VIII.
LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
KINDS OF DUTIES
CASE 70: MENDIOLA v. PEOPLE- REGINALD LAMPITOC
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan in two (2)
criminal cases for violation of Sections 3(j) and 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He
was sentenced to two (2) penalties, each of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years
as maximum and perpetual disqualification from public office.
Petitioner was charged in two (2) separate informations. The first
information, for violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, read as follows: That on or about May 20, 1988 in Angono,
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a public officer being then the Acting
Building Official of Angono, Rizal, did then there wilfully and
unlawfully knowingly approve and grant Building Permits for market
stalls in favor of Zeniada Ortillada, Marlon Rosales and Ruben
Blanco who are not legally entitled to such permits, for the place of
location to where these permits were issued is already covered by a
valid and existing building permit previously issued by accused on
March 12, 1987 in favor of the municipality of Angono, Rizal.
Contrary to law.
Section 3(j) of the statute includes among the acts of public officers
penalized thereunder the following: j. Knowingly approving or
granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled to
such license,permit, privilege or advantage, or a mere
respresentative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(Emphasis supplied)
The second information, for violation of Section 3(e) of the same
statute, read:That on or about and during the period from June 15,
1988 up to the present, in Angono, Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
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public officer, being then the Acting Building Officer of Angono, Rizal,
through evident bad faith in the discharge of his official administrative
functions, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully refuse to issue
partial occupancy certificates to the awardees of Phase II of the
Angono Public Market despite the readiness of the facilities of the
building for use as constructed, thereby causing undue injury to the
awardees/market vendors who cannot engage in their business.
Contrary to law.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, renders criminal the act
of a public officer of e. Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions. (Emphasis supplied)
The two (2) charges instituted against petitioner may be quickly
described as follows:
a. issuing "building permits for market stalls" in favor of three (3)
persons who are allegedly not legally entitled to such permits; and
b. refusing to issue certificates of partial occupancy to awardees of
market stalls in Phase II of the Angono Public Market although said
Phase II market was allegedly ready for use.
ISSUE: WON Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco were legally entitled to
the temporary renovation permits presented a substantial question of
law and it is well to recall that mistake on a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith.
HELD AND RATIO: Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General, we believe and so hold that all the above factors support
the claim of good faith in respect of both the first and second charges
against petitioner Mendiola. The question of validity and
enforceability of Resolution No. 7-1987 was all pervasive and
inevitably affected both the entitlement of the three (3) Phase I
stallholders to the temporary renovation permits issued by petitioner
Mendiola and the entitlement of the contractor and Phase II
awardees to a certificate of partial occupancy of the admittedly
incomplete new building. The facts or events surrounding the first
charge are so intertwined with those surrounding the second charge
as to render it very difficult to separate them, even conceptually.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, requires proof of
"manifest partiality" or "evident bad faith" or "gross inexcusable
negligence." The information for violation of Section 3(e) alleged only
"evident bad faith." We believe that, in the totality of the
circumstances of this case, the prosecution failed to show beyond
reasonable doubt the presence of any of these three (3) elements.
Indeed, it appears that the prosecution failed to overcome
the presumption of good faith to which every public official, acting in
discharge of his official duties, is entitled. The petitioner, caught
between two (2) contending groups was constantly trying to specify
in writing the reasons for his acts. While one need not agree with all
his acts or stated reasons therefor or the wisdom thereof, one cannot
say that they were so obviously and palpably sham justifications for
merely arbitrary and capricious acts as to warrant a finding of
"evident bad faith." No one has claimed that petitioner received any
money for issuing the renovation permits or refraining from issuing
the demanded certificate (s) of partial occupancy.
There is also substantial doubt whether the element of "undue injury
to any party" required in Section 3(e) was adequately shown by the
prosecution. The respondent Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked
the circumstance that the Phase II awardees had in fact entered and
occupied their respective stalls in the new building, without waiting
for the certificates (s) of partial occupancy which they demanded
from petitioner Mendiola and without paying heed to Resolution No.
097-1988 of the new Municipal Council warning them not to open up
their stalls in the still incomplete new building.
Under these circumstances, the filing of the two (2) criminal
informations appears quite unfortunate. We note also that, so far as
the record would show, petitioner Mendiola was, curiously, the only
person or public official criminally charged in connection with the
whole affair. That the three (3) Phase I stallholders on whose stalls
the new building encroached happened to be relatives or friends of
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petitioner, appears to us as essentially if not completely co-incidental;
the ruing of theSandiganbayan that petitioner deliberately chose to
protect the interests of his relatives and friend and not the interests
of the general community appears bereft of basis and as speculative.
The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt was not met.
CASE 71: SIBULO v. RAMIREZ- VIKTOR GUTIERREZ
FACTS: In an Order dated August 8, 1983, Judge Vicente P. Sibulo
initiated a complaint against his former deputy sheriff Ernesto
Ramirez for acts which directly or indirectly impede and obstruct the
administration of justice.
On March 1, 1982, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Ernesto Ramirez was
required by the Court to make a return within 10 days from receipt of
the Order of the writ of execution issued on October 15, 1981. The
Order of the Court was received by said Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Ernesto Ramirez on March 9, 1982. More than one (1) year had
elapsed since then and Deputy Provincial Sheriff Ramirez failed to
make a return in complete disregard of the Order of the Court.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, on March 18, 1983, the Court issued an
order directing said Deputy Sheriff Ernesto Ramirez to comply with
the Order of the Court dated March 1, 1982 and to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt for ignoring the Order of the
Court.
Inspite of these Orders of the Court, said Deputy Provincial Sheriff
failed to comply numerous times with the same compelling again the
plaintiff to move the Court for an Order requiring Deputy Provincial
Sheriff Ramirez to comply with the Order of the Court dated March
18, 1983 and the previous Order dated March 1, 1982.
It is apparent from the records that the actuation of Deputy Provincial
Sheriff Ernesto Ramirez is a willful disregard of the authority of the
Court tantamount to an improper conduct of an employee of the
Court tending, directly or indirectly, to impede
Executive Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes required the respondent to
submit his explanation, to which the respondent requested for an
extension of time to comply. Yet respondent did not submit his
explanation.
ISSUE: Were the acts of the Ramirez of not complying shows him
disobeying legal orders of his superiors?
HELD: The Executive Judge, therefore, referred the matter to this
Court through the Office of the Court Administrator.
There is ample evidence on record of respondent's unpardonable
conduct as an officer of the court warranting the drastic penalty of
dismissal.
Not only did respondent fail to make a return of the writ of execution
within the period specified in the order.
As an officer of the court, a sheriff has the duty to serve and make a
return of a writ of execution "to the clerk or judge of the court issuing
it, at any time not less than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60)
days after its receipt by the officer (sheriff) ... :
The law is mandatory. The Sheriff is left with no discretion on
whether or not to execute and to make a return of the writ within the
period provided by the Rules of Court aforestated.
From the foregoing, there is no reasonable doubt that the actuations
of the respondent sheriff constitute disrespect and disregard, if not
outright defiance, of the court's authority. He ignored altogether the
fact that as an officer of the court he is charged with certain official
duties which must be performed honestly and faithfully and within the
period specified in the Revised Rules of Court or in the orders of the
court.
Moreover, as an officer of the court, Deputy Sheriff Ramirez is
subject to the Civil Service law, 10 particularly the Article on
Discipline. His acts, from his unwarranted failure to make a return of
the writ of execution, to his obstinate refusal and continued failure to
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present his side of the charge could easily fall under the following
grounds for disciplinary action:
Dishonesty;
Misconduct;
Being notoriously undesirable;
Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;
Falsification of official document;
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the respondent guilty of serious
misconduct in the performance of his official duties and hereby
orders his DISMISSAL from the service, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch of the government service, effective upon
receipt hereof.
CASE 72: TABUENA v. SANDIGANBAYAN- REBECCA FLORES
FACTS
President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly
to the president’s office and in cash Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA)’s unpaid obligation to PNCC, to which Tabuena
replied “I will do it”. About a week later (January 8), Tabuena
received a memorandum of the verbal instruction of the President.
The memo reads
"Office of the President of the Philippines Malacañang
January 8, 1986
MEMO TO: The General Manager
Manila International Airport Authority
You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine
National Construction Corporation, through this Office, the
sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in
cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said
Company mentioned in a Memorandum of Minister Roberto
Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985 and duly
approved by this Office on February 4, 1985.

Your immediate compliance is appreciated.
(Sgd.)
FERDINAND MARCOS."
Thus, on January 10, 16 and 30 year 1986, 25 million, 25 million and
5 million respectively were withdrawn (from PNB extension office)
respectively by accused Luis A. Tabuena, General Manager of the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).
All the above withdrawals were done by way of cash placed in
peerless boxes and duffle bags, laded on a PNB armored car and
delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez (secretary
of
Pres. Marcos), to which she issued a receipt only on the last day of
delivery January 30, 1986 (5 million). (There were three withdrawals
and deliveries, 25M, 25M and 5M)
But it appears that were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for
the months of January to June 1986.
