CITIZENSHIP (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political
community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of
full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications (such as minority)
and imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community.
Section 1.
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law.
Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
1. Jus Sanguinis - acquisition of citizenship based on blood relationship
(embodied in our Constitution under Sec. 1(2) of Art. V)
2. Jus Soli - acquisition of citizenship based on the place of birth
3. Naturalization - the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the privilege of a native born citizen
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippines citizenship
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
Naturalization
The legal act of adopting a foreigner and clothing him with the privileges of a
natural-born citizen
Kinds of Naturalization Laws in the Philippines
1. General law of naturalization applied through a judicial process (Revised
Naturalization Law)
2. Special naturalization law - an act of Congress making a specific
individual a citizen
3. Mass naturalization law - Philippine Bill of 1902 (“all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands continuing to reside in them who were Spanish
subjects)
4. General law of naturalization applied through a combination of
administrative and presidential legislative process - LOI 270 of former
President Marcos
5. Administrative Naturalization Law - administrative proceedings

NOTE: In the Philippines, we follow jus sanguinis and naturalization.

“Citizens at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution”

● Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution are citizens under the
1987 Constitution
● Those who are citizens under the 1935 Constitution are citizens under the
1973 Constitution
● Under Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the following are citizens:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of [the 1935] Constitution, had been elected
to public office in the Philippine Islands

Page | 1
 1. Having an invalid declaration of intent in their Petitions of naturalization
Section 2.
2. Failing to comply with the requirements for the education of minor
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
children
without having to perform any act to acquire of perfect their Philippine
3. Allowing oneself to be a “dummy” for aliens
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Modes of Reacquisition of Citizenship
1. Naturalization
Natural Born Citizen 2. Repatriation
● Certain Constitutional Offices are reserved for Natural Born Citizens 3. Direct Grant by Law
(President, Vice-President, Senators, Congressmen, Commissioners of
Constitutional Commissions, Supreme Court Justices and Justices of Who may be Repatriated under RA 8171
lower collegial courts) 1. Women who lost their citizenship by marriage
● Aside from reserving the these aforementioned offices for natural-born 2. Those who lost their citizenship for political or economic reasons
citizens, there are no substantial distinctions under the law between
Naturalized and Natural-Born Citizens Effect of Repatriation
1. Those who were originally natural born citizens regain their natural-born
status
2. The effectivity repatriotization in general is upon the date of application
Section 3. and not when it was approved
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Modes of losing Citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63

1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation of citizenship;
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws
of a foreign country
4. Rendering service in the armed forces of a foreign country
5. Being a deserter to the armed forces

Grounds for the cancellation of a Certificate of Naturalization under

Commonwealth Act 473
1. Having a certificate of naturalization that was fraudulently or illegally
obtained.
2. Permanent residence in the country of origin within 5 years of
naturalization

Page | 2
 Section 4. local legislation exploitation of natural
Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, resources & national
unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have security
renounced it.
Governing law RA 9225 → An Act Making Citizenship of PH
Citizens who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent
1. In the 1973 Constitution, Section 4 → General Rule: Female citizen who
1. Sec 3 → Retention of PH Citizenship
marries an alien retains her Philippine Citizenship
a. Natural-born Pinoys may
a. Exception: By Acts / Omissions, she is deemed under the law to
reacquire status after
have renounced it
2. Main Difference of 1973 & 1987 Constitutions naturalization as foreign citizens
a. 1973 (female) v. 1987 (all citizens, regardless of gender) by taking an oath of allegiance
2. Sec 5 lays down the limitations of their
3. 1973 Constitution repealed Commonwealth Act No. 63 Sec. 1(7) which
restored Civil & Political Rights
states that a Filipina may lose her Philippine Citizenship by marriage to
a. Suffrage
an alien whose laws make her into a citizen of such country.
b. Hold elective / appointive office
c. Exercise profession
Section 5.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.

Dual Citizenship v. Dual Allegiance

Key Differences Dual Citizenship Dual Allegiance

How it is acquired Involuntarily Voluntarily

Example of acquisition Parents’ citizenship (jus Oath of allegiance to 2

sanguinis) + born abroad jurisdictions = DUAL
(jus soli) = DUAL ALLEGIANCE
CITIZENSHIP

Views of commissioners Not inimical to national This is the impact of

on this interest because foreign liberalized naturalization
citizenship law is and could be inimical to
beyond the control of the nation because of

Page | 3
 CASES
1. Valles v. Commission on Election (Pat)
09 August 2000 | Purisima, J. | Express renunciation; dual citizenship
PETITIONER: Cirilo Valles
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
SUMMARY:
Rosalind is a Filipino-Australian (Filipino father, Australian mother) who settled
in the Philippines when she was 15 years old. After getting married, Rosalind
has continuously participated in the electoral process as voter and candidate. In
May 1998, Rosalind won against Valles in the Davao Oriental gubernatorial
elections. He filed for a petition to disqualify Rosalind on the ground that she is
an Australian citizen, and is thus not qualified to run for elective office. More
specifically, Valles argues that since Rosalind is a holder of an Australian
passport, alien certificate of registration, and an immigrant certificate residence,
she expressly renounced her Filipino citizenship. Even conceding that Rosalind
was a dual citizen, the Local Government Code provides that dual citizens
cannot run for public office.
The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that Rosalind was a holder of an
Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Renunciation must
be express, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizenship. At most,
Rosalind, had a dual citizenship - Australian and Filipino. Dual citizenship as a
disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. Rosalind’s filing of her
certificate of candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that
she will support and defend the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto, sufficed to renounce her foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
DOCTRINE:
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express.
FACTS:
1. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia (Filipino father, Australian
mother) in 1934. At the age of 15, she settled in the Philippines.
2. Rosalind has continuously participated in the electoral process not only
as a voter but as a candidate as well. After serving as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental, she ran (and won) as
governor twice.
3. Both wins were contested by the losing candidates on the ground that she
was not a Filipino citizen. However, on both times, the COMELEC
dismissed the complaints against Rosalind since Rosalind was able to
prove that her father was a Filipino citizen.
4. In 1998, Rosalind ran (and won) for governor again. Valles assails her
candidacy because of her citizenship. But the COMELEC ruled that by
virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis (her father is Filipino), she was a
Filipino citizen
5. Valles claims that Rosalind registered herself w/ the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued an Alien
Certificate of Registration, she applied for an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, and she also holds an Australian passport. In the application
for the certificates, Valles argues that Rosalind declared under oath
that she was a subject of Australia, thereby forfeiting her Philippine
citizenship.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Rosalind is a Filipino citizen under the applicable law when she
was born - YES
2. W/N Rosalind renounced her Filipino citizenship in her application for
the Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence - NO
3. W/N Rosalind is disqualified to run for public office because she is a
dual citizen - NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSES and the
COMELEC Resolutions AFFIRMED.
Page | 4
RATIO: c. Filing of COC suffices to renounce foreign citizenship
1. Yes, Rosalind is a Filipino citizen. The Philippine Law on citizenship because in the COC, the applicant declares that he/she is a
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, by virtue of which a child Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
place of birth (jus soli). and allegiance thereto.
a. Rosalind was born in 1934 to a Filipino father and Australian d. Even then, Rosalind actually executed a Declaration of
mother. The applicable laws are the 1902 Philippine Bill and Renunciation of Australian citizenship in 1992. Her Australian
the 1916 Jones Law. passport was also cancelled. These acts already settle the issue
b. Both organic acts provide that all inhabitants of the of her dual citizenship.
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and
resided therein, including their children are deemed to be SEPARATE OPINIONS: None.
Philippine citizens. Since Rosalind’s father (born 1879) in
Camarines Norte, he is a Filipino citizen. Consequently, his
daughter is likewise a Filipino citizen.
c. Also, under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions, Rosalind is
a Filipino citizen because her father is Filipino
2. No, Rosalind’s ACR and ICR did not amount to a renunciation of her
Filipino citizenship because renunciation must be express.
a. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2)
express renunciation, (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the constitution of a foreign country, (4) accepting
military commision of a foreign country, (5) cancellation of
certificate of naturalization, (6) having been declared a deserter
in times of war, (7) a woman marrying a foreigner who acquires
husband’s nationality if the foreign law so provides.
b. Rosalind’s application for those certificates were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship. At most, she had a
dual citizenship under such circumstances
3. No, the Local Government Code provision which disqualifies “those with
dual citizenship” refers to citizens with dual allegiance.
a. Dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for public office.
b. For candidates w/ dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon filing of COC to terminate their
status as dual citizens.

Page | 5
 2. Ong Chia v. Republic (Pat)
27 March 2000 | Mendoza, J. | Strict Application of Naturalization Laws
PETITIONER: Ong Chia
RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines, Court of Appeals
SUMMARY:
Ong Chia was born in 1923 in China. He stayed in PH since 1932 where he
found employment, started his own business and married a Filipina. When he
was 66 y/o, he filed a petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen in accordance
with the Revised Naturalization Law. During the hearing, he testified as to his
qualifications and presented three other witnesses. The prosecution did not refute
the testimony of Ong Chia’s witnesses. Trial court granted the petition.
OSG appealed the decision contending that Ong Chia (1) failed to state all
names by which he is/had been known, (2) failed to state al his former places of
residence, (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
(because he lived with his wife w/o the benefit of marriage for many years), (4)
has no known lucrative trade/occupation (based on his ITR), and (5) failed to
support his petition w/ appropriate documentary evidence. CA reversed the trial
court decision.
Ong Chia claims that the OSG’s submissions were merely annexed to the
appellant’s brief (which should not have been admitted by the CA in accordance
with the rule on formal offer of evidence). The Supreme Court held that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant. Commonwealth Act No. 473 clearly
provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth his present and
former places of residence. This requirement is important because it is published
so that anyone who might interpose an opposition to the application may know
of such application. Since Ong Chia failed to do so, his petition ought to be
denied.
DOCTRINE:
Naturalization laws are strictly construed in favor of the government.
FACTS:
1. Ong Chia was born in China in 1923. When he was nine, he settled in the
Philippines. It is in PH that he found employment and got married. At
age 66, he filed a petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law)
2. During hearing, he testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The prosecutor was so impressed
with the testimonies that they did not oppose is petition for
naturalization. Thus, the trial court admitted Ong Chia to Philippine
citizenship.
3. The State, through the OSG, appealed and contended that Ong Chia
a. Failed to state all the names by which he is/had been known (he
used the name “Loreto Chia Ong” before)
b. Failed to state all his former places of residence (did not state
the Ilo-ilo residence)
c. Failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay (lived with his wife w/o benefit of
marriage for more than 20 yrs)
d. Has no known lucrative trade/occupation (therefore cannot
support his family)
e. Failed to support his petition w/ appropriate documentary
evidence
4. CA reversed the trial court decision. Ong Chia appealed to the SC
ISSUES:
1. W/N the annexed documents to appellant’s brief have evidentiary value
despite not being formally offered as evidence - YES
2. W/N failure to include the Ilo-ilo address is a ground to deny
naturalization - YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is hereby denied.
RATIO:
1. Yes, the annexed documents need not be formally offered as evidence
because the relevant rule does not apply to naturalization proceedings.
Page | 6
 a. Ong Chia was not denied the right to object against the
authenticity of said documents because he was able to object in
the brief he filed w/ the Court of Appeals.
b. The documents are public documents which were executed
under oath. Ong Chia did not claim any flaw/irregularity to cast
doubt on the documents’ authenticity
2. Yes, failure to include the Ilo-ilo address is a ground to deny the
naturalization application
a. Ong Chia claims that since the Ilo-ilo address had been included
in an earlier petition for naturalization, the same had been
published and thus, the objective of giving investigating
agencies the opportunity to check on the background of
applicant has already been satisfied.
b. But naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
The Revised Naturalization law clearly provides that the
applicant shall set for the his present and former places of
residence. On this ground alone, the petition ought to be denied.

SEPARATE OPINIONS: None.

