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GALEN V BODENHAUSEN
Michigan State University
LORI A. SHEPPARD
Michigan Stare University
and
GEOFFREY P KRAMER
Indiana University - Kokomo
Abstract
The overwhelming majority of research on affect and social information processing
has focused on the judgments and memories of people in good or bad moods rather
than examining more specific kinds of emotional experience within the broad categories
ofpositive and negative affect. Are all varieties of negative affect alike in their impact
on social perception? Three experiments were conducted to examine the possibility
that different kin& of negative affect (in this case, anger and sadness) can have very
different kinds of effects on social information processing. Experiment I showed that
angry subjects rendered more stereotypic judgments in a social perception task than
did sad subjects, who did not difler from neutral mood subjects. E.uperiments 2 and
3 similarly revealed a greater reliance upon heuristic cues in a persuasion situation
among angry subjects. Specrfically. their level of agreement with unpopular positions
was guided more by the credibility of the person advocating the position. TheseJindings
are discussed in terms of the impact of emotional experience on social information-
processing strategies.
INTRODUCTION
Recent research addressing the impact of affect on social perception and memory
has tended to focus on the effects of global mood rather than more specific kinds
Addressee for correspondence: Galen V Bodenhausen, Department of Psychology, Michigan State Univer-
sity, 129 Psychology Research Building, East Lansing, MI 48824-1 117, U.S.A.
This article was wntten while the first author was a Visiting Professor at the University of Heidelberg
and at ZUMA, Mannheim, Germany; the support of these institutions is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks
are extended to Herbert Bless, Gerd Bohner, Michael Conway, Norbert Schwarz, Bob Sinclair, Fritz
Strack, and Michaela Wanke for helpful suggestions concerning this research.
of emotional experiences. The assumption inherent in this approach is that the overall
valence of affective experience is the variable of overriding importance in determining
the effects of affect on cognition. Presumably, bad moods are expected to have simiiar
effects, regardless of whether they are characterized primarily by sadness, anger,
anxiety, guilt, or some other negative emotion. The term ‘mood’ is used by some
theorists to refer to diffuse affective states often having antecedents or referents
that are unclear to the person experiencing the mood. Emotion terms such as ‘anger’
or ‘sadness’ have more focus and presumably arise from appraisals of specific actual
or contemplated states of the world (e.g. Ortony, Clore and Collins, 1988; Smith
and Lazarus, 1990). To obtain a richer understanding of the impact of affect on
cognition, it may ultimately prove to be necessary for researchers to look beyond
the global mood and examine the effects of more discrete kinds of emotional exper-
ience (cf Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). The research to be reported examined this
possibility in the realm of negative affect by comparing the effects of anger and
sadness on social perception.
There are several reasons to suspect that anger and sadness may have different
kinds of effects on cognitive processes. The two types of negative affect show marked
differences in their physiological manifestations, and they appear to be mediated
by different elements of the limbic system. Anger, which primarily involves activity
in the amygdala, is associated with an increase in pulse, blood pressure, and secretion
of epinephrine; sadness, which primarily involves activation in the hippocampus,
does not produce comparable physiological effects (see Henry, 1986). These differ-
ences are reflected in subjective experience of bodily states, in that angry people
report experiencing symptoms of arousal (e.g. perceptions of greater cardiac activity,
a sense of restlessness, etc.) while sad people do not (Shields, 1984). To the extent
that the physiological concomitants of emotional expenence play any direct or indir-
ect role in producing the effects of affect on cognition, anger and sadness may have
very different kinds of impact (for evidence linking physiological states to patterns
of social judgment and memory, see Bodenhausen (1990) Clark (1982) and Wilder
(1993)).
The literature on the effects of affect on social judgments has emphasized cognitive
and motivational theoretical accounts rather than ones rooted more directly in phy-
siological mechanisms such as arousal or other neuroendocrine phenomena. It is
interesting to consider whether the logic of these accounts would imply any differences
in the effects of anger versus sadness on social perception. Two theoretical issues
will be considered. First we will consider accounts for the mood congruency effect
in judgment, then we will turn to research linking affective states to differences
in information-processing strategies.