Sandiganbayan found Tabuena et. al were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, convicting them of malversation under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code. For having malversed the total amount
of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
funds during their incumbency as General Manager and Acting
Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA.
ISSUE: WON Tabuena et al are guilty of the crime charged of
malversation.
HELD: NO
RATIO: They are acquitted.
Grounds for acquittal
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1) On the reason of good faith, a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the
accused.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that
was what the MARCOS memorandum required him to do. He could
not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior.
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the
view that criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical
mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into,
and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing
the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose. The accused
may thus always introduce evidence to show he acted in good faith
and that he had no intention to convert. And this, to our mind,
Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously shown.
2) Tabuena did not have to observe all auditing procedures of
disbursement (all disbursement above 1000 should be made in
check, payment of all claims against the government had to be
supported with complete documentation)
Tabuena did not have the luxury of time to observe all the
procedures
of disbursement considering that the MARCOS memorandum
enjoined him "immediate compliance", with the directive that he
forward to the president's office the P55 Million in cash.
In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-
government agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance,
directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner
in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a
directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good
faith should be read on Tabuena’s compliance, without hesitation nor
any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore
is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.”[16] The subordinate-superior relationship between
Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of
the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its
purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency
(MIAA) to another (PNCC). However, the unlawfulness of the
MARCOS Memorandum was being argued, on the observation, for
instance, that the Ongpin Memo referred to in the presidential
directive reveals a liability of only about P34.5 Million.
3) The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already
converted and misappropriated the P55 million when he delivered
the
same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC.
It must be stressed that the MARCOS memorandum directed
Tabuena "to pay immediately the PNCC, through this office, the sum
of 55milion pesos" Tabuena did exactly as the memorandum ordered,
he was acting in good faith when he delivered the money to Mrs.
Gimenez.
4) Even assuming that the sole purpose of the Marcos Memorandum
was for the personal benefit of those in power, still, no criminal
liability can be imputed to Tabuena because conspiracy was not
established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55
million.
5) Finally, the most compelling reason of all is the violation of the
accused's constitutional right to due process.
The court revealed its biased nature during its numerous questioning
over the witnesses (Monera, Peralta, and Tabuena), alarmingly even
exceeding the number of questions of the cross-examiner. In
addition the questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of probing, confrontation and insuation.
"A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses
as to create the impression that he is allied with the prosecution"
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PRESIDENT
CASE 73: ESTRADA v. DESIERTO- JOYCE BAYLON
FACTS: On November 13, 2000, The House of Representatives
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. On December 7, 2000, the
impeachment proceedings began in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were
made. On January 16, 2001, the impeachment trial stopped when 11
senators, in sympathy with the President, voted to stop the opening
of an envelope which allegedly has damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and then Senate
President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day,
the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that
General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. January. On January 20, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Estrada, after
his fall, filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. He sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in the cases that may be filed in
his office, until after his term as President is over and only if legally
warranted.” Thru another counsel, Estrada, on February 6, filed a
case for Quo Warranto praying for judgment confirming Estrada to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring Arroyo to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Estrada validly resigned
2. WON Estrada enjoyed immunity from suit
HELD:
1. Yes
2. No.
RATIO:
1. Yes. The resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. The elements of a
valid resignation are: (a) an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the
Palace. He constructively resigned. In the press release containing
his final statement:
a. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the Arroyo as President.
b. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he
was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
c. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity);
d. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come in the same service of the country;
e. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
2. No. Estrada is not immune for suit because he is not the president
anymore. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada
cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of
the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
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the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of
a non-sitting president. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is
an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The
rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any other trespasser.
LEGISLATORS
CASE 74: SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN- ARJUNA GUEVARA
FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the
then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the
stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted
with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a
violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization
of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were
allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal
cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information,
Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for
provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident
which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the
Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a
senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President
(Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of
the Senate without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: It is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house
may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” But on the other hand,
Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
“Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under
any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him”.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may
be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the
fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior
as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office”
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
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The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits
proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1)
the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity
of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have
a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of
the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him,
such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific
crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is
subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule
117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
JUDGES
CASE 75: DANTES v. CAGUIOA- JEAN GUECO
CASE 76: IN RE: RAUL M. GONZALEZ- PATRICIA CAŃALITA
FACTS: An anonymous letter by the “Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court ”was addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzales with
regard to charges of disbarment initiated by Mr. Miguel Cuenco
against Justice Marcelo Fernan. Mr. Cuenco was encouraging Hon.
Gonzales ro ask the intervention of Tanodbayan regarding the issue.
The Court then directed the Clerk of Court to furnish Hon. Gonzales
a copy of the Resolution on the administrative case entitled, “Miguel
Cuenco v. Hon. Marcelo Fernan” wherein the Court resolved to
dismiss the case for disbarment against Justice Fernan for lack of
merit. Mr. Cuenco in turn filed an Omnibus Pleading which the Court
considered as a motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied by the Court.
ISSUE: WON the herein act of Mr. Cuenco, in initiating a disbarment
proceeding against Justice Fernan is correct?
HELD: No.
RATIO: Under Art. XI, Sec.2 of the 1987 Constitution, a member of
the Supreme Court must first be removed by impeachment. With this,
it has been held by the Court that a public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from
office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer.
Chief Justice Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New
Constitution, stated that judgment in cases of impeachment shall be
limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. This
position implies that a member of the Supreme Court must first be
removed from office by impeachment. Should he be terminated as
such, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior
proven to be done by him.
The above rule is pertinent to the fundamental principles of
separation of powers and judicial independence. The proper remedy
therefore is for Mr. Cuenco to file impeachment proceedings against
Justice Fernan.
QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICERS
CASE 77: PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB v. BONIFACIO- KELVIN
HUNG
FACTS: The horse race held in Santa Ana Hippodrome had a faulty
start. One of the horses turned around and blocked the three horses
at its left thus enabling the three horses from the right side to run
ahead and gain a good lead. The official starter signalled the
stewards to cancel the race. The two stewards were also acting as
judges. Since his signal was unheeded, the official starter went to the
stewards and told them that in his opinion the race must be
cancelled. one of the stewards asked him to "shut up". When the
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winning horses were announced, the public showed its disapproval
of the result. Respondents (Commission on Races), convinced that
the race was faulty, decided to cancel it. While the investigation was
going on, the holders of the winning tickets were able to cash the
tickets. The company had to refund to the holders of the losing
tickets the sum of P5,032.
ISSUE: WON the respondents, acting in their capacity as members
of the Commission on Races, should be held liable for the loss
sustained by the Company when it decided to cancel the race.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Although the Court said that the respondents, in deciding to
cancel the race, acted in excess of the authority granted to them by
law, they could not be held liable for damages. As a rule, a public
officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally
liable to one injured as a consequence of an act performed within the
scope of his official authority, and in the line of his official duty. In
order that acts may be done within the scope of official authority, it is
not necessary that they be prescribed by statute, or even that they
be specifically directed or requested by a superior officer, but it is
sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his control or supervision, or that they have
more or less connection with such matters, or that they have more or
less connection with such matters, or that they are governed by a
lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the
officer is acting.
Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to
exercise his judgment in matters brought before him, he is
sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is
actually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured
as the result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however
erroneous judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are
done within the scope of the officer's authority, and without
willfulness, malice, or corruption.
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF SUBORDINATES
CASE 78: ALBERT v. GANGAN- FLOYD MAGO
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon Albert, president of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corp (NHMFC) approved loans taken out to
finance several projects in pursuance of its Community Mortgage
Program (CMP), a low-cost home financing scheme. One of the
projects under this program was the AMAKO project for which
P36,796,711.55 was released and approved by petitioner.
Upon petitioner’s instruction, an inspection of the said project was
conducted and it was found that the project was 3 months in arrears
in their amortization. Because of this finding, petitioner ordered other
investigations be conducted. After investigation, the CoA Resident
Auditor of NHMFC disallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO proj.
for the following reasons: (a) non-submission of documentary
requirements/non-complying or defective documents as required
under NHMFC Corporate Circular No. CMP-001; and (b)
irregular/excessive expenditures per COA Circular No. 85-55A
Months later, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
against his subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible
for the fraud with respect to the AMAKO loan transaction. Petitioner
also filed a civil case for sum of money, annulment, damages and
attorney’s fees with preliminary attachment, against SHGCCI,
AMAKO, Sapang Palay & Development Foundation, Inc., and other
persons responsible for the misrepresentation, tortious and
fraudulent acts in connection with the loan granted to AMAKO project.
The Commission on Audit (COA), after investigation, later found
petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount representing
payment of loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO. The COA
disallowed the plan payment because it found the payment irregular
and an excessive expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable
pursuant to sec. 103 of PD 1445, which states, “expenditures of
government funds or uses of government property in violation of law
or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee
found to be directly responsible therefor.”
