Annrpt2k17 PDF

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
ANNUAL REPORT
2017
ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

NIYAMAK BHAVAN, ANUSHAKTI NAGAR
MUMBAI-400 094
Website: www.aerb.gov.in
FUNCTIONS OF THE
ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
a Develop safety policies in nuclear, radiation and industrial safety areas for facilities
under its purview.
a Develop Safety Codes, Guides and Standards for siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation and decommissioning of different types of nuclear and
radiation facilities.
a Grant consents for siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning,

after an appropriate safety review and assessment, for establishment of nuclear and
radiation facilities.
a Ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements prescribed by AERB during all
stages of consenting through a system of review and assessment, regulatory inspection
and enforcement.
a Prescribe the acceptance limits of radiation exposure to occupational workers and

members of the public and acceptable limits of environmental releases of radioactive
substances.
a Review the emergency preparedness plans for nuclear and radiation facilities and
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nuclear and radiation facilities and prescribe the syllabi for training of personnel in
safety aspects at all levels.
a Take such steps as necessary to keep the public informed on major issues of radiological
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a Maintain liaison with statutory bodies in the country as well as abroad regarding safety
matters.
a Promote research and development efforts in the areas of safety.
a Review the nuclear and industrial safety aspects in nuclear facilities under its purview.
a Review the safety related nuclear security aspects in nuclear facilities under its purview.
a Notifying to the public, the ‘nuclear incident’, occurring in the nuclear installations in
India, as mandated by the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
AERB Annual Report - 2017

CONTENTS
Page No.
MISSION STATEMENT
HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITIES
ORGANISATION CHART OF ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
KEY FIGURES OF THE YEAR 2017
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CHAPTER 1. SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES .........................................1
1.1 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES .................................................1
1.2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION...................................................................2
1.3 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS ............................9
1.4 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES ...................17
1.5 OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION.........................................................................................22
1.6 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION ...............23
1.7 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES ................................................................26
1.8 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION .......................................................29
CHAPTER 2. SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF RADIATION FACILITIES ...................................35
2.1 APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES IN MEDICAL,

INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH .....................................................................................................35
2.2 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF RADIATION FACILITIES ............................................39
2.3 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION ...............................................44
CHAPTER 3. REGULATORY INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIATION FACILITIES........ 47
3.1 REGULATORY INSPECTION PROGRAMME ...........................................................................47
3.2 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES .................50
3.3 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF RADIATION FACILITIES ................................................51

Page No.
CHAPTER 4. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES .................. 57
4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ......................................................................................................57
4.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES ..................................................................................................59
4.3 BASIS FOR ACCEPTABLE DOSE TO OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS AND

ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES .................................................................................................63
4.4 INITIATIVES TAKEN BY AERB FOR DOSE REDUCTION .....................................................63
CHAPTER 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ............................................................................... 65
5.1 ROLE OF AERB IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN,

DURING EMERGENCY AND POST EMERGENCY .................................................................65
5.2 REVIEW OF PREPAREDNESS FOR SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY

AT NPP SITES................................................................................................................................66
5.3 HARMONISATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS OF NPPs ..........................66
5.4 CREATION OF ON-SITE EMERGENCY SUPPORT CENTRE AT NPPs ..................................67
5.5 NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY MONITORING CELL AT AERB ............67
5.6 PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY IAEA............................68
5.7 DEVELOPMENT OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ..........68
5.8 PUBLIC PROTECTION MEASURES ..........................................................................................68
CHAPTER 6. REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS .................................................................. 71
6.1 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ...................................71
6.2 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPED/AMENDED ......................................73
6.3 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER REVISION/DEVELOPMENT ..............................................74
6.4 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER PUBLICATION IN HINDI ....................................................74
6.5 REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT SAFETY STANDARDS..................................................................75
CHAPTER 7. SAFETY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH ..................................................................... 77
7.1 THERMAL HYDRAULICS SAFETY STUDIES .........................................................................77
7.2 SEVERE ACCIDENT STUDIES ...................................................................................................79
7.3 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES ..................79
7.4 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT ................................................................................81

Page No.
7.5 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES.........................................................................................................82

7.6 REACTOR PHYSICS STUDIES ...................................................................................................84
7.7 STUDIES PERTAINING TO THE BACK END OF THE FUEL CYCLE AND
SOIL REMEDIATION ...................................................................................................................84
7.8 STRUCTURAL AND SEISMIC ANALYSIS ................................................................................85
7.9 OTHER SAFETY ANALYSIS STUDIES .....................................................................................86
7.10 AERB FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH PROGRAMME ............................................................86
CHAPTER 8. INITIATIVES FOR ENGAGING WITH STAKEHOLDERS AND PUBLIC ......... 89
8.1 AERB AND MEDIA ......................................................................................................................89
8.2 COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS ..................................89
8.3 PUBLIC/STAKEHOLDERS’ AWARENESS PROGRAMMES ...................................................90
8.4 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REGULATORY INTERFACE (NCRI) ...................................92
8.5 DAE SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ MEET .........................93
8.6 THEME MEETINGS /SPECIAL MEET .......................................................................................93
8.7 EXHIBITIONS ...............................................................................................................................97
8.8 ADVERTISEMENTS AND ARTICLES........................................................................................98
8.9 TECHNICAL INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES ..................................................... 99
CHAPTER 9. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................................... 103
9.1 PORTAL FOR PUBLIC FEEDBACK .........................................................................................103
9.2 RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT 2005......................................................................................103
9.3 PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS ..............................................................................................104
9.4 AUDIT BY COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL (CAG) .........................................104
CHAPTER 10. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION .................................................................... 105
10.1 STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY ...................................................105
10.2 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT .............................................................................................107
10.3 CONTRIBUTION IN INTERNATIONAL PEER REVIEW .......................................................107
10.4 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN IAEA IRRS MISSION FOR OTHER COUNTRIES..................108
10.5 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES ..........................................108

Page No.
CHAPTER 11. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE ............... 113
11.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION ..............................................................................................113
11.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES,

PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FULL PARTICIPATION) ACT, 1995 AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF RESERVATION POLICY FOR
SCHEDULED CASTES / TRIBES / OBC ..................................................................................113
11.3 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................113
11.4 TRAINING ...................................................................................................................................115
11.5 AERB TECHNICAL TALK /COLLOQUIUM ............................................................................116
11.6 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ...............................................................................................117
11.7 PROMOTION OF EXCELLENCE IN HUMAN RESOURCES ................................................118
11.8 AERB AWARDS FOR MERITORIOUS PERFORMANCE.......................................................118
11.9 WELFARE ACTIVITIES FOR AERB EMPLOYEES ................................................................124
11.10 RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION ...............................................................................127
CHAPTER 12. PROMOTION OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGE.......................................................... 131
12.1 PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR HINDI IMPLEMENTATION .........................................131
12.2 PUBLICATIONS IN HINDI ........................................................................................................131
12.3 HINDI TALKS / WORKSHOPS / SEMINARS ..........................................................................131
12.4 HINDI COMPETITIONS.............................................................................................................133
CHAPTER 13. FINANCE .................................................................................................................... 135
13.1 ANNUAL BUDGET UTILISATION...........................................................................................135
13.2 FUNDS UTILISATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ..........................................135
13.3 FUNDS UTILISATION ON PUBLIC OUTREACH PROGRAMMES.....................................135
13.4 GRANTS TO RESEARCH PROJECTS ......................................................................................136
PUBLICATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 137
ABBREVIATION..................................................................................................................................143
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE (INES)...................... 148

LIST OF TABLES
Table Title Page No.
No.
1.1 Safety Review Committee Meetings of the Power Projects .............................................................2
1.2 List of Operating Nuclear Power Plants .........................................................................................10
1.3 Meetings of Safety Committees .....................................................................................................11
1.4 Licensing of Operating Staff ..........................................................................................................16
1.5 List of Facilities Authorised for Safe Disposal /Transfer of Radioactive Waste ............................16
1.6 Status of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Other Facilities ..........................................................17
1.7 Meetings of Safety Review Committee of Fuel Cycle Facilities ...................................................20
1.8 Status of R&D and Other Facilities ................................................................................................23
1.9 Unit-wise Comparison of Reportable Occupational Injuries in DAE Units for 2017 ....................26
1.10 Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries ..................28
,1(65DWLQJRI6LJQL¿FDQW(YHQWVLQ133V5HSRUWHGGXULQJ&DOHQGDU<HDU .......................31
3.1 Regulatory Inspections of Nuclear Facilities under Construction and Commissioning .................50
3.2 Regulatory Inspections of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors .....................50
3.3 Regulatory Inspections of Industrial and Fuel Cycle Facilities ......................................................51
3.4 Regulatory Inspections (Security Aspects) .....................................................................................51
3.5 Regulatory Inspections of Radiation Facilities ...............................................................................52
4.1 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in NPPs (2017) .................................................................60
4.2 Radiation Doses (Effective) received by Workers in Medical,

Industrial and Research Institutions in the Year 2017 ....................................................................61
4.2 (a) Radiation Doses (Effective) received by Workers in Medical,

Industrial and Research Institutions in the Year 2016 ....................................................................61
4.3 Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Front End Fuel Cycle Facilities (2017)........................62
5.1 Site and off-site Emergency Exercises carried out in the Year 2017 ..............................................66
7.1 New Research Projects Approved ..................................................................................................87
7.2 Research Projects Renewed ............................................................................................................87

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Title Page No.
No.
1.1 Distribution of Unit-wise Reportable Injuries in DAE Units in 2017 ...........................................27
1.2 Year-wise trend of Frequency Rate in DAE Units.........................................................................27
1.3 Year-wise trend of Severity Rate in DAE Units ............................................................................27
1.4 Year-wise trend of Injury Index in DAE Units ..............................................................................28
1.5 Year-wise trend of Incidence Rate in DAE Units ..........................................................................28
1.6 Year-wise trend of Fatal Injuries in DAE Units.............................................................................28
1.7 Type of Accidents in DAE Units in 2017 ......................................................................................28
1.8 INES Scale.....................................................................................................................................29
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&ODVVL¿FDWLRQRI'LUHFW&DXVHVRI6(5V........................................................................................31
&ODVVL¿FDWLRQRI5RRW&DXVHVRI6(5V ..........................................................................................31
4.1(a) Public Dose at 1.6 km Distance for NPPs ......................................................................................58
4.1(b) Total Effective Dose in Different Zones during the Year 2017 ......................................................59
4.2 Collective Dose (Person-Sv) at NPPs.............................................................................................60
6.1 AERB Regulatory Safety Document Development Process ..........................................................72
7.1 Temporal variations of Interface Velocity during the Chugging Phenomenon ..............................78
7.2 Variation of Mass Flow Rate of Air with Temperature Difference.................................................78
7.3 Variation of Peak Pressure as a Function of (a) Pipe Diameter, (b) Steam Pressure ......................78
7.4 Spatial and Temporal Characteristics of Thermal Plume Spread due to

Thermal Discharge from KKNPP...................................................................................................80
7.5 Total dose due to (a) I-131 and (b) all Important Radionuclides
considered for the Postulated Accident Scenario ...........................................................................81
7.6 Schematic of Multi-unit PSA Methodology ...................................................................................82
7.7 Water Vault and Test Vessel for COMREF .....................................................................................82
7.8 HYMIF Experimental Test Set-up ..................................................................................................83
9.1 RTI Queries replied during the Last 5 Years ................................................................................103

MISSION STATEMENT
The mission of the AERB is

to ensure the use of ionising
radiation and nuclear energy
in India does not cause
undue risk to health of
people and the environment.
HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITIES
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) continued to carry out safety monitoring and
regulatory supervision of nuclear and radiation facilities under its purview. Regulatory safety
oversight was carried out on operating power plants, nuclear power projects (under site evaluation/
under construction), several fuel cycle facilities, research units and large numbers of radiation
facilities spread across the country.
All operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities under AERB’s purview operated
safely during the year and radioactive discharges as well as doses to occupational workers were
well within prescribed limits. The radioactive releases from nuclear power plants remained
well within the limits authorised by AERB and the effective dose to public around the nuclear
power plant sites was far less than the annual limit of 1 mSv. The maximum individual radiation
dose among occupational workers has also remained well below the annual limit of 30 mSv.
KEY ACHIEVEMENTS DURING THE YEAR
¾Licencing of Nuclear Power Projects

Clearance for Raising Reactor Power Up to 100% FP (Commissioning Phase-C3) of
KKNPP Unit-2 – January 13, 2017
Clearance for Operation of KKNPP Unit-2 at Rated Power for Limited Duration (100
Effective Full Power Days) – May 29, 2017
Clearance for First pour of Concrete (FPC) of KKNPP-3&4 – June 23, 2017
¾Renewal of Licences of Nuclear Facilities

Licence for operation of 10 nuclear power plants viz. MAPS, KGS-1&2, TAPS-1&2,
RAPS-3&4 and RAPS-5&6
Licence for operation of nuclear facilities viz. HWP-Kota; NFC, Hyderabad;
Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal; Banduhurang mine and Tummalapalle mill
Licence for operation of CORAL, IGCAR
¾Licensing/Consent of Radiation Facilities

14,607 Licences for medical, industrial and research radiation facilities
$SSURYDOVRI5DGLDWLRQ6DIHW\2I¿FHUV562
5,584 permissions for procurement of radioactive sources and 944 permissions for
procurement of equipment/devices
i
2,345 authorisations for disposal of disused radioactive sources in radiation facilities.
Declaration of more than 66,259 diagnostic X-ray units in eLORA out of which
46,247 equipment registered as on December 31, 2017.
¾Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities

Posted onsite observers at four NPP sites viz. Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam, Kakrapar and
Kudankulam
24 inspections of nuclear power projects and 43 inspections of operating power plants
51 inspections of industrial and fuel cycle facilities
1,025 inspections of medical, industrial and research radiation facilities
¾Conducted nationwide campaign of enforcement inspection of Medical Diagnostic

X-Ray units covering 166 enforcement inspections; sealed 78 equipment and issued
warning for seal to 163 X-ray equipment.
¾Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) at NPPs

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emergency exercises at three NPP sites.
Completed design review of On-Site Emergency Support Centre at NPPs
(implementation in progress).
¾Regulatory Safety Documents

Approved two Safety Guides and uploaded on AERB website.
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IAEA and provided comments.
10 AERB safety documents have been translated in Hindi.
¾Safety Analysis and Research Development

Simulated table-top off-site emergency exercise at NAPS, TAPS and KGS sites were
modelled using the in-house developed atmospheric dispersion models.
Hydrogen mitigation facility (HYMIF) (phase-1) is commissioned in SRI Engineering
Hall, Kalpakkam with the objective of determining the performance and safety
characteristics of hydrogen mitigation devices and providing inputs for regulatory
decision making.
An experimental facility is commissioned at SRI and experiments were carried out
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ii
¾Public Information and Safety Promotional Activities for Stakeholders
6 Theme meetings were organised on various subjects for stakeholders of NPPs.
Two special meets were organised one on ‘Security of Radioactive Material (RAM)’
and another on ‘Accredited Personnel Monitoring and Bio-Dosimetry Laboratories’.
9 Awareness programmes were conducted on radiation safety covering a wide target
audience. In addition, 40 Safety Awareness programmes were conducted at various
radiation facilities during regulatory inspection.
Published advertisements in print media to sensitise the users on requirements of
AERB for use of medical X-ray equipment as well as use of radioactive sources
or radiation generating equipment. Also published in monthly magazine ALARA of
ISRT.
InFocus Advertorial in monthly magazine ‘Shubhyatra’ of Air India and ‘Railbandhu’
of Indian Railways in November 2017 issue.
Displayed exhibits on the safety and regulatory aspects of nuclear, radiation facilities
and display of safety documents, in relevant conferences/workshops.
¾ International Cooperation
Held bilateral and multilateral meetings with delegations from USNRC, CANDU
Owners Group (COG) and Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).
Hosted 5th meeting of Reactor Physics Working Group (RPWG) of International
VVER Regulator Forum at SRI, Kalpakkam.
Signing of bilateral arrangement between AERB and Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Regulatory Authority (BAERA) on April 08, 2017 for the exchange of technical
information and co-operation in the regulation of nuclear safety and radiation
protection.
Explore means of future cooperation between agencies of Japan and AERB as a future
step to recent bilateral agreement between India and Japan on peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
¾ Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)

Indian Delegation led by Chairman AERB, with experts from AERB, BARC,
NPCIL and the Indian Embassy at Vienna, participated in the 7th Review Meeting of
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).
India submitted its National Report for review by the Contracting Parties in on
August 2016, on which received total 224 questions and provided answers to all these
questions within the stipulated time.
iii
¾ Public Accountability
136 RTIs questions were replied during the period.
Responded to 28 parliamentary questions.
Provided all the relevant information during CAG Audit.
¾ Human Resource Development

Augmentation of manpower by recruiting 15 personnel in various categories (12
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developing soft skills.
Towards the aim of continual knowledge upgradation of its staff, AERB organised:
9Two refresher training courses on ‘Industrial Safety’
9Two technical talks and 8 colloquia
9A lecture series on ASME training course for almost 6 months, comprising of 50
lectures
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Kalpakkam
¾ Infrastructure Development
New website was launched on August 15, 2017, to make it more user-friendly and
more people centric to enhance the transparency and public outreach.
Construction of Regional Regulatory Centres at Kolkata and Chennai is in progress.
Tenders were invited for construction of AERB Niyamak Bhavan-C building.
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and Radiation Plants”
8 press releases were issued in Hindi and published in daily newspapers.
Four Hindi workshops were conducted.
¾ Special Activities
AERB implemented follow up actions on suggestions and recommendations made by
IAEA-IRRS.
The National Conference on Regulatory Interface (NCRI) was organised for
stakeholders of NPP and Radiation Facilities.
iv
¾New Initiatives
Accreditation of Laboratories: Initiative was taken to bring out clarity of roles of
NABL, AERB and BARC w.r.t. recognition/accreditation procedures for testing and
calibration in radiological measurements, identifying the gaps in requirements and
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of interest or duplication of activities arising out of such overlapping responsibilities.
Transport of Radioactive Material by Air: Review of IAEA regulations for safe
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vis-a-vis national legislation was taken up to identify various agencies/ competent
authorities for overseeing the requirements for various modes of transport. Review
of the regulations for safe transport of radioactive material by air was also taken up
to bring out clarity w.r.t the roles and responsibilities of Directorate General of Civil
Aviation (DGCA) and AERB.
Table-top Exercises: With emphasis on early phase decision making, table-top
emergency exercise was conceptualised on Emergency Action Level. During the year,
trial table-top emergency exercises were successfully conducted at NAPS (November
8, 2017) and TAPS (December 16, 2017). It was observed that the evolved table-
top emergency exercise methodology will stand as an effective tool to evaluate the
decision making of emergency managers in response to an emergency situation,
especially during the early phase.
v
COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD
Chairman, AERB
Shri S. A. Bhardwaj
Members
Shri D. K. Shukla Dr. K.V. Raghavan

([2I¿FLR0HPEHU Distinguished Professor, INAE
Chairman, SARCOP Indian Institute of Chemical
Technology, Hyderabad
Dr. Harsh K. Gupta Prof. Devang V. Khakhar Dr. G. K. Rath

President, IUGG, Director, Indian Institute Professor and Head
National Geophysical of Technology Bombay, Department of Oncology
Research Institute Mumbai AIIMS, New Delhi
(NGRI), Hyderabad
vi
Remembering........
Dr. K. V. Raghavan
AERB mourns the untimely demise of

Dr. K. V. Raghavan on October 12, 2017.
He was the longest serving Board member of AERB.
Dr. Raghavan will always be fondly remembered by us in AERB
for his invaluable wisdom and insights in the deliberations of the
Board. He was an internationally renowned Chemical Engineer,
a Fellow of the Indian National Academy of Engineers (INAE)
and its Vice President.
Dr. K. V. Raghavan, AERB Board Member
(October 2001 to October 2017)
vii
ORGANISATION CHART OF ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
B
O
A Board of AERB
R
D
S Chairman, AERB
C
Executive Director, AERB
R
E Accounts Administration
T
R
NSARG
v NFRG
I
T SRI NSAD DRI DRA&C DRP&E RSD OPSD NPSD R&DD
Regional Regulatory Centres

Southern Regional Regulatory Centre Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre Northern Regional Regulatory Centre
NFRG :
Nuclear Facilities Regulations Group OPSD : Operating Plants Safety Division
NSARG :
Nuclear Safety Analysis and Research Group NPSD : Nuclear Projects Safety Division
DRI :
Directorate of Regulatory Inspection NSAD : Nuclear Safety Analysis Division
DRP&E :
Directorate of Radiation Protection
RSD : Radiological Safety Division
and Environment
DRA&C : Directorate of Regulatory Affairs R&DD : Resources and Documentation Division
and Communications SRI : Safety Research Institute
viii
KEY FIGURES OF THE YEAR 2017
Staff Members 340 Renewal of Licences (NPP) 10
Board Meeting 03 Renewal of Licences for Nuclear 06

Fuel Cycle, R&D Facilities
Meeting (Project Safety Committee) 44
Licences (Radiation Facilities) 14,607
Meeting (Review of Operating NPP) 119
Operating Personnel Licensed 157
Meeting (Fuel Cycle and Other Facilities) 20
RSO Approvals for RF 2,729
Meeting (Review of Radiation Facilities) 19
Permissions for procurement of 5,584
Press Releases 08 Radioactive Sources
Regulatory Safety Documents (till date) 165
Regulatory Inspections
Inspectors (NPP) 34 Inspections (Nuclear Facilities 24

under Construction)
Inspectors (Operating Plants) 44
Inspections (Operating NPP) 43
Inspectors (Radiation Facilities) 54
Inspections (Industrial Safety) 51
Inspections 1,025
(Radiation Facilities)
Enforcement Inspections of 166

Diagnostic X-ray facilities
X-ray Equipment Sealed 78
X-ray units declared in eLORA 66,259 Theme Meeting/ Special meet 8
X-ray Equipment Registered in eLORA 46,247 Safety Awareness Programmes 9
RTI Questions Replied 136
ix
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
AERB has established a regulatory framework, which involves stipulating the safety requirements,
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during various stages viz. siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation etc. All Nuclear
Power Projects (NPP) undergo an elaborate and in-depth safety review during various consenting
stages.
A well-established multi-tier safety review mechanism is followed for safety review during various
stages of projects in all the nuclear power projects, back end fuel cycle facilities and radiation facilities.
The safety review process is supplemented by planned and special/surprise regulatory inspections
(RI) as established in regulatory safety documents of AERB. Compliance with the recommendations
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$(5%DORQJZLWKWKHVWLSXODWLRQVVSHFL¿HGLQWKHFRQVHQWDUHYHUL¿HGGXULQJ5,6DIHW\VLJQL¿FDQW
observations arising from RIs are reviewed in safety committees and considered before giving
clearance for subsequent stages.
Besides safety review of NPP and back end fuel cycle facilities, security related submissions are also
reviewed during the stage-wise consenting process. Similarly multi-tier safety review mechanism is
followed for safety review of operating power plants and fuel cycle facilities.
AERB established a Quality Management System (QMS) compliant with ISO 9001:2008, which is
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System (IMS) to meet expectations of the stakeholders.
Quality Management System (QMS)
,QRUGHUWRPHHWFRQWLQXDOLPSURYHPHQWRITXDOLW\LQFDUU\LQJRXWLWVIXQFWLRQV$(5%KDVEHHQFHUWL¿HG
XQGHU,62VWDQGDUGE\%,6VLQFH1RYHPEHU$(5%ZDVUHFHUWL¿HGIRU,62
during the years 2009, 2012 and 2015. QMS under ISO 9001:2008 has been implemented in AERB
for its core regulatory processes viz. consenting activities, regulatory inspections and preparation of
regulatory documents. Under the purview of ISO standard, surveillance audit by BIS is carried out
every year and internal audit is carried by trained auditors of AERB once in a year.
Executive Committee (EC) of AERB conducts the management review to ensure suitability, adequacy
and effectiveness of QMS at AERB. This review includes assessing quality policy and quality
objectives.
Internal audit of AERB was carried out during September 2017 as per the ISO procedures and Quality
Manual of AERB. There were 41 observations. No non-conformances (NCs) were reported during the
audit. All the observations have been complied.
x
The pre-audit meeting was conducted on August 28, 2017 to schedule the internal audits. The post-
audit meeting was conducted on November 9, 2017 to review the observations arising from the internal
audits and its compliances by the respective audited divisions.
BIS surveillance audit was carried out during December 19 - 20, 2017 for evaluation of the performance
and effectiveness of IS/ISO 9001:2008 Quality Management System (QMS) at AERB. The function/
activities of MR/Top Management, SSED (now merged with NPSD), NSAD, and R&DD were audited.
No non-conformance (NC) was reported by BIS auditors during the audit.
An awareness programme covering topics on QMS aspects viz. (i) Transition from ISO 9001:2008
to ISO 9001:2015; (ii) Internal audit under QMS and (iii) Graded approach in review of radiation
facilities was organised on October 18, 2017 at AERB. A plan was chalked out in consultation with
BIS towards transition to and implementation of ISO 9001:2015 within the stipulated time.
Integrated Management System (IMS) of AERB
The regulatory and other supporting processes and activities carried out by AERB are managed through
an existing management system compliant to above mentioned ISO standard and also to earlier IAEA
guidance GS-R-3. The system followed in AERB underwent review by IAEA during the IRRS mission
in March 2015 and their suggestions are being taken as inputs during the implementation of IMS to
achieve and sustain quality standards comparable with those of nuclear fraternity worldwide.
Meanwhile IAEA in the year 2016 revised the guideline for management system to GSR Part-II
'Leadership and Management of Safety' to include leadership in process management. Chairman,
AERB constituted a committee to frame the Integrated Management System of AERB in line with
the IAEA safety standards. In-parallel, individual Directorates and Divisions were developing their
process documents clarifying interfaces and methods for achieving quality expectations. The review
DQGDVVHVVPHQWV\VWHPIRUWKHHQWLUH,06RI$(5%KDVEHHQWDNHQXSIRUPRGL¿FDWLRQWRDGRSWEHVW
international practices.
xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the year 2017, Atomic Energy Regulatory of main and safety vessels, primary sodium circuit,
Board (AERB) continued to monitor safety aspects secondary sodium circuit and the safety grade
of all facilities and activities involved in nuclear decay heat removal (SGDHR) circuit up to 180°C.
energy and applications of ionising radiations. $(5% DOVR LVVXHG FOHDUDQFH IRU SXUL¿FDWLRQ RI
AERB also continued to strengthen itself as a more sodium in the secondary sodium storage tanks,
HIIHFWLYHDQGHI¿FLHQWUHJXODWRU ¿OOLQJ RI VRGLXP LQ WKH VHFRQGDU\ VRGLXP PDLQ
AERB continued to carry out its functions with the circuit (SSMC-1&2) in both the loops as well as
support of its secretariat and technical divisions. for commissioning of both the loops of the SSMC.
The Board met three times and reviewed the
safety status of operating Nuclear Power Plants,
Nuclear Power Projects under construction /
commissioning, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and
Radiation Facilities.
PFBR Progressing towards Commissioning
Four units of 700 MWe pressurised heavy water

reactors (PHWR) are under construction at
Kakrapar, Gujarat (KAPP-3&4) and Rawatbhata,
Rajasthan (RAPP-7&8). Periodic regulatory
inspections are being carried out in these units.
6DIHW\UHYLHZUHODWHGWRYHUL¿FDWLRQDQGYDOLGDWLRQ
AERB Board Meeting in Progress of computer based systems and reviewing
of commissioning procedures and technical
Highlights of overall achievements for the year are VSHFL¿FDWLRQVIRURSHUDWLRQLVLQSURJUHVV
as follows: Review is in progress for site excavation clearance
Safety Surveillance of Nuclear Power Projects of four units of 700 MWe PHWR at Gorakhpur,
Haryana site (GHAVP-1 to 4).
AERB granted clearance to Kudankulam (KK)
unit-2 (1000 MWe) for operating at rated power Safety Surveillance of Nuclear Power Plants and
for limited duration of 100 effective full power Research Reactors
days on January 13, 2017. AERB gave consent for There are twenty one nuclear power plants in
¿UVWSRXURIFRQFUHWH)3&RQ-XQHIRU operation in India. The radioactivity releases
KKNPP-3&4. from all the nuclear power plants were below the
AERB issued permission for Prototype Fast VSHFL¿HG OLPLWV (IIHFWLYH GRVH WR PHPEHUV RI
Breeder Reactor (PFBR) for integrated pre-heating public in the vicinity of NPP sites was far less than
xiii
the annual dose prescribed by AERB. The radiation $(5% UHYLHZV WKH LQGXVWULDO DQG ¿UH VDIHW\
exposure to occupational workers in these plants aspects and also focuses on the construction
was also below the prescribed limit. safety aspects of nuclear power projects and other
nuclear facilities under construction. In the year
AERB renewed the licences for operation of
2017, there were three fatal accidents, at TAPS-
MAPS, KGS-1&2, TAPS-1&2, RAPS-3&4 &
1&2, ECIL, Hyderabad and FRFCF, Kalpakkam.
5$36 7KHUH ZHUH VLJQL¿FDQW HYHQWV These accidents were investigated and reviewed.
reported from the operating nuclear power plants. AERB stipulated additional measures for
The reports on these events were reviewed in strengthening safety management at these facilities
AERB to see the adequacy of investigations, and disseminated the lessons learnt from these
corrective actions, lessons learned and the need for accidents to all DAE units.
any regulatory actions. All the events were of INES
The details of safety surveillance of nuclear
level-0 (corresponding to deviations below scale)
facilities including Industrial Safety status in DAE
except the one event at Tarapur which was of level units during this period are given in Chapter-1.
1 (detail in Section 1.8).
Safety Surveillance of Radiation Facilities
7KH ¿UVW SKDVH RI (0&&5 FDPSDLJQ ZKLFK
AERB issued 14,607 consents for operation
involves cutting, removal and disposal of coolant
(licence, authorisation and registration), 349
channels was completed in KAPS-2 after approval
Type approvals, 2,729 approvals of Radiation
from AERB. The second phase of EMCCR
6DIHW\2I¿FHUV562IRUGLIIHUHQWSUDFWLFHV
campaign was in progress.
permissions for import/procurement of radiation
Safety Surveillance of Nuclear Fuel Cycle equipment and 5,584 permissions for procurement
Facilities and other related Industrial Facilities of radioactive sources (imported and indigenously
manufactured).
AERB issued consent to UCIL for construction and
commissioning of Magnetite (as by-product) plant The details of safety surveillance of these facilities
at Turamdih mill. AERB renewed the licence for during this period are given in Chapter-2.
operation of Banduhurang Mine, Tummalapalle Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear and Radiation
Mill, Zirconium Complex Pazhayakayal, NFC- Facilities
Hyderabad, HWP-Kota and 2000 Amp Sodium AERB carried out 24 regulatory inspections for
Test Cell at HWP-Baroda. nuclear facilities under construction, 43 regulatory
AERB renewed licence for operation of K-130 inspections of operating NPPs and research
Cyclotron at VECC, Kolkata and granted clearance facilities, 51 inspections of industrial and fuel
for stage-2 commissioning of TWINDUS Linac-2 cycle facilities, 15 inspections of nuclear facilities
at RRCAT, Indore. AERB granted commissioning for physical protection systems affecting safety and
of Agricultural and Radiation Processing Facility 1,025 radiation facilities.
(ARPF) of RRCAT at Choithram Mandi, Indore, AERB has posted Site Observer Teams (SOT)
which is a technology demonstration plant housing at three more sites viz. Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam
indigenously developed 10 MeV, 5 kW electron and Kakrapar in addition to Kudankulam where
Linac accelerator for radiation processing of food continuous on-site AERB coverage exists since
and agricultural products. AERB granted clearance commissioning activities of KKNPP-1.
for Stage-2 (i.e. erection of sodium storage tanks, The details of regulatory inspection of nuclear and
structure and components) in Sodium Technology radiation facilities during this period are given in
Complex at IGCAR. Chapter-3.
xiv
Enforcement in Nuclear and Radiation Facilities The Status of Regulatory Safety documents are
AERB carried out unannounced inspections in given in Chapter 6.
major cities/towns and covered 166 number of Research & Development and Safety Studies
medical diagnostic X-ray facilities. Total 78 number
AERB focused on the areas covering severe
of X-ray equipment were sealed and warning
accident studies for PHWR, thermal hydraulics
was issued for sealing of 163 number of X-ray
safety studies, reactor physics studies, radiological
equipment in view of their non-compliance. Few
assessment and environmental safety studies and
other enforcement actions like periodic suspensions
of licence of the facility / RSO were taken against integrated risk assessment for multi-unit NPP site.
reported violations of regulatory requirements in As part of experimental investigations on mitigation
industrial radiography practices. aspects under Design Extension Conditions (DEC),
The details of enforcement actions are given in the Hydrogen Mitigation Facility (HYMIF)
relevant sections of Chapter- 2 and 3. was commissioned in SRI Engineering Hall,
Kalpakkam. In light of KAPS incident, R&D
Emergency Preparedness
works were initiated to study the corrosion aspects
Annual site emergency exercises were conducted of Zr-2.5%Nb. An experimental facility was
at 7 nuclear power plant sites. Off-site emergency commissioned at SRI Chemistry laboratory and
exercises to be conducted once in two years, were experiments were carried out to assess the corrosion
carried out at Tarapur, Kalpakkam, Kaiga and LQÀXHQFHRIYDULRXVLPSXULWLHVLQ$*06
..133VLWH$(5%RI¿FLDOVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQ6LWH
and 3 Off-site emergency exercises as observers. AERB continued to promote and fund research
projects on reactor safety, radiation safety, front
A new system for conducting off-site emergency and back end fuel cycle safety related problems
exercises is in developmental stage in which and industrial safety at academic institutions under
Emergency Action Levels (EAL) are used to the Safety Research Programme. Two new projects
conduct table top exercises. Such exercises were related to radiation safety viz. ‘Studies on levels of
conducted at Narora and Tarapur sites during Natural Radiation in the Environment Hill Districts
the month of November and December 2017 of Manipur’ and ‘Improving Radiation Safety
respectively, which have shown encouraging Standards in Dental Practice’ were approved and
output. four on-going projects were renewed.
The Status of Environmental Safety and
The details of various activities of safety assessment
Occupational Exposures are given in Chapter
and research are presented in Chapter-7.
4. The Status of Emergency Preparedness of the
Nuclear Facilities is given in Chapter 5. Public Outreach Activities
Regulatory Safety Document Development AERB hosted a 3-day National Conference on
During the year, two new Safety Guides viz. Regulatory Interface (NCRI)-2017 at Mumbai
³6WDQGDUG)RUPDWDQG&RQWHQWVRI6DIHW\$QDO\VLV with an objective to foster an environment wherein,
Report (SAR) for Nuclear Power Plants” (AERB/ the Licencees, Stakeholders and Professional
1336** DQG RQ ³0HGLFDO &\FORWURQ Associations could interact, discuss and provide
Facilities” (AERB/RF-RS/SG-3) were approved valuable feedback to AERB on various issues
and were uploaded on AERB website. AERB related to Nuclear / Radiation Safety, regulatory
reviewed 17 draft safety standards and 8 draft requirements and practices world-wide, emerging
GRFXPHQWSUHSDUDWLRQSUR¿OHV'33RI,$($DQG trends in design and manufacturing, challenges in
commented. supply chain and effectiveness of quality assurance
xv
Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB during Inauguration of NCRI-2017
programmes. More than 300 delegates participated Apart from above mentioned activities, AERB
in the conference. timely provided response to queries posted by the
members of public.
Nine programmes focusing on the aspects of
enhancing radiation safety awareness were The details of AERB initiatives for engaging
conducted for target audience. In addition 40 safety with stakeholders and public accountability are
awareness programmes were conducted at various presented in Chapter- 8 and 9.
radiation facilities during regulatory inspections. International Cooperation
AERB launched its new website www.aerb.gov.in Bilateral and multilateral meetings were held with
on August 15, 2017. The intent of the new website delegations from USNRC, CANDU Owners Group
is to make it more user-friendly, to enhance the (COG) and Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).
transparency and public outreach. Information on
AERB signed a bilateral arrangement with
regulatory activities on operating nuclear power
Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority
plants, VLJQL¿FDQW events, radioactive HIÀXHQW
(BAERA) for the exchange of technical information
discharges, occupational exposures etc. are provided
and co-operation in the regulation of nuclear safety
on the website and are updated periodically.
and radiation protection. Also, entered in bilateral
AERB provides information to its stakeholders agreement with Japan for the co-operation in the
through other means also like annual reports, press peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
UHOHDVHV EULH¿QJV HWF (LJKW SUHVV UHOHDVHV ZHUH
AERB hosted 5th meeting of Reactor Physics
issued during this period.
Working Group (RPWG) of International VVER
AERB advertisements were given in print media Regulator Forum.
on aspects of obtaining requisite consents for
The 7th Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties
possessing or use of radioactive sources/radiation
to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) was
generating equipment and requirements for medical
held at the Headquarters of IAEA in Vienna,
diagnostic X-ray units.
Austria from March 27 - April 7, 2017 in which
AERB also participated in some of the science Indian Delegation led by Chairman AERB with
and technology fairs for displaying exhibits on experts from AERB, BARC, NPCIL and the
the safety and regulatory aspects of nuclear and Indian Embassy at Vienna participated. India had
radiation facilities. submitted its National Report for review by the
xvi
Indian Delegation in 7th Convention on Nuclear Safety Meeting at IAEA
Contracting Parties in August, 2016. A total of schools of BARC, IGCAR and NFC and transfer
224 questions on the report were answered within of experienced personnel from operating plants
the stipulated time. The detailed report is made and R&D institutes. As on December 31, 2017,
available on AERB website. WKH VFLHQWL¿F DQG WHFKQLFDO PDQSRZHU LQ $(5%
is 340.
Indian delegation also organised a side event on
March 28, 2017 wherein a detailed presentation As a part of competence development, AERB
was given on the Pressure Tube (PT) leak events at continued to train its staff by organising training
KAPS units and their status of investigations. programmes, management development
programmes (MDP), workshops, on-job training at
The details on AERB’s contribution at various nuclear facilities, refresher courses, technical talks,
international fora are presented in Chapter-10. colloquia, participation in DAE’s Administrative
Human Resource Development and Training Institute (ATI) etc.
Infrastructure AERB is upgrading the infrastructure at its
AERB augmented the technical manpower Headquarter and regional regulatory centers.
substantially by inducting postgraduates through The details on human resources development and
AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme (AGFS) in infrastructure and welfare activities are presented
IIT Bombay and IIT Madras and through training in Chapter-11.
xvii
Chapter 1
SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
1.1 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF stages are carried out through multi-tier system of
NUCLEAR FACILITIES safety committees. The committees include experts
Nuclear facilities in India are sited, designed, LQUHOHYDQW¿HOGVLQFOXGLQJSURFHVVGHVLJQFRQWURO
constructed, commissioned and operated in and instrumentation, thermal hydraulics, structural
analysis, reactor physics, seismology etc., relevant
accordance with strict quality and safety standards.
to nuclear and radiation safety. The higher level
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) oversees
Committees include experts from academia,
the safety of the nuclear and radiation facilities and
national R&D institutes, and government bodies.
has been mandated to frame safety policies, lay
The multi-tiered system of safety reviews follows
down safety standards and requirements. AERB has
WKH SULQFLSOH RI ³PDQDJHPHQW E\ H[FHSWLRQ´
established a regulatory framework, which involves
following graded approach and is based on
stipulating the safety requirements, issuance of
SULQFLSOHV UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG FULWHULD VSHFL¿HG E\
UHJXODWRU\ FRQVHQWV YHUL¿FDWLRQ RI FRPSOLDQFH
AERB in its regulatory documents.
through safety reviews and inspections during
various stages viz. siting, design, construction, In this approach, the issues of greater
commissioning, operation etc. VLJQL¿FDQFH DUH JLYHQ FRQVLGHUDWLRQ DW KLJKHU
level committees for their satisfactory resolution.
All nuclear facilities undergo an elaborate
Recommendations of these committees concerning
and in-depth safety review during various stages.
the various safety issues and consents are
The objective of safety reviews and assessment at
further considered by AERB for arriving at
various consenting stages is illustrated below:
regulatory decisions. This arrangement ensures
The safety reviews related to the consenting comprehensiveness of the reviews and effective
decisions and safety monitoring during various FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH VSHFL¿HG UHTXLUHPHQWV
the chosen site meets the Site Evaluation Criteria and is suitable for the proposed type and capacity of the
plant from environmental considerations
Sitting
the proposed plant design and the applicant’s statements and commitments meet the regulatory requirements,
Construction the proposed construction meets quality requirements
the test program and procedures are consistent with requirements, the performance of the plant is as per
GHVLJQLQWHQWWKHUHVXOWVRIWHVWVFRQ¿UPWKHDGHTXDF\RIWKHGHVLJQIRUUHJXODURSHUDWLRQRIWKHSODQW
Commissioning safety analysis for the as-built facility has been carried out to meet the regulatory requirements
the operational limits and conditions are consistent with regulatory requirements and an adequate level
of safety is maintained during operation through proper operational and maintenance procedures and
Operation DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRQWURORUJDQLVDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHVWUDLQLQJDQGTXDOL¿FDWLRQRIRSHUDWLQJSHUVRQQHOPHHWWKH
requirements, and conditions for renewal of consent as prescribed by AERB.
1
Additionally, AERB carries out periodic regulatory fuel cycle and other related industrial facilities;
inspections to check conformance with regulatory overall safety performance of the nuclear facilities
requirements and consenting conditions. in operation and construction; R&D units and other
The licence for operation of the facilities is facilities; industrial safety of nuclear facilities; and
given after ensuring its satisfactory construction VLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWVDQGHQIRUFHPHQWDFWLRQVGXULQJ
and commissioning as per the approved design, the year 2017 are covered in following sections.
complying with the quality requirements and the 1.2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER
VSHFL¿HG VDIHW\UHJXODWRU\ UHTXLUHPHQWV 7KH CONSTRUCTION
licence for operation is given for a maximum
YDOLGLW\ SHULRG RI ¿YH \HDUV 5HQHZDO RI OLFHQFH AERB has established an elaborate system
for operation is considered based on separate for in-depth safety review of nuclear power projects
application along with a comprehensive safety and fuel cycle facilities that are under construction.
review as per the laid down requirements and For this purpose, different stages of ‘regulatory
process. FRQVHQW¶KDYHEHHQLGHQWL¿HGDVIROORZLQJ
AERB has also been entrusted with the xSiting
responsibility of review and assessment of nuclear xConstruction
security aspects for different types of nuclear xCommissioning
facilities in India. AERB has issued various
regulatory documents specifying nuclear security Important outcome of the safety reviews
requirements for nuclear facilities. Depending on and assessments related to nuclear power projects
the project stage, security aspects are reviewed and fuel cycle facilities are given in subsequent
against relevant regulatory requirements. Multi-tier paragraphs.
approach is adopted for review of security aspects The number of meetings of the important
also. safety review committees of the facility undergoing
Security review structure in AERB was reviews are given in following table:
restructured in September 2016, with constitution Table 1.1: Safety Review Committee Meetings
of a Committee for Reviewing Security Aspects of the Power Projects
(CRSA) and a working group (CRSA-WG) under
CRSA, for carrying out review of nuclear security Number of
Project Safety Committee
aspects of nuclear power plants (NPP), security of Meetings
radiation source in radiation facilities and during ACPSR-LWR 6
transport etc.
ACPSR-PHWR & PFBR 1
CRSA undertakes the detailed study to
identify the security aspects related to safety PDSC-PFBR 6
(including cyber security related to safety) which
are required to be brought under the regulatory PDSC KKNPP-3&4 8
purview of AERB and submits recommendations to PDSC (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8, 2
AERB. CRSA also reviews draft AERB regulatory GHAVP-1&2)
documents and updates existing documents related
PDSC (DFRP, FRFCF and DFMF) 2
to security of nuclear and radiation facilities based
on new information including internationally CESC (KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8, 16
available information. GHAVP-1&2)
The safety status of the nuclear facilities i.e. DSRC-NFC 3