Page | 7
 3. Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners (Pat)
31 May 1991 | Bidin, J. | Filipino citizens when Constitution was adopted
PETITIONER: William Gatchalian
RESPONDENTS: Board of Commissioners (Commission on Immigration and
Deportation)
SUMMARY:
This case is about the citizenship of William, grandson of Santiago, who entered
the Philippines and was allowed entry based on a forged cablegram which says
that the Gatchalians are Filipino. The basis of William’s claim of Philippine
citizenship is his grandfather’s Filipino citizenship, which is grounded on his
illegitimacy (therefore, he supposedly follows his Filipino mom’s citizenship).
As such, William’s father is Filipino and William must also be Filipino.
An earlier BOC decision recognized Santiago’s Filipino citizenship but after 28
years, BOC is assailing such recognition. The Supreme Court held that
Santiago’s citizenship may no longer be questioned and that the action has
already prescribed based on the Immigration Act (5 year period only). Since
Santiago is a Filipino and based on the valid marriages of the grandfather and
father of William, William is also a Filipino citizen.
DOCTRINE:
Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution provides that “those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution” are citizens of the
Philippines.
FACTS:
1. 1960 - Santiago Gatchalian (grandfather of William Gatchalian) was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration (BI) as a native born Filipino
citizen, following the citizenship of his natural mother Marciana
Gatchalian.
2. 1961 - 12 yr old William (and family) arrived in Manila from Hong
Kong. They presented a Certificate of Registration and Identity issued by
the PH consulate in HK, based on a cablegram bearing the signature of
DFA Sec. Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
3. After investigation, the Board admitted them as Filipino citizens.
4. 1962 - SOJ issued a Memorandum setting aside all decisions rendered by
the Board of Commissioners and directed the BOC to review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine
citizen (which included the Gatchalian’s case)
5. The new BOC ordered the exclusion of Gatchalian. In 1973, those
covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for re-hearing with the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI)
6. BSI recommended to Acting Commissioner Nituda the reversal of the
1962 BOC decision. Nituda affirmed BSI and admitted William as a
Filipino citizen
7. 1990 - NBI wrote to SOJ recommending that William (and others
included in the old warrant of exclusion be charged w/ violation of the
Immigration Act). BI Commissioner issued a mission order commanding
the arrest of William.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the citizenship of William’s grandfather may be questioned - NO
2. W/N the action has prescribed - YES
3. W/N William is a Filipino - YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit;
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is
declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack
of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases
No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise
DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. No, the 1960 decision forecloses the re-opening of the case after 30
years.
a. Grandfather Santiago - Filipino (by BOC order) because he is
the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian
(Marciana is a Filipino).
Page | 8
 b. Issue is not Santiago’s citizenship, but William’s.
2. Yes, the Immigration Act provides that deportation shall not be effected
unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within 5 years
after the cause of deportation arises
a. In this case, the cause of action and deportation arose in 1962.
Warrant of arrest was issued in 1990 (after 28 yrs).
b. Cause of action has already prescribed.
3. Yes, the Civil Code provides that marriages validly celebrated in other
countries are valid in the Philippines. Every intendment of the law or
facts leans toward the validity of marriage.
a. Since the marriage of William’s parents is valid, William
follows the citizenship of his Filipino father
b. William belongs to the class of Filipino citizens “who are
citizens of the Philippine at the time of the adoption of this
constitution”
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Feliciano, J. (dissenting)
1. On Prescription - Examination of Sec. 37(b) of the Immigration Act
shows that the 5-yr limitation is applicable only where the deportation is
sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37(a) OTHER THAN clauses
2, 7, 8, 11, and 12. Otherwise, no period of limitation is applicable →
deportation or exclusion may be effected at any time after entry.
a. Facts show that the govt sought to effect exclusion and
deportation of William under Sec. 37(a)(2). Thus, no time
limitation is applicable in respect of carrying out the 1962
Warrant of Exclusion.
2. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as Philippine
citizens must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after
having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed
acts which rendered them liable to deportation. What is actually involved
in this case is exclusion, not deportation.
3. Nituda’s reversal of the 1962 BOC decision is highly irregular.
4. William claims Philippine citizenship based on self-serving oral
testimony and total lack of official documentation. Facts on the record
are open to very serious doubt
a. Grandfather Santiago was born to Pablo Pacheco (whom
everyone assumes is Chinese) and Marciana Gatchalian
(Filipina) → Santiago is illegitimate therefore Filipino
citizenship following Marciana’s citizenship
b. Santiago has always regarded himself as Chinese, lived the bulk
of his life in China, documented himself as Chinese, married a
Chinese woman. It was only when he was 53 y/o that he
described himself as Filipino. His petition to cancel his ACR
was apparently made in preparation for efforts to bring in his
descendants to PH. He also did not submit a birth certificate
bearing the name Santiago Gatchalian.
5. Res judicata does not apply. Court must examine Santiago’s alleged
Philippine citizenship.
6. Comity provision in the Family Code cannot begin to operate until after
marriage abroad and its compliance w/ requirements for validity under
the marriage law of the place are shown as factual matters. Thus, since
grandfather Santiago’s marriage was not proven to be valid, his son
Francisco follows the Chinese citizenship of Santiago’s Chinese wife.
Consequently, since the validity of Francisco’s marriage with a Chinese
woman has not been proved, then William follows the citizenship of his
Chinese mother.
7. Although this dissent may seem unduly harsh, the Court must apply the
law as it is written. If William feels that he has some humanitarian claim
to a right to stay in PH, then the appropriate recourse is with the political
departments of the govt.
Davide, Jr., J. (dissenting)
1. William is guilty of forum-shopping.
2. The facts before this Court do not constitute conclusive or substantial
evidence that William is a Filipino citizen. Very serious doubts surround
his claim from the beginning
a. Entry into PH was made possible through a Certificate of
Identity, which was issued on the basis of a forged cablegram by
the DFA Sec.
Page | 9
 b. No sufficient evidence supports the claim of Philippine
citizenship of grandfather Santiago
3. Nituda’s reversal is not only highly anomalous, irregular, and improper,
it was also done w/o any semblance of authority. BSI did not have power
to review/modify/reverse a BOC decision rendered 11 years earlier. Also,
Nituda was acting alone when she approved the BSI recommendation.
Thus, the decision is void ab initio.
4. Since void ab initio, BOC 1962 decision does not constitute res judicata
5. Prescriptive period of 5 years does not apply because William is covered
by clause (2) “Any alien who enters the PH who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry”

Page | 10
 4. Tecson v. COMELEC (Sylina)
March 4, 2003 | Vitug, J | Citizenship- President Candidacy
CONSOLIDATED CASES
PETITIONER: Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.
RESPONDENTS: The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe (a.ka Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Victorino X. Fornier
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PETITIONER: Zoilo Antonio Velez
RESPONDENTS: Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (a.ka Fernando Poe, Jr.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PETITIONER: Victorino X. Fornier
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe (a.ka Fernando Poe, Jr)
SUMMARY: FPJ filed his candidacy for the presidential election.
Petitioner Fornier intitiated before the Comelec to disqualify FPJ on the
ground of material misrepresentation – that FPJ is not a natural born
citizen. Being an illegitimate child, he could not have acquired the
citizenship of his father
DOCTRINE: Being born in 1939, the 1935 Constitution would be made
applicable in determining FPJ’s citizenship.
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
… xx
(3) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
FACTS:
1. FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the President of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, representing
himself as a naturel-born Filipino citizen, born August 20, 1939
2. Fornier initiated before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ or to cancel his
COC on the ground that there was a material misrepresentation of his
citizenship, when in truth FPJ’s parents are foreigners
a. Bessie Kelley Poe (mother) – American
b. Allan Poe (Father) – Spanish national, being a son of Lorenzo
Pou (a Spanish subject)
→ granting that Allan was a Filipino Citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to FPJ, who is an illegitimate child
→ Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley
→ Even if no prior marriage, Bessie and Allan have only been
married for a year after the birth of FPJ
3. Fornier presented documentary evidence and was answered by FPJ by
also presenting documentary pieces of evidence. (there was a copy of a
purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley as
one of the evidence)
4. The other petitions, by Tecson et al., and Velez et al., are both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMEC asserting that under Art. VII
sec. 4 paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only SC had the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case (not really
important)
ISSUES:
WON FPJ’s a nature-born Filipino Citizen, which would allow him to run for
presidency- YES
RATIO:
1. Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines —
→ Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution
→ Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
→ Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.
→ Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

Page | 11
 → Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
2. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, jus sanguinis or
blood relationship became a basis of citizenship by birth
3. 1973 Consti provides
The following are citizens of the Philippines —
→ Those who are citizens of the Philippine at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution
→ Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
→ Those who elect Philippine Citizenship pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five
→ Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
4. The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the 1973
Constitution except for subsection (3) which now states
→ Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority
5. In this case, it was provided in Section 2, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution: "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."
6. Natural born citizen is defined to include those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire of perfect their Philippine
Citizenship.
7. FPJ being born in 1939, the 1935 Constitution should apply
in determining his citizenship
8. In the evidence presented by the petitioner, his earliest direct
ascendant was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married
to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan
9. Lorenzo’s record of birth was not presented however the
death certificate identified him as a Filipino
10. Birth certificate of Allan Poe showed that he is the son of
Lorenzo
11. The marriage certificate of Allan and Bessie also indicated
Allan as a Filipino citizen
12. The birth certificate of FPJ would disclose that he was born
20 August 1939 to Allan Poe (who also signed the
document), a Filipino.
13. The documents presented are public record in the custody of
a public officer
14. While the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen, the evidence
on hand would still preponderate in his favor.
15. FPJ could not be guilty of material misrepresentation
Separate Opinions:
16. DAVIDE, JR.
The provision of paragraph 3 of Section 1 of the Article IV
of the 1985 Constitution makes not distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is
enough that filiation is established or that the child is
acknowledged or recognized by the father
17. PUNO
We follow the principle of jus sanguinis, the rule of blood
relationship. Proof that Allan F. Poe, a Filipino citizen, is the
father of respondent Poe is proof that the blood of Allan F.
Poe flows in the veins of respondent Poe. No other proof is
required for the principle of jus sanguinis to apply. There is
no need for other proofs such as proofs of acknowledgment,
for such proofs are only used in civil law for the purpose of
establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children. Our
Constitutions from 1935 merely state — "those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines."
To disqualify respondent Poe due to his illegitimacy is
against the trend in civil law towards equalizing the civil
rights of an illegitimate child with that of a legitimate child.
Called originally as nullius filius or no one’s child, an
illegitimate child started without any birthright of
significance
Page | 12
CONCURRING:
18. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution is very clear.
As the provision does not distinguish between a legitimate
child and an illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should
not make a distinction.
19. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
provide for a qualification that the child be a product of a
legitimate union for the child to acquire the nationality of the
Filipino father. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. When the law does not distinguish, neither should
we. There should be no distinction in the application of the
fundamental law where none is indicated
1935 Constitution simply provided that when paternity is
known or established, the child follows the father's
citizenship; otherwise, the citizenship of the mother is
followed.
20. CALLEJO, SR., J.
Register of Death in San Carlos, Pangasinan, the citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou is stated to be "Filipino." Again, there lies
here in favor of respondent Poe's cause a prima facie proof of
the Filipino citizenship of his grandfather as per entry in the
Civil Register of the latter's Certificate of Death, a public
record. Moreover, during his lifetime, Lorenzo Pou
comported himself as a Filipino. He voted in elections and
did not register as an alien. He even owned real properties in
the Philippines. Accordingly, by Lorenzo Pou's acquisition of
Filipino citizenship under the pertinent provisions of the
Treaty of Paris and the relevant succeeding laws, Allan
Fernando Poe also acquired the Filipino citizenship of his
father.
21. AZCUNA, J.
It is true that under the Old Civil Code, prevailing when Poe,
Jr. was born, the effects of legitimation retroact only to the
time of the marriage, and not to the time of birth. However,
the New Civil Code, effective on August 30, 1950, made the
effects retroact to the time of the birth of the child. It is also
true that the Old Civil Code required, in addition to the
marriage, an acknowledgment by the parent(s) in the birth
certificate, a will or any public instrument. Under the New
Civil Code, however, this was liberalized so that
acknowledgment can be done also in a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing. Furthermore,
these new provisions of the law are made expressly
applicable to persons born under the old regime if these are
beneficial to them. And, finally, under the Family Code of
1988, even the need for acknowledgment has been dropped,
and retroactivity is also provided for, without prejudice to
vested rights.
DISSENTING:
22. CARPIO, J.
The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws
in force in 1939, are the governing laws that determine
whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at the
time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot
change the citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939
because such legislation would violate the constitutional
definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a Philippine
citizen from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine
citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent
legislation a natural-born citizen.
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a
natural-born Philippine citizen since there is no showing that
his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at
birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a
Philippine citizen "from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect" his Philippine citizenship. Private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does not meet this citizenship
qualification.
23. CARPIO-MORALES
As priorly observed, the Philippines has adopted the principle
of jus sanguinis, or blood relationship, as the rule in
Page | 13
 determining citizenship. Consequently, the civil law status of
legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of
Philippine citizenship.
24. TINGA, J.
There is no substantial evidence at this point that indubitably
proves the claim that Ronald Poe is a natural-born Filipino
Filipino citizenship is conferred by law and nothing else, not
even good faith or colorable possession thereof. Citizenship
is a privilege, and not a right. To cheapen citizenship by
according it through haphazard presumptions is tantamount
to cheapening our nation's worth and soul.

