Running Header: ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 1

Economic Deprivation: Poor

Economies, Radical Islam, and
the Future of the Arab Spring

Jeff Slusser

SSEC 401 Economic Studies

Prof Alan King

17 Feb 13
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Abstract

This paper focuses on countering the emerging threat from extremist Islam that is gaining

momentum throughout North Africa and the Middle East following the Arab Awakening. By

concentrating on the link between radical Islam and poverty, this paper highlights how Islamic

insurgents are utilizing the growing poverty as their method to gain popular support. In

particular, this paper concentrates on the economic situation of Tunisia and examines the

specifics of that country before recommending a tailored approach to improve their economy. By

focusing on Tunisia, the paper not only delivers a unique approach, but more importantly, a

framework through which to achieve similar results in neighboring countries.

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Introduction

On December 17, 2010, Tunisian street vender Mohammed al-Bou’azizi doused his body

with gasoline and ignited himself in protest against the social and economic policies of the long

standing Ben Ali regime. His sacrifice not only ignited a wave of protests in North Africa and the

Middle East, but would ultimately be linked to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt,

Libya, and Yemen in something that would later become known as the Arab Awakening. While

this singular event sparked revolutions throughout the Arab world, the revolutionaries

themselves were fueled by resentment over social inequality, corruption, and most importantly,

high levels of unemployment stemming from weak economies. As a result, many Arab countries

ousted their long standing autocratic dictators and attempted to implement some form of

democratic representational government. Sadly, in the aftermath of the revolutions, many of

these countries have realized it is far easier to remove a government than it is to build a

government. Consequently, without strong central governments, Arab nations that successfully

removed oppressive governments during the Arab Awakening are suffering from declining

economies that are once again leading to social unrest as wages plummet and unemployment

rates increase. This social unrest, if left unchecked, could easily lead to new revolutions, and

most importantly, make way for radical Islam throughout the region.

In order to demonstrate the potential for radical Islamic governments emerging in post

Arab Awakening nations, this paper will first cover three key topics. First, the paper will

demonstrate how radical Islam is progressing worldwide as an insurgency. Second, the paper

will demonstrate how poor economies were the most important factor in the successful

revolutions of the Arab Awakening. Third, and most important, the paper will demonstrate how

the poor economies that led to the Arab Awakening still exist within the emerging nations
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thereby posing a risk to the fledging governments. In covering these broad topics, the paper will

specifically concentrate on Tunisia and ultimately present specific economic recommendations to

counter the current trend of a declining economy and rising influence of radical Islam. In

particular, the paper will focus on the effects of five initiatives. First, average citizens must

believe they share in the responsibility of the new economy. Second, education must be stressed.

Third, governments must seek new trade agreements. Fourth, governments must seek additional

foreign investment. Finally, the nations must be given the time and space to allow for these

initiatives to mature. By creating a tailored approach for Tunisia, this paper will not only provide

a viable path for Tunisia, but also in a broad sense, for the rest of the nations emerging from the

Arab Spring.

Radical Islam as an Insurgency

Throughout the Islamic Middle East and North Africa, a large scale movement by radical

Islamic organizations has grown progressively more powerful. The movement, one best defined

as an insurgency, is exemplified by groups like Al Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates such as Al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansar al-Sharia, and Al-Shabaab. What

these groups share in common, is the ongoing attempt to undermine existing governments in an

attempt to replace it with one they approve of. While these groups focus in their respective

regions, that fact that they often cooperate towards a common objectives best defines them as, “a

global Islamic insurgency embodied and led by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda” (Highland,

2003, p. 4).

Regarding the idea of a global Islamic insurgency and their goals, Dale Eikmeier argues

that, “the global Islamist insurgency has not yet reached its final stage in which an Islamist

government or governments work to re-establish a pan-Islamic caliphate. While such an

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objective might seem farfetched, groups ranging from small and local to global acknowledge this

'back to the future' idea to be their ultimate goal” (Eikmeier, 2005). As Eikmeier explains, the

Islamic movement spreading throughout the world today is a global movement where various

groups are united by the common ultimate goal of reinstating an Islamic caliphate. Dale

Eikmeier is by no means the only individual to define the emerging Islamic extremism as a

global insurgency. In her book, Knowing the Enemy, Mary Habeck also observes how Islamic

extremists are, “committed to the destruction of the entire secular world because they believe this

is a necessary first step to create an Islamic utopia on earth” (Habeck, 2006, p. 7). As Habeck

explains, Islamic extremists the world over are attempting to create a greater Islamic state

reminiscent of Islam’s Golden Era. What these two demonstrate, is that the violent Islamic

movement erupting in all corners of the world today is best defined as an insurgency united

behind the common goal of recreating a larger Islamic caliphate.