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In his MFR, which was later denied, Albert’s defense was that he
cannot and should not be held personally liable for the amount of the
loan as he acted only in the performance of his official duties and
that there was no clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence on his part.
The COA in dismissing said MFR stated thus: Albert himself was the
final approving authority of the transaction in question and that the
officers/employees who processed the same were directly under his
supervision. He could have conclusively determined the validity of a
transaction involving such a large amount. Albert’s claim of good
faith and exercise of due diligence are disputable presumptions, and
these presumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts
constituting an offense, as where there exists the fact that loss of
government funds resulted from official action. Lastly, it stated that
Sec3. (9) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) declares to be unlawful the act
of “entering, in behalf of the government, into a contract or
transaction manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
- Aggrieved, petitioner filed this case contending that he can’t be held
personally liable for the amount of P36, 796,711.55 representing the
loan proceeds to AMAKO, because the questioned COA decisions
don’t have any findings that he has knowingly participated in the
alleged fraudulent transaction. He claims that there is no clear
showing that he acted in bad faith, with malice, or gross negligence
when he approved the loan transaction.
ISSUE:WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it held
petitioner personally liable for the subject disallowance.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The decision of a government agency must state the facts
and the law on which the decision is based.
The assailed decision failed to mention petitioner’s direct
participation in the fraudulent scheme. It merely held that petitioner
be immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance,
for the simple reason that, as the approving officer, any transaction
presented to him for approval is subject to his discretion. The COA
decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances
(the why’s, what’s and how’s of the disallowance), were patently
missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its
constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of govt funds at
sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure
is alleged to be fraudulent or why there was a misrepresentation.
Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by
reason of being the head of govt agency. The COA even mentioned
the anti-graft law which imputes liability for a grossly
disadvantageous contract entered into by a govt functionary but as to
why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was considered
disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts.
CASE 79: CHAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN- ASTER CARRILLO
FACTS: In November 1989, petitioner was hired as Accounting Clerk II and assigned at
the Regional Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Cebu City, discharging
the function of Cashier or Collection Officer. An audit was conducted to the
petitioner’s account and the auditor found that petitioner had a cumulative
shortage of cash accountability in the amount of P333,360.00 which was reflected in her
Cash Examination Report dated March 1, 1996, signed by petitioner. The auditor issued
a demand letter to petitioner requiring her to explain the shortage incurred, to which
petitioner did not respond.
During trial, petitioner admitted that she extended loans using her collection (public funds)
to her colleagues and that the same is practiced in their office (although she knows its
illegality). She was in effect telling that such act was known by her superiors and that they
consented to the doing of the same.. She furthered that even her immediate supervisor
was getting money out of the fund.
RTC and Sandiganbayan found her guilty of Malversation of Public Funds. Hence,
petitioner filed an appeal contending that she is in good faith and therefore if she should
be penalized, it should be administratively and not criminally.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of malversation despite the facts that there is an implied
consent by her superiors?
HELD: Yes.
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RATIO: The fact that the immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have
acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize
the disbursements. The accused was not in good faith because she allowed the doing
of an illegal act. There was no reason that prohibited her from doing the right thing.
Moreover, there was no indication that she attempted to stop the doing of the illegal act.
She allowed herself to be machinery in doing the criminal act and therefore she should
be held liable.
PERSONAL LIABILITY
CASE 80: TABUENA v. COURT OF APPEALS- DIANE DE LEON
FACTS: Eugenio de la Cruz, in his official capacity as Director of the
Forest Research Institute, was commanded by the Trial Court to
appoint Santos Tabuena, to the position of Administrative Assistant II
in the Forest Products Research Institute.
Along with the said decree, de la Cruz was also sentenced to pay
Tabuena the sum of P230 a month commencing from June 16, 1958
until he shall have been appointed and assumed office as
Administrative Assistant II in the Forest Products Research Institute,
plus the sum of P3,000 for moral damages and P1,000 for attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation, aside from the costs of the suit.
De la Cruz filed an appeal and therein manifested that an appeal
bond is not required to perfect his appeal. In answer to this, Tabuena
prayed to the Trial Court asking that de a Cruz be required to file an
appeal bond and to execute its judgment in so far as it commands
the appointment of Tabuena to the position of Administrative
Assistant II.
For the issue on the appeal bond, the Court ruled in favor of de la
Cruz. It sustained the contention of de la Cruz that he was exempted
from filing an appeal bond, as a public officer sued in his official
capacity.
ISSUE: WON de la Cruz is required to file an appeal bond
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: De la Cruz must pay the appeal bond.
The general rule is that an appeal bond is required for the purpose of
paying for costs, which the appellate court may award against the
appellant (Sec 5, Rule 41). As an exception, an appeal bond is not
required of the Government when it is the unsuccessful party,
because no costs are supposed to accrue against the Republic of
the Philippines unless otherwise provided by law (Sec. 1, Rule 131).
But exemption from the filing of bonds applies only where the action
is brought by or against public officers impleaded merely as nominal
representatives of the Government, and sued purely in their official
capacity.
In this case, de la Cruz was sued not only in his official capacity as
director of the Forest Product Research Institute, but also in his
personal capacity for having acted allegedly in manifest bad faith,
"with the purpose of persecuting, discriminating against or
committing injustice to the petitioner" and accordingly, the judgment
of the court of origin made him personally liable for damages in
varying concepts. On principle, a public officer, by virtue of his office
alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising
from illegal acts done in bad faith.
CASE 81: OROCIO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT- NORIEL
ALEJANDRO
CASE 82: COREA v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BULACAN- FRANCES BUBAN
FACTS: There were two policemen involved that were illegally
dismissed by the petitioner during his incumbency as the Mayor of
Norzagaray, Bulacan (the reason for the said dismissal was not
mentioned in the case). On December 13, 1968, CFI of Bulacan
rendered judgment in favor of the policemen and ordered Correa to
personally pay the salaries which the policemen failed to receive by
reason of their illegal dismissal from office until they are actually
reinstated. On August 24, 1976, CA affirmed the decision of the CFI
and became final and executory.
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On April 22, 1977, respondent Court issued the Order denying the
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. Petitioner thus came to this Court,
maintaining that he could no longer be required to pay the back
salaries of the private respondents because payment on his part
presupposes his continuance in office, which is not the case. He
contends that it is the Municipality of Norzagaray that is liable for
said payment, invoking Aguador v. Enerio and Sison v. Pajo.,
Petitioner further alleges that the fact that he is no longer municipal
mayor of Norzagaray, constitutes a substantial change in the
situation of the parties which makes the issuance of the writ of
execution inequitable.
Petitioner prays, among others, that judgment be rendered declaring
that the payment of back salaries of private respondents should be
made by the incumbent mayor and by the municipality of Norzagaray;
Bulacan, and that petitioner is no longer liable for the payment
thereof; and annulling the Order dated April 22, 1977 of respondent
court denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.
ISSUE: WON Correa as a public official (Mayor) who wrongfully or
illegally dismissed an employee during his incumbency is still liable
to the case personally.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Liability of public official who wrongfully dismissed an
employee is personal; Principle of personal liability applicable to
cases where public officer discharges an employee wrongfully. In the
discharge of governmental functions, “municipal corporations are
responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to
the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in
conformity with the requirements thereof.”
A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in
excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office
and is personally liable therefor like any private individual. This
principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a
public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee
wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-
compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from
office, the officials were acting outside their official authority.
Instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
REMEDIES
CASE 83: AMARO v. SUMANGUIT- EDWARD MATIAS
FACTS: On October 5, 1958, Amaro was assaulted and shot near
the city government building of Silay. The following day, he together
with his father and his witnesses “went to the office of Sumanguit but
instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed
and terrorized.” Because of this, they “gave up and renounced their
right and interest I the prosecution of the crime.
The Mayor advised Sumanguit to conduct an investigation of the said
crime and as a result, the City Attorney was about to file or had
already filed an information from illegal discharge of firearms against
the assailant. However, after “having finished the investigation of the
crime complained of, Sumanguit is now harassing the plaintiffs in
their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office
when he is absent and he is about to order the arrest of Amaro’s to
take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from
an dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the
crime.
Amaro filed suit for damages in the CFI of Negros Occidental against
the Chief of Police of the City of Silay but was dismissed.
ISSUE:Does Sumanguit’s action constitute an actionable dereliction?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on
appellee’s part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code which
provides that “[a]ny person suffering material or moral loss because
a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause,
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to perform his official duty may file an action from damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.”
The Amaro’s were “harassed and terrorized” may be a conclusion of
law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is
not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on
appellee’s refusal to give tem assistance which it was his duty to do
as an officer of the law. The requirement under the aforesaid
provision that such refusal must be “without just cause” is implicit in
the context of the allegation.
