H ousing Stud ies, V ol. 15, N o.

1, 45± 60, 2000

Public H ousing Re side nts as C lie nts of the Sta te

C H UA BE N G H UA T
D ep artm ent of So ciolog y , N a tional U nive rsity of Sing ap o re , Sing a po re

[P ape r ® rst re ceive d Janua ry 1 9 98 ; in ® na l for m June 19 9 8 ]

A BSTRACT Sta te-welfare provision cushions individual citizens from the full im pact of
capitalist m arket econo m y. O ne of its conseque nce s is the expansion of the rights of
citizens in the ir claim s for welfare provisions as citizensh ip entitlements. The gove rn-
m ent is obligated to m eet the se claim s in orde r to m aintain its m ass loyalty and its
legitimacy to rule. H ow eve r, citizens’ de pe nde ncy on state provision rende rs the m clients
of the state, reducing the ir political power at the ballot box. This em asculating tende ncy
reache s its logical conclusion w he n the state m onopolises the provision of particular
goods or services, it is the n able to threaten to w ithhold provision, thus threatening the
m aterial life of particular societal segm ents, if electoral support were no t forthcom ing
from the latter. This political dynam ic is ex am ine d throug h the ne ar universal public
housing program me in the single-party dom inant state of Sing apore.

Introduction

In ad vanced capitalist econom ies, to he lp the realisation of private capital `the

state actually replaces the m arke t mechan ism’ through various means , including
`improvem en t of the m ate rial infrastru cture, such as transp ortation , education,
he alth , recre ation , urban an d reg ional plann ing [an d] housing construction
(H aberm as, 1973, p. 35, origin al em phasis). Some of these provisions are concur-
rently mean s of `relie ving the social an d m ate rial costs resulting from private
production’ (H aberm as, 1973, p. 35). These are ge nerically conceptualise d as
social welfare bene® ts, of w hich actual monetary han dout from the state , or the
`dole’ , is but one . H aberm as’ suggestions repeat the comm only held understa nd -
in g that in capitalist societies the state necessarily supports the inte rest of capital
in the long run (Miliban d, 1969), an d that social welfarism is an unavoidable
mechanism to allev iate the ne gative conseq uences of unrestricted competition of
private capital w hile sim ultane ously maintain ing mass political support. W el-
farism is there fore not the conscious creation of socially and morally resp onsive
politicians but a result of the very logic of capitalist society itse lf.
Draw ing from the case of Germ any , O ffe (1984) sugge sts that state provision
of products an d services, i.e. social welfarism, is syn onym ous w ith decom -
m odi® cation; i.e. the products and serv ices are rem oved from the m arket an d
their provisions not tied to pro® t motivation. Th is has seve ral conseq uences: (i)
deman ds on state provision for a range of service s an d goods have the tenden cy
to keep expan ding , eventually stretch ing the state’s ® scal capab ility to the point
of crisis ; (ii) red ucing in dividual citizen ’ s depen den cy on the marke t to meet

0267± 3037 Print/1466- 1810 O n-line /00/010 045± 16 Ó 2000 T ay lor & Francis L td
46 C hua Beng H uat

his/he r need s both as a w orker and a consumer, thus increasin g his/he r deg ree
of freed om again st exploitative interests of capitalism ; and (iii) in their potential
ability to w ithhold political support for the rulin g govern men t if demand s for
goods an d services were not meet, the righ ts of the citize ns are expan ded .
O verall, these conse quen ces point potentially to an im proved position an d
empowerm en t of citize ns both in their relation s to the state and to the capitalist
m arket. In this sen se, O ffe argues, the welfare state is not sim ply subjected to the
`reproduction of capitalist reproduction’ but could have ne gative im pact on
capitalist inte rests. As Keane (1984) points out in his editorial introduction to the
collection of O ffe’ s essays , w hile the expan sion of welfare provision does have
the above consequen ces, Offe may have overstated the case.
State provisions and citize ns’ deman ds is not a one-w ay stree t, w he re the
latter holds all the triumph card s by virtue of its power to vote a party out of
of® ce. O n the other side of the equation , depende ncy on state provision for
signi® cant parts of their daily nee ds tran sforms citize ns into `clients’ of the state.
A s such, the exercise of electoral power is not w ithout its calculation s and costs;
it is in the citizen s’ ow n interests to elect the party w hich is most able to
m ain tain high levels of state provision s. Self-intere sts thus constrain the citizen s’
barg ain ing position w ith the state, opening them to its ad ministrative an d
regulatory functions. Furthe rm ore, depen den cy on state provisions is not even ly
distributed. For exam ple, not all citizen s are equally depen den t on public
tran sportation, hospitals or education institutions; man y can an d w ill pay for
their ow n consumption of these serv ices. W here such dual mode of consum ption
exists, the position of the state is further stren gthene d as it can play the intere sts
of one group of consumers ag ain st the other (D unleavy , 1979). Sacri® cing the
in teres ts of the state depe nde nts has become a tool, am ong others, for the
dism an tlin g of the welfare state, particularly in Western Europe. C itizen s depen-
dent on state provisions thus cede sign i® cant degrees of control of their life in
exchan ge for the consumption of state-provided goods and service s. The ten-
dency tow ard s clien tship an d loss of control on the part of the citizen s is
exagge rate d an d brought into relie f, thus the better for an aly sis , in instan ces of
single-party dominan t states, w here the rulin g party’ s fear of being rem oved
from of® ce by the electorate is non -existent an d the ability of the electorate to
m ake dem an ds is severe ly ham pered by the weakness of its electoral power
because of its inab ility to thre ate n the rulin g party due to the absence of
contende rs to political of® ce.
W ithin the above conceptual understa nd ing of the political dynam ics of
welfarism in ad van ced capitalist nation s, Singapore, the island nation under a
single-party dom inant govern ment of the People’ s A ction Party (PAP) m ay be
said to be a `text book’ case. The state provide s w ith gre at ef® cacy all the
ne cessary material infrastructure that is essen tial to support the in ternation al
competitiveness of capitalist en terprise s, both local an d multin ation al, operating
w ithin its boundarie s. These supplemen ts to the inte rest of capital are natu-
ralise d and ideologically prom oted as m ain tain ing an d improving `nation al’
competitiveness ; as pro® tability of capitalist en terprises mean s improved tax-
ation for the state an d employment opportunities for w orkers. Thus, all collec-
tive consumption goods are high ly subsid ised w ithin the overall plan nin g
functions of the state an d its m inistrie s, of w hich urban plan nin g and m an age -
men t are essen tial componen ts. (For details on urban plan nin g an d man agem en t
of Sin gapore, see C hua, 1997.) This ess ay is an attempt at exam ining the social
 Public H ousing Residents 47

an d political control w hich the PAP sing le-party dominan t state in Singapore
exercise s over its citize ns/clien ts through its nation al public housin g pro-
gram me, w ithout an y threat of being displaced by the electorate/citize nry from
the position of power.