In order to accomplish the goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate, Islamic insurgencies

usually originate in the impoverished and ignored regions. Typically, groups such as al Qaeda

offer the people a better form of government in exchange for their support. This method of

obtaining support by offering a better form of government is nothing new in the history of

politics and warfare. However, defining it as an insurgency and conducting counter insurgency is

something that has only recently emerged as official doctrine. In particular, U.S. General David

Petraeus, who commanded the Multi-National Force – Iraq and oversaw the now famous surge

that mostly quelled the exploding violence in Iraq, is most often associated with

counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN). However, while Gen Petraeus is rightly credited with

countering the violence that erupted in Iraq after the US invasion of 2003, his ideas were mainly

inspired by Dr. David Kilcullen who served on his staff (Lozada, 2009). Kilcullen, who holds a
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PhD in political anthropology, has recently emerged as an expert on insurgencies and

counterinsurgencies. Interestingly, according to Kilcullen, counterinsurgency is relatively simple

– “for your side to win, the people do not have to like you, but they must respect you, accept that

your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly

their security” (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 30). In other words, an insurgency/counterinsurgency is

fundamentally a competition between two or more competing forms of government. Thus, for a

particular side to win, it simply must appear better than the competition. How this specifically

applies to the Middle East and North Africa is that, “according to a 2012 Pew Research Center

Poll, majorities in several countries there (including Jordan, and Tunisia) value a strong economy

more than a democratic government” (Jones, 2013, p. 56). Therefore, the method used by the

insurgents in North Africa and the Middle East is one where they offer a better form of

government, one that will bring economic prosperity.

The potential influence insurgents can wield by offering a better government that will

bring economic prosperity cannot be emphasized enough. Historically, a population’s perception

of their government is highly influenced if not directly linked to how their economy is currently

performing. Take the United States for example, a Gallup Poll released on March 19th, 2012

stated that, “Americans’ rating of the economy and of the president’s job performance moved in

tandem in five of the past 12 years, with correlation scores of 0.5 or higher: 2001, 2003, 2004,

2008, 2012 to date” (Saad and Newport, 2012). Considering that these numbers were correlated

during the tenure of two separate Presidents and that the United States was involved in two

separate wars during that timeframe makes these numbers even more compelling. Where this is

even more important is that if relatively small fluctuations in the economy can drastically affect

the opinions of those who live in the words largest economy, then they also can drastically affect
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the opinions of those who live in poorest regions on earth. Highlighting this point, William

Shaub writes that, “Egypt had a massive income gap throughout Mubarak’s control, which is

clearly the root cause of the original uprising. One half of Egyptians live on $2/day or less. The

average per-capita income in the country is just $6,200 (Shaub, 2011). Regarding Tunisia,

another writer stated, “In Tunisia, protests which began primarily over economic frustration,

injustice and indignity grew to voice anger at the impunity of the security authorities and

endemic corruption in ruling families and elites” (FCO, 2011, p. 12). Even more compelling than

these two, AG Analyst writes,

if one were to examine closely, it was not so much as freedom and free will alone, that
provoked agents of political change, but economics too had a large, more dominant role
to play. If we were to diagnose the root cause of all revolutions that has [sic] ever
happened, from the French to the Russia, to the American the common denominator has
always been about socio-economic imbalances. In modern history, from the fall of
Communism, the historic election of Juan Peron in Argentina & his inevitable downfall,
to the more recent Arab Spring, were all as a result of the economics of the region.
People elected, protested or overthrew regimes, when their livelihood was at stake, when
unemployment became a casualty and the divide between the rich and the poor became
far too large to ignore. (Analyst, 2013)

As pointed out by Analyst, people generally grumble over political arrangements, but when a

large segment of the population can no longer put food on the table, revolutions generally occur

quickly thereafter. For this reason, the method employed by the Islamic insurgents throughout

North Africa and the Middle East is especially dangerous.

When looking specifically at Tunisia, where the Arab Spring began, the role the economy

played becomes even more evident, for the state of Tunisia’s economy united countless factions

of the population. Like many nations in the Islamic Middle East and North Africa, there has

historically been a huge divide between the rural poor regions and the urban wealthy regions. In

Ben Ali’s Tunisia, the majority of the economic, social, political, and educational progress

benefitted the urban coastal cities. Consequently, a social, cultural, and economic gap began to
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emerge between the cultured coastal Tunisians and the impoverished rural Tunisians. It is this

factor, more than anything else, that most significantly impacted the eventual ouster of Ben Ali.

A 2012 economic brief on Tunisia written by Stephan King for The African Development Bank

explains that, “youth unemployment was estimated at around 30% during [2008 and 2009] with a

national average of 14%. Regional disparities in employment and poverty within Tunisia were

distressingly high. The revolution began in the impoverished interior of the country” (King,

2012, p. 1). As King explains, the revolution itself started in the interior due to high

unemployment rates and extreme poverty among the youth. These same sentiments are also

shared by Arieff who stated,

despite its apparent relative prosperity, Tunisia has long exhibited a significant divide
between rural and urban areas, and especially between the developed, tourist-friendly
coast and the poorer interior. At least half of the population lives in Tunis and coastal
towns, and there is population drift toward these areas. Anti-government unrest,
particularly rooted in labor and economic grievances, has often originated in the
interior—as did the protests that unseated Ben Ali. (Arieff, 2012, p. 4)

As Arieff and King explain, the spark that ignited the revolution originated in the most

economically depressed regions of Tunisia. However, once the revolution sparked, it spread

quickly as the people came together under the goal of ousting the long standing Ben Ali regime.

