BEDOL VS COMELEC

FACTS:
As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao,
the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC’s
performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty
two (22) city and municipalities in the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and
gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor
which was slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the provincial
certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections
Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain ‘observations’ on the
provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in
abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of
elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to
appear despite prior knowledge.
Respondent’s [petitioner] contention:
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity that,
while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on
May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such
an excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written report was ever filed
with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to failure and
refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a
contempt charge by COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the basis of
an Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to
appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.
Petitioner questioned the COMELEC’s legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and its
assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt
by COMELEC.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC in
the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order is within the constitutional
powers of the COMELEC.
RULING:
Powers of COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions
of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution
and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications.
Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election
laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.
Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code
(Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of
judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu
proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus
Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.
Findings of guilt of indirect contempt
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds.
 First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled[12] canvassing of the
Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to
submit his explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of
paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which were
lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs
(a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC
through the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by
flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of a
national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d),
Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.

People v Corral, G.R. No. L-42300 (Jan. 31, 1936)

Facts:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934.
After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal
disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with section
432 of the Revised Administrative Code.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court promulgated
on March 3, 1910 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented
to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed
that at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the
municipality of Davao, Province of Davao.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense
had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general
election held on June 5, 1934.
Issue:
1. W/N the state has the right to deprive a person’s right to suffrage
2. W/N the appellant’s contention that the end of his punishment thus ends of his
disqualification for election has merit.

Held:
Yes. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their
having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions
upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered
infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to
exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged
a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a
privilege and not the denial of a personal right.
No. Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that
the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the
expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the
disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that
it is imposed, "for protection and not for punishment,. the withholding of a privilege and not the
denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are
against such a view.