Unit IA Tackling The NEBOSH Exam

NEBOSH International Diploma
Unit IA
Tackling the NEBOSH Exam
RRC Training acknowledges with thanks the co-operation of NEBOSH
in the production of this booklet.
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NEBOSH International Diploma – Unit IA – Tackling the NEBOSH Exam
NEBOSH NATIONAL DIPLOMA

UNIT IA
TACKLING THE NEBOSH EXAMINATION
SUBJECT PAGE
EXAMINATION SUCCESS 3
INTRODUCTION TO THIS GUIDE 3
A NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR 3
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNIT IA EXAM 5
EXAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 10
ELEMENT 1: PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT 11
ELEMENT 2: LOSS CAUSATION AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 25
ELEMENT 3: IDENTIFYING HAZARDS, ASSESSING AND EVALUATING RISKS 39
ELEMENT 4: RISK CONTROL AND EMERGENCY PLANNING 52
ELEMENT 5: ORGANISATION FACTORS 63
ELEMENT 6: HUMAN FACTORS 75
ELEMENT 7: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY 88
ELEMENT 8: MEASURING HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE 100
SUMMARY 107
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EXAMINATION SUCCESS
INTRODUCTION TO THIS GUIDE
This guide is intended as an aid for candidates taking the NEBOSH
International Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety qualification. It
focuses exclusively on the Unit IA examination.
This guide will assist candidates in understanding the format of the Unit IA
exam, the type of questions that might be asked and the kinds of answers
that are expected. It will also introduce candidates to some important
examination techniques that can make a huge difference to performance.
This is not a revision guide. It does not contain any course materials and
does not discuss revision techniques or course content other than through
suggested answers to past exam questions. Candidates who would like
further assistance with the revision process can make use of other RRC
resources produced specifically to address these important issues, including
revision notes and structured revision programmes.
Other sources of information on the International Diploma Unit IA exam are

available. NEBOSH publish a syllabus guide on the International Diploma
qualification that contains information about the examination process. This
information includes a sample Unit IA exam paper. Candidates who have
not already obtained a copy of this syllabus guide are strongly advised to do
so. NEBOSH also publish past exam papers and Examiner’s reports which
make excellent examination preparation resources. Candidates are advised
to check all of their course materials to identify additional sources of
information that might supplement this guide.
A NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR

Students taking the NEBOSH International Diploma qualification are often
very concerned about the assessments that they have to pass.
And rightly so.
NEBOSH qualifications are not easy to come by and each person who
passes a qualification does so on their own merits. In some ways this
should be very rewarding and reassuring. It represents one of the times in
life when there are no short cuts. Those who succeed deserve their
success.
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But, when you are preparing for the assessment, this higher truth can be
somewhat shrouded in the more immediate practicalities of revision,
preparation and exam nerves.
Unit IA is arguably the hardest of the three diploma unit examinations to

pass. This may be due to the fact that Unit IA has far more content than
either of the other two units. Or it may be due to the fact that Unit IA
covers a very wide variety of topics and some of them are rather nebulous
in nature (take human factors for example). It may also be due to the fact
that Unit IA is almost always the first diploma exam that a candidate will sit
and therefore is their first exposure to the reality of sitting a three hour
exam. This first exam can be a hard learning experience to go through.
And the national pass rates would indicate that once through Unit IA,
candidates do progressively better in both the Unit IB and Unit IC exams.
This is perhaps because some hard lessons have been learnt during that
first Unit IA examination experience.
Success in Unit IA depends on your performance during just three hours in

the exam at the end. And your performance there will depend on two key
factors:
 How much you can remember about the different topics.
 How well you can apply that knowledge in the exam situation.
It is no use being good at one thing without also being good at the other.
Staying calm under pressure and interpreting questions is no use if you do
not have the knowledge in your head to answer those questions. Getting
that knowledge in your head is the whole intention of the revision process.
However, having the knowledge in your head is no use to you if you cannot
function in an exam situation.
The whole purpose of this guide is to focus on that second essential
element of success: examination technique.
The following guidance sets out practical guidelines and hints and tips that I
have picked up over the last twenty years of teaching on NEBOSH Diploma
courses. I hope that you find it useful.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNIT IA EXAM

The NEBOSH International Diploma Unit IA exam paper has a set format.
The exam is exactly three hours long.
Ten minutes reading time is allowed before the start of the exam during
which you may read the exam paper but you may not write anything.
The exam contains six compulsory short-answer questions in section A.

Each of these is worth a maximum 10 marks.
It also contains five long-answer questions in section B. You have to

answer any three of these five questions. Each of these is worth a
maximum of 20 marks.
Your answers should be written into a standard answer booklet. This

answer booklet contains lined A4 paper with a cover. You complete the
cover with a few personal details as instructed and then write your answers
inside. There is a space at the top of each page for you to indicate which
question you are answering on that page.
A sample Unit IA exam paper can be found in the NEBOSH Guide to the
International Diploma. Additional old exam papers can be obtained from
NEBOSH, though these are probably less useful to you than the examiner’s
reports (also available).
Time Management in the Exam
You should aim to arrive at the exam venue early. Exams are stressful
enough at the best of times. Travelling to get there just in time or, worst
case scenario, arriving late will not help your nerves.
The exam paper clearly states that you have ten minutes reading time
before the exam proper starts. You may not write anything during this ten
minutes.
Section A contains six compulsory short-answer questions. The exam paper

states that you are advised to spend 15 minutes on each of these questions.
Six × 15 minutes totals one and a half hours.
Section B contains five long-answer questions. You must answer three

questions only. The exam paper states that you are advised to spend 30
minutes on each of these questions. Three × 30 minutes totals one and a
half hours.
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The only difficulty with following the advice on the exam paper is that it
leaves you no time to pause during the exam and no time for reviewing
your answers at the end of the exam.
Therefore, I would recommend that you reduce the amount of time that you
dedicate to each of the short answer questions. I would recommend 12 or
13 minutes for each short answer question and 30 minutes for each long
answer question. This leaves around 15 minutes of spare time. You might
use some of this time to pause briefly between questions to give yourself a
short break from thinking and writing. You might use some of this time to
make a careful decision about which three Section B questions you intend to
answer. You might use the remainder of this time to briefly review your
answers before the exam ends.
Whichever time management plan you decide is right for you, you must put
this plan into effect. I would recommend that you take a watch into the
exam with you. Take your watch off and put it on the table in front of you.
As you start each exam question write the start time and projected finish
times on the exam paper next to the question. Now you do not need to
remember what time you started or intend to finish – it is written down in
front of you. As you write your answer make sure that you check your
watch to ensure that you do not run over your intended finish time.
If you write the finish time down, check your watch and stick to your
intended plan then you cannot go wrong with time management during the
exam. If you do not have a plan, or if you have a plan but fail to follow it in
the exam room, then time management can go horribly wrong.
I frequently talk to students who run out of time. Don’t let it happen to
you.
Exam Technique
Exam candidates sometimes come unstuck because they do not fully
understand the question that they have been asked. Instead of answering
the question in front of them they answer the question that they THINK is in
front of them. There can be a big difference.
Below is a basic approach that might help with interpretation of the

question:
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 Step 1: READ THE QUESTION

Slow yourself down and read the whole question. Read it carefully.
Read all parts of the question – not just the first half, but the whole
thing. There can often be useful clues and memory triggers in the
second half of the question.
 Step 2: LOOK AT THE MARKS
If a question has 10 or 20 marks allocated then there must be at least

10 or 20 pieces of information that the examiner expects to see for you
to win those marks.
If the question is split into several parts and the marks available for
these parts are indicated in brackets then this is very useful since it
indicates how much information you should provide, how much writing
is required and how long you should spend on each part of your
answer.
 Step 3: HIGHLIGHT THE KEY WORDS
The key words are those words in the question which are essential to
understand the question's meaning. So, for example, if the question
was "Define the meaning of the term Safety Culture", you could say
that the key words are:
− DEFINE – that is what you are being asked to do – provide a
widely acceptable definition of a word or phrase; and
− SAFETY CULTURE – that is the phrase you are being asked to
define.
The verb or action word in each question is quite important. Below are
a few of the most commonly used instructions with a translation of
their meaning:
− LIST – literally list the words or phrases – no explanation or
description required at all. You are unlikely to get a list-type
question in the Diploma exams.
− STATE – say what it is – there is often no widely recognised
definition. This should not require a huge amount of detail.
− OUTLINE – give the key features of. You need to provide a brief
description of something or a brief explanation of reasons why. A
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huge amount of depth and detail is not required. Outline is very

frequently used in Diploma exams.
− DESCRIBE – give a detailed description of what the thing is, what
it looks like, how it works, etc. Here a lot of depth is necessary.
Frequently used in Diploma questions, especially the long-answer
questions.
− EXPLAIN – give a detailed explanation – reasons why, reasons for,
how it works, etc. Again, this word indicates that a lot of depth is
required. Frequently used in Diploma questions, especially the
long-answer questions.
Note that these are the same words that are used in the NEBOSH
Certificate exams, but here they are being used in a Diploma exam.
Consequently they do not indicate that exactly the same level of
answer is required. Certificate is a level 3 qualification. Diploma is at
level 6. If you give a level 3 answer to a level 6 question you will not
get the marks. So a question which asks for an outline of an idea in
the Unit IA exam expects a more detailed and precise answer than an
outline question in the Certificate exam. The award is at a significantly
higher level; your answer must reflect this.
 Step 4: READ IT AGAIN
Just to ensure that you understand its meaning.
 Step 5: PLAN YOUR ANSWER
You should consider jotting down a brief answer plan before you start
to write your answer in earnest.
Answer Planning
You should consider jotting down a brief answer plan before you start to
write your answer in full. The examiner expects to see a logical answer that
has a beginning, a middle and an end. If your answer contains ideas that
are jotted down as they come to mind, the answer will not have a logical
flow and it will not make sense. Answers like this are not easy to read and
they are not easy to mark.
It is not possible (unless you are a very gifted individual) to write long
answers with good logical flow unless you know what you are going to say
first. Hence the answer plan.
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For some short answers you can get away with not doing an answer plan.
This is especially true where the question already has a lot of structure and
so the structure of your answer simply follows the order in which the
question is asked.
But structuring your answer is only one of the reasons for writing an answer
plan. The other important reason is that in jotting down key words in your
plan, you start to recall all of the memories associated with those key
words. Planning gives you the opportunity to pause for thought and
remember.
The form that your answer plan should take is entirely up to you. You could
jot down a structured list of key words to show how your final answer will
be structured (rather like the contents page of a book). Or you could simply
jot down the odd word here and there in a random order on the page.
Perhaps one of the best ways of setting out an answer plan is to draw a
mind map. If you have used mind maps as a revision aid then you are
simply repeating what you already know. If you have not used mind maps
for revision, they make excellent planning tools.
Whatever method you use for planning, do not be concerned about the
appearance of your plan. It is there for you to jot down ideas as they come
to mind and then to structure those ideas. It does not have to look good.
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EXAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

In this section you will find a selection of past Unit IA exam questions with
possible answers. For each question there is a short discussion on
interpretation, an outline plan and a suggested answer. This section has
been structured to follow the elements of the Unit IA syllabus, with short
and long answer questions for each element.
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ELEMENT 1: PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH AND

SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Short Answer Questions

(a)
Question 1
Outline the difficulties that organisations face in trying to ascertain the

true cost of accidents and incidents. (5)
(b) Explain briefly how the principles of corporate governance would

support good safety management in an organisation. (5)
Interpretation
The question is in two parts and your answer must be presented in the
same way; an answer to part (a) and an answer to part (b).
Each part carries 5 marks, so 5 key pieces of information must be presented
in each part of your answer. You might decide to put down 6 or 7 pieces of
information just to be on the safe side. But beware of writing too much and
taking up too much time.
Note that part (a) asks for an outline (brief explanation) and part (b) asks
for a brief explanation!
Part (a) of this question is clearly asking for a brief explanation of why it can
be difficult to accurately associate financial costs to accidents.
Part (b) is asking for a brief explanation of the holistic approach to business
risk management and some comments about why this approach might align
with health and safety management principles.
Plan
(a) Accidents may go unreported; where do you draw the line; some
costs are not discoverable – influence on morale, business reputation,
etc.; delay between accident and cost – claim, specialist nature of
this accounting.
(b) Corporate governance business risk management; similarities with

H&S management – policy, organising, assessment, monitoring,
review; philosophy is the same; intention is the same; one relates to
holistic business risk; other relates to H&S.
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Suggested Answer
(a) Difficulties would include the fact that it is difficult to define the
scope and minimum level of incident to be analysed and costed;
underreporting in the workplace will mean many incidents are not
analysed at all; there may be a failure to understand the full scope of
costs because those costs may be indirect; there are inherent
difficulties in obtaining realistic accurate costings for certain things
(e.g. loss of goodwill/productivity); there may be insufficient
time/resources/expertise within the organisation dedicated to the
exercise; there will be long delays in knowing some actual costs (e.g.
in the event of a claim for compensation).
(b) The concept of corporate governance has risk management at its
heart, though it does take in all business risks, not just health and
safety. Many of the principles are similar to good health and safety
management practices: it requires clear policy and commitment from
senior management, risk evaluation (using risk assessment) is a key
control mechanism, the risk control management processes are very
similar to those applied to health and safety management (i.e. a
hierarchical approach is used), monitoring is required, clear
communication and reporting arrangements must be implemented,
internal audit is a requirement, annual Board level review of risk
controls is mandatory and the board must make a statement to
shareholders about compliance.
 Question 2
A company’s annual report for 2002 includes the following section on health
and safety:
“The year 2002 produced the lowest lost-time accident frequency rate,
at 2.1, for the last five years (compared with 3.3 in 2001, 3.6 in 2000,
2.4 in 1999 and 2.2 in 1998). The relocation of the Teesside works
during the year led to some significant improvements in working
conditions on that site and has facilitated the successful
implementation of OHSAS 18001. The major cause of accidents across
the company in 2002 was slips, trips and falls (39%), followed by
manual handling (21%) and contact with moving or stationary objects
(15%).”
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With reference to both the style and content of the section, provide notes to
suggest how the annual summary of health and safety performance might
have been improved. (10)
Interpretation
There is no sectionalisation of this question into separate parts and

consequently no breakdown of the marks. All the 10 marks tells us is that
the examiner expects to see 10 acceptable ideas on the page that match
ideas listed in the marking scheme. There is, however, some structure
provided in the question by the use of the words “style and content”. So
the answer could be structured in this way; comments about style followed
by comments about content. What is required here is a critical examination
of the report presented, with some comment about weaknesses and how
those might be addressed.
Plan
 Style – reactive, technical jargon, lacks explanation and interpretation.
 Content – presentation of data, reference to OHSAS; missing content.

Suggested Answer
The style of the annual report is rather abrupt, reactive and riddled with
technical jargon. There is no attempt to introduce the topic, provide an
overall interpretation of the year or focus on major pro-active successes.
For example the successful implementation of OHSAS18001 should be
presented as headline news and a major achievement. Overall the report
focuses on reactive data and is therefore concerned with negative
performance. Little is said of proactive measures taken. Overall the report
is dry and uninteresting, it fails to hold the readers attention or clearly
communicate a message.
In terms of content, the report deals with several sets of numerical data in a
very dry way. This data should have been presented in graph form.
Perhaps a line graph or bar chart for the historic data on rates and a pie
chart for the accident cause data. There is also a lack of interpretation or
explanation of this data. It is left to the reader to make up their minds if
this data shows an improvement or not. This is a weakness. Any rates
used should also be explained to the reader. As should the term
OHSAS18001. There would also appear to be missing content in the report,
for example there is no mention of occupational health issues; there is no
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comment about initiatives taken during the year; comparison against set
targets and industry sectors.
 Question 3
Outline ways in which a health and safety practitioner could evaluate and
develop their own practice. (10)
Interpretation
This question has no breakdown in term of sections or marks. But clearly

ten key ideas are required to win the marks available. The question is quite
straightforward and might be restated as “how does a safety practitioner
gauge their own performance and how might they further improve it?” Two
key words are highlighted in the question; evaluate and develop. An outline
is required, so a brief explanation.
Plan
 Evaluate – appraisal, objectives, review of failures, feedback from

others, benchmarking.
 Develop – PDP, CPD, qualifications, courses and seminars, meetings,

background reading, mentoring.
Suggested Answer
A safety practitioner can evaluate their own performance either by self-

critical evaluation or by using feedback from others. Feedback from others
might come from their work appraisal (from their boss, colleagues or even
underlings if a 360° appraisal scheme is used). They might also seek out
feedback from clients or contractors that they have to deal with routinely.
Achievement of objectives is always a good way to evaluate your own
performance (have you done what you said you would do?). It can also be
useful to reflect on failures; to review and learn lessons from things that did
not go well or according to plan. Alternatively the practitioner might try to
benchmark their performance against that of others who are in a similar role
in their organisation, or who have similar roles in other organisations.
A safety practitioner might develop their practice through their work

appraisal scheme by agreeing a personal development plan with their
manager, i.e. a scheme of training and experience building that will enable
them to perform better. This might include non-health and safety related
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topics such as management skills, interview skills, IT skills, etc.