The mood congruency effect refers to the tendency for people to render judgments
that are biased in the direction of a prevailing mood state. Theoretical accounts
of this effect emphasize the role of affect-laden concepts within the structure of
associative memory (e.g. Bower, 1991, Isen, 1987). According to these models, affect
‘primes’ or activates concepts in memory that are associated (semantically or episodi-
cally) with the affective state. These concepts may cue the retrieval from memory
Negative afecl and socialjudgment 41
of specific information relevant to the judgment, or they may be used in the interpre-
tation of ambiguous evidence relevant to the judgment. The net impact of these
processes is the generation of ajudgment that is biased in the direction of the valence
of the prevailing mood (see Bower, 1991, Forgas and Moyian, 1987). If one assumes
that negative concepts are interassociated in semantic memory, it becomes difficult
to generate a compelling theoretical rationale for systematic differences between
the effects of anger and sadness within these models of the mood congruency effect.
Both anger and sadness would be expected to activate negative concepts, and both
should therefore produce a tendency toward more negative judgments, relative to
the judgments of those experiencing neutral or positive emotional states.
A different explanation for the mood congruency effect has been offered by Schwarz
and Clore (1983, 1988). They propose that such effects may have little to do with
memory processes, but instead may arise more directly from the use of mood as
informational input in the judgment process. When asked to make an evaluative
Judgment, people may ask themselves, ‘How do I feel about it?’ and use their mood
as one obvious gauge, provided that they interpret their momentary feelings as being
at least partly a reaction to the object to be evaluated. Thus, according to this
view, a misattribution process occurs in which people mistake their current mood
(whatever its actual origins) for a reaction to a to-be-judged stimulus. When subtly
reminded that their current mood is in fact.based on something other than a reaction
to the object ofjudgment, people no longer show a mood congruency effect (Schwarz
and Clore, 1983). Thus, this mood-as-information effect may be limited to more
diffuse kinds of affective experience. Even if the anger or sadness being experienced
is sufficiently diffuse, the subjective reaction is negative in either case and should
translate into a more negative appraisal of the target to be judged.
expecting any differences between the two affective states’. From the standpoint
of research and theory on emotion and social information-processing strategies, how-
ever, it was expected that angry and sad subjects may differ in their tendency to
rely on global, heuristic strategies for generating a quick response requiring less
effort and fewer cognitive resources. Specifically,angry people may show this prefer-
ence for heuristic strategies, while sad people may be prone to be detail-oriented
and more thorough in their processing. To test these issues empirically, three exper-
iments were conducted in which sad, angry, and neutral mood subjects were asked
to render evaluative judgments based on a set of presented information. In addition
to the specific, relatively detailed information that was relevant to the judgment,
subjects were also provided with simple heuristic cues that could provide a basis
for responding to the judgment task. Of focal concern were two questions: (1) will
the judgments of both angry and sad people tend to be evaluatively more negative
than those of neutral mood subjects? and (2) will the judgments of angry subjects
reflect greater use of simple response heuristics, relative to both sad and neutral
mood subjects?
EXPERIMENT 1
Stereotypes can be viewed as judgmental heuristics that are relied upon by social
perceivers whenever they lack the ability or the inclination to think more extensively
about the unique personal qualities of outgroup members (Bodenhausen, 1988; 1990;
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985; Chaiken et
al., 1989). Therefore, if a given emotional state is likely to engender heuristic styles
of thinking, this should include stereotypic thinking. In a series of four expenments,
Bodenhausen et al. (in press) found that happiness had precisely this effect: people
who had been made happy prior to engaging in a social judgment task rendered
more stereotypic judgments. Thus, the paradigm they employed seemed especially
useful in examining possible differences in processing strategies between angry and
sad people.
In the first experiment, subjects were induced to feel either angry, sad, or a neutral
mood. Then, as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment, they were asked to read
about a case of alleged misconduct on the part of a fellow student and to make
some Judgments about the case. For approximately half of the cases, the accused
student was identified as a member of a social group that is stereotypically associated
with the type of offence alleged in the case. Otherwise, the case evidence was identical.
