9. G.R. No.

199522 June 22, 2015

RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution2 dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32912, which affirmed with modification the conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to
Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004 .

The facts of the case follow.

On the night of March 14, 2007,petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session and went to
the boarding house of AAA.3 At that time, Dinamling and the woman AAA were in an ongoing five-year relationship
and they had two common children (then aged four and two years old). Dinamling and his friend arrived as AAA was
putting the two children to bed. Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children, ordering AAA to pack her
things in a trash bag and a carton box for ducklings. His reason for the eviction was that she was allegedly using the
place as a "whore house" wherein she "brought (her) partners." AAA initially did not want to leave as she could not
carry the children and their things, but she left when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding bottle outside the house,
causing it to break. She then went to the house of BBB and requested the latter to fetch her children. When BBB
and another friend went for the children, Dinamling already had left with the older child and only the baby was left.
The baby was brought by the friends back to AAA. In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between
Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. When AAA went to the police, she
was merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked over. Dinamling was, at that time, a policeman
himself.4

Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., another incident occurred. AAA was at the house of CCC
when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When she came out, Dinamling
punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he kept on following her when she
already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she was "good-for-nothing." AAA left for the
barangay captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road,
Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the
pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle.5 AAA
stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding and
about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks
pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no
remorse over his acts.6

As a result of the above incidents, petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two (2) criminal Informations in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f)7 of RA No. 9262. The two
Informations against him read:

Criminal Case No. 1701:

That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two
common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by repeated verbal
and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting utterances directed against the victim and a feeding
bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the
victim being pregnant at the time.

Criminal Case No. 1702:

That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two
common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by boxing the victim
on the head, kicking her at the back and removing her pant(sic) and panty (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the
victim being pregnant at the time.
Upon arraignment, Dinamling pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.8

For the prosecution, AAA, her mother DDD and Dr. Mae Codamon Diaz testified. For the accused, only petitioner
testified for and in his own defense. His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the town's
police station at the time that the offenses were committed.9

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 4, 2009 finding Dinamling guilty of both charges. For Criminal
Case No. 1701, the court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor.10 For Criminal Case No. 1702, the court ordered him to suffer imprisonment of from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision in Criminal Case No. 1701 was affirmed and the one in Criminal
Case No. 1702 was affirmed with the modification on the penalty, by applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
such that Dinamling was sentenced to imprisonment of nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition assails the findings of the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding his defenses of denial and alibi as
well as in discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony. Allegedly, the
witness, Dr. Diaz, testified that she was unsure if the abortion was a result of the mauling that AAA suffered or could
have been caused by an infection or other factors.11

This Court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, but will modify some of the penalties imposed by the
appellate court.

The petition raises issues that call for an examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
As a general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of fact but only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
brought before this Court.12 Time and again, the Court has consistently declared that questions of facts are beyond
the pale of a petition for review.13 Factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the appellate courts,
are generally binding on this Court.14

But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of fact may not be entertained by this Court in a
petition for review, to wit:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) When
the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record,15

None of the above-mentioned exceptions, however, are cited by the petitioner as a ground to grant his petition. But
even assuming arguendo, and in the interest of substantial justice, that any of the exceptions above were indeed
invoked, as the petition alleges that the appellate court failed to give weight to petitioner's defenses of denial and
alibi as well as to his stance that the testimony of Dr. Diaz exculpates him from the crime, this Court, upon a close
examination of the case records, still found no error in the appellate court's finding of guilt in petitioner.

On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's evidence. In particular,
AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the charges was clear, categorical and
straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence. Herein below are excerpts of her testimony:
Q. Specifically inviting your attention to that incident in the evening of March 14, 2007, could you please tell the
court what transpired?

A. In the evening of March 14, 2007, somewhere around seven or eight o'clock in the evening, I was letting my kids
sleep (w)hen (Dinamling) came with a friend. They had a drinking spree and x x x he started to evict us from that
boarding house because according to him, I (was) using that boarding house as a whore house (by) bringing in
partners, et cetera to that boarding house. That (was) why he was letting us out of it. And he even told me that if I
(had) no travelling bag, I (could) use the basura (garbage) bag outside and I (could) use the carton where he placed
the ducklings to pack our things and leave the place. That night, I (did) not know how to carry them out and I was
waiting for him to stop talking and leave but he never left us up to the time he threw the feeding bottle of my baby
outside that caused it to break and that was also the time I decided to go to the house of BBB because it is the place
where my landlady (was) staying.

xxxx

Q. You mentioned of a feeding bottle.

A. He threw it outside, Sir.

Q. How did you feel as regards these actuations of the accused that evening?

A. That is worst. He was inflicting pain (on) me but that time it was directed (at an) innocent individual and that is
very painful.