Public H ou sing and Political Le gitim acy

The PAP w as ® rst elected into rulin g position in 1959, w he n Singapore w as

given domestic self-governme nt. One of the boldest steps taken by the PAP
govern ment tow ard s securing its political support base w as to embark on a
nation al public housin g program me; improvem en t of housing condition w as a
conven an t between the new ly enfran chise d electorate and the elected govern -
men t. The nation al public housing authority , H ousin g an d Developmen t Board
(H DB), w as estab lished in 1960. It w as en trusted not only w ith all developmen t
processes , from lan d clearan ce an d resettleme nt to plann ing and design of ¯ ats,
but also w ith allocation and , until the late 1980s, the m anage ment of housing
estates; only the actual construction of the multi-storey ¯ ats were contracted to
private en terprise . (The extent of H D B’s activities are discussed in great leng th
in the volume w hich commemorates its 25-year ann iversar y edited by W ong &
Yeh , 1985.) Beg inning m odestly w ith build ing m inimal rental accommodation
for the poor in overcrow ded and unhygien ic urban are as, the H DB m oved
quickly to introd uced 99-yea r leaseh old ow nersh ip of public housin g ¯ ats in
1964. According to the H DB, the home-ownersh ip scheme w as ª to en courage a
property-ow ning democracy in Sing apore, an d to en able Sing apore citize ns in
the lower middle income group to ow n their ow n homesº (H DB, 1964 Annual
Report quoted in C astells et al., 1990, p. 231). This strate gic move w as in kee ping
w ith the fact that the political credib ility of the PA P governm en t am ong the
electorate w as then still at its nascen t stage .
The nationa l housing program me w as initially met w ith resis tan ce from
reside nts affected by resettlemen t. Reside nts in overcrow ded urban houses
w hich were multiply subdivided an d subtenan ted, and squatter an d sem i-rural
areas w hich were poorly, if at all, serv iced by public utilities were all ag ain st
being resettled into high-rise housing, w ith m uch higher costs relative to extan t
rent an d ow ne rship arran ge ments in the affected are as . Essen tially , residen ts
were being m oved from inform al housin g sectors w hich were ¯ exible en ough to
accommodate the ® nan cial continge ncies of each household, including supple-
men tary garden farm ing an d an imal husban dry, to stand ard ised contractual
rental arran gem en ts of the form al sector (Gam er, 1972). Furthermore, as the ® rst
genera tion of public housing residen ts were hew ed largely from the urban poor
w ho were not used to livin g in high-rise build ings , serious hard sh ip were
imposed on them not only in ® nan cial ad justme nts but also physical ad aptations
(H as san, 1973).
Organ ised res istan ce by association s of res ide nts, tenan ts an d farmers were
often under the political in¯ uence of the Barisan So cialis, the left-win g splin ter
party from the PA P. This political lin kage migh t have ad ded impetus to the
govern ment’ s planne d resettlem en t of these are as because, given that historically
this w as the point in time at w hich the ne w rulin g PAP w as aim ing to
consolid ate its political base, resettlem en t w ould coincided w ith des truction of
the support bases of PAP’s opposition (Tremew an , 1994, pp. 45± 47). H owever,
by the mid-1970s , such resista nce had dissip ate d (Aldrich, 1985) because it had
48 C hua Beng H uat

become eviden t that the govern ment w as fairly even-han ded in rese ttling all
existin g establishe d comm unities, improvem en ts in housin g en vironm en t an d
public health became obvious also an d, the nascent econom ic grow th an d
expan sion of em ploymen t opportunities com bine d w ith govern men t’ s sale s
policies began to make public housing ¯ ats affordable an d attractive to the
in creasin g numbers of gainf ully employed Singapore an s. (The sen timen ts of
those w ho faced resettlem en t had chan ge d sign i® cantly by m id-1980s, see C hua,
1997, C hap ter 3.)
The public housin g program me’ s contribution to the overall econom ic devel-
opment w hich has tran sformed Singapore from a colonial trad ing post up to the
end of W orld W ar II into a developed econom y that is high ly integrate d into
global capitalis m m ay be so sum marise d:

public housing, by lowerin g the price of a m ajor w age-g ood, has

lowered the w age, it may be credited w ith stim ulatin g faster economic
grow th an d em ploymen t creation. It m ay also have released private-
sector resources for other form s of productive investme nt, thereby
in creasin g productivity an d grow th. By en surin g a higher stan dard of
living for the w orkin g population at a give n w age , it m ay have
contributed to better w orker productivity an d certain ly to political an d
social stability an d labour peace, w hich are ne cessary underpin nin g for
private investme nt an d economic grow th. (Lim , 1987, p. 185)

For the citize ns , alon g w ith expan sion of home ow ne rsh ip to all but the bottom
10± 15 per cent of the income strata, is the massive improvem en ts in living
conditions, for those w ho reside in public housin g estates an d new tow ns. Such
ne w tow ns are factored into the islan d’s public tran sportation and road syste ms
an d are thus well serviced . The y are com prehe nsive ly plan ned to en sure relative
self-suf® ciency in term s of the daily need s an d services of the residen ts.
Neigh bourh ood centres provide low level goods and services w ithin w alkin g
distan ce, w hile a tow n centre w hich caters to the entire new tow n carries higher
orde r goods. In recent ye ars, some of these tow n centres have been trans formed
in to `regional’ centres, expan ding not only their functions but als o catchmen t
areas of their users and upscalin g their offers of goods and service s. Prim ary an d
secondary schools, religious institu tions and public recreational facilitie s are all
read ily availab le w ith the aid of an in-town bus service , w hich also feeds into the
m as s rapid train sy stem that takes residen ts to other destina tions on the islan d.
Finally, a certain level of em ploymen t in each new tow n is availab le to its
reside nts because of the presen ce of commercial activities and small industrial
estates for clean ind ustrie s.
Undoubtedly, successful provision of public housin g an d concom itan t im-
provemen t of the material conditions of Singaporeans have paid great political
dividen d to the ruling PA P. Indee d, the PAP govern men t has become syn ony-
m ous w ith economic development w hich tran slate s into improvem en ts of m a-
terial life to the citizen s. The PAP has turned this success into its ow n political
ad van tage by suggestin g that only it alone is able to continue to delive r the
goods under stab le political and social conditions. W hile it is not possible to
state accurately, success in the public housin g program me, alon g w ith other
measu res of econom ic developmen t, undoubtedly accounts for a very substan tial
quantum of PA P’s popular support in the ballot box in all the gene ral elections
since 1959, w here it in variab ly garne rs the overw helm ing majority of votes. This
 Public H ousing Residents 49