Page | 14
 5 Go v. Ramos (Sylina)
September 4, 2009 | Quisimbing, J. | Citizenship
CONSILIDATED CASES
PETITIONER: Carlos T. Go, Sr.
RESPONDENTS: Luis T. Ramos
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PETITIONER: Jimmy T. Go
RESPONDENTS: Luis T. Ramos
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PETITIONER: Hon. Alipio Fernandez, Jr., in his capacity as the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Immigration; Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M. Macayaan, in
their capacity as Intelligence officers of the Bureau of Immigration
RESPONDENTS: Jimmy T. Go a.k.a Jaime T. Gaisano
SUMMARY: Ramos initiated a deportation case against Jimmy Go for being an
illegal and undesirable alien. It was also averred that through Jimmy’s stealth and
machinations, he was able to obtain a Philippine passport. Go denies the allegation
presenting evidence that his father, Carlos is a Filipino, who elected the citizenship
in accordance with the law.
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines.
The 3-yr period for electing Philippine Citizenship may be extended as when
the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino.
FACTS:
1. A complaint-affidavit initiated by Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration against Jimmy Go allegeing that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien
2. It is alleged that Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen although
personal circumstances and other records indicate otherwise
3. Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy which indicated “FChinese”
as the latter’s citizenship
→ Luis argues that although it appears in Jimmy’s birth certificate that
his parents are Filipinos, Carlos and Rosario Tan, the document seems to be
tampered as it appears that the citizenship of Carlos is handwritten while other
entries were typewritten
→ it was also avered that through Jimmy’s stealth, machination and
scheming have managed to cover up his true citizenship and with the use of
falsified documents was able to procure a Philippine passport
4. Jimmy in his counter-affidavit argued that such was only a harassment
case for him to be ouster of his rightful share in their business dealings
5. Jimmy argued that his father, a son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV,
paragaraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commenwealth Act No. 625
→ evidenced by the taking of Oath of Allegiance (July 11, 1950 and
executing an Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship (July 12, 1950
although having been only registered in 1956)
→ Carlos also voted in the 1952 and 1955 election
→ it was also argued that Carlos was born and raised in the Ph
6. Fchinese was argued to be not by Jimmy’s own doing but may be
attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who
might’ve relied on his Chinese-sounding surname.
→ He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate;
thus, if his father's citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been
changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already
taken his oath as a Filipino.
→ As regards the entry in his siblings' certificates of birth, particularly
Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the
entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his
father
7. Associate Commissioner Malenab-Hornilla, basing from the findings of
the NBI, dismissed the complaint as Jimmy’s father has been shown to
have elected Filipino citizenship
8. Board of Commissioners reversed the dismissal holding that Carlos’
election was made out of time
Page | 15
 9. Corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimy The Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940
10. The Board ordered the deportation of Jimmy
11. Carlos and Jimmy filed a supplemental petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC and reiterated their application for injunctive
reliefs.
→ RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction pending litigation on the
main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the previous decision.
→ RTC later dissolved the writ as a consequence of the dismissal of the
petition
→ they moved for MR but was also denied
12. Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of
Jimmy
→ Jimmy Commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but was dismissed
by reason of his provisional release on bail
13. Carlos and Jimmy questioned the decision and the resolution denying the
MR by way of certiorari before the CA. They imputed grave abuse of
discretion by the RTC for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that
what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the
March 8, 2001 resolution and the Charge Sheet
14. CA dismissed the petition.
→ CA argued that the issue on citizenship should proceed only before
the proper court in an independent action is without merit, and that neither the
Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the
Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens
→ they also rejected the petitioner’s claim that they enjoy the
presumption of being Filipino Citizens
→ CA held that the Board has exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try
and hear cases against alien, and in process determine their citizenship
15. Appellate court agreed with the RTC that the principle of jus soli was
never extended to Philippines
16. CA found Carlos to have failed to elect Philippine citizenship within 3
years upon reaching the age of majority
→ the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of
election and oath of allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the
affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of
several years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily
explained
17. Petitioners moved for MR which was then denied. They filed a review
on certiorari before the SC.
18. Commissioner Fernandez issued a warrant of deportation which resulted
in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy.
19. Jimmy again filed a petition for HC.
20. RTC dismissed such petition ruling that the remedy of HC cannot be
availed of to obtain an order release once a deportation order has already
been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the
order, but was also denied.
21. CA granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the
issue of Jimmy’s citizenship is finally settled.
ISSUES:
1. WON the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had
prescribed. NO
2. WON the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to
Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its
jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to
give way to formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage. NO
RATIO:
1. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once citizenship of an
individual is put into question, it necessarily to be threshed out and decided upon.
→ Sec 37(b) of Com Act No. 613 states that deportation may
be effected any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any
other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made
within 5 years after the cause of deportation
The court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5 year period should be
counted from the time when the complaint was filed. It is the legal possibility
of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of
the period of prescription.
→ (Sec 2 Act No. 3326) Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Page | 16
The counting would not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued
because the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen.
2. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own. Res Judicata does not obtain
as a matter of course. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.
→ Res Judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if
the ff concur:
a. If the person’s citizenship must be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party
b. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative
took active part in the resolution thereof
c. The finding or citizenship is affirmed by this court

The doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. This doctrine
benefitted only those who were individually declared to be citizens by a final
court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
The 3-yr period for electing Philippine Citizenship may be extended as when
the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino.
→ There is no sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-yr
period: The fact the Carlos exercise his right to suffrage in 1952 and
1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were
done after he elected Philippine citizenship. The mere fact that he was
able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine
citizenship.
→ His registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real
citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus
sanguinis).
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.

Page | 17
 6. Gonzalez v. Pennisi (Mac)
March 5, 2010. | Carpio | Citizenship- PROOF OF NATIONALITY/ THOSE
WHOSE MOTHERS ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, UPON
REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
PETITIONER: Department Of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, Bureau Of
Immigration Commissioner And Board Of Commissioners Chairman Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr., And Immigration Associate Commissioners And Board Of
Commissioners Members Arthel B. Caronongan, Teodoro B. Delarmente, Jose
D.L. Cabochan, And Franklin Z. Littua
RESPONDENTS: Michael Alfio Pennisi
SUMMARY: Michael Pennisi was a Fil-Am PBA player. He was born in
Queensland Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national and Anita
Quintos, allegedly a Filipina. Michael filed a petition for recognition as Filipino
citizen before the Bureau of Immigration. His petition was granted. However,
the Senate Committees on Games submitted a Committee Report that the BI
should conduct summary deportation proceedings against several Fil-foreigner
PBA players.
However, a verification on the authenticity of the above documents reveals
highly suspicious circumstances. His alleged mother and other relatives,
specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G.
Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application for recognition of Philippine
citizenship in the BI, are not known and have never existed in Panabingan, San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Is Pennisi a Filipino?
The Court ruled that Pennisi is a Filipino because of the pieces of evidence such
as certified true copies of the birth certificate and the registration of alien of his
mother which proved that his he is a child of a Filipino mother which was one of
the qualifiers of Filipino citizenship.
DOCTRINE: Certified true copy of registration of alien, indicating her
nationality as Filipino and other pieces of evidence such as birth certificate and
marriage certificate of parents should prevail over the affidavits submitted to
attack the nationality of a person. Certified true copies of the birth certificate and
the registration of alien of his mother proved that his he is a child of a Filipino
mother which was one of the qualifiers of Filipino citizenship.
FACTS:
1. Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on 13 March 1975 in
Queensland,Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita
T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999,
respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI).
2. He submitted a certified true copies of birth certificate, marriage
certificate of his parents, his mother’s Australian certificate of
registration as an alien indicating that her nationality is Filipino, birth
certificate of his mother, and a letter from Australian Department of
Immigration stating that his mother was not granted of Australian
citizenship.
3. He was granted of such recognition
4. However, on 7 August 2003, the Senate Committees on Games,
Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments (Senate
Committees) jointly submitted Committee Report No. 256 5 (Committee
Report) recommending, among other things, that (1) the BI conduct
summary deportation proceedings against several Filipino-foreign PBA
players, including respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary conduct an
immediate review of all orders of recognition.
5. However, a verification on the authenticity of the above documents
reveals highly suspicious circumstances. His alleged mother and other
relatives, specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M.
Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application
for recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not known and
have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
6. Thereafter, the DOJ issued Department Order No. 412 dated 21
September 2004 creating a special committee, with Chief State Counsel
Ricardo V. Paras as Chairperson, to investigate the citizenship of
Filipino-foreign players in the PBA. The special committee required
respondent to submit a position paper in connection with the
Page | 18
 investigation. On 18 October 2004, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking
respondent's certificate of recognition and directing the BI to begin SEPARATE OPINIONS: NONE
summary deportation proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-
foreign PBA players. CONCURRING: NONE

7. Respondent filed a petition for review, with an application for temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:
1. Is Pennisi a Filipino? YES

RATIO:

1. We agree with the court of appeals that while the affidavits of soliman
and peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of quintos' certificate of
live birth, such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid by
competent authority. The rule stands that "(d)ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

2. We further sustain the court of appeals that there could be reasons why
the quintoses and tomedas were not included in the census, such as they
could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in the
master's list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as
voters.

3. The late registration of quintos' certificate of live birth was made 10

years after her birth and not anytime near the filing of respondent's
petition for recognition as filipino citizen. As such, it could not be
presumed that the certificate's late filing was meant to use it fraudulently.
4. Finally, the australian department of immigration and multicultural
affairs itself attested that as of 14 july 1999, quintos has not been granted
australian citizenship.
5. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of quintos' australian
certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as filipino.
These pieces of evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by
soliman and peralta to the senate committees.

Page | 19
 7. Ma Cabiling v. Fernandez (Mac)
Date | Ponente | Citizenship-THOSE WHOSE MOTHERS ARE CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, ELECT
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP/REGISTRATION
PETITIONER: BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR.,
and VALERIANO CABILING MA
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the
Board of Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL
SUMMARY: Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of
the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for
almost sixty (60) years and spent their whole lives in the country. During their
age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of
twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship The Ma’s however failed to
have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in
which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person
whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than
thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship. Should those who
failed to obtain alien certificates of registration be deported? The Court ruled
that the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
DOCTRINE: Registration is made for the purpose of notification. The failure to
register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and
resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The
lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted
supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil
registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the
appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of
the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957,
respectively.
2. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for
almost sixty (60) years
3. They spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and
secondary education in the country.
4. They do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot
in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father
5. They have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their
respective families in the Philippines.
6. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of
Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
7. Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1 (4), Article IV, of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines.
8. Petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in
the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after
they elected Philippine citizenship.
Page | 20
ISSUES:
1. Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother
and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon
reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered
foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for
failure to obtain alien certificates of registration? NO
RATIO:
1. The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate states: (4) Those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship
2. In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the
manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit: Section 1. The option
to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section
1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
3. The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
4. We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to
complete the statutory requirements for such election.
5. The election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive
acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done.
The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the
herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is
equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
6. To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are
unanimous on the meaning of the term "to register" as "to enter in a register;
to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list.
7. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which
records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real
rights.
8. Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification.
9. Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person
who has knowledge thereof.
10. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons (and it) operates
as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others." 63 As pertinent is
the holding that registration "neither adds to its validity nor converts an
invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties." 64 It lays emphasis
on the validity of an unregistered document.
11. Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the
instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is
not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.
12. We even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage.
Thus, has it been admitted through existing rules that the late registration of
the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of
marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the
marriage certificate registered with the designated government agency.
Page | 21
13. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the
petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine
citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in
the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate
the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they
submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered
with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for
validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau
of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders
and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of
Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.

SEPARATE OPINIONS: NONE

CONCURRING: NONE

Page | 22
 8. Co vs. HRET (VHONE)
July 30, 1991 | Gutierrez, Jr. | Citizenship - Citizens by election
PETITIONER: Antonio Y. Co
RESPONDENTS: HRET & Jose Ong
SUMMARY: Jose Ong won a congressional seat in the second district of North
Samar. Petitioners filed an election protest on the basis of him not being a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar. The HRET declared Ong as a natural born citizen, in which case, a
petition was filed assailing this decision.
The Supreme Court ruled that Jose Ong is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines because he has elected to become a Filipino citizen. By establishing
his life in the Philippines, and also through the naturalization of his father when
he was a minor, it showed that he elected to be citizen of the Philippines.
DOCTRINE:
Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution states that “Those
born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.” In this case, embracing the
culture and values of the country, and establishing his life in the Philippines,
including being voted to a congressional seat showed that he has elected to be a
Philippine citizen. Also, his father’s naturalization when Ong was still a minor
was an election by the law.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Jose Ong won the congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar.
2. Petitioners filed an election protest against Ong on the grounds that:
a. He is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
b. He is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar
2. HRET declared Ong a natural bord citizen of the Philippines and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Jose Ong is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
2. W/N he is a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
decision of the house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED.
Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
RATIO:
1. The Court narrated how Jose Ong was elected as congressman by starting
with how his family came to the Philippines
a. His grandfather came to the Philippines in China, and
established his residence in Laoang, Samar. He was able to
obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
b. His father was born in China, but was brought to the
Philippines. He spent his childhood in the Philippines, wherein
he was able to assimilate with the community, and absorb the
Filipino culture and values. He got married, and was
naturalized.
c. Jose Ong studied in the Philippines, and he was able to graduate
from college, then he passed the CPA Board exams. He got
married and was registered as a voter in Samar. He was elected
by the people of Samar by a wide margin.
2. The assailed provision in this case is Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3
of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “Those born before January
17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.” The Court said that this provision must not
be taken literally, and the spirit and intent of the framers must be
followed. This provision was also curative in nature, wherein it tried to
correct the situation wherein a Filipino father and an alien mother’s child
is automatically granted the status of a natural born child, while an alien
father and Filipino mother’s child needed to elect Philippine citizenship.
It is significant to election matters because this provision bestows upon
the person the status of natural-born.
3. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The private respondent did more than merely exercise
his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Page | 23
 Philippines. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not
embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge
of alien-ness, no acts to show that this country is not his natural
homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are fully aware of
Mr. Ong's parentage.
4. The HRET posits that Jose Ong’s father was naturalized when Ong
was a minor, thus the law elected Filipino citizenship for Ong.
Questioning Jose Ong’s father’s citizenship collaterally cannot be
done because it is a violation of due process, since a direct attack is
the only possible way.
5. The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no
property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said
place is misplaced. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Sarmiento, J. (Concurring)
1. I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of
fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that
determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to
the membership of the House.
2. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the
Court, but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." It is not to review facts.
3. As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion
with which men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to say
that the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion because the
majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the
Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
Therefore the decision of the tribunal on Jose Ong’s citizenship is final.
Padilla, J. (Dissenting)
1. Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born
citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by
virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine
citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the
age of majority.
2. While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473)
minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the
Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become
Filipino citizens, 8 this does not alter the fact that private respondent was
not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473
did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely
because he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status
as a Filipino citizen.
3. It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize
the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children
becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January
1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are
natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to
17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon their
reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens.
4. Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January
1973)to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have elected
Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of
majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did
private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I
believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship,
contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal. For it is settled doctrine
in this Jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made m
accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act
mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected
expressly not impliedly.
5. The theory that Jose Ong’s father’s naturalization is an election of
Philippine citizenship is wrong because it was not the election of
citizenship contemplated in the Constitution Besides, the election is done
after reaching the age of majority, not minority.
Page | 24