Participation in Continued Professional Development (CPD) schemes such as
that operated by IOSH will enhance performance. Undertaking academic
qualifications (such as NEBOSH Diploma) of general or special interest may
be of use. Many practitioners find that attendance at conferences; seminars
and local meetings provides an opportunity to keep up-to-date with current
developments. Background reading of periodicals, etc. also provides an
opportunity to increase knowledge and understanding. Finally it may be
possible for the practitioner to enter into a mentoring arrangement with a
more competent practitioner who can then provide advice and guidance
(this might be done in a larger organisation where the resources exist to
operate this sort of arrangement).
Long Answer Questions
 Question 1
Explain the purpose and key features of each stage of the safety
management model described in the HSE document ‘Successful Health and
Safety Management’ (HSG65). (20)
Interpretation
This is a straightforward question but there are a few key words to pick up
on. An explanation is required – so depth and detail is expected. Each
stage of HSG65 must be analysed, not the model as a whole, but the
individual elements that make up the model. Purpose and key features of
each element must be discussed. So for each element consider: what is it
for, what does it do and what is it made up of, what does it look like, what
ideas does it encompass?
Plan
 Policy – intent, commitment, importance of health and safety.
 Organising – roles and responsibilities, 4Cs, culture.
 Planning and implementing – risk assessment, prioritisation,

arrangement to manage risk.
 Measuring performance – reactive, active.
 Review – using performance measures.
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 Audit – of the system, independent, objective, critical.

Suggested Answer
The diagram of the HSG65 management model would be useful to include

in your answer to this question.
The management system starts with Policy. This is where senior
management within the organisation must set out their aims and objectives
with regards health and safety. They must indicate how important health
and safety is to the organisation and the commitment that can be expected
to it. The policy sets the tone for the rest of the management system.
Statement of intent, signed by the most senior managers(s) and kept under
regular review, would be expected to fulfil this element of the system.
The management system then moves on to Organising. This requires the

organisation to attend to the structures that must exist internally to ensure
good health and safety management; allocation of roles and responsibilities.
It also encompasses the creating of a positive health and safety culture. In
order to achieve this, the organisation will have to focus on how it Controls
health and safety, how it Communicates the safety message, the
Competence of various people and ensuring that all parties Co-operate to
achieve the agreed aims.
Planning and implementing refers to the creation of management plans and

priorities which will be driven by risk assessment. Having recognised what
the significant risks are to the organisation those risks will have to be
managed. Implementing refers to the actual management of the risks on a
day to day basis. This means the creation of arrangements for the
management of health and safety and the carrying out of those
arrangements. Typical issues to be addressed here would be the
arrangements for conducting day to day risk assessment as required by the
nature of the workplace, arrangements for accident reporting and
investigation, arrangements for consultation with the workforce, etc.
Monitoring performance refers to the development of some performance

indicators that can be used to measure the organisations’ health and safety
performance across periods of time. Some of these indicators may be
reactive. This would include the use of accident statistics (e.g. accident
incidence rate, frequency rate, etc.) as well as ill-health statistics (e.g. days
lost due to work-related ill-health). Others may be proactive in nature and
would measure the active steps taken to ensure safety. Examples of this
might include the successful achievement of objectives identified by risk
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assessment, compliance with inspection requirements, compliance with

behaviour rules, etc.
Review refers to the requirement for an organisation to periodically review

its performance over a period of time, using the performance indicators that
have been developed. In this way good performance can be recognised
and encouraged, while poor performance can be analysed more closely to
see the reason and corrective actions. For example, if a key objective is
missed, the review process allows for an analysis of why that key objective
was missed and the identification of corrective actions to address those
underlying reasons.
Audit sits to one side of the main management model and refers to the
independent objective scrutiny of the management system to critically
analyse its suitability. Auditing may be performed by external personnel or
internal personnel. It must, however, be an objective analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of the management system in place which allows
for meaningful improvements to be made. Audits are always evidence
based (the favourite statement from the auditor is “prove it”) and seek to
continuously improve the management system itself. Though continuous
improvement is not explicitly mentioned in the HSG65 model (unlike OHSAS
18001 where it is), it is the clear intention of the model that an
organisational management system would improve through the audit and
review process.
 Question 2
A multi-site business in the UK has a quality management system compliant

with ISO 9001. It also has a health and safety management system and an
environmental management system that operate independently. The board
of directors is now considering the possibility of developing an integrated
management system encompassing all three elements. In order that a
decision can be made objectively, prepare a brief for the board that
outlines the key potential benefits of:
(a) An integrated management system. (10)
(b) Retaining the existing system of separate management systems. (10)
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Interpretation
This question is scenario based and though a lot of detail is not presented
on the scenario there are a few key features that must be recognised.
Firstly, the QMS is ISO9001 compliant. We can safely presume that that
compliance must stay in place, which can complicate integration. Secondly,
there is a SMS and an EMS, but these are not stated as being certificated to
a standard, i.e. we are not told that they are OHSAS 18001 and ISO14001.
We can perhaps assume that they are not.
We are asked to prepare a brief; in other words write a report. It should

look passingly like a report, though detailed report formatting is not
required. The target audience is the board (of directors), so technical
language can be used, provided it is explained. Most importantly we are
asked to outline the potential benefits of integration and of staying put.
The marks are evenly divided between the two options. Note that we are
not explicitly asked for the disadvantages of either option.
Plan
(a)  Integration – Consistency of format, avoidance of duplication of

procedures, record-keeping, auditing, software. Holistic solutions
rather than just optimising for quality or environment. Synergy
(benefits from one area applied to other areas), encouraging
interaction between specialists, etc.
(b)  Existing system – Flexibility, safety standards set by legislation,

quality set internally. May not need such a complex system in
one area compared to another; why fix what isn’t broken?
Integration may be a costly exercise; may encourage more
detailed auditing, if kept separate, specialists stay specialists.
Suggested Answer
The business has a quality management system compliant with ISO 9001.
It also has a health and safety management system (SMS) and an
environmental management system (EMS) that operate independently. The
business is now considering the possibility of developing an integrated
management system encompassing all three elements. This report has
been prepared in order that a decision can be made objectively. In it, the
key potential benefits of integrating the three management systems and
also of retaining the existing independent management systems will be
outlined.
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The benefits of integration
There are many benefits that might potentially flow from integration of
these three independent management systems. These are outlined below:
Consistency of format – integration will require that a consistent format is

applied to all three areas. The same basic philosophy underpins each area
(conformance to a standard) and therefore the same management process
and language can be applied to each.
Avoidance of duplication of procedures – consistency of approach reduces

duplication, leading to efficiencies. These efficiencies might show in terms
of indirect labour costs, productivity increases and reduction in direct labour
paperwork.
Record-keeping – (as referred to above) since systems are integrated,

personnel will look at three areas of concern once rather than looking at
three separate areas of concern independently. This should lead to
improved record keeping and a reduction in the amount of paperwork
generated by the three independent systems.
Auditing – once integrated, all three management areas will be audited

together. Certainly from an internal audit perspective this should lead to
improved auditing across three areas and may lead to a reduction in the
time taken to audit. In short one audit will look at one management system
rather than conducting three separate audits to look at three separate
management systems.
Software – the integration of management systems will require the

integration of software systems. Again this should lead to efficiencies in
time spent interacting with the system.
Holistic solutions rather than just optimising for quality or environment –

one of the major benefits of integration is that an holistic approach is
adopted. Unlike current arrangements, where one system (and therefore
the personnel who runs that system) is looking at one area of improvement
and has little interest in improving other areas, the integrated system gives
ownership of all three areas to all personnel. Therefore it is in everyone’s
interest to see improvements across the board. In other words, with an
integrated system an improvement that enhances quality but is detrimental
to environmental performance is not seen as worth making. One that
enhances health and safety (H&S) and has no negative impact on
environment and quality is worth taking.
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Synergy – another key benefit of the integrated system approach is

synergy; i.e. the idea that benefits from one area can be applied to other
areas and that when this happens the whole becomes greater than the sum
of the parts.
One final benefit of integration is that it encourages interaction between

specialists and will require specialists to branch out into other areas of
knowledge. Though specialists may retain a higher level of competence in a
chosen area, they will have to develop their competence in other areas.
This can be of great benefit since cross-pollination of ideas should then flow
within the organisation; there is greater sharing of knowledge and practice
and less ring-fencing of know-how.
The benefits of retaining the existing system of separate management

systems
Flexibility – current arrangements are highly flexible. This is especially the

case with the H&S and EMS since these are not in compliance with an
external system and can be operated as we see fit. The QMS is less flexible
since it is ISO9001 compliant and therefore must meet external standards in
order to retain certification. It must be recognised that in order to retain
this certification, any integration of systems would have to remain ISO9001
compliant. This complicates the integration process.
Safety standards set by legislation, quality set internally - whilst the general
philosophy of all three systems is the same (conformance to standard) both
H&S and environmental systems are driven by the need to comply with the
law. Quality, however, is driven by our own internal need to meet customer
expectation. Current arrangements allow internal standards to carry equal
weight with legal standards. Integration may lead to more weight being
given to legal standards and a dilution of quality standards as a
consequence.
May not need such a complex system in one area compared to another –
integration inevitably leads to complexity because the need to achieve
compliance in one area ripples out across all three areas of concern. This
can lead to an over complication of systems. The QMS is driven by the
requirements of ISO certification. This might therefore drive complexity into
the SMS and EMS.
Why fix what isn’t broken – all three management systems are functioning
acceptably across the multi-site operation and look to be working well. Any
20 © RRC Training
attempt to change these systems may lead to disruption (at least in the
short term) for little benefit.
Integration may be a costly exercise – inevitably there are costs associated

with integration. An IMS will have to be selected, tailored to our needs and
then implemented across the whole operation. Personnel, both specialists
and others, will require re-training in new systems. The potential for
business disruption exists, which may have unforeseen cost implications.
May encourage more detailed auditing if kept separate – current audit

arrangements require detailed focus on the three areas of concern
independently. This separate focus does mean that greater scrutiny is
applied to each topic area.
Specialists stay specialists – the current system requires that QMS staff are
specialists in quality management only. The same applies to EMS and SMS
staff. These staff have developed their competence over years of practice
and study. Retaining the current system allows these people to stay
specialist, rather than requiring them to move into other areas where they
have little or no experience or knowledge and therefore no competence.
 Question 3
A financial review within your organisation has resulted in a proposal to the

Board of Directors to cut its health and safety budget and to cancel a capital
project that was designed to lead to significant improvements in the
working environment.
As the organisation’s Health and Safety Manager, present an argument to

the Board for rejection of this proposal. (20)
Interpretation
This is a straightforward question requiring a defence to be presented to the

threat of financial cutbacks. Note that the short scenario given threatens
cuts to the health and safety budget and the cancellation of a capital
project. Whilst a separate defence does not have to be presented to both
threats, the arguments used must be applied to both threats. Note that a
report to the board (of directors) is required here, so your answer should
look report-like and your language should be for the non-specialist.
© RRC Training 21
Plan
 Moral, legal and economic arguments.
 Moral – policy obligation to staff, personal impact of accidents and ill-

health, IR and PR implications of moral failure, Directors personal
values (put last).
 Legal – compliance with legal requirements, enforcement notices,

prosecution, avoidance of legal action against directors and/or
managers, compensation.
 Economic – costs of failure; direct/indirect costs, uninsured

losses/hidden nature of losses, financial benefits of good standards –
especially working environment.
Suggested Answer
This report has been prepared following the proposal to the board to cut the
health and safety budget and cancel the health and safety capital project.
The report will argue for the rejection of this proposal based on three basic
principles: the sound economic argument that underpins good health and
safety management within this organisation, the legal implications of failing
to manage health and safety effectively and the moral imperative. Each of
these arguments will be pursued in turn below.
The economic argument

Health and safety (H&S) failings cost money. They can cost a lot of money.
And whilst it is true that putting good H&S standards in place also costs
money, the costs associated with failures far outweighs those costs. There
are two ways in which this organisation may fail to ensure H&S. One is a
failure to ensure safety. This leads to accidents. The other is to failure to
ensure health. This leads to ill-health, sickness and chronic disease. Both
accidents and ill-health have direct costs associated with them. For
example; a workplace accident leads to production downtime, damage to
equipment, plant and premises and loss of product. Damaged equipment
and premises must be repaired or replaced. This in turn usually leads to
indirect losses to the organisation; losses that do not stem directly from the
event itself, but flow from it as inevitable consequences. Lost product must
be re-made. This incurs overtime or additional labour costs. Personnel who
have been injured remain absent from the workplace. They are paid full
salary during their absence and at the same time the organisation has to
employ temporary labour to cover their job. In some instances this
22 © RRC Training
temporary labour solution cannot be applied and then other workers in the
workplace have to pick up the work of their absent colleague. This leads to
overworking, fatigue and stress. This in turn leads to an increase in human
error and higher absenteeism.
Whilst some of the costs highlighted above are quite apparent, some may
be hidden to the organisation. Others are non-discoverable in nature. If
industrial relations are severely damaged by a workplace accident that
reflects in poor productivity, higher absence rates and reduced efficiency.
But how could that be exactly costed out? The answer is it cannot be. If
bad publicity were to result from a workplace accident, that might have a
direct effect on our customers willingness to do business with us. Again, a
very significant cost that would be difficult to quantify and discover.
The above arguments relate to workplace accidents. But that ignores the
cost implications of work-related ill-health. Occupational ill-health often
results from poor working conditions and poor working environments. It
almost invariably leads to workplace absence and, in some instances, may
be severe enough to warrant dismissal on medical grounds. There are costs
associated with the worker absence, the management of that absence and
the legal action that often results from such ill-health and dismissals. Not to
mention the poor IR and PR that can accompany such illnesses.
Studies which have analysed workplaces looking for the costs associated
with workplace accidents suggest that the uninsured losses to an
organisation are greater than the insured losses by a factor of 8× as a
minimum. In other words, our insurance company cannot be approached to
fund the vast majority of losses that we incur when we injure people at
work or make them sick. We fund those losses ourselves.
None of the above included any comment about the financial implications of
legal actions. Which this report will now move on to consider.
The legal argument

There are legal standards that we must comply with and failure to comply
can lead to enforcement action being taken against us in the form of legally
binding notices that require us to carry out such improvements or to stop
certain activities. This enforcement action invariably carries with it the costs
associated with carrying out the improvement to the enforcement officer’s
timescale, or stopping an activity that we find to be financially beneficial.
This is not to mention the bad IR and PR that is usually associated with
these enforcement notices. In other instances, failure to achieve legal
© RRC Training 23
compliance may result in prosecution. Directors may also face personal

liability for legal failing of the organisation that they direct. Needless to say,
all of the above legal actions carry with them the risk of incurring huge legal
fees in mounting a defence (and paying the prosecution legal fees in the
event of the case being lost).
In addition, injure a worker, or cause ill-health, and we may well be sued by

the injured party. These cases may result in the payment of compensation
to injured victims. Though this money may come from our insurers in the
first instance, it invariably leads to higher insurance premiums in the short-
and long-term as those insurers attempt to claw back their loses from us.
The moral argument

We have a clear policy obligation to our staff to ensure their ongoing health,
safety and welfare. That has been made clear in the statement of intent
signed by our Managing Director as the headline of our H&S policy. Aside
from the legal and financial arguments deployed above, we must also
consider the huge personal impact of accidents and ill-health that can and
do occur as a result of our H&S standards. One worker may be injured or
made ill, but that one person has a family and loved ones, they have friends
and colleagues. The impacts of a serious accident or case of ill-health have
very wide ranging implications. We must reflect on our own personal values
and decide whether we would wish to see the unpleasant and sometimes
tragic consequences of poor H&S standards occurring in our organisation.
In conclusion I would state that cutbacks cannot be made to the H&S

budget, nor to the capital project, on the basis of the three arguments
described above. We owe it to ourselves, to our workforce and to our
shareholders to retain our H&S budgets so that we are best able to avoid
the losses that workplace accident and ill-health might cause.
24 © RRC Training
ELEMENT 2: LOSS CAUSATION AND

INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
 Question 1
Describe the requirements of an interview process that would help to

obtain from witnesses the best quality of information relating to a workplace
accident. (10)
Interpretation
This question simply requires you to describe the best way to carry out an
accident investigation interview in order to obtain the facts. If you have
been involved in accident investigations previously, then much of this
answer will be familiar to you from past experience.
Plan
 Interview as soon as possible  Record the findings.

after the event – injury/shock
 Establish facts.
make this difficult.
 Avoid leading questions/implied
 Suitable environment.
conclusions.
 Put witness at ease.
 Sketches/photographs.
 Interview one witness at a time.
 Listen to witness without
 Establish good rapport. interruption.
 Purpose – preventing  Give sufficient time to answer.

reoccurrence, not to apportion
 Issues summarized/agreed.
blame.
Suggested Answer
The first requirement is to interview as soon as possible after the event

although injury or shock may make this difficult. The interview should be
carried out in a suitable environment where the witness can be put at ease.
Only one witness should be interviewed at a time, with the interviewer
taking time to establish good rapport. The purpose of the interview should
be explained, that of preventing a reoccurrence and not to apportion blame,
© RRC Training 25
and also the need to record the findings. Questioning techniques should
establish facts and avoid leading questions or implied conclusions. Sketches
and photographs may help with the interview. Finally, the witness should
be listened to without interruption, given sufficient time to answer, and the
issues discussed should be summarized and agreed at the end of the
interview.
 Question 2
The accident rates of two companies of similar size and producing identical
products are found to vary significantly. Suggest possible reasons for this
variation. (10)
Interpretation
This question is asking for an interpretation of accident statistics data. No

detail is given, other than the clear indication that the two companies are,
on the face of it, very similar yet have very different accident rates. We are
asked for reasons; in other words we must explain why this might occur in
practice. Clearly one reason will not be sufficient and we must give a wide
variety of reasons to explain this situation.
Plan
 Artificial difference – reporting culture, rate calculations.
 Real differences – layout, maintenance, workers, training,

communications, hours and shifts.
Suggested Answer
Possible reasons for the variation in accident rates might include:
 Variations in the levels of accident reporting; this might result from

different safety cultures and different reporting systems. So accident
rates may in reality be very similar, but reporting rates are not,
therefore accidents are in effect concealed at one of the sites.
 Differences in the way that the accident rates are calculated; leading to
two different sets of accident rates from sets of similar raw data.
 Differences in the layout of workplaces; resulting in a higher rate of

accidents at one site than another.
26 © RRC Training
 Differences in the selection, age and maintenance of equipment used,

again resulting in higher accident rates.
 Differences in the nature of workers recruited into each workplace