nuclear facilities under construction; operating
Total 44
nuclear power plants and research reactors; nuclear
2
(A) NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS UNDER Following are the highlights of Safety Review of
CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS KKNPP Unit-2:
A1. Light Water Reactor Based NPPs (a) Out-of-Pile Testing of Prototype Double
(i) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project Check Valve
Unit-2 After carrying out extensive type testing of
prototype Double Check Valve (DCV) at Russian
Based on satisfactory review of Phase-C2
Federation, as recommended further out-of-pile
commissioning tests and plant performance,
tests were carried out by NPCIL for 170 hot cycles
clearance for Phase-C3 commissioning of
in one of the DAE facility at Kalpakkam. The
KKNPP-2 was granted for raising the reactor
performance of DCV was found acceptable and
power upto 100% FP. In Phase-C3 commissioning,
meeting the design intent. After completion of hot
UHDFWRU SRZHU ZDV ¿UVW UDLVHG WR )3 ZKHUH
testing, visual inspection of prototype internals
commissioning tests related to reactor physics,
was carried out and no indications were observed.
calibration of Neutron Flux Monitoring Equipment
These valves were installed in KK Unit-1 and
(NFME) and performance tests on In-Core
tested for 3 cycles at 130°C and performance was
Monitoring Systems (ICMS) were carried out.
found satisfactory.
Subsequently reactor power was raised to 100%FP
and the Phase-C3 dynamic tests viz., tripping of 2 (b) Implementation of Design Change Notice
out of 4 Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs), TG trip (DCN) for New DCVs
test with operation of BRU-K (condensate steam Site submitted a proposal for implementation
dump valves), Tripping of one CCW pump, tripping of DCNs (similar to that of KKNPP-1) of new
of one Condensate Extraction Pump (CEP-2), TG DCVs for installing in KKNPP-2. These DCNs of
load shedding to zero value (Gross Load Rejection new DCV for KKNPP-1 were already reviewed
WHVWFKHFNLQJHI¿FLHQF\RI3DVVLYH+HDW5HPRYDO and accepted. In view of this, AERB permitted
System (PHRS) etc. were carried out successfully. to implement the peripheral DCNs (excluding
Plant performance data with stabilised reactor installation of DCVs) such that the implementation
power operation at 100% FP for 7 days was of DCNs does not have any safety impact on
submitted by KKNPP-2. existing system and can be reverted back if new
Subsequently, AERB reviewed application DCVs are not installed. However, separate proposal
for operating Unit-2 at rated power for limited for installation of new DCVs in KKNPP-2 along
duration i.e. 100 effective full power days (EFPDs) with action plan for establishing the reliable
and granted clearance for operating the Unit-2 for performance of new DCVs needs to be submitted.
100 EFPDs. Thereafter site submitted a request for (c) Main Outfall (MOF) Sampling
extension of clearance up-to February 28, 2018
During liquid radioactive waste (LRW)
which was reviewed and extension was granted.
discharge through Unit-2 (on trial basis to check
Presently, KK Unit-2 is operating at 99.5%FP,
HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI ¿HOG FKDQJH QRWLFH WKH 7ULWLXP
1000MWe.
value on west side was observed to be below
During the course of commissioning detectable limit, however on east side, the value
activities, AERB Site Observer Teams (SOT) were observed was 0.36 Bq/ml (limiting value is 1 Bq/
deputed regularly to KKNPP site for physical ml). Since the discharge point is on east side, a
YHUL¿FDWLRQ RI FRPSOLDQFHV WR WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV higher concentration of radioactivity is expected on
and recommendations made by AERB as well as to the east side of discharge canal compared to west
witness various commissioning tests. The reports side before it joins sea. Site was asked to relocate
sent by SOT were regularly reviewed for necessary the location of sensors for realistic/representative
follow up at AERB. measurements.
3
G 5&3,PSXOVH7XEH/HDN5HFWL¿FDWLRQ KKNPP Unit-3&4 plant design is a repeat
Steam leak was found on the RCP-2 design of Unit-1&2, which was extensively
differential pressure transmitter impulse line, reviewed in AERB, hence review process for Unit-
on the discharge side. As leak was in the non- 3&4 was optimised to detailed review of design
LVRODEOH ORFDWLRQ IRU UHFWL¿FDWLRQ RI OHDNDJH ,FH differences impacting safety and compliance to
SOXJJLQJ WHFKQLTXH TXDOL¿HG WKURXJK PRFNXS AERB safety code on ‘Design of Light Water
ZDVDGRSWHG6LWHVXEPLWWHGÀH[LELOLW\DQDO\VLVIRU Reactors based Nuclear Power Plants’.
the impulse tubes of Unit-2 and based on the same Aspects reviewed broadly included those
corrective measures in other supports of impulse related to site characteristics and analysis/design
tubes were also incorporated. of civil engineering structures, updated work
(e) Implementation of Manual Updating of RQ 'HVLJQ %DVLV )ORRG /HYHO FRQ¿UPDWRU\
LHGR Limiting Value geotechnical investigations, analysis and design
methodologies of SSCs including results of seismic
Site submitted a proposal on manual updating DQDO\VLV DQG GHVLJQ FKHFN RI LGHQWL¿HG ORFDWLRQV
of LHGR limiting value based on burn-up in lower in foundations of safety related structures,
level system of ICIS of Unit-2 (similar to that of
construction methodology, mix design and QA
KKNPP-1) which was reviewed. Similar proposal
during construction.
on manual updating of LHGR limiting values were
already reviewed and accepted for KKNPP-1. In Based on safety review AERB granted
view of this, KKNPP-2 was permitted to implement clearance for FPC to KKNPP- 3&4 on June 23,
the similar manual updating of LHGR limiting 2017 with certain stipulations. FPC activities at
value and incorporate the feedback experience of Site were started and are currently in progress.
implementing the same in KKNPP-1. AERB accorded approval for commencement of
construction activities of various buildings.
(f) Revised schedule of implementation of
AFR Facility AERB Site Observer Teams (SOT) were
deputed regularly to KKNPP Site for physical
NPCIL submitted a note providing status
YHUL¿FDWLRQRIFRPSOLDQFHVDQGWRZLWQHVVYDULRXV
of Away From Reactor (AFR) for KKNPP-1&2
activities. The reports sent by SOT were reviewed
and addressing the postulation of liner leak in
for necessary follow up.
L-section of SFP compartment (which is the largest
compartment) and consequent action plan for SFA The following are the highlights of safety
storage. review of KKNPP-3&4:
(ii) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (a) Design Basis Flood Level (DBFL)
(Unit- 3&4) During excavation clearance, a detailed study
Subsequent to AERB Clearance for Site towards evaluation of the run up due to short period
Excavation for KKNPP-3&4 on January 21, 2016, waves using coupled models was recommended
Site completed excavation activities including WR EH FDUULHG RXW DQG EDVHG RQ WKH VDPH ÀRRG
consolidation grouting for main plant buildings. OHYHO ZDV DVNHG WR EH UH¿QHG 13&,/ VXEPLWWHG
NPCIL submitted application seeking Consent for UHYLVHGÀRRGHVWLPDWLRQGXHWRVWRUPVXUJH7KH
First Pour of Concrete (FPC) of KKNPP Unit-3&4 estimated Design Basis Flood Level (DBFL) is
on April 27, 2016 and progressively submitted P6XI¿FLHQWPDUJLQH[LVWVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Reports (PSARs) DBFL (5.56 m) even under beyond design basis
Chapters relevant for FPC clearance along with scenarios for the site as the safe grade elevation of
changes w.r.t. KKNPP-1&2. the KKNPP site is 7.5 m above MSL.
4
E *HRSK\VLFDO 6XUYH\ DQG &RQ¿UPDWRU\ Based on satisfactory review of the prerequisites
Geotechnical Investigations and other safety related aspects, AERB granted
AERB, as part of Excavation Consent, asked permission on April 24, 2017 for integrated pre-
NPCIL to take up additional geophysical studies to heating of main and safety vessels, primary sodium
verify existence of lineament reported in literature. circuit, secondary sodium circuit and the Safety
Based on satisfactory review of these additional Grade Decay Heat Removal (SGDHR) circuit up
investigations, existence of any additional to 180o C.
seismogenic feature was ruled out. Post excavation,
WRDI¿UPWKHDGHTXDF\RIIRXQGDWLRQVSHFL¿FLQSXWV
XVHG FRQ¿UPDWRU\ JHRWHFKQLFDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQV
were carried out and outcome investigations were
reviewed.
(c) M35 Grade Concrete
The 28 day compressive strength for M35
concrete from batching plant is found to meet the
requirements of minimum strength. The green
concrete temperature control and workability
requirements at the point of pumping were found
WR PHHW WKH VSHFL¿HG UHTXLUHPHQWV 13&,/ KDV
PDGHFRPPLWPHQWWKDWWKHVSHFL¿HGFKDUDFWHULVWLF
compressive strength will be met for cube as
well as cylinder specimens by ensuring testing of
cylinder specimens at same frequency as that of
FXEHVSHFLPHQV7KLVLVSHULRGLFDOO\EHLQJYHUL¿HG
in the regulatory inspections.
(d) QA Manual for Design and Construction
Overall QA aspects are covered in PSAR
Chapter-17 and in QA manual. These have
been reviewed and found to be satisfactory. For Secondary Sodium Pump
..133 4$ PDQXDO RQ GHVLJQ VSHFL¿FDOO\
covering the SSCs which are under Indian scope
has been reviewed. Revised QA manual for AERB also granted permission for melting
Construction was reviewed by AERB and found to DQG SXUL¿FDWLRQ RI VRGLXP LQ VHFRQGDU\ VRGLXP
be satisfactory. storage tank on June 6, 2017 and clearance for
A.2 Fast Breeder Reactor based NPPs ¿OOLQJ RI 6RGLXP LQ ERWK ORRSV RI 6HFRQGDU\
(i) Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Sodium Main Circuit (SSMC-1&2) on June 30,
2017 and permission for commissioning of both
Pre-commissioning activities related to loops of SSMC on December 22, 2017.
commissioning of secondary sodium system,
VRGLXP ¿OOLQJ LQ WKH PDLQ YHVVHO WHVWLQJ RI AERB Site Observer Teams (SOTs) were
fuel handling equipment etc. are in progress at deputed to PFBR Kalpakkam Site since July 2017,
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). Earlier, in for independent regulatory monitoring safety
February 2017, PFBR undertook Leak Rate Testing aspects related to the ongoing commissioning
of Reactor Containment Building at designed activities. The reports sent by SOT were regularly
pressure. reviewed for necessary follow up.
5
A.3 Pressurised Heavy Water Rectors based
NPP
(i) KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8
Safety review of twin units of 700 MWe
Pressurised Heavy Water Rectors (PHWRs) each at
Kakrapar, Gujarat (KAPP-3&4) and Rawatbhata,
Rajasthan (RAPP-7&8) are in progress. Civil
construction activities related to safety and non-
safety buildings were in progress at KAPP-3&4
and RAPP-7&8.
Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB and AERB

KAPP-4 IC Dome Liner Erection 6U2I¿FHUVGXULQJYLVLWWR.$33 .DNUDSDU
Construction of major structures like Reactor AERB carried out the safety review of PSAR
Building Containment and Internal Structures chapters pertaining to site characteristics and
is nearing completion. After erection of major design of civil engineering structures. GHAVP is an
equipment like End-shield, Calandria, Steam alluvial site, which poses several challenges with
Generators, Diesel Generators and core components respect to analysis and design of civil engineering
like Calandria Tubes (CT), Pressure Tubes (PT), structures. AERB undertook review of the NPCIL
Reactivity Devices etc. are being installed. submittals pertaining to detailed seismo-tectonic
Functionality tests and pre-commissioning and geotechnical investigations for GHAVP site.
activities on few systems were started. Review of reports related to estimation of design
basis for external events, especially ground motion,
(ii) GHAVP-1&2
ÀRRG ZLQG DQG WHPSHUDWXUH DQG JHRWHFKQLFDO
AERB issued siting Consent for four units investigations were completed.
(700 MWe PHWRs) at Gorakhpur, Haryana site To eliminate the potential for liquefaction,
(GHAVP-1 to 4) in 2015. Design of these units scheme of ground improvement was proposed,
at GHAVP-1 to 4 is similar to KAPP-3&4 and IHDVLELOLW\ RI ZKLFK ZDV YHUL¿HG E\ FRQGXFWLQJ
5$33 H[FHSW IRU VLWH VSHFL¿F FKDQJHV mock-up at site. The proposed scheme along with
NPCIL submitted application seeking clearance for the results of mock-up were reviewed and accepted,
excavation for GHAVP-1&2. with certain stipulations regarding quality control
during actual execution.
6
ensure strengthening of quality surveillance during
manufacturing of the safety critical equipment and
thorough review of Vendor’s Quality Management
System.
(b) Re-rolling of Calandria Tube (J-8) at
KAPP-4
An Event Report for the Calandria Tube
(CT) shifting by ~3 mm to South end at channel
J-8 at KAPP-4 after rolling at North end was
submitted. The CT was removed after carrying out
Ground Improvement-Trial using Replacement of PRFNXSVDQGWKHQHZUROOHGMRLQWZDVTXDOL¿HG
/LTXH¿DEOH6WUDWDE\&RPSDFWHG6RLO
Soil-Cement Mix at GHAVP in post-installation tests. ER is under review at
AERB.
AERB undertook a detailed review of the (c) Pre-stressing Procedure and Sequence for
analysis methodology for safety related buildings the Inner Containment at KAPP-3&4
incorporating soil structure interaction (SSI)
DVSHFWV DQG REVHUYDWLRQV ZHUH LGHQWL¿HG IRU AERB continued the safety review of civil
compliance. Based on safety review excavation engineering aspects for the under construction
consent of GHAVP-1&2 is under consideration. 2x700 MWe PHWR NPP units at KAPP. Reports
related to pre-stressing procedure and sequence for
Highlights of safety review of PHWRs under the inner containment were reviewed and accepted,
Construction (KAPP-3&4 and RAPP-7&8) are based on which pre-stressing activities commenced
given below: at KAPP site. AERB also reviewed the approach
(a) Indications in the welds of the Central Top undertaken for ultimate load capacity analysis of
Hatch Beam (CTHB) of KAPP-4 inner containment structure vis-à-vis the material
An Event Report (ER) for the observed liquid models and the failure criteria adopted for the
penetrant examination (LPE) indications in the analysis.
welds of the Central Top Hatch Beam of KAPP- (d) Erection of Dome Structure of Primary
4 was reviewed at AERB. Based on the feedback Containment of RAPP-7&8
w.r.t. KAPP-4 CTHB, AERB recommended to
Primary containment of 700MWe PHWR
is provided with liner for reducing the leakages
through the containment. For ease of construction,
dome structure along with the liner was pre-
fabricated at ground level and placed over the
Primary Containment wall. Detailed review of
installation of major equipment in the Reactor
Building, mechanical aspects of ring header of
Containment Spray System etc. was completed.
(B) FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES UNDER
CONSTRUCTION: REVIEW STATUS
Safety review activities related to fuel cycle
,QQHU&RQWDLQPHQW'RPH/LQHU$VVHPEO\DW5$33
facilities continued during the year.
7
B.1 Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel
Reprocessing Plant
Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel
Reprocessing Plant (DFRP) is being set up at
Kalpakkam for reprocessing of the spent fuel from
Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) on regular basis
and demonstration of reprocessing process of the
PFBR spent fuel. While the construction activities
in the main process plant have reached completion,
civil construction activities in the Head End Facility
(HEF) of the plant, which houses the cells required
Multi Pin Chopper for FRFCF
for receiving and initial processing of spent fuel
subassemblies, are nearing to completion. In the
main process plant, pre-commissioning checks are AERB had reviewed the institutional
in progress. mechanisms at the site for quality assurance
The seismic design bases of the plant aspects related to construction of the facility, based
buildings of DFRP were as per the then prevailing on which the facility was asked to establish a
Indian Standard IS 1893 - 1975, as the Kalpakkam comprehensive mechanism for addressing of QA/
site was categorised under Zone II as per the QC aspects during procurement, manufacturing,
standard. In line with the recent regulatory construction and commissioning of equipment, in
requirements relating to seismic design inputs DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHLUVDIHW\VLJQL¿FDQFH
for nuclear facilities and the latest assessment of
the seismic design inputs that were worked out
for the Kalpakkam site, AERB had asked DFRP
to take up a seismic re-evaluation of DFRP with
respect to the latest ground motion parameters
derived for Kalpakkam site. In compliance to this,
DFRP has now submitted a document on seismic
re-evaluation of DFRP plant, which is currently
under review.
B.2 Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF)
FRFCF is an integrated facility being set Waste Management Plant
up at Kalpakkam. The facility will be used for
recycling the spent fuel from PFBR, including
fuel fabrication and assembly, reprocessing and
waste management. AERB issued consent for
construction of this facility in the year 2013 and
subsequently granted extension of Consent for
Construction of FRFCF during December 2016.
Presently, civil construction activities of Waste
Management Plant (WMP), Core Subassembly
Plant (CSP), Fuel Fabrication Plant (FFP)
and Reprocessed Uranium Plant (RUP) are in
progress. AERB is following up the safety aspects
Fuel Fabrication Plant
related to construction.
8
B.3 Nuclear Fuel Complex, Kota (NFC-K) 1.3.2 Consents / Clearances / Permissions Issued
500 Tons Per Annum (TPA) PHWR Fuel During the year, a number of applications
Fabrication Facility (PFFF) and 165 TPA Zircaloy from the utilities were reviewed and licences for
Fabrication Facility (ZFF) are being setup at operations /clearances / permissions were issued.
Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Kota to meet
x Renewal of licence for operation of MAPS
additional demand of nuclear fuel supply for the
under Factories Act, 1948 up to December
4 nos. of 700 MWe PHWRs coming up at RAPP-
DQG.$33 ,Q¿UVWSKDVHWZRPRGXOHV 31, 2020
of each 250 TPA PHWR Fuel Fabrication Facility x Renewal of licence for operation of KGS-
and 65 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication Facility will be 1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and
set up and 100 TPA Zircaloy Fabrication Facility Factories Act, 1948 up to May 31, 2022
will be added in second phase in near future.
x Renewal of licence for operation of TAPS-
AERB issued siting consent for NFC-K on 1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and
May 28, 2014. Subsequently, AERB has given Factories Act, 1948 initially up to December
clearances for site grading, various construction 31, 2017 and subsequently up to March 31,
activities such as boundary wall, peripheral road, 2021
watch towers, construction power, temporary
storage shed and non-plant buildings, construction x Renewal of licence for operation of RAPS-
of which is under progress. 3&4 under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and
Factories Act, 1948 up to October 31, 2022
Review of analysis and design of critical
civil engineering structures for the proposed NFC x Renewal of licence for operation of RAPS-
at Kota were completed. The most important part 5&6 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 up to
of the facility is the PHWR fuel fabrication facility March 31, 2020
(PFFF), which is designed as per the seismic loads x Renewal of Licence for operation of CORAL,
corresponding to maximum credible earthquake IGCAR under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 up
of IS-1893. Other structures of NFC-Kota are to September 30, 2017 then extended up to
designed for design basis earthquake as per IS-
March 31, 2018.
1893.
1.3.3 Safety Review of Operating Nuclear
Safety review of application and submissions
Facilities and Research Reactors
towards grant of consent for construction of plant
building of NFC-Kota is under progress. Number of meetings conducted by various
1.3 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER safety committees/standing committees/expert
PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS group during the year are given in Table 1.3
1.3.1 Operational Safety Review The safety status of operating NPPs and
research reactors is described below:
AERB carries out safety review and
monitoring of operating NPPs and research reactors (i) Tarapur Atomic Power Station
following multi-tier review process. Exhaustive TAPS-1&2
review takes place during review of application
for renewal of licence. Currently there are 21 The licences for operation of TAPS-1&2
operating nuclear power plants in the country. The under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories
details of these NPPs indicating their capacity, Act, 1948 were valid till March 31, 2017. Station
commencement of operation and validity of current submitted applications for renewal of these licences
operating licence is given in Table 1.2. up to December 31, 2017. These applications were
9
Table 1.2: List of Operating Nuclear Power Plants
Gross
Site / District / Commencement of Validity of
NPP Unit Type Capacity
State Operation Licence
(MWe)
Tarapur Atomic TAPS-1 160

Power Station BWR October-1969 March 2021
Tarapur/
TAPS-2 160
Palghar/
TAPS-3 540 August -2006
Maharashtra
PHWR August 2021
TAPS-4 540 September -2005
Rajasthan RAPS-1# 100 December-1973

Atomic Power August 2019
RAPS-2 200 April-1981
Station
RAPS-3 Rawatbhata/ 220 June-2000
Chithaurgarh PHWR October 2022
RAPS-4 /Rajasthan 220 December-2000
RAPS-5 220 February-2010

March 2020
RAPS-6 220 March-2010
Kakrapar KAPS-1 220 May-1993

Kakrapar/
Atomic Power PHWR July 2019
KAPS-2 Tapi/Gujarat 220 September-1995
Station
Madras Atomic MAPS-1 Kalpakkam/ 220 January-1984
December
Power Station Kancheepuram / PHWR
MAPS-2 220 2020
Tamil Nadu March-1986
Narora Atomic NAPS-1 Narora/ 220 January-1991

Power Station Bulandshahar / PHWR June 2018
NAPS-2
220 July-1992
Uttar Pradesh
Kaiga KGS-1 220 November -2000
Kaiga/ May 2022
Generating
KGS-2 North Uttar 220 March-2000
Station PHWR
KGS-3 Kannada / 220 May-2007
Karnataka April 2018
KGS-4 220 January-2011
Kudankulam Kudankulam/
Nuclear Power KKNPP-1 Thirunelveli/ VVER 1000 December-2014 July 2020
Plant
Tamil Nadu
# Unit under shutdown since 2004 and the reactor core is defueled.
10
Table 1.3: Meetings of Safety Committees
No. of
Name of the Safety Committee/Expert Groups
Meetings
SARCOP 17
TAPS-1&2 Safety Committee 10
PHWR Safety Committee-1 14
(RAPS-1&2, MAPS-1&2, NAPS & KAPS-1&2)
PHWAR Safety Committee-2 12
(KGS-1&2, KGS-3&4, RAPS-3&4 & RAPS-5&6)
PHWAR Safety Committee-3 (TAPS-3&4) 08
Kudankulam Safety Committee (KKNPP-1) 11
IGCAR Safety Committee (RR & CORAL) 05
Standing Committee on Reactor Physics (SC-RP) 10
Standing Committee on Control, Instrumentation and Computer based Systems (SCCI&CS) 06
([SHUW*URXS2Q(TXLSPHQW4XDOL¿FDWLRQ(*(4 05
Expert Group on Coolant Channels (EG-CC) 17
Civil Engineering Safety Committee for Operating Plants (CESCOP) 04
Total 119
reviewed in safety committees and AERB extended forthcoming two unit outage which is scheduled
the above licences up to December 31, 2017. from last week of December 2017. Station has also
Subsequently, station submitted a combined planned to carry out inspection of safety related
application for renewal of licence for operation civil structures in the same outage.
under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories General performance of TAPS-1&2 with
Act, 1948 till March 31, 2021. AERB reviewed UHVSHFW WR LQGXVWULDO DQG ¿UH VDIHW\ KHDOWK DQG
the application through its multi-tier review environment is satisfactory except for the fatal
process. During review, it was noted that station
accident that occurred while transporting the cask
has made satisfactory progress towards resolution
over long distance using forklift. Subsequent
RI WKH LGHQWL¿HG VDIHW\ VLJQL¿FDQW LVVXHV VXFK DV
to the accident, practice of using the forklift for
RPV inspection, core shroud health assessment,
replacement of small diameter pipings, health transferring the waste casks has been discontinued.
assessment of biological shield, transfer of spent Waste casks are now transported using trailer.
fuel subassemblies stored in dry casks, drywell Station has technical and administrative capability
KHDOWK DVVHVVPHQW HTXLSPHQW TXDOL¿FDWLRQ HWF for continued safe operation of the units. Based on
Works related to installation and commissioning above, AERB renewed the licence for operation of
of CFVS and containment inerting system are in TAPS-1&2 under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and
advance stage and are expected to be completed in Factories Act, 1948 up to March 31, 2021.
11
TAPS-1 is under shutdown since June 04, (iii) Rajasthan Atomic Power Station
2017 for refuelling, maintenance, surveillance RAPS-3&4
and in-service inspections. During this refuelling
outage, RPV core belt region weld joints have Licences for operation of RAPS-3&4 under
the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act,
EHHQ LQVSHFWHG ZLWK PRGL¿HG %$5& 9HVVHO
1948 were valid till October 31, 2017. Station had
Inspection System (BARVIS). Upper shell
submitted applications for renewal of these licences
weld joints have been re-inspected using Weld
to AERB, which were reviewed through its multi-
,QVSHFWLRQ0DQXSXODWRU0RGL¿HG5HYLHZRI
tier review process.
inspection results and subsequent assessments are
in progress. It has been noted that performance of RAPS-
3&4 with respect to nuclear, radiological and
(ii) Kaiga Generating Station industrial safety has been satisfactory. In-Service
KGS-1&2 Inspection (ISI) of safety related SSCs are being
carried out as per the approved ISI program.
Licences for operation of KGS-1&2 under
,6, UHVXOWV KDYH QRW LQGLFDWHG DQ\ VLJQL¿FDQW
the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories Act,
degradation in safety related SSCs and plant is
1948 were valid till May 31, 2017 and October FDSDEOH IRU VDIH RSHUDWLRQ IRU DW OHDVW QH[W ¿YH
09, 2017 respectively. KGS-1&2 had submitted \HDUV5DGLRDFWLYHHIÀXHQWGLVFKDUJHVDQGHIIHFWLYH
application for renewal of these licences to AERB, dose to a members of public residing at exclusion
which was reviewed through multi-tier review zone are well within the limits. A number of safety
process. PRGL¿FDWLRQV EDVHG RQ WKH RSHUDWLQJ H[SHULHQFH
Review assessment indicated that the have been implemented to enhance the plant safety.
performance of KGS-1&2 with respect to Majority of short and medium term post Fukushima
nuclear, radiological and industrial safety has LGHQWL¿HGVDIHW\PHDVXUHVKDYHEHHQLPSOHPHQWHG
been satisfactory. The units have been operated and actions are in progress for implementation of
in accordance with the requirements of Technical long term measures such as installation of PARS,
creation of OESC etc. In view of above, AERB
6SHFL¿FDWLRQVIRURSHUDWLRQ,Q6HUYLFH,QVSHFWLRQ
renewed the licence for operation of RAPS-3&4
(ISI) of safety related SSCs are being carried
under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories
out as per the approved ISI program. ISI results
Act, 1948 up to October 31 2022.
KDYH QRW UHYHDOHG DQ\ VLJQL¿FDQW GHJUDGDWLRQ LQ
safety related SSCs and plant is capable for safe RAPS-5&6
RSHUDWLRQIRUDWOHDVWQH[W¿YH\HDUV5DGLRDFWLYH Licence for operation of RAPS-5&6 under
HIÀXHQWGLVFKDUJHVUHPDLQHGZHOOEHORZWKHOLPLWV the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 was valid till May
VSHFL¿HGLQWHFKQLFDOVSHFL¿FDWLRQ(IIHFWLYHGRVH 31, 2015. AERB had earlier extended the licence
to a members of public residing at exclusion zone for operation of RAPS-5&6 for limited duration
were well within the limit prescribed by AERB. i.e. up to December 31, 2017 in order to facilitate
Majority of short and medium term post Fukushima completion of LGHQWL¿HG actions. After completion
LGHQWL¿HGVDIHW\PHDVXUHVKDYHEHHQLPSOHPHQWHG of pending actions, station submitted application
and actions are in progress for implementation of for renewal of licence for the remaining licensed
long term measures such as installation of PARS, period i.e. May 31, 2020 which was reviewed
creation of OESC etc. In view of above, AERB through multi-tier review process.
renewed the licence for operations of KGS-1&2 It was noted that the performance of RAPS-
under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and Factories 5&6 has been satisfactory. Station has resolved
Act, 1948 till May 2022. most of the operational problems and has revised
12
many mandatory documents as LGHQWL¿HG earlier. Considering above, licence of the CORAL facility
It was also noted that licence for operation of was extended up to September, 2017 subject to
RAPS-5&6 under Factory Act, 1948 is valid till keeping the facility in safe shutdown condition in
March 31, 2020. In order to synchronise these two FRPSOLDQFHZLWK7HFKQLFDO6SHFL¿FDWLRQVDQGQRW
licences and facilitate issuing a common licence carrying out reprocessing operation during this
in future, the licence for operation of RAPS-5&6 period.
under Atomic Energy Act, 1962 was renewed up to
March 31, 2020. Subsequently, CORAL had requested to
extend the current licence till March 2018 in
(iv) Madras Atomic Power Station order to complete the activities related to ageing
MAPS-1&2 management, residual life assessment of major
Licence for operation of MAPS under component and dose reduction, which are part
Factories Act, 1948 was valid till January 17, 2017. of licensing requirements. The application was
Station had submitted application for renewal reviewed in detail by AERB and licence of CORAL
of this licence. During review, it was noted that has been extended up to March 2018 to complete
the general performance of MAPS with respect the pending activities, subject to keeping the
to industrial safety, health and environment is facility in safe shutdown condition in compliance
satisfactory. Adequate staff strength exists in safety ZLWK7HFKQLFDO6SHFL¿FDWLRQV
section, medical section and welfare organisation. (vi) Update on Investigations on Incidents of
7KRXJK WKHUH LV D VKRUWIDOO LQ ¿UH VWDII DYDLODEOH Leakage from the Coolant Channels in
PDQSRZHU LV VXI¿FLHQW WR PHHW WKH IXQFWLRQDO
KAPS- 1&2 units
requirement. In view of this, licence for operation
of MAPS under of the Factories Act, 1948 was KAPS-1&2 units had experienced the events
renewed up to December 31, 2020. of leak from the coolant channel on March 11,
2016 and July 01, 2015 respectively. As reported
(v) Compact Reprocessing of Advanced Fuel
in Lead mini Cell earlier, the sections of the failed coolant channels
from these units were removed and brought to
The reprocessing of FBTR spent fuel is being BARC, Mumbai for Post Irradiation Examination.
carried out at CORAL (Compact Reprocessing of Apart from the observation of cracks in these
Advanced fuels in Lead cell) facility of IGCAR. channels, examination of these coolant channels
Licence for operation of CORAL under Atomic
also indicated shallow multiple localised corrosion
Energy Act, 1962 was valid up to March 2017 for
spots on their outer surface. Removal and detailed
the reprocessing of total 14 FBTR spent Fuel Sub-
examination in laboratory of three more healthy
Assemblies (FSA). Subsequent to completion of
channels, and in-situ non-destructive examination
reprocessing of 14 FSAs, CORAL had submitted
an application for continuation of operation for E\UH¿QHGWRROLQJRIODUJHQXPEHURIFKDQQHOVRQ
reprocessing additional 14 FSAs of FBTR. the reactors indicated that localised corrosion has
taken place practically in all the coolant channels
During review, it was noted that as per the of KAPS-1&2. Presence of some trace impurity
existing safety report, the facility is designed for ZDVLGHQWL¿HGLQWKHFDUERQGLR[LGHJDVZKLFKLV
reprocessing of 14 FSAs of FBTR due to limitation
used in the annulus gas system of such reactors. It
imposed by the waste tank capacities. The proposal
is indicated that the gas supply since 2012 could
entails regular operation of the facility which is
have presence of such impurity.
beyond the original design intent. In view of this,
AERB had decided to keep the facility in shutdown Detailed investigations through series
condition till review against stipulated requirements of experiments carried out simulating the
of AERB for regular operation is completed. reactor environment conditions of radiations,
13
temperature etc., have now revealed that the Presently, both the units of KAPS are under En-
localised corrosion had occurred due to presence Masse Coolant Channel Replacement (EMCCR)
RI WUDFH LPSXULW\ LGHQWL¿HG DV D K\GURFDUERQ FDPSDLJQ 7KH ¿UVW SKDVH RI (0&&5 FDPSDLJQ
in the CO2 gas. Through these experiments it which involves cutting, removal and disposal of
has been established that presence of such trace coolant channels, has been completed in KAPS-2
impurity in annulus gas mixture forms certain after approval from AERB. The second phase of
products under reactor environment conditions, EMCCR campaign is in progress. Activities of
which are capable of causing localised corrosion cleaning and inspection of retained core components
on the coolant channels under prolonged exposure i.e. calandria tubes, AGMS bellows, lattice tubes and
condition. Inspections were performed in all the bearing sleeves have been completed satisfactorily.
other PHWRs in the country, after the events in Installation of coolant channel assemblies is in
.$36 7KHVH LQVSHFWLRQV KDYH FRQ¿UPHG progress. In KAPS-1, defueling of core, draining
that the localised corrosion phenomena was and drying of PHT system have been completed.
PHT system feeder cutting and disposal activity is
limited to KAPS-1&2 reactors alone. Based on
in progress.
WKH RXWFRPH RI LQYHVWLJDWLRQV VSHFL¿FDWLRQV
for CO2 gas and its quality assurance checks (vii) Coolant Channel Inspection in TAPS-3&4
have been made more stringent for all operating TAPS-4 was shut down on April 23, 2017
PHWRs. The capability of coolant channel leak for Biennial Shutdown (BSD) activities. During
detection system was also analysed and found to this BSD, as per in-service inspection (ISI)
meet the design requirements. requirements, inspection of coolant channels was
([HFXWLYH'LUHFWRU$(5%DQG$(5%6URI¿FHUVGXULQJ9LVLWWR.$36 6LWH
14
carried out. During these inspections, multiple System (CFVS), implementation of hydrogen
indications were observed on the interior surface management provisions, establishing On-site
of two pressure tubes (PTs). AERB recommended Emergency Support Centre (OESC) etc. AERB is
station to carry out inspection of additional ten closely monitoring the status of implementation of
channels. During these inspections, multiple WKHLGHQWL¿HGVDIHW\XSJUDGHV
indications were observed on the interior surface in The generic Technical Basis Document
all inspected channels. Coolant channel L-08 was (TBD) on ‘Accident Management Guidelines
observed to have crack-like indications on ID side. (AMGs)’ for Indian PHWRs and BWRs has been
In view of this, TAPS-3 was also shut down on UHYLHZHGDQGDFFHSWHGE\$(5%6WDWLRQVSHFL¿F
July 11, 2017 for inspection and health assessment accident management guidelines are in place at all
of coolant channels. AERB had stipulated that the stations. With respect to hydrogen management
restart of TAPS-3&4 would be subject to regulatory in the containment during severe accident, a
review and clearance. generic Design Basis Report on Passive Catalytic
Subsequently, inspection of a number of Recombiner Device (PCRD) has been reviewed
coolant channels was carried out in TAPS-3&4. and accepted by AERB. The design basis for OESC
'HWDLOHGUHYLHZRILQVSHFWLRQ¿QGLQJVKDVUHYHDOHG DWDOO133VLWHVKDVEHHQ¿QDOLVHGDQG2(6&VDUH
that all these indications are volumetric in nature being constructed in phased manner at all the
except the indications observed in channel L-08 of sites. Installation of CFVS at TAPS-1&2 is near
TAPS-4. Structural integrity assessment has been completion and design basis report for CFVS at
FDUULHG RXW IRU WKH PD[LPXP GHSWK ÀDZ ZKLFK PHWRs is under review.
LQGLFDWHGDYDLODELOLW\RIVXI¿FLHQWPDUJLQVDJDLQVW AERB also reviewed the design basis reports
the requirement given in code. Channel L-08 has and preliminary analysis/design reports for the
been defueled and isolated from the main PHT OESC building being constructed at Kalpakkam
system. Based on the extensive safety reviews site. Based on the review, permission was granted
carried out and the corrective measures taken by to start the construction activity of OESC at
NPCIL, AERB granted permission to start TAPS- Kalpakkam.
3&4. Subsequently, both units are synchronised
1.3.5 Licensing of Operating Staff
to grid and performance of both units has been
satisfactory since synchronisation. Operating personnel of NPPs are required
to go through a licensing procedure which
1.3.4 Safety Assessment of Operating Nuclear
includes clearing checklists, written exams and
Power Plants (NPPs) in the wake of
ZDONWKURXJK DQG ¿QDOO\ TXDOL¿FDWLRQ LQWHUYLHZV
Accidents at Fukushima Daiichi NPPs
7KH ¿QDO DVVHVVPHQW TXDOL¿FDWLRQ LQWHUYLHZV IRU
Safety assessment carried out post Fukushima NPP operating personnel responsible for control
accident, indicated that the Indian NPPs have room operation namely Shift Charge Engineer
inherent strength in dealing with external hazards. (SCE), Assistant Shift Charge Engineer (ASCE)
However, certain safety enhancements were DQG &RQWURO (QJLQHHU DUH FRQGXFWHG E\ WKH ¿QDO
LGHQWL¿HGIRUVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHGHIHQFHVDJDLQVWWKH assessment committee constituted by AERB,
rare external events exceeding the design bases and which includes AERB representatives. A candidate
enhancing severe accident mitigation capabilities. after successfully completing the pre-requisites of
7KHVHDFWLRQVZHUHFODVVL¿HGDVVKRUWPHGLXPDQG licensing procedure, including clearing checklists,
long term measures. Implementation of the short written exams, walkthrough and scrutiny of
and medium term actions is completed. Actions training records, appears before this committee and
are in progress for the long term measures which only after satisfactory performance, the candidate
include provision of Containment Filtered Venting is licensed /re-licensed for the given position.
15
Table 1.4: Licensing of Operating Staff
No. of Persons Licensed Licensing Committee
Plants
SCE ASCE ASCE (F) CE CE (F) Meetings
TAPS-1&2 6 4 NA 3 NA 2
TAPS 3&4 8 9 1 7 3 2
RAPS-1&2 1 1 1 1 - 1
RAPS-3&4 3 1 3 6 - 1
RAPS-5&6 1 3 4 4 - 1
MAPS-1&2 3 3 1 3 1 2
NAPS-1&2 9 8 - 7 4 2
KAPS-1&2 3 3 3 9 4 2
KGS-1&2 2 7 1 3 - 2
KGS-3&4 3 5 2 2 1 2
KKNPP-1&2 - - NA - NA -
Total 39 44 16 45 13 17
During the year, 17 meetings were held mill had also submitted application for change in
for licensing/re-licensing of operating personnel authorised limits due to capacity enhancement.
responsible for control room operations at operating This is also under review in AERB.
plants. Total of 157 candidates were licensed / A list of DAE facilities authorised for safe
relicensed. In addition to above, 20 personnel for disposal/transfer of radioactive waste is brought
operation of FBTR (5 Senior Shift Engineers, 1 out in Table 1.5.
Senior Fuel Handling Engineer, 8 Junior Shift
Engineer, Junior Fuel Handling Engineer and Table 1.5: List of Facilities Authorised for Safe
5 Control Room Assistant / Field Supervisors) Disposal / Transfer of Radioactive Waste
and 1 Shift Engineer for operation of CORAL
S. No. of
were licensed / re-licensed . Details are given in Name of DAE Organisation
No. Facilities
Table 1.4.
1 Uranium Corporation of India 10
1.3.6 Authorisation for Safe Disposal / Transfer Limited (UCIL)
of Radioactive Wastes for DAE Facilities
2 Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL) 03
under GSR-125
3 Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) 05
The existing authorisation of all authorised
4 Nuclear Power Corporation of India 14
facilities are valid up to December 2018. All these Limited (NPCIL)
facilities submit the periodic waste disposal reports
5 IGCAR 05
to AERB to demonstrate compliance with the
authorisation conditions. 6 Board of Radiation & Isotope 05
Technology (BRIT)
During the year, application has been
7 Technology Demonstration Plant 01
received from NFC for change in authorised limits
(HWB)
due to change in process at NFC facilities. This
Total Number of Authorisations 43
is presently under review in AERB. Turamdih
16
1.4 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND OTHER Complex (ZC), Heavy Water Plants (HWP), Atomic
RELATED INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research
1.4.1 Operational Safety Review (AMD), Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology
(BRIT) and some of the facilities of Indira Gandhi
The nuclear fuel cycle facilities and other
Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). In addition
related industrial facilities under the regulatory
control of AERB are mines and ore processing to this, Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) and other
plants of Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. facilities handling Naturally Occurring Radioactive
(UCIL), mineral separation plants and chemical Materials (NORM) are also regulated by AERB
processing plants of Indian Rare Earths Limited with respect to radiological safety aspects. The list
(IREL), Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), Zirconium of fuel cycle facilities is presented in Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Status of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Other Facilities
Type of District / Scope of the Validity of Current

Name Functional Status
Facility State Facility Licence
Facilities Operated by UCIL

Mines Narwapahar In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Underground Renewal of licence
Jharkhand uranium mine under process
Turamdih In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Underground December 31, 2018
Jharkhand uranium mine
Bagjata In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Underground June 30, 2020
Mohuldih In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Underground October 31, 2019
Jaduguda Shutdown Singhbhum (E)/ Underground Statutory
Jharkhand uranium mine clearance from
Forest Advisory
Committee awaited
Bhatin Shutdown Singhbhum (E)/ Underground Statutory
Jharkhand uranium mine clearance from
Forest Advisory
Committee awaited
Tummalapalle In operation Y.S.R. Kadapa/ Underground February 28, 2018
Andhra Pradesh uranium mine
Banduhurang In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Opencast June 30, 2018
Ore Jaduguda In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Uranium Ore December 31, 2020
Processing Jharkhand Processing
Facilities
Turamdih In operation Singhbhum (E)/ Uranium Ore February 28, 2018
Jharkhand Processing
Tummalapalle Under Trial Y.S.R. Kadapa/ Uranium Ore December 31, 2019
operation Andhra Pradesh Processing
17
Facilities Operated by IREL
Mines Chavara In operation Kollam/ Mineral August 19, 2019

Kerala Separation
Manavalakurichi In operation Kanyakumari/ Mineral August 19, 2019

Tamil Nadu Separation
Ore OSCOM In operation Ganjam/ Odisha Mineral August 19, 2019

Processing Chatrapur Separation
Facilities
OSCOM In operation Ganjam/ Odisha Monazite April 30, 2020
Chatrapur Processing
Udyogamandal In operation Ernakulum/ Rare earths November 11, 2018

Kerala compounds
and Uranium
production
Facilities Operated by NFC
Nuclear NFC, In operation Hyderabad/ Fuel fabrication August 31, 2022

Fuel Hyderabad Telangana
Fabrication
Facilities Zirconium In operation Tuticorin/ Tamil Reactor grade June 30, 2021
Complex, Nadu Zirconium
Pazhayakayal sponge
production
Facilities Operated by HWB
Heavy HWP-Kota, In operation Rawatbhata/ Heavy water December 31, 2020

Water Rawatbhata Rajasthan production
Plants
HWP- In operation Khammam/ Heavy water June 30, 2020
Manuguru Telangana production
HWP- Heavy water Vadodara/ Tri-Butyl May 31, 2021

Baroda production Gujarat Phosphate
suspended (TBP) and
In operation, Potassium metal
(Solvent production.
production and K
& Na metal plant)
HWP- In operation Hazira /Gujarat Heavy water July 31, 2018

Hazira production
HWP- In operation Raigad/ Heavy Water December 31, 2019

Thal Maharashtra production
18
Heavy HWP-Tuticorin Heavy water Tuticorin/ Production of Application for