9. Republic vs. Sagun (VHONE)
Feb. 15, 2012 | Villarama, Jr. | Citizenship - Election of Philippine Citizenship
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Nora Fe Sagun
SUMMARY:
Sagun is a legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, but she did
not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of
33, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. It was
not recorded in the LCR of Baguio. She applied for a Philippine Passport, but
was denied due to her father being a Chinese national, and her lack of annotation
that she elected Philippine citizenship. She asserted that by virtue of her positive
acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be
annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a
Philippine passport. The trial court ruled that she is a Philippine citizen.
SC held that the there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Also, the law lays down
the process of electing Philippine citizenship.
DOCTRINE:
CA 625 prescribes the procedure in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship:
a. A statement of election under oath
b. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and
c. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry.
FACTS:
1. Sagun is a legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, but
she did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
2. At the age of 33, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. It was not recorded in the LCR of Baguio.
3. She applied for a Philippine Passport, but was denied due to her father
being a Chinese national, and her lack of annotation that she elected
Philippine citizenship.
4. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her
record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
5. The trial court ruled that she is a Philippine citizen.
6. Petitioner, through the OSG, filed a petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Sagun’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence -
NO
2. W/N Sagun has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law - NO
RATIO:
1. For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding
established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing
the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is
part of our citizenry.
2. After registering as an alien, pursuant to the Alien Registration Act,
Commonwealth Act No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1 (4), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, must be accomplished. CA 625 prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship, which are:
a. A statement of election under oath
b. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and
c. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry.
3. It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule
which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election
of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
Page | 25
 4. Even without the procedural infirmity, the trial court’s decision is still
erroneous because Sagun failed to comply with the legal requirements for
valid election. Even with her oath of allegiance, it was executed 12 years
after she reached the age of majority. This lapse of time is not within
reasonable time (three years), and there was no satisfactory explanation
for the delay.
5. She cannot argue that her exercise of her right to suffrage and
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship because the law provides for the process of
acquiring such citizenship status.

SEPARATE OPINIONS: NONE

CONCURRING: NONE

Page | 26
 10. SO v REPUBLIC (Jestine)
January 29, 2007 | Callejo, Sr., J. | Naturalization Proceedings
EDISON: Edison So
RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines
SUMMARY:
In 2002, Edison So filed a Petition for Naturalization under C.A. No. 473. He
presented two witnesses (his family’s lawyer and an old classmate). The RTC
granted his petition. The OSG appealed because 1) Edison does not have the
qualifications under CA No. 473 and 2) his witnesses are not credible. Edison
assailed this by claiming that the requirements under CA No. 473 was amended
by RA 9131. CA reversed RTC. SC ruled that RA 9139 did not amend CA No.
473 but it merely provided for another mode of acquiring citizenship. In this
case, Edison applied for naturalization under CA No. 473 thus his application
should be governed by C.A. No. 473. In addition, Edison’s witnesses’
testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know Edison well
and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications.
DOCTRINE:
Character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the
applicant’s conduct and character. They should to testify on specific facts and
events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by law
FACTS:
1. In 2001, RA 9139 (Administrative Naturalization Law) became effective.
2. February 28, 2002, Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization under C.A. No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law). He
alleged that -
● He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila
● He is a Chinese citizen who has lived Binondo since birth
● He is gainfully employed, was educated in a school recognized
by the Philippine Govt.
● Basically he says that he has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications as stated in CA No.473.
2. Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit of Atty. Artemio Adasa,
Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and other documents including his Birth Cert
and Alien Certificate of Registration.
3. On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order setting the petition for
hearing. RTC ordered that the entire petition, including annexes and the
order be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila and that it be
posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall
Building. Edison complied with the Order. No one opposed the petition.
4. During the hearing, Edison presented Atty. Adasa, Jr.
● He who testified that he came to know Edison in 1991 as the
legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business and that
would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted
by Edisons family. He also states that Edison has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
5. Edison also presents Mark Salcedo.
● He testified that he has known Edison for 10 years. That he and
Edison were classmates at UST where they took up Pharmacy.
That Edison was a member of some school organizations and
mingled well with friends. He also states that Edison has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
6. Edison also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of
the Philippines. He also offers in evidence documents which included his
Birth Cert, School records, ITR, Bank Statements, etc.
7. RTC granted the petition.
8. Republic (through the OSG) appealed the decision to the CA on the
grounds that 1) he did not prove that he had all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications under CA No. 473 and that 2) his 2
character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his
fitness to become a Filipino citizen.
9. Edison averred that he is UST Cum Laude who is on his 2 year of Med
nd
School and that requirements for C.A. No. 473 had been relaxed after the
Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China and the requirements were further relaxed when RA
Page | 27
 9139 was signed into law. Edison pointed out that the petition, with all
its annexes, was published in the official gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the NBI, DOJ, DFA,
and the OSG but they failed to oppose the petition.
10. CA reversed RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Did R.A. No. 9139 amend the requirements required under C.A. No.
473? (No, it merely provided for another mode of acquiring
citizenship)
2. Whether or not the witnesses presented by Edison are credible in
accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines
set forth in C.A. No. 473? (No, they were not credible)
RATIO:
1. Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the
political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a
citizen.
2. There are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No.
9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended;
and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
3. R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and
more encouraging. It is a law separate and distinct from CA No. 473.
C.A. No. 473 1. RA 9139
covers all covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all
aliens their lives, who never saw any other country and all along
regardless of thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love
class and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and
traditions
Judicial Administrative
1. RA 9139 merely to prescribes another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. THUS, a
native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization.
2. HERE, Edison applied for naturalization under CA No. 473 (even if at
the time of the filing R.A. No. 9139 was already available).
Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.
3. Also, if the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made
applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would
be broadened to apply even to aliens who are not native born.
4. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is
contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization
procedure in the country since RA 9139 would make it impossible for
non-native born aliens to qualify for naturaliztion. On the other hand, if
we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an
alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized
under C.A. No. 473
5. Character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the
applicants conduct and character. They should to testify on specific facts
and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.
6. HERE, Edisons witnesses’ testimonies do not convince the Court that
they personally know Edison well and are therefore in a position to
vouch for his qualifications. The witnesses testimonies consisted mainly
of general statements in answer to the leading questions and what they
conveniently did was to enumerate the qualifications as set forth in the
law without giving specific details.
7. Also, Atty. Adasa testified to his relationship with Edison’s but not
specifically to Edison. Atty. Adasa’s statements refer to his observations
on the familys practices and not to Edison in particular.
8. Mark Salcedo also did not give specific details on Edisons qualifications.
But made general statements regarding Edison’s qualifications.
9. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove
not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character
of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. This means that he
must not only be an individual who has not been previously convicted of
a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has
Page | 28
not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not
incredible. But he must have a good standing in the community; that he is
known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good
warranty of the applicants worthiness. HERE, what was established was
the educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be
equated with their credibility.

Page | 29
 11. In Re Petition for Habeaus Corpus of Willie Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago
(Jestine)
January 24, 1989 | Padilla, J. | Loss of Citizenship
PETITIONER: Willie Yu
RESPONDENTS: Miriam Defensor-Santiago (as Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation)
SUMMARY: In 1978, Petitioner Willie Yu, a Portuguese Citizen, applied for
naturalization and became a Filipino Citizen. Three years later, however, in
1981, he applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and in the commercial
documents he signed to obtain the same, he declared his nationality as a
Portuguese citizen. Sometime after (for reasons not disclosed) Yu was detained
in pursuant of a deportation proceeding by respondent CID. Eventually the case
reached the Supreme Court for resolution and the main issue is whether or not
Yu’s declaration of Portuguese Citizenship in his passport application amounts
to renunciation of his Naturalized Filipino Citizenship. The court held in the
affirmative, stating that his actions amounted to express renunciation. His acts of
representing himself has a Portuguese citizen was grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of PH Citizenship.
DOCTRINE: Express renunciation which is defined by jurisprudence (BIC vs.
Gallano) to mean a “renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly
and not left to inference or implication”. Representation of oneself as a citizen of
another country in commercial documents amounts to express renunciation of
naturalized Filipino Citizenship.
See separate and dissenting opinions.
FACTS:
1. In 1971, Willie Yu, a Portuguese Citizen, was issued a Portuguese
Passport, valid for 5 years, and renewed for the same period upon
expiration
2. In 1978, Willie Yu became a Naturalized Filipino Citizen, which meant
that he renounced “absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and
3. “Pledged to maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines’
4. Despite this, however, in 1981, Yu applied for and was issued Portuguese
Passport # 35/81, Serial # 1517410 in the Portuguese Embassy of Tokyo
5. In addition, he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed in the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.,
Filed in Hongkong Sometime in 1980
6. Sometime after (for reasons not disclosed) Yu was detained in pursuant
of a deportation proceeding by respondent CID.
7. (Probably Unnecessary Procedural Stuff incoming) Yu then Filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus which was eventually dismissed with finality
in the SC after an MR, but then Yu filed a Motion for Clarification with a
Prayer for a TRO which was granted, which prompted respondent
Commissioner to file a Motion to Lift the TRO. Acting on the motion to
Lift the TRO, the SC resolved to give Yu an opportunity to explain and
prove why he should still be a considered a citizen of the PH despite his
acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. His compliance thereof
explained the facts of the case. The current resolution is the Court’s
resolution of the motion for clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not Yu’s declaration of Portuguese Citizenship in his passport
application amounts to renunciation of his Naturalized Filipino Citizenship. (YES.
It amounts to express renuncication.)
RATIO:
1. To the mind of the court, both the application for Portuguese Passport
and the representation on the commercial documents, considered
together, amount to Express Renunciation of Naturalized Filipino
Citizenship
2. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Page | 30
 3. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having someone is a dangerous precedence. Mere use of a foreign passport should not
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine amount to renunciation. Yu was deprived of his full day in court
citizen, resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
Cruz, J. Concurring:
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself
as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Yu failed to overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status as a
Philippine citizen. naturalized Filipino. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its nationals.
4. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly However, there was no express renunciation as it didn’t comply with Com. Act.
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. No. 63 which defines it was being and unequivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of significance and consequences.
5. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by
the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine Cortes, J. Dissenting:
citizenship, but he has failed. The evidence presented do not constitute substantial evidence under the law that
6. While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced the petitioner lost his citizenship by express renunciation. It was merely a
his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in photocopy of a memorandum of a passport application and photocopies of
adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no commercial papers without authentication. They were not even Prima Facie
less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and evidence .
satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.
7. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for
release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the
temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately
executory.
Separate Opinions:
Fernan, C.J. Dissenting:
The traditional standards of fairness in due process are not met in this case as Yu’s
citizenship was deprived of his citizenship through a summary procedure with
non-sufficient evidence. One is entitled to have his status determined in a judicial
proceeding, not an executive one (Quoting J. Gutierrez) There should have been a
full blown trial and the evidence shown by the majority was inadequate

Gutierrez Jr., J. Dissenting:

He disagrees with the summary procedure laid out and believes that
denaturalization should have been prosecuted in a proper trial court due to the
serious implications of de-Filipinization. Using informal evidence to denaturalize