(staff selection) perhaps coupled with differences in staff retention
rates (turnover). This may result in less well qualified, less adept staff,
working at one site for shorter periods of time while better qualified
staff, with higher ability, work at the second site for longer periods of
time.
 Training and competence of workforce in each workplace may vary

depending on the amount of training and the effectiveness of that
training.
 The effectiveness of communication channels in each workplace and

the efficacy of worker consultation may vary, such that one workplace
can respond quickly to issues raised, while the other workplace cannot.
 Straightforward variations in production volumes and rates and the

number of hours worked at each of the two companies. Longer hours
and busier workplaces give rise to higher number of accidents, which
may not be factored into the accident rates.
 Different working patterns and shift system at the two sites may result
in differences in worker fatigue. Tired workers who are changing their
shift pattern frequently and working long hours have more accidents.
 Question 3
Outline “domino” and “multi-causality” theories of accident causation,

showing their respective uses and possible limitations in accident
investigation and prevention. (10)
Interpretation
Two different theories must be addressed here. And for each one an
outline of the theory is required along with an indication of their use and
limitations. It would therefore make sense to address each theory in turn
and to cover each in sufficient detail to get 5 marks.
© RRC Training 27
Plan
 Domino – Heinrich, Bird & Loftus, step by step, single cause, simple,
logical, does not seek multiple causes, may lead to simple fix.
 Multi-causality – complex, realistic, prompts wider investigation,

overcomplicated, may lead to wrong solution.
Suggested Answer
Domino theory of accident causation was first proposed by Heinrich using a

5 step model. He proposed that an accident might be thought of as the
result of a series of events rather like a row of 5 dominos stood up on end.
His point was that the removal of a single step in the chain stops the event.
This idea was developed further by Bird and Loftus, who took the causation
chain back to the management doorstep. The benefits of this theory of
accident causation are that it helps to structure accident investigation; it
encourages straight line thinking (the chain of events) and encourages the
search for underlying causes. The limitations are that it may be overly
simplistic and therefore not appropriate for more complex events. It relies
on straight-chain thinking and therefore restricts the search for multiple
accident causes. It might lead to very simplistic solutions being applied to
complex causations, which would lead to ineffective accident prevention.
The multi-causality theory of accident causation looks for multiple

underlying causes leading to events (can visualise using fault tree). This
model shows the links between a number of underlying failings and the
probability of accidents occurring. This theory is therefore more reflective
of real accident causation in more complex workplaces. The benefits of
using this approach during accident investigation are that it encourages the
search for multiple underlying failures and encourages use of systematic
accident analysis techniques (e.g. FTA). However, the inherent weakness is
the very complexity that the model supports, which might be inappropriate
in simple accident scenarios. In fact the complexity might lead investigators
to design unnecessary and ineffective corrective actions that a simpler
straight line approach would not do.
28 © RRC Training
 Question 1
The table shows the numbers of lost time accidents to employees for two
hospitals situated in the same locality. Hospital A is a long-established
general hospital employing 2500 staff; hospital B is a private hospital
employing 300 staff.
Year Hospital A Hospital B
2000 75 4
2001 69 7
2002 82 6
2003 78 5
(i) Assuming the numbers of employees have remained constant over the
period, calculate the annual lost-time accident incidence rates for the
two hospitals. (4)
(ii) Identify possible limitations with the data that might make direct
comparisons on safety performance unreliable. (4)
(iii) Suggest reasons for an actual difference in safety performance

between the two hospitals. (12)
Interpretation
This question sets a scenario and gives data for interpretation. On first look
this can appear daunting. In reality this question should be well within your
grasp. Don’t be fooled by first impressions. (You are allowed to take a
simple calculator into the exam with you. You would need it for this
question).
You must answer the question in three parts. Note that part (i) asks for the
annual AIR – so this must be calculated for each year (not a 4 year
average). The most important point to recognise with this question is the
difference between part (ii) and (iii). Part (ii) is about the data – i.e. why
might it not be possible to make direct comparisons between these two
hospitals based on the information given. Part (iii) is concerned with giving
real practical reasons as to why one workplace might have a higher AIR
than the other.
© RRC Training 29
Plan
 AIR – (number of accidents/number of staff) × 1000 = number of lost
time accidents per 1000 employees. Show all working out!
 Data limitations – definition of lost time, definition of employee,
reporting culture, business?
 Reasons – risks (A&E), age, paths, etc equipment A is larger, SMS, staff
recruitment/retention, pay.
Suggested Answer
(i) The annual lost time accident incidence rate is given by the equation:
number of lost time accidents in a year
× 1,000
average number of employees in the year
So, in the year 2000 the rate for hospital A would be:
(75/2500) × 1000
= 0.03 × 1000
= 30 lost time accidents per 1000 employees per year.
The rates for hospital A for the following three years are 28, 33 and
31 respectively.
The rates for hospital B are calculated using the same formula, to
give rates of 13, 23, 20 and 17 respectively.
Note that marks are usually awarded for showing the workings as in
the example above, so don’t just write the answers. In summary, we
can say that the incidence rates in hospital A were higher than for
hospital B.
(ii) Limitations with the data include:
 The two hospitals may have different definitions of lost time

accidents (LTAs).
 The hospitals may have very different reporting rates (culture).
 The hospitals may have different extent of use of contractors

(rates relate only to employees).
 Each hospital may do different proportions of overtime and also

have part-time employees (figures only take account of the actual
30 © RRC Training
number of employees).
You should note that this part of the question is not looking for an
explanation as to why hospital A might have a higher accident rate
than hospital B. Instead it is looking for an explanation as to why
direct comparisons of the numbers may be misleading – this part of
the question is about the pitfalls of using statistics.
(iii) Reasons for real differences might be:
 Inherent differences in risks (for example; a general hospital will

have an accident and emergency department and so unplanned
admissions with possibly intoxicated/abusive patients – hospital B
will not have A&E).
 Hospital (A) is older and consequently the fabric of the building

will be older and more worn. Floor surfaces, paths, roadways,
etc. will be in a poorer state of repair as a consequence. Also the
age of the hospital will be reflected in the age of the equipment
in use; older trolleys, tables, chairs, etc. in comparison to the
newer, recently equipment, private hospital.
 Hospital A has a far larger, more complex workforce and this will
be inherently more difficult to manage. Communications across a
large hospital and the introduction of new rules and procedures
will be inherently more difficult when compared to managing a
smaller hospital of some 300 staff.
 The management system in hospital A will be older and very well

established. Poor practices may have crept in. This will be hard
to change and address. Safety performance may suffer as a
consequence. In contrast, newer hospital B may have modern
systems designed from the start.
 Hospital A may find it difficult to recruit and retain staff as a

result of pay/reward structures. The private hospital will not
have the same constraints and will be able to pay a better salary.
Consequently the private hospital is likely to have less of an issue
with recruitment and retention. The most able staff can be
picked by hospital B and they can be enticed to stay.
© RRC Training 31
 Question 2
A forklift truck is used to move palletised goods in a large distribution

warehouse. On one particular occasion the truck skidded on a patch of oil.
As a consequence the truck collided with an unaccompanied visitor and
crushed the visitor’s leg.
(a) State, with reasons, why the accident should be investigated. (4)
(b) Outline the actions which should be followed in order to collect

evidence for an investigation of the accident. Assume that the
initial responses of reporting and securing the scene of the accident
have been carried out.
(8)
(c) Describe the factors which should be considered in analysis of the

information gathered in the evidence collection. (8)
Interpretation
We have a simple scenario here and the answer must relate back to this
scenario wherever necessary. There are 3 parts to the question, so our
answer must be in three parts. Note the marks breakdown. Part (a) is
simple enough. Part (b) is concerned with the collection of evidence
following the event. Part (c) is concerned with the analysis of the
investigation evidence. This is perhaps the part of the question most open
to misinterpretation.
Plan
 Why investigate – causes, prevention, insurance, morale of staff, IR,

PR.
 Evidence collection:
− From scene – photos, sketch, samples, text, CCTV.
− From witnesses – interview; from records & docs – risk
assessments, maintenance logs, etc.
 Factors:
− Organisational – culture, peer group pressure, practices, etc.
− Personal - drugs/alcohol, training, experience, attitude, etc.
32 © RRC Training
− Job – shift, comfort, environment, etc.

Suggested Answer
(a) The accident should be investigated for various reasons. First,

investigation allows for the identification of the immediate and
underlying causes of the accident and the various factors that may
have made a contribution. This in turn should allow for the
identification of the corrective actions necessary to prevent a
recurrence of this event and others like it.
Second, any investigation gives the organisation a good opportunity

to assess its compliance with legal requirements and best practice.
Third, an investigation provides an opportunity for management to

demonstrate a clear commitment to health and safety and show that
they are interested. This has a direct impact on the safety culture of
the organisation and on employee morale. Indeed, employee morale
would suffer badly if the event were not investigated.
Forth, the factual evidence collected during the investigation will be

vital in deciding liability issues should there arise a claim for
compensation based on this accident.
(b) Assuming that first aid assistance has been given to the injured
visitor, and that the scene has been secured, the first actions must be
to collect evidence from the scene itself before that evidence
becomes contaminated. This would be done by photographing the
scene, or perhaps even videoing it. Drawing sketches and taking
measurements to annotate that sketch. Writing a brief description of
the scene with any additional information that may be relevant but
that is not apparent from photographs or a sketch (for example a
loud tannoy, or high or low ambient temperatures in the warehouse).
CCTV footage may be available and should be secured.
Factual information about the environment around the accident scene

must also be gathered. So the condition of the floor, light levels,
marking on the floor, the presence of pedestrian walkways and
signage must all be recorded in some way. The oil patch must be
photographed in situ before clear up and perhaps a sample taken as
evidence.
The position of the forklift truck must be carefully recorded and any
forensic evidence that shows its route must also be noted (such as
© RRC Training 33
skid marks on the floor, collision marks on surrounding structures

such as racking, etc.). The FLT must also be carefully examined to
determine its condition and the acceptability of its safety related
features. This examination should also take into account the position
of any load on the FLT and the capacity rating of the FLT.
The oil spill on the floor will have to be investigated in more detail to
determine its source and the reasons for its presence on the floor.
Failures in the spill detection and clear-up procedures may be
identified.
Following investigation of the physical evidence, the background

documents and records must be scrutinised and copies may have to
be taken. Risk assessments, SSWs, operating procedures, FLT
maintenance and inspection logs, training records and other company
documentation will all have to be examined.
Another vital source of information must also be addressed during the

investigation and that is, of course, the witnesses. The FLT driver
should be isolated from other people to prevent possible
contamination of their evidence. They should be interviewed about
the event as soon as possible to prevent the natural process of
reviewing an event and then embellishing it. Other witnesses would
also be interviewed as soon after the event as possible, this may
include the injured party depending on their availability. Other
personnel who did not directly witness the scene, but who have
information relevant to the investigation, may also be interviewed and
this would include reception staff who greeted the visitor to site, and
maintenance personnel who carried out work on the FLT in the recent
past.
(c) The various factors that will have to be analysed in order to

determine the causes of this accident can be thought about in various
ways, but one way that might be useful is to consider Organisational,
Job and Personal factors.
Organisational factors that should be considered in the analysis would

include:
 The safety culture of the organisation, especially as perceived by

the Warehouse staff and the FLT driver in particular.
 Peer group pressure and the influence of this on the behaviour of
34 © RRC Training
the driver (he may have been speeding because to drive slowly is
considered unmanly) and the visitor (they may have been in a
group of peers and behaving recklessly).
 Pay and reward schemes in operation. The FLT driver may have
been incentivised to drive fast through the pay and reward
system.
Personal factors that should be considered would include:
 The basic personality traits of the driver, their attitude towards

health and safety general and pedestrian safety in particular.
 Their training in FLT driving, including basic skills training, job-

specific training and any induction training they may have had
into the warehouse.
 The FLT driver’s experience and their general reliability and

competence level.
 The intelligence level of the driver and their ability to understand

instructions.
 The driver’s fitness as assessed against the fitness criteria that

exist for FLT drivers, as published by the HSE.
 Factors that may have compromised the driver’s ability to

function correctly, such as fatigue, stress, drugs and alcohol.
Job factors would play an enormous part in the analysis and the
following factors would have to be considered:
 Signage in the warehouse, markings on the floor and the

provision of barriers to segregate pedestrians and vehicles.
 The levels of supervision in the warehouse.
 Procedures and rules in place to govern the movement of visitors

around the site.
 Procedures and rules relevant to the movement of FLTs within

the warehouse.
 Maintenance, testing and inspection regimes in place for the FLT.
 Shift patterns, hours of work and workload allocation within the

warehouse.
© RRC Training 35
 Question 3
Accident investigations can vary in terms of duration, size and specialisms of

the investigation team and resources allocated.
(a) Explain why it is important for an organisation to investigate

workplace accidents. (10)
(b) Outline the factors that would influence the level of investigation
required following a workplace accident. (10)
Interpretation
Two part answer required. Part (a) requires an explanation, so depth and
detail implied. The question itself is very direct. Part (b) requires a brief
explanation of factors, but again is quite direct.
Plan
 Identify causes (underlying and immediate), take corrective action,

identify cost, promote positive culture, provide information for legal
reporting and insurance claims.
 Seriousness or potential seriousness (severity, number involved),

nature of accident (complexity), use of permits, breach of legal
requirements or may involve a civil claim.
Suggested Answer
(a) There are many important reasons why an organisation should

investigate workplace accidents. These might be considered under
the following areas:
 Identification of causes. The true causes of an accident must be

discovered if any form of effective corrective action is to be
taken. It is important that the true underlying causes are
identified as well as the immediate causes. These principles are
clearly identified in both the simple domino theory of accident
causation as well as the more complex multi-causality theory.
 To take corrective action to prevent recurrence. Unless the true

root causes and underlying causes of accident are known, then
effective corrective action to prevent recurrence cannot be
identified and taken. The prevention of accidents is a legal,
36 © RRC Training
moral and economic imperative for an organisation.

 Underlying deficiencies in safe systems, risk assessments, etc.
must be identified and corrected. Even though these deficiencies
may not have directly led to a particular event, they will
contribute to future accidents in the workplace. Deficiencies
must be addressed in the interest of continuous improvement.
 Investigations can be used to determine cost (financial) to an

organisation. This may be important as a way of promoting good
health and safety internally, by highlighting the financial impact
on the organisation of failure.
 Good accident investigation is vital for worker morale and helps

to promote a positive culture by involving people in a practical
way in health and safety in the workplace. In the absence of
visible investigation, workers will make their own minds up about
the organisation’s priorities and they may form negative views.
 Accident investigation may be a necessity in order to gather

information for legal requirements regarding accident reporting.
 Finally, accident investigation is often mandatory under insurance

policies for the simple reason that an accident may result in a
claim for compensation. In such an event the insurance
company must have good quality factual information, gathered at
the time of the accident, in order to make an informed decision
about liability; do they fight the claim or pay out?
(b) The various factors that might influence the level and complexity of
an accident investigation would include the following:
 Seriousness of the event. Accidents that have minor outcomes

may not require detailed, complex investigations because they
had minor outcomes. No one was seriously hurt; there will not
be a claim for compensation, so why spend a lot of time and
effort investigating. This argument can be effectively applied to
some accidents but not all (as we shall discuss next).
Potential seriousness. Accidents that result in minor injury, or
minor property damage and even near misses, can have the
potential for very serious outcome. That outcome was not
realized in this instance, but the possibility existed. Therefore,
one factor that is crucial to examine is the potential of an event
© RRC Training 37
to have serious outcomes in terms of severity of injury caused

and/or number of people involved. Where there is the potential
for high severity outcomes, then a more detailed and complex
investigation would be warranted. Where that potential does not
exist, then a simpler, quicker investigation will suffice.
 Nature of accident. Many accidents are very simple in their

causation. They take little time to investigate and little time to
analyse. A complex and in depth investigation is not going to
reveal any hidden depths and therefore is unwarranted. An
organisation can learn all it needs to know with a simple, quick
investigation.
 Permits-to-work. Any event involving permits to work (PTW) will

be, by the very nature of PTWs, high risk work and often
complex high risk work. It is therefore often sensible to
undertake a thorough and detail investigation to ensure that the
permit system is working correctly. Any accident occurring under
permit control implies a failure of the permit system itself and
therefore must be taken seriously (if the permit system was
working well, then the accident would not have happened).
 Any event that results in the necessity to report to the enforcing

authorities should be investigated in more depth and detail
because of the reporting requirements. This is not because a
complex investigation is required to discover the facts of the
event. Often these events are relatively simple. Instead, it is
because of the potential involvement of the enforcer at some
stage after the event has been reported. Site visits, enforcement
actions and ultimately prosecution may result from the report and
therefore it is in the interest of the organisation to collect detailed
factual information should the need arise.
 Similarly, any event which seems to indicate that there has been
a breach of legal requirements (and possible enforcement action
that may follow) must be investigated to a higher degree.
 Finally, as was mentioned above, any event that appears to

involve significant injury or loss to a person, and therefore may
result in a civil claim, should be investigated in more depth and
detail because of the liability issues that may rest on having
detailed factual evidence and analysis from the time of the event.
38 © RRC Training
ELEMENT 3: IDENTIFYING HAZARDS,

ASSESSING AND EVALUATING RISKS
 Question 1
Outline the range of internal and external information sources that may be
useful in the identification of hazards and the assessment of risk. For each
source, indicate the type of information available and how it contributes to
hazard identification or risk assessment. (10)
Interpretation
There is a lot of structure in this question, even though it does not have an
explicit parts breakdown. The question clearly asks us to outline internal
and external info sources. I think a 50:50 split between the two sources is
sensible here (though not clearly indicated). The question also asks for a
range – this indicates that we must take a step back and take in the wide
view – focus too narrowly on one set of sources and you will miss points.
For each source of info we are clearly told to indicate the type of info
available and how it is useful. And everything relates to risk assessment.
Plan
External information sources Internal information sources
 Relevant governmental  Damage.