Water production Tamil Nadu solvents Renewal of Licence
Plants suspended TiAP, DHOA, for Operation dated
D2EHPA-II 04-12-2017 is under
In operation
review.
'LYHUVL¿HG
activities like
solvent production
plant)
HWP- Heavy water Angul/ Production of August 31, 2020
Talcher production Odisha solvents
suspended TBP, 10B
enriched Boron,
In operation
D2EHPA,
'LYHUVL¿HG
TOPO, TAPO,
activities like
DNPPA
solvent production
plant)
TDP- Main Plant Mumbai/ Crude Sodium October 31, 2021
Chembur operation is Maharashtra Di-Uranate
shutdown
(Some systems
are operated in
closed loop for
developmental
activities)
1.4.2 Licence Renewed/Issued x Licence for operation of 2000 Amp Sodium

Test Cell at Heavy Water Plant- Baroda was
AERB continued its regulatory supervision
renewed up to May 31, 2021.
of fuel cycle facilities. During the year, a number
of applications from the utilities were reviewed and x Licence for operation of Banduhurang mine
licences were renewed/issued/extended to various was renewed up to December 31, 2017 from
DAE units under the Factories Act, 1948 / Atomic June 30, 2017.
Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004. The x Licence for operation of Tummalapalle mill
OLFHQFHV DUH YDOLG IRU D SHULRG RI PD[LPXP ¿YH was extended up to December 31, 2019
years. x Licence for operation of HWP-Kota was
x Licence for operation of Nuclear Fuel renewed up to December 31, 2020.
Complex, Hyderabad was renewed up to 1.4.3 Safety Review of Fuel Cycle Facilities
August 31, 2022.
Number of meetings conducted by various
x Licence for operation of Zirconium Complex, safety committees for fuel cycle facilities and
Pazhayakayal was renewed up to June 30, other industrial facilities during the year is given
2021. Table 1.7.
19
Table 1.7: Meetings of Safety Review Committee of Fuel Cycle Facilities
Name of the Committee No. of meetings

Design Safety Review Committee for Nuclear Fuel Complex (DSRC-NFC) 3
Design Safety Review Committee for Uranium Extraction Projects (DSRC-UEP) 2
'HVLJQ6DIHW\5HYLHZ&RPPLWWHHIRU'LYHUVL¿HG3URMHFWV'65&'3 1
UCIL-AMD Safety Committee 2
BSM-NORM Safety Committee 2
NFC Safety Committee 5
HWP Safety Committee 3
IGCAR Safety Committee (Other Facilities) 2
Total 20
The highlights of safety review of the operating operation was extended up to December
fuel cycle and other industrial facilities are given 31, 2019 subject to resolution of certain
below: issues.
(i) Uranium Corporation of India Limited x Renewal of licence for operation of Turamdih
(UCIL) Mill is under review.
The mines at Narwapahar, Turamdih, (ii) Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL)
Banduhurang, Bagjata, Mohuldih and Rare Earth Division at IREL Udyogamandal
Tummalapalle were under normal operation. and Mineral Separation Plants (MSP) of IREL at
Operations at Jaduguda and Bhatin Mine are under Chavara, Manavalakurichi and Chatrapur operated
shutdown. The mills at Jaduguda and Turamdih safely during the year. Monazite up-gradation
were in operation during the year. Tummalapalle operations were under progress in Monazite up-
mill is in trial operation during the span. gradation plants at IREL OSCOM, Manavalakurichi
During the year, following proposals were and Chavara. Monazite Processing Plant (MoPP) at
reviewed: IREL, Orissa Sand Complex (OSCOM), Chatrapur
x Renewal of licence for operation of were in operation.
Banduhurang Mine was reviewed and The following proposals were reviewed:
the licence was extended up to June 30, x Proposal for permanent storage of Thorium
2018 subject to compliance of pending Oxalate available at RED, Udyogamandal in
recommendations. transit storages.
x Setting up of Magnetite (as by-product) plant x Proposal for processing of crude SDU
at Turamdih Mill was reviewed and consent (Sodium Di Uranate) received from
for construction and commissioning of Technology Demonstration Plant (TDP)
magnetite plant was granted. of Heavy Water Board using the existing
x Licence for operation of Tummalapalle facilities at RED, Udyogamandal as one time
Mill was reviewed and the licence for trial campaign.
20
(iii) Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) and recommendations, the licence for operation of
Zirconium Complex (ZC) Zirconium Complex was renewed further for a
period of four years beyond June 30, 2017 i.e. up
All the plants of NFC, Hyderabad and ZC,
to June 30, 2021.
Pazhayakayal operated safely during the year. The
following proposals of NFC and ZC were reviewed. Application for Renewal of Licence for
Operation of Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad
Application for Renewal of Licence for
Operation of Zirconium Complex, Pazhayakayal Application for renewal of Licence for
operation of Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC),
Licence for operation of Zirconium Hyderabad was reviewed and based on review,
Complex, Pazhayakayal was renewed for a period AERB renewed licence for operation of NFC,
of one year i.e. up to June 30, 2017 to allow ZC Hyderabad with enhanced product capacities
to comply with pending AERB recommendations. up to August 31, 2022. AERB also reviewed the
Zirconium Complex has satisfactorily addressed condition assessment of various plant buildings
the pending recommendations viz. submission at NFC-Hyderabad as part of the periodic safety
RI ¿UH KD]DUG DQDO\VLV UHSRUW PDQDJHPHQW RI review for licence renewal. In general the
VROLG OLTXLG HIÀXHQWV PDLQWDLQLQJ ¿UH PDQ condition of buildings was found to be satisfactory.
SRZHU DV SHU UHTXLUHPHQW RI &ODVV,, ¿UH VWDWLRQ Buildings which required repair and rehabilitation
DQG DXJPHQWDWLRQ RI ¿UH¿JKWLQJ HTXLSPHQW E\ ZHUH LGHQWL¿HG DQG DSSURSULDWH DVVHVVPHQWUHSDLU
SURYLVLRQRIDGGLWLRQDOPXOWLSXUSRVH¿UHWHQGHU approaches were proposed by NFC, which was
Based on satisfactory compliance to AERB considered by AERB.
SARCOP Members visit Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad
21
(iv) Heavy Water Plants by AERB Safety Committee and recommended
The heavy water plants operated safely during to renew the registration subject to resolution of
the year. Heavy water is produced at HWP-Kota, LGHQWL¿HGGLVFUHSDQFLHVVXFKDVTXDQWLW\RIXUDQLXP
Manuguru, Thal and Hazira. While, heavy water FRQWHQWLQVODJLQFOXVLRQRIVSHFL¿FDWLRQVIRUUDZ
production is suspended at HWP-Baorda, Talcher PDWHULDO SURGXFWV DQG UHVLGXH ODVW ¿YH \HDUV
and Tuticorin due to unavailability of feed synthesis operational data and radiological surveillance data
gas from fertiliser plant. Presently, HWP, Baroda is in the application.
engaged in production of potassium metal, sodium 1.5 OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE
metal and Tri Butyl Phosphate (TBP) solvent. OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN
'LYHUVL¿HG SURMHFWV QDPHO\ 9HUVDWLOH 6ROYHQW CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION
Production Plant (VSPP) at HWP, Talcher is under
normal operation and Versatile Solvent Synthesis 1.5.1 Safety Performance of Nuclear Facilities
Plant (VSSP) at HWP, Tuticorin is not operating. in Construction
Technology Demonstration Plant (TDP), Chembur KKNPP - 2
is under trial run due unavailability of feed from
KKNPP-2 completed Phase-C3
Phosphoric acid plant of RCF, Chembur. The
commissioning tests as per approved procedures
following proposals were reviewed:
and 100 EFPDs operation of KKNPP-2 is expected
Renewal of Licence for HWP-Kota WR EH FRPSOHWHG E\ WKH ¿UVW ZHHN RI -DQXDU\
Application for renewal of licence for 2018. The results of all commissioning tests were
operation of HWP-Kota was reviewed and based reviewed vis-à-vis requirements of commissioning
on review, AERB renewed licence for a period of procedures/ITPs and results were found to meet the
three years up to December 31, 2020. acceptance criteria.
Renewal of Licence for Operation of 2000 Amp In addition to it, as recommended, KKNPP-2
Sodium Test Cell at HWP-Baroda operated continuously for 7 days at 100% and
submitted plant performance data for the said period
Application for renewal of Licence for
demonstrating satisfactory performance. However,
operation of 2000 Amp Sodium Test Cell at HWP-
during Phase-C3 commission stage, there were
Baroda was reviewed and based on review, AERB
few instances resulting in shutdown of KKNPP-2
renewed licence for operation of 2000 Amp Sodium
for attending the maintenance/overhauling of
Test Cell at HWP-Baroda up to May 31, 2021.
some components. During power raise to 100%
(v) Atomic Minerals Directorate for FP passing of the MSR dump valves to condenser
Exploration and Research (AMD) was observed, in order to attend the same, unit was
Exploration work at various sites of AMD brought down to hot shutdown state. After carrying
in northern, southern, eastern, western, central and out necessary maintenance/overhauling on MSR
south-central regions was in progress. Considering dump valves, reactor was started back. During
the low hazard potential these sites are inspected Phase-C3, steam leak was found on the RCP-2
once in two years. differential pressure transmitter impulse line, on
WKHGLVFKDUJHVLGH)RUUHFWL¿FDWLRQRIOHDNUHDFWRU
(vi) Beach Sand Minerals (BSM) and Naturally
was brought to cold shutdown state. As the leak
Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM)
was in the non-isolable location from the MCP,
Facilities
IRUUHFWL¿FDWLRQRIWKHDERYHOHDNDJH,FHSOXJJLQJ
Periodic radiological reports submitted by technique was adopted.
these facilities were reviewed. Application for
KKNPP–3&4
renewal of registration for operation of facilities
for processing Columbite and Tantalite ores by M/s First Pour of Concrete (FPC) activities are
Metallurgical Products India Pvt. Ltd was reviewed being performed safely at Site and Job Hazard
22
Analysis (JHA) for the same was reviewed and 1.5.2 Safety Performance of the Nuclear
found to be acceptable. Facilities in Operation
PFBR 7KHRSHUDWLRQDOSHUIRUPDQFHDQGVLJQL¿FDQW
HYHQWVDUHUHYLHZHGDQGWKHUHTXLUHGPRGL¿FDWLRQV
Pre-commissioning/commissioning
are implemented. The operational performance
activities at PFBR are in progress. There were no
of all the NPPs has remained satisfactory during
major reportable incidents at PFBR calling for
last year. There was one fatal accident that took
enforcement actions during the period.
place at Tarapur Atomic Power Station - 1&2 on
KAPP-3&4, RAPP-7&8 and GHAVP-1&2 April 06, 2017. Details of which are given under
There were no major reportable incidents section 1.8.
calling for enforcement actions during construction $OO WKH VLJQL¿FDQW HYHQWV RFFXUUHG DW
and equipment erection stage of KAPP-3&4 and operating NPPs were reviewed in detail in AERB
RAPP-7&8. Pre-project activities are in advanced to see the adequacy of investigations, corrective
stage of completion at GHAVP site. actions, lessons learned and the need for any
regulatory actions.
DFRP and FRFCF
All fuel cycle facilities operated safely during
There were no major reportable incidents
the period. However, there was a fatal accident that
calling for enforcement actions during equipment
took place on June 25, 2017 at ECIL Hyderabad,
erection of DFRP.
the details of which are given under section 1.8.
There was a fatal accident of a contractor’s
1.6 R&D UNITS AND OTHER FACILITIES
person within the premises of the FRFCF project site
IN CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION
On December 12, 2017 due to a vehicular accident
involving a mobile telescopic crane of a contractor. Safety review of Variable Energy Cyclotron
The accident is currently under investigation. The Centre (VECC), Raja Ramanna Centre for
details of which are given under section 1.8. Advanced Technology (RRCAT), Indira Gandhi
Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) and
NFC-Kota Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL)
Construction of Non-plant buildings and site was done by AERB apart from the Fuel Cycle
preparation activities for the plant buildings are in Facilities. The status of R&D units and other
progress at NFC-Kota Site. facilities are presented in Table 1.8.
Table 1.8: Status of R&D and Other Facilities
Validity of
Scope of the
Type of Facility Name Functional Status Current
Facility
Licence
Facilities operated by VECC, Kolkata, West Bengal
Particle Room Temperature In operation Heavy ion August 31,
Accelerator Cyclotron (K-130) acceleration 2022
Research
Super Conducting Commissioning Heavy ion No time limit
Facility (PARF)
Cyclotron (K-500) acceleration
Medical Cyclotron Equipment Erection Cyclotron machine March 31,
Project along with 3 2018
beam lines for
production of radio-
pharmaceuticals
23
Validity of
Scope of the
Type of Facility Name Functional Status Current
Facility
Licence
Facilities operated by RRCAT, Indore, Madhya Pradesh
LASER 150 TW Ti: Sapphire In operation 90 TW – for regular June 30, 2021
Laser System and 150 TW- trial
(25 femto-second)
PARF TWINDUS Stage 1: Installation, Electron June 30, 2019
LINAC-2 Testing and Commissioning Acceleration 10
MeV, 1 kW
PARF TWINDUS TWINDUS Technology January 19,

LINAC-1 LINAC-1 is Shifted Demonstration for 2023
from RRCAT to ARPF, Food Irradiation
Agricultural
Radiation Processing Choithram Mandi. In 10 MeV, 1 kW
Facility (ARPF) Commissioning stage
PARF INDUS-1 In operation 450 MeV, 100 mA August 31,
Electron Storage Ring 2018
PARF INDUS-2 In operation 2.5 GeV, 200 mA March 31,
SRS 2021
Accelerator Electron LINAC In operation 10 MeV, 10 kW January 31,
2018
LASER 1 PW Laser System Construction 1 PW August 31,
(femto second) 2018
Facilities operated by IGCAR, Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu
Accelerator 1.7 MV Tandetron In operation 1.7 MV August 31,
Accelerator 2021
Accelerator 150 kV Accelerator In operation 150 kV August 31,
2021
Facilities operated by ECIL
Electronic ECIL Hyderabad In operation Production of June 30, 2020
component Instrumentation,
development Control &
Communication
systems and
other Electronic
components.
Electronic ECIL, Tirupati In operation Production of October 31,
component Nuclear Industrial 2021
development Instrumentation
systems, EVM &
VVPAT power packs
etc.
24
1.6.1 Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre commissioning of the accelerator. After review of
The Room Temperature Cyclotron (K- the application by AERB, clearance for the Stage-2
Commissioning was granted.
130) was under operation delivering alpha and
proton beams of various energies and intensities. x Permission for operation of Vertical Test
Commissioning of Super-conducting cyclotron and Stand (VTS) for testing of Superconducting
Radioactive Ion Beam facility are in progress. The RF Cavities
equipment erection of medical cyclotron, which Vertical Test Stand (VTS) is being used to
will be used, for commercial production of isotopes test the Superconducting RF (SCRF) cavities. It
for Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and is used to measure Q (Quality) factor: a measure
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography of the rate of energy loss. SCRF can be used for
(SPECT) isotopes as well as high end technological development of high intensity proton accelerator.
research is completed. The following proposal was The proposal for multi-cell SCRF cavities from
reviewed by AERB. RRCAT was reviewed by AERB and based on the
review the permission for testing of SCRF cavities
Renewal of Licence for Operation of K-130
in VTS was granted.
Cyclotron, VECC, Kolkata
x Commissioning Consent for Agricultural
K-130 room temperature cyclotron of
and Radiation Processing Facility (ARPF)
VECC was in operation since 1977 and is being
used for R&D studies. Based on the review of ARPF is based on 10 MeV, 5 kW electron
the performance of the cyclotron, the licence for linear accelerator at Choithram Mandi, Indore. It
operation was renewed. is a technology demonstration facility of RRCAT
for food process. For this RRCAT has indigenously
1.6.2 Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced developed electron Linac which was successfully
Technology commissioned at RRCAT, Indore. The machine
INDUS-1 Synchrotron Radiation Source was is now relocated in Choithram Mandi, Indore.
under operation with beam energy of 450 MeV and RRCAT applied for commissioning of this Linac
beam current of 100 mA delivering synchrotron at new location. The proposal was reviewed by the
UDGLDWLRQ WKURXJK ¿YH OLFHQVHG EHDP OLQHV AERB and based on the review, the commissioning
INDUS-2, which is a synchrotron cum electron consent was granted.
storage ring, was under operation at 2.5 GeV (max) 1.6.3 Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research
beam energy and beam current of 200 mA (max). (IGCAR):
Six beam lines of INDUS-2 have already been The following clearance/ trial operations of
authorised by AERB for carrying out experiments. IGCAR Facilities were granted after review:
In addition to these major accelerators, other
accelerators and Laser Facilities/Projects at RRCAT x Clearances for conducting experiment
are being periodically reviewed. The following with sodium in Mini Sodium Experimental
proposals/issues related to RRCAT were reviewed. Facility (MINA), Sodium Cable Fire Facility
(SOCA), Sodium Fire Experimental Facility
x Commissioning of stage-2 of TWINDUS (SFEF) and Sodium Fuel Interaction Facility
Linac-2 (SOFI) at IGCAR were granted on May 17,
RRCAT is developing TWINDUS Linac-2 2017.
with 6 kW beam power and 10 MeV beam energy. x 7ULDO RSHUDWLRQ RI ³,UUDGLDWLRQ &DSVXOH
Clearance for commissioning at low power was Fabrication Facility (ICFF)” at IDEAS
issued to RRCAT. After satisfactory commissioning building, IGCAR was granted on August 29,
at low power, RRCAT has applied for full power 2017.
25
x Clearance for conducting experiment with 1.7 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR
sodium in Mockup RISHI facility at IGCAR FACILITIES
was granted on September 25, 2017.
1.7.1 Occupational Injury Statistics of DAE
x Clearance for Stage-2 (Erection of sodium Units:
storage tanks, structure and components)
The compilation of Occupational Injury
in Sodium Technology Complex, FRTG,
Statistics for the year 2017 for DAE units (other
IGCAR was granted on September 28, 2017.
than BARC facilities and mines of IREL & UCIL)
1.6.4 Electronics Corporation of India Limited: provides the data on accidents and analysis of
All the manufacturing Units of ECIL were in number of injuries and loss of man-days. Details
operation. are presented in Table 1. 9.
During the calendar year 2017, there were 24
reportable injuries including 3 fatalities with a loss
of 19,372 man-days [including 9 man-days lost due
to previous years injury at KAPS-1&2] compared
to 31 reportable injuries including 3 fatalities with
a loss of 19,802 man-days in 2016. During the
calendar year 2017, one fatality each has occurred
at TAPS-1&2, ECIL, Hyderabad and FRFCF,
IGCAR, Kalpakkam.
x The year 2017 recorded a Frequency Rate
(FR) of 0.16 as compared to 0.23 in the year
SARCOP Meeting in Progress at ECIL, Hyderabad
2016 and a Severity Rate (SR) of 136.76 as
Table: 1.9: Unit-wise Comparison of Reportable Occupational Injuries in DAE Units for 2017
C1 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
C2 C3
No. of C4 Number Frequency Severity Injury Incidence
No. of No. of
Unit Lost Time No. of of Man- Rate Rate Index Rate
Man-days Fatal
(Reportable) Employees hours (C1x10 ) (C2x10 ) (C6xC7) (C1x103)
6 6
Lost Injury
Injury Worked C5 C5 1000 C4
NP Plants 3 6292 1 14430 35028850 0.085 179.62 0.0154 0.20
NP Projects 2 148 0 12743 42705737 0.04 3.46 0.0002 0.15
HWPs 3 624 0 4927 12040649 0.24 51.82 0.0129 0.60
IRELs 2 30 0 536 1248760 1.60 24.02 0.0385 3.73
NFCs 3 141 0 4122 9785900 0.30 14.40 0.0044 0.72
UCIL Mills 2 38 0 2368 5017280 0.39 7.57 0.0030 0.84
ECIL 3 6043 1 2725 6786840 0.44 890.39 0.3936 1.10
IGCAR & 6 6056 1 6179 16448361 0.36 368.18 0.1343 0.97
FRFCF
AMD 0 0 0 2996 5083800 0 0 0 0
BRIT 0 0 0 1047 2085624 0 0 0 0
VECC 0 0 0 962 192400 0 0 0 0
RRCAT 0 0 0 2425 5221804 0 0 0 0
Total 24 19372 3 55460 141646005 0.16 136.76 0.0232 0.43
26
compared to 150.04 in 2016. Similarly, the Distribution of unit-wise reportable injuries
year 2017 recorded an Injury Index of 0.0232 in 2017 are presented in terms of percentage in
as compared to 0.035 in the year 2016 and an Figure 1.1. Year-wise trend of Frequency Rate
Incidence Rate of 0.43 as compared to 0.61 (F.R.), Severity Rate (S.R.), Injury Index (I.I.),
in 2016. Incidence Rate (I.R.) and Fatal Injuries in DAE
7KHLQFLGHQFHUDWH¿JXUHVKLJKOLJKWVRYHUDOO Units along with its Trend Line is shown in Figure
better safety performance of the DAE units among 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 respectively. This trend
other similar industries in the country. Table 1.10 indicates that the F.R., S.R., I.I., I.R. and Fatalities
gives the comparison of incidence rates in some of in DAE units are in decreasing trend since 2001.
the DAE units with other similar industries in the Type of accidents in DAE units in 2017 are
country. shown in Fig. 1.7 which indicates that the fall of
7KHUH ZDV QR QRWL¿DEOH GLVHDVH UHSRUWHG persons type accidents (29%) are maximum and
during the period from any of the operating units of followed by fall of object (21%) and stepping on/
DAE under the purview of AERB. striking against/struck by object (21%).
Fig. 1.1: Distribution of Unit-wise Reportable

Injuries in DAE Units in 2017
MAPS 1&2, KKNPP 1&2, BHAVINI, ECIL-Hyderabad,
KAPP 3&4, 4% 4% 13%
4%
4%
NFC
Hyderabad,
13%
HWP
Manuguru,
4%
HWP Kota,
8% IGCAR,
25%
UCIL
Tummalapalle Mill, TAPS 1&2,
8% IRE OSCOM, 9% 4%
Fig. 1.2: Year-wise trend of Frequency Fig. 1.3: Year-wise trend of Severity Rate
Rate in DAE Units in DAE Units
1.6 600
527.44
1.41
1.4
500
404.63
1.2
1.05 400
321.96
319.87
1 0.92
245.46
0.8 0.74 300

219.27
0.6
150.04
0.5
166
0.48 200
0.54 0.41
206.8
0.48
187.98
0.4 0.33
161.74
158.2
0.23
157.34
136.76
0.21 100
122.36
0.2 0.27 0.27 0.16

0.23
105.12
60.72
0.13
0 0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
27
Fig. 1.4: Year-wise trend of Injury Index Fig. 1.5: Year-wise trend of Incidence Rate
in DAE Units in DAE Units
0.4 3.5
3.25
0.337
0.35 3
0.299
0.295
0.3
0.266
2.5 2.59
2.41
0.292
0.25
2 1.83
0.2
1.5 1.25
1.21
0.15 1.43
0.118
1 1.15 0.83
0.1 1
0.06
0.61
0.102
0.53
0.035
0.038
0.69 0.7
0.5
0.023
0.05 0.58
0.016
0.43
0.043
0.052
0.043
0.029
0.033
0.33
0 0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Fig. 1.6: Year-wise trend of Fatal Injuries Fig. 1.7: Type of Accidents in DAE Units in 2017
in DAE Units 8% 4%
14 4%
29%
12
13%
12
10
10
8
8
21% 21%
6 5
6
5 Fall of Persons
5 Fall of Object
4
3 3 Stepping on, Striking Against or Struck by Object excluding Falling Objects
4
3 3 Caught in or Between Objects
3
2
2 2 2 Exposure to or Contact with Extreme Temperature
1
0
Exposure to or Contact with Electric Current
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Exposure to or Contact with Harmful Substances including radiations

Table 1.10: Comparison of Incidence Rates of DAE Units with Equivalent Non-DAE Industries
(Data Source- Pocket Book of Labour Statistics - 2015 published in February 2017,
Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Govt. of India ISSN 0971 5398)
Incidence Rate (per
thousand workers
Industry Type employed)
Fatal Non-Fatal
Heavy Water Plants (2017) 0.00 0.60
Manufacture of Chemicals & Chemical Products (2013) 0.25 1.12
Nuclear Fuel Complex (2017) 0.00 0.72
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products except Machinery and Equipment (2013) 0.07 0.18
Nuclear Power Plants (2017) 0.06 0.13
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply (2013) 0.46 0.63
28
1.8 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND 3 are called ‘Incidents’. The level 0 or below scale
ENFORCEMENT ACTION means events that have no nuclear and radiological
VDIHW\VLJQL¿FDQFH
AERB requires NPPs to report certain events
that occur in the plant which have or may have $OOWKHVLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWVUHSRUWHGZHUHUHYLHZHGLQ
impact on operational safety. Under the reporting detail by AERB and measures to prevent recurrence
system established by AERB, the events reportable of such events were recommended.
to the regulatory body are divided into two L 6LJQL¿FDQW (YHQWV LQ 133 XQGHU
categories, termed as, Construction
(a) Events, and 7KHUHZHUH6LJQL¿FDQW(YHQWV5HSRUWHGDW
E 6LJQL¿FDQW(YHQWV KKNPP-2 during the year.
This categorisation of events is done based (a) During performance test of Annulus Passive
RQ WKHLU VDIHW\ VLJQL¿FDQFH DQG LPSRUWDQFH WR Filtrations System (KLB50-80) in Phase-C3,
operational safety experience feedback. Based on differential pressure was not observed across one
the established reporting criteria, Event Reports RIWKH¿OWHULQ./%7UDLQZKHQLWZDVWDNHQLQWR
(5 DQG 6LJQL¿FDQW (YHQW 5HSRUWV 6(5 DUH VHUYLFH'XULQJWKH¿HOGVXUYH\LWZDVIRXQGWKDW
submitted to AERB. The SERs received from suction line of KLB Train#60 was plastered with
the operating NPPs are rated on the International cement (blanked condition). The suction side of
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) of KLB Train#60 was blocked during blocking of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The unused penetrations prior to start of Hot Run of
INES rates events at seven levels (1 to 7) depending Unit-2, as this was not marked or tagged. Cement
RQWKHLUVDIHW\VLJQL¿FDQFHDVVKRZQLQ¿JXUH which had blocked the suction side of KLB Train
was removed. Test for KLB train#60 was repeated
below.
which was reviewed and found acceptable.
Fig. 1.8 : INES Scale (b) During the dynamic test for tripping of one
CCW pump, steam supply to TDFPs got changed
over as intended, but due to the increase in the
inlet pressure of steam supplied, both TDFPs
got accelerated and tripped on over speed (3600
rpm). EDPF’s discharge control valve did not
open on auto and caused level reduction in SG’s
which resulted in EP. The event was reviewed
DQGFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQVRQPRGL¿FDWLRQRI7')3¶V
steam supply changeover pressure interlock and
electrical driven feed pump (EDFP) starting logic
were taken. Same test was repeated successfully
DIWHULPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDERYHPRGL¿FDWLRQ
(c) After completion of C3 phase tests, there
was non-availability of forced core cooling for
more than 30 minutes while unit was being cooled
Events rated at level 4 and above are termed
down due to unavailability of JNA pump. As per
as ‘Accidents’. The accidents at Chernobyl NPP in
procedure RCP were switched off after cooling
former USSR (now in Ukraine) in April 1986 and primary circuit upto 98oC and one JNA pump was
Fukushima NPPs in Japan in March 2011 were rated being taken in service for reactor core cooling,
at level 7 on INES. Events rated at levels 1, 2 and however discharge valve had failed to open. It was
29
decided to connect another JNA pump for reactor (f) KKNPP-2 was in hot shutdown state after
FRROLQJ,QWKHPHDQWLPHSULPDU\EORZGRZQÀRZ EP actuation on SG low level. Leak search was
ZDVIRXQGÀXFWXDWLQJ7KHEORZGRZQFRQWUROZDV conducted inside UJA. Steam leak was found on
WDNHQRQPDQXDOWRFRQWUROÀXFWXDWLRQ'XULQJWKLV the RCP-2 differential pressure transmitter impulse
SURFHVV EORZ GRZQ ÀRZ JRW UHGXFHG DEUXSWO\ OLQH RQ WKH GLVFKDUJH VLGH )RU UHFWL¿FDWLRQ RI
causing rise in pressure of primary and isolation of leak, reactor was brought to cold shut down state.
JNA circuit from primary. After reducing pressure As the leak was in the non-isolable location from
in primary, JNA circuit was reconnected and forced WKH 0&3 IRU UHFWL¿FDWLRQ RI WKH DERYH OHDNDJH
core cooling of primary system was ensured. It was Ice plugging technique was adopted. The leaky
recommended that surveillance testing frequency tube was removed by cutting. Repair of the leaky
of motor operated valves of safety systems portion of impulse line nozzle at RCP-2 discharge
should be augmented. Site informed that review was successfully done after isolating the leak by
of operability of motor operated valves of safety ice plugging. The repair weld joint was examined
system is in progress. through VT, DPT and RT. Three main contributors
(d) Reactor was brought down to HSD state IRUIDLOXUHLGHQWL¿HGZHUHWKHUPDOPRYHPHQWRI5&3
from 90%FP due to suspected passing of turbine discharge line, fatigue failure due to mechanical
steam dump valves. In order to inspect and attend YLEUDWLRQDQGZHOGGHIHFW6LWHVXEPLWWHGÀH[LELOLW\
the observed problem, steam side of all SGs were analysis for the impulse tubes of Unit-2 and based
isolated by closing MOIVs of respective SGs. on the same corrective measures in some supports
SG-2 level as read by sensor recorded a dip in have been incorporated.
value. On sensing the change in SG level, SG-2
level CV which was in auto mode, got opened and Considering the events occurred during
started making up of SG-2 level as per its level Phase-C commissioning of Unit-2 due to human
program which was in ON condition. This resulted errors by operating personnel, AERB directed
in increase of pressure in SG-2 to >7.84 MPa NPCIL to strengthen the Operator training and
which led to EP actuation. Site informed that this human performance for operating personnel.
event occurred due to malfunctioning of SG-2 level LL 6LJQL¿FDQW(YHQWVLQ2SHUDWLQJ133
sensor 20JEA20FL006 which maintains SG level
,Q\HDUDWRWDORIVLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWV
at ~3.8 m during startup of Unit. The event was
were reported from operating NPPs. Out of these,
UHYLHZHGDQGFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQVRQ¿OOLQJSURJUDP
to be kept OFF and gate valve of respective control RQHVLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWDW7$36ZDVUDWHGDWOHYHO
YDOYHWREHHQVXUHGFORVHGDIWHU¿OOLQJRI6*XSWR RQ,1(6ZKLOHVLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWVZHUHUDWHGDW
3.8m were taken. OHYHO RQ ,1(6 2QH VLJQL¿FDQW HYHQW DW 7$36
1&2 was not rated on INES as it was related to
(e) KKNPP-2 was operating at 94%FP, one of industrial safety and had no relevance to nuclear
the pressure transmitters reading of steam supply and radiological safety. The number of SERs in
IURP 065 WR 7')3V WXUELQH VWDUWHG ÀXFWXDWLQJ each NPP and their ratings on INES are given in
This caused generation of repeated anticipatory
Table 1.11.
signal for both TDFP-I and TDFP-2 unloading.
5HGXFWLRQ LQ IHHG ZDWHU ÀRZ UHVXOWHG LQ GUDVWLF For the purpose of analysis, the events were
level drop in all SGs and EP actuated on SG low categorised as per the IAEA-IRS coding system.
level. The event was reviewed and corrective 7KH FODVVL¿FDWLRQ RI V\VWHPV IDLOHG DIIHFWHG LQ
DFWLRQV RQ PRGL¿FDWLRQ RI 7')3 FRQWURO YDOYH WKH VLJQL¿FDQW HYHQWV LV JLYHQ LQ ¿JXUH 7KH
interlock (generation of anticipatory closure of FODVVL¿FDWLRQRIGLUHFWFDXVHVDQGURRWFDXVHVRIWKH
TDFP steam control valves by only once during VLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWVDUHJLYHQLQ)LJXUHDQG
steam supply changeover) was taken. respectively.
30
7DEOH,1(65DWLQJRI6LJQL¿FDQW(YHQWVLQ133V5HSRUWHGGXULQJ&DOHQGDU<HDU
Number of Event of Number of Event of Number of Event of Total

NPP
INES-0 INES-1 INES-2 and above events
TAPS-1 & 2 0 0 0 1*
TAPS-3 & 4 2 1 0 3
RAPS-1 & 2 2 0 0 2
RAPS-3 & 4 1 0 0 1
RAPS-5 & 6 0 0 0 0
KAPS-1 & 2 1 0 0 1
NAPS-1 & 2 3 0 0 3
KGS- 1 & 2 0 0 0 0
KGS- 3 & 4 1 0 0 1
MAPS-1 & 2 4 0 0 4
KKNPP-1 11 0 0 11
Total 25 1 0 27
* Industrial safety related event, so INES is not applicable.
)LJ&ODVVL¿FDWLRQRI)DLOHG )LJ&ODVVL¿FDWLRQRI'LUHFW
Affected Systems of SERs Causes of SERs
I & C Systems; Human factors;
17% 14%
Mechanical
Primary Failure; 32%
Systems; 40%
Feedwater,
Steam and
Power I & C failure;
Conversion 22%
Systems; 17%
Essential
Reactor
Auxiliary
Electrical Chemistry related Electrical
Systems; 3%
Systems; 23% failure; 8% Failure; 24%
)LJ&ODVVL¿FDWLRQRI5RRW&DXVHVRI6(5V
Others; 8%
Human Performance related-
RCA under progress; Personnel work practices, work
11% organisation; 11%
Human Performance
related- Procedure
Equipment related- Maintenance, unavailability/
testing or surveillance , incompleteness/non-
installation ; 11% compliance ; 22%
Management related Human Performance

Causal Factors; 6% related- Training; 6%
Equipment related- Design

configuration & analysis ; 25%
31
x 2QH VLJQL¿FDQW HYHQW UDWHG DW OHYHO RQ of the accident. Station has now stopped the use of
,1(6LVEULHÀ\GHVFULEHGEHORZ forklift for transport of waste. Now the waste casks
During biennial shutdown of TAPS-4, are being transported using trailer.
maintenance on a valve in poison injection line from LLL 6LJQL¿FDQW(YHQWVLQ,QGXVWULDO3ODQWV
poison tank to calandria was taken up after forming 7ZR VLJQL¿FDQW HYHQWV UHSRUWHG WR $(5%
an ice plug. After completing maintenance on the were reviewed in detail and measures to prevent the
valve, ice plug thawing operation was performed. recurrence of such incidence was recommended.
During this operation, a leak developed from the The analysis and recommendations of the accident
valve bonnet. Maintenance personnel arrested the were forwarded to all units of DAE for information
leak by tightening the bolts of valve bonnet. In the and lessons to be learnt from this incident.
meantime, about 4.75 tons of tritiated heavy water
escaped from moderator system. The event had no A brief description of events along with
implication to reactor safety, but had radiological review and recommendations/directives of AERB
VLJQL¿FDQFH 7KLUWHHQ QRV RI SODQW SHUVRQQHO is given below.
LQYROYHGLQOHDNUHFWL¿FDWLRQMREUHFHLYHGLQWHUQDO (a) On June 25, 2017, one fatal accident took
tritium uptake exceeding the investigation level place at Electronics Corporation of India Limited
(i.e. 4 GBq/m3). Maximum radiation exposure to (ECIL), Hyderabad. New cabling work (11kV, 3
a plant personnel due to the event was 14.43 mSv. core 300 mm2 XLPE) was planned to be carried
The cause of the event was attributed to inadequate out by ECIL for providing electrical supply to Hall
maintenance procedure, absence of leak testing 4 and 5 of Electronics Manufacturing Services
requirement for the valve after maintenance and Division (EMSD), ECIL for which licensed
weakness in contingency planning. Following electrical contractor at Hyderabad was awarded the
the event, appropriate actions have been taken to contract for supply and installation of distribution
address these shortfalls / weaknesses. transformers and related HT/LT. As a part of the
x Fatal Accident at TAPS-1&2 contract, the work of lifting and terminating 300
mm2. XLPE cable was planned to be executed on
The victim got crushed under the wheels of a June 25, 2017 (Sunday) involving nine contract
forklift while crossing the road near plant main gate workers. ECIL generally follows a practice of
on April 6, 2017. The forklift was being used for carrying out electrical maintenance activities
WUDQVIHURIVROLGUDGLRDFWLYHZDVWH¿OOHGGUXPIURP during Sundays and holidays to avoid disturbances
TAPS-1&2 to Solid Waste Management Facility to production activities. In order to perform the
6:0)%$5&XVLQJWKHIRUNOLIW7KH¿OOHGGUXP assigned job, existing power to 11kV switchyard
was placed inside a cask of height 6 ft and 4 ft 9 of ECIL had to be disconnected. Supervisor of
inch diameter and weighing about 7 tons. contractor was informed telephonically (by ECIL
Immediately after the accident, AERB had employee from the M/s Telangana State Southern
stopped the transfer of radioactive solid waste Power Distribution Company Limited (TSSPDCL)
from TAPS-1&2 to SWMF, BARC till completion Substation) in the afternoon about the disconnection
of review of operating procedure and clearance of of power supply from TSSPDCL substation to
the same by AERB. Subsequently, AERB carried ECIL switchyard. Prior to start of work, Supervisor
out regulatory inspections on April 7, 2017 and on ensured no power in the line using discharge rod.
April 20, 2017 for investigation of the accident. Thereafter, the deceased was instructed to remove
Detailed review of the incident revealed that the the horn gap fuses (at height around 14 feet on
forklift operator was driving with a hindered vision Dipole structure) to carry out the cable work. The
due to size of the cask and this was the major cause victim climbed the structure without wearing PPEs
32
DQGUHPRYHGWKH¿UVWKRUQJDSIXVH+*):KHQ for drastic improvement in safety management
he tried to remove the 2nd HGF, he received an system and safety culture of ECIL.
electric shock and fell on the ground and received (b) On December 12, 2017, a fatal accident had
head injury. occurred at FRFCF, Kalpakkam ‘lay down’ area of
AERB reviewed the fatal accident and noted M/s Tata Projects Ltd (TPL). During manoeuvring
that multiple sequential deviations/ violations of a mobile crane, the helper of the crane who
comprised direct causes of the fatal accident and was guiding the crane operator for reversing the
concluded that the event was a result of unsafe vehicle, got caught in between the left rear end of
work procedure, assumed work pressure to the vehicle [counter weight of mobile crane] and
complete hazardous activities ignoring basic safety a vertical scaffolding pipe of a nearby temporary
measures, work around existing for considerable structure, resulting into internal head injuries and
period, inadequate supervision of the contractor subsequent death. This incident was reviewed by
work and working on electrical systems not under Industrial and Fire Safety Committee (I&F-SC) of
the purview of ECIL with full knowledge of ECIL AERB. The root cause of the accident as established
RI¿FHU E\WKHFRPPLWWHHLV³IDLOXUHRIVDIHW\PDQDJHPHQW
systems to prevent unsafe working conditions and
7KHGH¿FLHQFLHVLQGLFDWHGDGHJUDGHGVDIHW\ unsafe working practices at work place”. Some of
culture at ECIL. AERB decided to depute an the important recommendations made by the safety
AERB Observer at ECIL for a month to observe committee were; establishment of dedicated safety
effectiveness of implementation of roadmap organisation at FRFCF, need for improvement in
for improving safety management system. workers training and work assignment, medical
Accordingly, AERB Observer Team (AOT) was management system and measures to be taken for
deputed at ECIL from October 03-28, 2017. Based ensuring that reverse movement of long chassis
on site visits, AOT strongly emphasises the need vehicles is avoided.
33
Chapter 2
SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF
RADIATION FACILITIES
2.1 APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION AERB regulates these facilities/institutions. These

SOURCES IN MEDICAL, INDUSTRY sources have the radiation hazard potential ranging
AND RESEARCH from high to very low. Proper design, handling
Radiation sources such as radioisotopes (192Ir, and disposal methodologies are required for
60
Co, 137Cs, 170Tm, 75Se, 241Am, 99mTc etc.) and ensuring safe and intended use of radiation sources.
radiation generating equipment (X-ray machines, Regulation of these sources is in accordance with
accelerators etc.) are being used in multifarious the radiation hazard potential involved and the
and ingenious ways to achieve overall societal extent of use in the public domain.
health and prosperity. The radiation sources have A glimpse on the various applications of these
a wide range of applications in the industries, sources and their licensing status is as given
medicine, agriculture and research institutions and below.
No. of Facilities /
Description Equipment Licensed as
on December 31, 2017
MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES
Teletherapy In teletherapy (branch of Radiotherapy) 448 facilities with

tumour is treated using ionising radiation 648 teletherapy units
keeping radiation source(s) at certain
distance. The radioisotopes like 60Co
and radiation generators such as Linear
Accelerators are used. They are of high
radiation hazard potential.
Brachytherapy In brachytherapy (branch of radiotherapy 283 Remote After

in which the source is kept very near to the Loading and
lesion) the isotopes used are 192Ir, 137Cs, 90Sr, 51 Manual After
106
Ru, 125I and 60Co with activity range from Loading equipment
few MBq to GBq. They are of moderate
radiation hazard potential as compared to
teletherapy.
35
No. of Facilities /
Cath Lab X-rays are used in medicine as an important x 1,360 Cath Lab
diagnostic tool. Diagnostic Radiology equipment
using X-rays are:
x Interventional Radiology equipment
(Cath-Lab and C-Arm):
These equipment are used in operation
theatres for various interventional
procedures and pose moderate radiation
Computed Tomography hazard to patients and medical
professionals involved in operation of
x 3,179 CT equipment
the equipment. The C-Arm equipment
is of low to moderate hazard potential.
x Computed Tomography (CT):
These equipment are of moderate
radiation hazard potential to both x 41,988 other medical
worker and patient. X-ray equipment
x General purpose Radiography and
Radiography and
Fluoroscopy equipment and Dental
Fluroscopy
equipment:
These constitute around 70-80% of all
X-ray equipment that are used, and are
of low to very low radiation hazard
potential, to both worker and patients.
x Mammography, Bone Mineral
Densitometer:
These equipment are of very low
Nuclear Medicine In Nuclear Medicine, radio- 272 facilities. (PET-CT,

Facilities pharmaceuticals, such as Tc, I, 201Tl
99m 131
SPECT and Gamma
and 18F are used for diagnosis and treatment. Camera)
18
F radiopharmaceuticals are routinely used
in PET-CT facilities, while 131I is used for
diagnosis and treatment of thyroid cancers.
The facilities using radio pharmaceuticals
are of moderate-low radiation hazard.
36
No. of Facilities /
Medical Cyclotron Radio-isotopes that are used in Nuclear 18 facilities

Medicine are generally produced in
Medical Cyclotron facilities. Cyclotrons
are utilised for the production of 18F
labelled radiopharmaceuticals. The medical
cyclotron facilities are of moderate to high
INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES
RPF Radiation Processing Facilities (RPF) 19 Gamma Irradiators

including Gamma Irradiators and Electron 8 Accelerator Facilities
Beam Accelerators are used mainly for
radiation processing of food, sterilisation
of healthcare products and crosslinking
of polymers in cable industries. Radiation
processing of food items includes inhibiting
sprouting, delay in ripening, microbial
decontamination, insect disinfestation,
shelf-life extension etc. The activity range
is about few PBq (1015). They are of high
IRED Industrial radiography using Industrial 554 facilities with 2,701

Radiography Exposure Device (IRED), equipment
is one of the important non-destructive
(NDT) methods used for study / evaluation
of weld joints, castings etc. Radioisotopes
like 192Ir, 60Co, 170Tm, 75Se and different
HQHUJLHVRI;UD\VDUHXVHGLQWKH¿HOGRI
industrial radiography. The activity range
is from few TBq to few tens of TBq. The
X-ray energy range is from few hundreds
of keV to few MeV. They are of high to
moderate radiation hazard potential.
37
No. of Facilities /
GIC Gamma Irradiation Chamber (GIC) is 102 facilities with 118

basically used for research and development devices
and also in blood banks for irradiation of
blood and its components. Usually 60Co
and 137Cs radioisotope are used in this
application. The activity ranges from few
tens of TBq to few hundreds of TBq. They
are of high to moderate radiation hazard
potential.
Irradiator based on X-ray generator are also
used in blood banks.
Nucleonic Gauges Nucleonic Gauges also known as Ionising 1,920 facilities

Radiation Gauging Devices (IRGD) are
used for monitoring and measuring of
physical parameters such as thickness,
level, density, coating thickness, elemental
analysis etc. Sources used for nucleonic
gauges are gamma sources such as 60Co,
137
Cs, 241Am etc., beta sources such as 85Kr,
90
Sr, 147Pm, 204Tl and neutron sources such
as 241Am-Be and 252Cf. The activity range
is from MBq to GBq. They are of low
Well Logging Radioactive sources are used in well 63 facilities

logging application for exploration of oil,
coal, geophysical logging etc. The sources
used are mainly 137Cs, 241Am-Be, some
calibration sources such as 60Co, 226Ra,
232
Th etc. and neutron generators (e.g.
Deuterium-Tritium (DT)). The activity
range is from kBq to GBq. They are of
moderate to low radiation hazard potential.
APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES IN RESEARCH AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS
38
No. of Facilities /
Consumer Goods Consumer products such as smoke 15 facilities

Manufacturing Facilities detectors, thorium gas mantles and starters,
gaseous tritium luminescence devices use
exempt quantity of radioactive sources.
They are of very low hazard potential.
However, regulatory control exists on the
manufacturing facilities of these devices.
Facilities using Though sealed radioactive sources are 259 facilities

Sealed Sources used in various industrial and medical
applications, but here sealed source means
those used in education, research and
calibration purposes. The activity range
is from kBq to GBq. They are of low to
moderate radiation hazard potential.
Facilities using Unsealed sources are used in various 213 facilities

Unsealed Sources research and academic institutions such
as agriculture, veterinary science, tracer
studies etc. They are of low radiation
hazard potential.
2.2 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF equipment conforming to the regulatory standards.