CASE 84: URBANO v. CHAVEZ- JOSHUA BAGOTSAY
FACTS: Two petitions consolidated into one decision.
First Case: Urbano instituted a criminal case against Secretary Luis
Santos of the Department of Local Government and several other
public officials for alleged violation of the provisions of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
complaint against them was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Solicitor General
Francisco I. Chavez entered its appearance as counsel for the said
respondents as far as the preliminary investigation of the case is
concerned.
Second Case: Co filed a complaint for damages against Solicitor
General Francisco I. Chavez, the Businessworld Publishing
Corporation, and several other persons. Co alleged that the
defendant Chavez knowingly, willfully and maliciously published
and/or caused to be published certain defamatory imputations
against the petitioner in an article which appeared in the December
4, 1987 issue of Business World. Co alleged that the defamatory
remarks impute that he was a close associate of former President
Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc and that
he was involved in some anomalous transactions relating to the
funds of the national government during the time that President
Marcos was in office.
It appears that at the time of the publication of the questioned article,
Solicitor General Chavez was the counsel of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the government agency
responsible for the investigation of alleged graft and corrupt practices
relating to the former President, his relatives and his close
associates.
The first case relates to the authority of the Office of the Solicitor
General to appear for certain government officials in the course of
the preliminary investigation of their case before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The second case pertains to the authority of the said
Office to appear for the Solicitor General who was haled to court in a
civil suit for damages arising from an alleged defamatory remark
which appeared in a newspaper.
ISSUE: Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public
officer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal
action against him or in a civil action for damages against him?
HELD: No.
RATIO: It is undisputed that the Office of the Solicitor General is the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal
cases. As such, the said Office participates in a criminal case only
when the same has reached the appellate courts. It is the office of
the city, provincial or state prosecutor, as the case may be, and not
the Office of the Solicitor General, which attends to the investigation
and the prosecution of criminal cases in the first instance.
However, under the doctrine announced in Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc. and Garrido, the Office of the Solicitor General is
authorized to enter its appearance as counsel for any public official,
against whom a criminal charge had been instituted, during the
preliminary investigation stage thereof. Nevertheless, in the same
case, this Court held that once an information is filed against the
public official, the Office of the Solicitor General can no longer
represent the said official in the litigation. The anomaly in this
paradigm becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment of
conviction, the case is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. The
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Office of the Solicitor General, as the appellate counsel of the People
of the Philippines, is expected to take a stand against the accused.
More often than not, it does. Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of
interest here, and one which smacks of ethical considerations, where
the Office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the public official,
defends the latter in the preliminary investigation stage of the
criminal case, and where the same office, as appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines, represents the prosecution when the case
is brought on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been
contemplated and allowed by the law, its unconditional terms and
provisions notwithstanding. It is a situation which cannot be
countenanced by the Court.
The Court rules that the Office of the Solicitor General is not
authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal
case. For this reason, the doctrine announced in Anti-Graft League
of the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Ortega and Solicitor General v.
Garrido, and all decided cases affirming the same; in so far as they
are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed
abandoned.
This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled
to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly
committed by him. Any pecuniary liability he may be held to account
for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State
is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General
likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for
damages.
CASE 85: RODRIGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN- JENNIFER BALMEO
FACTS: Rodrigo and Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal Planning
and Development Coordinator, respectively, Pangasinan, while
Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer.
Rodrigo entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction for
the electrification of San Nicolas.
Mejica prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the project
was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by
mayor Rodrigo and confirmed so payment was effected by the
Municipal Treasurer. Then they received a Notice of Disallowance
from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinanwho found that as per COA
evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project
was actually accomplished.
Of the two units of generator supposedly purchased, only one
second-hand unit was delivered. The same generator broke down
after only two nights of operation. In addition, instead of 40 wooden
posts, only 27 were installed. The powerhouse was only 65.635%
completed. The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the a part of the
payment.
Then they requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of
]
disallowance and to re-inspect the project. Reiterated their plea in a
letter but the Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on
petitioners’ requests. So the case was filed and reached the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganyan has jurisdiction to decide the case
against the Mayor even if his salary grade was less than 27SG?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Because the local government official’s actual salary may
be less than what the Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes,
depending on the class and financial capability of his or her
respective local government unit.
This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official’s
Grade. As the foregoing discussion shows, on official’s salary is
determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the
nature of his position – the level of difficulty and responsibilities and
level of qualification requirements of the work. To give credence to
petitioners’ argument that Mayor Rodrigo’s salary determines his
Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and
ignore the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.
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Petitioner mayor’s position having been classified as Grade 27 in
accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of
the same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject
to the Anti-Graft Court’s jurisdiction.
Case dismissed.
IX. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
EXPIRATION OF TERM
CASE 86: PAREDES v. ABAD- JOHN PAJO
FACTS: This is a consolidated case of Paredes v. Abad, Sunga v.
Mosqueda, and Valley v. Caro.
The Judges dismissed the election protest filed by the petitioners
against the private respondents who had been proclaimed elected
and assumed their positions for a 4-year term as a result of the Nov
8, 1971 elections.
The reason for Judge’s dismissal of the election protests and
declares it as moot and academic is provided under Section 9 Article
XVII of the Transitory Provisions of the New Constitution, making the
held position of the respondents’ position under a new term.
ISSUE: WON respondents have the right to extend their tenure in
office.
HELD: No.
RATIO: When the said provision of the New Constitution, upon the
ratification of said Constitution on January 17, 1973, made indefinite
the four-year term of the elective provincial, city and municipal
officials, said four-year term had not yet expired — it was to expire
on December 31, 1975. More than this, the law under which they
were elected to a four-year term provides for a hold-over. We hold
that, as far as these elective officials are concerned, said
constitutional provision refers only to those who had been duly
elected; they are the ones who should continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President.
The Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it
did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly
elected.
There is a difference between the "term" of office and the "right" to
hold an office. A "term" of office is the period during which an elected
officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and
enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A "right" to hold a public office
is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and
responsibilities of the office. In other words, the "term" refers to the
period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an
office is entitled to stay therein, whether such period be definite or
indefinite. Hence, although the said provision made the term of the
petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein
petitioners, in an election protest, of the "right" of the private
respondents to continue holding their respective offices. What has
been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the "term",
not the "right" to the office, although the "right" of an incumbent to an
office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the "term"
thereof.
CASE 87: ALAJAR v. ALBA- OLIVE CACHAPERO
RESIGNATION
CASE 88: LAO v. TO-CHIP- JOSHUA SALTERAS
FACTS: On the basis of private respondent Leticia Abianda To-
Chip's letters-complaint addressed to the Land District Officer of the
Bureau of lands, the Supervising Land Examiner of said Bureau filed
a complaint against petitioner Tomas Lao with the Provincial Fiscal
of Samar for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, which
penalizes squatting and other similar acts. After preliminary
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investigation, the Provincial Fiscal dismissed the charges for lack of
merit.
Alleging that the filing of said complaint publicly put him to shame as
he is a businessman with a gross annual income of forty million
pesos, petitioner filed in the then Court of First Instance of Samar an
action for damages based on Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
against Private Respondent To-Chip and her husband Ramon To-
Chip, the latter as a nominal party.
In its decision, the lower court awarded petitioner moral damages of
P50,000 and attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P10,000.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On August 1, 1986, the Court of Appeals, thru its First Civil Cases
Division composed of justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Ma. Rosario
Quetulio-Losa and Leonor Ines Luciano, with Justice Luciano
as ponente, promulgated a decision reversing the lower court's
decision and dismissing the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the validity of the Court of Appeals decision
on the ground that on August 1, 1986, the appellate court had no
jurisdiction to issue said decision as two of the three members of the
first Civil Cases Division had been "effectively disempowered to sit
thereon as of July 31, 1986" as a result of the reorganization of said
court.
In its resolution of November 7, 1986, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration. Said resolution which was also
penned by Justice Luciano and concurred in by Justices Jorge R.
Coquia and Emeterio C. Cui states that the justices who were not re-
appointed because of the reorganization held office in a hold-over
capacity until the newly appointed as well as re-appointed justices
took their oath of office before the President at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of August 1, 1986. As the questioned decision was
promulgated at 11:45 A.M. of August 1, 1986, the justices who were
not re-appointed were still validly performing judicial functions
including the promulgation of decisions.
In line with the reorganization of the Court of Appeals, all the justices
tendered their resignation. The records of the Office of the Court
Administrator reveal that on July 30,1986, President Aquino
accepted the resignations of the justices of the Court of Appeals. The
following day, July 31, 1986, the President appointed the Presiding
Justice and forty-one (41) Associate Justices of said court.
At 5:20 o'clock in the afternoon of July 31, 1986, this Court received
the communication of the President regarding her acceptance of the
resignations of the Justices of the Court of Appeals. This Court then
informed the justices concerned about said communication. Hence,
the office of Justice Gaviola received the notice of the President's
acceptance of his resignation at 8:15 P.M. of the same day while the
office of Justice Quetulio-Losa received such notice at 8:30 A.M. of
the following day, August 1, 1986.