Page | 31
 12. Juan G. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (Jestine)
June 23, 1989 | Cruz, J. | Repatriotization
PETITIONER: Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC, League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter,
Salvador Estuye
SUMMARY: In 1988, Petitioner Frivaldo was elected as governor of Sorsogon.
Soon after, Respondent League of Municipalities, represented by Estuye filed a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground
that he was not a Filipino citizen, having lost the same after being naturalized in
the US in 1983. Frivaldo admitted his naturalization, but contended that 1.) it
was justified as he sought the same in order to avoid persecution from Marcos
during Martial Law 2.) that he could not have repatriated himself before the
1988 elections as the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the
purpose of LOI No. 270 had not been organized yet, 3.) His participation in the
elections divested him of American citizenship under US laws. The case
eventually reached the SC and they ruled that Frivaldo was disqualified from
office for not being a Filipino Citizen. He lost his citizenship when he
voluntarily became a naturalized American Citizen and his exile was no excuse
to renounce Filipino citizenship as many others were exiled during that time
without doing so (Ninoy). The lack of the aforementioned committee was no
excuse to not seek patriotization as he could have sought the same through
judicial or legislative proceedings (or by simply waiting for the committee to be
formed) and the forfeiture of his American citizenship, if ever, does not
automatically restore his Filipino Citizenship.
DOCTRINE: If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state. Naturalization in another country is an
effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship and can only be cured by
repatriotization.
FACTS:
1. On, January 22, 1988, Petitioner Frivaldo was elected as governor of
Sorsogon.
2. On October 27, 1988, Respondent League of Municipalities, represented
by it’s president Salvador Estuye filed a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having lost the same after being naturalized in the US in
1983.
3. Frivaldo, in his answer admitted his naturalization, but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he sought US Citizenship to avoid
persecution from Marcos during Martial Law
4. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means
of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law
Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the
Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy
5. Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but
the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of
January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He
then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask
that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion
6. In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines
because his naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed
with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955
I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization
in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for
reasons of convenience only.
7. He also contended that he could not have repatriated himself before the
1988 elections as the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the
purpose of LOI No. 270 had not been organized yet
8. His last contentions are that his oath in his certificate of candidacy that
he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation and
his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested
him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus
restoring his Philippine citizenship.
Page | 32

ISSUE: Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the
time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon (No
he was not. He is disqualified from being Governor.)
RATIO:
1. Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution states that all public officials
and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all
times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter
alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
2. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting
mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence (a
Certification from the US District Court of California) shows, however,
that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983.
3. The Nottebohm case is not relevant to the petition before us because it
dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided
by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even
the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national.
4. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance
with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
5. Frivaldo claims that by actively participating in the elections in this
country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws
of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. It should be
obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship,
such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
6. Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under
LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet
been constituted erroneously suggested that the lack of that body
rendered his repatriation unnecessary. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to
wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
7. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
his violation of the rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, renouncing all fidelity to any other state.
8. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner
JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines
and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province
of Sorsogon
Gutierrez Jr., J. Concurring:
Setting aside the procedural infirmities of what was essentially a quo
warranto was proper in this case as it was clear based on Frivaldo’s
admission that he was disqualified Where the disqualification is based on
age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that
the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
Page | 33
 13. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (Pamie)
August 1, 1989 | Cruz, J. | Citizenship
PETITIONER: RAMON L. LABO, JR.
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL
SUMMARY:
Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Lardizabal filed a
"Petition for quo warranto against Labo asserting that Labo is an Australian
citizen hence disqualified; also that he was naturalized as an Australian after he
married an Australian.
The issue is whether or not Labo, Jr. is disqualified from holding office for
failing to meet the citizenship requirement?
Yes, Labo, Jr. is disqualified from holding office for being an Australian citizen.
He did not question the authenticity of the evidence presented and the facts
clearly showed that he has been naturalized as an Australian citizen. Also, his
marriage to an Australian does not have any effect on his citizenship. Lastly, his
claim of dual citizenship is without merit since he has already renounced his
Philippine citizenship by being naturalized, expressly renouncing Filipino
citizenship and subscribing to an oath of allegiance to another country.
DOCTRINE:
CA No. 63: Modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation of citizenship;
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws
of a foreign country,
Modes of reacquisition:
1. Direct act of Congress
2. Naturalization
3. Repatriation
FACTS:
1. Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City.
2. His rival, Lardizabal filed a "Petition for quo warranto against Labo.
3. Lardizabal avers that:
a. Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
b. That he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian.
4. Labo avers that:
1. His marriage with an Australian did not make him an
Australian;
2. that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino
3. Even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an
Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage
with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous.
4. Also even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate
the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast
majority.
5. Original issue: Labo asks that the court restrain COMELEC from
deciding on the Petition filed by Lardizabal since it was not filed on time.
(To which the court said, it was filed on time)
6. But the SC deemed it important to resolve the matter on Labo’s
citizenship
1. As his citizenship is the subject of the quo warranto proceeding,
and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that
more important question clearly and urgently affecting the
public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same
action.
ISSUES:
1. WON Labo, Jr. is disqualified from holding office for failing to meet the
citizenship requirement? - YES
2. Did his marriage, and the subsequent annulment, affect his citizenship? -
NO
3. Is he a dual citizen? - NO
RATIO:
1st issue: Labo, Jr. is disqualified for being an Australian citizen.
1. There is a Statement by the Australian Government: (evidence presented)
Page | 34
 1. LABO, JR. was married to an Australian citizen. As the spouse 1. The claim that his naturalization in Australia made him only a dual
of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship is a
requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted specious argument and cannot stand against the provisions of CA No.
Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may
2. Any person who is granted Australian citizenship must take an be lost.
oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. This 1. Naturalization in a foreign country;
need not necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as 2. Express renunciation of citizenship;
this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former country. 3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution
3. The marriage was declared void on 27 June 1980. or laws of a foreign country,
4. According to our records LABO is still an Australian 2. All of these are applicable to Labo.
citizen.
2. Labo does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. SEPARATE OPINIONS: None.
Neither does he deny that he obtained an Australian Passport, which
he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared
before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and
registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. He also
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number
of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and even sought to avoid
the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a
foreigner.

2nd issue: The marriage, and its voiding, did not affect Labo’s citizenship.
1. The contention that his marriage to an Australian did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through
a formal and positive process. As a condition for such naturalization, he
formally took the Oath of Allegiance.
2. Also, even if it be assumed that his naturalization was annulled after it
was found that his marriage to the Australian void, that did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship.
3. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
4. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.

3rd issue: His naturalization resulted to the lost of his Philippine citizenship.

Page | 35
 14. Aznar v. Osmena
May 25, 1990 | Paras, J. | Citizenship
PETITIONER: JOSE B. AZNAR
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO
RENNER OSMEÑA
SUMMARY:
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor
of Cebu Province. Aznar filed a petition for the disqualification on the ground
that he is allegedly a citizen of the US and submitting a Certificate issued by the
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner certifying that Osmena is an
American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence. COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification
for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
The issue is whether or not Osmena is a Filipino citizen?
The SC ruled that yes, Osmena is a Filipino citizen and may run for office.
Aznar’s contentions are not supported by substantial evidence. Osmena did not
lose his citizenship through any of the three modes. He is merely a dual citizen
by birth. Osmena remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship
cannot be presumed.
DOCTRINE:
There are three modes of losing Filipino citizenship:
1. By naturalization in a foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of citizenship;
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country.
ISSUES:
FACTS:
1. Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the
position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province
2. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed a
petition for the disqualification on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
a. Submitting a Certificate issued by the Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner certifying that Osmena is an
American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence
3. At the hearing before the COMELEC , Aznar presented the following
exhibits to show that Osmena is an American citizen:
1. Application for Alien Registration of the Bureau of
Immigration signed by Osmena
2. Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356
3. Permit to Re-enter the Philippines
4. Immigration Certificate of Clearance
4. Osmena maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that:
1. He is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and
son of the President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.;
2. He is a holder of a valid Philippine Passport
3. He has continuously resided in the Philippines since birth and
has not gone out of the country for more than six months;
4. He is a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
5. COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having
been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent
is not a Filipino citizen.
6. Hence, this petition.
7. Original issue: timeliness of petition
8. SC deemed it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the Osmena’s
citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has
been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on
the merits of the case.
1. WON Osmena is a Filipino citizen? - YES
Page | 36
RATIO:
1. Aznar’s contention that Osmena is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
2. Aznar failed to present direct proof that Osmena had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
1. By naturalization in a foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of citizenship;
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
3. From the evidence, it is clear that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three modes mentioned
4. Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens
and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American
under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.
5. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption
that Osmena is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the Aznar to
prove that Osmena had lost his Philippine citizenship.
6. Also, unlike other jurisprudence, Osmena vehemently denies having
taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a
valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously
participated in the electoral process in this country. Thus, Osmena
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be
presumed.
Note: In the dissent of Justice Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen,, he should be
regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this
is a case of non sequitur.
- Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can
be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation
either "'express" or "implied".
The statement in the Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law" has no retroactive effect. And
while it is true that our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual
citizenship, the fact is it actually existed. The effect of such dual citizenship or
allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
SARMIENTO, J., (concurring):
1. In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to
be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time.
a citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he
lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained an alien
certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to "express
renunciation."
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., (dissenting):
1. While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of
birth, a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some
point in time in his life.
2. That election was made by Osmena when he obtained Alien Certificates
of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or
declaration that one is not a citizen.
CRUZ, J., (dissenting):
1. When a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming
that he is not a citizen.
2. One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship is by "express
renunciation". It is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is
not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which
is another and different mode.
3. No naturalization is involved here. The question is: Was there an express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship when he knowingly and voluntarily
registered as an alien?
4. What he actually did was register with the Philippine government as an
alien within its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from
the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act.
As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an
alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this
decision, he categorically asked the Republic to treat him as an
Page | 37
 American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that
was willing to consider him its own.

PARAS, J. (Dissenting):
1. While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of birth or
other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a
choice at one time or another.
2. Osmena made a deliberate choice when he asked the Government to
register him at least twice as an alien in this country. That choice pro
tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
3. Finally, the Court is inconsistent in its rulings. In Labo, Jr. vs.
COMELEC, I see no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien
while holding private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the
majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia". And is exactly
what private respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he
declared that he was a citizen of the United States.

Page | 38
 15. Mercado v. Manzano (Marian) 2.
May 26, 1999 | J. Mendoza | Dual Citizen holding elective office
PETITIONER: Ernesto S. Mercado 3.
RESPONDENTS: Eduardo B. Manzano & COMELEC
SUMMARY: Manzano won as vice mayor in their local elections but his
proclamation was suspended due to an election contest filed by his opponent, 4.
Mercado, alleging that Manzano was a US citizen. The 2nd Division of
COMELEC ruled in favor of Mercado relying on the Local Government Code
which states that dual citizens cannot hold elective positions. The COMELEC en
banc reversed this ruling owing to the fact that Manzano’s participation in the
local elections effectively renounced his US citizenship following the
Immigration & Nationality Act of the US. The court held that Manzano’s 5.
participation is not the reckoning point of his renunciation of his US citizenship,
it was the filing of his COC under oath where he stated that he is (just) a Filipino
citizen. Further, the prohibition in the LGC actually pertains to dual allegiance,
not dual citizenship and even if it were dual citizenship, Manzano has validly
renounced his US citizenship; thus, he can hold elective office. 6.
DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
1. Dual citizenship [involuntary] → concurrent application of different
laws of several jurisdictions
a. All those listed in Art 4, Sec 1 of the Constitution may acquire
another citizenship thru jus sanguinis (place) since citizenship
under the PH follows the principle of jus soli (blood)
b. So example would be, Filipino parents (jus soli) + born in US
(jus sanguinis)
2. Dual allegiance [voluntary] → thru a positive act a person owes loyalty
to 2 or more states
This is the one deemed inimical by Art 4, Sec 5
FACTS:
1. Daza, Mercado, and Manzano were rivals for the Vice Mayor position in
Makati → Manzano won. Mercado was a close 2nd. Talo si Daza.
Manzano’s proclamation was suspended because of a pending petition
for disqualification → issue: Manzano was a US Citizen [filed by
Mamaril]
2nd Div of COMELEC granted Mamaril’s petition thereby cancelling
Manzano’s certificate for candidacy
○ Reason → Dual citizenship of Manzano.
○ Legal Basis → Local Government Code, Section 40(d)
Manzano’s answer: Meet my family…
○ Filipino Dad + Filipino Mom
○ Born in California, US
○ Despite registration as American citizen [Alien Certificate of
Registration ℅ Bureau of Immigration], he is a Filipino
LGC Sec 40(d) provides that dual citizens are disqualified from holding
any elective local position
○ Again, COMELEC 2nd Division said that Manzano cannot run
○ COMELEC en banc, reversed this decision → he can run
Reason of COMELEC en banc
○ Manzano acquired his US citizenship thru the US Constitution
→ thru jus soli
○ Manzano is also a natural born Filipino citizen under the 1935
Constitution → at age 6, he was brought to the PH, though
registered as an alien, he did not take an oath of allegiance to the
US
○ When Manzano turned 18, he registered as a voter in the PH →
thereby renouncing his US citizenship under US Law + under
PH Law, he no longer had US citizenship
Page | 39
ISSUES:
1. Under Sec 40(d) of the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot
hold elective office. Manzano is a dual citizen who claims to have
renounced his US citizenship thru participating in the PH elections. Can
Manzano hold elective office as he effectively renounced his US
citizenship? - YES. But the renunciation was done thru his filing of the
certificate of candidacy, not his participation in the elections.
RATIO:
1. The court holds that Manzano is a dual citizen. Both American and
Filipino.
2. The court also holds that dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance.
a. Dual citizenship [involuntary] → concurrent application of
different laws of several jurisdictions
i. All those listed in Art 4, Sec 1 of the Constitution may
acquire another citizenship thru jus sanguinis
b. Dual allegiance [voluntary] → thru a positive act a person
owes loyalty to 2 or more states
3. The constitution also provides in Art. 4, Sec 5 → Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest & dealt with by law
a. Commissioner Ople opined that the purpose of this provision is
to do away with the siphoning of the Philippines’ national
capital to other countries
b. A shared allegiance is injurious to the economy, employment, &
national security [as per Comm. Bernas also]
4. To clarify, Sec 5 of Art 5 speaks of DUAL ALLEGIANCE not DUAL
CITIZENSHIP
5. By electing Philippine Citizenship, people renounce their allegiance to
the other country
6. In Parado v. Republic → a person applying for naturalization who
renounces his loyalty to another country effectively declares that he owes
allegiance to the PH
7. Regarding Manzano’s election of PH Citizenship
a. He is Filipino ℅ jus sanguinis
b. He is American ℅ jus soli
c. But thru his participation in the PH National Elections,
Manzano renounced his American citizenship [as per
COMELEC en banc] thus, he is now pure Pinoy
8. Mercado alleges that participation in national elections does not elect
Philippine citizenship because Manzano did so when he was already 37
years old. The law requires election immediately after reaching the age of
majority.
a. COMELEC en banc’s basis → Immigration and Nationality Act
of the US which states that US citizenship is lost thru voting in a
foreign land’s election
b. ^ however, this law was deemed unconstitutional by
jurisprudence
c. Despite this, the court holds that aside from voting, Manzano’s
filing of his certificate of candidacy effectively renounced his
US citizenship → thus, he is not a dual citizen anymore
i. The COC stated that he is a filipino citizen & this was
made under oath
9. Further, Manzano’s youth was spent in the PH, he received his education,
& practiced his profession here; thus, there is no doubt of his election as
a Filipino citizen
SEPARATE OPINIONS: NONE