While the current radical Islamic organizations in the Middle East and North Africa have

generally promised governments that will bring economic prosperity and equality, this does not

mean that all insurgent groups offer these same benefits. Insurgent groups, by definition, emerge

as an opposition group offering a better form of governance, one that will counter the unique

specifics of a given nation or region. Regarding this important piece, Kilcullen writes,

there are no standards or universal templates in counterinsurgency. Fundamentals and

principles exist, but they require judgment in application, and there is no substitute for
studying the environment in detail, developing locally tailored solutions, and being
prepared to adjust them in an agile way as the situation develops. (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 26)
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In other words, counterinsurgencies must be conducted in a tailored approach because

insurgencies originate for reasons that are particular to a specific location. Thus, while radical

Islamic insurgencies in the Middle East and North Africa are fundamentally different than the

Chinese Communist insurgency of the 1920s, they are also different from one another also. The

point is, one must examine the particular underlying societal issues respective insurgents are

exploiting in order to successfully counter them. In Tunisia, the poor economy sparked the

revolution. However, this is not always the case and as such, one must always evaluate the

underlying causes of an insurgency before attempting to develop a counterinsurgency campaign.

Radical Islam and Poverty

To understand today’s link between radical Islam and poverty, one must first understand

that at its peak, Islam extended, “from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean to the confines of China,

an empire greater than Rome at its zenith” (Smith, 1991, p. 222). Today however, the state of

Islam lies in ruins. “The United States, Europe, and even Japan and other Asian states developed

militarily, economically, and politically into superpowers that dominate international politics,

finance, the media, popular culture—in sum, all of human life” (Habeck, 2006, p. 9). The core

issue however, is that Islam is one of the largest religions in the world, but due to their economic

plight, they generally lack the ability to influence world events. Emphasizing this point, Samuel

Huntington wrote, “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is

Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and

are obsessed with the inferiority of their power” (Huntington, 1996, p. 217). As Huntington

observes, the entire Islamic world is obsessed with revitalizing Islam. The crisis for the world

though, is that some such as bin Laden see Jihad as that path.
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To provide some background on the economic and political plight of the Islamic Middle

East and North Africa, United States President Barack Obama stated in early 2011 that, “If you

take out oil exports, this entire region of over 400 million people exports roughly the same

amount as Switzerland” (Klein, 2011). The deficient of exported goods is best demonstrated by

the low GPD per capita rates in non-oil producing Islamic nations. For example, Tunisia’s GDP

per capita rate hovers just under $10,000 (IndexMundi, 2013). Although this amount appears low

compared to the United States’ per capita rate of $49,000 (IndexMundi, 2013), Lachen Achy

writes, “before the January 14 Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia was neither an economic miracle nor

a full success story, but it was doing better than its neighbors” (Achy, 2011, p. 4). Sadly, Achy is

quite correct, for when Tunisia is compared to countries such as Yemen, Afghanistan, and

Pakistan, whose per capita GDPs are $2,300, $1,000, and $2,800 respectively (IndexMundi,

2013), one understands the level of poverty many Islamic nations face.

While the poverty levels encountered by many Islamic nations are extreme, the

distribution of what little wealth exists is surprisingly similar to that of most industrialized

nations. For example, in Tunisia, the top 20% of the population controls 46.3% of the wealth

(Encyclopedia, 2013). In Yemen, the top 20% of the population control 46.1% of the wealth. In

Pakistan, the top 20% of the population controls 41.1% of the wealth (Encyclopedia, 2013).

Surprisingly, in the United States the top 20% control 46.4% of the wealth, in England the top

20% control 43% of the wealth, and in Switzerland the top 20% controls 40.3% of the wealth

(Encyclopedia, 2013). As the statistics demonstrate, wealth distribution remains relatively

constant between Western and Islamic nations. However, the difference between these nations,

as pointed out by the CIA World Factbook, is that the Western nations rely on high value

economies centered on industry and financial services such as banking, insurance, and business
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services. Islamic nations, on the other hand, either rely almost exclusively on oil exports such as

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar, or in the cases such as Tunisia, Pakistan, and Yemen, they rely

on low value economies such as low technology agriculture and herding (CIA, 2013).

Consequently, the Islamic world is plagued by a general lack of industrialization that has resulted

in much lower GDPs. The low GDPs ensure that what little wealth exists in these nations is

almost exclusively reserved for a few ruling elites. As a result, the Islamic Middle East and

North Africa is plagued with extremely high levels of poverty, an even greater number of those

who are barely getting by, and an extreme disparity in wealth between the ruling elites and the

general population.

Not surprisingly, the Islamic world is obsessed with overcoming their economic plight.

Among the many leaders who have presented plans to overcome the issues and revitalize Islam,

none have been more controversial than the late Osama Bin Laden who founded Al Qaeda. To

the West he was seen as a terrorist, but to many Muslims he was seen as a man who fought to

better Islam. In his CRS report to Congress on al-Qaeda, Christopher Blanchard writes that one

of Al Qaeda’s primary goals was to support the, “emergence of a new virtuous leadership”

dedicated to opposing “the Zionist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant coalition” that Al Qaeda blames for a

litany of social and political ills in the Islamic world (Blanchard, 2007, p. 5). Blanchard further

notes that Al Qaeda sees, “themselves and their followers as the vanguard of an international

Islamic movement primarily committed to ending U.S. “interference” in the affairs of Islamic

countries and supportive of efforts to recast Islamic societies according to narrow interpretations

of Islam and Islamic law” (Blanchard, 2007, p. 18). Ultimately, Al Qaeda has presented three

foundations as its path to revitalization: a Quran based authority to govern, liberating the Islamic

homeland from foreign aggressors, and liberating individuals from Arab governments that do not
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adhere to its strict interpretation of the Quran and Sharia law. Frighteningly, many Muslims do

not agree with bin Laden’s methods, but they do agree with his goal of revitalizing Islam.