ISSUE: WON the August 1, 1986 decision of the CA is valid.
HELD: No.
RATIO: From these facts, it is clear that when the decision in
question was promulgated at 11:45 A.M. on August 1, 1986, Justices
Gaviola and Quetulio-Losa had both ceased to be members of the
Court of appeals since at that time, they had been informed that their
resignations had been accepted by the President. It is therefore,
immaterial that the newly appointed and re-appointed justices took
their oath of office at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 1, 1986.
What is crucial is that when the questioned decision was
promulgated, two of the three justices necessary to constitute a
quorum in a division had lost their authority to act as justices by
reason of the presidential acceptance of their resignations. To
endorse the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the justices who
were not re-appointed were acting in a hold-over capacity until their
replacements shall have taken their oath of office, will abet, rather
than avoid, a disorderly administration of justice.
Time and again, We have ruled that to be binding, a judgment must
be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge
who signed it. Thus, the promulgation of a decision after a judge
retires is nun and void. Fairness, equity and justice demand that the
same rulings, although they involved judges of the lower courts,
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should be applied with equal force to cases involving decisions
promulgated by the higher courts the justices of which have resigned.
CASE 89: CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE- JIMUEL MATIAS
FACTS: Respondents are seeking a reconsideration of the Court’s
January 25, 2000 decision, wherein we declared section 8 of RA
8551 to be violative of petitioners’ constitutionally mandated right to
security of tenure. As a consequence of our ruling, we held that
petitioners’ removal as Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM and the
appointment of new Commissioners in their stead were nullities and
ordered the reinstatement of petitioners and the payment of full back
wages to be computed from the date they were removed from office.
Respondents insist that the Court should take judicial notice of then
President Estrada’s appointment of Canonizado to the position
of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP on 30
June 1998, and of Canonizado’s acceptance and of his having
qualified for such position by taking his oath on 2 July 1998 before
then DILG Undersecretary Ronaldo Puno and again, on 7 July 1998,
this time before the President, since these “partake of official acts of
the Executive Department,” which are matters of mandatory judicial
notice, pursuant to section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court. By accepting such position, respondents contend that
Canonizado is deemed to have abandoned his claim for
reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM
Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible
ISSUE: WON Canonizado’s appointment to and acceptance of the
position of Inspector General should result in an abandonment of his
claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM.
HELD: No.
RATIO: It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one
office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates
the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act
or proceeding. Public policy considerations dictate against allowing
the same individual to perform inconsistent and incompatible duties.
The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere physical
impossibility of one person’s performing the duties of the two offices
due to a lack of time or the inability to be in two places at the same
moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and relations of the
two positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and
antagonism should one person attempt to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one toward the incumbent of the other.
The positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General
of the IAS are incompatible with each other. RA 8551 prohibits any
personnel of the IAS from sitting in a committee charged with the
task of deliberating on the appointment, promotion, or assignment of
any PNP personnel, whereas the NAPOLCOM has the power of
control and supervision over the PNP. However, the rule on
incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case at bar because at
no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices
simultaneously. Canonizado was forced out of his first office by the
enactment of section 8 of RA 8551. Thus, when Canonizado was
appointed as Inspector General on 30 June 1998, he had ceased to
discharge his official functions as NAPOLCOM Commissioner. Thus,
to reiterate, the incompatibility of duties rule never had a chance to
come into play for petitioner never occupied the two positions, of
Commissioner and Inspector General, nor discharged their
respective functions, concurrently.
As in the Tan and Gonzales cases, Canonizado was compelled to
leave his position as Commissioner, not by an erroneous decision,
but by an unconstitutional provision of law. Canonizado, like the
petitioners in the above mentioned cases, held a second office
during the period that his appeal was pending. Canonizado was
impelled to accept this subsequent position by a desire to continue
serving the country, in whatever capacity. This selfless and noble
aspiration deserves to be placed on at least equal footing with the
worthy goal of providing for oneself and one’s family, either of which
are sufficient to justify Canonizado’s acceptance of the position of
Inspector General. A contrary ruling would deprive petitioner of his
right to live, which contemplates not only a right to earn a living, as
held in previous cases, but also a right to lead a useful and
productive life.
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ABANDONMENT
CASE 90: FLORESCA v. QUETOLIO- VITO SALES
Petitioner, LUIS FLORESCA, is a pre-war justice of the peace who
seeks for the reinstatement for the said position. He claims that he
was not reinstated to such position upon the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government or upon the establishment of the
Republic of the Philippines, which is clearly a violation of his security
of tenure.
Petitioner also prays to oust respondent, AMPARO QUETULIO, who
was appointed to and actual incumbent of the said position held
before the war by the petitioner. However, respondent asserts her
right to stay in view of petitioner's abandonment of said office.
ISSUE: WON the court may reinstate the petitioner to his pre-war
post after he abandoned it.
HELD: No
RATIO: Petitioner was asked to assume his pre-war post after the
liberation but he refused to do so pointing out that the salary of the
position could not then sustain his family. Instead, petitioner
accepted several positions in the government (Junior Legal Assistant,
Civilian Investigator and Senior Social Worker).
Petitioner’s refusal to go back to his old post and his subsequent
acceptance of other employments when he simultaneously continued
to perform the functions of the justice of the peace clearly show
deliberate abandonment of the latter office, especially when attention
is called to the fact, likewise undisputed, that in the year 1946, the
petitioner, in his application submitted to the committee in charge of
passing upon applications for government positions in Ilocos Norte,
made it clear that he wanted to be appointed to any position other
than that of justice of the peace. To now reinstate the petitioner
would be to allow a government official to subordinate public interest
to personal comfort and convenience.
SEPARATE OPINION: The constitutional guarantee of judicial
tenure of office, as provided for in section 9 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, is not a carte blanche for a judicial officer to freely
relinquish his court position and to claim it at any time at his pleasure.
A judicial office is not a household furniture which can be relegated
to a corner and retrieved at one's convenience. It is not a private
property that the occupant, at his discretion, may lend to others and
reoccupy again.
CASE 91: LAMEYRA v. PANGILINAN- KAMAE CRUZ
FACTS: In February 1988, Pedro C. Lameyra (Lameyra) was
appointed janitor/messenger in the Municipal Hall of Famy, Laguna
under temporary status and was given a permanent appointment on
January 1989 to the same position by then Municipal Mayor
Melquiadez Acomular (Acomular).
George Pangilinan (Pangilinan) defeated Acomular in the last
election.
In August 1995, Lameyra received a letter from Pangilinan, informing
him that he is dropped from the roll of employees of the Famy LGU
pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) due to 2 reasons: (1) Insubordination,
and (2) AWOL.
Lameyra filed a notice of appeal with the CSC, alleging that he was a
permanent employee and that he was terminated without prior
written notice of the charges and without investigation and hearing,
in violation of his security of tenure and due process. He alleged that
Pangilinan’s act was of political vengeance as he was publicly known
to have voted for his political rival during the May 1995 elections.
Pangilinan alleged that Lameyra was guilty of insubordination and for
being absent without official leave without any justification of his
continued leave of absence without official leave. Also, there was a
memorandum issued requiring all heads of offices and employees of
local, provincial and municipal agencies to fill up and accomplish the
daily time log book pursuant to paragraph 3, Civil Service Rules XV,
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EO 5, series of 1990, with the warning that falsification of time
records will subject the offender to summary removal from the
service. Pangilinan said that despite knowledge of this memorandum,
Lameyra still deliberately failed and refused to comply with the
memorandum and did not report for work since July 1995.
The CSC dismissed Lameyra’s appeal and affirmed Pangilinan’s
action. Lameyra filed a motion for reconsideration. Lameyra then
filed a petition for review before the CA. The CA denied the petition.
Lameyra alleged that the CA committed an error of law and
committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts.
Essentially, Lameyra claimed that he was not given due process
before Pangilinan terminated his employment, and that the CSC
erred in refusing to consider the new evidence submitted with
Lameyra’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the CA allegedly erred
in evading the factual issues Lameyra issued before it.
ISSUE: WON Lameyra was illegally terminated.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 12 Series of 1994
provides as follows: "2.1 Absence without approved leave. a. An
officer or employee who is continuously absent without approved
leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be
separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior
notice. He shall, however, be informed of his separation from the
service not later than five (5) days from its effectivity which shall be
sent to the address appearing in his 201 files.
It is clear from a reading of the above provision that the no prior
notice is required to drop from the rolls an employee who has been
continuously absent without approved leave (AWOL) for at least
thirty (30) calendar days. It appears that solely on the basis of the
certification of the Personnel Officer/Human Resources Management
Assistant Benito Vicencio to the effect that Lameyra did not report for
work for the period from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995, and the
undisputed fact that he has not submitted any proof that he actually
filed an application for leave nor presented any approved leave
application for the said period, Lameyra’s termination from the
service was upheld by the CSC and the CA.