is so, if for no other reason than the citize ns ’ desire to protect the investmen t of
a large part of their long -term saving s in their public housing properties. Thus,
w hile not denying the presen ce of other factors in ge neratin g support at
elections , including fear of governm en t reprisals for voting for opposition
partie s, the ab ility of successful public housin g programme to genera te legiti-
m acy for the ruling govern ment is unde niable. (The politics of legitim acy
through public housing provision is the central them e of C hua, 1997.) It is
around this success an d its political implications that the issues of public
housing reside nts as clients of the state turn .

U nive rsal Provision as M on op olisation of H ou sing Supp ly

The lease hold ow nersh ip scheme introd uced in 1964 w as not en thusiastic ally
received. It w as , however, given a boost in 1968, w hen the governm en t allow ed
citizen s to use their savings in the state-m an age d compulsory social security
funds, the Cen tral Provide nt Fund (CPF), to be used for both dow n-payme nts
an d m onthly mortgages of the ¯ ats purchase d from the H DB. The ide a for the
C PF for Singaporean w orkers w as ® rst m ooted in the early 1950s by the late
D avid M arsh all, a very promine nt law yer w ho w as to become the ® rst C hief
M in iste r of Singapore and late r Singapore’ s am bass ad or to Fran ce until his
retire men t. M arsh all had appare ntly sen t a memorand um on the establishm en t
of an employee s fund to the colonial govern ment. The colonial authorities
subseq uently passe d a bill to create the C PF because ª the concept appealed
strongly to the ban ks an d to the Secretary for the Treasu ry as a mean s of
compellin g saving s from the population º (Chan, 1984, p. 69). Since then , every
w age earner has been com pelled to save a proportion of his or her monthly
in come in the C PF, w ith a m atchin g contribution from the employer. Further-
m ore, the rate of sav ings kept increasin g in tande m w ith economic expans ion
an d ris ing w age s. It reache d a peak in 1984 w ith savings of 25 per cent of the
m onthly w age from both the employee and employer; this w as subseque ntly
reduced as a result of an econom ic dow nturn in 1985 but had sin ce 1987 been
creep ing upw ard s an d stabilise d at 20 per cent from each party.
As the size of an in dividual w orke r’s sav ings tend to accumulate quickly,
alm ost every Sing aporean w orker is keen to use the saving s before retire ment.
Since housing w as, an d still is, the only ave nue in w hich a very substan tial
portion of these saving s can be used, home-ow ne rsh ip became very popular.
Through the C PF mechan ism , a closed ® nancial circuit is set up in the public
housing sector: ind ivid ual w orkers save monthly in the C PF; the C PF is used to
buy govern ment bonds, part of w hich is used as grants an d loan s in public
housing construction; ¯ ats are sold to households, w ith the H DB holding the
m ortgage ; ® nally, monthly m ortgage pay men ts are ded ucted from the house-
holds’ monthly C PF saving s. The govern men t estim ate s that 90 per cent of
Singaporean households are able to mee t their m onthly mortgage paym en t for
public housin g ¯ ats through their monthly C PF savin gs, especially for dual
in come fam ilies. (For details on the 1966 am en dmen ts, see Yueng , 1973.) A
fam ily can thus ow n a public housin g ¯ at w ithout affecting their monthly
disposable income. The res ult is the tran sform ation of a nation into not only
home-owners but often ex cessive consumers of housin g (Lim et al., 1986).
The popularity of the home-ow nersh ip program me is re¯ ected in the fact that
by 1985, m ore than 85 per cent of the total population live in public housing in
50 C hua Beng H uat