As Blanchard notes, al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups blame Western nations

such as the United States, France, and England for the economic deprivation experienced by

many living in Islamic lands today. Ultimately, radical Islamic organizations exploit the poverty

experienced by many Muslims in an attempt to gain support. In a manner similar to Adolf Hitler

who blamed Germany’s economic woes on the Jews in the 1920s and 30s in an effort to unite the

German population behind him, Islamic extremists blame the Islamic fate on “the Zionist-Anglo-

Saxon-Protestant coalition” in an attempt to unite the population behind them. Sadly, these ideas

appeal to large numbers of economically deprived individuals living under autocratic dictators.

As a result, the rural conservative populations of countries such as Tunisia, Libya, Mali, and

Niger are all too susceptible to Islamic fundamentalism.

The relationship between radical Islam and poverty is not that radical Islam preaches

poverty or even that it necessarily results in poverty. Instead, radical Islam emerges as a promise

to govern better, to be less corrupt, and to revitalize the economy. In essence, radical Islam is an

insurgency promising a better form of government to the impoverished people. Most

importantly, they promise to rekindle Islam’s past in the form of a modern Golden Era. Sadly,

these promises come at the steep price of living under Islamic fundamentalism as interpreted by

individuals such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Anwar

al-Awlaki.

The Link Between Moderate Islam, Poor Economies, and the Arab Spring that Sparked in

Tunisia
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As mentioned earlier, “If we were to diagnose the root cause of all the revolutions that

has [sic] ever happened, from the French to the Russian to the American, the common

denominator has always been about socio- economic imbalances” (Analyst, 2013). If socio-

economic factors have historically sparked revolutions, then the next question is where does

radical Islam fit into the Arab Spring and its aftermath? The answer is that radical Islam is not

responsible for the Arab Spring. Instead, radical Islam was only one of many insurgent groups

that were united by poor economies towards the mutual goal of removing their respective

regimes from power in order to improve their economic situation. In other words, many secular

and religious groups temporarily put aside religious and political differences in order to

overcome the economic crisis that had developed in North Africa and the Middle East. However,

once the revolutions occurred, revolutions only made possible by poor economies uniting a

majority of the population, moderate Islamic groups were the largest and best organized social

organizations in the various countries and were therefore best situated to emerge successful when

elections were held. The state of Tunisia’s economy, how it sparked the revolution, and then how

Islamists were able to seize power after the revolution through fair elections perfectly illustrates

these points.

When Mohammed al-Bou’azizi ignited himself in protest against the economic policies

of Ben Ali, he ignited the economic and political frustrations felt by the majority of Tunisians.

Eric Andrew-Gee points out that it was unemployment and economic stagnation that provoked

the revolution, for people could no longer afford to feed their families (Andrew-Gee, 2011). In a

similar statement, Stephen King points out in his economic brief to the African Development

Bank that, “High unemployment, inequality, and anger at corruption fueled the popular revolts”

(King, 2012, p. 1). In other words, while corruption and police brutality played a role in the
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revolution, the economic situation in Tunisia sparked the revolution. To understand how the poor

economy united a majority of Tunisians rather than a brutal regime, a brief political economic

background is necessary.

Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was born in 1936 to an average family. Not coming from wealth

or power, he nonetheless completed his advanced schooling in the United States and France

before returning to Tunisia. Ben Ali rose quickly in the ranks of the security establishment and

served as ambassador to Poland in the early 1980s before eventually becoming Prime Minister in

1987. On November 7th, 1987, Ben Ali came to power when he initiated a bloodless takeover

ousting Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba (BBC, 2011). Ruling Bourguiba mentally

unfit, Ben Ali stepped in and promised, “a gradual transition towards democracy, though in his

first two presidential polls – in 1989 and 1994 – he was elected unopposed” (BBC, 2011). Sadly,

like most Arab autocrats, the promised democracies and representative governments soon faded

into memory. Tunisia under Ben Ali was no different, except that along with the political

oppression and corruption, he did manage to deliver, “stability and a measure of economic

prosperity” (BBC, 2011). In fact, the relative economic prosperity Ben Ali brought to Tunisians

appeased the people, or at least the majority. As a result, political tensions existed, but action was

delayed in lieu of economic prosperity.

Throughout the majority of Ben Ali’s reign, Tunisia witnessed modest yet continual

economic growth. Lachen Achy writes, “before the January 14 Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia was

neither an economic miracle nor a full success story, but it was doing better than its neighbors”

(Achy, 2011, p. 4). Achy supports this argument by demonstrating how “[Tunisia] achieved an

average economic growth rate of nearly 5 percent during the last decade, outpacing other Middle

Eastern and North African and lower middle-income countries’ averages” (Achy, 2011, p. 4).
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The 5 percent growth rate can mostly be attributed to a successful family planning policy,

something made ever more efficient by ensuring the education of women.