RADIATION FACILITIES Approvals are also issued as an interim consent
towards the respective Licences. No Objection
2.2.1 Issuance of Consents
&HUWL¿FDWHV 12& DUH LVVXHG WR WKH VWDNHKROGHUV
Consenting process involves the issuance to import either equipment or radioactive source,
of consent, in the form of Licence, Authorisation after which the stakeholders need to obtain either
or Registration (in the order of decreasing hazard a Type Approval or the respective consent for use.
potential), to operate the equipment/ facility. Type AERB has a system of multi-tier review process
Approvals are issued to manufacturer/ supplier for (i.e. review by AERB and its Safety Committees)
39
for various consents depending on the hazard IDFLOLWLHV LV JRYHUQHG E\ UHJXODWLRQV VSHFL¿HG
potential involved. The process of issuance of by AERB in Safety Code for the ‘Safe Transport
various consents is as per AERB Safety Guide of Radioactive Materials’ and is in line with the
on ‘Consenting Process for Radiation Facilities’ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQWV VSHFL¿HG E\ ,$($ IRU
(AERB/RF/SG/G-3). safe transport of radioactive material.
The transportation of radioactive material The number of licences and other consents
(including that of nuclear material from nuclear issued during the year are as follows:
Number
Consent Practice Equipment/ Facility/Activity
Issued
Radiotherapy Linear Accelerator 67
and Tele-cobalt
Nuclear Medicine Medical Cyclotron Facility 10
PET-CT and SPECT-CT 55
Diagnostic X-ray Interventional Radiology 427
Licence Computed Tomography 913
Manufacturing facilities of 11
diagnostic X-ray equipment
Radiation Processing Facilities (RPF) 13
Industrial Radiography 140
Research Accelerators 2
Radiotherapy HDR Brachytherapy 31
Gamma Irradiation Chamber (GIC) 19
Well Logging 2
Authorisation
Nuclear Medicine Facilities 67
Diagnostic X-ray Facilities Suppliers 18
Service Agencies 21
Diagnostic X-ray 12,593
Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices (IRGD)/ Nucleonic 73
Gauges
Registration Facilities using radio- Unsealed sources 68
isotopes for research Sealed sources 33
Consumer Products Manufacturing Facilities 24
Type A package 20
Radiotherapy 23
Type Approval/ Renewal Interventional Radiology 18
Computed Tomography 12
40
Number
Consent Practice Equipment/ Facility/Activity
Issued
Diagnostic Radiology 118
Industrial Radiography Exposure Device (IRED) 12
Type Approval/ Renewal Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices/Nucleonic Gauges 62
Well Logging Source 47
Consumer Products and Scanning Facility 57
Medical Linear Accelerator 64
Tele-cobalt 12
Radiotherapy Simulator 12
PET-CT/SPECT-CT 29
RAL Brachytherapy Unit 35
NOCs Issued for Import of Diagnostic Radiology 66

Equipment Computed Tomography 6
Interventional Radiology 7
Industrial Electron Beam Accelerator 1
Industrial Radiography Exposure Devices (IRED) 260
Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices/Nucleonic Gauges 400
Scanning Facilities 52
Practice Indigenous Imported
Industrial Radiography 1038 362
Well logging - 175
Nucleonic Gauges 80
GIC 13 -
Thorium Nitrate - 3
Permission for Procurement
Consumer Products - 535
of Radioactive Sources
Tele-cobalt source 40 4
HDR Brachytherapy - 386
MAL Brachytherapy 6 7
Nuclear Medicine 2,734
Radio Immuno Assay (RIA) 34
Radioisotopes used in Research Facilities 167
41
Number
Consent Equipment/ Facility/Activity
Issued
Disposal of Radioactive Exported to the original supplier 1,521
Sources (permission
Disposal in Authorised waste management facility within 824
for transportation of
the Country
radioactive material for
safe disposal) Disposal of Contaminated Material 02
Transport of Radioactive 5HQHZDO RI FHUWL¿FDWH RI DSSURYDO RI GHVLJQ IRU VSHFLDO 160
material form radioactive material
Intermediate Approvals leading to issuance of Licence:

Number
Consent Equipment / Facility
Issued
Site Medical Cyclotron 3
Gamma Radiation Processing Facility 5
Industrial Accelerator Radiation Processing Facility 5
Layout plan Radiotherapy 306
Nuclear Medicine Centres 120
Medical Cyclotron 1
Research Centres 56
Sources Storage Pit (well logging) 9
Source Storage Facility (Industrial Radiography) 273
Other
Industrial Radiography Enclosure 175
Approvals
Gamma Irradiation Chamber 12
Scanning Facilities 12
RIA 5
Design and Research Accelerator 1
Construction
Radiation Processing Facility 4
Commissioning Medical Linear Accelerator (Radiotherapy) 53
Tele-cobalt 8
RAL Brachytherapy Facilities (HDR) 28
Radiotherapy Simulator 8
42
Number
Consent Equipment / Facility
Issued
Commissioning Medical Cyclotron 4
Industrial Radiography Enclosure 115
Well Logging Source Storage Facility 63
Decommissioning Tele-cobalt units 15
Remote After Loading (RAL) brachytherapy unit 1
Gamma Irradiation Chamber (GIC) 2
Other Nuclear Medicine 15
Approvals
Simulator 10
Source Movement Well logging 748
Industrial Radiography Exposure Devices 2,239
IRGD/Nucleonic Gauges 26
Source Gamma Radiation Processing Facility 8
replacement/
replenishment
2.2.2 Safety Committees for Radiation Facilities based on their review. The committees consist of
The safety committees review the radiation H[SHUWVLQWKH¿HOGIURPWKHLQGXVWU\PHGLFLQHDQG
safety aspects of medical, industrial and research academic institutions apart from the experts from
institutions which use radioactive sources/ radiation Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Board
generating equipment. of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT) and
AERB.
The committees also recommend issuance of
licence for operation or issuance of Type Approval,
Number of
Name of Committee Abbreviations
Meetings
Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation SARCAR 3
Accelerator and Laser Safety Committee ALSC 2
Safety Review Committee for Radiation Processing Plants SRC-RPP 2
Committee on Safe Transport of Radioactive Material COSTRAM 5
Committee for Recognition of Calibration Laboratories for Radiation CRCL 1
Monitoring Instruments
43
Number of
Name of Committee Abbreviations
Meetings
Committee to Review functioning and Accreditation of CORFAL 1
Environmental Survey Laboratories (ESL) at NPPs and other Radio
Analytical Laboratories (RAL)
Committee for Accreditation of Personnel Monitoring Laboratories CAPML –
Committee for Investigation and Review of Exposure in Nuclear CIRENURA 3
Fuel Cycle and Radiation Facilities
$SSURYDORI5DGLRORJLFDO6DIHW\2I¿FHUV Centre, alleging violations pertaining to radiation

While the built-in safety of the equipment safety norms in the institute. During the inspection,
and institution’s operational preparedness towards AERB team observed several non-compliances,
safety are ensured by adhering to requirements major ones being providing false calibration date
VSHFL¿HG E\ $(5% WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI for well type chamber in e-LORA system, non-
radiation safety is carried out by the AERB provision of TLD badges to students, performing
DSSURYHG5DGLRORJLFDO6DIHW\2I¿FHUV5627KH brachytherapy treatment without verifying the
RSOs are thus not only acting as extended arms of position of applicators by appropriate imaging
the regulatory body at every radiation facility, but system and shortcomings in carrying out the
are also the pivotal interface between the radiation Quality Assurance tests of radiotherapy equipment.
facility and the regulatory body. %DVHGRQWKHVH¿QGLQJVDVKRZFDXVHQRWLFH
The number of RSOs approved for different was issued against the institution on June 27, 2017.
practices during the year are as given in following Institute admitted certain lapses in its response to
table: show-cause. The representatives of the institution
were invited to present their case before the AERB
2.3 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES AND
safety committee. While admitting the lapses,
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
the representatives assured of implementation
(i) Violations of Regulatory Requirements by of corrective measures to address all the non-
Radiotherapy Facility compliances. AERB observed that person entrusted
AERB carried out special regulatory with the dual responsibilities as licencee and RSO in
inspection during June 2-3, 2017 for investigation the institution had failed to discharge his duties and
of complaints received against a Radiotherapy did not have the requisite administrative authority
Type of Practice Number Type of Practice Number

Radiotherapy 404 Radiation Processing Facilities 19
Nuclear Medicine 134 Industrial Radiography 266
CT and Cath-lab Centres 1622 Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices 165
Research Centres 63 Well Logging 16
Gamma Irradiation Chamber 40
44
for ensuring overall effective implementation and Mumbai. However on investigation, it was revealed
management. that the above radiography device does not belong
to the agency that operated the device and in turn
Enforcement Actions:
was loaned by another radiography agency based in
(a) Institution was directed to transfer the Kolkata. Though the incident happened on July 06,
responsibility of Licencee to Employer or a suitable 2017, the Employer/ Licencee of the radiography
radiation professional of Radiotherapy Department, agency did not report the same to AERB within the
with adequate empowerment to discharge the VSHFL¿HGWLPHSHULRG
overall responsibilities of Licencee in an effective
Enforcement Action:
manner.
Suspension of the licence of radiography
(b) Suspension of RSO approval for a period of
agency who loaned the radiography device for a
three months. period of one year with effect from October 30,
(ii) Unauthorised Loaning and Operation of 2017.
Industrial Radiography Device Follow-up of Radiation Incident Reported in
During an unannounced regulatory Year 2016
inspection, on December 26, 2016 it was observed x Radiation Injury to the Untrained Person
that personnel belonging to an Ahmedabad based in Industrial Radiography
radiography agency were operating an Industrial
Gamma Radiography Exposure Device (IGRED) 5DGLDWLRQ LQMXU\ RQ WKH ULJKW KDQG ¿QJHUV
of an untrained and unmonitored person, who
belonging to a Delhi based radiography agency.
had been engaged for radiography work by a
During investigation it was found that the device
radiography agency at Ahmedabad was reported
was taken on loan basis. For loaning of the device
to AERB on December 22, 2016. The source
no prior permission was obtained from AERB.
pigtail with radioactive source (30 Ci of 192Ir) got
AERB has taken following enforcement decoupled from the driving cable and remained in
actions on May 09, 2017 against the agency who the guide tube during operation of IGRED. The
loaned the device. said person continued the radiography job without
Enforcement action was also taken against knowing that the source was in exposed condition,
the facility which had taken the IGRED on loan since he was not provided with a radiation survey
basis. (This is the same facility as referred in point meter. Later he found that the pigtail was in the
(iii) below) guide tube. Without knowing the repercussions, he
lifted the source by bare hand and put the source
Enforcement Actions: back into the IGRED, which resulted the radiation
x Suspension of licence to operate radiography injury.
devices for a period of one year. The person was neither a trainee nor had
x Suspension of RSO approval to carry out undergone any radiation safety program and was
industrial radiography work for a period of not provided personal monitoring device (TLD
one year. badge) and radiation survey meter for handling
radiography device. AERB issued show-cause
(iii) Detachment of the Source assembly of notice on December 30, 2016 to which institute
Industrial Radiography Device submitted response on January 31, 2017 and
Incident of detachment of the source assembly from same was discussed in AERB Apex committee.
driving unit due to breakage of driving unit ball tip Subsequently, AERB took following enforcement
was reported by a radiography agency based in actions against the institution on May 09, 2017.
45
Enforcement Action: patient doses would also be helpful for establishing
x Revoke the Licence of radiography facility, national level ‘Reference Criteria’ on the
who engaged the untrained person on appropriate use of radiological examinations.
radiography work. A pilot project for recording and monitoring
x 6XVSHQVLRQRIDSSURYDORI562DQG&HUWL¿HG of radiation doses of patients undergoing medical
Radiographer of radiography institution to diagnostic procedure as well as IR procedure were
carry out industrial radiography work for a deployed at TMH. TMH used Aadhaar no. of patient,
period of one year. wherever possible, as unique identity number for
tagging radiation dose record of each individual
INITIATIVE ON PATIENT DOSE patient. A meeting was held on April 11, 2017 at
MONITORING TMH, Mumbai with representatives of TMH,
Project Report on Patient Dose Recording and All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS),
Monitoring: Delhi and AERB for discussion on collecting and
monitoring of accumulated dose to the patients
AERB discussed a proposal on patient dose
undergoing diagnostic radiology procedure.
monitoring from Tata Memorial Hospital (TMH),
AIIMS representatives mentioned that patient
Mumbai on November 08, 2016 in a meeting
dose recording and monitoring system is already
held at AERB with representative of TMH and
deployed in the Department of Neuroimaging and
representatives of manufacturers/suppliers of
Interventional Neuroradiology of AIIMS, Delhi.
computed tomography (CT) and interventional
On May 29, 2017 AERB requested AIIMS to run
radiology (IR) equipment. The objective of the
a similar pilot project on radiation dose recording
meeting was to develop a mechanism for linking of
patient doses in CT and IR procedures with patient and monitoring system for the patients undergoing
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ QXPEHU WR WUDFN KLVKHU UDGLDWLRQ diagnostic radiology as well as IR procedures at
dose(s). This tracking of radiation dose would AIIMS.
be helpful for alerting the medical practitioner(s) The inputs received from this project would be
on medical dose history of the patient for taking helpful for devising a roadmap for implementation
informed judgment on the medical exposure or of radiation dose recording and monitoring system
repeated radiological procedures. Analysis of at national level.
46
Chapter 3
REGULATORY INSPECTION OF
NUCLEAR AND RADIATION
FACILITIES
3.1 REGULATORY INSPECTION LQVSHFWLRQ ¿QGLQJV PDGH GXULQJ WKH UHJXODWRU\

PROGRAMME inspections are broadly categorised adopting the
Regulatory inspection programme is one graded approach for follow up of their review
of the key regulatory processes. The inspection and resolution. The facility is required to submit
programme provides a high level of assurance that DQDFWLRQWDNHQUHSRUWRQWKHGH¿FLHQFLHVEURXJKW
licensed activities are conducted in accordance RXWGXULQJWKHLQVSHFWLRQZLWKLQWKHVSHFL¿HGWLPH
with regulatory requirements and in conformity frame. These action taken report and RI responses
with safety and security objectives. In AERB, a are reviewed in AERB for disposition and need
comprehensive and systematic annual inspection for enforcement actions, if any. AERB may also
programme is prepared to oversee various initiate enforcement actions, if in its opinion the
Licensing/Consenting stages of the facility viz. licencee has violated the conditions of the licence
siting, design, construction, commissioning, wilfully or otherwise or misinformed or did not
operation, decommissioning and release from divulge the information having bearing on safety,
regulatory control. after specifying the reasons for such actions.
The regulatory inspection team can also initiate
The regulatory inspections are carried out
enforcement actions on-the-spot, if necessary, in
as per the guidelines given in AERB safety guide
cases of serious non-compliances. The enforcement
on 'Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement in
actions may include one or more of the following:
Nuclear and Radiation Facilities (AERB/SG/G-
4)'. Inspections are carried out periodically as (a) A written directive for satisfactory
well as under special circumstances. Generally, UHFWL¿FDWLRQ RI WKH GH¿FLHQF\ RU GHYLDWLRQ
the inspections are carried out with prior detected during inspection;
announcement. AERB also carries out special (b) Written directive to applicant/licencee for
XQDQQRXQFHG LQVSHFWLRQV ZLWK VSHFL¿F REMHFWLYHV improvement within a reasonable timeframe;
as deemed necessary. The provisions of the guide
as applicable to different types of facilities are (c) Orders to curtail or stop activity;
further elaborated in the respective safety manuals G 0RGL¿FDWLRQ VXVSHQVLRQ RU UHYRFDWLRQ RI
on ‘Regulatory Inspections and Enforcement’ for licence; and
NPP and Research Reactors (AERB/NPP/SM/G-
(e) Initiate legal proceedings under provisions of
1), Fuel Cycle Facilities and Related Industrial
the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
Facilities (AERB/NF/SM/G-2) and Radiation
Facilities (AERB/RF/SM/G-3). Formation and Functioning of Directorate of
Regulatory Inspection (DRI)
AERB carries out Regulatory Inspections
(RI) of the nuclear, industrial and radiation facilities In order to integrate, harmonise and improve
under its regulatory purview to check compliance to HI¿FLHQF\ DQG HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH LQVSHFWLRQ
regulatory requirements and consenting conditions. activities of AERB, a separate dedicated Directorate
The inspection report is prepared and forwarded of Regulatory Inspections (DRI) has been formed
to the facility for taking corrective actions. The within AERB. DRI is primarily responsible for
47
organising RIs at facilities. DRI is mandated to plan and coordinate RI activities covering both safety
(radiological and industrial) and security aspects. In addition, it has to program and deploy on-site
observers. DRI has to take measures to achieve synergy and convergence of purpose and resources for the
RI program. The working process of DRI and interface with safety review divisions is depicted below:
&4+2TQEGUU+PVGTHCEGU
025& 125&
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4+6GCO
54
2TG4+ 2+
&4+
&CVCDCUG *CTOQPKUCVKQP
516
54
7VKNKV[
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54
&KURQUKVKQP
4+6GCO
54
44%U
45&
DRI prepares a consolidated plan for x Two routine inspections of each nuclear
inspection of all nuclear and radiation facilities power plant under construction in a year
considering the following: covering 4 to 6 inspection areas
x potential magnitude and nature of the hazard x Four routine inspections of nuclear power
associated with the facility or activity plant under commissioning in a year covering
x outcome of safety review 4 to 6 inspection areas.
x results of previous inspections The plan also envisages conduct of special

regulatory inspections for important activities
x progress of activities at the facilities or events at nuclear facilities and conduct of
x available resources, and unannounced inspections.
x guidelines provided in existing regulatory AERB has posted onsite observer team at
documents. three sites [Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam and Kakrapar]
in addition to Kudankulam where continuous on-
The inspection plan considered;
site AERB coverage exists since commissioning
x Four routine inspections at each operating activities of KKNPP-1. The observers provide
nuclear power plant in a year covering 2 to 6 continuous onsite coverage of the operating as
inspection areas, well as under construction NPPs. This has led to
48
establishment of continuous regulatory presence identify the corrective actions and implement the
at 4 NPP Sites which covers 11 operating NPPs, same for resolution of the reported deviations. The
2 NPPs under commissioning and 6 NPPs under FORVXUHRIWKH*UHHQ2UDQJHDQG5HG¿QGLQJVDUH
construction. considered by AERB after review and acceptance
7KH PHWKRG RI UHSRUWLQJ RI LQVSHFWLRQ ¿QGLQJV of the corrective actions. The Licencee has its
during regulatory inspections of nuclear and own internal mechanism for resolution of White
industrial facilities has been revised to bring out the ¿QGLQJVZKLFKLVFKHFNHGE\$(5%LQVSHFWRUVRQ
¿QGLQJVDVGHYLDWLRQVIURPUHJXODWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWV sample basis during subsequent inspections.
DRI has also revised the categorisation of In case of radiation facilities, the inspection
LQVSHFWLRQ¿QGLQJVDQGDGRSWHGDJUDGHGDSSURDFK plan envisaged prioritisation of inspection of
LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH VDIHW\ VLJQL¿FDQFH RI WKH the facilities having reported cases of excessive
deviation. The reported deviations are categorised radiation exposures and the facilities from where
DV:KLWH*UHHQ2UDQJHDQG5HG¿QGLQJVLQWKH periodic safety status reports are not received as
LQFUHDVLQJ RUGHU RI VDIHW\ VLJQL¿FDQFH DQG DUH DV SHU WKH VSHFL¿HG UHTXLUHPHQWV $V DQ LQQRYDWLYH
described below; measure, awareness programmes on radiological
x :KLWH¿QGLQJLVUHODWHGWRPLQRUGHYLDWLRQV safety aspects were added to routine inspection
which may not affect systems, structures or activities to improve compliance to regulatory
components related to plant or personnel requirements. While AERB has been effectively
safety. regulating the high hazard nuclear facilities and
x *UHHQ¿QGLQJLVUHODWHGWRGHYLDWLRQVZKLFK other radiation applications, it is facing challenges
may affect the safety of the plant or personnel in bringing the widely spread Diagnostic X-ray
together with certain other failure(s). facilities under its regulatory control. Although,
X-ray facilities are of low hazard potential, they
x 2UDQJH¿QGLQJLVUHODWHGWRGHYLDWLRQVZKLFK
can affect the safety of plant, personnel need to be operated in accordance with AERB’s
or the environment in future, if remains regulatory requirements. In this connection, AERB
uncorrected or involve certain unanalysed conducts special unannounced inspections in major
plant conditions which may affect safety. cities/ towns in the country and sealed/ issued
warnings to the facilities which failed to meet the
x 5HG¿QGLQJLVUHODWHGWRDGHYLDWLRQVZKLFK regulatory and safety requirements.
can affect the safety of plant, personnel or
the environment and needs urgent corrective The regulatory inspections are carried out
action(s) by the facility. by headquarter and its regional centres i.e. the
Southern Regional Regulatory Centre (SRRC),
Reported deviations are categorised as White, Eastern Regional Regulatory Centre (ERRC)
*UHHQ 2UDQJH DQG 5HG ¿QGLQJV LQ WKH and Northern Regional Regulatory Centre
LQFUHDVLQJRUGHURIVDIHW\VLJQL¿FDQFH (NRRC). In addition, Directorate of Radiation
The closure of the Green, Orange and Red Safety (DRS)/ Radiation Safety Agency (RSA)
in some states are also authorised to carry out
¿QGLQJVDUHFRQVLGHUHGE\$(5%DIWHUUHYLHZ
regulatory inspections for ensuring radiation safety
and acceptance of the corrective actions.
of medical diagnostic radiology X-ray equipment
installed in the respective states.
2UDQJHDQG5HG¿QGLQJVDUHWDNHQXSLQVDIHW\
review to arrive at the appropriate follow-up or The information on regulatory inspections
enforcement actions. Further, instead of the existing conducted at various nuclear, industrial and
practice of recommending actions for resolution of radiation facilities during the year is given in the
the reported deviations, the Licencee is required to following Sections:
49
3.2 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF AERB follows-up the implementation
NUCLEAR AND FUEL CYCLE of all the recommendations made during these
FACILITIES inspections. The number of regulatory inspections
of NPPs and research facilities is given in
AERB carries out regulatory inspections
Table 3.2
of the nuclear facilities as a safety audit measure
to ensure compliance with the AERB safety In addition to the routine inspections, a site
requirements and stipulations. Emphasis is given observer was posted for a short period at ECIL-
on aspects related to project management, safety Hyderabad (during October, 2017) to oversee the
culture, quality assurance, civil construction, implementation of improvement actions in ECIL.
equipment storage and preservation, fabrication Physical protection systems of NPP for
and erection of major safety related components, security of systems affecting safety is carried out
documentation, commissioning activities,
LQGXVWULDO DQG ¿UH VDIHW\ UDGLRORJLFDO PRQLWRULQJ Table 3.2: Regulatory Inspections of
and emergency preparedness. Operating Nuclear Power Plants and
Research Reactors
The information on the routine and special
regulatory inspections carried out by AERB during No. of Inspections
Facility
the year for the nuclear and fuel cycle facilities Routine Special
under construction and commissioning is given in
TAPS-1&2 2 -
Table 3.1.
TAPS-3&4 3 2
Table 3.1: Regulatory Inspections of (1 unannounced)
Nuclear Facilities under Construction and RAPS-1&2 3 -
Commissioning
RAPS-3&4 3 -
No. of Inspections
Project RAPS-5&6 3 -
Routine Special
MAPS-1&2 3 2
KKNPP-2 2 -
NAPS-1&2 2 2
KKNPP-3&4 3 - (1 unannounced)
KAPP-3&4 3 1
KAPS-1&2 2 1
RAPP-7&8 3 1
KGS-1&2 3 -
PFBR 4 1 (Unannounced)
KGS-3&4 3 -
DFRP 1 1 (Unannounced)
KK-NPP-1&2 3 -
FRFCF 2 -
IGCAR (FBTR, 2 -
GHAVP-1&2 1 1 KAMINI, IFSB)
Total 19 5
IGCAR, CORAL 1 -
During the year, a total of 43 regulatory IGCAR, RML 1 -
inspections of operating NPPs and research IGCAR, RCL 1 -
facilities were carried out, which included 36 IGCAR, FRTG 1 -
scheduled inspections for nuclear and radiological
safety aspects and 7 special inspections. Total 36 7
50
Table 3.3: Regulatory Inspections of Industrial once in a year. The details of inspection during the
and Fuel Cycle Facilities year for nuclear and fuel cycle facilities is given in
Table 3.4 below.
No. of Inspections
Facility Table 3.4: Regulatory Inspections
Routine Special
(Security Aspects)
HWP-Kota 2 -
Facility No. of Inspection
HWP-Thal 4 -
FRFCF 1
HWP-Hazira 2 -
DFRP 1
HWP-Manuguru 3 -
GHAVP 1
HWP-Baroda 1 -
RAPP-7&8 1
HWP-Tuticorin 1 -
MAPS 1
TDP/RCF, Chembur 1 -
IGCAR (CORAL) 1
NFC-Hyderabad 3 -
IGCAR 1
ZC-Pazhayakayal 2 - (FBTR & IFSB)
UCIL-Jaduguda mill 1 - TAPS-1&2 1
UCIL-Turamdih mill 1 - TAPS-3&4 1
UCIL-Bagjata mine - 1 NAPS 1
(unannounced)
KKNPP-Site 2
UCIL- 2 -
Tummalapalle mine PFBR 1
UCIL- 1 - HWP-Kota & HWEAC 1

Tummalapalle mill KAPP-3&4 1
IREL-Chavara 1 - Total 15
IREL-Udyogamandal 1 -
IREL-OSCOM 2 1 3.3 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF
(unannounced) RADIATION FACILITIES
VECC 1 - The information on the routine and special
BRIT/ISOMED 1 - regulatory inspections carried out by AERB during
BSM&NORM 17 - the year for the radiation facilities is given in
Facilities Table 3.5.
ECIL Hyderabad 1 - Enforcement Actions against Errant Medical

Diagnostic X-Ray Facilities
RRCAT 1 -
As part of the nation-wide campaign to
Total 49 2
ensure increased compliance and regulatory
51
Table 3.5: Regulatory Inspections of Radiation Facilities
No. of facilities/
Radiation Facility Type of Inspection
institutes inspected
Radiotherapy Periodic 168
Medical Cyclotron Includes Site and Periodic 8
Nuclear Medicine Includes Pre-commissioning and Periodic 104
Diagnostic Radiology (DR) Excessive Exposure Investigation, Type 190
(carried out by AERB) Approval, Special
QA Service Agency 28
DR Equipment Manufacturers 11
Diagnostic Radiology (carried out by On sample basis 154
AERB and Directorate of Radiation
Safety)
Industrial Radiography Periodic, Excessive Exposure Investigation, 68
Type Approval, Special
Radiation Processing Facilities Includes Site, Pre-commissioning, Periodic 15
and Special
Gamma Irradiation Chamber Periodic 29
Well Logging Periodic 17
Ionising Radiation Gauging Devices On Sample basis 196
/Nucleonic Gauges (Vulnerable/ Inactive Facilities)
Calibration Facilities, Radio On sample basis 14
analytical lab, Research facilities
using sealed sources
Consumer Products Manufacturer Periodic, Type Approval 18
Container Scanner Special 4
Research Accelerator Periodic 1
Total 1025
coverage of medical diagnostic X-ray equipment, Bahadurgarh, Dehradun, Rishikesh, Mussorie,

AERB carried out unannounced inspection of Paonta Sahib, Chandigarh, Kolhapur,
facilities in major cities/towns in the country viz. Thiruvananthapuram, Alappuzza and Thrissur,
Bhopal, Indore, Ujjain, Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, covering 166 number of medical diagnostic x-ray
Kakinada, Rajahmundry, Chiplun, Ratnagiri, facilities. During these inspections, 78 number of
Bhubaneshwar, Cuttack, Rohtak, Sonepat, diagnostic equipment were sealed and warning for
52
Regulatory Inspection of Nucleonic Gauge Installations
VHDOZDVLVVXHGWR;UD\HTXLSPHQWLQYLHZRIWKHLUQRQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHVSHFL¿HGUHJXODWRU\
and radiation safety requirements.
Trivandrum Rohtak
Alappuzza Sonepat
Thrissur Bahadurgarh
Visakhapatnam Dehradun
ed
ed
ed
Kakinada Rishikesh
al
al
al
Rajahmundry Mussorie
Se
Se
Se
Chiplun Paonta Sahib

Ratnagiri Chandigarh
Kolhapur Bhubaneshwar
Cuttack
Before start of the campaign, AERB DQG ¿UVW GHFODUH WKHLU ;UD\ HTXLSPHQW LQ WKH
had put out notices in various leading national e-governance portal (e-LORA) of AERB and
dailies, directing utilities who have not yet within 6 months obtain the requisite Licence/
obtained Licence/Registration to come forward Registration.
53
ATTENTION
All owners of Medical Diagnostic X-ray Equipment
Have you obtained Licence for operation of your X-ray equipment for
ensuring radiation safety...?
( Operation of Medical X-ray equipment without AERB (Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board) Licence is an offence under Atomic Energy
(Radiation Protection) Rules 2004, promulgated under Atomic Energy
Act 1962.
Choose between
Operating
Licence
or
Sealing of X-ray
equipment
( DO NOT DELAY – Several X-ray equipment have been sealed by AERB

for operating without AERB Licence.
Licence can be obtained online through AERB’s web application
eLORA (e-Licensing of Radiation Applications) System.
Visit AERB website www.aerb.gov.in for more information
Message from AERB
Act Now – Ensure Radiation Safety – Register in eLORA – Be assured
While undergoing prescribed medical X-ray examination, public is
advised to ensure that X-ray equipment is Licensed by AERB
Issued by: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

(Government of India)
Niyamak Bhavan, Anushaktinagar
Mumbai – 400094 (Maharashtra)
AERB Advertisement on Licensing requirements for Medical Diagnostic X-Ray Equipment in Leading Newspapers
The surprise inspections carried out at various they are installed and operated in accordance with
cities/towns in the country, revealed that certain WKH UDGLRORJLFDO VDIHW\ UHTXLUHPHQWV VSHFL¿HG
diagnostic X-ray facilities have still not complied by AERB. AERB issues the requisite Licence/
with the regulatory requirements of AERB and Registration after ensuring that they conform to the
accordingly requisite enforcement actions were VSHFL¿HGVDIHW\UHTXLUHPHQWV
taken against such facilities. The above actions The details on enforcement actions taken
taken by AERB received wide media attention. by AERB against Medical Diagnostic X-ray
Though the X-ray equipment are of low facilities, published in Newspapers are given
radiation hazard potential, it is important that below.
54
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55
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ate duri
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(QIRUFHPHQW5,FRQGXFWHGE\$(5%RI¿FHUVDWYDULRXV'LDJQRVWLF5DGLRORJ\IDFLOLWLHVDW-DPPXDQG'HKUDGXQSXEOLVKHG
in Regional Newspapers
56
Chapter 4
ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES
4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY by International Commission on Radiological

Environmental safety in the vicinity of Protection (ICRP). Based on this limit, AERB
nuclear installations is ensured through control KDV IXUWKHU VSHFL¿HG OLPLWV RQ HIÀXHQW GLVFKDUJHV
on radioactive discharges into the environment through gaseous, liquid routes, in the Technical
and environmental monitoring. These radioactive 6SHFL¿FDWLRQV IRU RSHUDWLRQ RI 133V 7KHVH
discharges are mainly in the form of liquid and WHFKQLFDOVSHFL¿FDWLRQOLPLWVDUHVHWIDUEHORZWKH
JDVHRXV UDGLRDFWLYH HIÀXHQWV UHOHDVHG GXULQJ WKH GRVH DSSRUWLRQPHQW WR WKH SXEOLF IRU WKH VSHFL¿F
operation of the facility. UDGLRQXFOLGH 7KH UDGLRQXFOLGH VSHFL¿F GRVH
The waste management aspects are reviewed apportionment is small fraction of the annual dose
throughout the lifecycle of the plants, right from limit (1mSv/year) to public. While specifying these
the siting stage, to construction, commissioning, limits, it is ensured that the discharge is controlled
operation and decommissioning stage. Based on within public exposure limit of 1000 micro-Sievert
the satisfactory review of the arrangements made IROORZLQJWKHSULQFLSOHVRI³$V/RZDV5HDVRQDEO\
by the plant for safe management of radioactive $FKLHYDEOH´$/$5$7KHOLPLWVVSHFL¿HGLQWKH
wastes, AERB issues authorisation under the WHFKQLFDO VSHFL¿FDWLRQV DFWXDOO\ HQVXUH WKDW WKH
Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive GRVHWRWKHSXEOLFLVZHOOEHORZWKHVSHFL¿HGOLPLW
Wastes) Rules, 1987 with respect to the quantity of 1000 micro-Sievert for NPP site. The actual
DQGDFWLYLW\FRQWHQWRIWKHUDGLRDFWLYHHIÀXHQWV discharges from the plants are seen to be well
$(5% KDV VSHFL¿HG WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU EHORZWKHOLPLWVVSHFL¿HG
safe management of radioactive wastes in form of 3HULRGLFUHSRUWVLQFOXGLQJHIÀXHQWGLVFKDUJHV
Safety Code ‘Management of Radioactive Waste are submitted by the plant sites to AERB in
(AERB/SC/RW)’ and has issued several guides prescribed forms. AERB also conducts regular
thereunder providing guidance on various aspects inspection of these plant sites to verify compliance
to meet the requirements of the Code. The Safety ZLWKWKHODLGGRZQUHTXLUHPHQWV(YHU\¿YH\HDUV
Code deals with the requirements for radiation prior to renewal of licence for operation of these
protection aspects in design, construction and
facilities, the adequacy of waste management
operation of waste management facilities and the
DUUDQJHPHQWVHIÀXHQWUHOHDVHDQGWKHLULPSDFWRQ
responsibilities of different agencies involved.
the environment are thoroughly reviewed.
The Code is also applicable to the management
of radioactive waste containing chemically and The independent Environmental Survey
biologically hazardous substances, even though Laboratories (ESL) of the Health, Safety
RWKHU VSHFL¿F UHTXLUHPHQWV PD\ DGGLWLRQDOO\ EH and Environment Group, BARC, carry out
applicable as per relevant standards. environmental surveillance at all the operating
$(5%KDVVSHFL¿HGWKDWWKHUDGLDWLRQGRVHWR nuclear power plant sites. The liquid and gaseous
the members of public near the operating NPPs due radioactive wastes discharged to the environment
to the discharges from the plants shall not exceed during the year 2017 from the operating units were
annual limit of 1 mSv (i.e. 1000 micro-Sievert). only a small fraction of the prescribed technical
This is in line with the limits recommended VSHFL¿FDWLRQOLPLWV
57
7\SLFDO YDOXHV IRU UDGLRDFWLYH HIÀXHQW concentration in items of diet, viz. vegetables,
discharges from Indian 540 MWe PHWR (TAPS- FHUHDOVPLONPHDW¿VKHWFDQGWKURXJKLQWDNHRI
3&4) for the year 2017 are given below, which air and water. It is seen that the effective dose to
are comparable to the reported discharges from public around all NPP sites is far less than the annual
other international nuclear power plants of this limit of 1mSv (1000 micro-Sievert) prescribed by
type. AERB. The effective doses to the members of the
Radiation dose to members of the public public (Year 2013 to 2017) due to the release of
near the operating plants is estimated based on UDGLRDFWLYHHIÀXHQWVIURPWKHSODQWVDUHSUHVHQWHG
gaseous release and measurements of radionuclide in the Figures 4.1 (a) and 4.1 (b).
/LTXLG(IÀXHQWV *DVHRXV(IÀXHQWV Solid Rad. Waste Produced

Tritium Tritium FPNG Volume Activity
(Bq/Unit) (Bq/Unit) (Bq/Unit) (m3/Unit) (Bq/Unit)
( ( ( 30.1 (
Fig. 4.1 (a): Public dose at 1.6 km distance for Nuclear Power Plants
(AERB prescribed annual limit is 1000 micro-sievert (μSv))
45
40
35
30
Effective dose (μSv)
25
20
15
10
0
Tarapur Site Rawatbhata site Kalpakkam site Narora Site Kakrapara Site Kaiga Site Kudankulam site
2013 6.94 27.40 15.52 0.56 0.92 0.8 0.001
2014 8.71 41.01 23.14 0.44 0.76 1.10 0.081
2015 3.04 35.58 30.39 0.36 0.42 1.10 0.022
2016 4.24 16.97 30.06 0.50 0.40 1.30 0.075
2017 3.41 40.21 31.20 0.37 0.22 1.30 0.012
Note: Public dose at Rawatbhata and Kalpakkam sites are relatively higher as compared to other reactor sites, due to release of Ar-41
from RAPS-2 and MAPS.
58
Fig. 4.1 (b): Total Effective Dose in different Zones during the Year 2017
(AERB prescribed annual limit is 1000 micro-sievert (μSv))
45
40
35
30
Effective dose (μSv)
25
20
15
10
0
Tarapur Site Rawatbhata Site Kalpakkam Site Narora Site Kakrapara Site Kaiga Site Kudankulam Site
1.6km 3.41 40.21 31.20 0.37 0.22 1.30 0.012
1.6-5km 1.62 18.39 17.64 0.24 0.15 0.90 0.003
5-10km 0.70 7.16 6.76 0.17 0.13 0.70 0.001
10-15km 0.43 2.91 3.40 0.14 0.13 0.60 0.001
15-30km 0.25 1.37 1.35 0.12 0.13 0.40 0.0007

Note: Public dose at Rawatbhata and Kalpakkam sites are relatively higher as compared to other reactor sites, due to release of Ar-41
from RAPS-2 and MAPS.
4.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES occupational worker annual dose limit is 30 mSv,

,Q HDFK 133 D 5DGLRORJLFDO 6DIHW\ 2I¿FHU with the condition that it should not exceed 100
(RSO) and alternate RSO are designated by the P6YLQDVSDQRI\HDUV7KHVSHFL¿HGDQQXDOGRVH
constraint for radiation exposure of temporary
Competent Authority to implement the radiation
worker is 15 mSv.
protection programme. The RSOs are entrusted
with the responsibility for providing radiological For better exposure control, individual cases
surveillance and safety support functions. These are investigated and controlled at an early stage
include radiological monitoring of workplace, plant VR DV WR UHPDLQ ZLWKLQ WKH $(5% VSHFL¿HG GRVH
V\VWHPV SHUVRQQHO HIÀXHQW PRQLWRULQJ FDUU\LQJ limits. The following Investigation Levels (ILs) are
out exposure control, exposure investigations and applicable to the nuclear facilities.
analysis and trending of radioactivity in plant Monthly dose - 10 mSv
systems.
Quarterly dose - 15 mSv
All NPPs have established radiological
surveillance programme and work procedures Annual dose - 20 mSv
intended to control the occupational exposures. The information on number of workers in
AERB Safety Manual on 'Radiation Protection NPPs who received dose between 20 to 30 mSv
for Nuclear Facilities' (AERB/NF/SM/O-2 and above 30 mSv during the year 2017 is given in
5HYVSHFL¿HV'RVH/LPLWVDQG,QYHVWLJDWLRQ Table: 4.1. In the year 2017, there was no case of
Levels (IL) for occupational workers to control the individual radiation exposure above the prescribed
individual doses. As per AERB directives, for an annual dose limit of 30 mSv.
59
Table 4.1: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Nuclear Power Plants (2017)
Average Number Average dose Number of Workers

Number of received Dose in the range
Dose for of for Exposed
NPP Monitored
Monitored Exposed Persons < 20 20-30 >30
Persons
Person (mSv) Persons (mSv) (mSv) (mSv) (mSv)
TAPS-1&2 1321 2.23 1058 2.78 1321 0 0
RAPS-1&2 823 0.85 546 1.29 823 0 0
MAPS-1&2 1251 2.05 1111 2.31 1251 0 0
NAPS-1&2 1111 0.86 757 1.26 1111 0 0
KAPS-1&2 1554 2.28 1264 2.81 1553 1 0
KGS-1&2 1433 0.98 1069 1.31 1433 0 0
RAPS-3&4 1362 0.24 703 0.47 1362 0 0
TAPS-3&4 1487 1.66 1230 2.01 1487 0 0
KGS -3&4 1191 0.51 655 0.93 1191 0 0
RAPS 5&6 1005 0.19 392 0.48 1005 0 0
KKNPP 2286 0.19 457 0.95 2286 0 0
Figure 4.2 gives collective dose for operation and maintenance of NPPs for last 5 years.
Fig. 4.2: Collective Dose (Person -Sv) at Nculear Power Plants
5
4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
TAPS-1&2 RAPS-1&2 MAPS-1&2 NAPS-1&2 KAPS-1&2 KGS-1&2 RAPS-3&4 TAPS-3&4 KGS-3&4 RAPS-5&6 KKNPP
2013 4.48 1.34 2.47 2.34 0.92 2.06 1.71 2.66 0.93 0.87 0.013
2014 2.85 3.09 2.72 2.13 1.38 1.64 2.16 0.90 0.85 1.24 0.08
2015 3.42 0.73 1.97 2.64 2.23 1.18 1.43 1.96 0.84 0.56 0.20
2016 2.397 2.646 1.599 2.646 2.410 1.828 2.337 2.482 0.522 1.038 0.084
2017 2.94 0.70 2.57 0.95 3.55 1.41 0.33 2.47 0.61 0.19 0.43
60
Table 4.2: Radiation Doses (Effective) received by Workers in Medical, Industrial and Research
Institutions in the Year 2017*
Averaged No. of Workers received