Page | 40
 16. Maquiling v. COMELEC (Marian)
April 16, 2013 | C.J. Sereno | Reneging renunciation of foreign citizenship
PETITIONER: Casan Maquiling
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC, Rommel Arnado
SUMMARY: Arnado is vying for the position of one of the cities in Lanao del
Norte’s mayor. His citizenship, however, is contested by his opponent,
Maquiling because records submitted by another opponent, Balua, showing that
Arnado used his US passport 4 times in his business travels. Balua claims that
Arnado’s use of his US passport effectively negates the renunciation of
Arnado’s US citizenship which he has done twice. This renunciation along with
oath taking are the twin requisites delineated in the Citizen Retention Act of
2003 which enables a natural-born who acquired a foreign citizenship to
reacquire his or her original status in order to run for elective public office. The
1st Division of COMELEC annulled Arnado’s mayorship because the use of his
foreign passport negates his renunciation of his US citizenship. This was
reversed by the COMELEC en banc relying on a plausible cause stated by
Arnado to use such passport & the absence of law providing for the use of
foreign passport to negate one’s renunciation of a foreign citizenship. The SC
held that Arnado’s use of his foreign passport is a voluntary act indicative of his
intent to still benefit from his foreign citizenship. They added that the legal
effect of renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is not immune from any form of
attack. Thus, since Arnado used his passport before the filing kf his COC, his
COC is void ab initio and he is disqualified from running. In effect, Maquiling,
as the lone qualified candidate garnering the highest votes, can take Arnado’s
seat as mayor.
DOCTRINE: The court holds that the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is a voluntary act of representing one’s foreign
nationality. It does not remove Filipino citizenship but it reneges the Oath of
Renunciation needed to qualify Arnado to run for office.
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for certiorari assailing the ff: a 1st Div COMELEC
resolution for applying Sec 44 of the Local Government Code & an en
banc COMELEC resolution in holding that Arnado is a Filipino Citizen
qualified to run for public office despite his use of a US passport. The
antecedent facts are…
2. Arnado is a natural-born citizen → naturalized in the US → he lost his
Filipino citizenship → repatriated in the PH + took oath of allegiance to
the PH → took again an oath + executed an affidavit of renunciation of
his foreign citizenship (2009)
3. Then, he filed his certificate of candidacy as Mayor of Lanao del Norte
→ he stated that he is “Filipino / Naturalized Filipino”
4. Balua, another person vying for mayorship, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado to cancel his COC
a. Balua contends that Arnado is not a resident of Lanao del Norte
+ he is a foreigner
b. Proof: 2010 certification of Bureau of Immigration stating that
Arnado is a USA-American + travel records showing that
Arnado has been using his US passport
5. COMELEC directed Arnado to answer but he did not → the election
passed & Arnado won. Arnado filed his answer after the elections. He
presented the ff:
a. Affidavit of renunciation to US + oath of allegiance to PH
b. Affidavits of his neighbours to prove his residence
c. Voter’s certification in Lanao
6. COMELEC 1st Div’s ruling → Arnado’s proclamation for mayorship
is annulled
a. Balua failed to show that Arnado did not meet the 1-yr
residency requirement
b. But Arnado, thru using his US passport in 2010, negated his
renunciation of his US citizenship in 2009
7. Arnado raised an MR to the COMELEC en banc. He mainly claims that
his use of a US passport does not repudiate his renunciation
Page | 41
 a. He also claims that he only used the US passport because he
was not notified that his PH passport was released already
8. Maquiling, another mayor-candidate garnering the 2nd highest votes,
intervened. He avers that since Arnado’s mayorship was cancelled, he
shall be the successor
9. COMELEC en banc’s ruling → Arnado did not negate his renunciation
thru the use of US passport
a. Arnado’s renunciation of his US citizenship in line with RA
9225 effectively erased his becoming a citizen of another
country → he became pure Filipino again
b. Arnado’s use of US passport does not negate his renunciation,
there’s no law stating that
i. 1st Div’s reliance on In Re: Pet for Habeas Corpus of
Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago is wrong because the
naturalized Pinoy there renewed his passport in
Portugal
ii. Arnado also presented a plausible reason for his use of
the US passport because the release of his PH passport
was not made known to him
iii. Use of foerign passport is not among the grounds under
Sec 1, Commonwealth Act No. 63 where PH
citizenship may be lost
c. But Comm. Sarmiento dissented → citizenship as qualification
for elective office is a continuing requirement. Obtaining the
highest number of votes does not mean that he can already hold
such seat. Arnado failed to prove that he sincerely renounced his
US citizenship thru the use of US passport
10. Maquiling contests the decision of the COMELEC en banc hence this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON Maquiling can be proclaimed as mayor if Arnado’s mayorship is
annulled - YES.
2. WON the use of a foreign passport after renouncing a foreign
citizenship negates such renunciation. - YES.
RATIO:
1. [1st issue] It was held in Aratea v. COMELEC, Jalosjos v. COMELEC &
Jalosjos v. COMELEC that although a void COC effectively disqualifies
the winner, the voice of the electorate is still respected.
2. However, in line with the Local Government Code, Sec 40(d) → dual
citizens cannot hold elective local positions, Arnado is barred from even
becoming a candidate
a. Thus, Arnado’s disqualification goes beyond a void COC. It is
as if he never participated in the elections at all.
b. Hence, Arnado, being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his
favor shall not be counted, Maquiling is the only qualified
candidate with the highest number of votes.
c. COMELEC properly corrected Maquiling’s petition from a
cancellation of COC to a disqualification case.
d. The effect of a disqualification case [Sec 6 of RA 6646] →
votes cast in disqualified candidate shall not be counted
3. [2nd issue] The court holds that the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a voluntary act of representing
one’s nationality.
a. It does not remove Filipino citizenship
b. But it reneges the Oath of Renunciation needed to qualify
Arnado to run for office
4. Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention & Reacquisition Act states that
those seeking to run for office should renounce his foreign citizenship
a. The court is convinced that Arnado did renounce his citizenship
thru taking an oath of allegiance to the Ph twice
b. But this legal effect is open to attack when said renouncer does
positive acts to show his intent to continue possession of foreign
citizenship
c. ^ this is evident in Arnado’s use of his US passport 4 times
Page | 42
 5. The court agrees with COMELEC that Arnado did not lose his Filipino
citizenship when he used such passport; however, his renunciation of his
US citizenship is negated → in effect, he is not a DUAL CITIZEN
a. He now falls under the disqualification in Sec 40(d) of the LGC
→ the purpose of this law is to thwart people who would later
represent themselves as foreign citizens while holding office
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Carpio, J. (concurring)
1. Carpio agrees that Arnado is disqualified from holding office &
COMELEC shall proclaim Maquiling as Lanao del Norte’s Mayor
2. Carpio highlights that the PH can only declare Filipino citizenship
3. In Mercado v. Manzano, Fr. Bernas reiterated the involuntariness of
DUAL CITIZENSHIP because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of foreign countries
4. Carpio echoes the main opinion’s stand on the retraction of renunciation
of the US citizenship thru the use of a US passport → it is as if he never
renounced his foreign citizenship
5. Carpio looks at the intent of the framers in Sections 2&3 of the
Citizenship Retention & Reacquisition Act of 2003 → where the oath of
renunciation is written
1. Carpio clarifies that the framers were not concerned with DUAL
CITIZENSHIP but DUAL ALLEGIANCE
2. Sec 3 lists the twin requirements of renunciation of foreign
citizenship to hold public office:
1. Swearing to an oath of allegiance
2. Executing renunciation of foreign citizenship →
Arnado failed in this aspect
3. Thus, failure to meet any of these 2 requirements is a cause,
under Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to disqualify
someone from running for elective public office
6. Re: selection of lawful mayor
1. Arnado retracted his renunciation before he filed his COC
2. Thus his COC is void ab initio. Arnado was never a candidate
and the votes for him are stray votes.
3. Decisions where the 2nd placer cannot hold the seat of the 1st
placer applies only if the COC of the 1st placer is valid
4. Thus, Maquiling can rightly claim the mayorship
Brion, J. (dissenting)
1. Main points of dissent:
a. Use of passport reverted Arnado to a dual citizen → thus
disqualified under Sec 40(d) of the LGC
i. Reasons:
1. Arnado complied with RA 9225 to re-acquire
PH citizenship & qualify him to run for office
2. He has just reasons to use his US passport →
not notified of the issuance of his PH Passport
3. Use of US passport was also not an express
renunciation of his PH Citizenship under
Commonwealth Act 63 → thus in reverting to
a DUAL CITIZENSHIP status, he can still
hold office
a. He needed to use such passport to
attend to his business affairs - it is an
isolated case properly justified
b. Maquiling, as 2nd placer can hold seat of 1st placer
i. No one can replace Arnado because the people of
Lanao del Norte elected him despite his “foreigner”
label
ii. There is also a presumption of eligibility in cases of
doubt because to rule otherwise will defeat the will of
the people
Abad, J. (separate & concurring)
Page | 43
1. Fully concurred with main opinion. Just wanted to add another argument
to support it.
2. Section 5(2) of RA 9225 → means where a former Pinoy who acquired
foreign citizenship can reacquire old citizenship
1. Arnado has complied with this ^
3. New argument → Arnado failed to comply with Section 349 (a)(5) of
Immigration & Nationality Act of the US
1. This sets the procedure of those who transfer residences in
renouncing their US citizenship
2. Provides that → renouncers of US citizenship [naturalized/birth]
shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing the ff acts:
… (5) making formal renunciation of nationality before US
consulate as prescribed by Secretary of State
3. Arnado never did such manifestation before a US consul; thus,
Arnado remains to be American in the eyes of America → thus,
a DUAL CITIZEN

