Hayley Southard

2/12/18
Law and Ethics
Paper 2

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), L.B. Sullivan, one of the elected

commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama prosecuted the New York Times Company

for a civil libel exploit losses. It went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which alleged Alabama law

was unconstitutional because it unsuccessfully afforded the newspaper protected free speech and

press in libel action by a public official. The Court demanded newspaper’s constitutional rights

made it essential to have a statute that forbid a public official from gaining misrepresented

slandering compensations related to the official’s demeanor unless the official can offer evidence

that the report was made with ‘actual malice’. ‘Actual malice’ was described by the Supreme

Court as “knowledge that the defamatory statement was false or made with reckless disregard of

whether it was false or not.” The Court also alleged under the correct protection, confirmation

accessible against the newspaper was unsatisfactory in supporting the judgement and overturned

the verdict. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan)

It relates to the libel/slander issue Olive’s constitutional rights also include the necessity

of a public official from recapturing misrepresented slandering compensations related to the

official’s demeanor unless the official can offer evidence that the report was made with cruelty.

Since Barkfield’s testimonial was an opinion made with actual malice rather than facts, I do not

consider that the situation will apply.

Time Inc. v. Hill (1966) looks at a publisher from Time Inc. magazine claiming denial of

free speech and press under First Amendment toward compensations of dishonest information of

a play revealing an experience that the publisher and his family grieved from. The Supreme
Court held that First Amendment Protected speech and press in matters of public interest with

evidence the report was distributed with awareness of misrepresentation or neglect for the truth.

The jury’s order to the lesser court of law unsuccessfully restricted a verdict of liability. (Time

Inc. v. Hill)

It relates because it focuses on the public’s best interest and similar to this instance,

Barkfield wrote an opinion piece in the newspaper based on an experience he suffered from in

the past. I concur that this needs to be considered in the public’s best interest because a child was

injured due to Olive’s actions. Being threatened can affect your decisions and actions, but Olive

should have calmly considered all of her options before taking action instead of panicking and

trying to follow the gunman’s instructions while being concerned for her own safety.

In Curtis Publishing v. Butts (1967), Wally Butts, former Athletic Director of the

University of Georgia, prosecuted the Curtis Publishing Company for libel in publishing an

article in the Saturday Evening Post with offensive language. The Supreme Court considered the

decision whether or not free speech and press involves a law prohibiting a public official from

recuperating compensations for slanderous untruths related to demeanor unless there was

evidence the report was made in “actual malice” established by a public figure involved in the

public interest. The Court concluded a “public figure” that is not a public official could also

recover damages, with a damaged reputation, on irrational manners leading to dangerous leave

from inquiry criteria and information by rational publishers. (Curtis Publishing Company v.

Butts)

Since Olive was considered a public figure and not a public official, I think that Olive

should not receive compensation for damages because the information against her was the truth
and the language in the article was opinion that did not damage her reputation. What damaged

her reputation was that she omitted information from her job application.

Gertz v. Robert Welch (1974) focuses on the issue of libel. After Nuccio, a Chicago

police officer, shot and killed a youth in addition to being convicted of second-degree murder,

the youth’s family hired Elmer Gertz, a dependable attorney, to signify them in civil lawsuit

against Nuccio. Robert Welch Inc. distributed an article about Gertz that categorized him as

"Communist" and member of a Marxist organization during the trial. The statements contained

serious inaccuracies, thus Gertz prosecuted for libel. The district court alleged that the New York

Times standard applied, meaning Gertz avoided liability unless Robert Welch Inc. substantiated

a slanderous misrepresentation was issued with actual malice. The Supreme Court said Gertz was

a nonpublic figure and the states could outline the suitable norm of legal responsibility for a

publisher or broadcaster of libelous untruth wrong doings of a private individual. (Gertz v.

Welch)

It relates to the case of libel/slander issue because it argues the First Amendment protects

free speech and deliberates a publisher’s statutory opportunity against accountability or offense

of a private citizen. As a newspaper reporter, the custom applies to Barkfield in his reporting and

Barkfield has the right to freedom of speech and press as protected by the First Amendment, but

there is criteria. In addition, due to recent events, Olive has become a public figure so she might

not be able to escape liability.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal (1990) concerns J. Theodore Diadiun authoring an editorial

piece in an Ohio newspaper indicating that Michael Milkovich, a local high school wrestling

coach, lied under oath in a trial ensuing over an occasion involving Diadiun and his team during

a wrestling match. Milkovich charged Diadiun for libel and the Supreme Court affirmed a lesser
court of law admittance against Diadiun. The First Amendment established ruling on the article

asserting an “opinion” secure from state slander law. It held that the First Amendment does not

exclude the claim of Ohio’s libel laws to the suspected offenses confirmed in the article.