Average
No. of Dose for No. of Annual individual Dose
Category of Dose for
Monitored Monitored Exposed Excluding zero dose D (mSv)
Radiation Worker Persons
Persons Persons Persons 0<D 20<D 30<D
(mSv) D>50
(mSv)
Diagnostic X-rays 97458 0.23 34959 0.64 34957 2 0 0

Radiation Therapy 13527 0.14 4019 0.48 4019 0 0 0
Nuclear Medicine 2531 0.41 1355 0.77 1355 0 0 0
Industrial Radiography 7152 0.39 2619 1.07 2619 0 0 0
Radiation Processing 71 0.02 7 0.20 7 0 0 0
Facility
Research 3890 0.09 962 0.36 962 0 0 0
Total /Avg. 124629 0.23 43921 0.65 43919 2 0 0
* Data (External dose) as on February 16, 2018 with National Occupational Dose Registry System (NODRS). The
data does not include excessive exposure cases above investigation levels which are currently under investigation.
The information on number of workers in exceeded radiation exposures in different ranges

medical, industrial and research institutions who during the year 2016, was given in Table-3.2
received various doses during the year 2017 is of AERB annual report for the year 2016. The
given in Table 4.2. information for the year 2016 is now updated
incorporating the outcome of excessive exposure
The information on number of workers in cases that have been concluded and is given in
medical, industrial and research institutions, who Table 4.2(a) below.
Table 4.2 (a): Radiation Doses (Effective) received by workers in

Medical, Industrial and Research Institutions during 2016*
(updated after investigations on workers who have received doses above investigation levels and
receipt of more data)
Average
(mSv) D>50
(mSv)
Diagnostic X-ray 94732 0.28 37388 0.71 37365 20 3 0
Radiation Therapy 13167 0.19 4966 0.51 4966 0 0 0
Nuclear Medicine 2577 0.51 1568 0.85 1568 0 0 0
61
Average
(mSv) D>50
(mSv)
Industrial 7211 0.44 2708 1.17 2698 8 1 1
Radiography
Radiation Processing 81 0.10 15 0.52 15 0 0 0
Facility
Research 4170 0.13 1194 0.47 1194 0 0 0
Total /Avg. 121938 0.28 47839 0.72 47806 28 4 1
*Data (External dose) as on February 16, 2018 with National Occupational Dose Registry System (NODRS). The
data does not include excessive exposure cases above investigation levels which are currently under investigation.
The information on number of workers in various Fuel Cycle Facilities who received radiation doses less than 20
mSv, between 20 to 30 mSv and above 30mSv during the year 2017 is given in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Radiation Doses Received by Workers in Front End Fuel Cycle Facilities (2017)
Number Average Dose Maximum No. of workers received

Type of of for Exposed Dose of dose in the range
Location
Facilities Exposed Persons Exposed < 20 20 – 30 >30
Persons (mSv) Persons (mSv) mSv mSv mSv
Jaduguda 251 0.33 0.65 251 0 0
Bhatin 63 0.10 0.34 63 0 0
Narwapahar 865 4.58 7.54 865 0 0
Uranium mines Turamdih 456 5.74 10.99 456 0 0
(UCIL) Bagjata 175 6.95 8.07 175 0 0
Banduhurang 47 2.58 3.05 47 0 0
Mohuldih 129 3.84 6.41 129 0 0
Tummalapalle 805 3.86 9.02 805 0 0
Jaduguda 696 3.04 7.56 696 0 0
Uranium mill
Turamdih 429 1.50 2.90 429 0 0
(UCIL)
Tummalapalle 506 0.38 0.93 506 0 0
Chavara 68 0.4 2.3 68 0 0
Thorium mines Manavalakurichi 149 1.69 11.8 149 0 0
and mills (IREL) Chatrapur 454 2.83 15.3 454 0 0
Udyogamandal 255 1 7.51 255 0 0
Fuel Fab. (NFC) Hyderabad 1258 0.94 8.83 1258 0 0
Total 6606 6606 0 0
62
4.3 BASIS FOR ACCEPTABLE DOSE TO discharge limits taking into cognisance differences
OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS AND in NPP system design. The operating data shows
ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES that releases from NPPs have been a small fraction
The dose limits for exposure from ionising RIWKHVSHFL¿HGUHOHDVHOLPLWV
radiation for occupational workers and the members 4.4 INITIATIVES TAKEN BY AERB FOR
of the public are prescribed by AERB in its Directive DOSE REDUCTION
No.01/2011 under Rule 15 of the Atomic Energy (i) Review of Radiation Protection Aspects
(Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004. These dose during Project Stage
limits are based on the ICRP recommendations and
IAEA Safety Standards on Radiological Protection During design and commissioning stages, it
and are in line with the international practice and is ensured that an elaborate radiation monitoring
standards. system consisting of area radiation monitors,
process monitors, environmental monitors and
The estimated dose to the members of the HIÀXHQWPRQLWRUVLVPDGHDYDLODEOHWRJLYHKLVWRU\
SXEOLF GXH WR GLVFKDUJH RI UDGLRDFWLYH HIÀXHQWV trend and instantaneous readings of the monitors
from nuclear facilities at a site shall not exceed an for exposure control. Based on the operating
effective dose of 1 mSv in a year. H[SHULHQFHPDQ\GHVLJQPRGL¿FDWLRQVIRUH[SRVXUH
Observance of Dose Limits control have been incorporated progressively in the
Indian NPPs.
The exposure control consists of application
of primary dose limits, action levels such as (ii) Operation Phase
investigation level and operational restrictions. Radiation protection programme during
Operational restrictions are established based the operation of NPPs is revised and approved
on dose, dose rate, air activity and surface by AERB. This programme comprises of
contamination levels etc., at workplace such that the organisational, administrative and technical
exposure of workers does not exceed the applicable elements. ALARA measures are put in place for
dose limits. Individual exposures exceeding the exposure control of the plant personnel and the
investigation levels are investigated and reported public. AERB ensures that plant management
to AERB. All cases of exposures exceeding the makes adequate review of the implementation
annual limits are reviewed by AERB committee. and the effectiveness of the radiation protection
Authorised Limits of Environmental Releases / SURJUDPPH 5DGLRORJLFDO 6DIHW\ 2I¿FHU 562
Discharge for each NPP is authorised by AERB to carry out
radiological safety functions.
The discharge of radioactive waste from
a NPP is governed by the Atomic Energy (Safe The environmental surveillance programme
Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987. It is also reviewed to evaluate the impact of operation
is mandatory for the NPP to obtain authorisation of the NPP on the surrounding areas of the plant
under these rules from the Competent Authority VLWH DQG HQVXUH WKDW HIÀXHQW UHOHDVHV DQG SXEOLF
IRUGLVSRVDORIUDGLRDFWLYHZDVWHVDQG¿OHDUHWXUQ exposures are below the regulatory limits.
annually to AERB indicating the actual quantity of (iii) Collective Radiation Dose Budgeting
radioactive waste discharge.
Collective dose budget is prepared by each
Discharge constraints are set at a much NPP annually on the basis of jobs that are likely to
lower value than the authorised limits to achieve be executed and collective dose consumed in the
HIÀXHQWUHOHDVHVDW$/$5$OHYHO7KHVHGLVFKDUJH previous years as well as the existing radiological
constraints are usually set at 50-65% of authorised condition in the plant. The aim is to minimise the
63
collective dose in line with ALARA principle. committee at each NPP and subsequently by the
AERB carries out review of the budget. Any AERB Safety Committees.
upward revision of the budget requires adequate (vii) Exposure Control and Implementation of
MXVWL¿FDWLRQ E\ 133 UHYLHZ DQG DSSURYDO E\ ALARA
AERB.
AERB ensures that all nuclear plants have
(iv) Review of Radiological Safety Aspects radiation safety programmes and work procedures
Routine quarterly and annual reports on intended to control the occupational exposures.
radiological safety aspects are prepared by the RSO Exposures to site personnel are controlled by
of the NPPs. The reports are reviewed at AERB combination of radiation protection measures such
and necessary corrective measures required for as:
exposure control are recommended to respective (a) All NPPs have ALARA committees
NPP. at station and sectional level. Periodic
(v) Regulatory Inspection and SOT ALARA reviews are conducted at
the NPPs to identify areas for dose
During the regulatory inspection,
reduction and implement corrective
HQYLURQPHQWDOPRQLWRULQJGDWDHIÀXHQWGLVFKDUJH
actions.
data, radioactive waste disposal data and quality
assurance programme in radiation protection (b) The operating experience on
are checked. Additionally, AERB also conducts radiological events at NPPs in India
regulatory inspections during Biennial Shutdown and in other countries is reviewed and
(BSD)/ Refuelling Shutdown (RSD) of NPPs to the lessons learned are communicated
ascertain compliance with radiation protection to all concerned station personnel.
procedure. Access control to various zones is (c) Improved collective dose budgeting.
observed by Site Observer Team (SOT) members.
Any violation in safety norms during movement (d) Restricting the external exposure by
of personnel or material is brought to the notice means of shielding, remote operation,
of plant authorities for appropriate action and it is source control, rehearsing the work on
ensured that there is no repetitive violation. mock ups and minimising the exposure
time.
(vi) Review of Radiation Exposure to
Occupational Workers (e) Minimising the internal exposures by
source control.
The radiation exposure to the occupational
workers is periodically reviewed by AERB based (f) Periodic review of radioactive work
on the health physics reports. The exposure cases practices
exceeding the regulatory constraints/ limits are (g) Periodic training of radiation workers
primarily investigated by the exposure investigation on radiation protection aspects.
64
Chapter 5
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) in India The establishment and submission of emergency
are designed, constructed, commissioned and preparedness and response plan is one of the pre-
operated in conformity with relevant nuclear requisites for licensing of radiation facilities (RF).
safety requirements. These requirements ensure
5.1 ROLE OF AERB IN EMERGENCY
an adequate margin of safety so that NPPs can be
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
operated without undue radiological risks to the
PLAN, DURING EMERGENCY AND
plant personnel and members of the public. State
POST EMERGENCY
of the art safety measures are provided based on
principles of defense-in-depth, redundancy (more AERB lays down the requirements and
numbers than required) and diversity (back- provides guidance for preparation of Emergency
up systems operating on different principles). Preparedness and Response (EPR) plans. AERB
These include fail safe shutdown system to safely reviews and approves the EPR plans for both
shutdown the reactor, combination of active and plant and on-site emergency situation whereas
passive (systems working on natural phenomena offsite emergency plans are reviewed by AERB
and not needing motive power or operator and approved by the District Authority / Local
action) cooling systems to remove the heat from Government. Periodic inspections are carried out
the core at all times and a robust containment to ensure that the arrangements and infrastructure
V\VWHPVIRUFRQ¿QLQJDQ\UHOHDVHRIUDGLRDFWLYLW\ for effective emergency response are in place. It
Notwithstanding these, it is mandatory to develop is further ensured that the plans are tested through
Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) periodic exercises as prescribed by AERB Codes
plans as a measure of abundant caution. These and Guides. A dedicated group within AERB
plans are prepared in accordance with the national oversees the above task.
laws and regulations and deal with the effective
6LWHVSHFL¿F HPHUJHQF\ SUHSDUHGQHVV SODQV
management of any eventuality with a potential
of the respective stations are tested by carrying out
to pose an undue radiological risk to the plant
periodic emergency exercises involving the station
personnel and public.
authorities, district administration, and the members
Similarly, EPR plans are ensured for of public on sample basis. These exercises are used
nuclear facilities under the purview of AERB for twin purposes:
handling hazardous chemicals namely ammonia
a) Familiarisation of personnel concerned with
and hydrogen sulphide based Heavy Water Plants
the management and implementation of
(HWP) and some of the heavy water plants catering
emergency response and protective measures,
to the production of solvents. These plans are
and
prepared as per AERB Safety Guidelines on ‘On-
Site’ and ‘Off-Site’ Emergency Preparedness for b) Assessment of the adequacy of these plans
non-nuclear installations and deal with the effective and improvement in them based on feedback
management of any eventuality with a potential to from exercises. It is also ensured that each
pose an undue chemical risk to the plant personnel Shift Crew of the plant takes part in these
and public. exercises at least once a year.
65
Plant Emergency Exercises (PEE) are 5.2 REVIEW OF PREPAREDNESS FOR
carried out once in a quarter by each NPP. The Site SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY AT
Emergency Exercise (SEE) and Off-Site Emergency NPP SITES
Exercise (OSEE) are carried out by each site once
AERB conducts regulatory inspections to
in a year and once in two years respectively. During
check the emergency preparedness at all NPPs.
the periodic regulatory inspections of NPPs, AERB
$(5% RI¿FLDOV FDUULHG RXW VSHFLDO UHJXODWRU\
reviews the preparedness of plants to handle
inspections on emergency preparedness aspects
emergencies to verify that this is in accordance
and participated in Off-site emergency exercise as
with the approved plans.
observers at 3 NPP sites viz. Kaiga, Kalpakkam and
The number of site and offsite emergency .XGDQNXODP $(5% RI¿FLDOV DOVR ZLWQHVVHG VLWH
exercises carried out at NPP sites in 2017 is emergency exercises at 2 NPP sites viz. Rawatbhata
JLYHQ LQ7DEOH $(5% RI¿FLDOV ZLWQHVVHG VLWH and Tarapur. These OSEEs were generally in line
emergency exercises carried out at two sites and with the approved EPR plans. The observations
offsite emergency exercises at three sites.
made during these exercises and inspections were
Table 5.1: Site and Off-site Emergency sent to stations for implementation of the corrective
Exercises carried out in the Year 2017 actions. The coordination among plant personnel,
NPP Sites SEE OSEE GLVWULFW RI¿FLDOV DQG SXEOLF LQYROYHG LQ WKHVH
exercise was good and their response / actions were
Tarapur 1 1
timely. The observer’s reports on these site and off
Rawatbhata 1 0 VLWH HPHUJHQF\ H[HUFLVHV DQG WKHLU ¿QGLQJV DUH
Kalpakkam 1 1 being discussed in AERB for appropriate corrective
Narora 1 0 actions and guidance.
Kakrapar 1 0 5.3 HARMONISATION OF EMERGENCY

PREPAREDNESS PLANS OF NPPs
Kaiga 1 1
Successful demonstration of EPR plans is
Kudankulam 1 1
a mandatory requirement for issuing licence for
Total 7 4 operation of NPPs. AERB ensures that necessary
Demonstration of contamination checking in public domain Demonstration of Bus decontamination in public domain
during Off-Site Emergency Exercise at Kalpakkam site during Off-Site Emergency Exercise at Kalpakkam site
66
EPR plans are in place and they are successfully for protected stay of response personnel for
demonstrated before issuing regulatory consent for extended duration. AERB after a detailed review,
First Approach to Criticality. AERB evaluates all accepted the generic guidelines for establishing
WKHHOHPHQWVRIWKH(35SODQVVXFKDVLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ OESC and had asked NPCIL to submit design basis
RI HPHUJHQF\ FODVVL¿FDWLRQ GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ UHSRUWIRUWKHVLWHVSHFL¿F2(6&IRUDOO133VLWHV
QRWL¿FDWLRQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DQG SURMHFWHG GRVH in accordance with these guidelines. The design
assessment, and ensures the periodic revision of RI2(6&KDVEHHQ¿QDOLVHGE\WKHXWLOLW\DQGWKH
these plans. implementation is in progress.
During review and revision of plant EPR of Decision Support System (DSS) for nuclear
few of NPPs, AERB felt the need of harmonisation emergencies is intended to provide comprehensive
of plant, site and offsite EPR plans of NPPs. and timely information to emergency managers
Keeping this in view, standard templates on plant on an emergency situation arising from a nuclear
and site EPR plans were prepared by NPCIL in line accident. Based on the radiological monitoring
with latest published IAEA safety standards on EPR readings of installed radiation monitors and
(GSR part-7, GS-G-2.1, GSG-2 and GSR part-3) meteorological conditions, the Decision Support
and all NPPs were asked to revise their plant and System (DSS) estimates the projected public dose.
site EPR plans accordingly. Harmonised plant EPR These estimates are used to decide appropriate
plan of all NPPs was approved by AERB and site protective actions in the public domain. A decision
EPR plans of NPPs are in the process of approval. has been taken to implement DSS progressively at
all the NPP sites.
Off-site emergency preparedness plan is
in the process of restructuring. This plan is being 5.5 NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL
bifurcated into two parts, Part-1 will be related to EMERGENCY MONITORING CELL
SODQW DQG VLWH VSHFL¿F JXLGHOLQHV IRU PLWLJDWLQJ AT AERB
the effects of offsite emergency situation, whereas The implementation of off-site emergency
3DUWZLOODGGUHVVWKHJXLGHOLQHVIRUVWDWHRI¿FLDOV preparedness and response plan during actual
about protective actions in public domain. Part-1 emergency situation in public domain is the
will be approved by AERB and Part-2 will have responsibility of District, State and National
approval from District Authority. This task is Authority and Department of Atomic Energy
being done in collaboration with National Disaster (DAE). As per the existing requirements, the
Management Authority (NDMA). information of any nuclear and radiological
5.4 CREATION OF ON-SITE EMERGENCY emergency situation in India is to be reported
SUPPORT CENTRE AT NPPs to these authorities, including AERB. In order to
strengthen the monitoring of progress of response
Based on the reviews undertaken on safety actions during nuclear and radiological emergencies
assessments of Indian NPPs, in light of the accident and the review of these actions, a Nuclear and
at Fukushima NPPs, AERB had mandated the Radiological Emergency Monitoring Cell
requirement for establishing the On-Site Emergency (NREMC) is established at AERB. The cell
Support Centre (OESC) at all NPP sites. AERB consists of experts who repeatedly demonstrated
had constituted an Advisory Committee to develop expertise in activating the cell on short notice
the guidelines for establishing OESC at all NPP to analytically assess the emergency situation
sites. This facility will have capability to withstand and the actions performed by various agencies
HDUWKTXDNH DQG ÀRRG RI PDJQLWXGHV ODUJHU WKDQ to handle the emergency. The NREMC,
their respective design basis for the NPP. The with the infrastructure of communication
building will be designed with requisite shielding facilities, documents and protocols to obtain
67
the information during the emergencies from is available to handle nuclear and radiological
concerned agencies and standard operating emergency situation, national requirements on
procedure (SOP) was activated during the off- this subject do not have legal framework. In
site emergency exercises conducted at NPPs to view of this, AERB has decided to prepare safety
review its effectiveness. code on emergency preparedness. The document
5.6 PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY preparation work is in progress.
EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY IAEA In order to communicate various aspects of
India is signatory under the IAEA nuclear and radiological emergencies in effective
&RQYHQWLRQV RQ ³(DUO\ 1RWL¿FDWLRQ RI D 1XFOHDU manner, a Technical Document (TECDOC) on
Accidents and Assistance in case of a Nuclear emergency preparedness and response actions is
Accident or Radiological Emergency”. Under also under preparation at AERB.
these conventions, India has agreed to provide 5.8 PUBLIC PROTECTION MEASURES
QRWL¿FDWLRQ RI DQ\ QXFOHDU DFFLGHQW WKDW RFFXUV
within its jurisdiction that could affect other System of preventive action is based on the
countries and any assistance can be provided projected dose and other response action is based
in the case of a nuclear accident that occurs in on the releases of radioactivity. The emergency
DQRWKHUVWDWHWKDWKDVUDWL¿HGWKHWUHDW\7KH&ULVLV response plan takes into account the deterministic
Management Group, Department of Atomic Energy effects, stochastic effects and socio-economic
(CMG-DAE) is the national contact point for consequences to the public and environment. This
India for these conventions. Periodic exercises are is ensured by keeping residual doses well below
conducted by IAEA for training and preparedness the reference levels in line with IAEA.
of the involved agencies. These exercises are of The generic criteria and operational criteria
three types, have been established for appropriate protective
9 ConvEx-1 covers communication and DFWLRQVDQGLQFOXGHGLQWKHVLWHVSHFL¿F(35SODQV
QRWL¿FDWLRQDVSHFWV of NPPs and are being used for implementation of
protective actions.
9 ConvEx-2 covers aspects related to
requesting and / or providing assistance For the purpose of emergency planning and
during emergencies, and preparedness, the current AERB requirements call
for establishment of on the site (on-site) and off the
9 ConvEx-3 cover all aspects of early
site (off-site) zones around each NPP. The exact
QRWL¿FDWLRQDQGDVVLVWDQFHFRQYHQWLRQ
size and shape of each zone is a result of detailed
During the year 2017, representative from planning which includes consideration of the
AERB participated in the exercises conducted VSHFL¿FFRQGLWLRQVDWHDFKVLWHXQLTXHJHRJUDSKLFDO
under this convention. features of the area, and demographic information.
5.7 DEVELOPMENT OF DOCUMENTS This planned strategy provides a substantial basis
RELATED TO EMERGENCY to support activity beyond the planning zone, in the
MANAGEMENT extremely unlikely event it would be needed.
In pursuance of the objective of ensuring In accordance with the severity of the
safety of occupational workers and members of the potential consequences, emergency situations are
public, as well as protection of environment, the graded as Plant Emergency, Site emergency and
AERB has been entrusted with the responsibility Off-site emergency. The plant conditions during
of laying down safety standards and enforcing accident scenarios i.e. Emergency Action Levels
rules and regulations for normal and emergency (EALs) are the basic guidance for declaration of
conditions in a facility. Although enough guidance emergency based on hazard analysis.
68
AERB and NPCIL are working on protective measures are actions taken to mitigate
GHYHORSPHQW RI ³,QLWLDWLQJ &RQGLWLRQV DQG the consequences of a radiological event and protect
(PHUJHQF\ $FWLRQ /HYHOV IRU &ODVVL¿FDWLRQ RI site personnel, members of public and livestock
Emergency Level” which provide rapid and from radiation. On the time scale, these protective
coordinated response through the emergency actions are implemented as precautionary protective
FODVVL¿FDWLRQV\VWHP$QHZV\VWHPIRUFRQGXFWLQJ actions and urgent / early protective actions. These
offsite emergency exercises is in developmental include sheltering, administration of prophylactics,
stage in which these EALs are used to conduct control on consumption of contaminated foodstuff
table top exercises. Such exercises were conducted and if needed, evacuation. It is essential to ensure
at Narora and Tarapur sites during the month of that the response measures would reduce the overall
November and December 2017 respectively, which LPSDFWRQSXEOLFWRDOHYHOVLJQL¿FDQWO\ORZHUWKDQ
have shown encouraging output. Based on EALs, what it would be, in the absence of such measures.
69
Chapter 6
REGULATORY SAFETY
DOCUMENTS
One of the mandates of AERB as given (e) Safety Manuals

in its constitution is to develop Safety Codes, (f) Technical Documents
Standards and Guides for different phases for
The requirements covered in safety codes,
different types of plants, keeping in view the
safety standards and safety guidelines are mandatory
international recommendations and national
in nature. Safety guide is a safety document
requirements. Accordingly, AERB has put in place
containing detailed guidance and methodologies
a well-established process and mechanism for
that are acceptable to AERB to implement the
development of regulatory safety documents. The
VSHFL¿F SDUWV RI D VDIHW\ FRGHVDIHW\ VWDQGDUG
framework for regulatory document development
Safety guides are recommendatory in nature.
in AERB involves a multi-tier review system. The
experts from Technical Support Organisations 6.1 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS
(TSO), National R&D Centres, Industries, DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Academic Institutes and Government Organisations AERB has established a process for
apart from retired specialists having experience in development, review, revision and publication of
WKHUHODWHG¿HOGVDYDLODEOHLQWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQDUH Regulatory Safety Documents (REGDOCs) for use
also involved in the process as appropriate. in regulation of nuclear, fuel cycle and radiation
The dynamic process of regulatory document facilities. Experts, utility and stakeholders are
development takes into account the following involved in the development of the regulations and
aspects: guides by direct involvement as well as through
x Outcome of discussions/safety reviews comments and feedback throughout the development
process. Technological advances, research and
x Requirements felt during consenting or
development work, relevant operational lessons
enforcement process
learned and institutional knowledge are considered
x New regulatory and technological as appropriate in development/revision of the
developments relevant to AERB regulations and guides.
x International practices
Methodology is established for development/
x 6SHFL¿F DVSHFWV RI UHFRPPHQGHGDFFHSWHG revision of AERB regulatory safety documents.
practices Safety Document Development Proposal (SDDP)
x Experience/feedback from nuclear and is prepared by AERB staff based on the requirement
radiation facilities (for preparation or revision of a REGDOC). The
Regulatory safety documents issued by said SDDP is submitted to Advisory Committee
$(5% DUH FODVVL¿HG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ GHFUHDVLQJ on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ACNRS) which
order of hierarchy: is Apex Committee for review of the REGDOCs.
Based on the recommendation of ACNRS, SDDP
(a) Safety Codes
is approved by Chairman, AERB and subsequently
(b) Safety Standards the R0-draft of revised or new REGDOC is prepared
(c) Safety Guidelines LQKRXVH ZLWKLQ $(5% E\ &RQVXOWDQW 7KH ÀRZ
(d) Safety Guides chart depicting this process is given below:
71
Fig. 6.1: AERB Regulatory Safety Document Development Process
Approval & Issue
Publication &
Chairman, AERB / Board
Distribution
Public
Disposition of Public Comments by R&DD Comments
& Review by ACNRS (Safety
Codes)
Review by Advisory Committee on Nuclear and Review

Review Stage
Radiation Safety (ACNRS) by

Experts
Review by Working Group (WG)/Task Force (TF)
In-house preparation of Initial Draft Copy of New

or Revision of Existing Document
Preparation Stage
SDDP Prepared by AERB Staff; Review by

ACNRS and Approval by Chairman, AERB
The initial draft is then reviewed in a time disposition of public comments is carried out. The
bound manner by a Task Force (TF)/Working disposition is submitted to ACNRS before placing
Group (WG) duly constituted for the purpose. The it to Board for approval/publication.
draft is then submitted to ACNRS for their review.
Revised draft is circulated among the experts, both AERB has issued regulations and safety
within and outside DAE for obtaining their review documents which provide adequate coverage
comments. The resulting draft is sent for approval commensurate with the radiation risks associated
from Chairman, AERB. In case of Safety Codes, with the facilities and activities, in accordance with
the draft is put up on AERB external website for a graded approach. Till date, AERB has published
SXEOLF FRPPHQWV IRU VSHFL¿HG WLPH SHULRG7KH about 165 regulatory safety documents.
72
The progress on regulatory safety documents This Guide is intended to apprise the utilities
during the year is given below: on the regulatory and radiation safety requirements
that need to be ensured during the various stages
6.2 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS
such as setting up of a MCF, operation, maintenance
DEVELOPED/AMENDED
and decommissioning. It addresses medical
This year two Safety Guides have been cyclotrons of both types namely self-shielded and
approved and uploaded on AERB website. bunker type along with the safety requirements of
the radiochemistry laboratories associated with the
1) Safety Guide on “Standard Format and MCF. In addition to this, it also covers regulatory
Contents of Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
requirements for Types I to III categories of MCF,
for Nuclear Power Plants” (AERB/NPP/
while only broad guidelines are given for Type IV
SG/G-9)
MCF.
The safety analysis report (SAR) of a nuclear The following safety documents are amended
power plant (NPP) is the main safety document with respect to certain clauses.
for design, construction, commissioning,
operation and decommissioning and contains 1) AERB Safety Standards on “Design
all relevant information to demonstrate the of Concrete Structures important to
overall safety of NPP, such as design bases, site Nuclear Facilities” (AERB/SS/CSE,
and plant characteristics, safety analyses and 2001)
conduct of operations etc. SAR is prepared by $(5% 6DIHW\ 6WDQGDUG ³'HVLJQ RI
the applicant for submission to the regulatory Concrete Structures important to
body to enable it to assess the suitability of the Nuclear Facilities” [AERB/SS/CSE,
plant for consenting. 2001] was amended. The amendments
were made in Clauses related to
The objective of the Guide is to provide
UHTXLUHPHQWV ZUW ZDWHU ¿OO WHVW RI
guidance for preparation of the SAR by the
OLTXLGUHWDLQLQJVWUXFWXUHVPRGL¿FDWLRQ
applicant, bringing out the possible content and
to acceptance criteria of the test and
structure of an SAR. Use of this format will help to
ensure completeness of the information provided. the provisions pertaining to corrective
It is applicable for preparation of SAR of all types treatments during the test and design
of NPP designs. for bond.
2) Safety Guide on “Medical Cyclotron 2) AERB Safety Manual on “Hydrogen

Facilities” (AERB/RF-RS/SG-3) Release and Mitigation Measures
under Accident Conditions in
Medical cyclotrons are used to produce
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor”
positron emitters, used for PET-imaging, as well
[AERB/NPP-PHWR/SM/D-2]
as other radioisotopes used in SPECT imaging.
Medical Cyclotron Facility (MCF) consists of $(5% 6DIHW\ 0DQXDO RQ ³+\GURJHQ
cyclotron vault and control room, radiochemistry Release and Mitigation Measures under
and radiopharmaceutical production areas (R & Accident Conditions in Pressurised
R), Quality Control (QC) laboratory, radioactivity Heavy Water Reactor” [AERB/NPP-
dispensing, packaging and dispatch areas, cold- PHWR/SM/D-2] was amended. The
chemistry laboratory areas, change rooms and amendments were made in Clauses
personnel radiation surveillance area (such as UHODWHG WR TXDOL¿FDWLRQ FULWHULD RI
decontamination area). Different types of MCF are recombiner devices for revision of the
being operated in the country. temperature requirements.
73
6.3 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER 5) Criteria for Planning, Preparedness and
REVISION/DEVELOPMENT Response for Nuclear or Radiological
The R0 drafts of the following regulatory Emergence ( AERB/NRF/SG/EP-5 , Rev.1,
safety documents were prepared: 2014)
6) Commissioning of Pressurised Water
1) AERB Safety Code titled ‘Regulation of
Reactors Based Nuclear Power Plants
Nuclear and Radiation Facilities’ (AERB/
(AERB/NPP-PWR/SG/O-4, 2014)
SC/G (Rev.1)).
7) Site Evaluation of Nuclear Facilities (AERB/
2) AERB Safety Code titled ‘Design of
NF/SC/S , Rev.1, 2014)
Pressurised Heavy Water Based Nuclear
Power Plant’ (AERB/NPP-PHWR/SC/D, 8) Siting, Design, Construction, Commissioning,
(Rev.1)). Operation, Closure and Monitoring of Tailing
Management Facilities for Uranium Ore
3) AERB Safety Code titled ‘Design of Fast
Processing (AERB/FE-FCF/SG-4, 2013)
Breeder Based Nuclear Power Plant’ (AERB/
NPP-FBR/SC/D, New). 9) Radiological Safety in Handling Beach Sand
Minerals and Other Naturally Occurring
4) AERB Safety Guide titled ‘Design Basis
Radioactive Materials (AERB/FE-FCF/SG-
Events (DBE) for Pressurised Heavy Water
5, 2013)
Reactors’ (AERB/SG/D-5, (Rev.1)).
10) Protection against Internally Generated
5) AERB Safety Guide titled ‘Design of
Missiles in Nuclear Power Plants (AERB/
Electrical Power Systems of Nuclear Power
NPP/SG/D-3, 2013).
Plants’ (AERB/SG/D-11, (Rev.1)).
6) AERB Safety Guide titled ‘Consenting 6.5 REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT SAFETY
Process for Nuclear Power Plants and STANDARDS
Research Reactors’ (AERB/NPP&RR/SG/G- AERB reviews draft IAEA documents as
1, (Rev.1)). ZHOODVGUDIWGRFXPHQWSUHSDUDWLRQSUR¿OHV'33
6.4 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER of IAEA and provides comments. The following
PUBLICATION IN HINDI IAEA safety standards/DPPs were reviewed during
the period:
The following AERB safety documents
are translated in Hindi and are in the process of 6.5.1 IAEA Draft Safety Requirements
publication: Documents
1) Design of Light Water Reactor Based 1) Radiation Safety of Accelerator Radioisotope
Nuclear Power Plants (AERB/NPP-LWR/ Production Facilities (DS 434)
SC/D, 2015) 2) Remediation Process for Areas Affected by
2) Nucleonic Gauges and Well Logging Past Activities and Accidents (DS 468)
Applications (AERB/ RF-IGD/SG-1, 2015) 3) Arrangements for the Termination of a
3) Safety Aspects in Design and Operation of Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (DS
Heavy Water Plants (AERB/HWP/SG-1, 474)
2014) 4) Arrangements for Public Communication in
4) Life Management of Heavy Water Plants Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or
(AERB/HWP/SG-2, 2014) Radiological Emergency (DS 475)
74
5) Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities (DS 16) Security during Lifetime of a Nuclear Facility
478) (NST 051)
6) Design of the Reactor Coolant System and 17) Developing a Nuclear Security Contingency
Associated System in Nuclear Power Plants Plan for Nuclear Facilities (NST 056)
(DS 481) 6.5.2 IAEA Draft Document Preparation
7) Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (DS 3UR¿OHV'33V
484) 1) External Events Excluding Earthquakes in
the Design of Nuclear Installations (DS 498)
8) Ageing Management and Programme for
Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power 2) Application of the Concept of Exemption
Plants (DS 485) (DS 499)
9) Design of Fuel Handling and Storage Systems 3) Application of the Concept of Clearance (DS
500)
for Nuclear Power Plants (DS 487)
4) Protection against Internal and External
10) Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (DS 489)
Hazards in the Operation of Nuclear Power
11) Human Factors Engineering in the Design of Plants (DS 503)
Nuclear Power Plants (DS 492)
5) Arrangements for Preparedness and Response
12) Format and Content of the Package Design for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency
Safety Report (PDSR) for the Transport of (DS 504)
Radioactive Material (DS 493)
6) Source Monitoring, Environmental
13) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Monitoring and Individual Monitoring for
Radioactive Material (DS 495) Protection of the Public and the Environment
14) Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations (DS 505)
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 7) Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA
(DS 496) Regulations for the Safe Transport of
15) Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Radioactive Material (DS 506)
in Storage and of Associated Facilities (NST 8) Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for
048) Nuclear Installations (DS 507)
75
Chapter 7
SAFETY ANALYSIS AND
RESEARCH
AERB recognises the importance of safety natural circulation in the loop is able to remove
analysis and research in support of its regulatory the heat from the containment atmosphere and
process. In-house safety research and development maintain the containment pressure below the
(R&D) helps in obtaining deeper insights into the design pressure.
issues concerning nuclear and radiation safety to 7.1.2 Calandria Vault Dew Point Monitoring
DUULYH DW VFLHQWL¿FDOO\ VRXQG DQG ULVN LQIRUPHG System Performance for RAPS and MAPS
regulatory decisions. Safety analysis activities
are carried out by Nuclear Safety Analysis and The annulus gas monitoring system (AGMS)
Research Group (NSARG) of AERB that includes of a standard PHWR is used for detecting leakage
Nuclear Safety Analysis Division (NSAD) in from pressure tube (PT) and calandria tube (CT).
Mumbai and Safety Research Institute (SRI) at +RZHYHUWKHVDPHREMHFWLYHLVIXO¿OOHGE\FDODQGULD
.DOSDNNDP7DPLO1DGX)XUWKHUGRPDLQVSHFL¿F vault dew point monitoring system in old PHWRs
research is pursued in other divisions as well. like RAPS and MAPS. Process dynamics model
Several important developmental studies were for MAPS-1&2/RAPS-2 was developed to assess
the leak detection capability of calandria vault
taken up and completed during this year. A brief
dew point monitoring system. Leak corresponding
overview of these activities is presented in the
to VLR (Variable Leak Rate) with crack growth
following sections.
from Leak Start Crack (LSC) to Critical Crack
7.1 THERMAL HYDRAULICS SAFETY Length (CCL) has been simulated. The time for
STUDIES reaching dew point alarm value was estimated.
7.1.1 Long-term Containment Heat Removal Further, assessment was performed for evaluating
System beetle alarm in calandria vault drain line utilising
operator experience as well as analysis insight.
The containment integrity must be ensured
,WLVIRXQGWKDWVXI¿FLHQWWLPHLVDYDLODEOHIRUWKH
during hypothetical/severe accident conditions.
operator intervention to shutdown, cool-down and
Engineered safety systems in the existing plants depressurise the reactor.
can cool the containment atmosphere and reduce
the pressure for design basis and certain beyond 7.1.3 Parametric Studies on Direct Contact
design basis accidents. In case of extremely Condensation of Steam in Vapour
unlikely multiple failure scenarios such as loss-of- Suppression Pool
coolant accident (LOCA) with no active cooling A thermal hydraulic model has been
systems available due to station blackout (SBO), developed from fundamental conservation laws
LQWHUQDO¿UHRUÀRRGLQJWKHGHFD\DQGVWRUHGKHDW to investigate the unsteady direct condensation
need to be removed from the containment to ensure of steam. Extensive numerical studies were
its integrity. Feasibility studies for a long term undertaken using the above model to study the effect
passive heat removal system for containment of of important geometrical and process variables to
700 MWe PHWR using thermal hydraulic system capture essential features of such phenomena. The
codes were carried out for the prototype and scaled objective of this study is to support the design of
down experimental model. The results indicate that upcoming Water and Steam Interaction Facility
77
Fig. 7.1: Temporal variations of Interface Velocity Fig. 7.2: Variation of Mass Flow Rate of Air with
during the Chugging Phenomenon Temperature difference
(WASIF) Phase-II experimental program. A found to be increasing with the rise in steam
W\SLFDO SORW RI ÀXLG RVFLOODWLRQ GXULQJ XQVWHDG\ temperature as expected (see Fig.7.2). The study
condensation process when steam is injected into provided insight into certain fundamental aspects
water is shown in Fig. 7.1. of systems employing natural convection for decay
7.1.4 CFD Analysis on Passive Residual Heat heat removal.
Removal System 7.1.5 Numerical Investigation of Condensation
A CFD model of air-steam heat exchanger Induced Water Hammer Transients
of passive residual heat removal system was Investigation of condensation induced water
developed. The heat exchanger was modelled as hammer phenomenon (CIWH) using RELAP5/
a porous medium using appropriate mathematical 0RG ZDV FDUULHG RXW WR LGHQWLI\ WKH LQÀXHQFH
formulations. The objective was to investigate of various parameters. Parametric studies were
WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI QDWXUDO FRQYHFWLRQ ÀRZ performed with respect to test pipe diameter and
under various operating conditions. It was found upstream steam pressure. The CIWH phenomenon
WKDW QDWXUDO FLUFXODWLRQ ÀRZ LV HVWDEOLVKHG RYHU is observed in all cases. With increase in pipe
the entire range of steam temperature conditions diameter the peak pressure increases and attains
FRQVLGHUHG LQ WKH VWXG\ 7KH PDVV ÀRZ UDWH RI a maximum value for a 50 mm diameter pipe
FRROLQJÀXLGDLUDQGWKHKHDWUHPRYDOUDWHZHUH (Fig.7.3). For the given geometrical and operating
Fig. 7.3: Variation of Peak Pressure as a Function of (a) Pipe Diameter, (b) Steam Pressure
a. b.
78
conditions, peak pressure attains a minimum at The innovative approach was adopted for modeling
around 6 bar steam pressure. These studies were of entire phase of the transient, which emphasised
performed to support the experimental work jointly on modeling of multiple PT-CT contacts and
taken up with BARC in the area of CIWH. channel collapse. The time of complete evaporation
7.2 SEVERE ACCIDENT STUDIES of moderator was estimated which will be an input
for assessment of severe accident management
7.2.1 Development of a Code for Analysis of guidelines (SAMG) intended for arresting the
Accident Conditions in PHWRs progression of the accident.
$K\EULGFRGHZLWK¿QLWHYROXPHIRUPXODWLRQ
7.2.4 Estimation of Hydrogen Generation
for the coolant channels and lumped analysis for
during Molten Fuel Coolant Interaction
other components/structures of the reactors is
under development. In the present form, the code In a very unlikely scenario of hot molten
has the capability to simulate coolant channel heat- corium interacting with the cold water (MFCI),
up, fuel failure and hydrogen generation during additional hydrogen generation may occur and this
in-channel phase of the accident and has been may pose an additional challenge to the hydrogen
applied to study of accident sequence in 700 MWe, management system. Present study is focused
standard 220 MWe and MAPS reactors. The code on estimation of hydrogen generation during
is also augmented to study effect of steam limited interaction of corium with water. Methodology for
condition on hydrogen generation within a coolant estimation of hydrogen was developed based on
channel and to study design extension conditions the results of experiments reported in the literature.
(DECs) in MAPS. It was found that the hydrogen generation depends
on degree of fragmentation of the melt, debris
7.2.2 Hydrogen Distribution in Presence
VL]H KHDW WUDQVIHU FRHI¿FLHQW EHWZHHQ GHEULV DQG
of Recombiners for KGS-220 PHWR
surrounding water among others.
Containment using 2D CFD
An analysis to study the distribution of 7.3 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND
air, hydrogen and steam in a standard PHWR ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES
containment during a postulated accident scenario 7.3.1 Source Term and Atmospheric Dispersion
of multiple failures involving Loss of Coolant Studies for Emergency Exercises at NAPS
Accident (LOCA) coincident with Loss of and TAPS
Emergency Core Cooling System (LOECCS) and
Loss of Moderator Cooling (LOMC) has been Source term estimation and atmospheric
FDUULHG RXW WR ¿QG WKH DGHTXDF\ RI SUHVFULEHG dispersion studies were carried out for the
number of recombiners for hydrogen removal. postulated scenario that was considered in the
The results indicate that prescribed number of table-top emergency exercise. For the emergency
UHFRPELQHUVDVSURSRVHGE\WKHXWLOLW\DUHVXI¿FLHQW exercise at NAPS, seismic induced LOCA along
to maintain the hydrogen concentration within safe with failure of safety systems was considered.
limit. Accident progression and SAMG actions for
water injection to calandria and calandria vault
7.2.3 Safety Assessment of Old PHWRs
are assumed as per the information received at
With the objective of assessing the safety nuclear and radiological emergency monitoring
of old PHWRs for an accident scenario involving cell (NREMC) during the exercise. Based on the
multiple failures such as LOCA with loss of ECCS postulated accident progression during the exercise
and loss of spray system, simulations were carried and standard analysis results available, release
out using system thermal hydraulics code RELAP5. from the fuel, retention in PHT, release into the
79
containment, retention and decay in containment, This GIS based system is developed to provide
UHWHQWLRQ LQ WKH OHDN SDWK DQG ¿QDOO\ UHOHDVHV WR real time information such as possible affected
the atmosphere were estimated. Further, using area, population to be evacuated, evacuation
the estimated activity release, detailed dispersion routes, transport requirement, nearest hospitals,
modeling is carried out to infer the affected sectors primary health centres etc. for proper emergency
and the respective dose levels. This information preparedness and management.
would be utilised while taking decisions for
7.3.3 Mapping of Condenser Coolant Discharge
various intervention measures such as sheltering,
along Kudankulam Sea by Processing
distribution of iodine prophylaxis, evacuation etc.
Satellite Thermal Data
With the estimated release term, dispersion study is
carried out establishing the in-house capability for Spatial and temporal characteristics of the
monitoring and regulatory decision making during thermal plume spread due to the thermal discharge
emergency situations. from KKNPP site and sea surface temperature
pattern around KKNPP with respect to seasons
7.3.2 Nuclear Emergency Management
using satellite Thermal Infra-Red data (Landsat
Information System (NEMIS) for NPP
7 band 6 B2, Landsat 8, band 11) shows that the
Sites
difference between the intake and the mixing zone
Towards AERB’s efforts in strengthening at receiving body is well within the limit. Fig.7.4
the monitoring capability of an emergency shows the thermal plume spread.
situation, in-house tools are being developed.
7.3.4 Investigation of Radionuclide (Gaseous
6LWH VSHFL¿F JHRVSDWLDO GDWDEDVH IRU HPHUJHQF\
and Aerosols) removal in Water Pools
planning is generated for Tarapur and Kakrapar
Employed in Wet Scrubbers
sites. Environmental baseline data such as village
boundary map, population data, data on emergency The capability of existing numerical models
planning zones is collected and incorporated in the for estimating the removal of radioactivity (gaseous
graphical user interface (GUI) based information and aerosols) and heat absorption capacity in
system for off-site emergency management. scrubber tank (ST) are further enhanced. The
Fig. 7.4: Spatial and Temporal Characteristics of Thermal Plume Spread due to Thermal Discharge from KKNPP
a.
Date: 20.2.2017 Date: 9.4.2017 Date: 3.11.2017