Page | 44
 17. Vilando v. HRET (Marian)
Aug 23, 2011 | J. Mendoza | Acquisition of citizenship thru parent
PETITIONER: Renald Vilando
RESPONDENTS: HRET, Jocelyn Limkaichong, Hon. Prospero Nograles
SUMMARY: Limkaichong’s qualification as a sitting representative of the 1st
district of Negros Oriental is being assailed on the ground of her citizenship.
Several petitioners (taxpayers, opponents) argue that (1) Lim’s father’s
naturalization did not reach finality and (2) her mother thru marrying a chinese
& applying for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) renounced her Filipino
citizenship. Thus, under the 1935 Constitution, Lim did not acquire Filipino
citizenship thru her mom nor dad. However the court held that Lim’s father’s
nationality cannot be collaterally attacked & the previous ruling of the CFI on
Lim’s father’s naturalization is under the presumption of validity since Vilando
was not able to adduce evidence. As for her mom, Vilando was unable to
provide a true copy of the cited law used as basis for his claim. The court also
held that the application of Lim’s mom for an ACR is not prima facie evidence
of renunciation since such shall be done expressly.
DOCTRINE:
Attack on nationality shall always be direct.
Art 4 of the 1935 Constitution speaks of the ff as citizens of the PH:
1. Fathers are Filipinos
2. Mothers are Filipinos + upon reaching 18, elects such citizenship
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the HRET
declaring Limkaichong qualified to be a member of the House of
Representatives. The facts are as follows…
2. In 2007, Limkaichong (hereinafter, Lim) won over Paras as the
Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. She was proclaimed
& later assumed office.
3. 3 petitions for disqualification were filed against Lim by her opponents
mainly questioning her citizenship (she was Chinese).
a. Procedural: COMELEC (disqualify) → Court reversed
COMELEC → directed opponents to seek relief before HRET
thru quo warranto
4. Quo warranto’s contents
a. Lim was a chinese citizen
b. Lim’s father’s (Julio Sy) naturalization did not attain finality
c. Lim’s mother acquired her Filipino citizenship thru her husband
5. Lim’s defense
a. Acquisition of her father’s citizenship was not irregular
b. Validity of citizenship cannot be assailed collaterally
6. HRET ruled in favor of Lim since her opponents did not meet the
quantum of proof required to sustain their claim that she is not natural
born
7. Hence this petition
ISSUES:
1. WON a quo warranto petition may collaterally attack Lim’s father’s
citizenship - NO.
2. Under the 1935 constitution, a person may attain his or her citizenship
from his or her mother if he shall elect the same when he turns 18. Lim’s
mother applied for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) in lieu of her
marriage with Lim’s father. Is Lim a Filipino citizen despite the
application of her mother for an ACR? - YES.
RATIO:
1. [1st issue] An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done directly
thru an action for nullity.
a. Proper proceeding → Commonwealth Act Sec. 18 [as held in
Queto v. Catolico where a person’s nationality may not be
assailed by an election case involving his offspring]
b. HRET is not empowered to rule on Lim’s father’s nationality
since he is not an elected officer under an election contest
Page | 45
 c. OSG opined that this ^ is the general rule. But an exception is if
the judgment is void on its face (but in this case it is not, aka
Lim’s qualification is valid).
d. Thus, the HRET properly relied on the 2 decisions of the Negros
CFI which confirmed Lim’s father’s Filipino citizenship
2. [2nd issue] Facts of Lim’s life are…
a. Born on Nov 9, 1959 → under 1935 Constitution
b. ^ Art 4 thereof speaks of the ff as citizens of the PH
i. Fathers are Filipinos
ii. Mothers are Filipinos + upon reaching 18, elects such
citizenship
3. Thus, even if Lim’s father’s naturalization fails, she is still a Filipina
because her mother is and she has impliedly elected such citizenship
4. In Art 4, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution → it does not matter if the
father is naturalized or natural-born
5. Re: assertion that Lim’s mother could not have been Pinoy because her
husband was chinese → legal basis: Chinese Revised Nationality Law
a. This fails because the opponent cannot produce a true copy of
said law formally declaring that Lim’s mother lost her
citizenship
6. Also, an application for alien certificate registration (ACR) is not an
indubitable proof of forfeiture of Filipino citizenship
a. It is not prima facie evidence of renunciation of Filipino
citizenship, it just shows that one submitted his or her person to
registration
b. Renunciation of citizenship must be done expressly
c. ^ Lim’s mother never did such an express renunciation

Page | 46
 18. Bengson v Cruz (JAYA)
G.R. No.142840 | May 7, 2001 | J. Kapunan | Citizenship
PETITIONER: ANTONIO BENGSON III
RESPONDENT: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ
SUMMARY:
Teodoro Cruz ran for district representative in Pangasinan and won. His
opponent, Bengson, contested Cruz’s qualification by assailing that he does not
meet the constitutional requirement of being a natural-born Philippine citizen
because he still had to undergo the process of reacquiring his former
citizenship.
The court found the petition without merit. The court said that those who lost
their former Filipino citizenship may reacquire it by (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. In this case, Cruz was able to
reacquire his citizenship by repatriation after he took an oath to the Republic
and registered the same to the civil registry.
DOCTRINE: It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
FACTS:
1. Teodoro Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who was born in
Tarlac to both Filipino parents.
2. Sometime in 1985, Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service to the US Marine Corps. ‘As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.’”
3. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Filipino citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. Thereafter, he ran for district
representative of Pangasinan and won.
4. Cruz’s opponent, Bengson, filed a quo warranto claiming that Cruz
does not meet the natural-born requirement.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship changes the kind of
citizenship (natural-born or naturalized) a person previously had. NO.
RATIO:
1. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two
kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A
person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.
2. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire
the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A.
No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
3. In this case, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation because under various statutes, repatriation is an option for
reacquisition of citizenship if the loss thereof was based on any of the
following circumstances: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in
the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
4. Repatriation only requires taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. And in
effect, “Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.”
5. Thus, the Court has ruled in the end that “Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.”
Page | 47
Sandoval-Guiterrez, J. Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Sandoval-Guitierrez reiterates that Section 2, Article IV of the
Constitution defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. In this case, Cruz had to undergo
repatriation to reacquire his Philippine citizenship. Thus, “Section 2,
Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship, and to those who elect Philippine citizenship
[…] where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation there is only room for
application. The phrase from birth indicates that there is a starting point
of his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and
without interruption.”

Page | 48
 19. Cordoro v Tambunting (JAYA)
G.R. No. 176947 | Feb. 9, 2011 | J. Carpio | Citizenship
PETITIONER: GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING
SUMMARY:
Cordora filed a complaint regarding the qualification of Gustavo Tambunting
to hold public office by assailing, among others, that Tambunting is an
American citizen as reflected in some of his travel documents wherein
Tambunting identified himself as an American citizen.
The court ruled against Cordora. The facts of the case presents that
Tambunting was born to a Filipino mother and an American father which
allows him to possess dual citizenship which no longer requires a person to
undergo the process of naturalization for American citizenship. Furthermore,
dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from public office. It has
been held in Manzano that “persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.”
DOCTRINE:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states [...]
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process.
FACTS:
1. Gustavo Tambunting was born to a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting eventually entered the politics and decided to run for
public office.
2. After filing his candidacy, a complaint was filed by Cordora against him
for alleged violations of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Cordora claims that Tambunting lacks the
citizenship and residency requirement for holding public office. Cordora
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated
that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon
arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from
the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
3. Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he is a natural-born and
presented his birth certificate as proof of his citizenship. He,
nevertheless, does not deny that he underwent the process involved in
INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s
citizenship. Thus, in the end claims that he is a dual citizen.
4. Commissioner Sarmiento agrees that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. “Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to
acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130
only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting
acquired at birth.”
ISSUE:
1. W/N the possession of dual citizenship is synonymous to dual allegiance.
NO.
RATIO:
1. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
Page | 49
 person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
2. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with
dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A.
No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an
oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s
foreign citizenship.”

Page | 50
 20. David v Agbay (JAYA)
G.R. No. 199113 | Mar. 18, 2015 | J. Villarama, Jr. | Citizenship
PETITIONER: RENATO M. DAVID
RESPONDENT: EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
SUMMARY:
David was a former Philippine citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship in
1974. Upon his retirement, David went back to the Philippines and bought a
parcel of land from Agbay, Eventually, it turned out that the said property was a
public land and part of salvage zone. Thus, David filed cases against Agbay and
in opposition, Agbay also filed a criminal case against David for his alleged
falsification of representing himself as a Philipppine citizen in the MLA
document with the DENR.
The court ruled that David’s citizenship was Canadian at the time he filled up
the MLA document because the process of reacquisition requires former
citizens to take an oath of allegiance which David failed.
DOCTRINE:
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A No. 9225.
Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the
authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to
describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-
acquisition and retention.
FACTS:
1. In 1974, David migrated to Canada and became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. After he retired, David together with his wife, returned to the
Philippines and bought a parcel of land which they eventually discovered to be a
public land and part of salvage zone.
2. In opposition to the application filed by David, Agbay assailed the citizenship
of David and argued that he is disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines
because he is a Canadian. In reply to Agbay, David claims that he had already
intended to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a
CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino when he represented
himself in the Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) land with the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro as a Filipino. Thus, no
falsification in violation of the RPC took place.
ISSUE:
1. W/N persons who lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization prior
to the effectivity of RA No. 9225 shall be considered as having retained their
Philippine citizenship. -NO.
RATIO:
There is a difference between reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
in light of RA No. 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003”. Section 2 thereof provides “Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act” while in relation to the said section, Sec. 3 states
that “natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic.” Thus, the petitioner in this case,
having lost his Philippine citizenship prior to the effectivity of RA No. 9225, did
not retain his Philippine citizenship and must have had undergone the process of
reacquisition by taking an oath before declaring himself as a Filipino citizen. No.
Page | 51
 21. AASJS member - Calilung v. Datumanong (JENNICA)
May 11, 2017 | J. Quisumbing | Citizenship
PETITIONER: ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS MEMBER -
HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG
RESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG,
Secretary of Justice
SUMMARY: Calilung prays for a writ of prohibition to stop respondent from
implementing R.A. 9225 entitled “An Act Making the Citizenship of the
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes.
He avers that the said law is unconstitutional since it violates Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. He contends that the law cheapens the Philippine
Citizenship since Sections 2 and 3 of RA. 9225, allow dual allegiance and not
dual citizenship. The SC ruled that the law is not unconstitutional. The Court
resort to the deliberations of Congress in resolving the issue. Rep. Locsin: He
said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the
problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that
the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of
allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be.
Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned. What Rep. Act
No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country.
DOCTRINE: What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize
dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
FACTS:
1. Calilung prays for a writ of prohibition to stop respondent from
implementing R.A. 9225 entitled “An Act Making the Citizenship of the
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,
Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended,
and for Other Purposes. He avers that the said law is unconstitutional
since it violates Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."
2. Furthermore, he contends that the law cheapens the Philippine
Citizenship since Sections 2 and 3 of RA. 9225, allow dual allegiance
and not dual citizenship.
3. He maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship.
a. “SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act.”
2. He also states that Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine
citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their
foreign allegiance.
a. “SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic”
Page | 52
ISSUE: to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
1. W/N the law is unconstitutional? - NO. given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
2. W/N this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
allegiance? - NO. premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on
issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
RATIO:
1. The Court resort to the deliberations of Congress in resolving the issue.
Rep. Locsin: He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he
said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by
requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual
citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country
because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of
allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may
be. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual
allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country
concerned. He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine
citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.
2. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225
is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries.
3. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.

4. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the
issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country.
5. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration
of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still
has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act
No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se,
but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance

Page | 53
 22. POE v. COMELEC (JENNICA)
March 8, 2016 | J. Perez | Citizenship of Foundling
PETITIONER: MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND ESTRELLA C.
ELAMPARO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS
AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
SUMMARY: Grace Poe was found abandoned as newborn infant. When Grace
Poe was 5 years old, spouses Fernando Poe and Susan Roces filed a petitioner
for her adoption with MTC of San Juan City. Petitioner married Teodoro
Llamanzares and the couple flew back to U.S. She became a naturalized
American citizen. When her father died, Grace Poe and her husband decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines. Petitioner took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225. Petitioner filed COMELEC COC for the presidency for the May
2016 elections. Petitions were filed in COMELEC to cancel her candidacy on
the ground that he cannot be considered a natural-born filipino since she cannot
prove that her biological parents were FIlipinos. The issue is w/n Poe is a
natural-born Filipino citizen - YES. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person
with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would
be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the
evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. Foundlings are likewise citizens under international
law.
DOCTRINE: As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings
either.
FACTS:
1. Grace Poe was found abandoned as newborn infant in Parish Church,
Iloilo by a certain Edgardo on 3 September 1968. Parental care and
custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano and his wife. Emiliano registered petitioner as a foundling three
days after with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. When
Grace Poe was 5 years old, spouses Fernando Poe and Susan Roces filed
a petitioner for her adoption with MTC of San Juan City.
2. Petitioner married Teodoro Llamanzares and the couple flew back to
U.S. She became a naturalized American citizen.
3. When her father died, Grace Poe and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines. Petitioner came home to
Philippines on 24 May 2005. She secured her TIN, purchased
condominium unit, and her children began attending Philippine private
schools.
4. Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same Act, she led with the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three minor children on 10 July 2006. the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of
the Philippines.
5. President Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie
and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before
assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship.
6. The petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States."
7. The U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.
8. Petitioner led with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6
Page | 54
 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013."
9. Petitioner led her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May
2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship
10. Petitions were filed in COMELEC to cancel her candidacy on the ground
that he cannot be considered a natural-born filipino since she cannot
prove that her biological parents were FIlipinos.
11. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy since she was not able
to fulfill the citizenship and residence requirement, and the she
committed material misrepresentation in her COC.
ISSUE: W/N Grace Poe-Lllamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen. - YES.
RATIO:
1. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically,
the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is
not a Filipino citizen.
2. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if
not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
3. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments,
that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the
population in Iloilo was Filipino.
4. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are
the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church
in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, at nasal
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
5. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features
is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population
of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be
more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the
evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
6. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While
the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
7. As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
8. Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough
to merit specific mention.
9. We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic
right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social
justice. (ex. Provisions in the present charter: Article II Sec. 11, Art. XIII,
Sec.1, Art. Sec. XV, Sec. 3) Certainly, these provisions contradict an
intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate
status.
10. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship
upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place
to be adopted
11. Legislations on adoption such as R.A. 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption
Act of 1995), R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and Court’s
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC (Rule on Adoption), all expressly refer to “Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
12. Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. (Art. 15 UDHR,
Art. 7 UNCRC, Art. 24 ICCPR). The common thread of the UDHR,
UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
13. Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
generally accepted principle of international law.
14. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that
Page | 55
 even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.
15. The COMELEC also ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition
of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
16. The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on
the matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in
particular.
17. Bengson III v. HRET: repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen.
18. The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of
natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at
birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No.
9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to
determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it t
to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had
been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.
19. More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be
continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET 145 where the
phrase "from birth" was clari ed to mean at the time of birth: "A person
who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire
or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed
out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution:
natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category
for repatriated citizens:
i. Natural-born: do not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain PH citizenship
ii. Naturalized in accordance with law
Carpio, J. (Dissenting Opinion):
● There is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine
citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a law
would only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino citizen
● There is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship.
● Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded
foundlings from being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle. Petitioner failed to
prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen
● there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle
of international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to
a foundling at birth.
● Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law
presuming that a foundling is a citizen of the country where the foundling
is found, such presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution
since customary international law has the status merely of municipal
statutory law.
● Sixth, Poe failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
● Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her
status as a foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Brion, J. (Dissenting Opinion):
● In other words, citizenship cannot be presumed; the person who
claims Filipino citizenship must prove that he or she is in fact a
Filipino.
● Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution does not, on its face,
include foundlings in listing the "citizens of the Philippines."
● The Constitution did not intend to include foundlings within its express
terms but did not totally leave them without any remedy. They fell under
the naturalized classification.
● The Philippines has no treaty obligation to automatically bestow
Philippine citizenship to foundlings under the 1935 Constitution.
Del Castillo, J. (Dissenting Opinion):
● Following the principle of jus sanguinis, proof of blood relation to a
Filipino parent is necessary to show that one is a Filipino citizen by
birth. Poe has shown no evidence of blood relation to a Filipino parent
Page | 56
 ● it should be pointed out that the 1935 Constitution never carried over
any proposed provision on foundlings being considered or presumed
to be Filipino citizens.
● Thus, in our legal hierarchy, treaties and international principles
belong to the same plane as domestic laws and, hence, cannot prevail
over the Constitution.
De Castro, J. (Dissenting Opinion):
● Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article IV are clear, unequivocal and leave no
room for any exception.
o Verba legis: Undeniably, Poe does not come within the scope of
Filipino citizens covered by paragraphs (3) and (4).
● Given that the language of the third and fourth paragraphs of the article
on citizenship clearly follow only the doctrine of jus sanguinis, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids.
● International Law Instruments/ Conventions are not self-executing
o Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the
international conventions cited but will entail an affirmative
action of the State, so that the nature of citizenship is
citizenship by naturalization.
● Natural-born citizenship must be an established fact and should not be
subjected to uncertainty nor be based in statistical probabilities.
● A Foundling does not Meet the Definition of a Natural-born Filipino
Citizen
o A foundling is one who must first go through a legal process
to obtain an official or formal declaration proclaiming him/her
to be a foundling
● It should also be emphasized that our adoption laws do not confer
"natural-born citizenship" to foundlings who are allowed to be adopted.
Perlas-Bernabe, J. (Dissenting Opinion):
● In this case, petitioner has shown no evidence of blood relation to a
Filipino parent to prove that she acquired Filipino citizenship by birth
under the jus sanguinis principle.
● Under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which governs
petitioner's case, foundlings are not included in the enumeration of who
are considered as Filipino citizens
● The fact that a candidate's parents are unknown directly puts into
question his/her Filipino citizenship because the candidate has no prima
facie link to a Filipino parent from which he/she could have traced her
Filipino citizenship.
● 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in its final form, never carried over
any proposed provision on foundlings being considered or presumed to
be Filipino citizens.
● Found no merit on international covenants saying that foundlings are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. Since 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitution subscribe to the jus sanguinis principle, it is
axiomatic that no international agreement or generally-accepted principle
of international law could contravene the same.
● Opposed petitioner’s resort to statistical probability. The constitutional
requirements for of ce, especially for the highest of ce in the land, cannot
be based on mere probability. "[M]atters dealing with quali cations for
public elective of ce must be strictly complied with."
Velasco, J. (Concurring Opinion):
● As pointed out by petitioner, the same view was shared by the framers of
the 1935 Constitution. A delegate to the 1934 Constitutional Convention,
Sr. Nicolas Rafols, proposed to explicitly include "children of unknown
parentage" in the enumeration of jus sanguinis Philippine Citizens in
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. The suggestion, however,
was not accepted but not on the ground that these children are not
Philippine citizens. Rather, that the cases of foundlings are "few and far
in between," as pointed out by delegate Manuel Roxas, and that citing a
similar Spanish Law, they are already presumed to have been born to
Filipinos.
● An alternative construction of the 1935, not to say the present
Constitution, presents dire consequences. In such a scenario, abandoned
children with no known parents will be considered stateless. This violates
the rights of a child to immediate registration and nationality after birth,
as recognized in the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of a Child.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the proposal that foundlings, like Sen. Poe,
are not natural-born Filipino citizens.
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 23. Reyes v. COMELEC (JENNICA)
October 22, 2013 | J. Perez | Citizenship
PETITIONER: REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC AND JOSEPH SOCCORO B. TAN
SUMMARY:
Tan is a registered voter and resident of Marinduque filed a petition to cancel the
COC of Reyes since her COC contained material misrepresentation on her
citizenship when she is in fact, an American Citizen. COMELEC First Division
and En Banc issued a Resolution cancelling petitioner’s COC. SC held that
petitioner failed to comply with the citizenship requirement. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no
proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her. Notably, in her Motion for
Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is
a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-
American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.
Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said
Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply
with rules, even as a super uity." We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's
explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the
rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. To cover-up her
apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her
appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have
reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. This contention is
misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of
allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as
certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration.
DOCTRINE:
For respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following
acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA
9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she
remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and
hold any elective public office in the Philippines.
FACTS:
MR of the En Banc Resolution of 25 June 2013 which dismissed the petition,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC.
Facts from the SC Resolution June 25, 2013:
1. Respondent Tan is a registered voter and resident of Marinduque, filed
before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Cancel the COC of
petitioner on the ground that her COC contained material
misrepresentation, specifically: 1) she is single when she is married; 2)
she is a resident of Marinduque when she is a resident of Batangas and at
the same time a resident of Quezon City; 4) different birth dates; and 5)
the she is a Filipino Citizen when she is in fact, an American Citizen.
2. Respondent filed "Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly
Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits" consisting of,
among others: (1) a copy of an article published on the internet on 8
January 2013 entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O.
Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document
executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database
record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an
American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of
Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Bureau of Immigration which
indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels
abroad.
Page | 58
 3. COMELEC First Division issued a resolution cancelling petitioner’s
COC.
4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that she is a
natural born citizen and the she has not lost such status by simply
obtaining American passport Additionally, petitioner surmised that the
COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American
citizen. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012.
5. COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
6. Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed
winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.
7. COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory.
8. On same day, petitioner took her oath of office Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
9. HRET still has no jurisdiction in this case since the petitioner cannot be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been
said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives
begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
10. More importantly the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed
of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via
its Resolution dated 14 May 2013.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Reyes complies with the citizenship requirement. - NO.
RULING:
1. As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground
of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
a. Petitioner is not a citizen of PH because of her failure to comply
with requirements of RA 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-
General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship
before any public o cer authorized to administer an oath.
b. In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied
with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding,
respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to
present a case. She, however, speci cally denied that she has
become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.
c. Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence
thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however,
establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American
passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012,
petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden
now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to
the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented
in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless
and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges
of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and
thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is,
therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public o ce
in the Philippines. "
2. Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the
cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the
Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US
passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the
burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or
that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born
citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of
R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Page | 59
3. Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she
averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the
said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated
24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit
"if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply
with rules, even as a super uity." We cannot, however, subscribe to
petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to
comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies
to her.
4. Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath
of office as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean
that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition
of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the
proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in
order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records
evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by
Respondent COMELEC." This statement raises a lot of questions — Did
petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born
Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest
opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has
indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
5. To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by
R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of
allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial
Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her
status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
6. Said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of
R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration. Thus, petitioner's oath of office as Provincial Administrator
cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A.
No. 9225.
7. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC
and the HRET insofar as the petitioner's being a Representative of
Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation,
which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally
proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a
continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact
ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than
mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of
discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no
longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET.
Abad, J., (Concurring Opinion):
● No citizenship issue tackled
Carpio, J., (Dissenting Opinion):
● No citizenship issue tackled.
Leonen, J., (Dissenting Opinion):
● Leonen voted to grant the Motion of Reconsideration based on
jurisdictional grounds, or the lack thereof of the Court. He emphasized,
based on Jurisprudence (Angara and Guerrero cases) that the case should
have been decided by the HRET, due to the fact that the Petitioner was
already proclaimed. No Citizenship issues tackled.
Brion, J., (Dissenting Opinion):
● Sanchez certification itself is not sufficient to establish that Reyes was a
naturalized U.S. citizen.
● Tan miserably failed to submit relevant evidence showing that Reyes had
been a naturalized American citizen (such as a certi cation from the U.S.
government that Reyes was a naturalized U.S. citizen) who would now
require the application of RA 9225 to run for elective office.
● an admission of dual citizenship, without more, is not a sufficient basis
for a CoC cancellation, as this Court has already held in its settled
rulings.
● While Reyes might have admitted in her motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC that she had been married to an American citizen,
the admission did not mean that she had already lost her Philippine
Page | 60
 citizenship in the absence of any showing that, by her act or omission,
she is deemed under the law to have renounced it. (Section 4, Article 4 of
Consti)
● As applied to Reyes, her possession and use of a U.S. passport, by
themselves, did not signify that she is no longer a natural born Filipino
citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship.

Sereno, J., (Concurring Opinion):

● The COMELEC First Division, therefore, did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion when it admitted in evidence the documents offered,
even if the printed Internet article showing that petitioner had used a U.S.
passport might have been hearsay, and even if the copy of the Bureau of
Immigration Certification was merely a photocopy and not even a
certified true copy of the original.
● There was no grave abuse of discretion when, based on the records, the
COMELEC cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner after
finding that she had committed false material misrepresentation with
respect to her citizenship and residency. It thereafter declared that she
should have complied with the requirements of renouncing her foreign
citizenship and taking the oath of allegiance under R. A. 9225 before she
could qualify to run for any elective office.
● This submission of the Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
and the Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration
confirms the acquisition of foreign citizenship by petitioner and the
applicability of R.A. 9225 to her. Thus, the COMELEC was correct in
ruling that she was no longer a Filipino citizen when she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy and that without complying with the
requirements of R.A. 9225, she was not qualified to run for public office.
Since these two documents were not submitted to the COMELEC, there
can be no grave abuse of discretion either on the part of the COMELEC
First Division when it cancelled her Certificate of Candidacy, or on the
part of the COMELEC En Banc when it affirmed the cancellation.

Page | 61
 SECTION 2: Hakuna Matata
PROGRAMME Original Music: Hakuna Matata
INTRO: It’s the Citizenship Hakuna Matata! What a wonderful phrase
Original Music: The Circle of Life Hakuna Matata! Ain't no passing craze
AAAAAHHH ZABENYAAAAAAA PILIPINO KA BA? CHORUS:
PINOY KA BA? PINOY KA BA? There are less worries, for a natural born
No need to elect, nor to Perfect
From the day we were born in our families Hakuna Matata
It has been inherent to us
In Article IV, we would be able to see SECTION 3: It lives in You
Who Filipinos are Original Music: It lives in You
CHORUS: Night and the spirit of life calling
It’s the citizenship, our topic today Oh, oh, iyo
It’s in Article IV, of the Constitution. Oh oh iyo
Till we find our place, in the path unwinding Oh, oh, iyo
It’s the citizen... the citizenship. Oh oh iyo

SECTION 1: I Just Can’t Wait to be Fil And the voice with the fear of a child answers
Original Music: I Just Can’t Wait to be King Oh oh iyo
Oh oh iyo
Simba: Hey what does it take to be, a Philippine citizen? Oh oh iyo
Zazu: Well they are seen in section one, you better check it out. Oh oh iyo
Simba: My mother is a citizen; my father is one too. Oh, oh, iyo
Well I guess there is no doubt, that I would be one too. Oh oh iyo
Zazu: But it is not the only way to know. Wait, there's no mountain too great
Simba: Oh, I just can’t wait to be Fil! Oh, I just can’t wait to be Fil. Hear these words and have faith
Oh, I just can’t wait to be Fil Oh, oh iyo
Oh oh iyo
CHORUS (He just can’t wait to be Fil!) Have faith
Oh, I just can’t wait to be Fil!!!!! (x4)
Oh, I just can’t wait... to be Fil It lives in you, it lives in me
It could be lost, it could be regained
Into the waters, into the truth
In your reflection, it lives in you

Page | 62
SECTION 4: If You Marry an Alien Tonight
Original Music: Can You Feel the Love Tonight?

Timone: I can see what's happening

Pumba: What
Timone: And they don't have a clue
Pumba: Who
Timone: They'll fall in love and here's the bottom line
Our trio's down to two
Pumba: Oh

The sweet caress of twilight

There's magic everywhere
And with all this romantic atmosphere
Disaster's in the air

CHORUS
If you marry an alien tonight
Citizenship retains
Unless by their, acts or omission
They had it renounced.

SECTION 5: Be prepared
Original Music: Be Prepared

CHORUS:
So prepare for dual allegiance
Be prepared for another set of slides
A shining new topic
Is tiptoeing nearer
And where do we feature?
Just listen to teacher
I know it sounds so boring
But you'll be rewarded
When at last I am given my dues
Prepare there’s a quiz after this
Be prepared!

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