agencies (OSHA/HSE).
 Injury.
 European Safety Agency.
 Ill-health.
 ILO.
 Near-miss.
 WHO.
 Maintenance records.
 Professional and trade bodies.
Suggested Answer
External information sources that might prove useful during the risk
assessment process would include:
© RRC Training 39
 National governmental enforcement agencies such as the UK’s HSE,

USA’s OSHA, Western Australia’s Worksafe. These all produce legal and
best practice guidance and statistics.
 International bodies such as the European Safety Agency; the

International Labour Organisation; the World Health Organisation.
 Professional bodies such as IOSH and IIRSM.
 Trade Unions – a number of trade unions produce information on safety

and health matters. The trade union interest here may be in making
members aware of possible compensation areas.
 Insurance companies – who set the levels of premiums and need data
to calculate the probable risks of any venture. The average risks
involved in most activities can be found in insurance tables. Since the
risk manager is involved in managing risks, these tables will be
extremely useful, although getting hold of them may not be so easy.
 Trade associations.
 Finally, information can be obtained from manufacturers or suppliers

which can indicate the extent of a hazard and the relevant control
options that might be necessary. For example; safety data sheets from
chemical suppliers provide essential information on the chemical nature
of a hazardous substance and necessary controls. Similarly, the noise
and vibration magnitude data from a machinery supplier can give an
insight into the potential noise or vibration exposure and the
subsequent exposure controls necessary.
Internal information sources might include:
 Accident and near-miss reports and investigation reports. These are

useful because they will clearly identify hazards that either have or had
the potential to cause injury. They may also be useful during the risk
assessment process because they help in the evaluation of likelihood
and severity of injury, and hence the degree of risk.
 Inspection reports may be useful in identifying the easily observed

hazardous conditions in the workplace and also the common types of
control failure. This process not only aids the hazard identification
process, but also influences risk assessment; the effectiveness of
various control options can be better estimated based on current
controls.
40 © RRC Training
 Audit reports may also be useful in a similar way; in identifying hazards

that have been overlooked and identifying the effectiveness of existing
controls.
 Maintenance logs may be useful in determining the effectiveness or

otherwise of particular controls in the workplace, such as automatic
warning systems, guards and PPE.
 Question 2
State the objectives and outline the methodology of a Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis (FMEA), giving a typical safety application. (10)
Interpretation
This is a straightforward question clearly relating to FMEA. Three parts to

your answer are required – objectives (brief) method (most of the marks
will be for this) and an example application (just one).
Plan
 Objectives – element failure modes and effect on system.
 Method – break down, identify failure modes, effect, severity and

likelihood, means of detection, rate, controls, document findings.
Suggested Answer
The objective of FMEA is to analyse each component of a system in order to

identify the causes of a component failure and the subsequent effects on
the system as a whole.
The methodology would include:
 Break down the system into component parts.
 Identify how each component could fail, and the possible causes of
failure.
 Identify the effects of the failure on the system as a whole.
 Assess the probability and severity of the failure.
 Identify the means of detection of the failure.
 Prioritise failures in terms of severity and probability.
© RRC Training 41
 Determine actions to reduce risks to an acceptable level.

 Document the findings.
A typical safety application would be chemical process or nuclear safety,

where a failure of a simple component could have disastrous consequences.

(a)
Question 3
Outline the factors that need to be considered to ensure that a risk

assessment is suitable and sufficient. (5)
(b) Identify the circumstances that would necessitate a risk assessment

to be reviewed. (5)
Interpretation
This is a two part question so a two part answer is needed. The first part of
the question refers to the general requirement that a risk assessment
should be suitable and sufficient which, in effect, means that it should be
thorough and complete. Part (b) is straightforward – when do you need to
review a risk assessment?
Plan
(a) Significant hazards, those exposed, evaluation of risk, adequacy of

existing controls and need for further controls recorded. Reference to
relevant standards and legislation, competence of assessors,
complexity is proportionate, should remain valid for reasonable period
of time.
(b) Change in nature of work, new equipment/materials, modification of

plant/premises. Legislative changes; suspect not valid, after incidents,
periodically.
Suggested Answer
(a) The following factors need to be considered in order to decide

whether a risk assessment is suitable and sufficient. The assessment
must address the significant hazards that exist. It must clearly
identify those exposed to the significant hazards. This might include
broad groups of people; staff, vulnerable groups (e.g. young
persons) and individuals (e.g. a pregnant woman). The assessment
must correctly evaluate the risk generated (likelihood and severity)
42 © RRC Training
and the adequacy of existing controls. It must correctly recognise

the need for any further controls. It must be recorded suitably
(significant findings in a retrievable medium). Reference to relevant
standards and legislation should be made. The complexity of the
assessment process and the competence of the assessors must be
proportionate to the complexity and level of risk. Finally it should
remain valid for reasonable period of time.
(b) A risk assessment might be reviewed because of a variety of

circumstances. Most notably, an assessment must be reviewed on
significant change or if the employer has reason to suspect that it is
not longer valid. Change might include a change in the nature of
work, new equipment/materials, the modification of plant/premises,
or even changes to legal standards. Reasons to suspect that the
assessment is no longer valid would include: following an accident,
an incident or a report of ill-health linked to the circumstances that
the risk assessment relates to. Good practice would indicate that a
risk assessment should be reviewed periodically as well. The review
period might be determined by the level of risk inherent in the
operation to which the assessment relates.
© RRC Training 43
 Question 1
An industrial site situated close to a housing estate contains a vessel for the
storage of liquefied petroleum gas. It is estimated that a major release of
the contents of the vessel could occur once every one hundred years
(frequency =0.01/year). Such a release, together with the presence of an
ignition source (probability, p=0.1), could lead to a flash fire or a vapour
cloud explosion on site. Alternatively, if the wind is in a certain direction
(p=0.6) and there is stable wind speed of less than 8 m/s (p=0.5), a vapour
cloud may drift to the housing estate where it could be ignited (p=0.9).
(i) Using the data provided, construct an event tree to calculate the level
of risk of fire/explosion BOTH on site AND in the local community.
(10)
(ii) Comment on the significance of the results obtained in (i). (4)
(iii) Outline, with examples, a hierarchy of control option to minimise the

risks. (6)
Interpretation
This looks like a very intimidating question, but once you get into it, it’s not
as bad as it looks (honestly). It’s a three part question, so a three part
answer is required. Note the marks for each part. Part (i) is the bit with
the maths. This requires you to have a clear vision of what event tree
analysis is; start with a top event and deal with possible consequences –
use a simple binary decision making logic diagram. Part (i) clearly indicates
that two calculations are required. Workings out must be shown for each.
Part (ii) is for a brief interpretation of results. It is worth stating the obvious
here. Part (iii) is concerned with a general hierarchy of control options and
is not concerned with the specific technical control necessitated by bulk
storage of LPG (Unit C topic).
Plan
I wouldn’t plan the answer here because the plan would need to be so well
developed you might as well just draw up the full answer. And since part
(ii) can’t be answered until you know the outcome of part (i).
44 © RRC Training
Suggested Answer
(i) The event tree should look something like this:
(Remember that the probabilities on each yes/no branch point must

add up to 1, so having been given the probability of there being an
ignition source on site as 0.1, the probability of there NOT being an
onsite ignition source (and therefore no on-site explosion ) must be
1 – 0.1 = 0.9. This is a vital step to remember when calculating the
probability of an off-site explosion because the question itself does
not give you this vital number – you have to work it out for
yourself.)
An explosion will only occur on-site if the release encounters the on-
site ignition source. The frequency of such an occurrence on-site is
0.01 × 0.1 = 0.001/yr, which is once every 1000 years (i.e. 1/0.001).
An off-site ignition will only occur if: the vapour isn’t ignited on site
AND the wind is in a certain direction AND the wind speed is < 8m/s
AND the vapour finds an ignition source in the housing estate. Thus,
the expected frequency of off-site explosion is (0.01/yr × 0.9 × 0.6 ×
0.5 × 0.9 = 0.00243 per year. This result can be alternatively
expressed as approximately once in about 411 years (obtained by
taking the reciprocal of the previous figure; i.e. 1/0.00243).
© RRC Training 45
(ii) Risk to members of public greater than risk to employees. Figures

allow comparison with benchmark data; e.g. UK HSE proposes
individual risk of death from workplace activities as one in a million
per annum. The greater risk to members of the public is clearly
unacceptable and given the fact that an explosion is likely to cause
multiple fatalities, both of these expected frequencies would appear
unacceptable.
(iii) A standard hierarchical approach – elimination, substitution or

minimisation of quantity/use of LPG, reduce probability of release
(protective systems, maintenance, operation, ignition sources,
emergency procedures, siting of tanks) – is a good approach to this
part of the question.
 Question 2
Dental practitioners often work alone or in small teams in the community.
(i) Outline the types of hazard to which the dentist or his/her staff
may be exposed. (8)
(ii) Explain how the risks from the hazards identified in (i) can be
minimised to protect the dentist and other employees. (12)
Interpretation
This question is quite focused in terms of the workplace. You are probably
not a dentist. But I am sure you know what one looks like and what they
do. You can probably imagine your dentist’s workplace and the sorts of
hazards they might have there (including you). Note the question is in two
parts. Note part one asks for an outline – not much depth or detail needed.
Note that part two asks for an explanation of the controls for those hazards
already identified. More detail required in this part then.
Plan
 Hazards – fire, substances, biological, drills, electricity, vibration, MSDs,

X-rays, violence, stress, general.
 Controls – general principles RA, SSW, IITS and then explanation of

controls relevant to each of the above. Step-by-step.
46 © RRC Training
Suggested Answer
(i) For a dentist working in a small practice the principle hazards would
include:
 Fire – various ignition sources will exist in the practice, notably

electrical equipment and sterilisation equipment. Fuels would
include paper, furniture any flammable liquids present in the
practice. Risk might be complicated by the nature of building
occupants (may be elderly, disabled or infirm).
 Hazardous substances will be present in the workplace. Some
of these would include pain killers anaesthetics, filling materials,
etc. (e.g. mercury).
 Biological hazards may be inherent in the work undertaken.
Patients may carry blood borne pathogens such as hepatitis or
HIV that present a serious risk of infection to staff and to other
patients should poor equipment and utensil hygiene practices
develop.
 Mechanical hazards will be presented by various dental tools
(e.g. drills).
 Electrical hazards will be present in the workplace. Most of the
equipment in use will be electrically operated, including drill
motors, DSE, inspection lamps. Any X-ray equipment will have
high voltage parts.
 Vibration hazards from hand-held drills. Though small, dentists’
drills vibrate at high frequency and because they are pinched
firmly between thumb and forefinger the potential for localised
injury exist (VWF).
 Musculoskeletal problems are inherent in sitting at a workstation
typing in data. This may be a risk of particular importance to
reception and office admin staff.
 Radiation hazards presented by X-ray equipment in the practice.
 Violence to staff as a result of having to deal with the public
(customers) and the fact that many customers may be agitated
(as a result of fear of pain).
 Stress associated with heavy workload, etc.
 General workplace hazards such as slips, trips and falls.
© RRC Training 47
(ii) The hazards identified above can be controlled by using some

general management principles.
Risk assessments should be carried out to verify these hazards and
correctly evaluate the risks presented and the control necessary. A
written safety policy would have to be developed to record
arrangements made.
The development of safe systems of work (SSWs) and operating
procedures is an important requirement that would have special
relevance to some of the hazards identified (e.g. operation of the X-
ray generator, and SSWs to control the risks from violence).
Staff selection and training would be critical to control many of the
risks identified above. The dentists, their technicians and assistants
would all have to be suitably qualified and experienced. This might
require very specific training in order to adequately control the risk
inherent in certain operations – such as use of the X-ray equipment
or the administration of anaesthetic drugs.
An assessment of PPE needs would have to be undertaken. This
would be of particular relevance in the control of biological
pathogens.
Personal monitoring would be of great importance in the control of
personal radiation dose.
Stress management systems might be necessary should preliminary
investigation of the issue indicate that stress was a hazard of note
in the practice. This might include the adoption of stress
management policies, flexible working arrangements and access to
counselling services.
Inspection and maintenance of equipment and premises would be a
critical control. Some medical equipment would be subject to strict
regimes of inspection, test and calibration. Other items of
equipment might be subject to less stringent maintenance, but must
be kept in safe working order (e.g. PAT for all portable appliances).
Fire precautions would have to be maintained. This would comprise
fire detection, warning and fire evacuation procedures. Staff would
have to be trained on fire fighting and fire evacuation procedures
and would almost certainly require training in patient handling in the
event of fire. Fire escape routes would have to be maintained free
of obstructions.
48 © RRC Training
General housekeeping would have to be maintained to a high

standard, especially in public areas.

(a)
Question 3
Outline the use and limitations of fault tree analysis. (4)
(b) A machine operator is required to reach between the tools of a

vertical hydraulic press between each cycle of the press. Under
fault conditions, the operator is at risk from a crushing injury due
either (a) to the press tool falling by gravity or (b) to an unplanned
(powered) stroke of the press. The expected frequencies of the
failures that would lead to either of these effects are given below:
Failure type Frequency (per year) Effect
Flexible hose failure 0.2 a
Detachment of press tool 0.1 a

Electrical fault 0.1 b
Hydraulic valve failure 0.05 a or b
(i) Given that the operator is at risk for 20 per cent of the time
that the machine is operating, construct and quantify a
simple fault tree to show the expected frequency of the top
event (a crushing injury to the operator’s hand). (10)
(ii) If the press is one of ten such presses in a machine shop,

state, with reasons, whether or not the level of risk shown
should be tolerated. (4)
(iii) Assuming that the nature of the task cannot be changed,

explain how the fault tree might be used to prioritise
remedial actions. (2)
© RRC Training 49
Interpretation
This is another of those very scary looking questions that looks worse than
it really is. Note that there are four parts to the question and hence four
separate parts to your answer. Part (a) is very straightforward. Part (b) (i)
has the maths, but as long as you have a clear idea of what FTA is about it
should be OK. Remember to always show your workings out. Part (ii) is a
continuation of part (i) and if part (i) answer is wrong then part (ii) can be
difficult. Part (iii) similarly is linked to part (i), so a mistake in a might
mislead you. Note that a detailed technical understanding of power presses
is not required here. The question is about the practical application of FTA.
Plan
This is another question where a plan would be so detailed that you might
as well just get on with the answer.
Suggested Answer
(a) FTA is used for analysis of events which may have multiple causes.
The probability/frequency of the “top event” can be quantified provided
there is sufficient data on the probabilities/frequencies of the
underlying events. It also helps identify critical stages where
intervention might be most effective (to reduce probability of top
event). However, complex events require skill to work out and of
course the top event probability calculation is only as good as the data
which is input into the calculation.
50 © RRC Training
(b) (i)
(ii) If the frequency of a crush injury to an operators hand is once

every ten years and there are ten such presses, then across the
entire workshop the crush injury frequency will be (0.1/yr x 10)
= 1 per year. Given the nature of the likely disabling injury this
frequency is obviously far too high to be tolerable without some
attempt to reduce the risk.
(iii) Looking at the fault tree priority should be given to those factors
that would give greatest reduction in frequency of top event. In
the diagram flexible hose failure makes the greatest contribution
to the frequency of the top event, followed by detachment of the
tool and electrical fault. Controls include: solid pipe instead of
flexible hose, more reliable components, maintenance and
testing.
© RRC Training 51
ELEMENT 4: RISK CONTROL AND

EMERGENCY PLANNING
 Question 1
A risk management programme encompasses the following concepts:
(i) Risk avoidance (2)
(ii) Risk reduction (3)
(iii) Risk transfer (3)
(iv) Risk retention (2)
Identify the key features of each of these concepts and give an

appropriate example in each case.
Interpretation
This question has very clear structure, so your answer should follow suit.
Note that you are asked for an example; failure to provide one would imply
that full marks cannot be awarded even if your explanation is full.
Plan
 Avoidance – don’t do it; e.g. get someone else to do it for you.
 Reduction – control the risk; hierarchy; e.g. substitute chemical.
 Transfer – insure the risk; e.g. liability insurance.
 Retention – with or without knowledge.

