UNCOMMON CARRIER

G.R. No. 125948. December 29, 1998.*

FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HONORABLE PATERNO V. TAC-AN, BATANGAS CITY and ADORACION C. ARELLANO, in
her official capacity as City Treasurer of Batangas, respondents.

Contracts; Common Carriers; A “common carrier” is one who holds himself out to the public as
engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from place to place, for
compensation, offering his services to the public generally.—There is merit in the petition. A
“common carrier” may be defined, broadly, as one who holds himself out to the public as
engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from place to place, for
compensation, offering his services to the public generally. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines
a “common carrier” as “any person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public.”

Same; Same; The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the
definition of a common carrier.—Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no
doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or
carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry
for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited
clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The definition of “common carriers” in the Civil Code makes no
distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air.—As correctly
pointed out by petitioner, the definition of “common carriers” in the Civil Code makes no
distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It does not
provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. In fact,
in the United States, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers. First Philippine
Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 661, G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998

ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC., respondents.

Civil Law; Contracts; Common Carriers; Definition.—The definition of common carriers in Article
1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity. We also did not distinguish between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population.

Same; Same; Same; Determination of a common carrier.—The test to determine a common

carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier
which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent
of the business transacted.” Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA
340, G.R. No. 147246 August 19, 2003

G.R. No. 186312. June 29, 2010.*

SPOUSES DANTE CRUZ and LEONORA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. SUN HOLIDAYS, INC.,
respondent.

Civil Law; Common Carriers; Definition of Common Carriers.—As De Guzman instructs, Article
1732 of the Civil Code defining “common carriers” has deliberately refrained from making
distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carrier’s principal business,
whether it is offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. The intent
of the law is thus to not consider such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many
other distinctions may be concocted by unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of
persons or goods in order to avoid the legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers. Cruz
vs. Sun Holidays, Inc., 622 SCRA 389, G.R. No. 186312 June 29, 2010

G.R. No. 150255. April 22, 2005.*

SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TRANSPORT
VENTURE, INC., INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and BLACK SEA SHIPPING
AND DODWELL now INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES, respondents. Schmitz Transport &
Brokerage Corporation vs. Transport Venture, Inc., 456 SCRA 557, G.R. No. 150255 April
22, 2005

Common Carriers; Customs Brokers; It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs broker
may be regarded as a common carrier.—It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs
broker may be regarded as a common carrier. Thus, this Court, in A.F. Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. v.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, held: The appellate court did not err in finding petitioner, a
customs broker, to be also a common carrier, as defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, to
wit, Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public. x x x Article 1732 does not distinguish
between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity. The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a
common carrier but a customs broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs
declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that
petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration. And in Calvo v. UCPB
General Insurance Co., Inc., this Court held that as the transportation of goods is an integral part
of a customs broker, the customs broker is also a common carrier. For to declare otherwise
“would be to deprive those with whom [it] contracts the protection which the law affords them
notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for [its] customers, is part and parcel
of petitioner’s business.” Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation vs. Transport Venture, Inc.,
456 SCRA 557, G.R. No. 150255 April 22, 2005

G.R. No. 138334. August 25, 2003.*

ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARAVAN TRAVEL &
TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondents.

Civil Law; Common Carriers; Damages; Definition of common carrier.—By definition, a contract
of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate
themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed price.
Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and are classified as private or
special carriers and common or public carriers. A common carrier is defined under Article 1732
of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by lane, water or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public.

Same; Same; Same; Respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either
passengers or goods and is therefore neither a private nor a common carrier.—It is obvious
from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is there fore, neither, a private nor a common
carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its
covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s
services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as
well as booking customers for tours. Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 528, G.R. No.
138334 August 25, 2003

TORRES-MADRID BROKERAGE, INC., petitioner, vs. FEB MITSUI MARINE INSURANCE CO.,
INC. and BENJAMIN P. MANALASTAS, doing business under the name of BMT TRUCKING
SERVICES, respondents.

Civil Law; Common Carriers; Diligence of Common Carriers; By the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, they are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and in the safety of their passengers.—Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of transporting passengers or goods
or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. By the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, they are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and in the safety of their passengers.

Same; Same; As long as an entity holds itself to the public for the transport of goods as a
business, it is considered a common carrier regardless of whether it owns the vehicle used or
has to actually hire one.—That TMBI does not own trucks and has to subcontract the delivery of
its clients’ goods, is immaterial. As long as an entity holds itself to the public for the transport of
goods as a business, it is considered a common carrier regardless of whether it owns the vehicle
used or has to actually hire one. Torres-Madrid Brokerage, Inc. vs. FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance
Co., Inc., 796 SCRA 142, G.R. No. 194121 July 11, 2016

NATURE AND BASIS OF LIABILITY

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD Co., defendant and
appellee. Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, No. 12191 October 14, 1918

PUBLIC UTILITIES; PRINCIPLES GOVERNING LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIER.—The

following are the principles governing the liability of a common carrier: (1) the liability of a
carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is a breach if it f ails to exert
extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to
carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all
circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at f ault or to have acted negligently in case of
death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary
diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.
 2. ID. ; ID. ; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER MILITATES AGAINST His
CLAIM; CASE AT BAR.—A circumstance which militates against the stand of appellant is the fact
borne out by the evidence that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the
left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the
window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this reason that
the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him
a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence. Isaac
vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc., 101 Phil. 1046, No. L-9671 August 23, 1957

PAZ FORES, petitioner, vs. IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent. Fores vs. Miranda, 105 Phil.
266, No. L-12163 March 4, 1959