m ore than half a million ¯ ats, of w hich 85 per cent ow ned a 99-ye ar lease. The
then projected am bition of the H DB w as to house 90 per cent of the total
population in public housin g. Thus by the late 1980s, Sin gapore w as alread y de
facto a `home ow ning ’ nation, w hich the PAP ide ologically them atised as a `home
ow ning dem ocracy ’; an aim it set in 1964 w he n the sche me w as ® rst introd uced.
H avin g promise d universal provision of public housin g to all elig ib le Singa-
porean househ olds, the PA P govern men t has, since the early 1990s, initiate d
various ® nan cial assistance package s to he lp the bottom 10 per cent of income
earne rs ow n their ¯ ats. Such scheme s include rad ical red uction of selling price
of low -end ren tal ¯ ats to sittin g tenan ts, price discounts on refurbished tw o-
bedroom ¯ ats an d cash gran ts for ® rst time home-ownin g familie s.
This extension to unive rsal provision is an incremental process rather than
in tended at the very outset of the public housing program me. Popularity of the
lease hold ow ne rsh ip sche me after 1968 meant an unabated demand , re¯ ected in
application queues of up to ® ve years’ w aitin g period . C oncurrently, the
govern ment kept rais ing the in come-ceiling of elig ib ility, in step w ith economic
expan sion, to accommodate the housing nee ds of increasin gly more an d more
househ olds. To meet the continual deman ds , the state had to acquire more lan d
through both reclam ation of the coastlines an d from priv ate holding s through its
dracon ian land acquisition law s.
The Lan d Acquisition Act, inhe rite d from the colonial govern men t but rad -
ically ame nde d in 1966, one ye ar after political inde pende nce, en abled the state
to acquire all lan ds deeme d necessary for the purpose of nationa l deve lopment,
at com pensation rate s determ ine d by the statutes themselves, w hich were
in variab ly drastically below extan t m arket value s. Prior to the amen dments , lan d
acquisition w as stren uously resisted by land lord s, especially in sem i-rural areas
in the urban frin ge , w hich were the earlie st are as to be targete d for residen tial
development. A s men tione d earlie r, this resis tan ce w as supported by, and in
allian ce w ith the left-w ing political party, the Barisan So cialis. H owever, faced
w ith both political dete ntion of m an y of its more capab le leade rs an d intern al
squab bles between differen t factions w ithin the party, the Barisan w as, by 1966,
alread y a party in decline. By the time the amen dments were in place, political
support for resista nce ag ain st acquisition an d resettlement had all but evapo-
rated (Game r, 1972, pp. 83± 88). (Game r provides a detail account of the long
draw n ne gotiations between resistin g land lord s and the lan d acquisition of® ce of
the H DB durin g the days before the 1966 ame nd men ts that rad ically extend the
power of the state .) Similar to the earlie r men tione d settlem en t defence, resist-
an ce again st lan d acquisition dissip ate d by the late 1960s.
The govern ment w as quite conscious of the fact that the dracon ian Act violates
common law s that govern property rig hts. H owever, in the H DB’ s view : ª The
m ajority of the acquired private land s comprised dilap idate d properties or
ne gle cted land w here squatters had mushroom ed. The governm en t saw no
reas on w hy these ow ners sh ould enjoy the greatly en hance d lan d values over
the ye ars w ithout an y effort put in by themº (Wong & Yeh, 1985, p. 41). Such
a stan ce effectively erased all the bas is for land speculation w ithout intention to
develop. (For greater discussion on lan d acquisition, see Chua, 1991). A s a result,
the state expande d its holdin gs from the approxim ate ly 40 per cent it inherite d
from the British colonial governm en t to approxim ate ly 85 per cent of the nation ’s
total lan d mass. This near monopolisation of lan d has , of course, rad ical
conse quen ces for the housin g marke t and housing conditions for the population .
 Public H ousing Residents 51

(Lan d m onopolisation by the state also has serious consequences on the lan d
m arket, for exam ple, the govern ment, through the U rb an Redevelopmen t Auth-
ority, reserv ices acquired lan d and releases it at marke t value to commercial
development, am ass ing in the process a very large am ount of state wealth in its
corporatised developmen t company , Pidem co Land . Unfortunate ly, this aspect
w ill have to be excluded from this essay in the intere st of space.)
The most obvious consequence is that the state eme rges as the prim ary
developer in the nation. Its activities include not only infras tructure buildin g,
in cluding airp ort and seaport, but als o developmen t of industrial sites, of® ce
an d retail buildings an d, of course, public housin g. O n the other hand , w ith only
15 per cent of the land in priv ate hold ings to be distributed between commercial
an d private housing constructions, prices of the latte r naturally become very
high an d too exorbitant for the overw he lm ing m ajority of Singap orean s. The
bulk of Singapore ans thus become depen den t on the state to provide housing
an d correspondingly, the state becomes obligated to mee t this dem and , ag ain
driving the state tow ard s unive rsal provision, rende rin g itself to be the mon-
opoly supplier of housing for the nation . The population an d the state are thus
locked into a depend an t± supplier relation that is increasin gly impossible for
eithe r party to break aw ay from.

T he O bligation to Supply

Ironically, in spite of being the ne ar monopolistic supplie r of housin g to the vast

m ajority of the citizen ry the PA P governme nt, via the H DB, rem ain s insiste nt
that eligib ility to purchase public housin g is a `privilege ’ and not a `rig ht’ of
citizen sh ip, even if all Singaporeans treat public housin g colloquially as `govern -
men t housing ’. This is a sign i® cant ad ministra tive gloss w hich is politically
ad van tageous to the govern ment. It is achieved by setting up the H DB as an
`autonomous’ statutory board , unde r the overseeing jurisd iction of the M inistry
of N ational Development.
As an autonom ous age ncy, the H DB operates ® nan cially and ad ministra tively
as if it were a `private’ corporation that `freely’ en ters into contractual relations
w ith an y busines s partie s, be they build ing contractors or tenants. The H DB is
thus at liberty to impose conditions of sale an d rental on intere sted partie s. The
legal position of a Sing aporean see king to purchase or rent a public housin g ¯ at
is that of consumer, free to (dis)ag ree w ith the conditions stipulate d by the
ven dor or the land lord , nam ely by the H D B. H ousing thus remain s at the leve l
of property righ ts of ind ivid uals, the governm en t’s comm itme nt to unive rsal
provision notw ithstan ding .
The political ad van tages of this arrang eme nt to the govern men t are several.
First, housin g consumption rem ain s at the level of w hat each household is ab le
to purchase for itself w ithout refere nce to an y mean s tests , as in conven tional
citizen ’s righ t to state welfare provisions. Second, resp onsib ility for an y hiccups
in the public housin g sector, from long w aiting period to poor estate serv ices,
can be borne by the H D B and de¯ ected from the govern ment itse lf. Third , on the
other han d, achieve ments of the H D B can be appropriated by the govern ment as
part of its ow n. Fin ally, the political morality implie d in the idea of a `priv ilege’
versu s that of `entitlement’ of citize nship are sign i® cantly different. A s a `privi-
lege’ , the state ’ s resp onsibility to provide is not legally oblig atory an d the
citizen ’s enjoy ment of the priv ile ge is equally contingen t on his or he r ow n
52 C hua Beng H uat

circumstan ces; the resp onsivenes s of the PA P govern ment is see n as an emblem
of its moral leade rsh ip an d sh ould be accordingly appreciated by the citizen ry.
O n the other han d, as an `entitle ment’ , the citize n can tran sform his or her
circumstan ces of deprivation in to a demand w hich the state is oblige d to meet,
rather than actin g as age nts of the state w hich have no legal choice. Signi® cantly,
it is this m oral± legal differen ce w hich `enables’ the PA P govern ment to m ain tain
that it is ag ain st social welfarism of liberal dem ocratic states, in spite of its very
extensive provision of collective consumption goods an d serv ices (Caste lls,
1988) .
H owever, as sugges ted, the political distinction between `privile ge’ and `enti-
tlem en t’ is but a gloss an d the ability of a corporatised H DB to ins ulate the
govern ment from housing dem an ds and its oblig ation s to provide is very
lim ited indee d. N o less for reason s that the state being practically the monopo-
listic ow ner of lan d has elim inated any alte rnative housing availab le to an yone
but househ olds w ith very high income and als o the PA P governm en t’s nee d to
m ain tain high levels of mass political support. The pressure on the governm en t
in its role as monopoly supplier to provide housing eme rge d in the mid-1980s.