Suggested Answer
(i) Risk avoidance: actively avoiding or eliminating the risk. This might
be done by, for example, discontinuing or avoiding a risky process or
activity or by eliminating a hazardous material. Closing down a
butchery operation within a food factory (with the hazards associated
with that operation) and buying in ready-prepared meat from a
supplier is an example of risk avoidance.
52 © RRC Training
(ii) Risk reduction: reducing the level of residual risk. This might be
done, for example, by adopting a hierarchy of measures to control
the risk. Such as removing one hazardous agent and introducing
another less hazardous agent in its place, or adopting an engineering
control by guarding a piece of machinery, or adopting a safe person
strategy by training workers so that they are aware of a hazard and
can behave accordingly.
(iii) Risk transfer: transfer of risk to a third party. This is often done by
insurance. If the risk is realised and a loss occurs then the insurance
policy will pay for the loss. Thus the financial risk has been
transferred from the workplace on to the insurer (at a cost).
Alternatively risk might be transferred to a contractor. Here, a
separate organisation is retained to undertake an activity that the
workplace does not want to carry out directly. However, because of
the complexity of health and safety (and contract) law, it must be
remembered that liability for losses may be laid at the door of the
workplace and not just the contactor.
(iv) Risk retention: accepting a residual level of risk within the company.
This is often done with the knowledge of the workplace (i.e.
knowingly) where the risk is small and the costs of reducing the risk
seem disproportionate to any benefit. If a loss occurs, then the
organisation will have to cover that loss from revenues. Sometimes a
risk may be retained without knowledge (i.e. unwittingly). This can
occur when a risk has not been recognised (and therefore goes
uninsured) or when a risk is recognised and insurance is put in place,
but the insurance fails to cover the loss. This might occur if the loss
is greater than the amount of insurance cover purchased, if there is a
large excess, or if there are policy exclusions that mean the insurer
avoids payment.
© RRC Training 53
 Question 2
Production line workers in a textile plant are required to use knives routinely
as part of their work. Outline the factors to be considered when
developing a system of work designed to minimise the risk to these
employees. (10)
Interpretation
This question outlines a simple scenario. Implicit in the question is the fact
that knives have to be used, so elimination of knives is not an option. The
question asks for factors to consider or “things to think about” when
developing the SSW. An outline is required; so a brief explanation of a
range of factors.
Plan
Task analysis, risk assessment, control of risk. Must consider elimination

(automation, process change), type of knife, environment (space
constraints, lighting), individual factors (age, attitude, skill), PPE,
consultation with workforce, training.
Suggested Answer
The first factor to consider is the identification of the tasks requiring the use
of knives (by task analysis for example). This might then be followed by
risk assessment. The people at risk, the hazards and various risk factors
must be identified and recorded in this risk assessment. The correct
methods needed to control the risk must be designed and implemented.
During the risk assessment process the potential for risk elimination by
automation or process change should be considered (though it must be
expected that use of knives will remain). Consideration must be given to
the type of knife (safety features), safe storage of knives, safe carrying of
knives and knife sharpening arrangements. The environment must be
considered (factors such as space constraints and lighting), as must
individual factors relevant to staff using knives (age, attitude, skill).
Suitable PPE must be selected and supplied. Staff training in much of the
above will be necessary.
54 © RRC Training
 Question 3
A safety critical system depends for its success on a single component.

Outline ways of reducing the likelihood of failure of this component and
describe additional ways to increase the reliability of the system. (10)
Interpretation
This question requires a brief explanation of a range of ways of increasing

system reliability.
Plan
Planned maintenance, planned replacement before wearout, component

design, suitable component quality (materials of construction, specification
and QA), parallel circuit, standby, redundancy, use of hazard analysis
techniques to predict failure modes; use of failure data.
Suggested Answer
There are various options available for reducing the likelihood of failure of a
single line component. A planned maintenance scheme might be adopted
where the component is examined and replaced if it appears to be in poor
condition (condition-based maintenances). Alternatively, the component
might be replaced before wearout irrespective of condition. Correct
component design will make a difference to probability of failure, as will
selecting high quality components (materials of construction, specification
and quality assurance). Use of a parallel circuit would mean that in the
event of failure, there is an alternative component to use in its place.
Alternatively a standby system might be used, so that if the first system
should fail and parallel redundancy cannot be applied, then an entirely
separate system is on hand to use. Lastly hazard analysis techniques might
be used to predict failure modes. This might be quantified by the use of
failure data.
© RRC Training 55
 Question 1
A chemical process control panel contains a digital temperature display that

shows the reaction temperature. If a critical temperature is reached, the
operator must press an emergency stop button, which results in the
reaction being quenched and cooled. If this fails, safety relies on an
emergency venting system.
Concern has been expressed about the adequacy of relying on the operator
to take the necessary action when the temperature is too high. One
proposal is to automate the reaction quench sequence if a specified
temperature is exceeded. One such simple system, comprising three key
components (A1, B1 and C1) connected in series, has been proposed. A
further suggestion is that an identical standby protective system (A2, B2
and C2) could be placed in parallel to the first. This would be designed to
cut in automatically by means of a sensor and switch arrangement (D) in
the event of failure of the first system.
The following reliability data are available:
A1/A2 (Temperature sensor) 0.94
B1/B2 (relay) 0.95
C1/C2 (quench valve) 0.91
D (sensor switch) 0.98
(i) If the manual system is retained, identify measures that could be

taken to reduce the probability of operator error resulting in the
reaction not being quenched. (8)
(ii) Using simple reliability theory, calculate the reliability of the

proposed basic protective system AND the improvement that the
addition of the standby system would provide. (8)
(iii) Identify the factors that should be taken into account in deciding
which of the two automated systems to specify. (4)
56 © RRC Training
Interpretation
This question is on three parts. Your answer should follow this pattern.
The first part is a straightforward question about reducing operator error.
Part two is the maths part that clearly asks for two separate calculations to
be made. Part three asks for an evaluation of the pros and cons of both
control options.
Plan
(i) Replace digital readout with analogue; mark with danger bands;
minimise number of displays; add visual and audible warning; stop
button prominent next to temperature gauge, minimize distractions;
lighting.
(ii) No plan – see answer.
(iii) Financial cost, reliability improvements, reliance on automatic

system?
Suggested Answer
(i) There are several modifications that could be made to the system
described without automating the quench system. The digital readout
could be replaced with a large, obvious, centrally positioned analogue
temperature display which could be marked with danger bands to
indicate the over-temperature levels. The number of other displays on
the control panel could be minimised to give emphasis to the
temperature readout. A distinct visual and audible warning could be
fitted to the temperature display such that over-temperature
conditions are accompanied by flashing light and an audible alarm.
The stop button could be made prominent and positioned adjacent to
the temperature display. Access to the control panel could be
restricted, so minimising possible distractions. Attention could be paid
to the provision of lighting to the control panel to ensure that the
display is clearly visible.
© RRC Training 57
(ii) Reliability of proposed basic system:

A1 B1 C1
0.94 0.95 0.91 1
R(1) = R(A1) × R(B1) × R(C1) = 0.94 × 0.95 × 0.91 = 0.8126
The improvement provided by the addition of a stand-by system:

A1 B1 C1
0.94 0.95 0.91 1
sensor
A2 B2 C2 D
0.94 0.95 0.91 0.98
2
Where the reliability for the combined system of two series circuits
arranged in parallel would be given by:
R(s) = 1 - [(1 - R(1)) × (1 - R(2))]
Where, R(1) is as already calculated above for the basic series circuit 1
(= 0.8126) and, of course, the standby system arrangement alone
(series circuit 2 in the diagram) has a reliability given by:
R(2) = R(A2) × R(B2) × R(C2) × R(D) = R(1) × R(D) = 0.8126 × 0.98 = 0.7963
So, for the combined arrangement in parallel, we have the reliability:

R(s) = 1 – [(1 – 0.8126) × (1 – 0.7963)] = 0.9618
Relative Improvement = 100% × (0.9618 – 0.8126)/0.8126

= 18.36%
(iii) The factors that should be taken into account in deciding which of the
two automated systems to specify would include: the cost of the two
systems, the estimated improvements in reliability created by applying
the simple automated system and the relative improvements in
reliability associated with applying the more complex system, the
magnitude of risk if the quench system were to fail.
58 © RRC Training
 Question 2
A small company formulating a range of chemical products operates from a

site on which it employs about 50 staff. The site poses a risk to employees,
the neighbouring community and the environment and the company has
been asked by the enforcing agency to provide details of its procedures for
dealing with a range of emergencies.
(i) Outline the types of emergency procedure that a site of this nature
may need to put in place in order to deal with incidents affecting the
safety of site personnel. (5)
(ii) Describe the arrangements that should be in place in order to

demonstrate an effective major incident procedure. (15)
Interpretation
Part one asks for an outline only, so little detail is needed here. It also
explicitly mentions safety and site personnel – two key words there. Part
two asks for a description of the arrangements in place – so detail is
required on this major incident procedure.
Plan
(i) Local chemical spillage/release; fire evacuation, first-aid treatment;

major incident procedures; sabotage/bomb threats.
(ii) Identification of major incident risks; stakeholder consultation; clear

responsibilities (e.g. main controller, incident controller, etc.);
procedure initiation/activation (including call-out); emergency control
centre (equipped – information/site plans, communications);
additional equipment – communications, spillage control, PPE, etc.;
communications with public (neighbours); press management;
business continuity; regular practice drills, reviews and training of
staff.
Suggested Answer
(i) A site of this nature might have a range of procedures in place to

ensure the safety of site personnel. These procedures would include
a local spillage/release procedure to deal with small onsite spillages
or releases to atmosphere. There would also be the need for a fire
evacuation procedure in the event of fire breaking out. First-aid
© RRC Training 59
treatment arrangements would have to be in place, comprising

facilities, equipment and personnel and these might be tailored to the
specific risk present on the site (toxic chemicals). Major incident
procedures would need to be developed to cover more serious
spillages, fires and releases, where large amounts of chemical might
be released into the local environment and may present a risk to the
local population off site, as well as personnel on site. Procedures
should also exist to counter the threat of sabotage and bomb threats.
(ii) Arrangements would include the identification of major incident risks.

Stakeholders would have to be consulted on the development of the
major incident plan (on-site personnel and external agencies). The
plan would require the clear allocation of responsibilities to key
personnel such as a main controller, an incident controller and
subordinates. Clear procedures for initiation/activation of the plan
would be needed. This should include arrangements and contact
details and methods for the call-out of key people. An emergency
control centre would have to be set up. This centre would have to be
suitably equipped with emergency information, site plans, appropriate
communications equipment, etc. Additional equipment would have to
be obtained and stored at suitable locations on site. This might
include communications equipment, spillage control kit, PPE for
clean-up personnel, etc. Arrangements for communications with the
public (such as neighbours) would have to be developed pre-incident.
As would arrangements for management of the media. Some form of
business continuity plan would be included in the major incident plan.
Once in place, the plan would have to be communicated to site staff
and regular training and drill undertaken to ensure the practicalities
of the plan and clear understanding by key personnel.
 Question 3
An investigation of a serious accident has concluded that maintenance

operations in a particular area of a factory should have been subject to a
permit-to-work system. Identify and explain the main factors that should
be considered when setting up such a system. (20)
60 © RRC Training
Interpretation
Clear identification of key words in the question. Whole focus of the

question is the set up of a permit-to-work (PTW) system. The only piece of
information of importance in the first part of the question is to pick up on
the fact that the PTW system is to address maintenance operations.
Plan
Factors to consider:
 Defining what the permit system covers (tasks to be performed, legal
requirements, personnel responsibilities).
 Selection, training and competence of personnel (assessment, records,
certification).
 What the permit itself prescribes (validity conditions, emergency
procedures, the tasks, hand-back conditions).
 How the work should be co-ordinated and monitored.
Suggested Answer
Maintenance operations in a factory environment may involve various high
risk types of work, such as work on large complex items of machinery, work
on pressure systems, work on high voltage electrical systems, work in
confined spaces, work on plant containing hazardous chemicals, work at
height and work on plant at extremes of temperature, to name but a few.
And very often multiple hazards will exist at the same time and generate
high and complex risk. Consequently maintenance work may often be
designated as high risk and made subject to permit to work (PTW) control.
In these cases, a PTW system must be carefully designed and implemented
to ensure safety at all stages of the maintenance work.
Various factors must be considered when such a system is being designed,
developed and implemented:
 In the first instance the system parameters must be clearly identified so
that there is a clear understanding of what the permit system covers.
The system must define which work is covered by the permit system
and which work falls outside of permit control. This may sometimes be
subject to legal requirements. For example, confined space entry
should always be made subject to permit control as a matter of course.
In other instances the use of a permit system will be dependent on
perceived risk on site (for example hot work). The definition of permit
parameters must also identify who key site personnel are and what
© RRC Training 61
their specific responsibilities and authorities actually are with regards

the permit system. Personnel with responsibility for authorising work
under the permit system must be clearly identified, as must personnel
who have responsibility delegated to them in the absence of key
personnel. Personnel responsible for undertaking specific activities,
such as risk assessment or atmospheric monitoring, should have their
responsibilities clearly allocated, as should staff responsible for
monitoring the effective operation of the permit system.
 Another factor to consider is the effective selection, training and
competence of personnel. Competence is a key word here. All
personnel associated with the PTW system must have the necessary
competence to undertake their specific roles or task. This implies
training, knowledge, experience and perhaps other qualities, such as
ability. Assessment of competence may be necessary. Training
records, and in some instances specific certification for key personnel,
may have to be obtained and records retained.
 What the permit itself prescribes must be considered in the
development of the permit system. This will vary depending on the
nature of the types of work that fall within permit control. Generally,
there would be arrangements designed into the system for the formal
specification of key safety requirements before the commencement of
work. These safety requirements would be communicated to relevant
personnel through use of the permit system and the actioning of key
controls would be verified. There would be some form of formal hand
over of control from authorising manager to personnel undertaking the
maintenance work activities, as well as some very specific restrictions
placed on those workers as to types of work permitted and types of
work not permitted. The verification of safety throughout the operation
and the formal hand-back of plant/equipment or areas would then
follow. Formal acceptance of these areas would follow, with the
cancellation of the permit to prevent future work being carried out
under old permissions.
 The PTW system must clearly identify how the work should be co-
ordinated and monitored. Personnel with key responsibilities must be
identified here, as well as the co-ordination and monitoring
arrangements being described in the system.
62 © RRC Training
ELEMENT 5: ORGANISATION FACTORS


(a)
Question 1
Explain briefly what is meant by the ‘health and safety culture’ of an

organisation. (2)
(b) Identify, using practical examples, the barriers to the development

of a positive health and safety culture within an organisation. (8)
Interpretation
Part (a) is asking for a straightforward explanation of the phrase. Note only
2 marks are available here. Part (b) is asking for an outline of a range of
reasons why it might be difficult to improve the culture. Note that you must
give practical examples to illustrate your answer.
Plan
 Beliefs, values, behaviour. Positive or negative.
 Re-organisation, lack of confidence, poor leadership, no resources, no

commitment, poor communication.
Suggested Answer
(a) The health and safety culture of an organisation is the system of

shared values and beliefs about the importance of health and safety
in that workplace. The culture is how workers at all levels within the
organisation think and feel about health and safety, and about how
this translates into their behaviours. The culture may be positive or
negative and will pervade the whole organisation from top to bottom.
(b) There are many possible barriers to the development of a positive

health and safety culture within an organisation. These are not
dissimilar from the factors that promote a negative health and safety
culture and include the following:
 Company reorganisations – change is unsettling for all people in

an organisation and during times of change people may lose their
belief in the company and its aims and means. For example, a
© RRC Training 63
company downsizing and making workers redundant will struggle

to secure worker commitment to a health and safety policy that
states that “people are out most valuable asset”.
 Lack of confidence in management – if workers do not trust

management to make sound decisions about the direction of the
organisation and the methods used, then they will not engage in
initiatives started by management.
 Lack of leadership – people in organisations need to see that

people in management positions are showing clear leadership
with regards health and safety. If no managers are clearly
showing leadership and indicating the way forward, then workers
will not be able to make their own way. Clear leadership,
demonstrated by clear decision making as to the way forward,
coupled with action will show others where to head.
 Lack of resource – health and safety costs money. If safety is

not adequately resourced in terms of money and personnel then
positive improvements will be hard to achieve. For example: a
health and safety budget being cut to achieve a short term
financial target, resulting in the loss of a part time safety officer.
 Lack of management commitment – in the absence of senior

management commitment, resources and attention will not be
paid to health and safety. Priorities will lie elsewhere and others
within the organisation will respond accordingly. It is only with
the clear commitment from senior management that
organisations can hope to make positive improvements to their
safety culture. For example, if senior managers are heard to
belittle and denigrate health and safety in meetings, this will send
a clear and negative message to middle and junior staff.
 Poor communications – in the absence of clearly communicated

policies and decision making, people will not be subject to the
positive influence of their organisation. They will be left to make
their own minds up about how important health and safety is. If
communications are clear, then they will know what the
organisation is thinking and what the organisation is doing to
improve health and safety. Example: notice boards, team
briefings and management meeting minutes do not feature any
health and safety element.
64 © RRC Training

(a)
Question 2
Explain the reasons for establishing effective consultation

arrangements with employees concerning health and safety matters
in the workplace. (4)
(b) Outline the range of formal and informal consultation arrangements

that may contribute to effective consultation on health and safety
matters in the workplace. (6)
Interpretation
This is a straightforward question in two parts. The first part asks you to
explain, in effect, the advantages of having effective consultation
arrangements in the workplace. The second part then requires you to
outline what those arrangements might be, ranging from formal safety
committees to informal day to day discussions.
Plan
(a) Reasons:
 Ownership of safety measures by employees.
 Improved perception of value of H&S.
 Use of employee knowledge.
 Encourage ideas from employees.
Arrangements:
 Safety committees.
 Consultation with safety representatives.
 Consultation at departmental meetings.
 Informal consultation by leaders with employees.
 Consultation during accident investigation or risk assessment.
 Tool box talks.
 Discussion at safety circles.
 Staff appraisals.
 Questionnaires/suggestion schemes.
© RRC Training 65
Suggested Answer
(a) Reasons
Effective consultation arrangements with employees can result in a

number of benefits relating to health and safety matters in the
workplace. These include the development of ownership of safety
measures by employees and an improved perception of the value and
importance of health and safety. There is also the opportunity for
the input of employee knowledge to ensure more workable
improvements and solutions to health and safety problems. Finally,
effective consultation encourages the submission of improvement
ideas by employees.
(b) Arrangements
A key formal consultation arrangement is the establishing of a health

and safety committee. Another essential arrangement is consultation
with safety representatives. These may be trade union appointed
representatives or elected representatives. Planned direct
consultation can take place at departmental meetings or team
briefings. Less formal consultation can also take place during risk
assessments or accident investigations.
Other informal consultation arrangements include day to day

meetings with leaders and employees, tool box talks, safety circles or
improvement groups, staff appraisals and questionnaires or
suggestion schemes.
 Question 3
The senior management of an organisation wishes to introduce a number of

new, safer working procedures but has met with resistance from the
workforce. Outline the steps that managers could take to gain the support
and commitment of staff when introducing the changes. (10)
Interpretation
This question presents a simple case study that can be answered, in the
main, from your own experience. How would you overcome resistance to
change to safer work methods? Find out why, consult, explain, involve,
train, review.
66 © RRC Training
Plan
 Reasons for resistance.  Demonstrate benefits of

change.
 Consult with workforce
(formal/informal).  Training incentives.
 Step by step approach.  Senior management

commitment.
 Clear explanation to the
workforce.  Review.
 Involve workforce in proposals.

