent:

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession
of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.

Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession of the firearms, ammunition and
explosive. However, his denial flies in the face of the following testimonies which he himself made:

Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, on the contents of the bag. He even allowed the police
officer to open it. Based on his actuations, there could be no doubt that he owned the bag containing the
firearm, ammunition and explosive.

Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to fabricate. Besides, the allegation that
his brother owned the bag is uncorroborated and self-serving. 23

As above-quoted, the presence of the second and third elements of illegal possession of firearm,
ammunition, and explosive raises questions of fact. Considering further that the Court of Appeals merely
echoed the factual findings of the trial court, the Court finds no reason to disturb them.

As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony of SCAA Buco on four important
points: one, that petitioner was a passenger of the bus flagged down on 5 May 2009 at a military
checkpoint in Ilang, Davao City; two, that SCAA Buco boarded and searched the bus; three, that the bus
conductor pointed at petitioner as the owner of a small, gray-black pack bag on the back seat of the bus;
and four, that the same bag contained a .30-caliber firearm with one magazine loaded who three live
ammunitions, and a hand grenade. Notably, petitioner does not challenge the chain of custody over the
seized items. Rather, he merely raises a pure question of law and argues that they are inadmissible on the
ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

The Court disagrees.

Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth Amendment to the United
States (U.S.) Constitution,24 reads:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures only. 25

Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article HI of the Constitution does not apply. As to
what qualifies as a reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal
in this jurisdiction,26 may shed light on the matter.

In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, 27 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic
surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such that what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:

Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great
significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The
petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government
has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effo1i to decide whether or not a given "area,''
viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253; £:y; parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the
application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy.29 Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).30

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy.
Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as
reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation
of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a
"search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate, in People
v. Johnson,31 the Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure clause
due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that society will regard as reasonable:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs. and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.32 (Citations omitted)

Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People,33 the Court described seaport searches as reasonable searches on the
ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy:

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

xxxx

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port
security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in
domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

xxxx

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when [they] used x-ray scanning machines
for inspection of passengers' bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in
the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct u search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner
did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.34

In People v. Breis,35 the Court also justified a bus search owing to the reduced expectation of privacy of
the riding public:

Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the performance of his duty.
Prior to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a finger on Breis or Yurnol. Neither did his presence in
the bus constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The
expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against unreasonable searches in a public bus
is not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only the bus was being
searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving vehicles has been upheld.36

Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case

basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.37 Other factors such as customs,
physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity may diminish this expectation.38 In Fortune
Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a common carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a passenger
due to the hostile acts of armed men who boarded and subsequently seized the bus. The Could held that
"simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing
them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional
rights."40 In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals,41 a compulsory right of way was found improper for
the failure of the owners of the dominant estate to allege that the passageway they sought to be re-opened
was at a point least prejudicial to the owner of the servient estate. The Court thus explained,
''[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably
maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety
of its clients and patrons would be compromised."42 Similarly, shopping malls install metal detectors and
body scanners, and require bag inspection as a requisite for entry. Needless to say, any security lapse on
the part of the mall owner can compromise public safety.

Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners
have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private
premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security
measures and filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an
owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the
Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety.
Necessad1y, a person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises
that arc accessible to the public.

In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint
constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation
where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's
bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical
inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open
their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that petitioner consented to the
search) thereby making the seized items admissible in evidence.43 Petitioner contends otherwise and
insists that his failure to object cannot be construed as an implied waiver.

Petitioner is wrong.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right,
which may be waived.44 However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.45 Relevant to this
determination of voluntariness are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a
public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on;46 (d) his
or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found;47 (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.48

In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals,49the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to search
the car, to which the latter agreed. According to the Court, petitioner himself freely gave his consent to
the search. In People v. Montilla, 50 the Court found the accused to have spontaneously performed
affirmative acts of volition by opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts
amounted to a clear waiver of his right. In People v. Omaweng,51 the police officers asked the accused if
they could see the contents of his bag, to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are
only clothings." The policemen then asked if they could open and see it, and the accused answered "you
can see it." The Court held there was a valid consented search.

Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA
Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes, just open if' based on petitioner's
own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of his bag. In its Decision
dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals aptly held:

A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers asked the accused if they could see
the contents of his bag and he answered "you can see the contents but those are only clothings.'' When
asked if they could open and see it, he said "you can see it." In the present case, accused-appellant told the
member of the task force that "it was only a cellphone" when asked who owns the bag and what are its
contents. When asked by the member of the task force if he could open it, accused-appellant told him
"yes, just open it." Hence, as in Omaweng, there was a waiver of accused-appellants right against
warrantless search.52

To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are mutually
exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the
absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for
which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches
done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public ·places. In contrast, a warrantless
search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be
dispensed with. Examples include search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view,
consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.

Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the following guidelines.1âwphi1 Prior to
entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and
seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at
bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required
instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's
presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus
owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for
an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced to
land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger
onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and
his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private
security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an
airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers
to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or
police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and
their bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the
search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid
reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the
dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for
public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any
discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances,
the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups
should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public
safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the
present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals, just
like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal
and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these
guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a
reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional
guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving
vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a
group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person unti1 the
passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the Resolution dated 15
October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099 are AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE VS PASUDAG

GR No. 128822, May 4, 2001

FACTS: SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About five (5)
meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn
plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the
garden. The store owner told him that Pasudag owned it. A team was dispatched and the team arrived and
went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. The police looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to
bring the team to his backyard garden which was about five (5) meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana
plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag standing beside
one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team brought accused
Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in
the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned the marijuana plants. SPO3 Fajarito prepared a
confiscation report which accused Pasudag signed.

ISSUE: WON the arrest and seizure valid?

HELD: As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may
validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. In the case at bar, the police
authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired
as to who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that
some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot
and confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that
they would be uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this
case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.

The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The testimony of SPO3
Jovencio Fajarito reveals that appellant was not duly informed of his constitutional rights. It has been held
repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out
as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-
appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of
the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.

PEOPLE VS ABE VALDEZ

GR No. 129296, Sept. 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 25
FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya finding
accused-appellant Abe Valdez guilty for violation Section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6245). He was
accused of planting and (maybe) manufacturing marijuana. During trial, one of the witnesses, SPO3
Marcelo Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an
unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio
Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to
appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya
then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3
Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and
arrest the cultivator of same. The following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, went to
the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. The police found appellant alone in his
nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that
they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants for evidence. The police took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested.
Meanwhile, the accused-appellant contended that at around 10:00am of September 25, 1996, he
was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He
was asked to go with the latter to "see something." He was brought to the place where the marijuana
plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present
and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and
told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning
the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He
was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was
taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. Finding appellant's defense insipid,
the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants.

Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers
had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that
there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana
plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were
visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they reached the site.
The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must,
therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless search was lawful.

HELD: No. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one
(1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The
place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession,
they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But
they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip
was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. In the instant case, it was held that the confiscated plants
were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the admissibility of the marijuana
plants as evidence for the prosecution, the SC found that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful
search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree.
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding.

The voluntary confession of ownership of marijuana was in violation of the custodial rights
because of the absence of competent and independent counsel, and thus, inadmissible too. In sum, both
the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to the appellant’s voluntary confession of ownership
of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant’s guilt failed to meet the test of constitutional
competence. Without these, the prosecution’s remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum
of evidence necessary to warrant appellant’s conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence on his
favor stands.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in
Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a
surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave the
description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully
buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned
themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going
on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted
moremarijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came
back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened
and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter
moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living roombut did not
find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to
the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’
They askedMusa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found
dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuanainside it is unreasonable,
hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of theobject is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of
the object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested the
accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they
found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.

Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seizedillegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution

PADILLA VS CA
PADILLA vs CA
Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help
pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession:

1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition

2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo

3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo

4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include
grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of
Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum
to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled
bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was
denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General
made a complete turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying for acquittal
(nabayaran siguro).

ISSUE:

1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

HELD: No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that
no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the
Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure—a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when
in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo,
petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the
presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the
hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.

Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:

? Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid
warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence
inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose
possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a
warrant)
? Search of moving vehicle

? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of
Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary
rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and search
contemporaneous with arrest.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that
curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private
citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.

2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the
subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly
proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are
inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the
records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and
issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court’s incisive
observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by
the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-
Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of
mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber
cannot be licensed to a civilian.

3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel
punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court “in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic
ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context” and adds that respondent court should have applied instead
the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D.
1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal
possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to
apply the governing law at the time of appellant’s commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as
it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated
the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous averment. The
severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the
invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of
P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that “the pertinent laws
on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution…” Appellant’s
grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the
province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only
function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the
lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT
that petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to “10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1
day, as maximum.