Plume max. Temp: 27.4°C Plume max. Temp: 29.8°C Plume max. Temp: 23.9°C
Ambient Temp: 25.0°C Ambient Temp: 27.4°C Ambient Temp: 21.5°C
¨7& ¨7& ¨7&
Plume Length: 1.2 km Plume Length: 2.8 km Plume Length: 1.6 km
Plume breadth: 0.5 km Plume breadth: 1.0 km Plume breadth: 1.0 km
Direction of plume: West Direction of plume: East Direction of plume: South
80
mathematical models consist of mass and species various postulated accident scenarios for a complex
balance equations. The model was employed to terrain site. LPM generally gives spatial distribution
review the proposed CFVS for TAPS-3&4 and of concentration in the study area as the output.
0$36 ,QGHSHQGHQWYHUL¿FDWLRQRIWKH'%5 For radiological impact assessment, it is more
design calculations were carried out to check the desirable to know the radiation dose rather than the
adequacy of vent pipe sizing, scrubber tank water concentration. For this purpose, LPM was suitably
LQYHQWRU\DQGUHWHQWLRQRIUDGLRDFWLYLW\,QÀXHQFH PRGL¿HG WR HVWLPDWH WKH GRVH GXH WR LQKDODWLRQ
RI YDULRXV V\VWHP UHVLVWDQFHV RQ PDVV ÀRZ UDWH ground deposited activity, and the cloud gamma
through CFVS was clearly brought out through a dose. For a severe accident, in which many of the
parametric study. The possibility of compressible retention mechanisms are expected to still work
ÀRZDQGFKRNHGÀRZFRQGLWLRQVZHUHFKHFNHG and allow release of only a very small percentage
of activity to the environment, the dose distribution
7.3.5 SRI - IGCAR Radiological Surveillance due to 131I and all important radionuclides for the
System postulated accident scenario at the site are shown
The computer code has been developed by in Fig.7.5.
SRI, AERB for a LAN based online radiological 7.4 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY
surveillance by analysing the real-time ASSESSMENT
environmental gamma measurements. The updated
7.4.1 Multi-unit PSA Activities
system with enhanced capability collects online
data through TCP/IP from 10 instruments installed A task group for Multi-unit PSA is formed
at various locations at Kalpakkam. to carry out the integrated risk assessment for an
DFWXDOPXOWLXQLW133VLWH$VD¿UVWVWHSDVWDWXV
7.3.6 Radiological Impact Assessment Studies
report on estimation of site level risk at multi-
of various Postulated Severe Accident
unit NPP site is prepared. This report provides the
Scenarios for a Typical Complex Terrain
update on the progress made in other countries in
Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP) model development of a multi-unit PSA methodology.
coupled with Lagrangian Particle Model (LPM) The in-house developed methodology for multi-
was employed to study the plume dispersion for unit risk assessment is presented in Fig 7.6. The
Fig.7.5: Total dose due to (a) I-131 and (b) all Important Radionuclides considered for the Postulated Accident Scenario
a. b.
81
Fig. 7.6: Schematic of Multi-unit PSA Methodology
proposed methodology describes a systematic way are two fold; (a) to demonstrate the ability of
RIFODVVL¿FDWLRQRIGHSHQGHQFLHVVSHFL¿FWRPXOWL the calandria vessel to act as core catcher, (b) to
unit NPP sites. HYDOXDWH WKH HIIHFWLYH KHDW WUDQVIHU FRHI¿FLHQWV DW
the outer surface of calandria vessel. In-principle
7.4.2 Reliability Assessment of various Systems
approval for conducting six experiments has been
of KAPP-3&4, 700 MWe NPP
obtained from IGCAR Safety Committee-Other
As part of independent regulatory assessment, Facilities (IGCAR-SC-OF) based on the safety
the reliability analysis of frontline systems and report containing detailed numerical and safety
support systems of KAPP-3&4 were performed analyses. The test vessel and water vault are
using RISKSPECTRUM. The detailed system fabricated and are shown in Fig.7.7
models were developed for various systems such
as shutdown cooling system, shutdown system-1, Fig. 7.7: Water Vault and Test Vessel for COMREF
boiler feed water system, auxiliary feed water
system, emergency core cooling system, etc. The
common cause failure modes were considered in
modelling and system unavailability values were
estimated. The estimated system unavailability
numbers were in good agreement with submitted
results.
7.5 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
7.5.1 Design of Core Melt Retention Facility
Test Set-up
To investigate the in-vessel corium retention
capability of calandria vessel during core collapse
accident, Core Melt Retention Facility (COMREF)
is being set-up. The objectives of experiment
82
Fig. 7.8: HYMIF Experimental Test Set-up
7.5.4 Photon and Neutron Energy Response of
Thermoluminescent (TL) Dosimeters
As per the common practice,
thermoluminescence (TL) method is the main
choice for ionising radiation dosimetry. In order
WR JDLQ LQVLJKW RQ WKH EHKDYLRXU DQG HI¿FDF\ RI
various thermoluminescence dosimeters (TLD)
used in nuclear facilities including medical and
industrial applications, theoretical simulations
were carried out to investigate the relative TL
response of the most commonly used TLD
materials to a wide range of photon energies.
7KH HIIHFW RI SRO\WHWUDÀXRURHWK\OHQH 37)(
7.5.2 Commissioning of HYdrogen MItigation on TL response of CaSO4:Dy was also studied.
Facility (HYMIF) Additionally, the neutron response of LiF:Mg,Ti
HYMIF (Phase-1) has been commissioned. based TL materials with different concentrations
In the experiment, hydrogen and air mixture was of 6Li was estimated in terms of the number of
6
released into the model PAR at 100 LPM with 1 Li(n, t)4He capture reactions for a wider range of
DQGK\GURJHQ99DQGDOORZHGWRÀRZSDVW neutron energies.
a bank of two palladium catalyst coated cordierite
7.5.5 Determination of Mass Absorption
plates. HYMIF experimental setup is shown in
&RHI¿FLHQW IRU 90S/90Y Beta Particles in
Fig.7.8. Augmentation of the facility and further
Aluminium
studies are in progress.
Study of attenuation of beta particles in matter
7.5.3 Experimental Studies on Zr-2.5%Nb
is of great importance due to its wider applications
Corrosion at SRI Chemistry Laboratory
in nuclear, agricultural and medical industries.
Using in-house experimental facility, many Experimental measurements and theoretical Monte
experiments have been carried out related to the Carlo (MC) simulations have been carried out to
corrosion aspects of Zr-2.5%Nb. Several parametric determine the attenuation and the mass absorption
FRPELQDWLRQV ZHUH GH¿QHG IRU WKH H[SHULPHQWDO FRHI¿FLHQW IRU 90S/90Y emitted beta particles in
programme including ethylene, chlorine, aluminium. A Geiger Muller counter has been
formaldehyde and formic acid as impurities in CO2 used for counting the beta particles as a function
carrier gas, temperature effect etc. Purge mode of aluminium thickness. For inter-comparison,
was employed and specimens were subjected to theoretical MC calculations are carried out,
scanning electron microscopic studies coupled simulating an equivalent experimental set up, to
with elemental analysis for the morphological score electron intensity vs. aluminium thickness.
changes in the Zr-2.5%Nb specimen. Corrosion Normal incidence of beta particles from the disc
spots obtained were critically assessed for different shaped 90S and 90Y sources independently and with
parameters including elemental composition, combination of 90S/90Y source are considered in
formation of by-products etc. theoretical simulations.
83
7.6 REACTOR PHYSICS STUDIES involving asymmetric core behaviour. To validate
7.6.1 In-house Reload Safety Evaluations for the multi-point kinetics model, the AECL 7236
Cycle-3 of KKNPP Unit-1 Reactor benchmark problem on ‘Three dimensional kinetics
benchmark problem in a heavy water reactor’ was
,QGHSHQGHQWYHUL¿FDWLRQRIGHVLJQGRFXPHQWV selected. It has been observed that the multi-point
on reload safety evaluations of Cycle-3 of KKNPP kinetics model results are in close agreement with
Unit-1 VVER-1000 reactor was carried out. Core the benchmark, establishing the credibility of
follow simulations were carried out for Cycle-3 multipoint model for asymmetric nuclear transients.
core. An indigenous computer code system,
EXCEL-TRIHEX-FA, was employed to study the 7.7 STUDIES PERTAINING TO THE BACK
important core physics parameters such as critical END OF THE FUEL CYCLE AND SOIL
boric acid concentration, core average burnup, REMEDIATION
relative radial, axial and 3D peak factors, various 7.7.1 Remediation of Contaminated Water
UHDFWLYLW\ FRHI¿FLHQWV DQG NLQHWLFV SDUDPHWHUV DV using In-house Synthesised Sorbents
a function of effective full power days (EFPD).
In order to develop methodologies for the
Comparison with the design calculations showed
remediation of contaminated soil and water and also
good agreement for all parameters. For Cycle-3
for the Technically Enhanced Naturally Occurring
also, the reactor was found to attain criticality with
Radioactive Materials (TENORM) arising from
the critical boric acid concentration closer to the
oil and gas industries, a variety of sorbents are
predicted value.
being developed in-house at SRI Chemistry
7.6.2 Development of Computational Tools for /DERUDWRU\ &KLWRVDQ PHWDO R[LGH PRGL¿HG
Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accident chitosan, graphene oxide and graphene sheets were
Analysis of Fast Reactors synthesised in-house and evaluated for the uptake
Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accident of Cesium using simulated waste solutions. Also,
(HCDA) in fast reactors is designated as a N-Succinyl chitosan and N-Maleyl chitosan based
beyond design basis accident with extremely low XOWUD¿OWUDWLRQ PHPEUDQH KDV EHHQ GHYHORSHG LQ
probability of occurrence. HCDA progresses in coordination with academic institutes and studies
various phases namely: pre-disassembly, transition, are in progress for evaluating the membrane for
disassembly and mechanical consequences. A Cesium uptake studies. Uptake of Cesium and
computer code has been developed indigenously to Cobalt has been successfully demonstrated using
simulate the core energetics during various phases. the in-house synthesised sorbents such as chitosan
The mathematical model consists of coupled and graphene oxide.
point kinetics and 2D hydrodynamics in Eulerian 5HPRYDORI,QRUJDQLF(IÀXHQWVIURP/RZ
framework. The developed model has been tested Level Liquid Waste by Electrochemical
and validated against benchmark problems. Method
7.6.3 Validation of Multi-Point Kinetics Model To demonstrate the application of
with AECL Benchmark electrochemical methods for the destruction of
A Multi-Point kinetics model was developed RUJDQLFDQGLQRUJDQLFHIÀXHQWVLQDTXHRXVVWUHDP
to circumvent the inadequacy of point kinetics Autolab PGSTAT AUTOLAB 302N (Potentiostat/
approach in the widely used system code RELAP5 galvanostat) was employed. For the degradation
for analysis of reactivity induced transients VWXGLHVORZOHYHOOLTXLGZDVWHHIÀXHQWVFRQWDLQLQJ
84
ammonium thiocyanate and ethylene di-amine pump shaft. A generalised rotor dynamics
tetra acetate (EDTA) was taken up. In order to program was formulated to predict the response
LQYHVWLJDWHWKHLQÀXHQFHRIYDULRXVH[SHULPHQWDO of any rotor system which includes consistent
conditions such as applied potential, electrode mass, gyroscopic and axial load/gravity effects.
FRQ¿JXUDWLRQVXSSRUWLQJHOHFWURO\WHVHWFDVHULHV A parametric study was also carried out to assess
of experiments were carried out using constant the effects of stiffness of HSB, added masses, and
voltage methods. Samples were withdrawn from boundary conditions on the natural frequencies,
HOHFWURFKHPLFDO FHOO SHULRGLFDOO\ WR ¿QG RXW WKH critical speeds and overall responses were
H[WHQW RI HIÀXHQW UHPDLQLQJ LQ DTXHRXV VWUHDP predicted. It is observed that HSB clearance are
Nearly 75% of ammonium thiocyanate and 80% VXI¿FLHQWO\ ODUJHU WKDQ RUELW UDGLXV RI URWDWLQJ
EDTA could be degraded by a constant voltage impeller in operating conditions to avoid pump
method. seizure.
7.7.3 Evaluation of Thermokinetic Parameters 7.8.2 Determination of Bounding Flaw Size
of Extractants used in the Back End of the for Volumetric and Planar Indications in
Fuel Cycle by Calorimetric Studies Pressure Tubes in PHWRs
1RYHO H[WUDFWDQWV SKDVH PRGL¿HUV DQG Pressure tubes are important safety Class-1
diluents are being developed and evaluated components where the fuel resides and nuclear
for wide variety of applications in the nuclear heat is transferred to the coolant. In order to
industry covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. assure the safety of pressure tube during service,
Tetra (2-ethylhexyl) diglycolamide (TEHDGA) is in-service inspections are carried out as per
a potential extractant for the separation of minor approved regulatory documents. During in-service
actinides from High Level Waste (HLW) while
inspections, selected tubes undergo detailed
Calix Crown is being employed for the recovery
H[DPLQDWLRQ ,I WKH LQVSHFWLRQ ¿QGLQJV VKRZ
of Cesium from HLW. Studies were taken up to
presence of indications, then detailed evaluation
understand the thermal decomposition of alternate
needs to be carried out. A crucial parameter which
diluents and extractants under adiabatic conditions
needs to be estimated is the maximum allowable
and assess their reactive thermal behaviour using
ÀDZ VL]HV ZLWK ZKLFK WKH WXEHV FDQ EH RSHUDWHG
accelerating rate calorimeter (ARC). The studies
7KHUHIRUH ERXQGLQJ YROXPHWULF DQG SODQDU ÀDZV
have given useful inputs for arriving at safety
were evaluated for delayed hydride crack (DHC)
margins using the novel extractants. The present
initiation in PHWR pressure tube for sustained hot
study indicates that the two extractants studied are
condition.
safe from the self-accelerating decomposition point
of view. Bounding axial and circumferential planar
ÀDZVZHUHDOVRHYDOXDWHGXVLQJIUDFWXUHPHFKDQLFV
7.8 STRUCTURAL AND SEISMIC
principles. The evaluation was carried out for
ANALYSIS
GHHSHVW SRLQW RI ÀDZ SHQHWUDWLRQ GHHSHVW SRLQW
7.8.1 Rotor Dynamic Analysis of PFBR Primary DQG WKH SRLQW RI LQWHUVHFWLRQ RI WKH ÀDZ ZLWK WKH
Sodium Pump IUHH VXUIDFH VXUIDFH SRLQW 7KH ERXQGLQJ ÀDZ
A rotor dynamic analysis is performed to sizes arrived are important for regulatory decision
¿QG WKH VWHDG\ VWDWH RUELW UDGLXV RI WKH YHUWLFDO making in assessing the safety of the pressure tube.
85
7.9 OTHER SAFETY ANALYSIS STUDIES 7.9.2 Ultimate Load Capacity of RAPS-2
7.9.1 Soil Structure Interaction, Liquefaction Containment
and other Hazard Assessment Studies for AERB undertook numerical simulation
GHAVP Site to assess the structural behaviour of RAPS-2
Gorakhpur Haryana site (GHAVP) is an alluvial containment under design extension condition
site with depth to bedrock estimated to be around (DEC) and evaluation of containment leakage rates
350m. Soil structure interaction (SSI) is a major for internal overpressure as a part of Consequence
consideration for heavy structures founded on such Analysis for Emergency Preparedness for RAPS
soil. Combined pile raft foundation system (CPRF) (Level-2 and Level-3). In addition to estimation of
is proposed for the GHAVP site. In order to gain failure, behaviour of containment is evaluated with
FRQ¿GHQFHRIWKH66,DQDO\VLVRI&35)V\VWHPLQD respect to various performance indicators, such
specialised software SASSI, AERB has initiated the DV RFFXUUHQFH RI ¿UVW FUDFN UHLQIRUFHPHQW \LHOG
SSI analysis of a sample pile-raft system obtained etc. Performance assessment is carried out using
from the literature. QRQOLQHDU ¿QLWH HOHPHQW WHFKQLTXH DYDLODEOH LQ
ABAQUS software. Pressure based on the criteria
Liquefaction hazard assessment was GH¿QHGLQ8615&5*LVHVWLPDWHGDV
undertaken in AERB using the state of art empirical times of design pressure (Pd), i.e. 2.74Pd, whereas
method and acceptance criteria recommended by DSSHDUDQFH RI ¿UVW FUDFN LQ FRQFUHWH RFFXUV DW
$(5% 7KH VWXG\ XWLOLVHG LQSXW GDWD IURP ¿HOG 1.2Pd. Initiation of considerable air leakage
test/studies undertaken by NPCIL. Apart from through containment wall was estimated at 1.5Pd.
design basis ground motion parameters, parametric Functional failure of the containment structure is
variation of magnitude of earthquake and PGA was estimated at 1.85Pd based on sharp change in slope
performed to discern sensitivity of liquefaction in pressure vs. leakage rate curve.
hazard at site with respect to ground motion
variability and estimation of margins. 7.10 AERB FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH
PROGRAMME
Also, AERB has undertaken an in-house
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) AERB promotes and funds research in
for GHAVP site. The ground motions derived radiation safety and industrial safety as part of its
at the base rock based on the PSHA studies are programme. AERB Committee for Safety Research
propagated to the ground level using a specialised Programmes (CSRP) frames guidelines for the same
VRIWZDUH 675$7$ 7KH LGHQWL¿HG VRIWZDUH KDV and also evaluates, recommends grants for research
in-built capacities to perform randomisation projects and monitor their progress periodically.
of soil, rock shear wave velocity and dynamic During this period, CSRP recommended two new
SDUDPHWHUV 6LWH DPSOL¿FDWLRQ VWXGLHV ZHUH projects. It also approved the renewal of four
conducted considering the hazard at bedrock as ongoing projects. The details are given in Tables
input. The work indicated that the proposed design 7.1 and 7.2.
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) is higher than $(5% DOVR SURYLGHV ¿QDQFLDO DVVLVWDQFH WR
the PGA estimated hazard from PSHA; but need Universities, Research Institutions and Professional
for augmentation of proposed design spectra at Associations for holding symposia and conferences
ORZHUIUHTXHQFLHVH[LVWV7KH¿QDOGHVLJQJURXQG on the subjects of interest to AERB. During this
PRWLRQ VSHFWUDDGGUHVVHG WKH ¿QGLQJV IURP VLWH SHULRG ¿QDQFLDO DVVLVWDQFH ZDV SURYLGHG WR
VSHFL¿F36+$VWXG\ Seminars, Symposium and Conferences.
86
Table 7.1: New Research Projects Approved
S.
Project Title Principal Investigator Organisation
No.
1. Studies on levels of natural radiation in the Dr. S. Nabadwip Singh Oriental College,
environment hill districts of Manipur Takyel, Imphal
2. Improving radiation safety standards in dental Dr. A. Saravanakumar PSG Institute

practice of Medical
Sciences Research
and Hospitals,
Coimbatore
Table 7.2: Research Projects Renewed

S.
Project Title Principal Investigator Organisation
No.
1. Studies on environment radioactivity levels in Dr. Ch. Gopal Reddy Osmania University,
and around Chitrial uranium mineralised areas Hyderabad
of Nalgonda district, Telangna state
2. Biological effects of low dose alpha particle Prof. P. Venkatachalam Sri Ramachandra
radiation exposure to blood lymphocytes for University, Chennai
biodosimetry
3. Studies on microbial diversity and ecology Prof. S. Karutha Pandian Algappa University
in the vicinity of a coastal NPP in relation to Karaikudi, T.N
water quality and nutrients
4. 3DWLHQW VSHFL¿F GRVH FDOFXODWLRQ XVLQJ FRQH Dr. B. Paul Ravindran CMC, Vellore
beam CT with local and global HU correction
strategies and deformable image registration
based adaptive radiotherapy
87
Chapter 8
INITIATIVES FOR ENGAGING
WITH STAKEHOLDERS AND
PUBLIC
AERB has the mandate to keep the public (v) AERB shuts down operation of some of
informed on radiation and nuclear safety related the medical diagnostic X-ray facilities in
matters. AERB views public outreach as an Trivandrum, Kerala issued on August 31,
essential element to build a long lasting trust and 2017.
FRQ¿GHQFH ZLWK PHGLD DQG WKH SXEOLF DW ODUJH (vi) AERB shuts down operation of some of
Towards this, AERB has been maintaining a website the medical diagnostic X-ray facilities in
with all relevant and updated information; issuing Kolhapur, Maharashtra issued on October 5,
press releases on contemporary issues, publishing 2017.
Annual Reports etc. AERB has stepped up drive to (vii) AERB mourns the untimely demise of Dr.
address public concerns and provided information K. V. Raghavan, Board Member, AERB on
to the public through print and electronic media on October 12, 2017 issued on October 17,
various topics of public concern. 2017.
8.1 AERB AND MEDIA (viii) AERB shuts down operation of non-
compliant diagnostic X-ray facilities in
As and when required, AERB conducts press
Dehradun, Mussorie, Rishikesh, Paonta
FRQIHUHQFHVDQGRUPHGLDEULH¿QJVRQWKHGLIIHUHQW Sahib and Chandigarh issued on October
topical issues. Also, issues press releases with an 17, 2017.
aim to keep members of public informed about its
Detailed press releases are available on
important activities. The press releases are issued
AERB website.
in English as well as in Hindi. During the period
eight press releases were issued: 8.2 COMMUNICATION AND
CONSULTATION WITH
(i) AERB shuts down operation of some of the STAKEHOLDERS
medical diagnostic X-ray facilities at Bhopal,
AERB provides all necessary information to
Indore and Ujjain owing to non-compliances
its stakeholders through its website, annual reports,
issued on January 23, 2017.
SUHVV UHOHDVHVEULH¿QJV DQG PHGLD LQWHUYLHZV
(ii) Enforcement actions against two industrial AERB website plays a pivotal role in keeping the
radiography institutions issued on May 22, public informed on issues related to radiological
2017. safety, major regulatory decisions, special technical
reports etc.
(iii) AERB grants Clearance for First Pour of
Concrete of Kudankulam NPP Unit 3&4 Information on operating nuclear power plants
issued on June 23, 2017. including, validity of operating licence, regulatory
LQVSHFWLRQVVLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWVUDGLRDFWLYHHIÀXHQW
(iv) 34th DAE Safety & Occupational Health discharges, occupational exposures, rated power
Professionals Meet at Kudankulam Nuclear capacities of all operating NPPs etc. are provided
Power Project, NPCIL during June 28-30, on the AERB’s website and the information is
2017 issued on July 05, 2017. updated on monthly basis.
89
The AERB annual reports contain information LQ WKH FRXQWU\ :LWK WKH LQFUHDVHG EHQH¿FLDO XVH
on safety status of nuclear and radiation facilities of radiation sources, there is concern about the
DQG¿QGLQJVRIUHJXODWRU\UHYLHZV,WDOVRLQFOXGHV likelihood of harmful effects of radiation. Apart
LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ VDIHW\ VLJQL¿FDQW HYHQWV UHSRUWHG from effective regulatory controls in place, AERB
by licencee and the regulatory inspectors. primarily focuses on enhancing awareness on safe
8.3 PUBLIC/STAKEHOLDERS’ use of radiation sources amongst stakeholders.
AWARENESS PROGRAMMES Towards this, AERB routinely conducts awareness
programmes to a wide variety of audience with
AERB pursues its public outreach activity WKHVSHFL¿FREMHFWLYHRIVSUHDGLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFH
with an aim to reach out to various stakeholders and of radiation safety. These include the radiation
bring awareness on the aspects of nuclear, radiation workers, safety personnel, manufacturers/ suppliers
and industrial safety. It also helps in making of equipment/sources, personnel from the industry,
AERB’s safety oversight and review process more university faculty and students. The following is
visible. the list of awareness programmes conducted by
8.3.1 Stakeholder Awareness Programmes AERB during the period.
There has been an accelerated growth in the In addition, 40 Safety Awareness programmes
application of ionising radiation technologies in were conducted at various radiation facilities during
WKH¿HOGVRIPHGLFLQHLQGXVWU\DQGEDVLFUHVHDUFK regulatory inspection.
Importance/ additional
Area Topic Target Audience
information
‘Radiation Safety and Delegates of To make stakeholders

Regulatory Requirements Radiographers aware on radiation
in Medical Radiography’ Association of safety and regulatory
during January 28-29, 2017 Maharashtra (RAM) requirements in
at Palghar, Thane Conference diagnostic radiology
‘Occupational Radiation Delegates of Indian Awareness on

Safety in Hospitals’, on Association of occupational radiation
February 8-11, 2017 during Occupational Health safety in diagnoistic
Diagnsotic 67th Annual National radiology
Radiology Conference of Indian
Association of Occupational
Health at India Habitat
Center, New Delhi
‘Radiation Safety Aspect Delegates of Indian To enhance awareness

and Regulatory Requirement Dental Association on radiation safety and
in Dental Radiology’ held (IDA) conference applicable regulatory
during February 17-19, 2017 requirements in dental
at Vashi, Navi Mumbai radiology
90
information
‘Radiation Safety and Delegates of Indian To enhance radiation

Regulatory Requirements in Society for Vascular and safety awareness
Interventional Radiology’ at Interventional Radiology $(5%RI¿FLDOV
Kolkata during February (ISVIR) Annual also participated in
22-25, 2017 Conference panel discussion
on topic ‘Radiation
Dose Management
in the Interventional
Radiology’
‘Safety Awareness vs. Radiographers in To sprade awareness

Diagnsotic Safety Regulations’ during diagnostic radiology on radiation safety
Radiology Conference of Radiographers and regulations for
Association of Maharashtra diagnostic radiology
(Pune Chapter) on June
04, 2017 at Deenanath
Mangeshkar Hospital, Pune
‘Radiation Safety in Delegates of Awareness on radiation

Cardiology’ on June 24, International Summit on safety in intervention
2017 at Coimbatore. The Preventive Cardiology radiology
Summit organised by the
Cardiological Society of
India
Radiotherapy ‘e-Licencing of Radiation Radiotherapy personnel To disseminate

Applications (e-LORA) form North Eastern information regarding
and Regulatory Process of states and suppliers of the regulatory process of
Radiotherapy Practice’ on radiotherapy equipment radiotherapy practice in
March 16, 2017 at Dr. B. and concerned staff of e-LORA. Also focused
Borooah Cancer Institute, Dr. B. Borooah Cancer on the diagnostic
Guwahati Institute, Guwahati radiology
Consumer Awareness programme 2I¿FLDOVIURPWKH Awareness on radiation

Products and on ‘Radiation Safety Customs Department safety and in operation
Scanning in Container Scanning involved in container of container scanners
Facility Facilities’ was conducted at scanning using radiation
Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust equipment
(JNPT), Nhava Sheva, Uran
on June 20, 2017
91
information
Radioactive Awareness on ‘Radioactive Agencies in Steel To spread awarness

Contamination Contamination in Steel industries like supplier about the incidents of
Products’ was conducted of raw material, export detection of radioactive
at All India Stainless Steel RI¿QLVKHGSURGXFWV contamination in
Industries Association, manufacturers of stainless steel product
Mumbai on March 31, 2017 stainless steel utensils and safe handling of
and members of All such radioactively
India Stainless Steel contaminated material
Industries Association till its disposal
8.4 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON trends in design and manufacturing, challenges

REGULATORY INTERFACE (NCRI) in supply chain and effectiveness of quality
AERB hosted a three-day National assurance programmes.
Conference on Regulatory Interface (NCRI)-2017 More than 300 delegates participated in the
during November 28-30, 2017 at Mumbai. The conference, with representation from the NPCIL,
FRQIHUHQFHZDVRUJDQLVHGIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQ,QGLD BHAVINI, NFC, Nuclear component manufacturing
with a purpose for engaging all its stakeholders industries and various professional associations
associated with use of nuclear energy and ionising such as Indian Radiologists Association,
radiation sources towards further strengthening Association of Medical Physicist of India (AMPI),
nuclear and radiation safety. The objective of the Nuclear Medicine Physicists Association of India
conference was to foster an environment wherein, (NMPAI), Indian Society of Radiographers and
the Licencees, Stakeholders, Professional Technologists (ISRT), Association of Radiation
Associations could interact, discuss and provide Oncologists of India (AROI) and Association of
valuable feedback to AERB on various issues NDT Service Organisation of India (NAASO),
related to nuclear/ radiation safety, regulatory amongst others.
requirements, practices world-wide, emerging
Chairman, AERB delivering the Inaugural

address during NCRI-2017 Delegates from Radiation Facilities in NCRI-2017
92
8.5 DAE SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ MEET
The 34th DAE Safety & Occupational Health
Professionals’ Meet was jointly organised by
AERB and NPCIL during June 28-30, 2017 at
Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project Site. Themes
IRU WKLV \HDU¶V PHHW ZHUH ³.H\ 3ULQFLSOHV RI
Human, Organisational and Technological Factors
LQ 6DIHW\´ IRU ,QGXVWULDO 6DIHW\ DQG ³/LIHVW\OH
Diseases–Silent Killer of the Millennium” for Release of ‘Occupational Injury and Fire Statistics -
Occupational Health. About 250 delegates from 2016’ during 34th'$(6DIHW\ 2FFXSDWLRQDO+HDOWK
Professionals Meet
various DAE units and Aided Institutions and
exhibitors participated in the Meet.
The AERB Industrial Safety Awards and Fire
Shri V. B. Sant, Director General, National
Safety Awards for the year 2016 were presented
Safety Council, delivered the prestigious Dr. S.
to the winners of the DAE units by Shri S. A.
S. Ramaswamy Memorial Endowment Lecture, Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB.
RQ ³+XPDQ DQG 2UJDQLVDWLRQDO )DFWRUV DSSURDFK
to Industrial Safety” in line with the topic of the 8.6 THEME MEETINGS /SPECIAL MEET
theme w.r.t industrial safety. The ‘Occupational AERB organises and /or participates in discussion
Injury Statistics and Fire Statistics -2016’ for DAE meetings and other professional meets to deliberate
units was released during the meet. on nuclear and radiation safety awareness and the
system of regulatory regime followed by AERB and
$WHFKQLFDOH[KLELWLRQRQLQGXVWULDODQG¿UH
the basis of regulatory decision making process.
safety appliances, public awareness and safety and
The details of such events are given below.
regulatory aspects was organised during the Meet
IRUWKHEHQH¿WRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVDQGWRHQFRXUDJH 8.6.1 Theme Meetings
the interaction between industries and DAE units. (i) Regulation and Management of Nuclear
Facilities / Projects
$ WKHPH PHHWLQJ RQ ³5HJXODWLRQ DQG
Management of Nuclear Facilities / Projects
with respect to Storage and Preservation
and Quality Assurance of Safety Related
Equipment/ Components during Construction and
Commissioning” was organised at AERB, Mumbai
on February 23, 2017. Eight speakers delivered
the talks on the various topics related to theme of
the meeting. A video on storage and preservation
was also streamed during the theme meeting. The
Inauguration of 34th'$(6DIHW\ 2FFXSDWLRQDO+HDOWK
Professionals Meet meeting was attended by 109 participants from all
DAE units, invited experts and AERB staff.
93
Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB delivering Inaugural Address during the Theme Meeting on
³5HJXODWLRQDQG0DQDJHPHQWRI1XFOHDU)DFLOLWLHV3URMHFWV´
(ii) Man-Rem Reduction Methodologies different DAE units such as IGCAR, BHAVINI,
in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Operations and MAPS, BARC and AERB participated in the meet.
Maintenance
(iii) Preparedness and Response to Nuclear
Two days theme meeting on ³Man-Rem
Emergencies: Recent Developments
Reduction Methodologies in Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Operations and Maintenance” was held during A theme meeting on "Preparedness and
February 16-17, 2017 at SRI Kalpakkam. The Response to Nuclear Emergencies: Recent
meet was jointly organised by Safety Research Developments" was organised at AERB,
Institute (SRI), AERB and Association of Waste Mumbai on March 14, 2017 to address recent
Management and Remediation of the Environment developments in the area. About 80 delegates
(AWARE), Kalpakkam. The theme meeting was and invitees from NPCIL, BARC, IGCAR
intended to take a consolidated look at the current and AERB participated in the theme meeting.
practices in fuel cycle operation and maintenance Presentations were made on overview of recent
including special activities, R&D activities carried developments in emergency preparedness
out for the minimisation of waste, man-rem and response (EPR) such as National Laws;
reduction methodologies, environmentally benign Regulations and Requirements on EPR; Hazard
technologies etc. in nuclear fuel cycle operations Assessment and Protection Strategy; Emergency
and maintenance. Around 100 participants from Planning Zones and Distances; Assessment and
Declaration of Emergency; Protective Actions;
Reference Levels and Termination of Emergency,
Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) and Roles
and Responsibilities of EPR organisation as per
National Disaster Management Plan (2016). The
recent developments in regulatory requirements
and guidance and Real time Online Decision
Support System (RO-DSS) were highlighted.
Case studies on EPR in Korea and EPR due to
Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB delivering
inaugural address during the Theme meeting on severe conditions in Light Water Reactors (LWR)
‘Man-Rem Reduction Methodologies in Nuclear were also presented. The meet brought out several
Fuel Cycle Operations and Maintenance’
improvements in EPR by incorporating the recent
94
developments in the regulatory requirements and
national disaster management plan. The integrated
and coordinated emergency management system
to handle the nuclear emergency was emphasised.
(iv) Emergency Preparedness and Response
Action from Onset of the Accident at
Fukushima - An Update
AERB is continuously involved in
Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB delivering inaugural
monitoring the developments and radiological address during the Theme Meeting on ‘Hypothetical Core
status at Fukushima Dai-ichi site. In this regard, Disruptive Accidents in Fast Reactors’
three theme meetings have been conducted by
AERB in preceding years. A fourth theme meeting were delivered by eminent speakers from various
ZDV RUJDQLVHG RQ ³(PHUJHQF\ 3UHSDUHGQHVV DQG R&D organisations and academic institutions, who
Response Action from onset of the accident at KDYH PDGH VLJQL¿FDQW FRQWULEXWLRQV LQ UHVHDUFK
Fukushima- an Update” at AERB, Mumbai on
and development areas concerned with fast reactor
March 30, 2017. The mandate of the theme meeting
safety and accident analysis. The outcome of
ZDV WR XSGDWH $(5% RI¿FLDOV DERXW HPHUJHQF\
the deliberations in the meeting has provided
management and radioactive waste management
thrust and direction in establishing a platform for
aspects of Fukushima Accident. During the meet,
collaborative research works for analysis of HCDA
IAEA report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
by advanced computational methods and intensive
Technical Volume-3 (Emergency Preparedness and
experimental works.
Response) was presented. Further, presentations
were made on Fukushima Dai-ichi plant status, (vi) Building Trust and Credibility with Public
emergency preparedness aspects and radiological through Effective Risk Communication
waste management. A review of Japan’s Emergency As a regulator, it is very important to keep
Preparedness and Response (EPR) System and
public informed on the issues of safety concern,
the International EPR framework prior to the
which requires effective communication with
accident was also presented. The meet brought out
public and stakeholders to build trust and credibility.
various aspects of emergency management which
With this view a theme meeting on ‘Building Trust
PD\ SURYH EHQH¿FLDO LQ WKH UHYLHZ RI HPHUJHQF\
and Credibility with Public through Effective Risk
preparedness manuals of NPPs and revision of
&RPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ZDVRUJDQLVHGIRU$(5%RI¿FLDOV
related regulatory documents.
on August 22, 2017 at AERB, Mumbai. Prof. Arti
(v) Hypothetical Core Disruptive Accidents in D. Kalro, IIT Bombay, Mumbai was invited for
Fast Reactors special lecture. The following presentations were
$WKHPHPHHWLQJRQWKH³+\SRWKHWLFDO&RUH organised during the meeting:
Disruptive Accidents (HCDA) in Fast Reactors”
(a) ‘Building Trust & Credibility with Public:
was organised during May 18-19, 2017 by the
A Regulatory Perspective’ by Shri Soumen
Safety Research Institute at Kalpakkam. The meet
Sinha, AERB.
was intended to take a consolidated look at the
existing knowledge and current status of ongoing (b) ‘Risk Communication to Public from Utility
computational and related experimental works in Perspective and Experience’ by Shri S.
the area of HCDA and identifying the gaps, if any. K. Malhotra, Raja Ramanna Fellow and
Around 70 delegates from various units of DAE Secretary, Atomic Energy Education Society
participated in the meeting in which invited talks (AEES), Mumbai.
95
Speakers Delivering Talk on Building Trust and Credibility with Public through Effective Risk Communication
(c) Crafting Effective Modes of Communicating ¾ to familiarise them with the requirements
Complex Technical Information using Public for security of radioactive sources and their
Relation by Prof. Arti D. Kalro, IIT Bombay, implementation as per the AERB Safety
Mumbai. Guide on Security of Radioactive Sources
8.6.2 Special Meet/Awareness Programme ¾ to inform about the responsibilities of
(i) Security of Radioactive Sources at Law Enforcement Authorities and RFs for
Radiation Facilities ensuring the security of radioactive sources.
An awareness programme on ‘Security Total 110 participants attended the
of Radioactive Sources at Radiation Facilities SURJUDPPHRXWRIZKLFK3ROLFH2I¿FLDOVLQWKH
(RFs)” for Law Enforcement Authorities and rank of DCP, ACP, Police Inspector, Police Sub-
RFs' personnel (i.e. Employer/Licencee/RSO) Inspector of Mumbai, Thane and Navi Mumbai
possessing Category-1 and 2 sources in Mumbai, UHJLRQ SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKH SURJUDPPH 2I¿FLDOV
Thane and Navi Mumbai region was organised on IURP %5,7 $(5% DQG 6HFXULW\ 2I¿FLDOV IURP
March 29, 2017 at AERB, Mumbai. The objective DCSEM attended the programme.
of the awareness programme was; In addition to presentations related to the
¾ to bring the personnel from Law Enforcement meet, visual clips on security of radioactive
Authority and Radiation Facilities on a sources and demonstration of radiation monitoring
common platform for information on security instruments was arranged for familiarisation with
of radioactive sources radiation detection instruments.
Inauguration of Security Awareness Programme for Law Enforcement Authorities and Radiation Facilities Personnel
96
Shri S. Jagannathan, Additional Director
General of Police (Training & Special Unit),
Maharashtra Police and Shri S. Mervin Alexander,
Joint Secretary (A&A), DAE inaugurated the
programme. The programme was well appreciated
by the participants and representatives from Law
Enforcement Authority requested to conduct more
such programmes for awareness among police
personnel.
(ii) Accredited Personnel Monitoring and Bio-
Dosimetry Laboratories
A special meet for accredited Personnel
Monitoring Laboratories (PML) and Bio- $(5%RI¿FHUVLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWDWFRQIHUHQFH
dosimetry Laboratories was organised at Mumbai
on March 30, 2017. The prime objective of this
including its safety documents. The exhibits are
meet was to ascertain the improvement in quality
aimed at giving correct perspective on radiation
of personnel monitoring services catered to various
doses received and provide public, a glimpse of
radiation facilities wide across the country and
the technical aspects of regulation. The response
to share impediment faced by the stakeholders
to the AERB's exhibits at these science fairs was
and remedies therefore in providing personnel
extremely encouraging with visitors of various age
monitoring services. Representatives from PMLs,
groups and students visiting the stalls and getting
Bio-dosimetry labs together with experts from
informed about AERB and its role. During the
RP&AD, BARC and AERB attended the meet.
year, AERB displayed exhibits and interacted with
The presentations on various topics such as, public at following events:
‘Techniques of Bio-dosimetry and its Limitations’,
‘Main features of National Occupational Dose x An exhibition stall was set up in the Annual
Registry System’, ‘Familiarisation with e-LORA Conference of Indian Society for Vascular
module for processing of Excessive Exposure cases’ and Interventional Radiology (ISVIR) held
and ‘Requirements for Accreditation of PMLs’ during February 22-25, 2017 at Kolkata.
ZHUH GHOLYHUHG E\ ¿OHG H[SHUWV 5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV $(5% RI¿FLDOV LQWHUDFWHG SHUVRQDOO\ ZLWK
from PMLs and Bio-dosimetry laboratories made a the delegates and distributed awareness
brief presentation and shared their experiences and OHDÀHWV
concerns on; x An exhibition stall was set up in
x Casual attitude of institutions for availing multidisciplinary conference on
PMS services Interventional Oncology "Synergy India
x Non-genuine excessive exposure issues 2017" held during August 5-6, 2017 at
Mumbai. The conference was jointly
x Reverse loading of the TLD cards
organised by Tata Memorial Centre (TMC),
x TLD cards worn above the lead apron Mumbai and ‘Indian Society of Vascular
and Interventional Radiology (ISVIR)’ in
8.7 EXHIBITIONS collaboration with ‘Synergy’, Miami, USA.
AERB participates in science and technology The conference was attended by about 300
fairs where it displays exhibits on the safety and SURIHVVLRQDOVIURPWKH¿HOGRI,QWHUYHQWLRQDO
regulatory aspects of nuclear and radiation facilities Radiology.
97
Posters describing role of AERB, radiation equipment as well as for users of radioactive
VDIHW\ LQ ÀXRURVFRS\ JXLGHOLQHV RQ XVH RI 7/' sources or radiation generating equipment.
badges and AERB e-licensing process (e-LORA)
x Advertisement in Monthly Magazine
were exhibited in the stall. The pamphlets on
ALARA
‘Radiation Safety in Fluoroscopy’ and information
brochures on regulatory requirements and radiation AERB Advertisement on ‘Licensing
safety aspects in Interventional Radiology were Requirement for Diagnostic X-ray Equipment’
GLVWULEXWHGGXULQJWKHFRQIHUHQFH$(5%RI¿FLDOV was periodically published in monthly magazine
interacted with delegates and received the feedback ALARA – published by Indian Society of
on eLORA. Most of the delegates expressed that Radiographers and Technologists (ISRT).
training on radiation safety should be included in x In-Focus Advertorial in Shubhyatra and
professional education and AERB should introduce Railbandhu
WUDLQLQJ ZRUNVKRS FHUWL¿FDWLRQ SURJUDPPH LQ
radiation safety. AERB published In-Focus advertorial in the Air
,QGLD LQÀLJKW PDJD]LQH µ6KXEK\DWUD¶ DQG ,QGLDQ
8.8 ADVERTISEMENTS AND ARTICLES Railways in-board magazine ‘Railbandhu’ in
November 2017. The objective of the advertorial
AERB publishes advertisements in print is to highlight the role of AERB to a wide range of
media once every six months in order to sensitise audience namely, passengers traveling by Air India
the users on requirements of obtaining regulatory (Domestic & International) and Indian Railways.
consent from AERB for use of medical X-ray The content featured about AERB’s overall
AERB’s Advertisement on handling of Radioactive Sources published in leading nationwide Newspapers
98
In-Focus Advertorial in ‘Shubhyatra’ of Air India
PDQGDWH DQG VSHFL¿F UROH LQ HQVXULQJ VDIHW\ RI 8.9.1 Interactions with Concerned Ministries on
radiation facilities, especially X-ray facilities. issues related to Radiation Safety
AERB is associated with various agencies
8.9 TECHNICAL INTERACTIONS WITH
in the process of ensuring radiation safety in
OTHER AGENCIES
medical radiation facilities and industries handling
AERB believes in sharing its technical radiation sources. AERB is routinely interacting
expertise with various Government Bodies, with various ministries for resolution of generic
8QLYHUVLWLHV HWF $(5% RI¿FHUV DUH DFWLYHO\ issues related to radiation safety due to handling of
participating in preparation and revision of radiation sources for various applications. Towards
Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) documents, Site this, AERB has interacted with various concerned
Appraisal Committee of Ministry of Environment
ministries including:
& Forest (MoEF), Working Groups on Nuclear
and Radiological Emergency Plans constituted by x Interaction with National Accreditation
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) Board of Laboratories (NABL) for the
etc. AERB encourages its technical divisions in purpose of Accreditation of Radiological
providing project guidance to undergraduates and Laboratories
post graduate students from various Universities/ Initiative was taken towards review of the
Colleges. process being followed for recognition/
Towards resolving generic issues related accreditation of radiological laboratories by
to radiation safety due to handling of radiation AERB. In the past AERB has accredited/
sources for various applications, AERB interacts recognised many laboratories associated
with various ministries. LQ FDOLEUDWLRQ DQG WHVWLQJ LQ WKH ¿HOG RI
99
Dosimetry, Radio-analysis, Environmental in-transit storage at the airport. It was
Survey and Radiation Monitoring concluded that the regulation for handling
Instruments. Since NABL has the mandate of radioactive consignments including the
for accreditation of such laboratories, a in-transit storage facility located at airports
preliminary meeting was arranged with all is primarily under the purview of DGCA
the stakeholders, viz. NABL, BARC (as it as per the prevailing laws and AERB’s role
maintains radiological standards) and AERB, is limited to issuance of shipment approval
in order to understand their respective roles and grant import and export permission for
and responsibilities. It was concluded that radioactive consignments. Further, it was
while it is the role of NABL to accredit the RSLQHGWRKDYHFRPSUHKHQVLYHFRQ¿UPDWRU\
radiological laboratories, the role of AERB study of the scope and extent of regulations
will be limited to oversee radiological safety for safe transport of radioactive material by
in such laboratories like any other radiation air including in-transit storage and handling
facilities handling radiation sources. Further, at airports, for identifying areas needing
it was opined to make an attempt to identify improvement, overlapping responsibilities
areas needing improvement, overlapping and duplication of work, and suggest means
and methods to address the same.
responsibilities and duplication of work and
prepare a roadmap for a smooth transition. x Interaction with Central Drugs Standards
Control Organisation (CDSCO) for the
x Interaction with DGCA for Transport of
import permission for radiopharmaceuticals
Radioactive Material by Air
in India.
Initiative was taken to review IAEA
x Meeting with Inter-Ministerial Committee
regulations for safe transport of radioactive
(IMC) at Directorate of Foreign Trades
PDWHULDO6SHFL¿F6DIHW\5HTXLUHPHQWV665
(DGFT) in connection with Pre-shipment
6, 2012 edition vis-a vis national legislation Inspection Agency (PSIA).
to identify various agencies/competent
authorities for overseeing the requirements x Interaction with Directorate of Advertising
while transporting radioactive materials by and Visual Publicity (DAVP) regarding the
various modes of transport. Review report audio visual advertisement on diagnostic
suggested that different ministries have role radiology licensing requirements.
in the transport of dangerous goods including x Attended the meeting of Expert Committee
radioactive materials depending upon modes for evaluation and appraisal on the project
of transport namely, road, rail, air and sea. To entitled, "Gamma Radiation Plant for
start with interaction with various agencies, Medical Device Reprocessing in Hospitals"
based on their responsibilities, transport of x Attended meeting of Standing Committee on
radioactive materials by air was taken up. Tertiary Cancer Care Program.
The main agencies involved in safe transport
of radioactive materials include Directorate 8.9.2 Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS)
General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), the
Airport Authority of India (AAI). So a National Standards Body is involved in standards
preliminary meeting was arranged with formulation apart from its other activities. During
representatives from DGCA and AAI to have WKH SHULRG $(5% RI¿FHUV ZHUH LQYROYHG LQ
clarity about the roles and responsibilities review and revision of BIS documents and
of all these agencies including the scope participated in the meetings conducted by BIS as
and regulatory jurisdiction of AERB Member of Committees/Sectional Committees of
with respect to transport which includes BIS as detailed below:
100
x As members of BIS committees, AERB 8.9.5 Project Guidance
RI¿FHUV SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKH PHHWLQJV
Every year many students from several
conducted by BIS on Development of BIS
academic institutions like IITs, BITS and other
codes related to ‘Cement and Concrete’ and
universities get an opportunity to work with
‘Earthquake Engineering’.
AERB scientists and engineers on emerging R&D
x $(5% RI¿FHU SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKH PHHWLQJ topics related to safety as part of their academic
of Electromedical, Diagnostic Imaging curriculum. Technical divisions of AERB provided
and Radiotherapy Equipment Sectional project guidance to undergraduate engineering
Committee (MHD 15) at BIS, New Delhi VWXGHQWVDVZHOODV07HFKVWXGHQWV$(5%RI¿FHUV
and provided inputs on radiological safety provided guidance as follows:
requirements of new Indian Standard of
Medical Diagnostic X-ray Equipment. x Guidance Provided by Safety Research
Institute (SRI), AERB Kalpakkam
8.9.3 Ministry of Environment & Forests
(MoEF) ¾ Technical guidance was provided to
x As a member of Site Appraisal Committee university student(s) in the area of
of MoEF for Nuclear Facilities and Strategic RS-GIS techniques. For this purpose,
)DFLOLWLHV $(5% 6U RI¿FHU SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ topographical maps and satellite data
the meeting and provided inputs. were used to generate various thematic
layers for Kalpakkam site.
x 2QH $(5% RI¿FHU DWWHQGHG PHHWLQJ RI
MoEF Committee for RAPS-5-8 at RR Site, x Guidance Provided by NSAD, AERB
Rawatbhata on June 22, 2017. ¾ Guidance provided to three students
8.9.4 Participation in Radiological Emergency on their projects titled, ‘Extreme Value
Exercise Analysis’, ‘Fission Product release
x 2QH$(5%RI¿FHUSDUWLFLSDWHGLQPRFNGULOO Model’ and ‘Calandria Vault Dew Point
on Radiological Emergency Exercise at Rajiv Monitoring System’.
Gandhi International Airport, Hyderabad ¾ Two students worked on the project
during July 11-13, 2017 conducted by titled ‘Human Error Probability
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The Estimation using HEP models’.
purpose of conducting this exercise at airports
has emerged on the backdrop false incident ¾ One student worked on the project
on leakage from radioactive consignment titled ‘Numerical Modeling of Point
reported on May 29, 2015 at the Indira Reactor Kinetics’.
Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi. ¾ Another student worked on the project
For this exercise a scenario related to titled, ‘Estimation of Reactivity
radioactive consignment was created and from Known Power History’, ‘CFD
observations were made and communicated to the Simulation of a PHWR Coolant
stakeholders/agencies for further improvement in Channel’ and ‘Linear Stability Analysis
radiological emergency scenarios. of a Nuclear Reactor’.
101
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Chapter 9
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
9.1 PORTAL FOR PUBLIC FEEDBACK is committed to disclosure of all relevant