Public H ou sing and the M iddle C lass: Instance s of Ex pansion of Political

Stre ngth of the Ele ctorate

The ® rst glim pse of the class factor in the citizen ± depen dant/state± supplie r
relations w as in the early 1980s . In 1981, a group of w orke rs w ith the Ports of
A uthority of Sing apore were evicted from their rental ¯ ats, provided by the
employer, w ithout priority of resettlem en t from the H D B. The majority of them
voted again st the PA P in a by-election in the constituen cy of A nson , causin g the
party to lose its ® rst parliam entary seat sin ce 1968 an d opening the w ay for
usin g the ballo t box to pressu re the PA P an d its govern ment in subseq uent
elections (Chua, 1982) . Simultaneou sly, pre® gurin g the emergen ce of public
housing as a terrain for the expression of class tension s, the govern men t began
to recognise that w ith increasin g econom ic af¯ uence the proportion of higher
in come households w ho aspired to ow n private housing exceeded the ab ility of
the 15 per cent priv ate lan d an d its developers to supply. These aspirations were
becom ing increasin gly frustrated an d migh t genera te political disen chantm en t
w ith the PA P govern men t. C onseq uently, it scaled dow n the H DB’ s am bition of
housing 90 per cent of the total population in public housin g to 75 per cent,
leaving the rem ain ing 25 per cent to ow n priv ate propertie s. To achieve this ne w
targe t, the state began to sell 99-ye ar leaseh old land parcels to priv ate developers
for high-rise cond ominium developmen t. This introd uces a ne w category of
private housing w ith similar tenure conditions as public housing, differen t from
conven tional freeh old priv ate ow nersh ip. In the process, the state has been ab le
to am ass signi® can t capital on the lan d it had compulsorily acquire d.
In ad dition to being differently design ed, better appointe d in ® nishes an d
some rudimen tary facilitie s, such as a sw imm ing pool, the `popularity ’ of the
99-ye ar lease hold condominiums derives large ly from their elevation to `pos-
ition’ goods w hich supposedly confer status to their ow ners. In a sea of public
housing dwelle rs, the private housing estate automatically emerged as a sign of
differen ce, even if it w as a dubious distin ction. It is not uncommon that a family
w ill take on ad ditional employment and red uce other family expenditures just
to ow n such a property, w hich may be even smaller in ¯ oor space than the high
 Public H ousing Residents 53

end of the public housing ¯ ats (Foo, 1995) . H owever, in the priv ate housing
m arket, these 99-yea r properties rem ain less attractive to housing consumers or
in vestors, w ho contin ue to prefer freehold properties . Thus in a dow nturn
m arket, as during the current curren cy crisis in Asia, they are most unlikely to
m ove. (It is dif® cult to provide actual ® gures for the relative pricing of public
housing an d 99-year condom inium ¯ ats; as a ge ne ral guide, prices of condom ini-
ums in outlying areas are approximately equal to the high end of the H DB ¯ ats
of com parable ¯ oor areas. ) Neverthele ss, even the 99-ye ar leaseh old private
condom iniums have failed to meet the rising demand s of the middle class an d
ne w supply strateg ies had to be invented.
Until ab out 1989, the H D B had alw ays imposed a m ortgage ceiling for the
prices of `resale ’ ¯ ats; that is, ¯ ats that are sold privately by ow ne rs w ho had
m ost likely, but not ne cessarily, purchased their lease s from the H DB. This had
a lim ited effect on keep ing prices dow n. A s prices continued to rise through the
1980s , purchasers of resale ¯ ats had to fork out larger an d larger sums of cas h
payme nts beyond the restricted m ortgage. To relieve these purchasers of the
in crease d ® nan cial burde n, the H D B lifted the mortgage ceilin g, allow ing them
to borrow up to marke t values of the resale ¯ ats. U nfortunate ly, this good
in tention wen t seriously bad . It sim ply led to even more rapid escalatio n of
resale prices, once credit w as made read ily availab le. Prices in the private
housing sector, including the 99-ye ar leaseh old condom inium s, of course, esca-
lated in tan dem but more dram atically, sin ce this sector is open to speculative
in vestmen ts not only by Sing aporean s by also foreigne rs.
C onsequently, by m id-1990s, prices of priv ate housing had become `out of
reach’ ag ain to the aspirin g middle class , particularly young professional fam il-
ies. The se individuals have very clear consumption horizon s w hich include a
private property an d a car, w hich being beyond the `norm’ of public housing
an d tran sportation, are both lifestyle goods and sy mbols of success. H owever,
unlike their m iddle class profession al counterparts else w he re, they are unable to
acquire all these items w ithin a short period of havin g en tere d the w ork force.
Indeed , ow nersh ip of a car w as, is an d w ill alw ay s be alread y too daunting, as
the price of cars are subjected to a total of ab out 200 per cent taxation an d other
tariffs. The m ism atch of consum ption aspiration s an d earn ing power w as
in creasin gly becoming a source of the young profession als’ disen chantme nt w ith
a `syste m’ w hich prom ise s to deliver the goods through meritocracy. The
appare ntly ne ver-en ding rise of prices of cars an d private housing ren dere d the
ability to posse ss them in creasin gly rem ote. The consum ing desires of the young
professional became ide ologically thematised as the failure to achieve the
`Sing apore D ream ’ , a pale version of the `American Dream ’. (The perceived
deprivation of young profession als w as hotly deb ate d in term s of the `Singap ore
D ream ’ in 1996; see Koh & O oi, 1996.)
Fe arin g that these group of educated, thus, high economic value -added
in dividuals w ould vote w ith their feet an d m igrate to developed nation s to
realise their lifestyle desire s, the govern ment introduced a series of price-red uc-
in g measu res in 1996; this is not an idle fear because emigration ® gures did go
up substantia lly durin g the brief econom ic recession in 1985± 87. The measu res
in clude releasing more state lan d on 99-ye ar leases to priv ate developers, thus
in creasin g priv ate housing supply; introd ucing new taxation sche mes on capital
gain s from real estate to curb speculation an d ® nally , introducing a ne w
cate gory of subsid ise d housing , the `executive condom inium’ . Under this
54 C hua Beng H uat

