Iran’s choice about Syria future (Economic and politics)

Iran aims at adapting to different strategies and tools to fulfil its future economic and

political interests in Syria (Terrill, & Army, 2018). Iran targets to collaborate with new local

partners, Syrian nationals sympathetic to Iran’s objectives, while subjecting its influence over

Assad, Syrian’s Leader. Iran’s bottom-up-approach strategy purposes to incorporate Syrian local

allies into state functions including those that govern the economy, and leadership (Terrill, &

Army, 2018). Despite the presence of Russia huge influence within Syria’s state institutions, the

existence of a regional competition with the Arab Gulf monarchies, and Turkey, Iran aims to

establish influence superseding traditional state-level actors. For example, Iran has exemplary

relations with influential local communities in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, enabling it to disrupt

its rivals. For this reason, Iran expects to gain from its interventions in Syria (Terrill, & Army,

2018).

Iran’s participation in the economic recovery of Syria is projected moderately to

compensate it for its role in supporting the regime and partly to sustain its influence in the post-

war era (Terrill, & Army, 2018). Iran is aware that that the Syrian economy sums up a potential

target market for Iranian products. In addition, Iran is planning on using two indirect approaches

to enrich itself in the Syrian economy (Terrill, & Army, 2018). For instance, Iran plans on

expanding its ventures in the most arid and underdeveloped areas in Syria including the country

side along Deir Ezzor and Aleppo. As a result, these financial contributions will enable Iran to

increase its influence by constructing constituencies in abandoned communities with less

competition from its rivals such as Russia (Terrill, & Army, 2018). Similarly, Iran has

constrained those that can obtain funding from the lines of credit it offers in Syria to Iranian

firms.
Thus, Iran can continue to provide the Syrian regime with a lifeline of energy and goods supplies

whilst still re-enforcing the roles of its affiliates in Syria’s economy (Terrill, & Army, 2018).

Economic and Political Impact

Networking

Iran is competing for alliances with critical players in the Syrian economic and political spheres

to maintain its business deals and sustain its interests (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018). To achieve

this, Iran has established economic councils to oversee its ventures and organize its relations

with Syrian Partners. For instance, Iran has established economic councils such as the Syrian-

Iranian Business Council, SIBC, which consists of influential businessmen such as Mazen Al-

Tarazi who invests in real estate and tourism (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018).

Oil and Gas

Syria is a relative small oil and gas producer in the petroleum industry (Laqueur & Schueftan,

2018). Before Syrian civil war, International Monetary Fund reported that Syria oil sales

accounted for 25% of the country’s revenue in 2010, generating an annual income of $3.2billion

(Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018). However, after the war, Syria has been imposed by sanctions from

EU and US restricting oil sales and foreign investments in its infrastructure and maintenance.

Additionally, most of the oil and gas fields under ISIS control were damaged by international

coalition airstrikes to hinder its production capacities (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018). Thus, Iran

seeks to be the sole supplier of refined oil products and energy demands to Syria. In addition, the

oil supplies from Iran are expected to generate substantial income for the Syrian economy since

the Syrian government will obtain the oil supplies on credit and will charge domestic providers

for distributing them in the market locally (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018).
Electricity

The Syrian civil war deteriorated electricity infrastructure perpetuated by neglect and attacks;

thus, diminishing the capacity of the power plants to meet domestic demands. Consequently, Iran

seeks to sign MoUs with Syria which aim at rehabilitating the thermal powers in Tayem, Banias,

Aleppo, and Latakia (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018).

Agriculture

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN estimated that the Syrian agricultural sector

contributed to 19% of Syria’s GDP in 2011, before the civil war (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018).

Yet, the agricultural sector has incurred losses of $16billion after the war attributed to decrease

in harvests of citrus, vegetables, cotton and animal feed (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018). Therefore,

Iran seeks to revive and control the Syrian domestic agricultural sector through the signing of

numerous MoUs that will enable Iran to construct flour and sugar mills in Southern Syria.

Moreover, Iran aims at signing MoUs with Syria that will enable it to export agricultural

mechanical equipment and the marketing of surplus Syrian agricultural produce (Laqueur &

Schueftan, 2018).

Tourism and real estate

Syria’s tourism sector was a major contribution to the country’s GDP with an estimate of 14.4%,

$64 billion, in 2011 before the civil war (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018). However, due to Syria’s

civil war, the tourism sector suffered a 98% decline according to the Syrian Economic Forum by

the year 2015 (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018). As a result, Iran intends to invest in the tourism

sector in Syria mostly in religious tourism. For instance, the Iranian Hajj and Pilgrimage

Organization, speculates to sign MoUs with Syrian minister of tourism to increase tourists

numbers visiting Syria’s religious sites (Laqueur & Schueftan, 2018).

As an Economic what will happen and what might affect Saudi Arabia

Iran’s economic and political influence in Syria is causing disorder in the Gulf countries (Lynch,

2018). Thus, to curtail Iran’s influence in Syria, Saudi Arabia has embarked on making common

cause with America and Israel (Lynch, 2018). For instance, Saudi Arabia has backed Israel’s

efforts in monitoring Iran’s activities in Syria and depending on the nature of Iran’s response; the

potential for war is impending (Lynch, 2018). Likewise, Saudi Arabia is supporting the US to

establish an institutionalized anti-Iranian bloc in the Gulf region in the form of a Middle East

Strategic Alliance, Arab NATO (Lynch, 2018). In the same way, Saudi Arabia has increased its

grip over the organization of Islamic Cooperation and is accusing Iran of economic sabotage by

supporting terrorism and meddling in Syria’s country affairs (Lynch, 2018).

What’s good and bad?

I believe that the Iranian intervention in Syria is a bad decision because Iran is mostly influenced

by Iran’s decision to achieve regional strategic goals rather than setting up of new markets

(Lynch, 2018). Moreover, I believe that Iran’s geographic approach in financial investments

reveals what it considers as strategic assets for the purpose of its security and sustainable

presence in Syria (Lynch, 2018). On the contrary, I concur that Iran is rooting its influence in

Syria by supporting local livelihoods by the provision of abundant animal feed at lower prices to

promote the important animal husbandry sector, provided medical services, rehabilitated schools,

and delivered electricity to gain favor among the local population (Lynch, 2018). Additionally, in

Southern Aleppo, where Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC, has established the

influence of Local Defense Forces, Iran has promoted Syrian local allies to penetrate local

businesses, oil trade and transportation. Hence, the Local Defense Forces are encouraged to

become economic actors in the region (Lynch, 2018).

What is the worst could happen if Iran does what they want to do!

Iran continues to dominate Syria’s economy and influences its political support for Assad’s rule

in Syria. As a result, Iran faces economic sanctions from Saudi Arabia, Israel, EU, and US

(Workman, 2018). For instance, the economic sanctions imposed on Iran include restrictions of

oil exports to Syria. Yet, Iran has opposed the sanctions, claiming that there are numerous

options to neutralize the reposition of Saudi Arabia, Israel and US (Workman, 2018). In addition,

Iran threatens to disrupt oil shipments from Gulf countries. In conclusion, a war between Saudi

Arabia, Israel, EU, and Iran looms large (Workman, 2018).

References
Laqueur, W., & Schueftan, D. (2018). The Israel-Arab reader: A documentary history of the

Middle East conflict.

Lynch, M. (2018). The new Arab wars: Uprisings and anarchy in the Middle East.

Terrill, W. A., & Army War College (U.S.). (2018). The Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the future of

Middle East security. Carlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Workman, A. (2018). Understanding the Gulf's new Syria policy: Power, identity, or economy?.