As an initiative towards ‘Minimum information in public domain as is permissible
under the Act. Required measures were taken
Government, Maximum Governance’, AERB
on the implementation of 'Right to Information
has launched electronic licencing system i.e.
Act’ (RTI) and the required information has been
e-Licensing of Radiation Applications (e-LORA
put on AERB website. The total number of RTIs
portal). All the consents for radiation facilities are
handled during the period was 136 of which 60
issued through eLORA. Feedback on consenting
RTIs were related to the diagnostic radiology.
process for radiation facilities was obtained through
AERB has also received 12 No. of RTI appeals
this portal.
against replies. Year wise RTI queries replied by
9.2 RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT 2005 AERB are given in Figure 9.1.
Under this Act, access to information from In addition to above, the frequently asked
a public agency has become a statutory right questions under RTI were compiled and uploaded
of every citizen. The management of AERB on AERB website for reference of the public.
Fig. 9.1: RTI Queries Replied during the Last 5 Years

103
9.3 PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS x Use of radiation technology and
radiopharmaceuticals.
Parliamentary questions and sub-questions
related to regulation of nuclear and radiation x Treatment of People Affected by Nuclear
facilities were received and replied. During the Disaster
period AERB responded to 28 parliamentary x Guidelines for Research and Diagnostic
questions. The questions answered with Facilities
implications to radiation safety were broadly on
x Administrative issues, such as Backlog
following issues:
vacancies etc.
x Regulation of handling radioactive material 9.4 AUDIT BY COMPTROLLER AND
in India AUDITOR GENERAL (CAG)
x Radioactive waste disposal and discharges 7KH 3ULQFLSDO 'LUHFWRU RI $XGLW 6FLHQWL¿F
Department, Mumbai has carried out Entity Audit
x Safety of Nuclear Power Plants and clearances
of Accounts of AERB during December 19, 2017 to
for new NPPs.
-DQXDU\IRUWKHWZR¿QDQFLDO\HDUVIURP
x Guidelines for physical protection of nuclear 2015-16 and 2016-17. No major irregularities were
facilities. reported during the audit.
104
Chapter 10
INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION
India is a contracting party in the framework nuclear emergency in both the countries was also
of several international instruments promulgated discussed.
for establishing a global regime for cooperation in
10.1.2 Visit of CANDU Owners Group (COG)
promoting safety in facilities/activities. Pursuant
delegation to AERB
to this, AERB actively participates and contributes
in several multi-lateral international platforms A three member delegation led by Mr. Fred
working for promotion of nuclear / radiological Dermarkar, President & CEO, CANDU Owners
safety in facilities/activities across the globe. AERB Group (COG) visited AERB and held discussions
has entered into bilateral arrangements/agreements with senior management of AERB on June 01,
with the regulatory authorities of several other 2017. The discussions primarily focused on sharing
countries. of information on the progress made on pressure
10.1 STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR tube leakage incidents of KAPS and evolving an
SAFETY AND SECURITY information exchange mechanism.
10.1.1 Bilateral Meeting between AERB and 10.1.3 NEA Delegation Commends AERB
USNRC A four member delegation of Nuclear Energy
th
The 15 bilateral meeting between Atomic Agency (NEA) led by Mr. William D. Magwood,
Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and U.S. Director General, NEA held a meeting with senior
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) took management of AERB in Mumbai on November
place at Maryland, USA during March 6-10, 21, 2017. India participates in technical committees
2017. The bilateral technical meeting included of NEA such as Committee on Nuclear Regulatory
the observation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Affairs (CNRA), Committee on Safety of Nuclear
Generating Station (PVNGS) ingestion pathway Installations (CSNI) and NEA Working Groups as
evaluated exercise as well as visit to Phoenix an adhoc-invitee. In addition, India also participates
National SAFER Response Center to view in activities related to various Task Groups and
emergency backup equipment as U.S. industry’s projects of NEA. During the joint meeting, both
post-Fukushima safety enhancements. On March
10, 2017 the NRC and the AERB delegation
participated in the bilateral technical meeting.
The aspects related to regulatory structure of
AERB, its functioning and the legal provisions
empowering the regulatory body were highlighted
by AERB during the meeting. AERB also provided
information on new reactor construction, newly
published regulatory documents and challenges
with public communication. NRC provided
information on current operating reactor issues,
new reactor construction materials, oversight and 0HHWLQJRI&KDLUPDQ$(5%DQG6U2I¿FHUVZLWK
Delegation of CANDU Owners Group (COG)
area of interest for research. The preparedness for
105
AERB and NEA emphasised strengthening the site, decommissioning of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP
nuclear safety through collaborative activities. and status of Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
NEA elaborated on the lessons learnt from 10.1.5 Visit of URENCO Team to AERB
Fukushima accident and various measures taken
to implement the new insights. Director General, A two member team from URENCO Ltd.
NEA appreciated the technical expertise which along with Prof. Nawal Kant Prinja, Technology
AERB is bringing to NEA and advocated for Director, Clean Energy, Wood PLC, UK visited
further strengthening of AERB participation AERB on December 20, 2017. The delegation
in NEA activities. He informed the decision of discussed on the concept of Uranium Battery
NEA Steering Committee to upgrade the status (U-Battery) and the regulatory processes/
of India from ‘Adhoc-Invitee’ to ‘Participant’ and challenges associated with it in India. Apart
handed over letter inviting India to join CNRA and IURP $(5% RI¿FLDOV H[SHUWV IURP %$5& DOVR
subsidiary bodies as ‘Participant’. participated in the discussion. Uranium battery is
being developed by a consortium of companies
10.1.4 Visit of Japanese Delegation to AERB
led by URENCO, utilising international expertise
India and Japan, recently, entered into a and capabilities. U-Battery is a micro nuclear
Bilateral Agreement for the co-operation in the reactor powered by TRISO fuel which will be able
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to take to produce power and heat for a range of energy
forward the bilateral co-operation and to explore needs. The regulations associated with these types
the area of future co-operation, a two member of technologies in India were explained to the
delegation led by Dr. Kazuhiro Tsuzuki, Senior foreign delegation. The information shared during
fellow, the Institute of Applied Energy (IAE) the discussion was informative and enriching.
visited AERB on December 5, 2017 and interacted
10.1.6 Meeting of the RPWG of International
with AERB Sr. Management. The delegation
VVER Regulator Forum
had prepared questionnaire covering aspects
of regulatory framework of India, relationship The 5th meeting of Reactor Physics Working
of AERB with international bodies, status of Group (RPWG) of International VVER Regulator
legislation related to nuclear safety etc. which Forum was organised by AERB at the Safety
was discussed in the meeting. Dr. Tsuzuki briefed Research Institute (SRI), Kalpakkam, during
on the Japanese nuclear policy, present status of -XO\ ,QFOXGLQJ ¿YH PHPEHUV IURP
operating as well as under construction NPPs in RPWG member countries (Russian Federation,
Japan, ongoing decommissioning activities at NPP Germany, Hungary and India), eleven participants
0HHWLQJRI&KDLUPDQ$(5%DQG6URI¿FLDOV
ZLWK-DSDQHVH'HOHJDWLRQ 0HHWLQJRI$(5%RI¿FLDOVZLWK53:*0HPEHUV
106
from AERB, BARC and NPCIL participated in Authority (BAERA) for the exchange of technical
the meeting. The meeting provided a platform for information and co-operation in the regulation
knowledge sharing on the recent developments in of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The
computational methods used for neutronics and arrangement will enable, among other things,
thermal hydraulic analysis of VVER type NPPs sharing of knowledge and expertise on various
and eventually, the opportunity for collaborative issues related to nuclear and radiation safety,
activities. education and training of the regulatory personnel
10.1.7 CANDU PSA Working Group and relevant assistance related to development of
regulatory requirements.
The CANDU PSA Working Group (CPWG)
organised the annual meeting at Ottawa, Canada 10.3 CONTRIBUTION IN
during October 23-27, 2017. The meeting was INTERNATIONAL PEER REVIEW
attended by 18 members of CPWG member 10.3.1 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)
countries operating CANDU type reactors. Four *RYHUQPHQW RI ,QGLD UDWL¿HG WKH &RQYHQWLRQ RQ
presentations were made by India. The presentations Nuclear Safety on March 31, 2005. The objectives
included current status of PSA activities, use of of the Convention are to achieve and maintain a high
36$LQULVNLQIRUPHGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJGH¿QLWLRQV level of nuclear safety worldwide, to establish and
of plant damage states of Level-1 PSA, regulatory maintain effective defences in nuclear installations
review process and a status update of previous against potential radiological hazards, in order to
tasks on CANDU PSA. protect individuals, society and the environment
10.1.8 CANDU Senior Regulators’ Meet from harmful effects of ionising radiation from
The CANDU Senior Regulators’ Meet such installations; and to prevent accidents with
(CSRM) was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina radiological consequences and to mitigate such
during November 13-17, 2017. The meeting was consequences, should they occur. The Convention
attended by representatives from nuclear regulatory places certain obligations on the States operating
bodies of Argentina, Canada, China, India, Korea, nuclear power plants. The obligations are based
Pakistan and Romania. Presentations were made on the principles contained in the IAEA Safety
by India on coolant Channel life management and Fundamentals document "Fundamental Safety
DVVHVVPHQWV UHTXLUHG WR GHPRQVWUDWH ¿WQHVV IRU Principles (SF-1)" and cover for instance, siting,
service for long term operation (LTO) and update design, construction, operation, the availability
on incidents of leakage from the coolant channels RI DGHTXDWH ¿QDQFLDO DQG KXPDQ UHVRXUFHV WKH
in KAPS- 1&2 units. The meeting provided a DVVHVVPHQW DQG YHUL¿FDWLRQ RI VDIHW\ TXDOLW\
technical platform to interact with senior regulators assurance and emergency preparedness.
of other CANDU countries and discuss the current The Convention has a peer review process, wherein
issues such severe accident management, operating the Contracting Parties are required to submit
experience feedback, post-Fukushima safety national reports on the implementation of their
enhancements etc. obligations for "peer review" at the meetings of the
10.2 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT Contracting Parties, to be held at the IAEA. These
review meetings are held once every three years.
10.2.1 Bilateral Arrangement between AERB The 7th review meeting of the Contracting Parties to
and BAERA, Bangladesh the Convention on Nuclear Safety was held at the
An arrangement was signed on April 08, 2017 Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy
between the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria from March
(AERB) and Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory 27 to April 7, 2017. Total 77 Contracting Parties
participated in the review meeting.
107
Chairman and Executive Director, AERB in 7th CNS review meeting at IAEA
India submitted its National Report for review 10.4 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN IAEA
by the Contracting Parties on August 15, 2016. IRRS MISSION FOR OTHER
The report updated how the Government of India COUNTRIES
FRQWLQXHV WR IXO¿O LWV REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU $UWLFOHV
The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review
6 through 19 of the Convention. All land-based
Service (IRRS) is designed to strengthen and
NPPs including storage, handling and treatment
enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory
facilities for radioactive materials attached to the
infrastructure of States for nuclear, radiation,
NPP and directly related to the operation of NPPs
radioactive waste and transport safety. The intention
were covered in the national report. This report
is to peer-review the regulatory framework of the
also addressed the national position with regard to
host country so as to make it a robust regulatory
the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety for the
body with respect to all its regulated facilities and
implementation of the objectives of the CNS that
activities.
was adopted on February 9, 2015. India received a
total of 224 questions on this National Report and x 2QH RI¿FHU IURP $(5% SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ
provided answers to all these questions within the the IRRS mission of Nigerian Nuclear
stipulated time. Regulatory Authority, Nigeria during July
An Indian Delegation led by Chairman, 2- 12 2017 as IAEA-IRRS team member.
AERB, with experts from AERB, BARC, NPCIL The review was carried out against the
and the Indian Embassy at Vienna, participated IAEA safety standards and requirements.
in the review meeting. The presentation and peer 10.5 AERB’s PARTICIPATION IN
review of the National Report of India was held INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES
on March 29, 2017 in Country Group (CG-7), AERB experts have been actively
for preparation of the Country Review Report. participating in various activities of IAEA and have
The Indian presentation was well received and all been contributing at various other international
the questions were satisfactorily answered by the fora. AERB is the national coordinator for IAEA-
Indian delegation.
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
Indian delegation also organised a side (INES) based reporting of events and IAEA/NEA -
event on March 28, 2017 and shared experience on Incident Reporting System (IRS) and Fuel Incident
the Pressure Tube (PT) leak events at KAPS units 1RWL¿FDWLRQDQG$QDO\VLV6\VWHP),1$6
and their status of investigations. AERB participates in various Technical
The National Report to the CNS along with and Consultants’ meetings organised by IAEA on
answers to the questions posed on the report and a range of topics for NPPs, fuel cycle facilities,
the country review reports have been uploaded on radiation facilities, transportation of radioactive
the AERB’s website. PDWHULDOV DQG LOOLFLW WUDI¿FNLQJ RI UDGLRDFWLYH
108
materials. AERB has been participating in IAEA IRFXV DUHDV YL] ³5LVN $JJUHJDWLRQ´ DQG
Coordinated Research Programme (IAEA-CRP) ³0XOWLXQLW,QWHUDFWLRQVDQG'HSHQGHQFLHV´
and NEA joint projects and information exchange
x CFD simulations for different tests for
programmes.
assessing the recombiner performance
10.5.1 Participation of AERB in the NEA/ have been carried out by AERB experts, as
MDEP Activities part of OECD/NEA upcoming ‘Thermal–
AERB continued to coordinate the activities hydraulics, Hydrogen, Aerosols and Iodine
related to India’s participation in the Nuclear Project’ (THAI-3).
Energy Agency (NEA) of Organisation for x As part of OECD/NEA MDEP VVERWG
Economic Cooperation and Development TESG-SA (Severe Accident), AERB
(OECD). During the period AERB experts position on PARs and ESBO were provided
contributed in the following programmes: for preparing the common position of
x 2QH RI¿FHU SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ 2(&'1($ various regulators. These include challenges
CSNI activity on benchmark on the seismic addressing hydrogen recombiner’s
capacity of reinforced concrete shear walls reliability and effectiveness during the plant
(CASH) at Paris, France. life and understanding of the strategies and
challenges in addressing extended station
x 2QH RI¿FHU SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ 2(&'1($
blackout.
meeting of the Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activates Working Group on 10.5.2 AERB’s Activities as MDEP Member
inspection practices. The Multinational Design Evaluation
x For Multi-unit PSA, inputs were provided Program (MDEP) is a multilateral co-operational
for the two documents being prepared by program amongst the national nuclear regulatory
the NEA-WGRISK Working Group on the bodies. The objective of the program is to
Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB along with participants of

31st Steering Technical Committee of MDEP at IAEA, Vienna
109
enhance multilateral co-operation; to encourage 10.5.3 Other International Meetings/Training/
multinational convergence of codes, standards Workshops
and safety goals and implement the MDEP During the year, AERB experts participated
products in order to facilitate the licensing of in following international meetings:
new reactors. However, national regulators
x 6th meeting of PSA Working Group of
retain sovereign authority for all licensing and
WWER Regulatory forum at Prague, Czech
regulatory decisions.
Republic
AERB is a member of the MDEP since
x Workshop pertaining to round robin analysis
2012. The current membership of MDEP consists
on ‘Improving the Robustness Assessments
of 15 national nuclear regulatory bodies. These
Methodologies for Structures Impacted by
are Canada, People's Republic of China, Finland,
Large Missile at Medium Velocity (IRIS),
France, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russian
Phase-III: Induced Vibration’ at EDF Lab
Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, United
Paris-Saclay, France
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United
States. x Expert faculty in the IAEA Workshop on
Safety Aspects of Long Terms Operation
AERB continued its association with
(SALTO) on Civil Structures at Angra NPP,
the MDEP in Policy Group, Steering Technical
Brazil
Committee and few of the design and issue
VSHFL¿FZRUNLQJJURXSV$(5%SDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH x Indo-US Technical Exchange Programmme
DFWLYLWLHVRIWKHGHVLJQVSHFL¿FZRUNLQJJURXSVRI on Security by Design
EPR, VVER and AP1000 reactors and also in issue x IPPAS (International Physical Protection
VSHFL¿FZRUNLQJJURXSVRI'LJLWDO,QVWUXPHQWDWLRQ Advisory Services) Workshop
and Control (DICWG), Vendor Inspection x 3rd Mongolia-India Working Group Meeting
Cooperation (VICWG) and Codes and Standards
x Regional Training Couse (RTC) on the
(CSWG).
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
During the year, AERB actively participated and Facilities organised by Japan Atomic
and contributed in following meetings: Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai, Japan
x MDEP Conference on New Reactor Design x Plenary Session Talk during the 37th Annual
Activities & MDEP Policy Group Meeting Conference of Canadian Nuclear Society
x MDEP VVER Technical Experts sub-group 10.5.4 Participation of AERB in IAEA Activities
on RPV & primary circuits
'XULQJ WKH SHULRG $(5% RI¿FLDOV
x MDEP meeting: 39th meeting of CNRA & participated and contributed in the following
62nd meeting of CSNI Technical and Consultancy meetings by IAEA:
x Participated in the 15th meeting of the x 7th Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)
AP1000WG x Meeting of Commission on Safety Standards
x Participated in Steering Technical (CSS)
Committee Meeting (STC) of MDEP and x Technical Meeting on the CANDU Senior
International Conference on topical issues Regulators
in Nuclear Safety
x Review Meeting of IAEA IGALL
x Participated in MDEP Digital (International Generic Aging Lessons
Instrumentation and Control Working Learnt) Phase-3 Working Group 3 on Civil
Group (DICWG) meeting Structures
110
x Meeting of WWER Regulatory Forum x Consultancy meeting to Develop the
x Meeting of PSA Working Group of WWER International Reporting System, Blue Book-
Regulatory Forum 201502017 (7th edition)
x International Conference on Topical Issues x Technical Meeting on Recent Development

in Nuclear Installation Safety: Safety in International and National Management
Demonstration of Advance Water Cooled System Standards, Including Quality
NPP. Management Aspects
x ISO/TC85/SC2 & WG Meeting on x International Conference on Radiation
Radiological Protection Protection in Medicine: Achieving Change
x Consultancy Meeting to review and revise in Practice
the INES User's Manual 2008. x 53rd meeting of the Committee on Nuclear
x Meeting of Transport Safety Standards Regulatory Activates working Group on
Committee (TRANSSC) inspection practices.
x 61st Regular Session of the IAEA General $(5% RI¿FHUV DOVR DWWHQGHG IROORZLQJ
Conference Member of Indian Delegation IAEA Conferences / Workshops / Training
x IAEA National Workshop on Review and Programmes on various themes of interest:
Assessment by the Regulatory Body. x Workshop on Advances in
x Annual Meeting of the INES Advisory Understanding the Progression of
Committee (INES-AC) Severe Accidents in Boiling Water
Reactors at IAEA
x Technical Meeting on CANDU Probabilistic
Safety Assessment x IRIS Phase III Benchmark Workshop
Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director, AERB along with participants of Annual Meeting of INES-AC
111
x Workshop on ‘Regulatory Supervision Response to Nuclear Security Event at
of Fuel Cycle Facilities’ NPP
x Train the Trainers Workshop on the x Pilot Workshop on Arrangement
International Nuclear and Radiological for the Termination of a Nuclear or
Event Scale. Radiological Emergency.
x Workshop for Senior Managers on x Training course at ICTP-IAEA
Leadership and Culture for Safety International School on ‘Nuclear
x Workshop on use of a Harmonised Security’
Safety Culture Framework x IAEA National Workshop on Review
x Regional Workshop and Table Top and Assessment by the Regulatory
Exercise on Management of the Body.
112
Chapter 11
HUMAN RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
11.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION 11.3 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

AERB manpower is being augmented at 11.3.1 Development of Information Technology
various levels and through various channels in Infrastructure
view of the expanding nuclear power programme (i) AERB New Website
and increasing number of radiation facilities in
The new website of AERB was launched on
the country. This is being done through fresh
August 15, 2017. The intent of the new design of
recruitments, transfer of experienced personnel
the website is to make it more user-friendly and
from operating plants and R&D institutes like
more people-centric to enhance the transparency
BARC and IGCAR and induction of postgraduates
and public outreach. Attempts are being made to
through AERB Graduate Fellowship Scheme
make the website more and more content rich from
(AGFS) in IIT Bombay and IIT Madras.
technical as well as public interest point of view.
Total sanctioned strength in AERB as on (ii) Performance Improvement of e-Licensing
December 31, 2017 is 459 comprising of 387 for Radiation Application (e-LORA)
VFLHQWL¿F DQG WHFKQLFDO DQG VXSSRUWLQJ VWDII Portal
However in position strength is 340 comprising
VFLHQWL¿FDQGWHFKQLFDODQGVXSSRUWLQJVWDII It was observed in the recent past that the
of Administrative / Accounts / Auxiliary. number of licencees and other service seekers of
eLORA program are growing exponentially. To
11.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS ensure the availability and performance of the
WITH DISABILITIES (EQUAL application, some major changes were carried out
OPPORTUNITIES, PROTECTION OF in the architecture of eLORA from August 2017
RIGHTS AND FULL PARTICIPATION) onwards. These changes include increase in number
ACT, 1995 AND IMPLEMENTATION of active virtual machines and enhancement of the
OF RESERVATION POLICY FOR bandwidth of the eLORA leased line.
SCHEDULED CASTES / TRIBES / OBC (iii) Enhancements in Internal IT
During the year 2017, AERB recruited 15 Infrastructure
SHUVRQQHO RI ZKLFK RI¿FLDOV ZHUH UHFUXLWHG 7KH HI¿FLHQF\ RI WKH H[WHUQDO DSSOLFDWLRQV
through BARC and IGCAR Training School in like website and eLORA are largely dependent on
WKHJUDGHRI6FLHQWL¿F2I¿FHU&2QHFDQGLGDWH condition of the internal back-end IT infrastructure
belonging to scheduled caste (SC) was recruited as of AERB. To improve the performance and
Upper Division Clerk (UDC). Two candidates were availability of internal IT infrastructure of AERB,
recruited as Stenographer Grade-III. There is one several steps were taken during this year, which
backlog vacancy in ‘Person with Disabilities Quota’ include introduction of link-load balancer to
due to resignation of a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) ensure the equal distribution of internet bandwidth
on July 31, 2017. Rosters are maintained as per the for various services like internet, email, domain
orders on the subject. The backlog vacancies are name service etc. and introduction of centralised
being worked out and periodic reports and returns back-up system for all the users and distribution of
are sent to DAE. encrypted pen-drives for all AERB employees.
113
(iv) Implementation of Pre-developed In addition, clearances related to construction
Software Applications of Niyamak Bhavan - C building at Head Quarter
To avoid various hassles in the software have been obtained from Municipal Corporation
development lifecycle and the consequent delays of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) and tenders were
in the implementation of the software, two pre- invited by DCSEM.
developed software applications viz. Payroll (ii) Engineering Hall at Safety Research
from IGCAR and Corporate Human Assets and Institute
Resources Management System (CHARMS) from The SRI Engineering Hall was inaugurated
NPCIL including on-line Annual Performance by Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB on May
Appraisal (APAR) system were implemented at 20, 2017 in the presence of Dr. A. K. Bhaduri,
AERB. Director, IGCAR. Dr. Bhaduri then dedicated the
11.3.2 Development of AERB, SRI and Regional QRQ,%5+6'¿UHGERLOHUWKDWZLOOSURYLGHVWHDP
Regulatory Centres for all the experimental facilities in the engineering
hall. The performance of boiler was demonstrated.
(i) AERB and Regional Regulatory Centres
AERB is establishing Regional Regulatory
Centres and the progress of work is as follows:
x 70% completion of Eastern Regional
Regulatory Centre (ERRC), Kolkata
building construction
x 40% completion of Southern Regional
Regulatory Centre (SRRC), Chennai
Chairman, AERB and Director, IGCAR, inaugurating
building construction. the Engineering Hall at SRI
Construction of Regional Regulatory Centers at Chennai and Kolkata in progress
114
11.4 TRAINING
As a part of competence development,
AERB continued to train its staff by organising
training programmes, workshops, on-job training
at nuclear facilities, refresher courses, technical
talks, colloquia and participation in DAE’s
Administrative Training Institute (ATI) etc. AERB
also imparted training on regulatory and safety
aspects with respect to nuclear and radiation
Participants of NDT Training Programme
facilities to other organisations on request.
11.4.1 Training imparted to AERB Staff Division (RP&AD), BARC for short
L ,QGXFWLRQ7UDLQLQJRI1HZ2I¿FHUV term training course on ‘Nucleonic
Gauges’ and ‘Research Application
Induction Training was provided to the
of Ionising Radiation’ to enhance the
QHZHO\ UHFUXLWHG RI¿FLDOV $IWHU WKH LQLWLDO
knowledge and familiarisation with
LQGXFWLRQ WUDLQLQJ FRXUVH DW$(5% WKHVH RI¿FHUV
regulations of these facilities.
were posted to NPP sites for gaining familiarity
DQGSUDFWLFDOH[SHULHQFHLQWKH¿HOG x ISNT Level-II training on
³5DGLRJUDSKLF 7HVWLQJ )LOP
(ii) Refresher Training Course on Industrial
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ 57),´ IRU ¿YH $(5%
Safety
RI¿FHUV GXULQJ 1RYHPEHU
Two refresher training courses on Atomic at Mumbai.
Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996 were conducted x ,617WUDLQLQJRQ³1'7IRU0DQDJHUV´
IRU$(5%RI¿FLDOVGXULQJ6HSWHPEHU was conducted during October 30-
and October 9-13, 2017. Twenty lectures were November 03, 2017 at AERB.
delivered by in-house experts on industrial safety.
x (LJKW RI¿FHUV FRPSOHWHG &RXUVH RQ
(iii) Training Programme on Topics related to ³'HVLJQRI3UHVVXUH9HVVHOV´DW$(5%
ASME during February 14, 2017 to September
The lecture series on ASME training course 12, 2017.
were conducted for almost 6 months (February (v) Simulator Training on PFBR
to September 2017). This course comprised of
50 lectures. The lectures were given by Dr. H. S. In order to familiarise the AERB staff with
Kushwaha, Former Director, HSEG, BARC who the operation of the upcoming PFBR, a simulator
is an expert in the subject. The course had been
especially formulated for mechanical engineers.
$ WRWDO RI RI¿FHUV IURP $(5% DQG 13&,/
participated in the course.
(iv) Training Course on topics related to NDT
and Radiation Safety
$(5% RI¿FHUV SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ IROORZLQJ
training programmes:
x 1LQH RI¿FHUV ZHUH GHSXWHG WR $(5%2I¿FLDOV3DUWLFLSDWHGLQ6LPXODWRU7UDLQLQJDW
PFBR, Kalpakkam
Radiological Physics and Advisory
115
WUDLQLQJ IRU $(5% RI¿FLDOV ZDV DUUDQJHG IURP x $ ¿YH GD\V UHVLGHQWLDO WUDLQLQJ SURJUDPPH
February 28, 2017 to March 10, 2017 at the full scope was conducted during December 11-15, 2017
simulator training facility at PFBR, Kalpakkam. IRU PLGGOH OHYHO RI¿FHUV RI $(5% 62)
$WRWDORIWHQRI¿FHUVIURP$(5%SDUWLFLSDWHGLQ on ‘Management Development Programme
this training programme. As a pre-requisite for the (MDP) at YASHADA, Pune. A total of 26
simulator training, in-house classroom training was RI¿FHUVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKHSURJUDPPH
also arranged at AERB on important plant systems
11.4.2 Training Imparted for Other
of PFBR and also on analysis of some of the design
Organisations
basis events (DBE).
$W %+$9,1, WKH RI¿FLDOV XQGHUZHQW x Third Fundamental Programme on Nuclear
FODVVURRP WUDLQLQJ ¿HOG YLVLWV DQG VLPXODWRU Energy (FPNE) was conducted by DAE
exercises. The simulator lesson plan covered various IRU %DQJODGHVK RI¿FLDOV IRU ¿YH ZHHNV
events and simulation of fuel handling systems during January 8, 2017 to February 17, 2017.
(fuel handling startup authorisation, inclined fuel AERB Module of FCNE-10 on ‘Regulatory
transfer machine, operation of rotatable plug and Framework for Nuclear Power Plants and
transfer arm etc.). Lectures were delivered by Fuel Cycle Facilities’ was given by AERB
experts from IGCAR and BHAVINI on Design faculty.
Basis Events for PFBR, detectors used for core x Internship for 13 students was conducted
monitoring and improving human performance, from May 22, 2017 for two months. Students
which were found very useful and applicable in from different academic institutes like BITS
regulatory activities. Pilani, VES’s Institute of Technology,
(vi) Management Development Programme Mumbai and VES College of Arts, Science
& Commerce, Mumbai had joined AERB
x A three days residential training programme for internship.
was conducted during March 17-19, 2017 for
11.5 AERB TECHNICAL TALK /
6HQLRURI¿FHUVRI$(5%62*DQGDERYH
on ‘Management Development Programme COLLOQUIUM
(MDP)’ at HDFC Training Centre, Lonawala. Towards the aim of continual knowledge
The training was conducted by Ms. Tessie upgradation of its staff, AERB conducts technical
*HRUJHZKRLVDQH[SHUWLQWKH¿HOGDQGKDV talks/colloquia on regular intervals. The topics are
executed the programme successfully. A total meticulously chosen in line with the mandate and
RIRI¿FHUVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKHSURJUDPPH IXQFWLRQLQJ RI $(5% FRYHULQJ ODWHVW VFLHQWL¿F
AERB Participants and Faculty of Management Development Programme (MDP) at YASHADA, Pune
116
DQGWHFKQLFDOGHYHORSPHQWZRUOGZLGHLQWKH¿HOG Y µ6LJQL¿FDQFH RI +XPDQ 2UJDQLVDWLRQDO
of nuclear and radiation industries, legal aspects, and Technological Factors in Safety and
regulatory practices and aspects enhancing personal Practices’ by Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive
and interpersonal effectiveness etc. Director, AERB on July 7, 2017.
11.5.1 Technical Talk (vi) ‘Anomaly affecting the Flamanville EPR
Two technical talks were organised during Reactor Vessel: A Follow up’, by Shri R.
the period on following topics: P. Gupta and Dr. Mayank Verma, NPSD,
x ‘Insights Gained through the Participation in AERB on August 11, 2017.
Working Group on Reactor Physics Analysis (vii) ‘TAPS-3&4 Coolant Channel Inspection
(RPWG) of VVER Regulator forum’ was Results and Review-2017’ by Smt. Sonal
conducted on August 4, 2017.
Gandhi, OPSD, AERB on November 24,
x ‘Understanding Leak Testing Methods / 2017.
Techniques’ was conducted on October 26
(viii) ‘BWR-720 MWe -LOSS OF AC POWER
and 27, 2017 by Shri L. M. Tolani, Ex Chief
Engineer (QA), NPCIL. (CLASSES III and IV)’ by Shri Srisht Pall
Singh, Former AERB was conducted on
11.5.2 AERB COLLOQUIA
October 6, 2017.
Eight colloquia were conducted during the
11.6 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
period on various topics of nuclear, radiation and
industrial safety. 11.6.1 Knowledge Portal
(i) ‘The Lessons Learnt and Not Learnt from A 'Knowledge Portal' is functional on the
the Three Nuclear Power Accidents: TMI- internal website of AERB, as part of knowledge
2; Chernobyl and Fukushima’ by Prof. preservation and easy retrieval. Training/
Bal Raj Sehgal, Emeritus Professor, Royal refresher course/teaching material, proceedings
Institute of Technology, Sweden, which was of Conferences and Seminars, etc. were included
one of the unique learning experiences on
in the portal at regular intervals. AERB Codes/
the three nuclear events and opportunity to
Guides/Manuals are also included on the portal.
gain knowledge on severe accidents, their
mitigation and management. 11.6.2 AERB Library
(ii) ‘ASN Safety Review of Areva’s Creusot A well-equipped library is maintained in
Forge site- A Vendor Experience’ was AERB. A total of 58 new publications have been
conducted on February 15, 2017. added during the period and with this, the total
(iii) ‘Human Factors in Safe Operation of a collection of publications has gone up to 10,568.
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), Three -Mile In addition, 20 Journals were subscribed during
Island, Chernobyl & PAKS’ on May 26, the period. Reference and information services
E\ $(5% RI¿FHUV 6KUL $ . 3DQGD have been provided to the users and visitors of the
Shri Sekhar Bhattacharya & Shri J. Koley. Library. List of New Additions, World Nuclear
(iv) ‘Regulatory Oversight through Effective News, NucNet News, NEA News Bulletin etc.,
Inspection’ by Dr. R. Bhattacharya, Former are circulated in digital form regularly by sending
Vice-Chairman, AERB and Senior Advisor, e-mails to AERB staff. Table of Contents of new
World Association of Nuclear Operators issues of important journals of AERB's subject
(WANO), on June 2, 2017. interest are also circulated regularly by email alerts.
117
11.7 PROMOTION OF EXCELLENCE IN 11.8 AERB AWARDS FOR MERITORIOUS
HUMAN RESOURCES PERFORMANCE
+LJKHU4XDOL¿FDWLRQ AERB started its award scheme from
the year 2012 to promote excellence among its
'XULQJ WKH IROORZLQJ 6FLHQWL¿F staff and recognise outstanding achievements of
2I¿FHUV KDYH DFTXLUHG KLJKHU TXDOL¿FDWLRQV DV those engaged in regulatory and associated R&D
detailed below: activities. AERB award scheme comprises of
x Shri A.D. Roshan, SO(G), NPSD acquired individual awards as well as group achievement
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in ‘Tsunami awards. The categories of awards are: Young
Hazard Assessment of Indian Coast’ in 6FLHQWL¿F2I¿FHU$ZDUG2XWVWDQGLQJ3HUIRUPDQFH
February 2017 from Indian Institute of Special Contribution Award, Leadership Award-1
Technology Bombay, Mumbai. (lower than SO/G), Leadership Award-2 (SO/G
and above), Meritorious Service Award and Group
x Shri Ajai S. Pisharady, SO(G), NPSD Achievement Award. In all these categories, awards
acquired Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in for the year 2016-17 were distributed during the
‘Seismic Fragility Analysis of a Nuclear AERB Annual Day function on November 15,
Containment Structure using Modal 2017.
Pushover Analysis’ in August 2017 from Shri S.K. Mehta, Former Director, Reactor
Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Group, BARC & Chairman, ACPSR, AERB was
Mumbai. the Chief Guest of the function. Shri S.P. Sukhatme
x Smt. Shylamoni P., SO(F), R&DD acquired and Shri S. S. Bajaj former Chairmen, AERB also
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in ‘Derivation graced the occasion. During this occasion former
of Ground Motion Parameters Maximising Chairmen shared their experiences on Nuclear
Damage Potential using Simulation Regulation in India and provided valuable insights
Technique’ in August 2017 from Indian on future challenges ahead and the way forward.
Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai. To know expectations of young generation
about AERB, a talk on ‘‘My Vision of AERB”
11.7.2 Promotion
was delivered by Shri Subrata Bera, NSAD and
During the year, 19 employees were Shri Soumyajyoti Kar, RSD (recipients of Young
promoted under the Merit Promotion Scheme. 6FLHQWL¿F2I¿FHU$ZDUG
Shri S. A. Bhardwaj, Chairman, AERB and Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Director,

AERB addressing the AERB Staff during AERB Day Celebration
118
6KUL6.0HKWD)RUPHU'LUHFWRU5HDFWRU*URXS%$5&
Chairman, ACPSR, AERB addressing the AERB Staff during
AERB Day Celebration
Shri S. P. Sukhatme and Shri S.S. Bajaj, Former Chairmen, AERB addressing the
AERB Staff during AERB Day Celebration
Shri Subrata Bera, NSAD and Shri Soumyajyoti Kar, RSD delivering Talks on
µµ0\9LVLRQRI$(5%´RQ$(5%'D\&HOHEUDWLRQ
&DW<RXQJ6FLHQWL¿F Cat. 2: Outstanding Performance/ Special