Q. Personally, did you feel distressed or stressed or fearful at the time the accused was acting that way?

A. When he started acting that way, I fear(ed) he would again inflict those pain (on) us.

Q. So when you went to the house of BBB, what happened next?

A. x x x He (BBB) went to fetch the kids and came home with one of the kids but to my dismay, even the milk of my
baby was not there any more; that night because it was around 11:00 o'clock, we had to use the feeding bottle of
BBB's son together with the milk because when they went to fetch the kids, the milk was gone.

Q. Was the incident on March 14, 2007 the first time or it happened (sic) previously?

A. It happened previously. Those were the time(s) that (I was) prompted to go back home and to my relatives for
protection but he (came, followed) us where we (went).

Q. In those previous incidents before March 14, 2007, what did he do, if any?

A. There are times he did that in public. He usually starts hitting my head, pulls my hair kicks me and there was a
time I went to the police station but they said that (it) is some kind of family problem that we could talk xxx over and
so it was left that way. I thought leaving him would be the best thing to do but he kept on following us.16

xxxx

Q. I am inviting your attention to that incident of March 20, 2007. Will you please tell the court what happened that
late afternoon or early evening?

A. I was at the house of CCC waiting for a friend because of what happened on March 14, 2007 when we left the
boarding house.

xxxx

Q. What transpired thereat, when you were at that place?

A. After sometime, around 9 o'clock, (Dinamling) came and shouted words that (on) final count, (I) should be out of
that place.

Q. And what else happened?

A. After shouting, he boxed me at the left ear.

Q. What transpired next?

A. (T)hen I felt there was blood in my ear. I followed him outside and I inquired (as to) why he (kept on) following us
when we (already) left the boarding house and then he started shouting at me, shouting my family name, x x x x that
I (was) good for nothing and that I (could) sue him (in) court and he (would) pay me. So I said "I thought when we
already left, you were at peace with yourself already." When I was going down, going to the barangay captain's
house, he followed me. When I tried to go back, he kicked me. He pulled my pants down and pulled even my panty
and he said x x x he (did) that to me because I was worthless.

Q. (At) what particular spot did the accused pull down your pants and your panty?

A. Front of CCC.

Q. What was that spot, road or backyard?

A. Road.

Q. Could you describe the place? Were there houses nearby, that road, that spot where he pulled down your pants
and panty?

A. There is a small store and people were looking at us. There are houses above and then one of them told me he
saw but he is afraid to come out.

Q. Was it already dark (at) that time?

A. Dark but then there was a street light near the residence.

Q. Was it still early evening?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About what time?

A. Around 9 o'clock.

Q. After pulling down your pants and your panty along that road, what else happened?

A. He threw my pants and panty back tome and he left shouting at me, my family name. It is very hurting because
my family (had) nothing to do with this.

xxxx

Q. And what happened the following day?

A. I stayed at my friend's house then at 5:00 o'clock early morning of March 21, there was pain at my back. That
night when he kicked me, there was pain at my back. I said I (would) just go tomorrow for medication but I did not
reach the day because I was bleeding. When I went to the bathroom, there (was) blood so I said I think I am going
to abort. There (was) blood already so I decided to go to bath before I (went) to the hospital but when I went to take
a bath, I already had profuse bleeding so they (had) to carry me with the use of a blanket to the hospital.17

AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would have been her third child with Dinamling. She also
testified about always being afraid of Dinamling, even fearing the sound of his motorcycle as that signalled that she
or her children would be abused. She previously filed with the police a complaint for physical injuries but nothing
came of it. Later, she learned from Dinamling that he had been discharged as a policeman.18

The trial court specifically ascribed credibility on the said testimony of AAA which the Court of Appeals has affirmed.
Under such circumstances, this Court has little option but to accord said findings with great respect, if not finality.
The findings off act of the trial court, as regards the credibility of a witness, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and supported by the evidence on record are accorded finality.19