However, Lameyra contests the finding that he was absent at all. He
claims that he reported for work but was prevented from signing the
log book by the very officer, Benito Vicencio, who certified that he did
not report for work on the dates in question. He alleges in his petition
and insists in his reply, that he was not furnished a copy of
Pangilinan’s comment, and was able to secure a copy only after
receiving a copy of the Resolution of the CSC upholding the
termination of his service. This allegation, which was raised even in
the CA was not disputed by Pangilinan. Accordingly, the first
opportunity that Lameyra had to contest the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his dismissal was when he filed his motion for
reconsideration
While it is settled doctrine that findings of fact of an administrative
agency must be respected and this Court should not be tasked to
weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative
body, it is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by
substantial evidence. We are not convinced that the certification of
the personnel officer that Lameyra did not report for work from July 6,
1995 to August 6, 1995 constitutes such substantial evidence in light
of the Lameyra’s submission that said personnel officer precisely
prevented him from signing the log book, that he has been replaced
by one Leynes in July, 1995, and that he has been asked to submit
his resignation which he refused to do. Under these circumstances, it
is believed that, in equity, and in proper compliance with the
requirements of due process, Lameyra should be given a last full
opportunity to prove his contention that the termination of his
services was illegal.
ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
CASE 92: ZANDUETA v. DE LA COSTA- GC PILLENA
Facts: Francis Zandueta was presiding over a 5th Branch of Courts
of First Instance of Manila.
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He received a new ad interim appointment issued (Commonwealth
Act No. 145) to discharge the Office of Judge in the Court of First
Instance of the 4th Judicial District with the authority to preside over
the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan.
The ad interim appointment of the petitioner was disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
The President of the Philippines appointed Sixto Dela Costa
(respondent), judge of 4th Judicial District, with authority to preside
over the Court of First Instance of Manila and Palawan.
Dela Costa’s appointment was approved by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that
C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON he will be considered to have abandoned the office he
was occupying by virtue of his former appointment.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to
an office newly created or reorganized by law qualifies for the
discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath,
enters in the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in
said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the
office he was occupying by virtue of appointment, and he cannot
question the constitutionality of the law by which he was last
appointed.
He is exempted from the said rule if he did not accept the new
appointment or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal
exigencies.
CASE 93: SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES- GABRIEL
ABLOLA
REMOVAL
CASE 94: DE LOS SANTOS v. MALLARE- DON TUTAAN
CASE 95: CRISTOBAL v. MELCHOR SUPRA- RONWELL LIM
FACTS: Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in
the President's Private Office. He is a third grade civil service eligible.
On Jan 1962, then Executive Secretary Mutuc informed him that his
services were terminated effective that day. Similar letters were
addressed to some other employees in said Office. The dismissed
employees appealed to the President for a reconsideration of their
separation from the service. But Sec. Mutuc denied their request.
Thus, five of the other employees filed a civil action before the CFI.
This case was entitled " Ingles v Mutuc". The said reached the SC
w/c declared that the 5 employees’ removal as illegal, ordering their
reinstatement. But it is worth mentioning that when the said civil case
was still pending in the CFI, the other 5 dismissed employees who
filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the
President, without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action.
With respect to the other employees who were not reinstated, efforts
were exerted by Sec Mutuc to look for placements outside of
Malacañang so that they may be re-employed. Cristobal was one of
those who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any
positions as befits his qualifications. He waited for Sec Mutuc to
make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service,
until Sec. Mutuc was replaced by other executive secretaries who
likewise assured him of assistance to be reemployed at "the
opportune time." So after the SC decided the case of Ingles v Mutuc,
Cristobal addressed the Office of the President, requesting
reinstatement to his former position, in accordance with the decision
of the SC in the aforementioned case. This request, however, was
denied repeatedly. Hence, he filed a complaint in the CFI. Answering
the complaint, the defendants represented by the Office of the
SolGen alleged that Cristobal had no cause of action as he is
deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the
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proper proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date
of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he
having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years,
thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation. The CFI dismissed
his complaint thus this appeal to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON his dismissal was illegal?
2. WON he was barred by laches for having failed to file his
complaint within the one-year period provided for in Sec 16, Rule 66
of the Rules of Court?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: 1. Yes. In the case of Ingles, it was clarified that positions
primarily confidential in nature are subject to the removal at the
pleasure of the appointing power. Thus, the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the
appointing power and when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the
incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" but his term merely
"expires”.
In this casem Cristobal, is a civil service eligible with eight (8) years
of service in the government. He was Private Secretary with annual
compensation of P4,188.00. No evidence was adduced by the
government to show that Cristobal's position was "primarily
confidential". As stated in the case of Ingles, "officers or employees
in the unclassified" as well as "those in the classified service" are
protected by the provision in the organic law that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII, 1935
Constitution). In this case, there was no cause for his removal.
2. Yes. The circumstances surrounding this particular case shows
that: (a) Jose Cristobal consistently pressed for a reconsideration of
his separation from the service; (b) he was give n assurance that
would be recalled at the opportune time; and (c) that he sudden
termination of his employment without cause after eight years of
service in the government is contrary to law following the ruling
Ingles vs, Mutuc which inures to the benefit of Cristobal who is
similarly situated as the plaintiffs in said case and who merely
desisted from joining the suit because of the assurance given him
that he would be recalled to the service - with all these factors, We
repeat, there is justification for not applying existing jurisprudence to
his case.
This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a
rigid application of the law, but rather its action should conform to the
conditions or exigencies to a given problem or situation in order to
grant a relief that will serve the ends of justice.
CASE 96: SALAZAR v. MATHAY- FRANCIS TORRES
FACTS: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was
appointed by the Auditor General “confidential agent” in the Office of
the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended
another appointment by way of promotion, as “confidential agent” in
the same office.
On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor
General that her services as “confidential agent” have been
terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On
March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable
recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued
an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which
was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day,
petitioner assumed the position.
On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil
Service requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as
“confidential agent”. However, no action was taken on said letter.
Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to
compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her
filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance.
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ISSUES:
1. WON the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or
not.
2. WON the services of petitioner as “confidential agent” was validly
terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not,
whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after
accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: 1. The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.
There are two instances when a position may be considered
primarily confidential:
a. When the President upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service
Commission) has declared the position to be primarily
confidential; or
b. In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the
functions of the office, there exists “close intimacy between
the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.”
In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265,
declaring “...confidential agents in the several department and offices
of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be
primarily confidential” brings within the fold of the aforementioned
executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily
confidential.
2. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot
complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is
in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions
are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of
officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This
should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a
primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the
appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not “removed” or
“dismissed” from office — his term merely “expires,” in much the the
same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of
the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and
cannot be deemed “removed” or “dismissed” therefrom, upon the
expiration of said term. The main difference between the former —
the primarily confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's
term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed,
but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and
becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power
expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.
When this even takes place, the latter is not “removed” or “dismissed”
from office — his term has merely “expired.”
But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position
was not primarily confidential and that therefore her removal from
said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of
tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the
position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April
1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of
“confidential agent” in the same office.
CASE 97: DARIO v. MISON- ANNESIR KADJIM
FACTS: In 1986, Cory Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3,
"DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE
REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE...”, the mandate of the
people to Completely reorganize the government.
In January 1987, she promulgated EO 127, "REORGANIZING THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE". Among other offices, Executive Order
No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs
and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
In February 1987, a brand new constitution was adopted. On
January 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison
issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. It also provided that by February
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1988, all employees covered by EO 127 and the grace period
extended to the Bureau of Customs by the President on
reorganization shall be: a) informed of their re-appointment, or b)
offered another position in the same department or agency, or c)
informed of their termination.
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials stating
that they shall continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents
whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or
who are not re-appointed, shall be deemed separated from the
service. A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of
Customs were given individual notices of separation. They filed
appeals with the CSC.
On June 1988, the CSC promulgated its ruling ordering the
reinstatement of the 279 employees, the 279 private respondents in
G.R. No. 85310. Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT
THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION," was signed into law containing the provision:
“Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by
the Civil Service Commission to have been
separated in violation of the provisions of this Act,
shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the
case may be without loss of seniority and shall be
entitled to full pay for the period of separation.
Unless also separated for cause, all officers and
employees, including casuals and temporary
employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the
appropriate separation pay and retirement and other
benefitsxxx”
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs
examiners appointed by Commissioner Mison pursuant to the
ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy, petitioned the
Court to contest the validity of the statute. On October 21, 1988,
thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil Service
Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30, 1988 Resolution
filed their own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to
comply with the said Resolution.
Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of
Customs until his relief on orders of Commissioner Mison on January
26, 1988. In essence, he questions the legality of his dismissal,
which he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of Executive
Order No. 127 (SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval
of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry
shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective
duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries
and benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from
government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or
Article III of the Freedom Constitution. Incumbents whose positions
are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed
separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall
receive the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled.
A provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally
invoked. He avers that he could not have been legally deemed to be
an "incumbent whose position is not included therein or who is not
reappointed” to justify his separation from the service. He contends
that neither the Executive Order (under the second paragraph of the
section) nor the staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of
Finance abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs,
but, rather, increased it to three. Nor can it be said, so he further
maintains, that he had not been "reappointed" (under the second
paragraph of the section) because "reappointment therein
presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new one in lieu of
that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has
absorbed that which has been abolished." He claims, finally, that
under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public
officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987, and that
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thereafter, public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Vicente Feria asserts his security of tenure and that he cannot be
said to be covered by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having
been appointed on April 22, 1986 - during the effectivity of the
Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39,
"ENLARGING THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS," the Commissioner of Customs
has the power "to appoint all Bureau personnel, except those
appointed by the President," and that his position, which is that of a
Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison
for purposes of reorganization.
Provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
explicitly authorize the removal of career civil service employees "not
for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization
following the ratification of this Constitution. For this reason, Mison
posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no
defense. That contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to Dario and
Feria), in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the Executive
Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new staffing
pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed
employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered
legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59
incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means that all
those positions were considered vacant."
The Commissioner's two petitions are direct challenges to three
rulings of the Civil Service Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated
June 30, 1988, reinstating the 265 customs employees above-stated;
(2) the Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, denying
reconsideration; and (3) the Resolution, dated November 16, 1988,
reinstating five employees.
ISSUE: WON Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a
grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public
officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-vacancy-
authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The State can still carry out reorganizations provided that it
is done in good faith. Removal of career officials without cause
cannot be done after the passing of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution:
“Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated
from the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and
other benefits accruing to them under the laws of
general application in force at the time of their
separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the
employees, they may be considered for employment
in the Government or in any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career
officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the
existing policy.”
The above is a mere recognition of the right of the Government to
reorganize its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section
4, Article XVI, of the 1935 Constitution. Transition periods are
characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are
dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new
Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of
tenure.
Since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions
for "automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987
Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to
dismiss public servants at a moment's notice. If the present Charter
envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer
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terms. Plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation
for "victims" of constitutional revamps - whether under the Freedom
or existing Constitution - and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow
reorganization.
In order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative
and the other positive, must concur, to wit: 1. The separation must
not be for cause, and 2. The separation must be due to any of the
three situations mentioned.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the
Provisional Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by
jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the
present Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions
and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are
merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the
Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with
reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We
are on the second stage - that inferred from the provisions of Section
16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
After February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have
acquired security of tenure.
The present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must
be as a result of reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution
does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test
of good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
"good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing
else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith,
no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is
void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely
a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith
since after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the
Customs hierarchy - except for the change of personnel - has
occurred, which would have justified (all things being equal) the
contested dismissals. There is also no showing that legitimate
structural changes have been made - or a reorganization actually
undertaken, for that matter - at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to
hire and fire employees.
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison
submits that under Section 59 thereof, "Those incumbents whose
positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall
be deemed separated from the service." He submits that because
the 394 removed personnel have not been "reappointed," they are
considered terminated. To begin with, the Commissioner's appointing
power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under
Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint
all Bureau personnels except those appointed by the President."
Thus, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and
Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison could not have validly
terminated them, they being Presidential appointees.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No.
127 had been on a mere holdover status cannot mean that the
positions held by them had become vacant. The occupancy of a
position in a holdover capacity was conceived to facilitate
reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under
the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987
when the 1987 Constitution became effective. After the said date the
provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
Resolutions of the CSC are affirmed. Petitions of employees are
GRANTED. Petitions of Mison are DISMISSED. Commissioner of
Customs is ordered to REINSTATE employees he removed and
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those he appointed as replacements are ordered to VACATE their
posts subject to payment of lawful benefits.
IMPEACHABLE OFFICIALS
1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLES VIII (SECTION 11) AND XI
(SECTION 3)
CASE 98: FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES-
RALPH VILLANUEVA
FACTS: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised
in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing
of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment
provided for by law.
ISSUE: WON the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representativesfalls within the one year bar provided in
the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question – has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
RATIO: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that
our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the
first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its
resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine
of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There
exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.
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At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing
that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings,"
this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the
vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but
rather the filing of a complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body
can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to
the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third
of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court
to assertjudicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept
in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the
law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to
secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is
no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous
in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not
above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just
because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have
less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
FORFEITURE
1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE X, SECTION 3
RA 7160, SECTIONS 69-75
CASE 99: PEREZ v. PROVINCIAL BOARD- CHEYENNE YU
FACTS: The former provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija, Celestino Juan,
was appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The
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Secretary of Justice, in Administrative Order No. 388, then
designated first assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of Nueva Ecija as
acting provincial fiscal.
However, President Ferdinand Marcos nominated petitioner Perez
for appointment to the position of Provincial Fiscal of Nueva
Ecija. But said nomination which was submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation was by-passed upon
adjournment sine die of Congress. On the following day, President
Marcos designated petitioner as acting provincial fiscal.
Respondent Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 146 addressed
to the Commission on Appointments, opposing the confirmation of
Perez’s appointment. The Committee ruled not to recommend the
confirmation of Perez's appointment.
Again on the sixth special session of Congress, Perez was
nominated anew for appointment to the office in question; but the
same was likewise by-passed upon Congress’ adjournment.
Based on the designation of President Marcos, Perez took his oath
of office as acting provincial fiscal pursuant and subsequently, he
formally assumed formally assumed office.
The Provincial Board passed another resolution ordering the
Provincial Treasurer to stop payment of petitioner's salaries as acting
provincial fiscal.
Subsequently, Perez filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of
mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January 30, 1980.
ISSUE: WON the filing a certificate of candidacy forfeits the right to
hold a certain office
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes
forfeiture of his right to the controverted office under Section 29 of
the Election Code of 1978:
SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position.— Every
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his
certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the
offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of
candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the
Philippines.
A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive
office is rendered moot and academic where his right to said office
has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an
elective office.
CASE 100: ADORMEO v. COMELEC- REGINALD LAMPITOC
FACTS: Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. filed their certificates of candidacy
for mayor of Lucena City for the 2001 elections. Talaga, Jr. was then
the incumbent mayor. He was elected mayor in 1992 and was again
re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost, however, in
the recall election of May 2000, he won and served the unexpired
term. Adormeo filed a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and/or Disqualification of Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter
was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
Talaga, Jr. responded that he was not elected City Mayor for 3
consecutive terms but only for 2 consecutive terms since he was
defeated in the 1998 election, interrupting the consecutiveness of his
years as mayor.
COMELEC First Division found Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the
position of city mayor. He filed a motion for reconsideration and
COMELEC en banc ruled in his favor and held that 1) respondent
was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not
win in the 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by
reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the
recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not
included in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully
serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the 1998
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elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service
as Mayor of Lucena City. After canvassing, Talaga, Jr. was
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.
ISSUE: WONTalaga, Jr was disqualified to run for mayor of in the
elections.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. COMELECs ruling that
private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
should be upheld. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by
his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service.
CASE 101: MENDOZA v. COMELEC- VIKTOR GUTIERREZ
FACTS: Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor
of Bataan province a number of times:
a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OICGovernor of Bataan by former Pres.
Aquino
 and served up to 1988
b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993,
assumed
office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to1998
e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of
candidacy for the same post in the 14 May 2001 regular elections.
On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare
respondent Roman’s election as governor of Bataan as null and void
for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
ISSUE: WON Private Respondent's incumbency to the post of
Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the
three-consecutive term limit fixed by law
HELD: No.
RATIO: A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent
elective local official merely serves the balance of the latter's term of
office; it is not a full three-year term.
The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the
proscription can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when
an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance
from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to
finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the three-‐
term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed
by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also
be held to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to
finish his term nor the elected local official who only assumes the
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balance of the term of the ousted local official following the recall
election could be considered to have served a full three-year term
set by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving
for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes
from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so
long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation
of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994
to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman
served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in
1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent
had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that
day was actually only his third term for the same position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a
contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s
service to less than nine years and shortchange his
constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power
should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious
preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97
percent of the votes cast.
(Note: Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.)
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-‐SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the
petition. MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined,
voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that a
term during which succession to a local elective office takes place
or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining
whether an elective local official has served more than three
consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit
elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive
terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-‐term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions
are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an
incumbent.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the
petition. He argued that a recall term should not be considered as
one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut
short the elected official's service to less than nine years and
shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of
political power should be balanced against the need to uphold
the voters' obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman
who received 97 percent of the votes cast.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss,
arguing that it is clear from the constitutional provision that the
disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the
service is full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term,
except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to
disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position.