2I¿FHU$ZDUG Contribution Award
1. Shri Anuj Kumar Deo, SO/E, NSAD 1. Shri Dinesh M. Rane, SO/E, RSD
2. Shri C. Nachiketa, SO/E, NPSD 2. Shri Vivek Gupta, SO/E, NPSD
Cat. 3: Leadership Award Cat. 4:
Leadership Award-2 Meritorious Service Award
Shri. V. Balasubramaniyan, Outstanding Scientist 1. Shri Puran Singh, Technician (G)
and Director, 2. Smt. Parvathi Harinarayanan, Upper
NSARG and SRI, AERB Division Clerk
119
Shri Anuj Kumar Deo, NSAD received the Shri C. Nachiketa, NPSD received the
µ<RXQJ6FLHQWL¿F2I¿FHU$ZDUG¶ µ<RXQJ6FLHQWL¿F2I¿FHU$ZDUG¶
Shri Dinesh M. Rane, RSD received the ‘Outstanding Shri Vivek Gupta, NPSD, received the ‘Outstanding
3HUIRUPDQFH6SHFLDO&RQWULEXWLRQ$ZDUG¶ 3HUIRUPDQFH6SHFLDO&RQWULEXWLRQ$ZDUG¶
Shri V. Balasubramaniyan, Outstanding Scientist and

Director, NSARG and SRI , AERB received the
³/HDGHUVKLS$ZDUG´
Smt. Parvathi Harinarayanan

Shri Puran Singh Upper Division Clerk Accounts Division,
Technician (G), AERB received ‘Meritorious Service Award’ AERB received ‘Meritorious Service Award’
120
Cat. 5: Group Achievement Award:
Group 1: Developments in Nuclear Reactor Dynamics and Reactor Physics
Name Designation Division
Smt. Reeta Rani Malhotra SO(G) C&RPD
Dr. Obaidurrahman K. SO(F) NSAD
Shri Santosh Kumar Pradhan SO(F) NSAD
Shri Gour Mohan Behera SO(F) C&RPD
Shri Prashant Sharma SO(E) NSAD
Shri Susheel Kumar SO(E) C&RPD
Dr. L. Thilagam TO(E) SRI
Smt. Bharati Ingavale SO(D) NPSD
Shri Soumen Koner SO(D) C&RPD
Shri Amandeep Singh SO(D) C&RPD
Shri Vivek Kale SO(D) NSAD
Shri Rakesh Kumar SO(D) NSAD
Group 2: Investigation of Incidents involving Excessive Exposure in Radiation Facilities

Shri Manas Kumar Pathak SO(G) ERRC
Shri Rajesh Kumar Yadav SO(F) RSD
Shri Rajoo Kumar SO(E) R&DD
Shri Senthil Kumar M SO(E) SRRC
Shri Pradip Kumar SO(E) RSD
Shri H.G. Desale SO(D) RSD
Shri Rajendra Shete SO(D) RSD
Smt. Swathy K Nair SO(D) RSD
Shri Chand Pasha SA/C RSD
Developments in Nuclear Reactor Dynamics and Investigation of Incidents involving Excessive

Reactor Physics Exposure in Radiation Facilities
121
Group 3: Documentation for Regulatory Review of PFBR
Shri Animesh Biswas SO(G) NPSD
Shri Rajnish Kumar SO(F) NPSD
Kum. Swati V. Burewar SO(F) NPSD
Shri Anjit Kumar SO(F) NPSD
Shri Surendra Jain SO(E) NPSD
Shri Suresh Kumar G SO(E) NPSD
Smt. Bharati Ingavale SO(D) NPSD
Shri Rahul Shukla SO(D) NPSD
Shri Suvadip Roy SO(D) NPSD
Kum. Ananya Mohanty SO(D) NPSD
Shri Vasudev SA/C NPSD
Group 4: Secure Socket Layer – Virtual Private Network (SSL-VPC) Solution: Cyber Security,
Software Project, IT Infrastructure Management, Review of Nuclear Security, Computer Hardware
etc.
Shri M. M. Kulkarni SO(H) R&DD
Shri E. R. Titto SO(F) R&DD
Shri Pradeep Chandra Gupta TO(D) R&DD
Shri Surya Teja. A SA(C) R&DD
Group 5: Implementation of Integrated Management System and tools like Safety Performance
Indicators and Safety Culture Indicators of Operating NPPs
Smt. Sonal Gandhi SO(F) OPSD
Shri N. Khandelwal SO(E) OPSD
Shri Swapnil Meshram SA/C OPSD
Documentation for Regulatory Review of PFBR
122
Secure Socket Layer – Virtual Private Network (SSL-VPC)
Solution: Cyber Security, Software Project, Implementation of Integrated Management System
IT Infrastructure Management, Review of and tools like Safety Performance Indicators and
Nuclear Security, Computer Hardware Safety Culture Indicators of operating NPPs
Group 6: Public Communication and Outreach

Shri L.R. Bishnoi SO/H SSED
Dr. Pankaj Tandon SO/G RSD
Shri Hemant K. Kulkarni SO/G C&RPD
Smt. Reeta Rani Malhotra SO/G C&RPD
Dr. R.M. Nehru SO/G SRRC
Dr. C. Senthil Kumar SO/G SRI
Shri A.D. Roshan SO/G SSED
Shri Neeraj Kumar SO/F OPSD
Dr. Obaidurrahman K SO/F NSAD
Smt. Manisha Inamdar SO/F RSD
Kum. Swati Burewar SO/F NSAD
Shri Soumen Sinha SO/F C&RPD
Shri P. Bansal SO/F RDD
Shri Amit Sen SO/F RSD
Shri A. Shrivastava SO/F OPSD
Shri Susheel Kumar SO/E NSAD
Smt. V. Anuradha SO/E RSD
Shri R.K. Chaturvedi SO/E RSD
Shri Pradip Kumar SO/E RSD
Smt. Minakshi Mishra SA/C RDD
Kum. Shobhashri SA/C RDD
Shri Ajeesh SA/C RSD
Shri Ashok Gerira APO(G) Admn.
Smt. Nalini B APO(E) Admn.
Smt. Suma Panicker Asstt. Admn.
Smt. Deepika A. Kushwaha Steno-II C&RPD
123
Public Communication and Outreach
11.9 WELFARE ACTIVITIES FOR AERB PHPEHUV$ZHOOHTXLSSHGSK\VLFDO¿WQHVVFHQWUH

EMPLOYEES (gym) is being maintained by the AERB Staff Club
11.9.1 International Women’s Day HI¿FLHQWO\IRUKHDOWKEHQH¿WRILWVRI¿FLDOV'XULQJ
the year, tournaments were conducted for Cricket,
International Women's day is celebrated Swimming, Brisk walk, Table Tennis, Badminton,
every year at AERB with a large participation Chess and Caroms successfully.
from its women employees, wherein debate and
speeches are organised on the topics of common The AERB Annual Day was celebrated on
interest. A cultural programme was organised on 'HFHPEHULQ$(5%/DZQV$URXQG¿YH
March 08, 2017 by women employees in AERB hundred and forty persons (540) consisting of
Auditorium. Two talks were organised one on AERB staff and their family members graced the
‘Women Health Matters’ and another on ‘Yoga for occasion. The family members of AERB staff also
+HDOWK\/LYLQJ¶IRUEHQH¿WVRIWKHZRPHQZKLFK participated in this annual cultural programme.
were well received by participants. Indoor games During the programme a video clip on AERB
were also organised as part of the celebration activities was presented for awareness of family
and all the ladies actively participated in the members. An exhibition was arranged where AERB
competitions. staff and family members exhibited their art work.
The participants of the cultural programme were
11.9.2 AERB Staff Club Activities presented with mementos in appreciation of their
AERB staff club conducts sports and cultural talent. The prizes were distributed to the winners of
activities for the welfare of the staff and family tournament held in 2016 and 2017.
International Women’s Day Celebration at AERB
124
11.9.3 World Environment Day Celebration
World Environment Day is celebrated on the 5th of June every year for
encouraging awareness and action for the protection of our environment. The theme
for the year 2017 was ‘Connecting People to Nature – in the City and on the Land, from
the Poles to the Equator’. As a part of it, a talk by Shri Vijaya Raghavan, a Naturalist
RQ³:RUOG(QYLURQPHQW´ZDVRUJDQL]HGRQ-XQHDW$(5%&KDLUPDQ$(5%
DQGVWDIIPHPEHUVSODQWHGVRPHÀRZHULQJVKUXEVLQWKHSUHPLVHVRI$(5%
&KDLUPDQ$(5%'LUHFWRU5 ''DQG$GPLQLVWUDWLYH2I¿FHUSODQWLQJÀRZHULQJVKUXEVLQWKHSUHPLVHV
11.9.4 International Yoga Day 11.9.5 Vigilance Awareness Week

International Yoga day was AERB celebrated the ‘Vigilance Awareness
celebrated on June 21, 2017 at Week- 2017’ during October 30 to November
AERB with a large participation 04, 2017. This year the theme of Vigilance
from AERB employees. A talk on Awareness week was ‘My Vision-Corruption Free
³&RPSUHKHQVLYH KHDOWK EHQH¿WV RI <RJD´ ZDV India’. A Pledge was taken by AERB Staff. A
delivered by Shri R. V. Raghavan, Yoga Guru poster competition was also organised during the
followed by relaxation and meditation session for week. Vigilance Quiz was conducted and many
EHQH¿WRI$(5%VWDII employees actively participated in it. A lecture on
‘Preventive Vigilance and a glimpse on Conduct
Rules’ was delivered by Shri Anjani Kumar, Dy.
Legal Advisor, DAE.
Celebration of International Yoga Day at AERB
125
Shri Anjani Kumar, Dy. Legal Advisor, DAE delivering lecture on ‘Preventive Vigilance and a Glimpse on Conduct Rules
A poster competition organised during Vigilance Awareness Week
11.9.6 Swachhata Pakhwada VXFKDVFOHDQLQJRIZRUNSODFHDQGRI¿FHSUHPLVHV

$V SDUW RI ³6ZDFKFKK %KDUDW 0LVVLRQ´ and canteen; weeding out of old/obsolete records
launched by the Government of India, AERB were carried out. The speeches and slogans
celebrated ‘Swachhata Pakhwada’ during April 1- writing competitions on ‘Swachhata Mission’
15, 2017. All the staff of AERB took a Swatchchhata were organised during the period. The awards were
Shapath (Cleanliness pledge). Various activities GLVWULEXWHG WR RI¿FLDOV PDLQWDLQLQJ FOHDQOLQHVV DW
their workplace.
:LQQHUVRI9LJLODQFH4XL]UHFHLYLQJSUL]HIURP6KUL/5%LVKQRL9LJLODQFH2I¿FHU$(5%
126
11.10 RETIREMENTS ON SUPERANNUATION
)ROORZLQJRI¿FLDOVUHWLUHGRQVXSHUDQQXDWLRQUHVLJQHGGXULQJWKHSHULRG
S. Date of
Name Designation Remarks
No. Retirement
1 Smt. Ratna Pradeep SO(G) 24-03-2017 Voluntary Retirement
2 Shri. S.N. Rao SO (H) 31-03-2017 Superannuation
3 Shri Leo Babu Joseph Work Assistant (B) 31-05- 2017 Superannuation
4 Smt. Nalini Balachandran Assistant Personnel 04-07-2017 Voluntary Retirement

2I¿FHU$GPLQ
5 Shri S.R. Bhave SO(F) 31-07-2017 Superannuation
6 Smt. Reeta Rani Malhotra 6FLHQWL¿F2I¿FHU* 31-07-2017 Resignation
7 Shri P. R. Krishnamurthy OS & Director 31-10-2017 Superannuation

NFRG and OPSD
8 Shri V.V. Pande SO (H) & Head, IPSD 31-10-2017 Superannuation
9 Shri Y.K. Shah SO(G) 31-10-2017 Superannuation
127
Photo Gallery AERB Annual Day 2017 Celebration
Shri S. Bansal, President, AERB Staff Club delivering Welcome Address and Smt. Sadhvi Srinivasan, General Secretary,
AERB Staff Club presenting the Staff Club Annual Progress Report
$(5%6WDşDQG&KLOGUHQSHUIRUPLQJLQFXOWXUDO3URJUDPPH
RQWKHHYHRI$(5%$QQXDO'D\
128
$(5%6WDş&OXE7RXUQDPHQWV3UL]H'LVWULEXWLRQ
AERB Premier League Winner – 2017 Winner of Chess Tournement - 2017
129
Chapter 12
PROMOTION OF OFFICIAL
LANGUAGE
AERB is committed to implementation of organised to discuss on various issues related

2I¿FLDO /DQJXDJH SROLF\ RI WKH *RYHUQPHQW RI WRHIIHFWLYHXVHDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIRI¿FLDO
India. It has an established programme for the language in AERB.
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI RI¿FLDO ODQJXDJH +LQGL LQ
This year, Chairman AERB, Shri S. A.
YDULRXV RI¿FLDO ZRUNV ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH UHJXODU
Bharadwaj, assumed the charge of Chairman,
RI¿FLDOZRUNVDQGYDULRXVWUDQVODWLRQVLQWR+LQGL
2I¿FLDO /DQJXDJH ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ
AERB proactively initiates a series of various
Committee (OLIC) of AERB.
activities for the propagation and implementation
RI WKH RI¿FLDO ODQJXDJH ZKLFK LQFOXGH YDULRXV (ii) DAE incentive scheme for working in Hindi
publications, training programmes, workshops, has been introduced and employees are
talks, annual competitions and divisional actively participating in the scheme. Twelve
inspections. awards were given under this scheme.
AERB also contributes in the joint activities 12.2 PUBLICATIONS IN HINDI
RI -RLQW RI¿FLDO ODQJXDJH FRRUGLQDWLRQ FRPPLWWHH (i) 10 AERB safety documents have been
of BRIT, Heavy Water Board, DCSEM, DPS and translated in Hindi and these are under
AERB. process for publication in Hindi.
Our objective is to create favourable (ii) AERB Bulletin has been translated in Hindi
environment for the use of Hindi and to motivate and same is under process for publication.
and encourage staff members to do their work in
Hindi. For promotion of Hindi some of the activities (iii) 7 press releases were issued in Hindi and
conducted are given below: published in daily newspapers.
12.1 PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR (iv) Licences, authorisations and inspection
HINDI IMPLEMENTATION reports were issued in Hindi.
L 5HJXODU PHHWLQJV RI 2I¿FLDO /DQJXDJH (v) Total 27,480 letters were sent in bilingual and
Implementation Committee (OLIC) were 68 were sent exclusively in Hindi.
12.3 HINDI TALKS / WORKSHOPS /
SEMINARS
(i) Four Hindi workshops were conducted (2
in Administrative Training Institute and 2
LQ $(5% RQ EHKDOI RI WKH -RLQW 2I¿FLDO
Language Coordination Committee. 19
RI¿FLDOV RI $(5% SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKHVH
workshops.
(ii) World Hindi Day was celebrated on January
RQ EHKDOI RI WKH -RLQW 2I¿FLDO
Chairman AERB, Shri S.A. Bharadwaj, presiding over Language Co-ordination committee of AERB
WKHPHHWLQJRI2I¿FLDO/DQJXDJH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ and four DAE units namely, DPS, HWB,
Committee (OLIC)
DCSEM and BRIT.
131
Dr. Mohisin Khan, delivering talk during
Dignitaries on Dias during World Hindi Day Celebration World Hindi Day Celebration
On the occasion of World Hindi Day, Dr. Nuclear and Radiation Plants”. Shri A. N.
Mohisin Khan, HOD, Hindi Department, Verma, Chief Executive, Heavy Water Board
Alibaug University was invited as the guest was invited as the chief guest in the seminar.
VSHDNHU +H JDYH D SUHVHQWDWLRQ RQ ³+LQGL 120 participants from various units of DAE
as a World Language”. On this occasion, WRRNSDUWLQWKLVVHPLQDU6FLHQWL¿FSDSHUV
Renowned Hindi poet and lyricist Shri in Hindi were presented in the seminar. An
Chandan Rai also presented his Hindi poems. e-magazine consisting of all the 7 papers was
The programme was very effective and was also released on this occasion.
well appreciated by the audience. (iv) Hindi Day was celebrated on September 14,
LLL $(5% RUJDQLVHG RQH GD\ VFLHQWL¿F VHPLQDU RQEHKDOIRIWKH-RLQW2I¿FLDO/DQJXDJH
in Hindi on July 28, 2017. The theme of Co-ordination Committee. AERB hosted this
WKH VHPLQDU ZDV ³6DIHW\ 5HJXODWLRQ RI programme. Renowned poets Shri Subhash
Shri S. A. Bharadwaj, Chairman AERB, Shri A.N. Verma,

CE, Heavy Water Board and Shri D. K. Shukla, Executive Shri S. K. Malhotra, Raja Ramanna Fellow and
Director, AERB, releasing the CD of e-magazine Secretary AEES, delivering lecture in Hindi Seminar
$(5%2I¿FHUV6KUL53*XSWDDQG6KUL5DMRR.XPDUGHOLYHULQJOHFWXUHLQ+LQGL6HPLQDU
132
Dr. Milind Lankeshwar, delivering talk on
Dignitaries on Dias during Hindi Day Celebration ‘Obesity Related Health Challenges’
Kabra and Shri Prakash Kumar were invited 12.4 HINDI COMPETITIONS
in this programme. On this occasion Shri
Subhash Kabra delivered a lecture on ‘Our A prize distribution ceremony was organised
languages-our pride’, he also recited his on February 17, 2017 for the winners of the Hindi
famous poems. Shri Prakash Kumar also competitions held in November 2016. Total 32
presented his poems. RI¿FHUV DQG VWDII PHPEHUV ZHUH DZDUGHG
number of prizes in three language groups. The
The programme was well appreciated by the highlight of the day was the musical program by
audience. ‘Symbol Blues Musical Group’, who belted out
(v) A health talk on ‘Obesity Related Health +LQGL DQG 0DUDWKL PHORGLHV IURP HDUO\ ¿IWLHV WR
Challenges’ in Hindi was delivered by the present era.
Dr. Milind Lankeshwar, Medical Division, The staff members of AERB also presented a
BARC on December 12, 2017. one act play on this occasion.
Artists of Musical Band performing in Hindi Prize AERB Staff Member Presenting the One Act Play
Distribution Ceremony ‘Vridha Ashram’
133
:LQQHUVIURP$(5%LQ-RLQW+LQGL&RPSHWLWLRQVUHFHLYLQJ3UL]HV
Marking the Hindi Day Celebrations, a The Competitions included Self-written poetry
series of Hindi Competitions were also held competition, debate competition, extempore speech
during September 6-12, 2017, on behalf of the FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG 4XL] FRPSHWLWLRQ RI¿FLDOV RI
-RLQW2I¿FLDO/DQJXDJH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&RPPLWWHH AERB won prizes in these competitions and they
at V.S. Bhavan, Anushakti Nagar, Mumbai. were awarded on the occasion of Hindi Day.
134
Chapter 13
FINANCE
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board receives VDODU\RI¿FHH[SHQVHVWUDYHODQGSXEOLFRXWUHDFK

¿QDQFHIURP'HSDUWPHQWRI$WRPLF(QHUJ\'$( programmes etc.
for meeting its expenditure of recurring nature 13.2 FUNDS UTILISATION ON RESEARCH
whether capital or revenue. AERB has full powers AND DEVELOPMENT
to operate its budget, which it prepares and submits
to the Central Government for approval. The Funds were utilised for procurement of
Central Government allocates the budget in the software for analysis work at headquarters and at
separate head of accounts of AERB. SRI Kalpakkam, radiation protection instrument,
experimental facilities for R&D activities etc.
13.1 ANNUAL BUDGET UTILISATION
Funds were also utilised for redevelopment
Actual expenditure during the period was
of AERB website, centralised back-up solution,
Rs. 73.78 crore, Rs. 7.65 crore under Plan Capital,
establishing disaster recovery centre for AERB
Rs.1.24 crore under Revenue i.e. Grant-in-Aid and
(e-LORA/ OAS), introduction of link-load balancer
Rs. 64.89 crore under Non-Plan. This includes
to ensure the equal distribution of internet bandwidth
VDODU\ RI¿FH H[SHQVHV WUDYHO SXEOLF RXWUHDFK
for various services like internet, email, domain
SURJUDPPHV JUDQWLQDLG WRZDUGV ¿QDQFLDO
name service and procurement of encrypted pen-
assistance for projects of AERB interest to
drives. Implementation of continuous improvement
academic institutes and for seminars/ conferences
plan for e-LORA covering important activities
etc. Expenditure for Capital plan was mainly
such as: increase in the number of active virtual
for R&D activities, implementation of eLORA
machines and enhancement of the bandwidth of the
DQG 2I¿FH $XWRPDWLRQ 6\VWHP &RQVWUXFWLRQ RI
e-LORA leased line.
Regional Regulatory Centres and Niyamak Bhavan
– C at AERB headquarters. 13.3 FUNDS UTILISATION ON PUBLIC
OUTREACH PROGRAMMES
Tendering activities for the enhancements
required in the infrastructure facilities in AERB AERB conducted awareness programmes
including AERB Board Room, conference rooms, during 2017 on Radiotherapy, Diagnostic X-ray,
communication facilities, sanitation facilities etc. Consumer Products and Scanning Facility,
were under progress. Internal painting of Niyamak Facilities providing Personnel Monitoring Services
Bhavan-A was completed. Construction activities and Security of Radioactive Material (RAM).
are started for Southern Regional Regulatory Centre During the period, AERB displayed exhibits at
(SRRC) at Chennai and construction activities Annual Conference of Indian Society for Vascular
progressed well for Eastern Regional Regulatory and Interventional Radiology and conference on
Centre (ERRC) at Kolkata. Interventional Oncology at Mumbai.
Non-Plan expenditure consists of mainly Press releases were issued in English as well
day-to-day running expenditure of AERB viz. as in Hindi. AERB published advertisements in
135
leading newspapers in order to sensitise the users 13.4 GRANTS TO RESEARCH PROJECTS
on requirements of obtaining regulatory consent AERB provides grants to academic
from AERB for use of medical X-ray equipment institutions for research projects to carry out safety
as well as for users of radioactive sources or research in the areas of interest. The outcome of
radiation generating equipment. Advertorials were the research is used in AERB for framing the new
published in Air India and Indian Railways in- regulations, safety review and analysis.
board magazines.
136
PUBLICATIONS
NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL JOURNALS: *DLNZDG ³,QYHVVHO 5HWHQWLRQ$QDO\VLV IRU

x Jha Somnath, Roshan A.D., Bishnoi L.R., a typical PHWR”, Life Cycle Reliability and
³)ORRU5HVSRQVH6SHFWUDIRU%H\RQG'HVLJQ Safety Engineering (2017).
Basis Seismic Demand” (2017). Nuclear x 6XYDGLS 5R\ ³+DUGZDUH7URMDQV $ &DXVH
Engineering and Design.(2017.01.006) of Concern in Safety Critical Electronic
x Jha Somnath, Roshan A.D., A.S. Pisharady, Systems", pp-110-119, Vol-4, Issue-5,
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6LPSOL¿HG 3UDFWLFDO $SSURDFK´ x M. Boopathi, R. Sujatha, C. Senthil Kumar,
Nuclear Engineering and Design, 6 1DUDVLPPDQ $ 5DMDQ ³0DUNRY
(2017.02.026) Approach for Quantifying the Software
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Ajai S. Pisharady, Roshan A. D. and L. R. Software Testing”, International Journal of
Bishnoi (2017) "Assessment of Ultimate Bio-Inspired Computation, May 2017.
Load Capacity of Concrete Containment x Susheel Kumar, S. Hari Kumar, C. S.
Structures Against Structural Collapse", 9DUJKHVH'.6KXNOD³5HJXODWRU\$VSHFWV
Nuclear Engineering and Design, 323 (2017), of Nuclear Power Program in India”, pp-146-
pp 417-426. 159, Volume 101 Part A, November 2017,
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Recombiner Concept for Severe Accident
2017.
Management in Nuclear Power Plants”,
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Postulated Rod Drop Incident in a PHWR”,
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imprecise failure data”, Life Cycle Reliability Enclosure of AIHMS Facility Under Wall
and Safety Engineering (2017). Temperature Induced Natural Convection”,
x Anuj Kumar Deo, P. K. Baburajan, R. Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume
Srinivasa Rao, U. K. Paul, Avinash J. 323, pp 367-375 (2017).
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³1XPHULFDO0RGHOOLQJRI,VRWKHUPDO5HOHDVH Proceedings of the 24th National and 2nd
and Distribution of Helium and Hydrogen International ISHMT-ASTFE Heat and
Gases inside the AIHMS Cylindrical Mass Transfer Conference (IHMTC-2017),
Enclosure”, International Journal of December 27-30, 2017, Hyderabad.
Hydrogen Energy, Volume 42, pp 15435- x T. Sai Praneeth, Nilesh Agrawal, Seik Mansoor
15447 (2017). $OL9%DODVXEUDPDQL\DQ³1XPHULFDO6WXG\
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01 (2017), 01-13. Hyderabad.
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES/ x Tejaswi Abburi, Seik Mansoor Ali, V.
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Autumn Meeting Gyeongju, Korea, October x Arun Aravind, C. V. Srinivas and H. Seshadri,
26-27, 2017. ³$ 0XOWLSOHVRXUFH *DXVVLDQ 3OXPH 0RGHO
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of Condensation Induced Water Hammer February 6-10, 2017.
Transients”, Proceedings of the 24th National x Ramakrishna P, Balakrishnan. S and K.
and 2nd International ISHMT-ASTFE Heat and Ananthasivan ³Chemical Characterisation
Mass Transfer Conference (IHMTC-2017), of Fe-Zr alloys by different Analytical
December 27-30, 2017, Hyderabad. Technique”, NUCAR, February 6-10, 2017,
x K.N.V. Adinarayana, Seik Mansoor Ali, V. KIIT University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha.
%DODVXEUDPDQL\DQ ³1XPHULFDO 0RGHOLQJ x C. Jayalakshmi³Generation of Geo-Spatial
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using PORFLOW”, Proceedings of the 24th of National Technology Day Meet-2017,
National and 2nd International ISHMT- IGCAR, Kalpakkam, May 12, 2017.
ASTFE Heat and Mass Transfer Conference
x M. R. Priya and L. Thilagam³An Optimised
(IHMTC-2017), December 27-30, 2017,
Shield Design for Am-Be Neutron Source”,
Hyderabad.
the proceedings of National Technology Day
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%DODVXEUDPDQL\DQ ³0RGHOLQJ RI &RRODQW 2017.
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Robert and V. Balasubramaniyan³Modelling Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), Jaipur,
Approach for Organisational and Cognitive November 3-7, 2017.
Factors ,QÀXHQFLQJ Human Reliability in x Dr. G. Sahani, Dr. Pankaj Tandon and
Industrial Applications”, in 34th DAE safety Dr. A.U. Sonawane, "Radiation Safety
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*XSWD ³5HJXODWRU\ 2YHUVLJKW RI +XPDQ November 3-7, 2017.
and Organisational Factors (HOF) during x Dr. Rajib Lochan Sha, Alok Pandey, Pankaj
different stages of Indian NPPs”, in 34th DAE Tandon, A. U Sonawane, " Probabilistic Safety
Safety Occupational Health Professionals Assessment of GammaMed plus iX HDR
Meet, KKNPP, Kudankulam, June 28-30, Brachytherapy Equipment", the proceeding
2017. of Conference of Association of Medical
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Statistics & Fire Statistics 2016’ in 34th DAE November, 3-7, 2017.
Safety and Occupational Health Professionals x Pramod Dixit, Subhalaxmi Mishra, Palani T
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KKNPP, Kudankulam, June 28 - 30, 2017. x B. Mishra, Dr. G. Sahani, Dr. Pankaj Tandon,
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behaviour of Uranium in Liquid Cadmium Conference of Association of Medical
in LiCl-KCl Eutectic”, in ICONEST 2017 Physicist of India (AMPICON-2017), ,
conference, August 10-12 2017, Indian Jaipur, November 3-7, 2017.
Institute of Sciences (IISc), Bengaluru. x B. Mishra, Mahesh M., Dr. G. Sahani, Dr.
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(ARTTICON-2017), Nashik, October 14-15, November 3-7, 2017.
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November 4-5, 2017. $YLQDVK - *DLNZDG ³7UDQVLHQW 5HVSRQVH
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ABBREVIATIONS
ACNRS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Technology

and Radiation Safety
BSD Biennial Shutdown
ACOH Advisory Committee on
BSM Beach Sand Minerals
Occupational Health
BSM-NORM SC Beach Sand Minerals &
ACPSR Advisory Committee for Project
Naturally Occurring Radioactive
Safety Review
Materials Safety Committee
AERB Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
CAG Comptroller and Auditor General
AFR Away From Reactor CANDU Canada Deuterium Uranium
AGFS AERB Graduate Fellowship CCL Critical Crack Length
Scheme
CCW Condensate Cooling Water
AGMS Annulus Gas Monitoring System
CEP Condensate Extraction Pump
AIHMS AERB IITM Hydrogen Mixing
Studies CESC Civil Engineering Safety
Committee
AIIMS All India Institute of Medical
Sciences CESCOP Civil Engineering Safety
Committee for Operating Plants
ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable
CFVS Containment Filtered Venting
AMD Atomic Minerals Directorate for System
Exploration and Research
CMG Crises Management Group
AMG Accident Management Guideline
CNRA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory
AOT AERB Observers Team Activities
ASCE Assistant Shift Charge Engineer CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety
ATI Administrative Training Institute CORAL Compact Reprocessing of

Advanced Fuels in Lead Cell
BARC Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
CSNI Committee on Safety of Nuclear
BARVIS BARC Vessel Inspection System Installations
BIS Bureau of Indian Standards CSP Core Sub-assembly Plant
BITS Birla Institute of Technology and CSRP Committee for Safety Research
Science Programmes
BRIT Board of Radiation & Isotope CSS Commission on Safety Standards
143
CT Calandria Tubes/ DSS Decision Support System
Computed Tomography
EAL Emergency Action Level
CV Calandria Vault
EC Executive Committee
DBFL Design Basis Flood Level
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
DBR Design Basis Report ECIL Electronics Corporation of India
DCN Design Change Notice Limited
DCSEM Directorate of Construction, EFPD Effective Full Power Days

Services & Estate Management eLORA electronic Licensing of Radiation
DCV Double Check Valve Applications
EMCCR En-Masse Coolant Channel
DEC Design Extension Condition
Replacement
DFMF Demonstration Facility for Metallic
EPP Emergency Preparedness Plan
Fuel Fabrication
EPR Emergency Preparedness &
DFRP Demonstration Fast Reactor Fuel Response
Reprocessing Plant
EQ Equipment/ Environment
DGCA Directorate General of Civil 4XDOL¿FDWLRQ
Aviation
ERRC Eastern Regional Regulatory
DGFT Director General of Foreign Trade Centre
'33 'RFXPHQW3UHSDUDWLRQ3UR¿OH ESL Environmental Survey Laboratories
DPS Directorate of Purchase and Stores FBTR Fast Breeder Test Reactor
DRA&C Directorate of Regulatory Affairs FE-FCF Front-End Fuel Cycle Facilities
and Communications
FFP Fuel Fabrication Plant
DRI Directorate of Regulatory
),1$6 )XHO,QFLGHQW1RWL¿FDWLRQDQG
Inspection
Analysis System
DRP&E Directorate of Radiation Protection FP Full Power
and Environment
FPC First Pour of Concrete
DRS Directorate of Radiation Safety
FPNG Fission Products Nobel Gases
DSRC Design Safety Review Committee
FRFCF Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility
DSRC-DP Design Safety Review Committee
IRU'LYHUVL¿HG3URMHFWV FSA Fuel Sub-Assembly
GHAVP Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut
DSRC-NFC Design Safety Review Committee
Pariyojana
for Nuclear Fuel Complex
GIC Gamma Irradiation Chamber
DSRC-UEP Design Safety Review Committee
for Uranium Extraction Projects GIS Geographical Information System
144
HCDA Hypothetical Core Disruptive JHA Job Hazard Analysis
Accident
KAPP Kakrapar Atomic Power Project
HEP Human Error Probability
KGS Kaiga Nuclear Power Station
HSEG Health Safety and Environment
Group KKNPP Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project
HWP Heavy Water Plant LHGR Linear Heat Generating Rate
HYMIF HYdrogen MItigation Facility LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
IAEA International Atomic Energy LOECCS Loss of Emergency Core Cooling

Agency System
ICMS In-Core Monitoring Systems LOMC Loss of Moderator Cooling
ICRP International Commission on LSC Leak Start Crack

Radiological Protection LWR Liquid Radioactive Waste
IGALL International Generic Ageing MAPS Madras Atomic Power Station
Lessons Learned
MCF Medical Cyclotron Facility
IGCAR Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research MDEP Multi-national Design Evaluation
Program
II Injury Index
MDP Management Development
IIT Indian Institute of Technology
Programme
IL Investigation Levels
MoEF Ministry of Environment and
IMS Integrated Management System Forests
INES International Nuclear and MoPP Monazite Processing Plant

Radiological Event Scale
MSL Mean Sea Level
IPSD Industrial Plants Safety Division
NAPS Narora Atomic Power Station
IR Incidence Rates
NCRI National Conference on Regulatory
IRED Industrial Radiography Exposure Interface
Device
NDMA National Disaster Management
IREL Indian Rare Earths Limited Authority
IRGD Ionising Radiation Gauging Device NEA Nuclear Energy Agency
IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review NFC Nuclear Fuel Complex

Service
NFME Neutron Flux Monitoring
IRS Incident Reporting System Equipment
ISO International Organisation for NFRG Nuclear Facilities Regulation

Standardisation Group
145
NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive PT Pressure Tube
Material
QA Quality Assurance
NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of
India Limited QMS Quality Management System
NPP Nuclear Power Plant R&D Research & Development
NPSD Nuclear Projects Safety Division RAPP Rajasthan Atomic Power Project
NREMC Nuclear and Radiological RAPS Rajasthan Atomic Power Station

Emergency Monitoring Cell
RCF Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilisers
NSAD Nuclear Safety Analysis Division
RCP Reactor Coolant Pumps
NSARG Nuclear Safety Analysis and
Research Group REGDOC Regulatory Safety Documents
2$6 2I¿FH$XWRPDWLRQ6\VWHP RI Regulatory Inspection
OECD Organisation for Economic RIA Radiological Impact Assessment

Cooperation and Development
RP&AD Radiological Physics and Advisory
OESC On-site Emergency Support Centre Division
2/,& 2I¿FLDO/DQJXDJH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ RPF Radiation Processing Facility

Committee
RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel
OPSD Operating Plants Safety Division
RRC Regional Regulatory Centres
OSCOM Orissa Sand Complex
RRCAT Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced
OSEE Off-site Emergency Exercise Technology
PCRD Passive Catalytic Recombiner RSA Radiation Safety Agency
Devices
RSD Radiological Safety Division/
PDSC Project Design Safety Committee Refuelling Shutdown
PEE Plant Emergency Exercises 562 5DGLRORJLFDO6DIHW\2I¿FHU
PET Positron Emission Tomography RTI Right to Information Act
PFBR Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor RUP Reprocessed Uranium Plant
PHRS Passive Heat Removal System SA Severe Accident
PHWR Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor
SAMG Severe Accident Analysis &
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment Management Guidelines
PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report SAR Safety Analysis Report
PSHA Probabilistic Seismic Hazard SARCAR Safety Review Committee for

Analysis Applications of Radiation
146
SARCOP Safety Review Committee for SSI Soil-Structure Interaction
Operating Plants
SSMC Secondary Sodium Main Circuit
SBO Station Blackout
STC Steering Technical Committee
SC Safety Code
SWMF Solid Waste Management Facility
SCCI&CS Standing Committee on Control for
Instrumentation & Computer Based TAPS Tarapur Atomic Power Station
Systems TBD Technical Basis Document
SCE Shift Charge Engineer TBP Tri Butyl Phosphate
SCRF Superconducting RF TDFP Turbine Driven Feed Pump
SC-RP Standing Committee Reactor Physics TDP Technology Demonstration Plant
SDDP Safety Document Development TECDOC Technical Document
Proposal
TENORM Technically Enhanced Naturally
SEE Site Emergency Exercise Occurring Radioactive Materials
6(5 6LJQL¿FDQW(YHQW5HSRUW TF Task Force
SFA Spent Fuel Assembly TLD Thermo Luminescence Dosimetry
SFP Spent Fuel Pool TPA Tons per Annum
SG Safety Guide TRANSSC Transport Safety Standards
Committee
SGDHR Safety Grade Decay Heat Removal
TSO Technical Support Organisation
SM Safety Manual
UCIL Uranium Corporation of India
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
Limited
SOT Site Observer Team
USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory
SPECT Single Photon Emission Computed Commission
Tomography
VECC Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
SR Severity Rate
VLR Variable Leak Rate
SRI Safety Research Institute
VSPP Versatile Solvent Production Plant
SRRC Southern Regional Regulatory
VVER Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky
Centre Reactor
SS Safety Standard/ Stainless Steel WG Working Group
SSC Structures, Systems and WMP Waste Management Plant
Components
ZC Zirconium Complex
SSED Siting & Structural Engineering
Division ZFF Zircaloy Fabrication Facility
147
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE (INES)
Level/ Descriptor Nature of the Events Examples
7 x Major release: Widespread health and environmental Chernobyl NPP, USSR
MAJOR ACCIDENT effects requiring implementation of planned and extended (now in Ukraine), 1986
countermeasures. Fukushima NPP,
Japan, 2011
6 x 6LJQL¿FDQW UHOHDVH /LNHO\ WR UHTXLUH IXOO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI Kyshtym Reprocessing
SERIOUS ACCIDENT planned countermeasures. Plant, Russia,1957
5 x Limited release: Likely to require partial implementation of Windscale Pile, UK, 1957
ACCIDENT some planned countermeasures Three Mile Island, NPP,
WITH WIDER x Severe damage to reactor core / several deaths from radiation. USA, 1979
CONSEQUENCES x Release of large quantities of radioactive material within Goiania, Brazil, 1987
DQ LQVWDOODWLRQ ZLWK D KLJK SUREDELOLW\ RI VLJQL¿FDQW SXEOLF
exposure. This could arise from a major criticality accident or
¿UH
4 x Minor release of radioactive material unlikely to result in Tokaimuro, Japan, 1999
ACCIDENT implementation of planned countermeasures other than local Saint-Laurent des Eaux
WITH LOCAL food controls. NPP, France, 1980
CONSEQUENCES x Fuel melt or damage to fuel resulting in more than 0.1% release Fleurus, Belgium, 2006
of core inventory. Mayapuri Incident,
x $W OHDVW RQH GHDWK IURP UDGLDWLRQUHOHDVH RI VLJQL¿FDQW India, 2010
quantities of radioactive material within an installation with a
KLJKSUREDELOLW\RIVLJQL¿FDQWSXEOLFH[SRVXUH
3 x Near accident of an NPP with no safety provisions remaining. Vandellos NPP, Spain,
SERIOUS INCIDENT x Highly radioactive sealed source lost or stolen/misdelivered 1989
without adequate radiation procedures in place to handle it. Ikitelli, Turkey, 1999.
x Exposure rates of more than 1 Sv/h in an operating area 6HOOD¿HOG8.
x Severe contamination in an area not expected by design, with a Yanango,Peru,1999
ORZSUREDELOLW\RIVLJQL¿FDQWSXEOLFH[SRVXUH
x Exposure in excess of ten times the statutory annual limit for
workers/ Non-lethal deterministic health effect (e.g. burns)
from radiation.
2 x 6LJQL¿FDQW IDLOXUHV LQ VDIHW\ SURYLVLRQV EXW ZLWK QR DFWXDO Forsmark.Sweden,2006
INCIDENT consequences Atucha, Argentina, 2005
x Exposure of member of public in excess of 10mSv/exposure of
a worker in excess of the statutory annual limits/ Radiation level
in an operating area of more than 50 mSv/h
x 6LJQL¿FDQW FRQWDPLQDWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH IDFLOLW\ LQWR DQ DUHD QRW
expected by design
x Found highly radioactive sealed orphan source, device or
transport package with safety provisions intact./ inadequate
packaging of highly radioactive material sealed source
1 x 0LQRUSUREOHPVLQVDIHW\FRPSRQHQWVZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWGHIHQFH Breach of operating limits
ANOMALY in depth remaining/ low activity lost or stolen radioactive at a nuclear facility/ theft
source, device or transport package of radioactive source
x Overexposure of member of public in excess of statutory limits.
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BELOW SCALE
148
Indian Delegation in 7th review meeting of Convention on Nuclear Safety, at IAEA, Vienna, Austria

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GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

a Grant consents for siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning,

a Prescribe the acceptance limits of radiation exposure to occupational workers and

a Promote research and development efforts in the areas of safety.

AERB Annual Report - 2017

ORGANISATION CHART OF ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

KEY FIGURES OF THE YEAR 2017

CHAPTER 1. SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES .........................................1

1.1 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES .................................................1

1.2 NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION...................................................................2

1.3 OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS ............................9

1.5 OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN

1.7 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES ................................................................26

1.8 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION .......................................................29

CHAPTER 2. SAFETY SURVEILLANCE OF RADIATION FACILITIES ...................................35

2.1 APPLICATIONS OF RADIATION SOURCES IN MEDICAL,

2.2 SAFETY REVIEW MECHANISM OF RADIATION FACILITIES ............................................39

2.3 UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION ...............................................44

CHAPTER 3. REGULATORY INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR AND RADIATION FACILITIES........ 47

3.1 REGULATORY INSPECTION PROGRAMME ...........................................................................47

3.2 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES .................50

3.3 REGULATORY INSPECTIONS OF RADIATION FACILITIES ................................................51

AERB Annual Report - 2017

CHAPTER 4. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES .................. 57

4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ......................................................................................................57

4.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES ..................................................................................................59

4.3 BASIS FOR ACCEPTABLE DOSE TO OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS AND

4.4 INITIATIVES TAKEN BY AERB FOR DOSE REDUCTION .....................................................63

CHAPTER 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ............................................................................... 65

5.1 ROLE OF AERB IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN,

5.2 REVIEW OF PREPAREDNESS FOR SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY

5.3 HARMONISATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS OF NPPs ..........................66

5.4 CREATION OF ON-SITE EMERGENCY SUPPORT CENTRE AT NPPs ..................................67

5.5 NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY MONITORING CELL AT AERB ............67

5.6 PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY IAEA............................68

5.7 DEVELOPMENT OF DOCUMENTS RELATED TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ..........68

5.8 PUBLIC PROTECTION MEASURES ..........................................................................................68

CHAPTER 6. REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS .................................................................. 71

6.1 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ...................................71

6.2 REGULATORY SAFETY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPED/AMENDED ......................................73

6.3 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER REVISION/DEVELOPMENT ..............................................74

6.4 SAFETY DOCUMENTS UNDER PUBLICATION IN HINDI ....................................................74

6.5 REVIEW OF IAEA DRAFT SAFETY STANDARDS..................................................................75

CHAPTER 7. SAFETY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH ..................................................................... 77

7.1 THERMAL HYDRAULICS SAFETY STUDIES .........................................................................77

7.2 SEVERE ACCIDENT STUDIES ...................................................................................................79

7.3 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY STUDIES ..................79

7.4 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT ................................................................................81

AERB Annual Report - 2017

7.5 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES.........................................................................................................82

AERB Annual Report - 2017

CHAPTER 11. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE ............... 113

11.1 MANPOWER AUGMENTATION ..............................................................................................113

11.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES,

11.3 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................113

11.4 TRAINING ...................................................................................................................................115

11.5 AERB TECHNICAL TALK /COLLOQUIUM ............................................................................116

11.6 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ...............................................................................................117

11.7 PROMOTION OF EXCELLENCE IN HUMAN RESOURCES ................................................118

11.8 AERB AWARDS FOR MERITORIOUS PERFORMANCE.......................................................118

11.9 WELFARE ACTIVITIES FOR AERB EMPLOYEES ................................................................124

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