People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the
RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be
applied.

PEOPLE V. COMPACION
[G. R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001]
FACTS:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing
and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong conducted a surveillance of the residence
of accused who was then the Barangay Captain. During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the
backyard of the accused which they suspected as marijuana plants. The team proceeded at the residence
of accused despite failure to obtain a warrant. SPO4Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the
accused. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that the
accused opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor
about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use
of his wife who was suffering from migraine. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana
plants. However, the accused, in his version, stated that while he and his family were sleeping, he heard
somebody knocking outside his house. After he opened the gate, 4 persons whom he thought members of
the military went inside his house. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some went
upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his
house.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid search on the backyard of the accused.

HELD:
 No. The search and seizure conducted was not authorized by a search warrant. Neither does it
fall within the exceptions. The accused’ right against unreasonable search was clearly violated. It is extant
from the records that accused’ did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While
such rights may be waived, either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused in allowing the members of the
military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could
not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure
could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and
seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily
armed.

As a general rule, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Thus, the following elements must be present; a prior valid intention based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and plain view justified were seizure of evidence without further search.

Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. The police entered accused house without the latter’s
consent, and with the intent to seize evidence.. The agents did not come across the marijuana plants
inadvertently. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to
be issued.

CABALLES vs. CA G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002 Warrantless Search
FEBRUARY 21, 2019
FACTS:

Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan,
Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with “kakawati” leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the
vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer,
and appeared nervous.

With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). When
asked where the wires came from, appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately
8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.

The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Theft.

The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who
were on routine patrol, merely on “suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,” does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant.

RULING:

It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar was not
authorized by a search warrant.

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or ‘constructive
borders’ like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct
the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:

(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4)
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the
vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in
a fixed area.

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely
conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle.They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It
cannot be considered a simple routine check.

The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol
became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which,
according to them, was unusual and uncommon.

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the conduct of a
search without a warrant.

Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search.
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain
petitioner’s conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

The impugned decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes was
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

People vs. Libnao

PEOPLE vs. LIBNAO | G.R. No. 136860 | Jan 20, 2003

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: This is a case finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of
violating Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance
operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from
Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big
bulks.

On Oct. 20, 1996, at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had
two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the herein appellant and her co-accused.
In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked
about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2. Upon reaching the
center, P03 Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. As soon as the
brgy. Captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and
personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with
newspaper.

The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic Chemist Babu
conducted a lab exam on them and concluded that the articles were marijuana. For their part, both accused
denied the accusation against them.

Libnao argued that her arrest was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She also
takes the issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She
claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her
choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered
inadmissible in evidence against her.

ISSUE: Whether both the accused can be convicted based on the prosecutions evidence.

HELD: YES. The above contentions deserve scant attention. The warrantless search in the case at bench
is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting
surveillance operation for 3 months in the area. The surveillance yielded information that once a month,
appellant and her co-accused Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. It is also clear that at the time Libnao
was apprehended, she was committing offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited
drugs in violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the ROC, one of the instances a police officer
is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a
crime in flagrante delicto.
Appellant also faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary
evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to formally offer them. She argues that absent any
formal offer, they must be deemed inadmissible.

The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they
have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in
the records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified,
presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their formal
offer; therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those
exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.

Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and
alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

The appeal is DENIED.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, June 10, 1968

DECISION

I. THE FACTS

Cleveland, Ohio detective McFadden was on a downtown beat that he had been patrolling for
many years when he observed two strangers (Terry and another man, Chilton) at a street corner. He saw
them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store
window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who
thereafter left swiftly.

Suspecting the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up’, the officer followed them and saw them
rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three,
identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men mumbled something, whereupon
McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt in his overcoat pocket – but was
unable to remove – a pistol. He removed Terry’s overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to
face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a
revolver from Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of
Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under Terry’s or
Chilton’s outer garments until he felt the guns.
 Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to
suppress the weapons, which was denied by the trial court. Terry eventually went to the U.S. Supreme
Court to question the admissibility of the gun and his resulting conviction.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the gun seized from Terry admissible in evidence against him and thus his conviction of
carrying concealed weapon was proper?

III. THE RULING

[The U.S. Supreme Court voted 8-1 to AFFIRM Terry’s conviction of carrying a concealed
weapon.]

YES, the gun seized from Terry was admissible in evidence against him; thus, his conviction of
carrying concealed weapon was proper.