Suggested Answer
The first step to gain support and commitment from the staff should be to
find out what the reasons for resistance are. Might there be fear of
redundancy, de-skilling or simply a general dislike of any type of change?
The most important requirement is to effectively consult with the workforce.
This could be through formal means; such as the safety committee, or more
informally; through day to day meetings with leaders and employees, tool
box talks, safety circles or improvement groups. A steady, step by step
approach with trials and pilots of the proposed changes will ease the
introduction, as will clear explanations of any proposed changes and the
reasons for those changes. It will be important to actively involve the
workforce in the proposals, take on board suggestions and offer training in
the new methods. It will also be valuable to demonstrate the benefits of
change, such as improved accident rates and production rates. A final part
of the process should be continuing demonstration of senior management
commitment and regular review of the changes to learn from any mistakes.
© RRC Training 67
 Question 1
A manufacturing company is about to embark on a process of organisational

change that is intended to reduce costs and increase productivity. As
planned, the change will lead to a smaller workforce, a flatter management
structure, enlarged responsibilities for the remaining staff, outsourcing of
most maintenance tasks, increased use of automated processes and the
need for some employees to be multi-skilled.
Review the elements of a strategy designed to ensure that the company
maintains its current high standards of health and safety, and its positive
health and safety culture, both during and after the change. (20)
Interpretation
This is another organisational change question, similar to short question 3,

but we are given more details about the scenario which need to be included
in the answer. So, we need to think about how reducing costs, increasing
productivity, reducing the workforce, increasing responsibilities, automating
processes and outsourcing maintenance tasks will impact on health and
safety and how these changes should be managed. Consequently;
consultation, staff involvement, communication, risk assessment, training
and monitoring of standards will be essential elements of the proposed
strategy.
Plan
 Clear policy.
 Allocation of senior management responsibilities.
 Set performance measures.
 Amend plans where safety is compromised.
 Consultation at all levels.
 Involve employees.
 Communicate.
 New risk assessments with employee involvement.
68 © RRC Training
 Map job skills.

 Assess training needs.
 Capture/replace lost process knowledge/experience.
 Procedures to manage risks in outsourced tasks.
 Mitigate employee anxiety (communication/job replacement/

redundancy).
 Allocate time and resources.
 Monitor safety performance.
 Review change process and safety implications.

Suggested Answer
The strategy should commence with the organisation making a definite

statement of safety objectives as part of the change process so that the
policy regarding health and safety during the change is well understood. It
should be clear that plans will be amended if it is identified that the change
process is adversely affecting health and safety. There should be senior
managers identified with clear responsibilities for managing safety during
the change and performance measures identified and set, against which the
impact of the change can be measured. To maintain the health and safety
culture there should be regular consultation at all levels in the organisation
and employees and their representatives should be involved in working
groups dealing with the change. In this way the organisation can utilize
employee experience and also encourage ownership of the change process.
In addition, there should be regular communication of plans and progress.
The planned change will render current risk assessments invalid and
therefore a programme of risk assessment revision will need to be
undertaken with full involvement of employees. The new roles will require
mapping of job skills and experience and also an assessment of training
needs.
Because the proposed change will result in a much smaller workforce, this
will lead to loss of informal knowledge and process experience which will
need to be identified and preserved before employees are made redundant.
The move to outsourcing will lead to increased use of third parties and
contractors, and therefore these new risks will need to be managed, and
also consideration given to contractor competence.
© RRC Training 69
The proposed changes will be stressful for the workforce and therefore
steps need to be taken to mitigate employee anxiety by regular and honest
communication, help with job replacement and an open approach to
redundancy. It will also be important not to rush through the changes and
to allow adequate time and resources for training and implementation of the
new structure.
Finally safety performance should be monitored during and after the change
and also regular review of the process and its safety implications.
 Question 2
The refurbishment of an organisation’s offices will involve the services of

several different trades from a number of small local companies and is to be
completed while the building is occupied. An interior designer specialising
in commercial properties will manage the project.
(a) Outline the criteria that should be used when selecting contractors
to undertake their part of the project. (6)
(b) Outline the organisational measures that the project manager may
need to consider in order to ensure the health and safety of office
personnel during the work.
You are not required to consider the specific risks associated with the
work. (14)
Interpretation
This question fits right into the third party control section of Element IA5.
The first part is straightforward – how do you assess the suitability of a
contractor? Note an outline is required, not just a list of key words. Note
the marks.
Part two is concerned with organisational factors, i.e. the management of

the work. It is not concerned with the practicalities of doing the work. This
is a Unit IA question, not a Unit IC construction question.
70 © RRC Training
Plan
 Experience, references, policy, competence, history, trade member,

tests, risk assessments and method statements.
 Work schedules, inductions, security, accident reporting,

accessibility/restrictions (including emergencies), emergency
procedures, hazards, waste, information.
Suggested Answer
(a) The criteria to be considered when selecting a competent building

contractor are fairly straightforward and would include:
 Previous experience with this type of work.
 Reputation with previous/current clients (obtained by taking up

references).
 Content and quality of health and safety policy document and risk
assessments.
 Level of training and competence of staff.
 Accident and enforcement history (accident statistics going back

over 3-5 years; enforcement notices and prosecutions).
 Membership of relevant professional bodies.
 Equipment and statutory examination records.
 Examples of risk assessment and method statements for work

carried out.
(b) The organisational measures that may need to be considered to

ensure safety of office staff during the work:
 Clear agreement on work schedules and timescales that are then

clearly communicated to all contactors and the office staff.
 Induction issues for contractors – so that they understand the

implications of their work for office staff.
 Security procedures such as signing in/out.
 Accident reporting procedures – so that in the event of an

incident involving office staff, the project manager is informed
immediately.
© RRC Training 71
 Clear communication and co-ordination on the means of escape

that have to be maintained to ensure office worker safety as the
project progresses.
 Procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency.
 Information on hazards in the building (e.g. utilities and asbestos

location/presence) that not only present a hazard to contractors,
but also present a hazard (if disturbed) to office workers.
 Arrangements for delivery and storage of materials – so as not to

interfere with office worker access and egress or emergency
escape routes.
 Removal of waste that may pose a hazard to office workers.
 Information on parts of the building where access might be

temporarily restricted.
 Question 3
Describe the indicators and measures that could be used to assess

the health and safety culture of an organisation. (12)
Describe the organisational factors that may influence the success

of an attempt to improve an organisation’s health and safety culture.
(8)
Interpretation
The first part of this question is concerned with how health and safety
culture might be assessed. Two important words appear in the question;
indicators and measures. How might an external assessor discover and
qualify an organisations health and safety culture? Part two of the question
is concerned with organisational factors, i.e. characteristics of the
organisation that might influence success.
Plan
(a) Attitudes, communication, business integration and decision making,

committee, advisor, enforcement action, policy documents.
(b) IR, confidence, management commitment, resource allocation.
72 © RRC Training
Suggested Answer
(a) The indicators and measures that could be used to assess the health
and safety culture of an organisation would include:
 Attitudes towards health and safety by workers/managers and

the acceptance of health and safety responsibilities. This might
be assessed by questionnaire or interview.
 The extent of communication on health and safety within the

organisation. This might be assessed by viewing all of the
various forms of communication that are apparent.
 The integration of health and safety into other management

functions (e.g. purchasing). This might be assessed by reference
to policy and procedure documentation and by interview.
 The influence of health and safety on management decision-

making. This might be assessed by reviewing management
meeting minutes and by interview.
 The effectiveness and composition of the safety committee. This

could be assessed by viewing meeting minutes and by interview.
 The status of the Safety Adviser. This could be assessed by

examining the position of the safety advisor within the
organisation and by reference to salary.
 The relationship with the enforcement agencies.
 The quality of the health and safety policy and its effectiveness.
This might be assessed by reading policy documentation and by
audit.
 Reference to health and safety in the organisation’s annual

report.
 Other measures might include the standard reactive monitoring

data, such as lost time accidents, etc. though these are fairly
limited in the context of assessing safety culture.
© RRC Training 73
(b) The factors that may influence the success of an attempt to improve
an organisation’s health and safety culture would include:
 The industrial relations (IR) climate within the organisation. If
this is good, then achieving consensus and buy-in will be fairly
easy. If IR is poor, then certain groups of workers may not
engage with attempts to improve the culture and may even
deliberately sabotage such attempts.
 The confidence of the workforce in their management’s ability to

control risks. If management have the trust of the workforce in
this respect then workers are more likely to listen to and respond
to improvement programmes.
 Management commitment to health and safety. If commitment is

seen to be demonstrated, then those workers who support any
improvement programmes have ammunition to win the
argument. If management commitment does not exist, or is not
see to exist, then those arguments will be lost.
 The resources and expertise devoted to health and safety. Lack

of resource handicaps any improvement programme. Good
resourcing and the presence of the right people in the right
positions will allow the best chance of success.
74 © RRC Training
ELEMENT 6: HUMAN FACTORS

 Question 1
“Perception” may be defined as the process by which people interpret

information that they take in through their sense.
Outline the range of factors that may affect how people perceive hazards
in the workplace. (10)
Interpretation
This is a relatively straightforward question. Perception is obviously a key

word since it is the whole focus of the question and has even been defined
in the question. Note you are asked for a range of factors. Focus too
narrowly on one or two ideas and you will miss the bigger picture.
Plan
Fatigue, drugs and alcohol, training, experience, aptitude, IQ, environment,

sensory impairment.
Suggested Answer
The range of factors that might affect how people perceive hazards in the
workplace are mostly factors associated with the person themselves. These
personal factors would include issues such as:
 The effects of fatigue. A tired person is less likely to take note of

sensory information that an alert person would detect early.
 Drugs and alcohol. These have an obvious effect on mental processes

and, in some instances, will be psycho-active and therefore directly
interfere with the processing of sensory information.
 Education and training. A trained person will know the meaning of

various sensory inputs, will recognise their importance and act
accordingly. An untrained poorly educated person may not make the
same associations between sensory input and hazards.
 Experience. Inexperienced workers often fail to recognise hazards for

what they are and underestimate the risk associated with hazards
© RRC Training 75
precisely because they lack experience. More experienced workers do

not fall into the same trap.
 Aptitude. Some individuals will have an innate ability to respond to

sensory stimuli in an appropriate manner.
 IQ. A worker with low IQ may struggle to correctly perceive the level
of risk associated with a particular hazard, particularly if the hazard is
not visible in nature. A person with high IQ may be better able to
interpret sensory information and translate that into hazard awareness.
 Environmental factors may interfere with a workers ability to perceive

hazards in the workplace. Factors such as low light levels, dust, noise
and extremes of temperature can have an effect on hazard perception.
This is not only due to direct interference with the sense themselves,
but also due to the psychological influence of environmental extremes.
 Any form of sensory impairment will have an obvious impact on

perception of hazards. A partially sighted worker may not be able to
see hazards to avoid them. A colour blind worker may mistake red and
green indicator lights.
 Question 2
Outline the organisational and behavioural factors that may lead new
employees to disregard instruction given during health and safety induction
training. (10)
Interpretation
This question is concerned with rule breaking, and with the reasons for rule
breaking (rather than the classification of rule breaking). Though the
question is not subdivided, there are two clear parts; organisational and
behavioural reasons.
76 © RRC Training
Plan
Behavioural Organisational
 Age.  Recruitment.
 Experience.  Induction itself.
 Culture.  Peer group pressure.
 IQ.  Culture.
 Attitude.
 Sensory perception.
Suggested Answer
Organisational factors that might lead new employees to disregard

instructions given during induction training might include:
 The employee selection process, whereby poor recruitment and

selection processes allow employees with poor attitude, intelligence and
behaviour patterns into the workplace.
 A poor induction process that fails to engage the employees, especially

if training provided is not applicable to actual practice in the workplace.
 The absence of refresher training.
 A lack of awareness on the part of experienced workers for the safety

of new starters.
 Peer group pressure coming to play on new starters; forcing them to

disregard instruction so as to fit in with their newly acquired peer
group.
 Poor levels of supervision such that inappropriate behaviour is not

detected or challenged early.
 Poor safety culture (including lack of management commitment) within

the organisation, which will be perceived by new starters early on.
The behavioural factors are those that relate specifically to the character of
the employee themselves, rather than relating to the organisation in which
they find themselves working. The behavioural factors that might lead to
employees disregarding instruction given during induction training might
include:
© RRC Training 77
 A lack of familiarity with working environment.

 Poor risk perception as a result of young age and or a lack of workplace
experience.
 Cultural issues associated with the cultural background of the individual

and consequently the beliefs and values that they bring into the
workplace.
 Language issues that might arise as a result of the nationality or

cultural background of the worker, their reading ability and any learning
difficulties they may suffer from.
 Sensory impairments such as deafness, impaired hearing, impaired

sight.
 Low IQ or poor mental capabilities leading to difficulties in

understanding instruction, understanding the true nature of hazards
and risks.
 Question 3
Identify measures to improve human reliability in the workplace. (10)

Interpretation
This question is asking for an outline of measures. Be aware that improving

human reliability means in the context of improving safety related behaviour
(reducing the risk of human error, violations, etc.). We are not concerned
with improving time keeping, quality or any other aspect of “reliability”.
Plan
Employee selection, training (induction, refresher, etc.) and supervision;

management commitment; incentive schemes; workplace/equipment
ergonomic assessments of the workplace; improving working environment;
job rotation (monotony/boredom); rest breaks (fatigue/attention span);
communication and consultation.
Suggested Answer
There are many ways of improving human reliability in the context of safety
related behaviour. If these measures are taken, then there is less likelihood
that workers will break safety rules or will be subject to human error.
78 © RRC Training
Employee selection – recruiting the right worker for the job is an important
measure. For example, a worker with high IQ on a monotonous job is more
likely to bend and break the rules to relieve the monotony.
Training (induction, job specific and refresher) – in the absence of proper,

effective training, workers will not know how to behave correctly and
consequently will have to do what they see as best.
Supervision – it is vital that workers are supervised to an adequate level in

the workplace so that non-compliance and errors are detected and
corrected early. This prevents bad habits from forming and sends a clear
message to the worker: rule breaking will not be tolerated.
Demonstrable management commitment – without strong leadership

workers will not feel motivated to behave correctly.
Incentive schemes – if workers see some form of reward for good behaviour
then they are more likely to comply with rules, etc. and they are also more
likely to exercise care when performing their duties because they have a
personal reason for caring about outcomes. Incentives can be financial in
nature, but may have no financial value at all (e.g. employee of the month
schemes).
Workplace/equipment ergonomic assessments of the workplace – it is

important that the environment and the equipment and workstation of
employees is designed and laid out to be as comfortable as possible and to
minimize the chances of error.
Job rotation is a good way of relieving monotony and boredom and

maintaining some form of interest.
Allowing for appropriate rest breaks – workers do not become so

excessively fatigued that decision making becomes poor (also to maximise
attention span).
Good workforce communication and consultation – so that workers feel

engaged in the decision making process in the workplace and therefore feel
a greater level of commitment to work.
© RRC Training 79
 Question 1
Describe what is meant by ‘skill-based’, ‘rule-based’ and ‘knowledge-based’

behaviour and explain how each of these operating levels can give rise to
human error and how, in each case, such error may be prevented.
Illustrate your answer with reference to practical examples and actual
incidents. (20)
Interpretation
This is a complex question, but is set out in a very clear way. A description
of Rasmussen’s three behaviour models is required. These must be related
back to the main types of human error outlined in HSG48. You should also
include an explanation of how these types of human error can be avoided.
Examples must be included for full marks to be awarded.
Plan
 Rasmussen – skill, rule and knowledge based behaviour modes.
 Errors – skill-based slips and lapses; rule based mistakes, knowledge

based mistakes.
 Error prevention:
− Skill-based – minimise fatigue and distractions, cross-checks &
supervision.
− Rule base – training, supervision, background knowledge, drills for
rare events.
− Knowledge based – competence, time, oversight, access to
resources.
Suggested Answer
These three levels of behaviour are based on the work of Rasmussen and
they underlie the basic types of human error described in HSG48; reducing
error, influencing behaviour.
Skill-based behaviour occurs when a person is carrying out tasks that are
routine and familiar. They may be physical tasks such as pushing a button
on a control panel. They may be mental tasks such as adding a column of
80 © RRC Training
figures in the head. The person is not using any higher-level reasoning
skills in performing the tasks, they are acting automatically. In this mode of
operation, two types of human error can occur: slips and lapses. A slip
occurs when the person performs an action incorrectly. For example, an
experienced crane operator attempts to lower a load slowly, but applies too
much pressure to the control lever resulting in a sudden violent lowering of
the load. A lapse occurs when a person omits a step in a process. For
example, an experienced machine operator forgets to remove the chuck key
from a grinder, resulting in the key being ejected on start-up.
These types of human error, which occur when a person is behaving in skill-
based mode, can be avoided by ensuring that people are not fatigued; this
might require attention to shift patterns and hours of work, as well as
ensuring that adequate breaks are taken. Ensuring that individuals
undertake a variety of tasks may help, by avoiding complacency and
reducing repetitiveness and boredom. Minimising distractions in the
workplace can reduce the likelihood of lapses. Slips and lapses can also be
minimised by introducing double-checking systems into the work routine so
that others check that certain actions have been carried out correctly.
Supervision to detect errors is also useful.
Rule-based behaviour is more complex than skill-based behaviour. Here a