It was expected that angry subjects (but not sad ones) would show greater use of
the stereotype in making judgments about the case.
’ It should be noted that Bower (1980) did propose that discrete emotional states may each be associated
with different subsets of information in memory. That is, there IS no reason to assume that all negatively
valenced infomation is interassociated. However, even though different negative emotions may be associ-
ated with different cognitive content, such content is still likely to be generally negative in tone. Hence,
It would be difficult for ‘pnming’ modefs of mood effects, especially as they have been developed in
the social cognition literature, to account for differential impact of different negative emotions without
adding new assumptions to these frameworks.
50 G. V Bodenhausenetal.
Method
*The neutral/control group Subjects in this experiment were the same as those in Bodenhausen ef a/.
(in press, Experiment 1). Data from these subjects were collected during the same experimental sessions
(and from the same Subject population) as the angry and sad conditions.
Negative affect and socialjudgment 51
Manipulation check
Effectiveness of the mood manipulation was assessed by a series of planned compari-
sons in which self-ratings of sadness and irritation were compared across the angry,
sad and neutral conditions. As expected, subjects in the angry condition rated them-
selves as being more irritated than did subjects in the neutral control condition
(Ms = 1.98 versus 1.33, p < 0.05), but sad subjects did not differ from the control
condition on this rating. Conversely, subjects In the sad condition rated themselves
as significantly more sad than did subjects in the neutral control condition (Ms
= 2.48 versus 1.62, p < 0.005), but angry subjects did not differ from the neutral
condition on this rating. Thus, the manipulations were successful in inducing the
intended, differentially negative affective states.
Perceived guilt
Because the results for the two cases (i.e. assault and cheating) were comparable
(case did not interact with any of the independent variables), the data were collapsed
across this replication factor. Mean ratings of defendant guilt are depicted in Figure
1 as a function of subjects’ affective state and whether or not a stereotype had
been activated. It is clear from an inspection of the figure that stereotype activation
had no discernible impact on subjects’ guilt judgments when they were in either
a sad or a neutral mood (Fs < l), but there was a marked increase in the perceived
guilt of stereotyped targets on the part of angry subjects, F(1,38) = 9 . 2 1 , ~< 0.005.
The interaction of stereotype activation and affect condition was reliable, 42,129)
= 3.83,~ < 0.025.
This pattern of guilt judgments is noteworthy in several respects. First, it provides
empirical corroboration for the idea that anger is associated with more heuristic
information processing. Angry subjects clearly made greater use of their stereotypic
None of the Subjects demonstrated any insight into expenmental hypotheses during the probe for suspi-
cions, although one subject did chide the researchers for failing to consider the possible contaminating
effects of the ‘first’ experiment on the ‘second’ one.
52 G. V. Bodenhausen et al.
Stereotype
7s 1
Present
Absent
b~ 6.5 -
.fi
.r
2 6-
'i
4.5
ANGRY SAD NEUTRAL
-
Affect Condition
Figure 1. Mean judgments of guilt as a function of affect condition and stereotype activation
beliefs than did sad subjects. Thus, it is evident that different kinds of negative
affect can indeed have different kinds of effects on social information processing.
Interestingly, the angry subjects in the first experiment displayed exactly the same
pattern of judgments as those of happy subjects who considered identical cases in
a previous set of experiments (Bodenhausen et al., in press). That happiness and
anger can have similar effects on social judgment while sadness and anger have
quite different effects underscores the importance of looking beyond affect valence
per se to the particular effects that are likely to accompany specific kinds of emotional
experience.
These findings are also interesting in light of traditional views linking prejudice
and stereotyping to emotional experience. While negative affect has often been postu-
lated to be associated with increases in prejudice and stereotyping (e.g. Dollard,
Miller, Doob, Mowrer and Sears, 1939; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosen-
blatt, Veeder, Kirkland and Lyon, 1990; Stephan and Stephan, 1985), the available
empirical evidence has focused almost exclusively on anger/frustration and anxiety
The data from Experiment 1 show that anger is associated with greater use of heuristic
cues in judgment, while Baron, Inman, Kao and Logan (1992) have shown that
anxious people use more heuristic strategies for social information processing. Based
on the literature reviewed earlier, it appears that sad people, in contrast, seem to
prefer more systematic strategies for social judgment. Correspondingly, we found
no evidence of increased use of stereotypes in social judgment on the part of sad
people, nor have previous studies of which we are aware.
