Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 3

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

DOMINGO MABUYO, defendant-appellant

[Section 10 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure]

FACTS

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Criminal Case No.
2486 finding the accused Domingo Mabuyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with
treachery as the qualifying circumstance, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. On June 18, 1966, at
about midnight, Norberto Anillo was shot dead at the doorstep of his house in Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan,
Batangas.

Agaton Anillo, the father of the deceased, and Adelaida Mirania, the widow, were interviewed, In their
respective statements they named Domingo Mabuyo as the triggerman and alluded to a certain Juan
Mendoza as the instigator of the crime. a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of
Tanauan against both Mendoza and Mabuyo. Upon a finding of a probable cause, the municipal judge
ordered the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest, but Domingo Mabuyo was nowhere to be
found.

On March 27, 1967, Domingo Mabuyo presented himself at the Office of the Chief of Police of Tanauan,
but only to be fingerprinted since he had with him an order of release issued by the Municipal Court.
Domingo Mabuyo's defense was alibi. He claimed that early in the morning of June 3, 1966 he left Bo.
Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, , and did not return to Tanauan until March
27, 1967, when he surrendered to the authorities.

The appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him of a crime not properly charged in the
information since he was charged with murder allegedly committed in Bo. Bagumbayan, Tanauan,
Batangas, but was found guilty of said crime committed in Bo. Ambulong, some 12 kilometers away in the
same municipality and province.

ISSUE

WON Place of the commission of the offense constitutes an essential element of the offense charged

RULING

It is a settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense
charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged
in the information, provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court.1 In the
instant case the place of commission does not constitute an essential element of the offense charged and
the evidence discloses that said offense was in fact committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the appellant was misled or surprised by the variance
between the proof and the allegation in the information as to the place where the offense was committed.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOLAS ARCEO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On or about May 1, 1901, the defendant, being the legal husband of one Tranquilina Arcilia, willfully and
illegally did enter into a second matrimonial bond with one Teodora de Guia in the Province of Rizal within
the police and court jurisdiction of Manila, the former matrimonial bond not having been legally dissolved
at the time

According to a certificate of marriage (fol. 20) signed by the pastor of the church at Bacolor, Pampanga,
the defendant, Nicolas Arceo, did marry Tranquilina Arcilia on February 3, 1897, in accordance with the
rites of the Roman Catholic Church

The defendant was married on the 1st of May, 1901, to Teodora de Guia, in accordance with a the rites of
the Roman Catholic Church which took place in Tambobong, included in the territory of Rizal Province

ISSUE

Whether or not the judge of CFI of Manila who presided at the trial had jurisdiction to try the case

RULING

it was held that the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila had no jurisdiction over crimes committed
in the Province of Rizal and within the 5-mile limit, as fixed by section 3 of Act No. 183, for police
purposes, The proceedings had in the lower court therefore void.

It is a general principle of law that the place where a crime is committed should be first ascertained in
order to determine the jurisdiction of the court of judge.

[NOTE: Any change in the territorial jurisdiction of a court enlarging or restricting the same can never be
established by mere deduction or inference. Judicial divisions and boundaries of provinces and districts
are always fixed by law. So that alterations of such boundaries can only be made in express terms by the
legislative body. Nothing to this effect is contained in Act No. 183, section 3, amending Act No. 140;
therefore it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the court below should be, and it is hereby, set
aside and the case dismissed with costs de oficio.]

Fencing is not a continuing crime

PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN

In 1985, a robbery was committed in Quezon City where jewelries worth millions were stolen. The said
jewelries were later found in the possession of a certain Danilo Alcantara in his house in Antipolo, Rizal.

Subsequently, a Quezon City prosecutor filed an information against Alcantara for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. The criminal case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Alcantara filed a
motion to quash the said information on the ground that the QC-RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Judge Jose De Guzman ruled in favor of Alcantara.

The Solicitor General argued that what the judge did was wrong because the crime of fencing is a
continuing crime; that an ingredient of the crime, that is, the robbery, happened in Quezon City, hence,
Quezon City courts have jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not fencing is a continuing crime.

HELD: No. A “continuing crime” is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single
criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. In this case, there are actually two separate crimes
which are robbery and fencing. They are independent of each other. The law on fencing does not require
the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in
the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend
on an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated. Alcantara should be prosecuted in Antipolo
because that’s where the crime of fencing was allegedly committed.

ROCABERTE VS PEOPLE AND HON. SANTOS

FACTS:

Rocaberte and two others were charged with the crime of theft. The Information states:

That on or about the period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of West Canayaon,
municipal of Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties...

Rocaberte moved to quash the information, alleging that the statement of the time of commission of the
felony charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, a period of 7 years," or "about 2,551 days," was fatally
defective; there was "so great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same
offense"; "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional right to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to
defend themselves. The trial court denied the motion. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUES:

Is the statement of the time of the commission of the offense "between October, 1910 to August, 1912,"
defective

HELD:

The rules of criminal procedure declare that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
approximate time of the commission of the offense. Where, however, the statement of the time of the
commission of the offense is so general as to span a number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to
August, 1912," it has been held to be fatally defective because it deprives the accused an opportunity to
prepare his defense.

[NOTE: A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the approximate time of the commission of the
offense. A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however,
a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The remedy against an indictment
that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a
bill of particulars.]