person is starting to use reasoning skills with some higher level decision
making. However, because the person is familiar with the situation (or
thinks they are) they have a set of options that they can choose from in
order to help them decide on appropriate action to take. In short, a logical
approach is made to a situation along the lines of “if A, then B”; where B is
the rule to apply if situation A occurs. In this mode of operation, one type
of human error can occur: rule-based mistakes.
A rule-based mistake occurs when a person incorrectly applies a rule to a

situation. For example, a security guard attempts to evacuate a building
during a bomb-threat. They know the rule for fire is “get out and stay out”
and they incorrectly apply this rule to the bomb threat situation. The
correct procedure would be to stay in the building. The security guard has
applied a general rule incorrectly to a situation.
This type of human error can be prevented by providing clear guidelines to

follow for all foreseeable eventualities, by training people in correct
diagnosis of problems and the rules to apply and by practice of the rules so
that they become well known. Good supervision and process design can
also minimise this type of error. Rule-based mistakes can also be minimised
© RRC Training 81
by good background training (education) so that workers are more able to

recognise the risks inherent with applying simplistic rule-based solutions to
problems, and by exposing workers to rare event situations so that they
become aware of times when standard rules do not apply (for example
conducting emergency drills).
Knowledge-based behaviour occurs when a person or group of people are

trouble-shooting and problem solving. It involves higher cognitive skills,
reasoning and decision making. It occurs when an unusual situation occurs
and the people involved have to take action and make decisions based on
their knowledge and understanding of the situation rather than relying on a
‘rule of thumb’.
The type of human error that occurs during this mode of operation is the
knowledge-based mistake. This occurs when a person makes a mistake
because they do not fully understand the situation, the system they are
working on or they lack background knowledge. For example, an electrician
electrocutes themselves whilst fault finding on a complex electrical system
because they lack the competence to correctly diagnose the problem safely.
Chernobyl is an example of this type of mistake leading to a major disaster,
as the operators did not know how to prevent the situation escalating.
This type of human error can be minimised by ensuring that people have
the right level of competence for their roles; i.e. training, background
knowledge and understanding. It can also be minimised by allowing people
time to think a problem through and correctly diagnose problems and
solutions. If time constraints are imposed, then knowledge-based mistakes
are far more likely to occur. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster was largely
caused due to knowledge-based mistakes – operators made incorrect
decisions during a simulation exercise because they did not have the
background knowledge to correctly interpret information being fed back to
them by the reactor. Competent operators would have made different
decisions. Knowledge-based mistakes can also be minimised by ensuring
that workers are overseen by competent persons and that they have access
to sources of advice, either within or external to the organisation.
82 © RRC Training
 Question 2
In relation to human error:
(a) Distinguish between routine, situational and exceptional violations. (6)
(b) Outline, with appropriate reference to workplace examples, the

factors that might promote routine violations at work. (14)
Interpretation
This question is set in 2 parts so must be answered in the same way. Note
the marks. Part (a) is itself broken into 3 parts, so each part will be
relatively short. Part (b) is a much more in depth description of factors.
Note that part (b) is only concerned with the promotion of routine violations
(not situational or exceptional ones). Note the comment about reference to
workplace examples. You do not have to base your entire answer on
examples, but clearly you should refer to several as you give your answer.
Plan
(a)  Routine – custom and practice.
 Situational – not usual, but forced by pressure.
 Exceptional – something is already wrong.
(b) Cut corners save time – working posture, slow controls, noise levels,
false alarms, procedures, PPE, environments, reward/incentive
scheme, work overload, perception, enforcement, new starters.
Suggested Answer
(a) A routine violation is a violation (an example of rule breaking

behaviour) that has become the normal way of working within the
work group (e.g. speeding when driving in a car); it has become
custom and practice to break the rule in this way.
Situational violations occur because the pressures of the job

encourage the rule to be broken; the procedures can’t be adhered to if
the job is to be done, e.g. no PPE available, so pressure to continue
without it. Situational violations are not the norm within the
workplace and you would often expect workers to do the job the right
© RRC Training 83
way, but then they will break the rule because of some form of
pressure (or perceived pressure). If a deadline is approaching the rule
breaking starts (in order to meet the deadline). Once the deadline is
passed, the pressure is relieved and the proper application of the rule
returns.
An exceptional violation occurs when things have gone wrong

(typically emergencies) and a rule is broken in an attempt to rectify
the situation. As the name suggests, exceptional violations only occur
in exceptional circumstances.
These definitions do not have clearly defined edges and it is possible

that one type can merge into another type over time. For example, a
situational violation occurs, workers get away with the rule breaking
(nothing bad happens) and so they are encouraged to break the rule
again. Over time, standards slip and the situational violation becomes
the normal way of working. It has become a routine violation.
(b) Routine violations often occur due to cutting corners to save

time/energy, which is encouraged by: awkward, uncomfortable or
painful working posture; excessively awkward, tiring or slow controls
or equipment; difficulty in getting in or out of maintenance or
operating position (posture); equipment or software which seems
unduly slow to respond; high noise levels which prevent clear
communication; frequent false alarms from instrumentation;
instrumentation perceived to be unreliable; procedures which are hard
to read or out of date; difficult to use or uncomfortable personal
protective equipment; unpleasant working environments (dust, fumes,
extreme heat/cold, etc.); inappropriate reward/incentive schemes;
work overload/lack of resources.
In addition, there are the following factors: perception that rules are
too restrictive/impractical/unnecessary (particularly true where has
been lack of consultation in drawing-up of rules), belief that the rules
no longer apply, lack of enforcement of the rule (e.g. through lack of
supervision/monitoring/management commitment – even sanctioned
by management “turning a blind eye” in order to get the job done),
new workers starting a job where routine violations are the norm and
not realising this is not the correct way of working (may be due to
culture/peer pressure or lack of training).
84 © RRC Training
 Question 3
Outline the desirable design features of controls and displays on a control

panel for a complex industrial process aimed at reducing the likelihood of
human error. (20)
Interpretation
This whole question is focused on the idea of human error (or operator
error), so think slips, lapses and mistakes. Not rule breaking. Note the key
words – “controls and displays”. Note we are not given a specific panel or
process, so we are free to discuss general principles.
Plan
 Controls: minimise number needed, easily operated (position), ordered

logically (follows process), require positive action – with feedback to
indicate successfully operated, stereotyping/conventions (switches up
for off, down for on; knobs clockwise for increase, etc.), position
controls next to corresponding displays, emergency controls
(prominent, distinctive), etc.
 Displays: visible, labelled, positioning of safety critical displays,

conventions/stereotyping (colours on dials relating to danger and safe
conditions, dials increase the same way, etc.), analogue vs digital
(appropriateness), glare avoidance.
Suggested Answer
It is important, during the design of control panels for industrial equipment,

to consider the possibility of human error. Equipment operators may be
subject to human error, they may commit skill-base errors (slips and lapses)
and they may make mistakes (both rule-based and knowledge-based).
These errors might result in highly undesirable consequences and therefore
must be prevented. This can be done by careful design of controls (those
parts of the control panel that an operator has to interact with to make
changes to the operation of the equipment) and displays (those parts of the
panel that deliver information to the operator about the status of the
equipment).
© RRC Training 85
Desirable features of controls might include:

 Minimise the number needed so as to avoid operator confusion.
 Place controls in positions where they are easily operated.
 Ensure that controls are ordered logically (e.g. in such a way that the
operation of the controls follows the logical order of the process being
controlled).
 Design controls so that they require positive action in order to be

operated and cannot be operated accidentally or knocked. For example
a hand brake of a car cannot be released simply by pushing down on
the lever.
 Ensure that feedback is available to the operator to indicate successful

operation of the control.
 Obey any stereotyping/conventions that might already exist for that

type of control. For example switches up for off, down for on; knobs
turn clockwise for increase, etc.
 It may be possible and desirable to position controls next to

corresponding displays. For example, if a knob alters temperature it
might be desirable to site the knob next to the temperature readout.
 Emergency controls should be prominent and distinctive so that they

are easy to see and activate. They might be positioned near to the
operator’s position so that they are within easy reach in the event of
emergency.
 Controls that have to be operated frequently might be positioned close

to the operator for ease of access, whilst those that are used
infrequently might be positioned further away.
 Controls might be laid out in an arc around the operator so that they
can all be activated without the need to over-reach.
 Controls that require force to operate should be power or servo

assisted.
 Control must not be overly sensitive; minor changes to the control

should not result in excessive changes to the parameter being
controlled.
86 © RRC Training
Desirable features of displays might include the following:

 Displays must be visible to the operator form their normal operating
position. They must also be large enough to be easily visible to the
operator.
 They must be appropriately labelled, so that the parameter they are

displaying is clear to the operator, this might require the use of
pictograms (which might also help overcome language barriers).
 The positioning of safety critical displays must be carefully selected so

that they are in the operator’s normal line of sight and in a
commanding position.
 Again, any conventions/stereotyping that exist should be recognised

and used. For example, colours on dials relating to danger and safe
conditions would normally use green for safe, red for danger. Dials
should all increase the same way, normally clockwise.
 Careful selection of analogue vs digital displays should be made. There

are times when a digital readout is perfectly acceptable and desirable.
There are other times when analogue is preferred since the position of
the needle on an analogue dial can be determined by a quick glance
that does not require the accurate reading of numbers.
 Displays must be carefully placed and lit so as to avoid glare.
 Duplication of adjacent displays should be avoided in some instances

where accidentally reading the wrong display might end in disaster.
© RRC Training 87
ELEMENT 7: REGULATING HEALTH AND

SAFETY
 Question 1
An organisation has decided to adopt a self regulatory model for its health
and safety management system.
Explain:
(a) The benefits; and (6)
(b) the limitations (4)
of self regulation in connection to the management of health and safety.

Interpretation
This question simply asks you to explain the benefits of self regulation; i.e.
speed, flexibility and ownership, versus the limitations arising from poorer
compliance.
Plan
(a) Benefits: (b) Limitations:
 Developed by those involved –  All those involved may not

ownership. operate within the self-regulatory
rules.
 Quicker to achieve than
statutory regulation.  Danger of self interest being put
ahead of employee or public
 Higher levels of compliance.
interest.
 Easily be adapted/updated.
 Lower levels of compliance.
 Cheaper/quicker means of
 No independent auditing.
addressing issues.
 May result in closer relationship

between industry and clients.
88 © RRC Training
Suggested Answer
(a) One of the more important benefits of self regulation is that it is

developed by those directly involved in the management of health
and safety and this can generate a sense of ownership. Other
benefits include the fact that it may be quicker to achieve than
statutory regulation and can result in higher levels of compliance. It
can also be easily adapted or updated and may offer a cheaper and
quicker means of addressing issues. Finally, the application of self
regulation may result in a closer relationship between industry and its
clients.
(b) Key limitations of the model are that all those involved may not
operate within the self-regulatory rules and that there is a danger of
self interest being put ahead of employee or public interest.
Additionally, self regulation can result in lower levels of compliance
because there is no third party or independent auditing and it may
not be valued highly by stakeholders.
 Question 2
Outline, with examples, the benefits and limitations of:
(a) Prescriptive legislation (5)
(b) Goal-setting legislation (5)

Interpretation
This question is clearly structured and simply requires a comparison of

prescriptive and goal setting legislation in terms of benefits and limitations.
Note that the benefits of one type of legislation, i.e. “prescriptive legislation
is not difficult to enforce”, is the limitation of the other i.e. “goal setting
legislation is more difficult to enforce”.
© RRC Training 89
Plan
(a) Prescriptive Legislation
Benefits: Limitations:
 Requirements clear and easy  Inflexible.
to apply.
 May require standards to be too
 Provides the same standard high or too low.
for all.
 Does not take account of local
 Not difficult to enforce. risks.
 Does not require a high level  May need frequent revision.

of expertise.
(b) Goal-setting legislation
Benefits: Limitations:
 More flexibility in the way  Open to wide interpretation.

compliance may be
 Duties and standards may be
achieved.
unclear until tested in courts.
 Is related to actual risk.
 More difficult to enforce.
 Can apply to a wide variety
 May require a higher level of
of workplaces.
expertise to achieve
 Less likely to become out of compliance.
date.
Suggested Answer
(a) The benefits of prescriptive legislation are that its requirements are
clear and easy to apply and it provides the same standard for all. It is
not difficult to enforce and does not require a high level of expertise.
Its limitations are that it is inflexible and may be inappropriate in some

circumstances by setting standards too high or too low. It does not
take account of local risks and may need frequent revision to keep up
with changes in technology and knowledge.
(b) The benefits of goal-setting legislation are that it has more flexibility in
the way compliance may be achieved and it is related to actual risk.
Also it can apply to a wide variety of workplaces and it is less likely to
90 © RRC Training
become out of date.
These benefits are countered by the fact that it may be open to wide
interpretation and the duties it lays down and the standards it requires
may be unclear until tested in courts of law. As a result it may
become more difficult to enforce and may require a higher level of
expertise to achieve compliance.

(a)
Question 3
Outline what is meant by punitive damages in relation to a

compensation award, clearly stating their purpose and to whom the
damages are paid. (5)
(b) In relation to claims for compensation outline the meaning of the

terms:
(i) No fault liability (2)
(ii) Breach of duty of care (3)

Interpretation
This, again, is a well signposted question and simply asks you to outline key
concepts relating to punitive damages, no fault liability and duty of care.
Plan
(a) Punitive damages:
 Monetary award paid to a claimant.
 Not awarded to compensate.
 Awarded to reform or deter the defendant.
 Both a punishment and a deterrent.
 Amount of award determined by court - not linked to the loss.
© RRC Training 91
(b) (i) No fault liability:

 Independent of any wrongful intent/negligence.
 Injury sufficient to confer liability.
 Compensation paid by insurance or government.
(ii) Breach of duty of care:
 Duty of care owed by an employer to employee.
 Employer breached duty.
 Breach led to the loss.

Suggested Answer
(a) “Punitive damages”, are a financial or monetary award which, whilst

paid to a claimant, are not awarded to compensate them, but in
order to reform or deter the defendant and similar persons from
pursuing a course of action such as that which damaged the
claimant. As such they are both a punishment and a deterrent. The
amount of the award is determined by a court and is not linked to the
losses suffered by the claimant.
(b) (i) “No fault liability” is a liability which is independent of any

wrongful intent or negligence. As such, an injury alone is
sufficient to confer liability with compensation being paid either
by an insurance company or from a government fund.
(ii) There are three standard conditions that must be satisfied in

order to establish a breach of duty of care. These are that a
duty of care was owed by an employer to his employee; that
the employer acted in breach of that duty by not doing
everything that was reasonable to prevent foreseeable harm
and lastly that the breach led directly to the loss, damage or
injury.
92 © RRC Training

(a)
Question 1
In relation to the improvement of health and safety within companies,

describe what is meant by:
(i) corporate probation (2)
(ii) adverse publicity orders (2)
(iii) punitive damages (3)
(b) Outline the mechanism by which the International Labour

Organisation can influence health and safety standards in different
countries. (7)
(c) Explain the role of legislation in improving workplace health and

safety (6)
Interpretation
This is another well signposted question, this time a long question. The first
part simply asks you to describe the concepts of corporate probation,
adverse publicity orders, and, again, punitive damages. If you are familiar
with these concepts, then providing the answer should not pose a problem.
The second and third parts of the question require a little more thought in
order to indicate the way in which both the ILO, and national legislation
influence, in their own ways, health and safety standards in the workplace.
Plan
(a) (i) Corporate probation:
 Supervision order.
 Imposed by court on a company which committed a

criminal offence.
 The court might:

− Require company to review policy/procedures.
− Initiate training programme (directors/senior
management).
− Reduce the number of accidents.
© RRC Training 93
 Aim is to instigate change in culture under the supervision

of the court.
(ii) Adverse publicity order:
 Publicise the failings of an organisation.
 Seek to change conduct through public perception.
 Requires company to make public statement and change

approach to management of H&S.
(iii) Punitive damages:
 Monetary award paid to a claimant.
 Not awarded to compensate.
 Awarded to reform or deter the defendant.
 Both a punishment and a deterrent.
 Amount of award determined by court – not linked to loss.
(b)  Conventions/recommendations.
 Ratification of conventions commits to national law.
 Report to the ILO detailing compliance with conventions.
 Complaint procedures for violation of ratified convention.
 Technical assistance.
 Apply pressure internationally on non-participating countries.
(c)  Sets minimum standards.
 Can be enforced by a regulator.
 Allows punishment if standards are not achieved.
 Kept up to date by government.
 Applies to all workplaces ensuring consistent application.
 May be prescriptive or goal setting (ACOPs, guidance).

Suggested Answer
(a) (i) Corporate probation is a supervision order imposed by a court

on a company that has committed a criminal offence. When
94 © RRC Training
applied to a health and safety offence, the court might require

the company to review its safety policy or health and safety
procedures, initiate a training programme for its directors and
senior management or reduce the number of its accidents. The
aim is to instigate a change in the organisation’s culture under
the supervision of the court.
(ii) The intention of an adverse publicity order would be to

publicise the failings of an organisation and seek to change its
conduct through public perception. It requires the company to
make a public statement and to change its approach to the
management of health and safety.
(iii) “Punitive damages”, is a financial or monetary award which,

whilst paid to a claimant, is not awarded to compensate them,
but in order to reform or deter the defendant and similar
persons from pursuing a course of action such as that which
damaged the claimant. As such they are both a punishment
and a deterrent. The amount of the award is determined by a
court and is not linked to the losses suffered by the claimant.
(b) The ILO develops international labour standards through conventions.