First, in assessing the reasonableness of stop-and-frisk as a valid form of warrantless search, the
U.S. Supreme Court held:

The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden’s taking steps to
investigate [Terry’s] suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden’s
invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We
are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is
the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the
performance of their duties. xxx

xxx [W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves
and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an
arrest.When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the
person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.

xxx. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any
other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus it must be
limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer
or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a full search, even though
it remains a serious intrusion.
 Next, on the distinction between protective search for weapons under stop-and-frisk on one hand,
and arrest (and the search incidental thereof) on the other hand, it was declared:

An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for
weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial
stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and
it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether
or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the other hand,
constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not
follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is
equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an
arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is
possessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting
him for a crime. Petitioner’s reliance on cases which have worked out standards of reasonableness with
regard to seizures constituting arrests and searches incident thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the
interests sought to be vindicated and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two cases,
and thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types of conduct
under the [right against unreasonable search and seizure].

Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude
that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.

xxx [The protective search for weapons under stop-and-frisk], unlike a search without a warrant
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of
evidence of crime. The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the
police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Revolver seized from Terry admissible in evidence

The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in
evidence against him, thus:

“xxx. At the time he seized [Terry] and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the
protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat
of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the
discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be
decided on its own facts. We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where
in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under
the [contest of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure], and any weapons seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.” (Emphasis
supplied)

POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]

Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38
Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber
gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 calibergun. They brought the
petitioner to the police station for furtherinvestigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked
to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession
but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles
recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under
Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It
is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the
basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and dutyof the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futileand much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under theexceptions heretofore discussed, and
hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated

Manalili v CA (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance
along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving
information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying
manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked
him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see
what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine
it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible
as evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained
in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable
cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by is in the place to be searched.
 Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained
when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent
court

PEOPLE V. SOLAYAO G.R. No. 119220. September 20, 1996

FACTS:

l SPO3 Nio and his team of CAFGU went to Brgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to conduct an investigation
regarding reports on the presence of armed men roaming around barangays of Caibiran.

l Upon arriving in Brgy. Onion, the agents became suspicious to the group of Solayao because the accused-
appellant himself is drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. What’s more suspicious is
when they noticed the team of SPO3 Nio, the group fled leaving behind Solayao, herein accused-
appellant.

l According to Solayao, he’s not aware that he is carrying a “latong” (49-inch firearm) wrapped in dried
coconut leaves. He thought that it’s only a torch which Hermogenes Cenining gave to him and that he is
not aware that there’s a concealed weapon inside. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed
to him after the others had been used up.

l Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the RTC of Biliran, with the crime of illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition defined and penalized under PD No. 1866.

l The lower court found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Nino confiscated the firearm
from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible accused-
appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon reaching
Barangay Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie
Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an
unlawful warrantless search.

HELD:

NO. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence
nor violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be likened to the Posadas case where the
suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a probable
cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself
as a government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were
armed men roaming around in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably
drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped
in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected
without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his
companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused-appellant has no license to carry the
firearm by merely relying on the lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-appellant admitted to
them during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to carry such weapon.

The prosecution should have presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the
Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber
would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm.

Hence, Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

G.R. No. 213225

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
RENANTE COMPRADO Y BRONOLA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 01156 which affirmed the Decision2 dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Misamis Oriental (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-
appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuan.

THE FACTS
On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Information reads:

That on July 15, 2011, at more or less eleven o'clock in the evening, along the national highway, Puerto,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, control and custody 3,200 grams of dried
fruiting tops of suspected marijuana, which substance, after qualitative examination conducted by the
Regional Crime Laboratory, Office No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City, tested positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug, with the said accused, knowing the substance to be a dangerous drug. 3

Upon his arraignment on 8 August 2011, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CJ) sent a text message to Police
Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 6,
Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of marijuana together with a female companion, was
sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a backpack containing
marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. At 9:30 in the evening, the CI
called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with body number
2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be
carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the
evening, the police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front of the station. 4

At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus bearing the said body and plate numbers.
P/Insp. Orate, Police Officer 3 Teodoro de Oro (PO3 De Oro), Senior Police Officer 1 Benjamin Jay
Reycitez (SPOJ Reycitez), and PO1 Rexie Tenio (PO1 Tenio) boarded the bus and saw a man matching
the description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack
placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate asked the man to open the bag, the police officers saw a transparent
cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.5

SPO1 Reycitez took photos of accused-appellant and the cellophane bag containing the dried marijuana
leaves.6PO3 De Oro, in the presence of accused-appellant, marked the bag "RCB-2" and the contents of
the bag "RCB-1."7Thereafter, PO1 Tenio and PO3 De Oro brought accused-appellant and the seized bag
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 8 On 16 July 2011, at around 1:40 in the morning, Police
Senior Inspector Charity Caceres (PSI Caceres) of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office 10, Cagayan de Oro
City, received the requests for examination and the specimen. PSI Caceres, after conducting qualitative
examination of the specimen, issued Chemistry Report No. D-253-20119 stating that the dried leaves
seized from accused-appellant were marijuana and which weighed 3,200 grams.