These numbers mentioned by Achy are by no means unique. The African Development

Bank charts Tunisia’s GDP growth rates as 4.6 in 2008 and 3.0 in 2009 (King, 2012). In fact,

during Ben Ali’s 23 years as President, Tunisia’s GDP grew from 10 billion to 45.9 billion

overall (Trading Economics, 2012). Ben Ali accomplished this through economic reforms

designed, “to rid the country of its socialistic legacy” (Sorkin, 2001). One of the most important

initiatives Ben Ali instituted was economic privatization. Despite its lack of natural resources,

Ben Ali’s economic initiatives and progressive society influenced many major corporations to

headquarter their African branches in Tunis. The World Bank and the International Monetary

Fund were just two of the major players to develop close ties with Tunisia. As Sorkin points out,

“with little natural resources, as opposed to its oil rich neighbors Algeria and Libya, Tunisia has

encouraged its private sector to carry the banner of economic progress, while offering investment

benefits to the tourism and manufacturing industries as a means to bolster economic growth and

encourage foreign investment” (Sorkin, 2001).

Adding to these impressive initiatives, under Ben Ali, polygamy was banned, woman

enjoyed equal citizenship and the right to initiate divorce, woman were allowed to serve in the

military, and they constituted more than 50% of the university students (Arieff, 2012, p. 4). Most

importantly, Ben Ali maintained a real unemployment rate that remained at less than 20%, and

was stable at 13% in 2010 (Wolf and Lefevra, 2012). In effect, Ben Ali transformed Tunisia

from a Third World backwater state to a developing nation on the path to full industrialization.

Due to these impressive economic initiatives, Tunisians largely turned a blind eye to the state

brutality.
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However, underlying political and economic tensions continued to simmer. Most

importantly, Tunisia became increasingly split between the wealthier coastal tourist regions and

the poor interior where unemployment ran increasingly more rampant, especially among the

young university graduates. In fact, “youth unemployment was estimated at around 30% during

[2008 and 2009] with a national average of 14%. Regional disparities in employment and

poverty within Tunisia were [also] distressingly high. The revolution began in the impoverished

interior of the country” (King, 2012, p. 1). As King points out, just before the revolution, youth

unemployment began to climb dramatically as did the regional distribution of employment, for

Ben Ali’s economic initiatives favored the tourist regions rather the poor interior. Highlighting

the importance of this key fact, Alexis Arieff wrote in her brief to Congress that, “Anti-

government unrest, particularly rooted in labor and economic grievances, [that unseated Ben Ali]

originated in the interior (Arieff, 2012, p. 4). Ultimately, Ben Ali had historically led an

authoritarian regime known for its brutality, and while the economy was successful, the people

ignored it. On the other hand, as the economy declined and the disparity between the rural and

coastal regions increased, inaction was replaced by action. This observation is perfectly captured

by Eric Andrew-Gee,

The absence of work violated an unspoken bargain struck between Ben Ali’s
authoritarian regime and the people: You ignore our iron fist, and we will supply you
with jobs. Emma Murphy, a professor at Durham University who has written extensively
on Tunisian politics, remembers a time when, frightened by a growing tide of Islamism
that Ben Ali opposed and content with 5 percent economic growth, Tunisians didn’t mind
the government “tightening the screws” politically. That time, though, has clearly passed.
(Andrew-Gee, 2011)

As Andrew-Gee clearly points out, people will often tolerate a brutal totalitarian government, but

in return it must deliver a stable prosperous economy to its population. On the other hand, when

the people no longer believe in the capability of the government, revolutions are a logical next
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 17

step. Thus, while the revolution began in the interior where poverty was worse, the poor

economy, state corruption, and police brutality ensured it spread quickly throughout the rest of

the country. As a result, Ben Ali was quickly overthrown and Tunisians were given a chance at

building their own representational government.

As demonstrated, poor economies created a singular movement where the Tunisian

people temporarily put aside political and religious differences in favor of removing Ben Ali.

However, these politically convenient alliances quickly dissolved once Ben Ali fled. Afterwards,

instead of working together to form a functioning government, Tunisian political activism

exploded. Overnight, more than 80 different political parties were formed representing every

facet of political interest. Most importantly though, and key to this argument, two primary

political interest groups emerged – the secular and the religious. However, the first elections

were held on 23 October, less than 10 months after Ben Ali fled. Consequently, the secular

political groups were far from organized. The Islamic groups, on the other hand, were well

organized and surprisingly to the West, emerged victorious when the elections were held. This

organization of the Islamic political parties is not limited to Tunisia, for it has been a common

theme throughout North Africa and the Middle East in the post Arab Spring. Sheri Berman notes

in her article for Foreign Affairs that,

religious organizations were among the only forums in which average citizens could
express themselves or participate actively in the lives of their communities, and so when
[governments] fell and the transition occurred, only Islamists had the infrastructure in
place to mobilize supporters effectively. (Berman, 2013, p. 65)

Ironically, the power of the Islamic parties is a direct result of Arab autocrats banning all

opposing political parties, including Islamic groups, yet allowing Islamic groups to meet under

the pretense of religious activity. Consequently, Islamic political parties gained power in nations

such as Egypt and Tunisia.