(Milkovich v. Lorain Journal)

Since Barkfield’s articles were both opinion pieces instead of facts, state slander law

protects the articles, but the Court might have a different opinion. I think that either state slander

law or the First Amendment should not protect opinion pieces because it cannot be supported by

evidence and it is considered offensive. I think it is also impossible to know the outcome of the

situation regardless of what could have occurred if the school had done a proper background on

Olive or if the child would still be alive whether Olive was the driver or not.

The case of City of San Diego, California v. Roe (2004) focuses on the dismissal of a

police officer for the creation and distribution of sextapes. The officer argued protection of free

speech, stating, “off-duty behavior was not associated with his main occupation and he was

protected by public employee speech.” The U.S. Supreme Court held that the city had every right

in the officer’s dismissal for dishonorable and obnoxious mannerisms. While his speech did not

communicate the purpose of the police department, the speech was still destructive. The officer’s

engagements did not affect public concern and the employer had permission to limit the officer’s

speech, thus the verdict was overturned. (City of San Diego, California v. Roe)

This relates to the case in that Olive can argue that any actions taken off-duty such as

consuming alcohol or drug use does not associate with her main occupation of driving children

to school. However, while threatened, Olive’s actions led to the death of a minor, thus Olive’s

history would affect public concern as well as her employer.

 Nussenzweig v. diCorcia (2007) covered Philip-Lorca diCorcia, an artist and

photographer, shot truthful photographs of people walking through Times Square and none were

attentive his actions. In 2001, diCorcia exhibited an art gallery owned by himself and

Pace/MacGill. Pace/MacGill issued and distributed a record comprising of pictures on display.

Erno Nussenzweig was in one of those images, but remained ignorant of the use and retail of his

picture as part of the exhibition in public until four years later in 2005. Later in 2007,

Nussenzweig appealed to the New York Supreme Court and claimed diCorcias’ use of the

photograph was entitled to First Amendment protection, and diCorcia’s action violated

Nussenzweig’s statutory right of privacy. The Court held because it was not supposed to decide a

case on constitutional grounds where it could be resolved on no constitutional grounds, it would

not review Nussenzweig’s First Amendment claim The Court approved rapid decision to

diCorcia and the Appellate Division affirmed. (Nussenzweig v. diCorcia)

It relates to invasion of privacy because diCorcia took photos without consent similar to

Olive’s case. However, Barkfield posted the photo with a news article while diCorcia showed his

photos as art. Barkfield could argue, “Any claim of a civil rights violation had to be within one

year of the display of the photograph” would begin when the image was placed in the article and

not after the photo was taken.

Foster v. Svenson (2015) draws attention to Svenson for photographing the Fosters and

their children through the Foster’s apartment windows and selling the photographs. It went to the

New York Supreme Court, sharing that Svenson’s engagements were not criminal by way of an

invasion of privacy and his usage of the portraits as established representation was not

considered for “advertising or trade purposes”. Any revenue from transactions of the creations

did not moderate statutory dwindling by “newsworthy and public concern”. The First
Amendment secured the portraits, sanctioning for promotion of the art. The character in which

the photographs were created was therefore not “outrageous” since it did not depict anything

beyond decency and secure under the “newsworthy and public concern” exemption. (Foster v.

Svenson)

This case relates to the situation because like Svenson, Barkfield took photos of Olive

through her window and without consent. However, Barkfield took the photos with a specific

purpose of exposing her and because it was part of his job as a reporter to have evidence with his

story. I conclude that Barkfield’s actions were not considered criminal by invasion of privacy,

but any profit from transactions of the images would moderate for ‘newsworthy and public

concern” due to Barkfield’s job as a newspaper reporter.

Work Cited
City of San Diego, California v. Roe. No. 03-1669. U.S. Supreme Court. 6 December 2004.

Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts. No. 37. U.S. Supreme. 23 February 1967.

Foster v. Svenson. No. 651826. New York Supreme Court. 9 April 2015.

Gertz v. Welch. No. 72-617. U.S. Supreme Court. 14 November 1973.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal. No. 89-645. U.S. Supreme Court. 24 April 1990.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. No. 39. U.S. Supreme Court. 6 January 1964.

Nussenzweig v. diCorcia. No. 8887. New York Supreme Court. 20 March 2007.

Time Inc. v. Hill. No. 22. U.S. Supreme Court. 27 April 1966.