In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was "like a corpse" because of
Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of her daughter, including the times that she
saw her with "bluish spots" and when AAA had a miscarriage from all the boxing and kicking that she had received
from Dinamling.20 She knew that Dinamling was a married man when he had his relationship with AAA21 and she
knew for a fact that Dinamling did not live with AAA and the children because he always went home to his own
wife.22

The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 and
as alleged in the two Informations filed against petitioner. The provision of the law states:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are
derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;23

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;24

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts
or omissions.25

As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been proven and
duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-year ongoing
relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two common children. AAA was often in
fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal abuse. In the evening of March 14, 2007, an incident
occurred in which she and her children were actually evicted by Dinamling from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the
presence of his own friend and the children, accused AAA of using the boarding house as a "whore-house" and
alleged that AAA brought sexual partners in that place. Dinamling further humiliated AAA by telling her to pack her
clothes in a trash bag and in a carton box used to pack ducklings. He then threw a baby bottle outside and broke it.
This forced AAA to hastily leave even without her children. Dinamling also left and took with him the elder child and
left the baby behind. AAA had to ask for her friends to fetch the children but the latter found only the baby.
According to AAA and her mother DDD, that incident was not an isolated one, as similar incidents had happened
previously.

As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition to the first
two elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender, the prosecution was able to prove
another incident of mental or emotional anguish through public ridicule or humiliation when it showed Dinamling
acting in the following manner: a) by calling and counting down on AAA for the latter to come out of the house where
she was staying;

b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;

c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-for-nothing;"

d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just pay her;

e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear (panty) and calling her
worthless;

f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name as he left.

All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public, highlighting the public ridicule and
humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and emotional pain. AAA's suffering is so much that even the
sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put fear in her.

All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other conclusion than the commission of the crime as prescribed
in the law.

It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated AAA's testimony of the actual incidents. The testimony of the
complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of the act, as long as it is credible, suffices to establish the
guilt of the accused because evidence is weighed and not counted.26 If, in criminal cases of rape27 or homicide,28 the
positive, categorical and credible testimony of a lone witness is deemed enough to support a conviction, then, in the
case at bar, involving a case of violation of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262, this Court shall treat in the same manner
the testimony of a single but credible witness for the prosecution. Especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of
truth and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner, corroborative
testimony is not needed to support a conviction.29

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who
are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic violence,
are addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.

The law defines psychological violence as follows:

Section 3(a)

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on
the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is
the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an
element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or
similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim
as such experiences are personal to this party.30 All of this was complied with in the case at bar. In the face of the
strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a defense of denial and alibi. On the nights of
March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at XXX Police Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those
dates.32 However, on cross examination, he admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police
station to AAA's boarding house.33

Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as inherently weak34 and
which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the
victim.35 In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight relative to the affirmative testimony of the
offended party.36 The only exception to this rule is where there is no effective identification, or where the
identification of the accused has been fatally tainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies.37

In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward, unequivocal and positive
declarations of AAA. For one, the positive identification of Dinamling as the perpetrator is not an issue. It is not
disputed that he and AAA knew each other very well as, in fact, they were at that time carrying on a five-year
relationship which had borne two common children.

Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only was heat some
other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been physically present at the place of
the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its commission.38 Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no
water. Not only was his alleged location at the time of commission, that is, the XXX Police Station where he was on
duty, in the same municipality as the crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also admited that this police
station is just "two to three minutes" away from AAA's boarding house. Where the accused admits that he was in the
same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it cannot be said that it was physically impossible for
him to have committed the crime, and his defense of alibi cannot prosper.39

Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found petitioner Dinamling guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
such conviction must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial of the accused is a negative assertion that is weaker than
the affirmative testimony of the victim.40 It almost has no probative value and may be further discarded in the
absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witness to impute so grave a wrong against the
accused.41As for alibi, it is not given weight if the accused failed to demonstrate that he was so far away and could
not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed.42

But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, the substance of which
allegedly frees him from responsibility for the incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn child.