On the other hand, Esses, Haddock and Zanna (in press) have reported a study
in which people were made sad (via the Velton procedure or via sad music) and
then asked to list characteristics they consider to be descriptive of typical members
of various social groups. These characteristics were then rated in terms of their
Negative aflect and social Judgment 53
valence (positive or negative) and the proportion of people in the group possessing
the Characteristic. A composite stereotype score was computed for each group for
each subject by multiplying the proportion and valence ratings for each Characteristic,
summing this product across all characteristics listed by the subject for the group,
and then dividing this sum by the number of characteristics listed for the group.
For some of the social groups being described, it was the case that those in a negative
mood had more negative stereotype composite scores than those in a neutral mood
condition. This pattern was interpreted as reflecting an increased use of negative
categories in the interpretation of the evaluative meaning of specific characteristics.
Such a process would be directly in line with theoretical accounts for the mood
congruency effect outlined earlier. Note, however, that subjects were engaging in
a free association task in which they listed and interpreted the attributes of social
groups. Under these conditions we mght expect the sort of ‘mood priming’ described
by mood congruency researchers to be most evident, as the task involves a fairly
unconstrained search of associative memory (for similar conclusions, see Fiedler
(1991) and Forgas (1992~)).In the present study, however, we found no evidence
that sad people show a mood congruency effect in judgments of specific members
of outgroups. In our task, negative affect may primarily have its effects via its impact
on processing strategies, whereas in the task used by Esses et ~ l . its, effects may
be mediated by mood-based priming of negative concepts in memory (for a systematic
review of the different processes through which mood affects social judgment, see
Forgas, 1992a,b)).
EXPERIMENT 2
of use sad people make of heuristic cues, and the effects of anger on reactions to
persuasive appeals have been largely unexplored. The present research was intended
to provide a direct comparison of the effects of heuristic cues on angry versus sad
recipients of persuasive messages.
Since the pioneering research of Hovland and Weiss (1951), it has been repeatedly
documented that under many circumstances, people agree more with a source who
is reputedly high in credibility, compared to a less credible source who advances
identical arguments (for reviews, see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Hass, 1981, McGuire,
1985). The two principal elements of source credibility are expertise (e.g. Kelman
and Hovland, 1953) and trustworthiness (e.g. Walster, Aronson and Abrahams,
1966). In Experiment 2, we examined the impact of variations in the expertise of
a communicator on the reactions of sad, angry, and neutral mood subjects to a
persuasive appeal, while in Experiment 3, we examined the impact of variations
in communicator trustworthiness.
Method
read the persuasive appeal. After listing their thoughts, participants then coded them
in terms of whether they were favourable, unfavourable, or neutral with respect
to the advocated position. Finally, Subjects were probed for suspicions and provided
with an educational debriefing.
Table 1. Mean agreement with advocated position as a function of affect condition and source
expertise (Expenment 1)
Source expertise
Affect condition Low High Difference P
Angry 2.00 4.67 2.67 0.01
Sad 3.86 2.69 -- 1 . 1 7 0.15
Neutral 2.36 3.79 I .43 0.20
Overall, the data in Table 1 indicate that subjects showed little inclination to
agree with the advocated position, and thought-listing data revealed a preponderance
of counterarguing. At least two-thirds of all listed thoughts were negative in all
conditions except for the angry-expert condition, in which only 54 per cent of the
thoughts were negative, on average. However, there were no significant effects in
an ANOVA on thought-listing measures.