SANDOVAL-‐GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and
AUSTRIA-‐MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ.
concurred, holds the view that the recall term served by respondent
Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995,
should be considered as one term.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-‐MORALES, J., also dissented and
voted to grant the petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one
term and that to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-
term limit would allow local officials to serve for more than nine
consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of
the Constitution. He contended that respondent Roman's election in
2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by
the Constitution.
ABOLITION OF OFFICE
CASE 102: DE LA LLANA v. ALBA- REBECCA FLORES
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes”, was passed.
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Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity.
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice
from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed
to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary.
He alleged its constitutionality under two grounds. First, he would be
one of the judges that would be removed because of the
reorganization and second, he alleged that such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of
tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme
Court can remove judges not the Congress.
ISSUE: WON the Judiciary reorganization violates the security of
tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution?
HELD: No.
RATIO: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation
of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is
the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount
to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Purpose of passing the law is justified. The enactment of the law was
done in good faith.
There are problems both grave and pressing, that call for remedial
measures.The process of modernization and change compels the
government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations.
The very vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which the
reorganization seeks to address. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of the population, the increasing
urbanization and other similar factors the judiciary is called upon to
resolve the controversy to the furtherance of the administration of
justice.
There is no denying therefore, the need for institutional reforms
characterized as both pressing and urgent. Thus. There is a need of
a major reorganization of such scope, which if it were to take place
would be the most after four generations.
CASE 103: MENDOZA v. QUISIMBING- JOYCE BAYLON
FACTS: In G.R. No. 78053, Mendoza questions the validity of the
March 19, 1987 letter-order of the then Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) Lourdes R. Quisumbing which
terminated his employment as Schools Division Superintendent of
Surigao City.
Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of
Surigao City who was reappointed by Quisumbing as such with a
"PERMANENT" status. He has served the Department of Education
for forty-two (42) years, moving up the ranks in the public schools
system. Executive Order No. 117 was issued by the President
reorganizing the DECS. Mendoza received the letter-order informing
him that pursuant to Executive Order No. 117 which provides for a
reorganization of the DECS and the implementing guidelines thereof
he would be considered separated from the service effective without
prejudice to availment of benefits. The letter particularly stated that
consistent with the mandate of reorganization to achieve greater
efficiency and effectiveness, all incumbent officials/personnel are on
'holdover' status unless advised otherwise. In his place, Secretary
Quisumbing appointed Dr. Socorro L. Sering, on a permanent status
on March 2, 1988. In the meantime, Mendoza wrote Secretary
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Quisumbing requesting reconsideration of the letter-order. The letter
was forwarded to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB). The
motion for reconsideration remained unacted upon, hence on June
24, 1987, Mendoza filed the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction. In a resolution dated
September 19, 1988, the RAB recommended that action on the
Mendoza's letter- reconsideration be deferred pending resolution of
the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the separation of Mendoza (and the other petitioners
in this consolidated case) from office,allegedly resulting from the
reorganization, is valid.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The ritual invocation of the abolition of office is not sufficient
to justify the termination of the services of an officer or employee in
such abolished office. It is a paramount principle in Public Officers'
Law that the power to abolish public offices vested in the legislature
is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations that it be exercised in
good faith, should never be for personal or political reasons, and
cannot, be implemented in a manner contrary to law. If an executive
department is bloated with unnecessary employees, there can be no
objection to a law abolishing the useless or non-essential items.
It is apparent that Mendoza’s termination as Schools Division
Superintendent of Surigao City was pursuant to the public
respondent's view that under Section 24 of Executive Order No. 117
all incumbent officials/personnel of DECS were on hold-over status
unless advised otherwise.
The dismissal of all employees and their being placed on holdover
status is particularly objectionable in the DECS. There could have
been no intention to get rid of hundreds of thousands of school
teachers. The use of "reorganization" even under the concept
advocated by the Solicitor General appears trivial if not unnecessary.
To use reorganization of the biggest Department in the government
in order to avoid the hassles of bringing administrative charges
against Mendoza and perhaps a few other alleged persona-non-
gratas like him is precisely what this Court rejects when we apply the
bona-fide rule. One does not burn down a house if his purpose is to
roast alleged pests. There was grave abuse of discretion when the
petitioner's services were terminated by a mere letter-order on the
justification that the petitioner, together with the entire personnel of
the DECS, was only in a hold-over capacity. If the petitioner is guilty
of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to the charges against him
instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over status in order to run
after him.
The petition is GRANTED. The LETTER-ORDER dated MARCH 19,
1987 issued by the public respondent which terminated the services
of Mendoza is SET ASIDE. The successor of the public respondent,
the former Lourdes R. Quisumbing as Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, is ordered to restore Mendoza to his position as
Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City without loss; of
seniority rights and with back salaries reckoned from the date of his
termination.
CASE 104: LARIN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY- ARJUNA
GUEVARA
FACTS: Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the office of
the Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin
for grave misconduct. His conviction was reported to the Office of the
President, at the same time, an administrative complaint was filed
with the same office. The President then, based on the
Sandiganbayan conviction, created a committee to investigate Larin.
Eventually, Larin’s removal was recommended. The President
dismissed Larin.
ISSUE: WON Larin was removed from office properly.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career
service of the Civil Service. Although it is a general rule that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, such power to
remove is with limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation can be
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found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer and under the
Administrative Code of 1987, such officers who fall under career
service are characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as
contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-
terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a
career service officer, Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. He
can only be removed from his office on grounds enumerated in the
Administrative Code of 1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his
removal was his conviction in the Sandiganbayan – this is not one of
those grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code. Further, the
Supreme Court notes that when Larin’s conviction was appealed to
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court actually absolved Larin.
CASE 105: BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB v. ZAMORA- JEAN
GUECO
DEATH
CASE 106: MALANYAON v. LISING- PATRICIA CAŃALITA
FACTS: Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from
office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was
pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought
the payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of suspension
pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides - should a public
officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or
gravity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits to which
he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed
an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as
Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the
salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during
the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November
28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground
that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his death
amounted to acquittal.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case due to the death of the
accused constitutes acquittal?
HELD: No.
RATIO: It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer
being "acquitted". It means that after due hearing and consideration
of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the
case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal
does not amount to acquittal.
Acquittal is always based on the merits of the case that the
prosecution failed to prive the guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
whereas dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the
court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does
not show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid in
form and/or substance, etc.
Respondents invoke Art. 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that “Death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his
criminal and civil liability.” This provision however is NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. For one thing the case
against Mayor Pontanal was not on appeal but on trial. For another
thing the claim for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil
liability. It is in fact a right provided the conditions of the law are
present.
Petition granted. The order of the court a quo is set aside and
another one is entered declaring illegal the payment of municipal
funds for the salaries of the late Mayor S.B. Pontanal during his
suspension from office and ordering the respondent treasurer to
retrieve payments so far disbursed
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CASE 107: LOYAO v. CAUBE- KELVIN HUNG
FACTS:
Exec. Judge Loyao of Maasin, Southern Leyte asked Judge Ramon
Velasco to conduct an investigation on the complaint of Grave
Misconduct in Office and Usurpation of Judicial Functions against
respondents. 20 public school teachers, 5 employees of the
Integrated Provincial Health Office and 1 employee of DPWH filed
the complaint against the respondents. They alleged that Caube
issued subpoenas directing them to appear before his office for a
conference to settle their financial obligations to Ester Servacio,
owner of Maasin Traders Lending Corporation purportedly under the
authority of Presiding Judge Sulpicio Cunanan. Despite the fact that
they were not parties to any civil or criminal cases, the complainants
appeared before the respondent's office. Caube prepared the
necessary compromise agreement and collected from the
complainants P500 as attorney's fees for preparing the amicable
settlement. Judge Velasco recommended that Caube be given a
warning and that a repetition of the same act would merit suspension
or dismissal while the case against Quisadio was dismissed for want
of merit. Judge Loyao was not satisfied with the finding of Judge
Velasco so in his report to the Court Administrator, he found the
respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct. Pending resolution, Caube
filed a request for retirement after which, he died.
ISSUE: WON death would preclude the finding of administrative
liability.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the
service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he shall still be answerable.
Caube's performance of the functions of a collection agent for a
moneylender; his use of court processes and resources; and his act
of deputizing the local police to serve subpoenas on the
complainant-debtors under the guise of a court proceeding captioned,
“Amicable Settlement,” constitutes a gross disservice to the judiciary.
Respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him.

To be sure, respondent Caube’s death has permanently foreclosed

the prosecution of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against
him for his malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded
from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him.
Respondent’s misconduct is so grave as to merit his dismissal from
the service, were it not for his untimely demise during the pendency
of these proceedings. However, since the penalty can no longer be
carried out, this case is now declared closed and terminated.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4|34