These are supplemented by recommendations containing additional or
more detailed provisions. Ratification of conventions by member
states commits them to apply the terms of the convention in national
law. There is also a requirement for member states to submit a report
to the ILO detailing their compliance with the requirements of the
conventions that they have ratified. The ILO can also initiate
complaint procedures against countries for a violation of a convention
that they have ratified and also provide technical assistance to
member states where this is necessary. In addition ILO can also apply
pressure internationally on non-participating countries to adopt ILO
standards.
(c) Legislation improves workplace health and safety by setting minimum

standards which can be enforced by a regulator and allowing
punishment of the offender if standards are not achieved. It is kept
up to date by government and applies to all workplaces ensuring
consistent application. The legislation may be prescriptive, or goal
setting, supported by approved codes of practice or guidance to assist
interpretation of standards required.
© RRC Training 95
 Question 2
Non-governmental bodies have an important role in influencing health and

safety standards. Identify FIVE relevant influential parties and outline
their role in regulating health and safety performance. (20)
Interpretation
The NEBOSH syllabus in IA7.3 ‘The Role of Non-Governmental Bodies and

Health and Safety Standards’ requires you to be able to “Identify relevant
influential parties (employer bodies; trade associations; trade unions;
professional groups (e.g. IOSH); pressure groups, public, etc., and outline
their role in regulating health and safety performance” consequently this
question comes as no surprise. The bodies referred to are already listed in
the syllabus so all we need to do is to expand on their individual roles in
regulating health and safety performance.
Plan
Relevant influential parties:
Employer bodies
 Represent interests of employer.
 CBI in UK:
− Main lobbying organisation for UK business.
− Works with government, legislators, policymakers to help UK
businesses compete more effectively.
Trade associations
 Membership of companies who operate in a particular area of

commerce.
 Promote common interests/improvements in quality, health, safety,

environmental and technical standards:
− Publication of guidelines, information notes, codes of practice, and
regular briefing notes on technical issues and regulatory
developments.
− Sharing of good practice.
96 © RRC Training
− Provision of news and events.

− Meetings, workshops seminars to enable networking/exchange of
information/ideas on technical and safety issues.
Trade unions
 Organisation of workers.
 Common goals in key areas wages/hours/working conditions.
 Negotiates with the employer on behalf of its members:

− Contracts.
− Wages.
− Work rules.
− Complaint procedures.
− Workplace safety and policies.
 Agreements negotiated binding on rank and file members.
 Unions may appoint safety representatives:

− Investigate accidents.
− Conduct inspections.
− Sit on a safety committee.
Professional Groups (e.g. IOSH)
 Individuals who work in a particular profession.
 Achieved a defined level of competence.
 Members pay a subscription/receive benefits.
 UK, Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH):

− Largest body for health and safety professionals.
− Chartered Safety and Health Practitioners.
− Sets professional standards.
− Supports and develops members.
− Provides authoritative advice and guidance on health and safety
issues.
© RRC Training 97
Pressure Groups
 Organised group of people who have a common interest.
 Seek to influence government policy or legislation.
 Carry out research.
 Lobby members of parliament.
 Aim to influence public and government opinion.
 UK – Centre for Corporate Accountability:

− Promotion of worker and public safety.
− Focus on role of state bodies in enforcing health and safety
law/investigating work-related deaths and injuries.
Suggested Answer
Employer Bodies
These represent the interests of employers. In the UK the main body is the
Confederation for British Industry (CBI). The CBI helps create and sustain
the conditions in which businesses in the United Kingdom can compete and
prosper for the benefit of all. The CBI is the main lobbying organisation for
UK business on national and international issues. It works with the UK
government, international legislators and policymakers to help UK
businesses compete more effectively.
Trade Associations
Trade associations are formed from a membership of companies who

operate in a particular area of commerce and exist for their benefit. They
can promote common interests and improvements in quality, health, safety,
environmental and technical standards. This can be through various
appropriate means. For example, the publication of guidelines, information
notes, codes of practice and regular briefing notes on technical issues and
regulatory developments. Sharing of good practice can be facilitated
together with provision of news and events appropriate to their members'
areas of activity.
There can also be meetings, workshops and seminars held, depending on

an association's membership, both internationally and at a national/regional
level, to enable networking and the exchange of information and ideas, for
example on technical and safety issues.
98 © RRC Training
Safety is of prime importance in any industry and there is usually a way of

publicising and circulating safety messages to the members on a regular
basis.
Membership of a trade association is generally available to companies and

organisations active in the relevant industry.
Trade Unions
A trade union is an organisation of workers who have formed together to
achieve common goals in key areas such as wages, hours, and working
conditions. The trade union negotiates with the employer on behalf of its
members and negotiates contracts with employers. This may include the
negotiation of wages, work rules, complaint procedures, rules governing
hiring, firing and promotion of workers, benefits, workplace safety and
policies. The agreements negotiated by the union leaders are binding on the
rank and file members and the employer and in some cases on other non-
member workers. In the UK, Unions may appoint safety representatives
from amongst the workers who may investigate accidents, conduct
inspections and sit on a safety committee.
Professional Groups
A professional group is an organisation of individuals who work in a

particular profession and have achieved a defined level of competence.
Members typically pay a subscription to join the group and receive a range
of benefits. In the UK, the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
(IOSH) is the largest body for health and safety professionals. It is an
independent, not-for-profit organisation that sets professional standards,
supports and develops members and provides authoritative advice and
guidance on health and safety issues.
Pressure Groups
A pressure group is an organised group of people who seek to influence

government policy or legislation. They can also be described as ‘interest
groups’, ‘lobby groups’ or ‘protest groups’. They carry out research, lobby
members of parliament and so aim to influence public and ultimately
government opinion. One example in the UK is the Centre for Corporate
Accountability. This is concerned with the promotion of worker and public
safety. Its focus is on the role of state bodies in enforcing health and safety
law and investigating work-related deaths and injuries.
© RRC Training 99
ELEMENT 8: MEASURING HEALTH AND

SAFETY PERFORMANCE

(a)
Question 1
Using examples, explain the differences between proactive and

reactive systems for monitoring health and safety performance. (6)
(b) Outline FOUR limitations of using accident and ill-health data as a

means of measuring health and safety performance. (4)
Interpretation
Part (a) of this question asks for an explanation of differences. So some

depth and detail is required here. Part (b) requires a brief explanation of
four possible limitations.
Plan
(a)  Proactive – forward looking, lead indicators, objectives achieved,

inspections.
 Reactive – backward looking, lagging indicators, accidents and ill-

health.
(b)  Negative.
 Historic.
 Poor reporting.
 Latency.
Suggested Answer
(a) Proactive monitoring systems measure the compliance with standards

whereas reactive monitoring measures previous failures in
performance, enabling an organisation to learn from its mistakes.
Proactive measures are often referred to as leading indicators, since
they measure achievement of objectives and targets and therefore
indicate the direction that the organisation is currently taking.
Reactive measures are often referred to as lagging indicators since
100 © RRC Training

they reflect where the organisation has already been; its history in
effect. Completion of safety inspections might be used as a proactive
measure. Number of accidents during a time period might be used
as a reactive measure.
(b) Reactive data such as accident and ill-health statistics can be seen as
rather limited because they measure failure, even though there might
have been successes in other areas. They are therefore inherently
negative. This data as a measure of performance provides only a
prediction, rather than a determinant, for the future. The data lags
current performance it does not lead current performance. Health
statistics can be very limited, simply because occupational diseases
have a long latency period. Therefore current data reflects
workplace standards that existed years previously. One final
limitation of reactive data is that they are extremely reliant on good
reporting systems. Poor reporting leads to poor data quality and
consequently poor meaning.
 Question 2
A national campaign aimed at improving standards of health and safety in a

particular industry has been deemed a failure due to a significant increase in
the rate of reported accidents over the period of the campaign. Explain
why accident rates may have proved a poor measure of the campaign’s
effectiveness and identify other measures that might have been used.
(10)
Interpretation
This question is quite straightforward, but note that there are two parts to it
hidden in the last sentence. We are asked to explain the inherent
weaknesses in using accident rates as an indication of success and we are
also asked for alternative measures that might have been used instead.
Plan
 Underreporting and effect.
 Auditing, inspections, sampling, surveys.
© RRC Training 101

Suggested Answer
Accident rates may have been a poor measure to use to indicate the
success of the campaign because there may have been underreporting of
accidents prior to the launch of the campaign. This underreporting would
have lead to an artificially low accident rate. The campaign would then
have raised awareness of safety issues within the industry. This draws
people’s attention to safety and accident reporting. As a result, accident
reporting improves despite the fact that the underlying accident rate might
not change at all or might even go down. Consequently, the apparent
accident rate increases during and after the campaign. This is a common
occurrence as safety awareness improves within industries and
organisations.
Other techniques that might have been used as an alternative to accident

rates to measure the effectiveness of the campaign might have included:
 Auditing workplaces before and after the campaign to get a very in-
depth view of safety management systems and their effectiveness.
 Safety inspections of sites to gather a snapshot of the standards within

workplaces and the standards of behaviour.
 Safety sampling exercises where representative numbers of workplaces

are visited before and after the campaign to make reliable predictions
about the industry as a whole.
 Attitude surveys given to workers before and after the campaign to see
if there was any change in workers’ opinions about safety.
 Question 1
As the health and safety adviser to a large organisation, you have decided
to develop and introduce an in-house auditing programme to assess the
effectiveness of the organisation’s health and safety management
arrangements. Describe the organisational and planning issues to be
addressed in the development of the audit programme. You do not need to
consider the specific factors to be audited. (20)
102 © RRC Training

Interpretation
Though this question is scenario based, there is very little detail about the
organisation and therefore we have to express our answer in very general
terms. Note the comments about not considering specific factors to be
audited. This question is concerned with the planning and organisational
arrangement issues that must be considered when establishing an audit
system.
Plan
 Resources.  Schedule.
 Senior management support.  Personnel.
 Scope.  Training.
 Audit system.  Feedback process.
 Software.  Launch.
Suggested Answer
The organisational and planning issues that would have to be addressed

would include:
 Correctly identifying and then gaining the resources required (money,

time and personnel) through careful planning and analysis.
 Gaining the support of directors and senior managers so that:

− Those resources are made available.
− Access is authorised to all of the necessary information and
personnel across the organisation.
− Access to the senior managers themselves during the audit process
is agreed.
 The scope of the auditing to be carried out must be decided upon. Will
the audit stick to health and safety issues, or range across other areas
as well? And which parts of the organisation are to be audited? These
will be particularly important questions to answer with regard to
geographic locations to be audited and, consequently, the legal
standards that will apply.
 The type of auditing will also need to be decided upon. Will a

proprietary system be purchased, or will one be developed from scratch
© RRC Training 103

internally, or a combination of the two? The manager will have to

decide on whether to use a scored audit system or one more reliant on
narrative judgments. A software system may need to be purchased to
run the audit system and again, decisions will have to be taken as to
the type of software and resource requirements.
 An audit schedule will have to be designed, taking into account the

resources made available for conducting audits, the size of the
organisation and the frequency required. The frequency of auditing
may have to vary from one part of the organisation to another,
depending on the risk level presented by that part of the organisation.
 Some thought will have to be given to the personnel who will carry out
the audits. Their time will have to be secured and their personal
commitment to the process secured as well. Training and ongoing
support will have to be made available and this may have to be
supplemented with background knowledge building as well. This will,
of course, require the co-operation of their managers.
 The methods used to provide feedback on audit finding, the type of

feedback given, the methods used for resolving disagreement with
feedback and the review process will all have to be considered and
finalised.
 Consideration must be given to how the audit programme will be

launched. This might involve clear communications of the programme,
its aims, methods and processes through various media. A test pilot
may have to be conducted to ensure the efficient working of the system
and to ensure the acceptability of the scheme to others.
104 © RRC Training

 Question 2
Your organisation has a made a determined effort to improve its safety

culture over the last few years. The board of directors has now requested
that you provide evidence of the effect of this investment on the
organisation’s health and safety performance. Review the performance
indicators that might be used to provide such evidence. (20)
Interpretation
Though this question outlines a scenario and makes reference to safety

culture, it is not asking about safety culture directly. Instead it is asking
about performance indicators that might be used to asses improvements to
safety culture.
Plan
 Active measures: audit results; inspection output; hazard reporting

levels; safety climate survey results; behaviour observation results;
health surveillance/monitoring data; achievement levels against
objectives.
 Reactive measures/indicators: accident/ill-health/near-miss reporting

data (though some cultural/system issues will influence reporting
levels); property damage levels; levels of absenteeism, litigation, and
enforcement action.
Suggested Answer
There are various performance indicators that might be used to assess the
safety culture of the organisation and the effect of investments and effort
directed at improving safety culture. These indicators can be split into two
main groupings – active (or proactive) measures and reactive measures.
Active measures are leading indicators that give a measure of the direction
that the organisation is heading in and a clear indication of current actual
performance. Audit results are an example of an active measure. Auditing
involves taking an in-depth, systematic, critical look at the safety
management system of the organisation and will give a comprehensive view
of the strengths and weaknesses of the management system itself. Safety
inspection output might also be used as an active measure. This can be
done by measuring the actual performance of inspection against standards,
© RRC Training 105

or by measuring the number of non-compliances identified and addressed

by the inspection process itself. Alternatively, hazard reporting levels might
be used to assess performance. A high level of hazard reporting is often
perceived as a negative indicator because a lot of problems are being
detected. Conversely, this can be viewed as a very positive indicator of
culture, since it demonstrates that a large number of workers have a good
understanding of the hazards inherent in the workplace and are taking the
time and trouble to report them. Safety climate survey results can be an
excellent indictor of culture and surveys can be designed and tailored
specifically to measure culture. Behaviour observation results are another
excellent way of measuring safety culture, since they focus on worker
behaviour rather than unsafe conditions. This is important for two reasons.
Firstly, unsafe acts (i.e. unsafe behaviours) underpin the vast majority of
accidents in the workplace. Secondly, by addressing worker behaviour
issues there is often a strong impact on attitudes that underpin unsafe
behaviour. Health surveillance/monitoring data and achievement levels
against objectives are two further active measures that might be used to
assess the effects of improvements over the years.
Reactive measures/indicators of culture include the most obvious:

accident/ill-health/near miss reporting data. These are lagging indicators
that will track behind current performance and do not show where the
organisation is going, but rather where it has been. There are some
limitations with using reactive data of this nature as indictors of
performance; most importantly there are issues over report rates. If
accidents, near misses, etc. are not reported, then the data generated will
not give an accurate picture of actual performance. Property damage levels
are another reactive measure that might be used, but it suffers from the
same inherent weakness – reporting of all events may not occur. Levels of
absenteeism are often a more accurate indicator, though again there are
inherent difficulties with making the link between workplace absence and
workplace accident or ill-health. The level of litigation, and enforcement
action that the company is engaged in, are clear indicators of safety culture.
106 © RRC Training

SUMMARY
In this guide we have discussed the importance of examination technique in
enabling you to put in a good performance for your Unit IA exam.
Key points have been:
 Manage your time
 Read the question
 Plan your answer
I hope that this guidance and the discussion of the past exam questions will
help you in passing Unit IA.
Just remember; in an exam, you make your own luck.
© RRC Training 107

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Unit IA Tackling The NEBOSH Exam

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NEBOSH International Diploma

RRC Ref. NIDAES.1.1

NEBOSH NATIONAL DIPLOMA

Other sources of information on the International Diploma Unit IA exam are

A NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR

And rightly so.

Unit IA is arguably the hardest of the three diploma unit examinations to

Success in Unit IA depends on your performance during just three hours in

 How much you can remember about the different topics.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNIT IA EXAM

The exam is exactly three hours long.

The exam contains six compulsory short-answer questions in section A.

It also contains five long-answer questions in section B. You have to

Your answers should be written into a standard answer booklet. This

Section A contains six compulsory short-answer questions. The exam paper

Section B contains five long-answer questions. You must answer three

Below is a basic approach that might help with interpretation of the

 Step 1: READ THE QUESTION

 Step 2: LOOK AT THE MARKS

If a question has 10 or 20 marks allocated then there must be at least

 Step 3: HIGHLIGHT THE KEY WORDS

huge amount of depth and detail is not required. Outline is very

 Step 4: READ IT AGAIN

Just to ensure that you understand its meaning.

 Step 5: PLAN YOUR ANSWER

EXAMPLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

ELEMENT 1: PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH AND

Outline the difficulties that organisations face in trying to ascertain the

(b) Explain briefly how the principles of corporate governance would

(b) Corporate governance business risk management; similarities with

There is no sectionalisation of this question into separate parts and

 Style – reactive, technical jargon, lacks explanation and interpretation.

 Content – presentation of data, reference to OHSAS; missing content.

This question has no breakdown in term of sections or marks. But clearly

 Evaluate – appraisal, objectives, review of failures, feedback from

 Develop – PDP, CPD, qualifications, courses and seminars, meetings,

A safety practitioner can evaluate their own performance either by self-

A safety practitioner might develop their practice through their work

topics such as management skills, interview skills, IT skills, etc.

 Policy – intent, commitment, importance of health and safety.

 Organising – roles and responsibilities, 4Cs, culture.

 Planning and implementing – risk assessment, prioritisation,

 Measuring performance – reactive, active.

 Review – using performance measures.

 Audit – of the system, independent, objective, critical.

The diagram of the HSG65 management model would be useful to include

The management system then moves on to Organising. This requires the

Planning and implementing refers to the creation of management plans and

Monitoring performance refers to the development of some performance

assessment, compliance with inspection requirements, compliance with

Review refers to the requirement for an organisation to periodically review

A multi-site business in the UK has a quality management system compliant

(a) An integrated management system. (10)

(b) Retaining the existing system of separate management systems. (10)

We are asked to prepare a brief; in other words write a report. It should

(a)  Integration – Consistency of format, avoidance of duplication of

(b)  Existing system – Flexibility, safety standards set by legislation,

The benefits of integration

Consistency of format – integration will require that a consistent format is

Avoidance of duplication of procedures – consistency of approach reduces

Record-keeping – (as referred to above) since systems are integrated,

Auditing – once integrated, all three management areas will be audited

Software – the integration of management systems will require the