chapter 13

Concurrent Powers in the Ethiopian Federal System

Assefa Fiseha and Zemelak Ayele

1 Introduction

Federations – unlike other forms of political organisation – are based on the

constitutionally guaranteed division of powers in which each level of govern-
ment is empowered to exercise its competences autonomously. A division of
power between a federal government and the constituent units of a federation
is thus one of the hallmarks of a federal system. The constitutional division of
power may take different forms. In many cases, federal constitutions list the
exclusive competences of either of the two levels of government, leaving the
residual powers to the other.
The dividing lines between the competences of federal and state govern-
ments are, however, never clear, even though many federal constitutions at-
tempt to divide functional competences and powers neatly between the two
levels of government. There often remain deliberate and/or unintended inter-
sections in the powers and functions of the two levels of government, which
are referred to as concurrent functions and powers.1 The latter r­epresent
the meeting point of the two levels of government that otherwise exercise
­exclusive powers. Concurrent powers are hence unique, since the two levels of
government exercise them simultaneously. Nevertheless, these levels of gov-
ernment do not sit together while exercising concurrent powers. Institutional
mechanisms for coordinating the exercise of such jointly assigned functions
and powers are thus required.
This chapter examines whether and how concurrent functions and powers
are defined in Ethiopia’s federal Constitution and how they are exercised by
the federal and state governments. It begins by considering the meaning of
concurrent functions and powers under the federal Constitution. It then looks
into how concurrent functions are exercised by the two levels of government.
The chapter goes on to explore the institutional mechanisms put in place for
coordinating the exercise of these functions and powers and resolving con-
flicts of jurisdiction that inevitably arise between these levels.

1 I. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimensions of Politics (2nd ed. Lanham:
University Press of America, 1987) 58.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004337572_014

242 Fiseha and Ayele

2 Division of Functions and Powers under the fdre Constitution

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (fdre) Constitution of 1995 con-

tains a long list of exclusive federal competences, a short list of exclusive state
competences, and a clause allocating residual powers to the states. Some 21
items are listed under article 51 of the Constitution as the exclusive federal
competences. These include functions that are almost always left for the fed-
eral government, including defence, foreign affairs, and developing fiscal and
monetary policies. The functions in which the federal government has some
kind of competence are not, however, limited to those 21 items,2 even though
it appears that article 51 was intended to exhaustively list all the functions that
are within the exclusive competence of the federal government.3
The other provisions dealing with federal powers were meant only to speci-
fy the respective powers of the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government with respect to the federal competences listed under article 51.
Yet what appears as a final product does not reflect this intention. Article 51
therefore does not incorporate all of the powers of the federal government. In
other words, what is not listed under article 51 is not automatically a residual
power that falls under the exclusive competence of the states. One first has to
deduct all of the functional competences of the federal government distrib-
uted throughout the Constitution in order to determine the residual powers
of the states.
Some of the exclusive federal powers not mentioned under article 51 but
indicated elsewhere are the power to enact a labour code, a commercial code

2 For instance, article 55(6) the Constitution authorises the House of Peoples’ Representatives
(HoPR) to issue proclamations on any matter that the House of Federation (HoF) declares
is relevant for the sustenance of the economic union of the federation. The HoF is the sec-
ond chamber of the federal parliament, which is composed of representatives of the nations
and nationalities (ethnic communities) of the country. Each ethnic community, regardless
of its population size, has at least one representative in the HoF. An ethnic community is
also ­entitled to an additional representative for every one million population belonging to
it. While playing no role in law and policymaking, other than what is stated above, the HoF
decides on the sharing of nationally raised revenue between the federal government and the
states. The HoF also has the power to interpret the Constitution and resolve constitutional
disputes.
3 Indeed, the word ‘exclusive’ does not appear in the English text of articles 51 and 55 which
enumerate the functional competences of the federal and state governments. The Amharic
text of article 52(1) contains the word ‘beteley’, which implies that the federal government has
exclusive power in those functional areas.