scheme, 99-ye ar leaseh old lan ds are sold to private deve lopers at a discount
from market rate s, in exchan ge for housing prices w hich are m ore affordable to
young profession als. In add ition, a cash gran t of $40 000 is to be given by the
govern ment to ® rst-time home-ow ne rs. Purchasers of executive condominiums
are subjected to restrictions w hich lim it the freedom to resell w ithin a speci® ed
period of residen ce, sim ilar to those of public housing residen ts.
To m inimise potential teeth ing problem s, the ® rst tw o parcels of subsid ised
land were sold to governm en t-linke d developmen t companies . W he n the ® rst
such project w as launche d in m id-1996, the lower than expected price of les s
than $400 per square foot (all monetary referen ces are in Sing apore dollars)
am ounted to at least one-third less than the price of comparab le private
condom inium developmen t. N ot surpris ingly, the number of applican ts over-
w he lmed the number of ¯ ats availab le; 11 000 to 400 units. In term s of the
housing market, undoubtedly, the schem e w ould put immediate pricing press-
ure on the privately developed 99-year leaseh old condom inium s, particularly
those in less desira ble outlying areas of the island . The scheme is thus detrime n-
tal to private capitalist intere sts in the condom inium sector.
It is this scheme that ® rst exposed the class divisions an d tensions w hich had
been build ing quietly under the overarching nation al econom ic grow th an d
improvemen ts of material life for the w hole population . The schem e quickly
became the site for acrim onious characte risation of young professionals. Vocal
public housing reside nts began to balk at state subsid y for the preferre d socially
exclusive lifestyles of those w ho deem themselves too good for public housin g.
This w as particularly gallin g as the executive condom inium applicants were
alread y reason ably well-off, judging by the estim ate that each of these house-
holds w ould have to have a combined m onthly income of no les s than $8000 to
be able to meet the monthly mortgage (Straits Times, 3 August 1996), agains t a
nation al median income of $2300 in 1990. The crux of the complaint of public
housing reside nts w as ª w hether it is justi® ab le an d equitable to use taxation
in come to bene ® t a small seg men t of the population w ho cann ot be conside red
poor but w ho have aspirations of luxury housin gº (Straits Times, 28 July 1996).
Some of the spite of the criticism w as in response to earlier m iddle class
professionals’ question ing of continual subsid ies to public housing residen ts
through the variou s estate upgrad ing schemes, w hich w ill be discussed in the
ne xt section.
As the above measu res were only recently introd uced, it is not possib le to
assess their impact on the housing market. Furtherm ore, asse ssm en t w as trunc-
ate d by the currency an d stock marke t crisis in South-East A sia since mid-1997,
in cluding Sing apore, w hich depres sed all property prices across categories an d
sectors. In resp onse to pressu re from the real estate industry , the governm en t
agreed to red uce lan d releases for 1998 an d possibly beyond. A rguab ly, the state
should continue to release lan d and brin g prices dow n, if the intere sts were to
provide affordab le housing to the nation s. H owever, havin g alread y en couraged
Singaporeans to invest heavily in their housin g, both public an d private , rad ical
decline of property prices w ill hurt seriously the ® nancial position of everyone
in a `home-ow nin g nation’ . The state w as, theref ore, constraine d to act to protect
the property marke t, in the las t ins tan ce, in the interest of protecting the
in vestmen ts of all home-ow ne rs.
Analy tically, the above tw o instan ces of state interven tion illus trate that,
w ithin the sphere of social housin g as part of state welfarism , the `righ ts’ of the
 Public H ousing Residents 55

citizen ry have dem onstrably expan ded. Although the expansion is uneven ly
distributed across class and ethnic lines ; in this instan ce the highe r en d of the
ne w middle class w as the obvious bene® ciary . (It is, of course, dif® cult to be
de® nitive about class divisions. In Singapore, w ith referen ce to consumption,
fam ilies w ho are ab le to ow n at least one car an d a home in the priv ate sector
are considere d rich an d have a househ old monthly income of m ore than $10 000;
the upper middle class household s w ould have between $6000 and $10 000; the
lower middle class between $3000 an d $6000. The poverty line is a household
m onthly income of about $1000 or less; those between this an d $3000 can be
conside red w orking class .) Fear of weaken ing mass political support has indee d
led the PAP govern ment to inte rvene into the private housin g m arket through
differen t measure s of decom modi® cation, such as discounts for lan d and dire ct
cas h gran ts, w hich sim ultane ously free the citize n/consumer from the full force
of the m arket. H owever, as the economic dow nturn als o makes clear, such
in terve ntion s are alw ays constraine d by capitalist in tere sts in the last instan ce. In
the Sin gapore housing sector, this `capitalist’ intere st is very w ide ly spread in
term s of home-ownersh ip of individ ual househ olds, w hose inte rests in protect-
in g their property investm en t have become govern ment responsibility .

Lim ite d R ights of C itize ns as C lie nts

A s the public housing program me to incorporate the overw helm ing m ajority of
the population unfolds, the depende ncy of the citizen ry on the state becomes
m ore and more absolute. As this absolute depende ncy dee pens, the citizen s qua
public housin g consumers become increasin gly vulnerable and subject to social
regulations tied to other social policies, beyond housin g issues. A mong these are:
(i) possible eviction an d acquisition for a lis t of `reason s’, such as the use of the
¯ at for illeg al activities, for exam ple gam blin g; w hen a member of the household
is convicted of throw in g objects out of the high-rise ¯ at w hich grie vously hurt
a passer- by, colloquially kn ow n as `kille r littering ’; (ii) because of govern ment’ s
pro-fam ily social policies, priority of allocation is give n to extended familie s an d
fam ilies w ho choose to live in close proximity in the same estate w hile sing les
are not perm itted to purchase or ren t ¯ ats on their ow n until beyon d 35 years
of age , an d (iii) the imposition of `racial’ quota in every block of ¯ ats and in the
total population of each housing estate, osten sibly to avoid `racial enclave ’
formation , w hich m ay jeopard ise racial peace.
In all these instan ces, the imposed regu lation s are ration alise d in term s of
socially `desira ble’ goals. H owever, each inte rven tion poses its ow n problems of
political creditability, invariab ly giving rise to scepticism. Some also ge ne rate
hard ship s on certain segme nts of the public housing res ide nts. For exam ple, the
racial quota regulation s specify the actual number of household s of each of the
three major race s of C hinese , M alays an d Ind ians to be accomm odate d in a block
of ¯ ats . In practice, this mean s that a household that w ants to sell its ¯ at can
only sell to potential buye rs from racial groups w hose prese nce in the block are
below the respective allocated quota; for exam ple, an Indian household cann ot
sell its ¯ at to an other Indian or Chine se if the quota of both these race s in the
speci® c block are alread y ® lled an d can there fore only sell to a M alay family; this
not only slow s dow n the sale but also potentially affects the sale price as the
m arket of buyers has as a conseq uence become res tricted.
In ad dition, the social and cultural effects of the quota reg ulation s are not
56 C hua Beng H uat