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The Link between Moderate and Radical Islam in Post Arab Spring Nations

On 23 October 2011, Tunisians went to the polls, and for the first time in recent history,

were able to choose between a dizzying array of candidates. Surprisingly, the moderate Islamic

party Ennahda won a plurality of the seats. Although the established organization of the Islamist

parties tells how they won the elections, it does not explain why. David Kirkpatrick writing for

the New York Times reveals how groups such as Ennahda emerged victorious from the polls

when he explains that,

their candidates and leaders focused on [economic development and internal security, not
moral issues]. Acknowledging a strong tradition of woman’s rights in Tunisia that is
unusual for the region, the party’s officials have repeatedly pledged to promote equal
opportunities in employment and education as well as freedom to choose or reject Islamic
dress like the head scarf. (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

As Kirkpatrick explains, the real strength of Islamic parties such as Ennahada is that they went

into the post revolution with much better organization and established support bases than other

groups, and then increased their support base by presenting themselves as moderate Islamic

groups. As a result, Ennahda appealed to large numbers of people, and the voices and votes of

those who did not agree with them were diluted in the dizzying array of other choices that

emerged.

True moderate Islamic groups are no real concern, and are perhaps exactly what

emerging Islamic nations need to successfully transition from autocracies to democracies.

Unfortunately, soon after winning a plurality of the votes, these moderate Islamic groups began

to exhibit strict Islamic values. In other words, once they gained their power, the actions

exhibited by the moderate Islamic groups were often contrary to their rhetoric during

campaigning. This fact is best demonstrated by the video released in late spring 2012 showing
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the Ennahda political leader, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, talking to a group of young radical Tunisian

salafists. In the video, Ghannouchi states,

the secularists are still controlling the media, economy and administration. Therefore,
controlling them would require more time […] the police and army’s support for
Islamists is not guaranteed, and controlling them would also require more time. I tell our
young salafists to be patient… Why hurry? Take your time to consolidate what you have
gained, create television channels, radio stations, schools and universities […] We’ve met
with Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the salafists, including Sheikh Abou Iyadh and Sheikh al-Idrissi.
(Trabelsi, 2012)

This speech, given to young Tunisian salafists by the leading member of the ruling moderate

Islamic political party in Tunisia, clearly demonstrates the fragility of Tunisia’s current interim

government. It also perfectly demonstrates how Islamic groups have managed to exploit the

fractured political landscape for their gain.

Public rhetoric by people such as Ghannouchi is not the only issue creating concern for

the future North African nations. The lack of response to increasingly violent actions by radical

Islamists is creating an even greater problem. In the wake of the Arab Spring, tepid security force

responses to progressively more violent acts by radical Islamists have emboldened these groups.

The lack of response ultimately culminated in the attacks on the US Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia,

the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, and most recently, the assassination of a leading Ennahda

critic during broad daylight in Tunis, Tunisia.

In Tunisia, radical Islamic groups emerged quickly after Ben Ali fled the country,

however, they represented only a small insignificant portion of the populations. Unfortunately,

the moderate Islamic interim Tunisian government largely turned a blind eye to actions taken by

this minority. It may never be known whether this lack of action was a decision to allow

individual expression in the wake of a totalitarian police state, or a deliberate act in order to

ultimately achieve more traditional Islamic state. What is known though, is the Tunisian
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 20

government has failed to act against the Tunisian radical Islamic groups, most notably, Ansar al

Sharia. Summarizing the events transpiring in Tunisia, Ian Black writes that,

The government has been blamed for failing to act against intimidation and violence by
mosque preachers and on extremist social networking sites. Assaults against journalists,
political activists and artists have not even been investigated, let alone prosecuted. Salafis
attacked the US embassy in Tunis last September after the deadly assault on the US
consulate in Benghazi and embassy in Cairo. Last October a leaked video featuring
Ghannouchi talking to Salafi leaders. (Black, 2013)

As Blank points out, there is either an inability to counter the radical Salafists in Tunisia, or a

lack of desire to counter them. Either situation poses incredibly difficult problems for Tunisia’s

future prospects as a moderate Islamic nation. In Libya, the situation is growing even

increasingly more dire, for the Libyan government is actually incapable of acting against radical

Islamists. This lack of ability is best demonstrated by the attack against the US Consulate in

Benghazi that resulted in four Americans killed, including US Ambassador Stevens. The point

here is that these groups represented only a small insignificant portion of the population one year

ago, but after the revolutions, they have become increasingly powerful.

Ultimately, the economic situation in Tunisia under Ban Ali created a unique situation

where diametrically opposed political groups formed an alliance to overthrow Ben Ali. However,

once he was gone, the alliance splintered and in the political chaos that ensued, Islamic groups

preaching moderation prevailed. These results were only made possible by the unique

combination of a population that tolerated an economically strong yet brutal state while they

prospered from it. Once the state could no longer buy the loyalty of a majority of the population

due to a declining economy, the population quickly turned on the state without regard to who or

what may takes its place. Sadly, Tunisia and Libya are only two examples, for radical Islam is

gaining momentum in the economically impoverished regions throughout North Africa and the

Middle East.
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 21

Poor Economies, Radical Islam, and the Future of the Arab Spring in North Africa and the

Middle East

Since the Tunisian Revolution occurred, interim mostly moderate Islamic governments

have taken office throughout North Africa with grandiose promises of economic revitalization,

civil liberties for all, and new written constitution. Unfortunately, few changes have occurred.