D.; CARRIERS; ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; WHEN PRESUMPTION OF CARRIER'S

LIABILITY ARISES.—An action for breach of contract imposes on the carrier a presumption of
liability upon mere proof of injury of the passenger; the latter does not have to establish the
fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it
was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Congco vs. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil.,
768, 777.) Morever, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict may not escape liability by proving
that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. (Art. 1759
New Civil Code, Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. Supra; Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900)
Fores vs. Miranda, 105 Phil. 266, No. L-12163 March 4, 1959

G.R. Nos. 66102-04. August 30, 1990.*

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.,** respondents. Phil.Rabbit Lines, Inc.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 158, G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990

Same; Same; Same; Carrier, presumed at fault or negligent, the moment a passenger dies or is
injured.—In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption
may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed
in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the
passenger was due to a forfuitous event.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Accident caused either by defects in the automobile or negligence of
driver, not a caso fortuito.—In any event, “[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his
failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in
the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid
the carrier’s liability for damages. Phil.Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189
SCRA 158, G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003.*

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE
NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY,
respondents. Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75, G.R. No. 145804
February 6, 2003

Same; Same; Same; Instances when a common carrier becomes liable for death of or injury to
passengers.—The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75, G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003

Same; Same; Same; In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract.—A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-
delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have
been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. Light Rail Transit Authority vs.
Navidad, 397 SCRA 75, G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003

CLASSES OF COMMON CARRIERS

G.R. No. 112287. December 12, 1997.*

NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND VLASONS
SHIPPING, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 112350. December 12, 1997.*

VLASONS SHIPPING, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION, respondents. National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA
45, G.R. No. 112287, G.R. No. 112350 December 12, 1997

Common Carriers; Private Carriers; Ships and Shipping; It has been held that the true test of a
common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to
avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.—Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a
common carrier as “persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public.” It has been held that the true test of a common carrier is
the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of
its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is
deemed a private carrier. “Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and
the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for the general public. The most typical,
although not the only form of private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime contract by which
the charterer, a party other than the shipowner, obtains the use and service of all or some part
of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or voyages.”

G.R. No. 102316. June 30, 1997.*

VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION, respondents. Valenzuela
Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc.vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 642, G.R. No. 102316
June 30, 1997

Same; Same; As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is deemed valid.—The issue posed in
this case and the arguments raised by petitioner are not novel; they were resolved long ago by
this Court in Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc. In that case, the trial
court similarly nullified a stipulation identical to that involved in the present case for being
contrary to public policy based on Article 1744 of the Civil Code and Article 587 of the Code of
Commerce. Consequently, the trial court held the shipowner liable for damages resulting from
the partial loss of the cargo. This Court reversed the trial court and laid down, through Mr.
Justice Jose P. Bengzon, the following well-settled observation and doctrine: “The provisions of
our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. Under American
jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special
person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner
from liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is deemed valid.
Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be
applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the
charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would
be void only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such policy has no
force where the public at large is not involved, as in this case of a ship totally chartered for the
use of a single party.” (Italics supplied.) Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc.vs. Court
of Appeals, 274 SCRA 642, G.R. No. 102316 June 30, 1997

No. L-49407. August 19, 1988.*

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner-appel-lant, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, respondents-appellees.

No. L-49469. August 19, 1988.*

MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, respondents-
appellees. National Development Company vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 593, No. L-
49407, No. L-49469 August 19, 1988

Civil Law; Common carriers; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act; Rule that for cargoes transported
from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the carrier in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods is governed primarily by the Civil Code, but on all other matters, the
Code of Commerce and special laws shall apply; The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is suppletory
to the Civil Code.—This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court in Eastern Shipping
Lines Inc. v. IAC (150 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) where it was held under similar circumstances that
“the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the
common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration” (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus,
the rule was specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines,
the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated
by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by special laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The laws of the Philippines will apply in case at bar and it is
immaterial whether the collision actually occurred in foreign waters.—In the case at bar, it has
been established that the goods in question are transported from San Francisco, California and
Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or damaged due to a collision which was
found to have been caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels.
Under the above ruling, it is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is
immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan. National
Development Company vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 593, No. L-49407, No. L-49469 August
19, 1988

G.R. No. L-69044 May 29, 1987

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY
CORPORATION, respondents.
No. 71478 May 29, 1987
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE NISSHIN FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE CO., and DOWA FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE CO., LTD., respondents.

On the Law Applicable

The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the
common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. 4 As the cargoes in question
were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed
primarily by the Civil Code. 5 However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and
obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws.
Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil
Code.

G.R. No. 156330. November 19, 2014.*

NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM and the EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD., petitioners, vs.
GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES, LTD., respondent. Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam vs. Glow
Laks Enterprises, Ltd., 740 SCRA 592, G.R. No. 156330 November 19, 2014

Remedial Law; Evidence; Foreign Laws; It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.—It is well-settled that foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which read: SEC. 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever
a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Nedlloyd
Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam vs. Glow Laks Enterprises, Ltd., 740 SCRA 592, G.R. No. 156330 November
19, 2014

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Conflict of Laws; Under the rules of private international
law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact.—It is worth reiterating at this
point that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded
and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign country or
state will be presumed to be the same as our local or domestic law. This is known as processual
presumption. While the foreign law was properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however,
proven not in the manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
decision of the RTC, which proceeds from a disregard of specific rules cannot be recognized.
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam vs. Glow Laks Enterprises, Ltd., 740 SCRA 592, G.R. No. 156330
November 19, 2014