evenly distributed. In a nation w here about 75 per cent are C hine se, the fear of
`racial enclave s’ are only applicable to m inority groups, name ly, the M alays an d
Ind ians . The policy is thus practically one of racial m ajoritar ian ism rathe r than
of racial equality in the inte rest of racial peace; the consequen t political scepti-
cism am ong analys ts and citizen s is unde rstand able. Finally , it should be noted
that the quota reg ulation s are unpopular w ith the residen ts, w ho are quite aw are
of the contrad ictions not only w ithin the quota regu lation s but also between
these and other imposed policies; for exam ple, the encourage men t of kin to live
in close proxim ity is potentially jeopard ise d by the impossibility of families of
kin living in the same block because of racial quota (Lai, 1995). (The political
implication s of m an y of these regulations are exam ined by Tremew an , 1994,
chap ter 3, w ho see s every piece of the housing program me as just another move
tow ard s the en slavem en t of the w ork ing class not only to the hege monic control
of the PAP govern ment but to capitalist exploitation .)
In all these instance s, public disagree ments, not am ounting to protests , are up
again st the apparen t ration ality of the `gre ate r’ good of society. W hile the
substan ce of the `greater’ good is undoubtedly political/ide ological, it is to a
certain extent norm ative ly defen sible. Tran slated into `social value s’, acceptance
of the `gre ate r good’ depen ds on the res onan ce the `values’ may have in the
cultural and political consciousness of the population . Some of these `values’
have become en tren ched in political an d public discourse in Sing apore since the
early days of political indepe nde nce. Am ong these is the idea that Singapore is
constitutionally a `m ulti-racial’ an d `multi-cultural’ society, w here equality of
race is constitutionally protected, although M alays are recognise d as the `ind ige -
nous’ people. Here in lies the ideological fram ing and justi® cation of the racial
quota reg ulation s. A rguab ly, lim ited public discourse an d overt politicisation of
social reg ulation s via public housing provision m ay be a re¯ ection of the
perceived `reason ableness ’, he nce legitim acy, of the regu lation s in the view s of
the Singapore electorate that have given the PAP the mand ate to govern w ithout
opposition for the past 35 years.
H owever, alth ough there are curren tly only tw o opposition members in a
parliame nt of 81 elected members, the ele ctoral support base for the PAP have
been w eake ning . Its electoral support in seats w hich were conteste d by oppo-
sition can didate s had decline d from about 75 per cent to about 62 per cent in the
1984 ge ne ral election an d 60 per cent in 1989 and 1991 (Singh , 1992). M ost
political partie s in dem ocratic elections w ould be happy w ith such ® gures.
H owever, the PAP had been greatly distress ed by every percen tage point slide
in these elections because incre ased anti-PAP votes problem atise its claim to be
a `people’ s movemen t’ w hich embodies an d govern s in the best inte rests of all
Singaporeans. It underm ine s the PA P’ s arg umen t that Sing apore sh ould have
only one dominan t political party , nam ely itself, an d that opposition parties are,
if any thing , a hindran ce to good governan ce. C onsequen tly, stopping the ero-
sion, or preferably recovery , of the lost groun d became an important concern in
the m ost recen t election in Jan uary 1997. In its determ ination to recover the
ground, housing became, in the PAP’ s cam paign strate gy, a political site to
constrain the electorate’ s freedom to choose. The 1997 genera l election has been
given close analys is by Da C unha (1997).
In 1991, to preve nt decline s in property values of older public housing estates,
the govern ment initiate d an estate upgrad ing program me. One billion dollars is
to be spent ann ually from the govern ment’ s curren t accounts to ® nan ce the
 Public H ousing Residents 57