Economies have remained far below the levels that created the necessary environment to

overthrow the ruling autocrats, radical salafist groups have either been ignored, or as in the case

of Libya, ceded territory, and interim governments have failed to draft the promised

constitutions. Even more dangerously, radical salafist groups have utilized the economic

uncertainly to increase their power base in rural regions, and have begun to openly challenge the

government’s right to rule demonstrating a classic insurgency model. Consequently, the

democratic potential in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is quickly fading into

memory as Islamic extremists exert increasing influence and control throughout the different

countries and regions.

Of these issues, poor economies present the most dangerous issue, for as previously

demonstrated, they can spark large scale revolutions by uniting large segments of the

populations. The economic situation in Tunisia since the revolution, has not even come close to

recovering or even reaching the levels that brought down Ben Ali. Highlighting the floundering

economy, The World Bank notes that,

the economy in 2011 did not recover as quickly as expected. While the government
approved a supplemental budget in June 2011 with a large fiscal stimulus package, only
part of it was absorbed, and the fiscal deficit was 3.5 percent of GDP in 2011 (instead of
the budgeted 5.1 percent of GDP). Due to the deterioration of the trade balance, tourism
and FDI receipts, the current account deficit widened considerably to 7.3 percent of GDP
in 2011. Consequently, the level of international reserves was reduced from 4.7 months
of imports at end-2010 to 3.5 months at end-2011. (World Bank, 2013)
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 22

As the World Bank notes, the Tunisian economy is in a grim state, and has not really started to

recover yet. Sadly, Tunisia is not the only Post Arab Awakening Islamic nation with a

floundering economy, for the economic recovery across the region has been sluggish (Jones,

2013, p. 56).

Acknowledging the failing economy, and its security implications, Lahcen Achy

emphasized the following four areas that the new government would have to address in order to

remain successful: high rates of youth unemployment, large numbers of marginal jobs, income

inequality, and regional wealth disparities (Achy, 2011, p. 1). Sadly, since Dec 2011, these areas

have not been sufficiently addressed and the, “short-term economic outlook therefore is expected

to result in levels of unemployment rates to remain at approximately 18 percent in 2012-2013”

(World Bank, 2012). Most importantly, the levels of youth unemployment are expected to

remain much higher. Regarding these numbers, Hannah Barnes for BBC writes that close to 30%

of all youth between 15 and 25 are unemployed through North Africa (Barnes, 2012).

Furthermore, Monia Ghanmi writing for the Magharebia in Tunis, Tunisia writes that, “The

Tunisian unemployment rate reached 18.9% in the fourth quarter of last year, with nearly three-

quarters of jobless citizens under the age of 30... The unemployment rate among those with

university degrees increased significantly, reaching 30.5%, versus 29.2% during the same period,

numbering 8,242 people during the last quarter of the year” (Ghanmi, 2012). As these two stress,

the Tunisian economy has continued to flounder, a fate shared by almost every nation in North

Africa. As a result, the governments of these emerging nations are under increasing pressure to

deliver economic results. If they cannot deliver at least modest economic results in the near

future, another revolution of coup could easily eliminate the historic chance the region has for

success. Most importantly however, given the increasingly bold actions undertaken by Islamic
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 23

extremist groups throughout the region, another revolution could easily pave the way for radical

Islam government rather than moderate Islam governments to emerge.

Economic Recommendations

In order to counter the growing radical Islamic insurgencies throughout North Africa and

the Middle East, the fledgling governments must immediately counter the rampant poverty and

enable families to put food on the table. While reforms such as better civil liberties and

constitutions guaranteeing individual freedoms must eventually materialize, if the economies are

not at least moderately revived in the immediate future, growing civil unrest will transition into

actively violent insurgencies. In order to accomplish a successful economic revitalization,

governments must take a staged approach. In the short term, governments must establish modest

unemployment funds where families are at least assisted in procuring food. In the long term

however, governments must focus on a climate of shared responsibility, educational initiatives,

trade agreements, and foreign investment. In keeping with the fundamentals of

counterinsurgency, this paper will focus specifically on Tunisia to illustrate these points.

In order to develop social programs such as an unemployment fund, the Tunisian

Government will unfortunately have to balance a near term economic policy with medium and

long term economic policies. As noted by the IMF,

The still-reasonable level of public debt, together with the large external financing
identified by the authorities for 2012, allow for a fiscal stimulus this year [but] current
spending will have to be contained and, as growth picks up over the medium term, fiscal
consolidation will need to be resumed to preserve fiscal sustainability. (IMF, 2012)

Although stimulus programs will certainly add to Tunisia’s already growing budget deficit, they

are an absolute must if Tunisia is to fully transitions into a representational government.

Ultimately, if the populations, especially the rural populations who are historically most

susceptible to radical Islamic insurgencies, cannot provide food for their families, they will
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 24

naturally turn to a person or group who can. Reaffirming this point, Monia Ghanmi, who writes

for a local paper in Tunisia, explains that,

many of the jobless believe addressing the issue requires the creation of an
unemployment compensation fund financed by the institutions as well as by workers. The
state and civil society organisations would contribute to the fund, acting as a bridge for
the unemployed to help them overcome their difficulties until they find a job. (Ghanmi,
2012)

If the Tunisian government can successfully convince the population that the government has

their best interest in mind, through such a program, the people will not readily support the

already brewing Islamic insurgencies.