By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, brought a copy of a medical
certificate issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:

a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital from March 21 to March 24, 2007;

b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling, and;

 c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and abrasion of the left elbow.43

The witness testified that she herself typed the medical certificate and had it signed by Dr. Baguilat.44 Dr. Baguilat,
however, was unable to testify, due to the alleged distance of the court from his current place of work.45 Instead of
Dr. Baguilat, it was Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, an obstetrician-gynecologist of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, who
testified that the medical certificate indicated that AAA was pregnant, but that her incomplete abortion might or might
not have been caused by her "mauling."46 Dr. Diaz added that the anemia was caused by profuse bleeding, while the
contusion and hematoma were caused by a fall, trauma, blow or impact to the patient's body.47 When cross-
examined, Dr. Diaz stated that other possible causes of abortion include infection of the reproductive organ or
urinary tract infection and intake of strong medicines, while another cause of anemia is malnutrition.48

Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as to whether the
mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime.

The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries from the
mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is charged. Such injuries are
likewise not alleged in the two informations against him. Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to
the fact or existence of such physical injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply put,
AAA's physical condition is not an element of the crime that petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same
is, strictly speaking, unnecessary.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the perpetrator
are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception
is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused the mental and
emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical
violence was a means of causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury,
the physical violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or
emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA
of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence
since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional
distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done on her as well as to the
mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.

The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to have led to her
mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the information in the case at bar. Thus, proof of
physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof or lack of proof of such injuries
would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or physical injuries, in isolation, are not elements of this particular
crime.

As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of non-physical suffering, that is, mental
or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the offended party, and not of direct bodily
harm or property damage which are covered by the other subsections of the law's provision. The use of physical
violence, whether or not it causes physical or property harm to the victim, falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged
and proven to have caused mental or emotional anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are similarly
covered only if they lead to such psychological harm. Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of
mental or emotional harm, are punishable under the other provisions of the law.

As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, or even the
complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to petitioner Dinamling's acquittal. Like the
physical injuries that was discussed above, the fact of AAA's miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not essential to
proving the elements of the crime, unless it is alleged to have caused mental or emotional suffering. It is not among
the crime's elements. In fact, it is not abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission
which is an aggravating circumstance, not an element, of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:

SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be
punished according to the following rules:

xxxx

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty
to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00); (b) undergo
mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.49
For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances which increase the
imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for the penalty to be properly
imposed.50

It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the crime's elements, as
indeed the information itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact of miscarriage one may logically derive
the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating circumstance for the crime and which is alleged as such in the
information. The pregnancy is proven by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she
presented in the course of such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete
abortion secondary to the mauling."

Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the incomplete abortion or
miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present contradictory evidence during trial to
controvert the prosecution's assertions and proof of pregnancy. The pregnancy was never put in issue during trial
and on appeal. Neither is the same in question in this petition. Therefore, it may be safely concluded that the fact of
AAA's pregnancy has been established and it may be taken account of and considered as a circumstance that
aggravates Dinamling's criminal liability.

Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now accordingly modify the penalties imposed by the trial court and
appellate court.51

As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance attends the crime. Although
1âwphi1

it was stated during trial that the offense was committed in the presence of AAA's children, such fact was not alleged
in the information and therefore will not be taken into consideration.52 Nighttime, though alleged, is not considered
aggravating because it neither facilitated the commission of the offense nor was it shown to have been purposely
sought by the offender.53 The fact of AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission, however, has been alleged
and established. This single circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises his penalty to
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA 9262 and also Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, petitioner Dinamling should be sentenced to a maximum penalty that is derived from prision mayor in
its maximum period, which is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the minimum penalty should come from the penalty one degree lower than prision
mayor which is prision correccional, whose range is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.55 Therefore,
this Court modifies the trial court's Order dated September 17, 2009,56 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
and imposes on petitioner Dinamling an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. The trial
court's order for petitioner to pay a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological
counseling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is upheld.

As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance. Again, the
single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises his penalty to the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA No. 9262 and Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals are to be modified. The maximum penalty should be
derived from prision mayor in its maximum period, which, again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years. And again, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional. Therefore, the new penalty to be imposed shall be
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
The rest of the penalties, like the imposition on the petitioner of a fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) and the order for him to undergo psychological counseling, as upheld by the appellate court, are
hereby affirmed.

Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same offense as defined in RA 9262 and are punishable by the
same range of penalties as prescribed in the said law. However, due to the greater ignominy of the acts done by the
accused in Criminal Case No. 1702, the minimum and maximum lengths of the sentence imposed should therefore
be greater than in Criminal Case No. 1701.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of petitioner to show any reversible error in
the assailed CA decision. The assailed Decision dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated November 25, 2011
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, are hereby AFFIRMED and MODIFIED only as to the penalties
imposed, to wit:

1) in Criminal Case No. 1701, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is ORDERED to serve an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. He is, likewise, ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling;

2) in Criminal Case No. 1702, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is hereby ORDERED to serve an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of six ( 6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as maximum. He is also ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and
to undergo psychological counseling.
SO ORDERED.

10. G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed
through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, 20143 and May 2, 20144 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the
motion to quash the Information5 which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as
follows:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB], being then
legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with a
certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-
mailed letter by his mother mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation
of the aforecited law.

Contrary to law.

We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC
was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009.6

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in
September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside
and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children
moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.7

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically.
This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight
attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical
and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman
named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011
when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.8 As can be
gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating
prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his
alleged marital infidelity.9

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-
Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived.10

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case,
Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest11 was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the
motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:

Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is
probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained
of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering from mental and
emotional anguish "wherever she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court notwithstanding that the
acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that
there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act
itself which had caused a woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred within the territorial
limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of the emphatic word
"causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the bringing about or into existence of something.
Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been brought about or into existence by a
criminal act which must logically have occurred within the territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the offense
to attach to it. To rule otherwise would violate or render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of our criminal laws
- territoriality.

In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children" - it becomes clear that there must be an act
which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a
criminal nature. Here, such act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain Liesel Mok" -
which has been conceded to have been committed in Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written, quashal of the Information must still be
ordered following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At best,
the Court draws the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law.12 (Emphasis in the
original)

Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought
direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in
danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it
is as if husbands of Filipino women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any
consequence, as long as they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is
an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not
only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take
cognizance of the case.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis ours)

As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.

In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an
acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that this
petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before this Court by AAA instead of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the petition
was belatedly filed.

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition was belatedly filed.
The date erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension14 was filed - June 2, 2014 - refers
to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date when the said motion was lodged before this
Comi. The motion was in fact filed on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the Rules of Court to
file the intended petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Comi in a Resolution15 dated June 9,
2014, granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition for review.

In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's response to her
Letter16dated May 26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for
assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the
extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.

We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by entertaining the petition
if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al., 17 where
the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the
absence of the OSG's participation, we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so
requires.18

Morillo, 19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the
word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the
prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case
on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such
case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to
prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the
dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court
of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same
offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.20(Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)

The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited instances may
only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the
accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.21

Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved."22 "There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted,
and the doubt concerns the c01Tect application of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23

Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is
a question of law. Thus, in Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:

[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law
prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime
charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question
of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.25 (Citations omitted)

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh the
evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for resolution
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not
Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No.
9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.

The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet no jurisprudence
on this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that
probable cause exists in the case.26 Calling the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by
the law,27 the RTC furnished copies of the assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate
through the Committee on Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights.28

The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality that a great number of
Filipino families have at least one parent working overseas. In. April to September 2016, the number of overseas
Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2 million, 97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas
contract workers or those with existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas without contract.29 It is thus
necessary to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of
psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by marital infidelity carried on
abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may be committed against women and their
children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following:

xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,
threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v.
People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime are
derived as follows:

(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar· such acts
or omissions.

xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who
are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic violence,
are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on
the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is
the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an
element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or
similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim
as such experiences are personal to this party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted
under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the
various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the
spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional
anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
1âwphi1

should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original)

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7
provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an
indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element
of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as shown in the
vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in
Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The
estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or
in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the
offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the
crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the
others x x x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against
women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and
essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes
the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section
5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the
victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element
of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must
be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond
reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband.
What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262
may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged
extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not
place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

11. .R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland
on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came
home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located
at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the
victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled
(sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their
child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
"equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the
obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject
to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is
conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion
of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal
directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case
only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when
they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three
modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41,
whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode
of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of
law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of
a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in
relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a
definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts.
Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail
over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree
with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she,
as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce
Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is
a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not
to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of
the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case,
it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which
was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have
no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice
is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof
access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that
the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case,
which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner
is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such,
our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts
falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted,
we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.