The results obtained in the second experiment nicely corroborate the implications
of the first study using a completely different social information-processing task
and a very different kind of heuristic cue. Anger appears to have very different
effects from sadness, in this case promoting the greater use of a simple heuristic
cue. Certainly there is no general mood congruency pattern evident among the judg-
ments of angry or sad subjects. One intriguing aspect of the data was the apparent
trend for sad subjects to use the expertise cue in a reversed fashion. That is, they
appeared to agree more with the low expertise source. However, this finding did
not reach conventional levels of significance. In order to determine whether this
56 G. V Bodenhausen et al.
EXPERIMENT 3
In the final experiment, we again examined the use of source cues in a persuasion
situation among angry, sad, and neural mood subjects. However, this time we manipu-
lated the source’s trustworthiness. When communicators advocate a policy that serves
their own interests and agendas, they are perceived as less trustworthy and often
have less persuasive impact than when they advocate a position that is unexpected
or at odds with their own interests (e.g. Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken, 1978; Walster
et al. 1966). The apparent trustworthiness of the communicator provides another
basis for a quick, heuristic response to a persuasive appeal that does not necessitate
thoughtful processing of message content. In the third experiment we once again
induced angry, sad, or neutral moods among recipients of persuasive appeals, and
systematically manipulated the apparent trustworthiness of the communicator by
varying the extent to which the advocated position served the communicator’svested
interests.
Method
a thought-listing measure in which they were asked to report any and all thoughts
that occurred to them as they read the persuasive appeal. After listing their thoughts,
participants then coded them in terms of whether they were favourable, unfavourable,
or neutral with respect to the advocated position. Finally, subjects were probed
for suspicions and provided with an educational debriefing.
Table 2. Mean agreement with advocated position as a function of affect condition and source
trustworthiness(Experiment 3)
Source trustworthiness
Affect condition Low High Difference P
Angry 1.72 3.94 2.22 0.04
Sad 2.42 1.47 -0.95 0.25
Neutral 2.40 3.93 1.53 0.13
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Researchers have recently made great strides toward increasing our understanding
of the role of affect in social cognition. The present studies contribute to this literature
in several respects, each of which will be discussed in turn.
the importance of looking beyond the valence of the social perceiver’s affective state
per se and beginning to explore the effects of discrete kinds of emotional experience
on information processing. In all three studies, angry and sad subjects showed clear
differences in the use they made of simple heuristic cues in the process of generating
evaluations of social information. Anger, sadness, anxiety, guilt, and many other
negative emotional states may each produce their own behavioural and judgmental
tendencies, and the same may be true for various positive states such as JOY, hope,
and pride. Consequently, it will be necessary for theoretical developments occurring
at the interface of affect and cognition to begin to explicitly account for the specific
effects of discrete emotions (cf;Bodenhausen, 1993).
With this in mind, it becomes clear that a straightforward mood congruency model
of affect and cognition will be inadequate to capture the full nchness of the impact
of affect on social thought and judgment. Because mood congruency perspectives,
at least as they are currently articulated, cannot easily account for variations in
patterns of judgment across different varieties of negative affect, they cannot account
for the overall pattern evident in these three studies. Recent theoretical developments
have indeed begun to incorporate multiple processes through which affect impinges
on social cognition (e.g. Forgas, 1992b), and it will become an important issue for
further exploration to uncover the conditions under which simple mood congruency
effects do and do not obtain, versus conditions in which more emotion specific
effects may be evident. The present data fit well within an adaptationist framework
arguing that emotions are associated with patterns of thought and action that serve
the needs of the types of situations in which the motions typically anse (e.g. Schwarz,
1990; Smith and Lazarus, 1990).
In order to make systematic progress in understanding the influence of emotional
experience on social information processing, it will be increasingly important for
researchers to look beyond mood valence. This will require the development of emo-
tion typologies that explicitly identify the consequential dimensions on which differ-
ent emotional states differ. As suggested elsewhere (Bodenhausen, 1993), emotions
may differ in their autonomic manifestations, the extent to which they produce rumi-
nation or distraction, their evolutionary connections to mental and behavioural pro-
clivities, and their tendencies to endure across time, as well as in many other ways.
It remains for future research to delineate the relative importance of these differences
in accounting for the differential effects of emotional states on perception, judgment,
and action.
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