Aside from the short term objective of putting food on the table, the most important

element to rebuild Tunisia’s economy is creating an environment where the majority of average

Tunisians believe they share responsibility. If the majority of the population does not believe

they share some level of responsibility in the state of the economy, the population can all too

easily blame the government for the economy and initiate another revolution. Furthermore, no

government can turn an economy around overnight, regardless of how efficient or inefficient it

is. In order to accomplish this feeling of mutual responsibility between the general public and the

government, Tunisia must move away from state corporatism and instead embrace social

corporatism (King, 2012, p. 2). In other words, Tunisia must develop institutions capable of

bargaining and representing their respective groups within not just the workplace, but also within

the government. For example, trade unions, labor groups, and employer associations are just

some of the economic institutions capable of representation in both sectors. This idea of social

corporatism is best explained by Stephen King who writes, “without national concertive efforts

that result in new socioeconomic pacts governments in transitional settings that are navigating

conditions of economic crisis will likely respond to exploding demands in an ad hoc fashion
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 25

combining capitulation to the demands of protestors with selective repression” (King, 2012, p.

2). As King explains, unless some level of national level bargaining is reached that is acceptable

to different segments of the population, protests and government reprisals are inevitable.

While popular support is effectively a requirement to rebuilding an economy, education

is an absolute requirement. Therefore, the new Tunisian government must expand the

educational opportunities for men and woman beyond what was available under Ben Ali.

Without an educated middle class working force, economic recovery is impossible, for as

Muhammad Faour observes, “[education develops] informed, responsible citizens who think

freely and contribute to society” (Faour, 2012, p. 3). Historically, the educated populace has

always posed the greatest threat to repressive governments, for they make informed choices that

help ensure the successful evolution of a government in transition, such as Tunisia, from an

autocracy to some version of democracy. However, more importantly, a sizable educated

working population will also stimulate the economy by creating new jobs and opportunities.

Furthermore, higher education leads to lower birth rates, an extremely important element for a

nation with a fragile emerging economy (Fitzgerald, 2011). Ultimately, an educated middle class

is essentially a prerequisite to building a successful market economy (Branson, 1991).

While shared responsibility and education will set the foundation for a successful

economy, Tunisia does not have the internal capital to successfully rebuild its economy without

some support. Therefore, two of the most important areas Tunisia must concentrate on in order to

mitigate their lack of internal capital include seeking foreign direct investment and developing

trade agreements with other nations. In the immediate future, foreign investment will assist in

lowering the unemployment rate. As argued by Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee, foreign

direct investment (FDI) is an important vehicle for economic recovery, and relatively contributes
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 26

to internal economic recovery more than domestic investment (Borensztein et al, 1998).

However, foreign investment cannot be the sole force behind economic recovery. Therefore, in

conjunction with foreign investment, Tunisia must seek new trade agreements with their large

trading partners such as the European Union and the United States. Trade agreements augment

and help sustain long term prosperity and continual economic growth.

Shared responsibility, education, foreign investment, and trade agreements will all assist

Tunisia in rebuilding its faltering economy. However, the last key element that Tunisia must

address is the declining security situation. Without a secure environment, foreign investment will

evaporate, trade agreements will fall away, education will collapse, and shared economic

responsibility will become meaningless. Thus, Tunisia must overcome the growing state of chaos

emerging from the Salafist jihadist threat simmering within its borders. It is generally accepted

that the attack on the US Embassy in Tunis on September 14th damaged Tunisia’s reputation as a

progressive and emerging free society. Unfortunately, the Tunisian government cannot simply

preempt this growing threat directly with military or police force. Instead, the Tunisian

government must refrain from the heavy handed tactics used by Ben Ali. Rather, the Tunisian

Government must take a long term incremental approach where two key objectives are sought.

First, the political Party Ennahda must publicly separate itself from the Islamic extremists. The

government must imprison those who break the law and those who organize groups to break the

law. Second, the Tunisian government must publicly expose the Islamic extremist groups as

insurgents. Most importantly, as the government pursues the insurgent groups, it must do so with

complete transparency, and the actions must be accompanied by economic reforms.

Conclusion
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 27

The emerging nations of the Islamic Middle East and North Africa have a long difficult

road ahead if they wish to successfully form some version of representational government.

Furthermore, while this paper primarily focused on Tunisia, and made specific recommendations

based upon Tunisia’s unique cultural, economic, and religious specifics, these must not be

blindly transplanted to other regions. Remembering Kilcullen’s premise of transplanting themes

rather than individual actions, some of the ideas discussed within this paper can certainly be

utilized in other regions. However, to blindly transplant everything will almost certainly result in

a situation where segments of a given population will feel alienated. Lastly, one must remember

how the United States took more than a hundred years to successfully form a government, and it

ultimately required a bloody civil war. Thus, outside influence can help emerging nations

through financing and loose guidance. However, foreign nations must refrain from dictating

terms or forcing specific forms of governments upon these emerging nations. Every piece of

outside influence adds to the insurgents’ claims that their respective governments are controlled

by foreign powers. Ultimately, the population must believe their government is acting in their

best interest, and providing economic stability is the most important first step.
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION Slusser, 28

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