scheme over a 15-yea r period . By 1996, this scheme had become a centrep iece in
the PA P’ s claim to continual political legitim acy an d ad ministrative ef® cacy. The
popularity of this scheme w ith the bulk of public housing residen ts can be
imagined . This w as matche d by the ire it in curred am ong a seg men t of the
m iddle class w ho have eithe r chosen voluntarily, or have been ex cluded by
public housing eligibility rules, to live in costly private housing.
To this middle class segme nt, the expensive upgrad ing program me appeared
to be part of an `endless’ stre am of giving ® nan cial ad van tage s to public housing
reside nts; as the housing units them selve s were alread y subsid ise d and capital
gain s from the resale of the ¯ ats could be retained as private gain s w ithout tax.
Furthermore, the economic ad vantage s to public housin g reside nts accrued from
these subsid ies appeare d to be derived from the tax-payin g m iddle class (Straits
Tim es, 25 August 1995). This complaint w as politically signi® cant enough to
w arrant a clari® cation from the M inister of Finance. He reason ed that the funds
for upgrad ing could not be derived from income tax because the tax rate s have
been declinin g ann ually. The funds, ins tead , w ere and w ill be derive d from
other sources of govern ment income, including prude nt man agem en t of accu-
m ulated surplus (Straits Tim es, 19 September 1995). It w as this m iddle class
complaint that drew vocal public housing residen ts to criticise the earlie r
men tione d `executive condominium’ sche me. These exchanges also disclose d
that public housin g policies have become a politically contested terrain .
Realisin g the importance of the upgrad ing program me to public housing
reside nts and dete rm ine d to retain or recover its electoral support, the PAP
in itially `threate ne d’ that constituencies w hich elected non -PAP candidate s
w ould be excluded from the upgrad ing programme; furthermore, in instan ces
w he re upgrad in g plans had alre ad y been approved, they could be w ithdraw n
by the elected PA P govern ment! N ot only the other political partie s but seg-
men ts of the population also saw this as an unfair use of public funds to
promote the PAP’ s bid for ab solute power. C harge s of `unfairne ss’ were not
denie d by the PA P; instead , such charges were dism issed as `naive’ because such
strate gic use of govern ment resources by the rulin g party w as part an d parcel of
`real politik’ . Any questionab le political ethics w as apparen tly absolve d by the
`fact’ that supposedly every political party does it (Straits Times, 29 December
1996) .
This `threat’ , combined w ith other electioneering strate gies, includin g rad ical
redraw in g of constituen cy bound aries w hich were further tied to a new pro-
posed structure for public housing estate m an agem en t, produced an overall
effect of increasin g the `pain’ or `cost’ for any public housing residen t w ho w as
contemplating voting for non -PAP contestants . In 1988± 89, estate man agem en t
responsibilities were removed from the H DB an d hande d over to `town councils’
led by the team of ele cted PA P members of parliam ent from three or more
constituen cies w hich are grouped into w hat are calle d `Group Represen tative
C onstituencies’ (GRC). In the 1997 ge ne ral election, the number of candidate s
per GRC w as expan ded to six, red ucing sin gle-se at constituencies w he re oppo-
sition partie s stood better chance s, to four. (For a history of the `town council’
see , O oi, 1990.) The cost in material life w ithin the res ide ntial environ ment w as
raised so high that to vote agains t the PAP w as tantam ount to voting ag ain st
one’s ow n m ate rial in terests . This strateg y most likely contrib uted to PAP’s
improved electoral support in contested constituencies to 65 per cent. The depth
of its contribution w as, however, dif® cult to asses s because the tw o large ly H D B
58 C hua Beng H uat

constituen cies had elected their respective members from tw o other political
partie s.
For the an aly tic purpose of this essay, the level of contribution is a moot point.
W hat is sign i® cant is that the strateg y exposed the fact that a citizen ry that is
absolutely depe nde nt on state monopolise d provision for its housin g need s
could be, an d w as held hostage by the PAP sin gle-party dom inant govern ment.
Furthermore, in practice, the PAP has become syn onym ous w ith the `state’
because of (i) its long reign and (ii) w ith opposition partie s in disarray an d
self-destruction, an y possibility of displacin g it from the seat of governm en t is
all but elim inated . It sh ould be now obvious that, in an d through public housin g,
citizen s of Singapore have become clien ts of the state an d depen dent upon the
m oral an d material large sse of its elected manage rs.

C on clus ion
The above analys is of the nation al public housing program me in Sing apore has
demonstrate d that public housing, as part of the package of state social welfare
bene® ts, has indeed expan ded some of the `righ ts’ of the citize ns in mee ting its
consumption nee ds. The state , in the inte rest of m ain tain ing m as s political
loyalty, has to accede to deman ds from the political ground . It must intervene ,
on beh alf of the citize ns, to decom modify housing as a consumer good in
various meas ures an d, in so doing , sh ield the citize ns /consumers from the pro® t
m otives of private capital in the housing market. In this sense, the rulin g
govern ment, as m an age r of the state, is obliged to continue and even expand
provision in the in teres t of securing political support from the m ajority of the
citizen s as voters. It is a step from w hich it cann ot w ithd raw w ithout serious
conse quen ces to its continuity in the seats of power. Conversely, the citizen s’
dependen cy on state provision has m ade them clients of the state ; a status w hich
reduces their ab ility to exercise their electoral power. It ren ders them captive
an d large ly im potent in the face of the state ’s thre ats of w ithholding continual
provisions because to confront the thre at w ould be to seriously jeopard ise their
ow n material in teres ts. On the one hand , the Sing apore polity is an elected
single-party dom inant state that hold s absolute political power, makin g it a
lim itin g case in democratically ele cted polities. On the other, this fact mere ly
he lps to brin g the dynam ics of state-provision± citize n-depen den cy into relief,
thus better facilitates an aly sis rathe r than refutes the presence of such dyn am ics.
Fin ally, w ith speci® c referen ce to Sing apore , obviously the ne ar monopolis-
ation of housing provision by the state age ncy, the H D B, has give n the PAP
govern ment a very strong hold on the m ate rial intere st of the vas t majority of
the population, makin g it very dif® cult for opposition forces to ® nd a crack in
its political power over the people. H owever, the grow ing middle class has been
able to ex tract differen t types of housing concessions from the PAP govern ment.
Furthermore, in instances of 99-year lease hold private condominiums, the
govern ment has turned a seg men t of high -income housin g consumers to the
in teres ts of private developers an d free them from the governm en t’s responsi-
bility and control. Gran ting such freedom to an increasin g portion of the
electorate w ould run a gre ate r risk of losin g majority electoral support an d
contin uity of govern ance; thus, the proportion of public housing to private
sector housing may be unlike ly to go below the an nounced 75 to 25 per cent,
respectively. O f course , it is no guarante e that the PA P w ill continue to be
 Public H ousing Residents 59

elected to power just by its housing policies alone . O ther meas ures of kee ping
the opposition out of parliam en t must be m ain tained an d if necessary invented,
depending on the inge nuity of its leaders an d, preferab ly, w ithin defensib le
boundarie s of democratic processes .

C orre spon de nce

C hua Beng H uat, Associate Professor, Departm en t of Sociology, N ation al Uni-
versity of Sing apore, 10 Ken t Rid ge C rescent, Singapore 119260 . Fax: 65-777 -
9579. Email: soccbh@nus.edu.sg

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A ldrich, B .C . (1985) H abitat defen ce in Southeas t A sia, So u the a st A sia n Jou rna l o f So cial S cien ce , 13, pp.
1± 14.
C astells, M . (1988) T he deve lopmen t of city-state in an open w orld e con om y: the Singapore
ex perience, B RIE W orking Paper N o. 31, U niversity of C aliforn ia, Ber ke ley.
C astells, M ., Goh , L . & K w ok, R.Y.W . (1990) T he She k K ip M e i Sy nd rom e : E con om ic D eve lo p m en t an d
Pu blic H ou sing in H o n g K o ng a nd Sing a po re (L on d on , Pion ).
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O xfor d U n iversity Pre ss).
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