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July 2011, at
around 6:30 in the evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in
Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him to
carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City
When they reached Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, their vehicle was stopped by three (3) police officers. All
of the passengers were ordered to alight from the vehicle for baggage inspection. The bag was opened and
they saw a transparent cellophane bag containing marijuana leaves. At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
accused-appellant, his girlfriend, and the police officers who arrested them boarded a bus bound for
Cagayan de Oro City.

When the bus approached Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, the police officers told the bus driver to stop at
the checkpoint.1âwphi1 The arresting officers took photos of accused-appellant and his girlfriend inside
the bus. They were then brought to the police station where they were subjected to custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel. 10

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. It held that
accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was merely requested to bring the bag to Cagayan de
Oro City, did not prove his innocence; mere possession of the illegal substance already consummated the
crime and good faith was not even a defense. The RTC did not lend credence to accused-appellant's claim
that he was arrested in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, because it was unbelievable that the police officers
would go out of their jurisdiction in Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, just to apprehend accused-appellant in
Bukidnon. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused RENANTE COMPRADO y
BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime defined and penalized under
Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the Fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos [₱500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in case of nonpayment of fine.

Let the penalty imposed on the accused be a lesson and an example to all who have criminal propensity,
inclination and proclivity to commit the same forbidden acts, that crime does not pay, and that the
pecuniary gain and benefit which one can derive from possessing drugs, or other illegal substance, or
from committing any other acts penalized under Republic Act 9165, cannot compensate for the penalty
which one will suffer if ever he is prosecuted and penalized to the full extent of the law. 11

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined that accused-appellant
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he raised no objection as to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. The CA reasoned that the seized items are admissible in evidence because the
search and seizure of the illegal narcotics were made pursuant to a search of a moving vehicle. It added
that while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives from the media and other
personalities required by law were present during the operation and during the taking of the inventory,
noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and would not render
inadmissible accused-appellant’s arrest or the items seized from him because the prosecution was able to
show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. The CA disposed the
case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment dated 18 April 2013 of the Regiorial Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 is hereby
affirmed in toto. 12

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES

I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;

II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; and

III. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

OUR RULING

The Court finds for accused-appellant.

I.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.13

The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. 14 This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented
warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances. 15

II.

A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. However,
the distinctions between the two have already been settled by the Court in Malacat v. CA: 16

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or prope1iy found which was
used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

xxxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk" it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. 17 (emphases supplied and citations omitted)

III.

A valid stop-and-frisk was illustrated in the cases of Posadas v. CA (Posadas), 18 Manalili v. CA

(Manalili), 19 and People v. Solayao (Solayao).

In Posadas, two policemen were conducting a surveillance within the premises of the Rizal Memorial
Colleges when they spotted the accused carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They approached the
accused and identified themselves as police officers. The accused attempted to flee but his attempt to get
away was thwarted by the policemen who then checked the buri bag wherein they found guns,
ammunition, and a grenade.21

In Manalili, police officers were patrolling the Caloocan City cemetery when they chanced upon a man
who had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. When this person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked what he was holding in his hands, but he turned to resist. 22

In Solayao, police operatives were carrying out an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran, Biliran. Later on, they met the group of
accused-appellant. The police officers became suspicious when they observed that the men were drunk
and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Upon seeing the
government agents, accused-appellant's companions fled. Thus, the police officers found justifiable
reason to stop and frisk the accused.23

IV.

On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and frisk committed by the police
in People v. Cogaed (Cogaed). 24 In that case, the police officers received a message from an informant
that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union, to
the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. A checkpoint was set up and when a passenger jeepney from
Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint, the jeepney driver disembarked and signaled to the police
officers that the two male passengers were carrying marijuana.

SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Cogaed and
Santiago Dayao. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao what their bags contained. Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barrio mate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana. The Court, in that case, invalidated the search and seizure ruling that there
were no suspicious circumstances that preceded the arrest. Also, in Cogaed, there was a discussion of
various jurisprudence wherein the Court adjudged that there was no valid stop-and-frisk:

The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the police
that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the
police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and· identified
her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to
look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Aruta's arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It was only the
informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not admissible because
of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.

Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police's informant, who
informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI waited
for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like in the case
at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and found bundles of what turned out to be marijuana leaves.
The court declared that the search and seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.

xxxx

People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving
information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." One
night, the police received information that this drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn
Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at the hotel. The informant told the police
that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was carrying a
juice box. The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his
person and in the juice box he was holding.

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua's situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no. valid 'stop-and-frisk'."25 (citations omitted)

The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records
reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in
the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime. P/Insp. Orate testified as follows:

[Prosecutor Vicente]:

Q: On that date Mr. Witness, at about 6:30 in the evening, what happened, if any?

A: At about 6:30 in the evening, I received an information from our Confidential Informant reporting that
an alleged courier of marijuana were sighted in their place, Sir.

xxxx

[Court]:

Q: Aside from the sighting of this alleged courier of marijuana, what else was relayed to you if there were
anything else?

A: Our Confidential Informant told me that two persons, a male and a female were having in their
possession a black pack containing marijuana, Sir.

xxxx

Q: And then, after you received the information through your cellphone, what happened next, Mr.
Witness?

A: So, I prepared a team to conduct an entrapment operation in order to intercept these two persons, Sir.

Q: You said that the Informant informed you that the subject was still in Cabanglasan?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: How did you entrap the subject when he was still in Cabanglasan?

A: I am planning to conduct a check point because according to my Confidential Informant the subject
person is from Gingoog City, Sir.

Q: According to the information, how will he go here?

A: He will be travelling by bus, Sir.

Q: What bus?

A: Bachelor, Sir.

Q: And then, what happened next Mr. Witness?

A: At about 9:30 in the evening my Confidential Informant again called and informed me that the subject
person is now boarding a bus going to Cagayan de Oro City, Sir.
Q: What did he say about the bus, if he said anything, Mr. Witness?

A: My agent was able to identify the body number of the bus, Bus No. 2646.

Q: Bearing Plate No.?

A: Bearing Plate No. KVP 988, Sir.

Q: What was he bringing at that time, according to the information?

A: According to my agent, these two persons were bringing along with them a back pack color black
violet with markings LOWE ALPINE.

Q: Then, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A: We set up a check point in front of our police station and we waited for the bus to come over, Sir.

xxxx

Q: About 11 o'clock in the evening, what happened, Mr. Witness?

A: When we sighted the bus we flagged down the bus.

Q: After you flagged down the bus, what happened next?

A: We went on board the said bus, Sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next?

A: We went to the back of the bus and I saw a man carrying a back pack, a black violet which was
described by the Confidential Informant, the back pack which was placed on his lap.

xxxx

Q: What happened next?

A: When he opened the back pack, we found marijuana leaves, the back pack containing cellophane
which the cellophane containing marijuana leaves.26 ·

In his dissent from Esquillo v. People,27 Justice Lucas P. Bersamin emphasizes that there should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." This principle was subsequently recognized in the recent cases
of Cogaed28and Sanchez v. People. 29 In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger carrying
his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by
itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant was in possession of
marijuana.
 V.

As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.30 Thus, it becomes imperative
to determine whether accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances wherein a peace officer
or a private person may lawfully arrest a person even without a warrant:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of
an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (l) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.31 On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it.32

Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-appellant could not be said to have
executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of the arresting officers 'Which would indicate
that he was committing the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had just committed an offense. Again,
without the tipped information, accused-appellant would just have been any other bus passenger who was
minding his own business and eager to reach his destination. It must be remembered that warrantless
arrests are mere exceptions to the constitutional right of a person against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus, they must be strictly construed against the government and its agents. While the campaign
against proliferation of illegal drugs is indeed a noble objective, the same must be conducted in a manner
which does not trample upon well-established constitutional rights. Truly, the end does not justify the
means.

VI.

The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned that the search and seizure is valid because
it could be considered as search of a moving vehicle:

Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.33

The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular
type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a· specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle,
the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the
information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying
marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover,
in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such
breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless
searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor
vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it
arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person.

VII.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.34 This exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. 35

Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite accused-appellant's failure to object to the regularity of his arrest before arraignment.
The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver
of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. 36

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Renante
Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from detention unless he is detained for
any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this
Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: