G.R. No. L-48250 December 28, 1979
It is the
GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC. and NELIA
SANTOS FANDINO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE J. ESPINO JR., and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.
This is a petition tor certiorari by way of appeal from the
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated September 26,
1977 rendered in CA-G.R. No. 55186-R entitled "Jose J.
Espino, Jr., plaintiff-appellant. versus Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. and Nelia Santos-
Fandino, defendants-appellees," the dispositive portion
of which states;
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
reversed and set aside. Defendants are ordered to
pay plaintiff-jointly and severally, the sum of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) by way
of moral damages. Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fee,
Costs of both instances shall be taxed against the
defendant defendants.
The facts of the case are as stated in the decision of the
respondent court to wit:
"Upon the evidence, and from the findings of the lower
court, it appears that in the morning of August 22, 1970,
plaintiff Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an
executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc., and
his wife and their two daughters went to shop at the
defendants' South Supermarket in Makati. While his wife
was shopping at the groceries section, plaintiff browsed
around the other parts of the market. Finding a
cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed in his hobby and
had been wanting to buy, plaintiff picked up that item
from one of the shelves. He held it in his hand thinking
that it might be lost, because of its tiny size, if he put it
in his wife's grocery cart. In the course of their shopping,
plaintiff and his wife saw the maid of plaintiff's aunt.
While talking to this maid, plaintiff stuck the file into the
front breast pocket of his shirt with a good part of the
merchandise exposed.
"At the check-out counter, the plaintiff paid for his wife's
purchases which amounted to P77.00, but he forgot to
pay for the file. As he was leaving by the exit of the
supermarket on his way to his car, carrying two bags of
groceries and accompanied by his wife and two
daughter, plaintiff was approached by a uniformed
guard of the supermarket who said: "Excuse me, Mr., I
think you have something in your pocket which you have
not paid for." (p. 5, tsn, Aug. 13, 1971), pointing to his
left front breast pocket. Suddenly reminded of the file,
plaintiff apologized thus: "I am sorry," and he turned
back toward the cashier to pay for the file. But the guard
stopped him and led him instead toward the rear of the
supermarket. The plaintiff protested but the guard was
firm saying: "No, Mr., please come with me.
procedure of the supermarket to bring people that we
apprehend to the back of the supermarket" (p. 8, Ibid).
The time was between 9 and 10 o'clock. A crowd of
customers on their way into the supermarket saw the
plaintiff being stopped and led by a uniformed guard
toward the rear of the supermarket. Plaintiff acquiesced
and signaled to his wife and daughters to wait.
"Into a cubicle which was immediately adjacent to the
area where deliveries to the supermarket were being
made, the plaintiff was ushered. The guard directed him
to a table and gave the file to the man seated at the
desk. Another man stood beside the plaintiff. The man
at the desk looked at the plaintiff and the latter
immediately explained the circumstances that led to the
finding of the file in his possession. The man at the desk
pulled out a sheet of paper and began to ask plaintiff's
name, age, residence and other personal data. Plaintiff
was asked to make a brief statement, and on the sheet
of paper or "Incident Report" he wrote down the
following: "While talking to my aunt's maid with my wife,
I put this item in my shirt pocket. I forgot to check it out
with my wife's items" (Exhibit A). Meanwhile, the
plaintiff's wife joined him and asked what had taken him
so long.
"The guard who had accosted plaintiff took him back
inside the supermarket in the company of his wife.
Plaintiff and his wife were directed across the main
entrance to the shopping area, down the line of check-
out counters, to a desk beside the first checkout counter.
To the woman seated at the desk, who turned out to be
defendant Nelia Santos-Fandino, the guard presented
the incident report and the file, Exhibit B. Defendant
Fandino read the report and addressing the guard
remarked: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito" (p. 22, Id.).
Plaintiff explained and narrated the incident that led to
the finding of the file in his pocket, telling Fandino that
he was going to pay for the file because he needed it.
But this defendant replied: "That is all they say, the
people whom we cause not paying for the goods say...
They all intended to pay for the things that are found to
them." (p. 23, Id). Plaintiff objected and said that he was
a regular customer of the supermarket.
"Extracting a P5.00 bill from his pocket, plaintiff told
Fandino that he was paying for the file whose cost was
P3.85. Fandino reached over and took the P5.00 bill
from plaintiff with these words: "We are fining you P5.00.
That is your the fine." Plaintiff was shocked. He and his
wife objected vigorously that he was not a common
criminal, and they wanted to get back the P5.00. But
Fandino told them that the money would be given as an
incentive to the guards who apprehend pilferers. People
were milling around them and staring at the plaintiff.
Plaintiff gave up the discussion. He drew a P50.00 bill
and took back the file. Fandino directed him to the
nearest check-out counter where he had to fall in line.
The people who heard the exchange of words between
Fandino and plaintiff continued to stare at him. At the
TORTS (Finals) | 1
trial, plaintiff expressed his embarrassment and
humiliation thus: " I felt as though I wanted to disappear
into a hole on the ground" (p. 34, Id.). After paying for
the file, plaintiff and his wife walked as fast as they could
out of the supermarket. His first impulse was to go back
to the supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass
windows. But reason prevailed over passion and he
thought that justice should take its due course.
"Plaintiff was certain during the trial that when he signed
the incident report, Exhibit A, inside the cubicle at the
back of the supermarket only his brief statement of the
facts (Exhibit A-2), aside from his name and personal
circumstances, was written thereon. He swore that the
following were not in the incident report at, the time he
signed it:
Exhibit A-I which says opposite the stenciled word
SUBJECT "Shoplifting"
Exhibit A-3 which says opposite the stenciled words
Action Taken: Released by Mrs. Fandino after
paying the item.
Exhibit A-4 which says opposite the stenciled words
Remarks Noted: "Grd. Ebreo requested Grd. Paunil
to apprehend subject shoplifter.
Private respondent's complaint filed on October 8, 1970
is founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the
New Civil Code and prays for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney s fees and 'expenses of
litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5.00
fine. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal,
Branch XIX dismissed the complaint, Interposing the
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed and
set aside the appealed judgment, granting and damages
as earlier stated.
Not satisfied with the decision of the respondent court,
petitioners instituted the present petition and submits
the following grounds and/or assignment of errors, to
wit:
I daughters at the time negated any criminal intent on his
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding
moral and exemplary damages to the respondent
Espino under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article
2219 of the Civil Code, considering that —
A. Respondent Espino was guilty of theft;
B. Petitioners legitimately exercised their right of
defense of property within the context of Article 429
of the Civil Code negating the application of Articles
19 and 21 of the same Code;
C. Petitioners acted upon probable cause in
stopping and investigating respondent Espino for
shoplifting and as held in various decisions in the
United States on shoplifting, a merchant who acts
upon probable cause should not be held liable in
damages by the suspected shoplifter;
D. Petitioners did not exercise their right maliciously,
wilfully or in bad faith; and/or
E. The proximate cause of respondent Espino's
alleged injury or suffering was his own negligence
or forgetfulness; petitioners acted in good faith.
II
Assuming arguendo that petitioners are hable for
moral and exemplary damages, the award of
P75,000.00 for moral damages and P25,000.00 for
exemplary damages by the respondent Court of
Appeals is not legally justified and/or is grossly
excessive in the premises.
III
The award of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees by the
respondent Court of Appeals is unjustified and
unwarranted under Article 2199 of the Civil Code.
We agree with the holding of the respondent appellate
court that "the evidence sustains the court's finding that
the plaintiff had absolutely no intention to steal the file."
The totality of the facts and circumstances as found by
the Court of Appeals unerringly points to the conclusion
that private respondent did not intend to steal the file and
that is act of picking up the file from the open shelf was
not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on
the contrary, he took the item with the intention of buying
and paying for it.
This Court needs only to stress the following undisputed
facts which strongly and convincingly uphold the
conclusion that private respondent was not "shoplifting."
Thus, the facts that private respondent after picking the
cylindrical "rat-tail" file costing P3.85 had placed it inside
his left front breast pocket with a good portion of the item
exposed to view and that he did not conceal it in his
person or hid it from sight as well as the fact that he paid
the purchases of his wife amounting to P77.00 at the
checkout counter of the Supermarket, owed that he was
not acting suspiciously or furtively. And the
circumstance that he was with his family consisting of
his wife Mrs. Caridad Jayme Espino, and their two
part to steal. Moreover, when private respondent was
approached by the guard of the Supermarket as he was
leaving by the exit to his car who told him, "Excuse me,
Mr., I think you have something in your pocket which you
have not paid for," Espino, immediately apologized and
answered, "I am sorry," which indicated his sincere
apology or regrets. He turned back towards the cashier
to pay for the file which proved his honesty sincerity and
good faith in buying the item, and not to shoplift the
same. His brief statement on the sheet of paper called
the Incident Report where private respondent wrote the
following: "While talking to my aunt's maid with my wife,
I put this item in in my shirt pocket. I forgot to check it
out with my wife's item," was an instant and
contemporaneous explanation of the incident.
Considering further the personal circumstances of the
private respondent. his education, position and
character showing that he is a graduate Mechanical
Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed as an
TORTS (Finals) | 2
executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate
manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein;
honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946;
a Philippine government pensionado of the United
States for six months; member of the Philippine veterans
Legion; author of articles published in the Manila
Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of
the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the
late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of
Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy Washington,
We are fully convinced, as the trial and appellate courts
were, that private respondent did not intend to steal the
article costing P3.85. Nothing in the records intimates or
hints whatsoever that private respondent has had any
police record of any sort much less suspicion of stealing
or shoplifting.
We do not lay down here any hard-and-fast rule as to
what act or combination of acts constitute the crime of
shoplifting for it must be stressed that each case must
be considered and adjudged on a case-to-case basis
and that in the determination of whether a person
suspected of shoplifting has in truth and in fact
committed the same, all the attendant facts and
circumstances should be considered in their entirety and
not from any single fact or circumstance from which to
impute the stigma of shoplifting on any person
suspected and apprehended therefor.
We likewise concur with the Court of Appeals that
"(u)pon the facts and under the law, plaintiff has clearly
made the cause of action for damages against the
defendants. Defendants wilfully caused loss or injury to
plaintiff in a manner that was contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, making them amenable to
damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article
2219 of the Civil Code." 2
That private respondent was falsely accused of
shoplifting is evident. The Incident Report (Exhibit A)
with the entries thereon under Exhibit A-1 which says
opposite the stenciled word SUBJECT: "Shoplifting,"
Exhibit A-3 which says opposite the stenciled words
Action Taken: Relesed by Mrs. Fandino after paying the
item," Exhibit A-4 which says opposite the stenciled
words Remarks Noted: Grd. Ebreo requested Grd.
Paunil to apprehend subject shoplifter," established the
opinion, judgment or thinking of the management of
petitioner's supermarket upon private respondent's act
of picking up the file. ln plain words, private respondent
was regarded and pronounced a shoplifter and had
committed "shoplifting."
We also affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that
petitioner Nelia Santos Fandino, after reading the
incident report, remarked the following: "Ano, nakaw na
naman ito". Such a remark made in the presence of
private respondent and with reference to the incident
report with its entries, was offensive to private
respondent's dignity and defamatory to his character
and honesty. When Espino explained that he was going
to pay the file but simply forgot to do so, Fandino
doubted the explanation. saying: "That is all what they
say, the people whom we caught not paying for the
goods say... they all intended to pay for the things that
are found to them." Private respondent objected and
said that he was a regular customer of the Supermarket.
The admission of Fandino that she required private
respondent to pay a fine of P5.00 and did in fact take the
P5.00 bill of private respondent tendered by the latter to
pay for the file, as a fine which would be given as an
incentive to the guards who apprehend pilferers clearly
proved that Fandino branded private respondent as a
thief which was not right nor justified.
The testimony of the guard that management instructed
them to bring the suspected customers to the public
area for the people to see those kind of customers in
order that they may be embarassed (p. 26, tsn, Sept. 30,
1971); that management wanted "the customers to be
embarrassed in public so that they will not repeat the
stealing again" (p. 2, tsn, Dec. 10, 1971); that the
management asked the guards "to bring these
customers to different cashiers in order that they will
know that they are pilferers" (p. 2, Ibid.) may indicate the
manner or pattern whereby a confirmed or self-
confessed shoplifter is treated by the Supermarket
management but in the case at bar, there is no showing
that such procedure was taken in the case of the private
respondent who denied strongly and vehemently the
charge of shoplifting.
Nonetheless, the false accusation charged against the
private respondent after detaining and interrogating him
by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in
which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon
him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the
presence and hearing of many people at the
Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation
and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the
petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21
in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that
under the facts of the case at bar, petitioners wilfully
caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner
that was contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. It is against morals, good customs and public
policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity
of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
Private respondent is entitled to damages but We hold
that the award of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) for moral damages and Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00, for exemplary damages
is unconscionable and excessive.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of each
TORTS (Finals) | 3
case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code). In the case at bar, that the facts and circumstances of the case at bar do
there is no question that the whole incident that befell not warrant the grant of exemplary damages.
respondent had arisen in such a manner that was Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to protect and
created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for recover their property, a right which the law accords to
the file. It was his forgetfullness in checking out the item them. Under Article 429, New Civil Code, the owner or
and paying for it that started the chain of events which lawful possessor of a thing has a right to exclude any
led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof and for
causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and this purpose, he may use such force as may be
serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which his property. And since a person who acts in the
may reduce the damages that private respondent may fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that office exempts him from civil or criminal liability,
many people were present and they saw and heard the petitioner may not be punished by imposing exemplary
ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be damages against him. We agree that petitioners acted
simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which upon probable cause in stopping and investigating
is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or private respondent for taking the file without paying for
bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by it, hence, the imposition of exemplary damages as a
management to witness private respondent's warning to others by way of a deterrent is without legal
predicament. We do not believe that private respondent basis. We, therefore, eliminate the grant of exemplary
was intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or damages to the private respondent.
embarrass him because petitioner's business depended
In the light of the reduction of the damages, We hereby
for its success and patronage the good will of the buying
likewise reduce the original award of Five Thousand
public which can only be preserved and promoted by
Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees to Two Thousand
good public relations.
Pesos (P2,000.00).
As succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes in
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
his concurring and dissenting opinion in Pangasinan
judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified.
Transportation Company, Inc, vs. Legaspi, 12 SCRA
Petitioners are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
598, the purpose of moral damages is essentially
severally, to private respondent moral damages in the
indemnity or reparation, both punishment or correction.
sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and the
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as and for
a complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are
attorney's fees; and further, to return the P5.00 fine to
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain
private respondent. No costs.
means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by SO ORDERED.
reason of the defendant's culpable action. In other
words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante and, it must be proportionate to
the suffering inflicted.
In Our considered estimation and assessment, moral
damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) is reasonable and just to award to private
respondent.
The grant of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is unjustified.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages (Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the
court will decide whether or not they could be
adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil Code). Considering
that exemplary damages are awarded for wanton acts,
that they are penal in character granted not by way of
compensation but as a punishment to the offender and
as a warning to others as a sort of deterrent, We hold

TORTS (Finals) | 4
G.R. No. 140420 February 15, 2001
SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA
FORNIDA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the
legitimate exercise of a person's rights, even if it causes
loss to another, does not automatically result in an
actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy
for the loss. This principle does not, however, apply
when there is an abuse of a person's right, or when the
exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished
pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment of
one's rights, one must act with justice, give their due,
and observe honesty and good faith
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41451,
which set aside the judgment2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC had earlier
dismissed the Complaint for damages filed by herein
respondents against petitioner. The dispositive portion
of the challenged CA Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET
ASIDE, and in its stead judgment is rendered
ordering the defendant-appellee Sergio Amonoy to
pay the plaintiffs-appellants bruno and Bernadina
Gutierrez as actual damages the sum of [t]wo
[h]undred [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos (P250,000.00)."3
Likewise assailed is the October 19, 1999 CA
Resolution,4 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of
this case as follows:
"This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No.
3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio
Cantolos, involving six(6) parcels of land situated in
Tanay Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of therein
Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formida. On 12 January
1965, the Project of Partition submitted was
approved and xxx two (2) of the said lots were
adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formilda. The Attorney's fees charged by Amonoy
was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formida executed a deed of
real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots
adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure
the payment of his attorney's fees. But it was only
on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the
claims settled and the properties adjudicated, that
the estate was declared closed and terminated.
"Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969
while Alfonso Fornilda passsed away on 2 July
1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his
daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
"Because his Attorney's fess thus secured by the
two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy
filed for their foreclosure in Civil Code4 No. 12726
entitled Sergio Amonoy vs. Heirs of Asuncion
Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso Fornilda before the
CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was assigned to Branch
VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that the
attorney's fees charged [were] unconscionable and
that the attorney's fees charged [were]
unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only
P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment
was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs
to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the
mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and
P9,645.00 as another round of attorney's fees.
Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public
auction.
"They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said
lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the
auction sale was held where Amonoy was the
highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his
bid was judicially confirmed. A deficiency was
claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was
conducted, and again the highest bidder was
Amonoy at P12,137.50.
"Included in those sold was the lot on which the
Gutierrez spouses had their house.
"More than a year after the Decision in Civil Code
No. 12726 was rendered, the said decedent's heirs
filed on 19 December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig,
Rixal[,] Civil case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano,
et al vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the
annulment thereof. The case was dismissed by the
CFI on 7 November 1977, and this was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.
"Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ
of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to
vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy's
motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25 April 1986
and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of
structures in the said lots, including the house of the
Gutierrez spouses.
"On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David
Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC Ivth Pasig,
Deputy Sheriff Joaquin Antonil and Atty. Sergio
Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the
Supreme Court. Among the petitioners was the
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On a
twin musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para
Papanagutin Kaugnay ng Paglalapastangan) with
full titles as fanciful and elongated as
their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and
Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary restraining order was
TORTS (Finals) | 5
 granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of
the petitioners' houses.
"Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered
in the said G.R. No. L-72306 disposing that:
"WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order
of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985,
granting a Writ of Possession, as well as its
Orderd, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986,
directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff to
demolish the houses of petitioners Angela and
Leocadia Fornilda are hereby ordered returned
to petitioners unless some of them have been
conveyed to innocent third persons."5
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the
abovementioned Decision, respondents' house had
already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with
a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the
destruction of their house was filed by respondents
against petitioner before the RTC on December 15,
1989.
In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed
respondents' suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower
court's ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents
P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
The Issue
In his Memorandum,7 petitioner submits this lone issue
for our consideration:
"Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct
was correct in deciding that the petition [was] liable
to the respondents for damages."8
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Petitioner's Liability
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the
legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without
injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law gives
no remedy.9 In other words, one who merely exercises
one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be
held liable for damages.
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is
not liable for the demolition of respondents' house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with
the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.
We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds
no application to this case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of
respondents' house on May 30, 1986 under the authority
of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the
records show that a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents' house,
was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The
CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the
Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO
was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, howeverm, did not heed the TRO of this
Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued
the demolition of respondents' house well until the
middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela
Gutierrez's testimony. The appellate court quoted the
following pertinent portion thereof:10
"Q. On May 30, 1986, were they able to destroy
your house?
"A. Not all, a certain portion only
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Was your house completely demolished?
"A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Until when[,] Mrs. Witness?
"A. Until 1987.
"Q. About what month of 1987?
"A. Middle of the year.
"Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court who
completed the demolition?
A. The men of Fiscal Amonoy."11
The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the
demolition, which allegedly commenced only on May 30,
1986, was completed the following day. It likewise belies
his allegation that the demolitions had already ceased
when he received notice of the TRO.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally
justified at the outsset, their continuation after the
issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of
his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad
faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss that
engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts
constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid
exercise of a right that had been suspended when he
received thae TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By
then he was no longer entitled to proceed with the
demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains:
"The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a
right without the spirit of justcie which gives it life, is
repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It
cannot be said that a person exercises a right when
he unnecessarily prejudices another xxx. Over and
above the specific precepts of postive law are the
supreme norms of justice xxx; and he who violates
them violates the law. For this reason it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice
others."12
TORTS (Finals) | 6
Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,13 the
Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as
follows:
"Artilce 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only
in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties.These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all
rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible xxx."
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by
petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only
an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In
insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this
Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of
respondents; house.1âwphi1.nêt
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque
injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a
right.14Anything less or beyond such exercise will not
give rise to the legal protection that the principle
accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is
occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much
less abated.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioner's liability is premised
on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of one's act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or
not punishable by law.15
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

TORTS (Finals) | 7
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and
ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17,
1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B.
Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.,"
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly,
respondent court's resolution of September 3,
1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the
salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual
findings of the court below, the evidence of record and
the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its
findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively
reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts
are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where
they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said
defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to
the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they
lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or
until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-
appellant filed their respective applications for a
marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973,
after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his
application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
together with an unidentified male companion,
abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel
where she was raped. The court a quo, which
adopted her evidence, summarized the same which
we paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974
when she testified, single and had finished a
college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov.
5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973,
at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she
was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City
on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to
take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr.,
came riding in a car driven by a male
companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr.
were sweethearts, but two weeks before
September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and
Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with
plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their
merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila
instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to
which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his
sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat
beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated
himself by her right side. The car travelled north
on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon
reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it
turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff
protested, but which the duo ignored and
instead threatened her not to make any noise as
they were ready to die and would bump the car
against the post if she persisted. Frightened and
silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B.
Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel.
Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the
car against her will, and amidst her cries and
pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match
to the joint strength of the two male combatants
because of her natural weakness being a
woman and her small stature. Eventually, she
was brought inside the hotel where the
defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against
her will and consent. She could not fight back
and repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr.
had forced her to lie down and embraced her,
his companion held her two feet, removed her
panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened
her that he would ask his companion to come
back and hold her feet if she did not surrender
her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in
feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the
pains she felt and how blood came out of her
private parts after her vagina was penetrated by
the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp.
17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked
Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home
but the latter would not consent and stated that
he would only let her go after they were married
as he intended to marry her, so much so that
she promised not to make any scandal and to
marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together
after the car that they used had already gone,
and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon,
Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30
o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5,
1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same
evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father
of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that
the following day which was a Monday, she and
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
marriage license, which they did. They filed their
TORTS (Finals) | 8
 applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A"
and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de
Leon and lived there as husband and wife from
September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr.
left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and
compelled her to go back to her parents on
October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when
she went home and could not sleep and eat
because of the deception done against her by
defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5,
1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in
toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who
declared that on September 8, 1973 when
plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, his sister who is the mother of
plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts
proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff
might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp.
5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon
of the next day (Sunday), his sister told him that
Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio
captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor,
Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr.
were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which
he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon
in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met
defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him,
"Pare, the children are here already. Let us
settle the matter and have them married."
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she
had already lost her honor, she would bear her
sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised
they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that
defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted
and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973.
On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of
the opposition of the latter's father to their
relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had
earlier made plans to elope and get married, and
this fact was known to their friends, among them,
Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good
their plans to elope on the afternoon of September
8, 1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr.,
met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named
Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the)
aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some
snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to
Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home,
thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo
Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant
took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels
where they tried to get a room, but these were full.
They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where
defendant-appellant registered using his real name
and residence certificate number. Three hours later,
the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to
the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las
Piñas, where they stayed until September 19, 1873.
Defendant-appellant claims that bitter
disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over
money and the threats made to his life prompted him
to break off their plan to get married.
During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr.
denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon
and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed
to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned
Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of
directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times
between the evening of September 8, 1973 and
September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts
of his son. He came to know about his son's
whereabouts when he was told of the couple's
elopement late in the afternoon of September 9,
1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise
denied having met relatives and emissaries of
plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to
his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise
to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida
B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his
father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite.
On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that
petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private
respondent, the trial court rendered a
decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private
respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00
as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all
liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower
court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from
civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags,
as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal
several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which
were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in
finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.
forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in
finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-
appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-
TORTS (Finals) | 9
appellant damages for the breach of defendants-
appellants' promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent
Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both
appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition
for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to
consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for
petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions
of facts and violative of the law on preparation of
judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper
law and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible
abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an
agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive
damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and
appellate courts failed to take into consideration the
alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed
to marry, and that there was no case of forcible
abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and
agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to
marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of
the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented
in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the
credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by
the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court
to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, presented before and
calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously
reviewed and discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves
questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again
constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and
jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court.
Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in
case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being
conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it
is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all
over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings
must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case
reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions
which under our decisional rules may warrant a review
of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the
foregoing considerations and our review of the records,
we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of
private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a
breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in
awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-
honored rule that an action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally,
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in
cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under
Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of
said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to
remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave
so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private
respondent and having carnal knowledge with her
against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in
order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter
renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate
and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably
warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and
exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to
paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and
2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said
damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of
a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape,
despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed
by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's
Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex
delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results
in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
TORTS (Finals) | 10
proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of
the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is
no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil case might arise did not exist.
Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the
right of herein private respondent to institute a civil
action arising from the offense because such
preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the
two proceedings involved are not between the same
parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with
continuing validity up to now, that there are different
rules as to the competency of witnesses and the
quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.
In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for
the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of
evidence only. 13Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal
prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to
final judgment before a civil action based on said offense
in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted
and prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

TORTS (Finals) | 11
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY
LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY
BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail
the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well
as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July
2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for
damages brought under the human relations provisions
of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent
herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the
screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00
o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was
having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was
spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart,
who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join
her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of
the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu
Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him
for which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went
up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits
which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the
celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr.
Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner
was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to
his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to
speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary
thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue
at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party
("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka
na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited
by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing
distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding
to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he
was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out
of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted
out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages,
Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages,
One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages
and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes
to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that
she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past
twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included
organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former
General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was
no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim
generated an exclusive guest list and extended
invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest
friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes
was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first
noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the
party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the
"captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr.
Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he
saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart
was engaged in conversation with another guest and as
Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead
from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told
her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then
requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party
as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered
prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said
that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim
turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a
Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing
that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other,
Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms.
Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave
the party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes
lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet
table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were
no other guests in the immediate vicinity. 30 However, as
Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she
decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam
ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha
na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She
then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show
enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began
screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint
before the lower court, also gave her version of the story
to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who
volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the
celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator,
not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they
reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go
down as he was not properly dressed and was not
invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes
already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar
talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion
and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38She ignored Mr.
Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the
celebrant to think that she invited him.40
TORTS (Finals) | 12
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the
complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of
Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that
Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the
party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he
was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant.
He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for
attending a party to which he was not invited by the host.
Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law
imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he
himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212
SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join
her and took responsibility for his attendance at the
party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and
Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of
the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to
leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation,
telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave
the place within the hearing distance of other guests is
an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for
which appellees should compensate the appellant for
the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence
therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises
from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs.
Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one]
cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to
another in a manner contrary to morals or good
customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of
Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the
presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and
was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr.
Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr.
Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should
have been done by appellee Lim was to approach
appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told
appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave
the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends
around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to
approach appellant because it was she who invited
appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s
invitation, appellant could not have suffered such
humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which
are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.
Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who
violates this duty becomes liable for damages,
especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad
faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-
will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr.
v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel
Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3)
attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument
raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and
passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and
Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in –
I.
… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI
NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN
FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR
DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY
BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH
HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S
INVITATION"
III.
… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE
HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS
TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE
AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS
REGARD
V.
… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE
DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant
to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes
TORTS (Finals) | 13
assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was
a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to
self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated
by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of
the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat
him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary
ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim
acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay
Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by
the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and
if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko,
as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached
divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the
same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left
without choice but to use its latent power to review such
findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are
not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the
exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein
as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms.
Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the
party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr.
Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave
the place within hearing distance of the other guests.
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr.
Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is
credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more
credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star
hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person
who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who
could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is
known by many, being an actor. While he was already
spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very
person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear
that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim,
mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party
intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-
crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to
call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair
and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant,
her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the
presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on
Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the
hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden
rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely
ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory
explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining
a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes,
on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very
close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim
approached you while you were at the buffet table?
How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She
was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka
imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud
voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms.
Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at
him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire
belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff
when the request for the latter to leave the party was
made such that they nearly kissed each other, the
request was meant to be heard by him only and there
could have been no intention on her part to cause
embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the
request that must have made the other guests aware of
what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was
no need for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of
the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil
cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however,
had not presented any witness to back his story up. All
his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and
Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes
to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and
TORTS (Finals) | 14
21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred
to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea
for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19
states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.1awphi1.nét
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this
article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties.61 These
standards are the following: act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1)
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a
violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms.
Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has
the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to
injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, 67 and
that is, the act complained of must be intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr.
Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
animosity against him. These two people did not know
each other personally before the evening of 13 October
1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an
explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct
except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44
years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against
(Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her
work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The
lameness of this argument need not be belabored.
Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has
nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr.
Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put
our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that
Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes
(without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she
invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
"predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms.
Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
abusive conduct especially because she did inquire
from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart
did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only
of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions,
cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages,
neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the
reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held –
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt
because of the latter’s lowly station in
life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a
democracy, such a limit must be established. Social
equality is not sought by the legal provisions under
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety
(Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example
or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should
be imposed upon appellees.73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is
that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and
the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that
at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was
"an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program
over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda
Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch;
and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for
Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During
his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed
that he had income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise.
On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of
petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion
reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny
as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are
concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right
done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must
be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed
by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
TORTS (Finals) | 15
26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

TORTS (Finals) | 16
G.R. No. L-39019 January 22, 1988
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO
YAMBAO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR.,
ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and JUAN O.
CHAVES, respondents-appellees.
YAP, J.:
In an action for recovery of damages for embarassment,
humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride, caused to
herein private respondents, by reason of the
disconnection of their electrical service by the
petitioners, the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXIV, rendered a decision
dated December 13,1967, ordering herein petitioners
jointly and severally to pay private respondents the sum
of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as
exemplary damages and, One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos as attorney's fees, and dismissing petitioners'
counterclaim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals and in toto the trial
court's decision. Their Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied, petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari.
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a
public utility corporation providing electric power for the
consumption of the general public in Metro Manila.
Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of
MERALCO.
Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O.
Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for
damages, together with their children, Isaac O. Chaves,
Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and Isaac Jr. and
Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr.
and Isaac, Jr. were practicing lawyers and Rosendo was
a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity
Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school
teacher.
The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiff Isaac Chaves became a customer of
defendant MERALCO in the year 1953 when he and
his family were residing at No. 211-D Rubi, Manila.
In connection with the contract for electrical service,
he deposited the sum of P5.00 (Exh. "A") with
defendant MERALCO on February 12, 1953. This
deposit in the name of plaintiff Isaac Chaves was
retained by MERALCO and made to apply to
subsequent contracts for electrical service entered
into after subsequent transfers of the Chaves family
to other residences and up to the time this family
went to reside at the place aforementioned, at No.
2656 Mercedes Street, Singalong, Manila. ...
At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant
Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs
and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11
to February 9,1965, for the sum of P7.90 (Exhibit
"C"), and the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965,
for the amount of P7.20 (Exhibit "C"). Juana O.
Chaves, however, informed Yambao that these bills
would be paid at the MERALCO main office.
Accordingly, on April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to
the defendant's main office at San Marcelino,
Manila, but paid only the bill marked as Exhibit 'C"
leaving the other bill Identified as Exhibit "C-l"
unpaid.
Past 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21,1965,
MERALCO caused the electric service in plaintiff's
residence to be discontinued and the power line cut
off.
The next day, April 22, 1965, at about 9:00 a.m.,
plaintiff Rosendo O. Chaves went to the MERALCO
main office and paid the amount of P7.20 for the bill
marked as Exhibit "C-l", and the sum of P7.00 for
the subsequent bill corresponding to the period from
March 10 up to April 8, 1965 (Exhibit "C-2") after his
attention was called to the latter account. Rosendo
O. Chaves then sought the help of Atty. Lourdy
Torres, one of the defendants' counsel, and,
thereafter, the power line was reconnected and
electric service restored to the Chaves residence at
about 7:00 p.m. of that same day. 1
Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice
given to herein respondent. However, since only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners,
'for the sake of argument and for the purpose of giving
focus on the legal issues', do not take issue with such
finding.
Petitioners contend that in the absence of bad faith, they
could not be held liable for moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees. The failure to give
a notice of disconnection to private respondents might
have been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by
itself does not constitute bad faith or fraud; it must be
shown that such a failure was motivated by in or done
with fraudulent intent.Petitioners also maintain that '
private respondents were in arrears in the payment of
their electricity bills when their electric service was
connected, no moral damages may be recovered by
them under the 'clean hands' doctrine enunciated in
Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Company, CA-G.R. No. L-
9683-R, May 26, 1964.
In its decision, the respondent Court of Appeals held that
MERALCO's right to disconnect the electric service of a
delinquent customer "is an absolute one, subject only to
the requirement that defendant MERALCO should give
the customer a written notice of disconnection 48 hours
in advance." This requirement is embodied in Section 97
TORTS (Finals) | 17
of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service breach of contract amounting to an independent
Commission which provides as follows: tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an
Section 97. Payment of bills. — A public service, intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering
may require that bills for service be paid within a to private respondent. This is a clear violation of
specified time after rendition. When the billing Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that any
period covers a month or more, the minimum time person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
specified time, service may be discontinued for the or public policy shall compensate the latter for
non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours' damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of
written notice of such disconnection has been given Article 2219 of the Code. Moreover, the award of
the customer: Provided, however, that moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which
disconnections of service shall not be made on provides that wilfull injury to property may be a legal
Sundays and official holidays and never after 2 p.m. ground for awarding moral damages if the court
of any working day: Provided, further, that if at the should find that, under the circumstances, such
moment the disconnection is to be made the damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
customer tenders payment of the unpaid bill to the breaches of contract where the defendant acted
agent or employee of the operator who is to effect fraudulently or in bad faith.
the disconnection, the said agent or employee shall Likewise, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that
be obliged to accept tender of payment and issue a being in arrears in the payment of their bills, the private
temporary receipt for the amount and shall desist respondents are not entitled to moral damages under
from disconnecting the service. 2 the doctrine that "he who comes to court in demand of
The respondent court stressed the importance and equity, must come with clean hands." We rejected this
necessity of the 48-hour advance written notification argument in the Manila Gas Corporation case, supra,
before a disconnection of service may be effected. Said wherein we held that respondents' default in the
the court: payment of his bills "cannot be utilized by petitioner to
defeat or null the claim for damages. At most, this
... It sets in motion the disconnection of an electrical
circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in
service of the customer by giving the notice,
ascertaining the amount of damages to which
determining the expiration date thereof, and
respondent ... is entitled."
executing the disconnection. It, therefore, behooves
the defendant MERALCO that before it disconnects Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion
a customer's electrical service, there should be committed by respondent court in affirming the trial
sufficient evidence that the requirements for the court's decision. The petition is hereby DISMISSED for
disconnection had been duly complied with, lack of merit.
otherwise, the poor consumer can be subjected to SO ORDERED.
the whims and caprices of the defendant, by the
mere pretension that the written notice had been
duly served upon the customer. 3
We find no reversible error in the decision appealed
from. One can not deny the vital role which a public utility
such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of
electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby
municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such
areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most
people in these areas justifying the exercise by the State
of its regulatory power over the business of supplying
electrical service to the public, in which petitioner
MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as
it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No.
1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions
under which and the manner by which a public utility
such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of
service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior
written notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior
notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar
case, 4 where we said:
... petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent
Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes

TORTS (Finals) | 18