BASIC PRINCIPLES

1.MAGNO VS CA =BP 22-4 COUNTS

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS. CAR REPAIR SHOPPetitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop
sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture
workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship,
he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business
operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation,
approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which
Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

TENG-MAGNO-LS Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared
that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng)
referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising
its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of
equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities.
(Ibid., P. 41)

CONDITION: WARRANTY The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to
put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the
pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not
come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a
third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however,
unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on
condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)

LEASING AGREEMTN As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a
leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner
would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same.

PDC After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in
turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner,
delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through
Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific
Bank.

REPLACE FIRST CHECK To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six
(6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while
the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject
of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were
not covered with sufficient funds

FAILED TO PAY Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it
pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware
that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife
went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and
when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."
(Ibid., p. 43)

RTC: MAGNO convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows: CA
AFFIRMED IN TOTO

By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash
out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the
equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment
on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the
additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price.
As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being
paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the
petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business
failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against
the petitioner.

To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it
was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an
unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal
sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full
harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble
objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and
potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having
actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the
other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that
of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time
in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction
(Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)

In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or
credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for
mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's
stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should
not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is
inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he
did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he
openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was
introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated
to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was
covered by L.S. Finance Management.

SO ORDERED.

ROGELIO ROQUE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo Marquez
(Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella)
in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join
them. At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that
Rodolfo's shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former.
Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he
warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to
perturb him.

RODOLFO TO TAYAO Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo
Tayao (Tayao) to ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because of this,
Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house
of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to
petitioner's house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon
arriving at petitioner's residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the latter did not
reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came out, he was already
holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner
then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner
kicked Reynaldo on the face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since
petitioner warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo's parents arrived
and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred
to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was operated on and confined for three
weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a medical certificate stating that a
bullet entered the base of Reynaldo's skull and exited at the back of his right ear.

DEFENSE petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child. While
driving, he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated.
Petitioner ignored the two and just went home. Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of
his house still shouting invectives against him. Petitioner's brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and
Reynaldo who agreed to leave but not without threatening that they would return to kill him.
Petitioner thus asked someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the brothers came back, entered
petitioner's yard, and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner requested Tayao to stop and
pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his gun. Hence, as an act of
self-defense, petitioner fired back twice.

RTC Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner guilty as charged,

CA AFFIRMED

ISSUE WON ROQUE IS GUILTY OF F HOMICIDE OR LESS SERIOUS PI.

HELD. F HOMICIDE.

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the
parts of the victim's body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds
inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter's
abdomen, the intent to kill can be presumed

It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the
location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the
accused-appellant's objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor.
Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets
surely would have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact
that the accused-appellant even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x
the bleeding victim.

The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also proper, there is
a need to modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of damages must be made in favor of
the victim Reynaldo.

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

HIT ON THE NAPE x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o’clock in the evening,
Alexander Flojo (hereafter “Alexander”) was fetching water below his rented house at 443
Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman
(hereafter “Alfredo”), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter “Lucila”), hit
him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to
Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and told the latter to just go up. Alexander
obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. STABBED LEFT FACE AN
CHEST Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to
fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of
Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.

HOSPITAL Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left
portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed
him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately
rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said
hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said
hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the
Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma,
left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which
penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about
two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the
victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a
thoracostomy tube to remove the blood.

SECOND WOUND FATAL According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the
victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could have
caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention.

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December
25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At
that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw invective words
against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the
ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.3
RTC F HOMICIDE

CA AFFIRMED

Issue Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?

RulingYES.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code , as amended, is
present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances
in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of
the two other elements.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the
victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from
the commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the
courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time
of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following
factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We
have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he
uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.10

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with
them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not
mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The
petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate,
indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and
the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used
therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence
of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being
sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.

=====
FIRST DIVISION

ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL G.R. No. 166326

RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA VS PEOPLE –ATTEMPTED MRDER

FACTS TAXI DRIVER Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped
driving in April 1998 after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as
a Bayaning Pilipino by the television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife
eked out a living as a manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro
Labrador II, Dasmarias, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael
and Edgardo.

EDGRDO HEATED WORDS At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy
food. Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben
resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.

GANGED UP At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food
and to look for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and
his two brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless
position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and
Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: Awatin sila! Awatin
sila! Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the
back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to
their house.

Ruben was brought to the hospital. Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr., signed a medical certificate in
which he declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal area, cerebral
concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left
shoulder and hematoma periorbital left.[4] The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the
parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven days.[5] The doctor
prescribed medicine for Rubens back pain, which he had to take for one month.[6]

RTC frustrated murder. CA affirming, with modification, the appealed decision.

convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER

On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners intent to kill
Ruben: As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow
block directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers
scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the
crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each other
maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of
them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it
three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist
from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[10]

HELD NO. An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated,
frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution
must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from
the commission of a felony by dolo.

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the
intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows.
Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained
assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit
Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting
in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.

That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if
Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a
felony, thus:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony

directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting
the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.

TREACHRY We reject petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove

treachery in the commission of the felony. THERE BEING CONSPIRACY TREACHERY
APPLIES TO ALL OF THEM

VILLAREAL VS PEOPLE

TICKLER: Hazing Villareal vs People G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012

FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
They were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
After their "briefing," they were brought in Caloocan for the commencement of their initiation.
The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites such as the
Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds and Auxies Privilege Round. The fraternity members,
including Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal), subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Leonardo "Lenny" Villa received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. When they were
sleeping, the neophytes were roused by Lenny’s shivering and mumblings. He was rushed to
the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. Accused contends that their acts were part of
the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives. CRIME CHARGED:
HOMICIDE for 35 Aquilans RTC RULING: 26- Homicide; 9- Acquitted CA RULING: 28-
acquitted; 4 (Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug)-Slight Physical Injuries; 2 (Dizon and
Villareal)- Homicide; 1-passed away

ISSUES: 1. Is there an intent to kill?

2. Is there an intent to do wrong against the physical integrity of Lenny?

3. What is the crime committed by the accused?

RULING: 1. No. The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is an

ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being
mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Dizon concocted the fictitious stories, so that he
could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role
playing. The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. Thus,
without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny.

2. No. In case of physical injuries under the RPC, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi
or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as
to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries
per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony.

3. Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon are guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Homicide. The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The RPC also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). The collective acts of the fraternity members were
tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony.
Organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With
the foregoing, the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house
situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely
as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow
porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other
part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and
height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as
a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in
the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it
a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch.
Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for
the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up
in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark,
and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called
out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion
the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door
open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that
the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition,
followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that
Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran
back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that
he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the
door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

DIED Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

RTC SIMPLE HOMICIDE The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried,
and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

ISSUE whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act.

HELD NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is

sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of
the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

 Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,

even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our
code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the
sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury.

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me
incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and
others of the like sort.

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that
the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice,
or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate
right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be
said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling
into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from
the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.

TORRES, J., dissenting:---the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, while the act was done
without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts
committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the
erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a
malefactor;

SALVADOR YAPYUCO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS FIESTA in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera,
Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta
celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m..
GUNFIRE The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious
procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who
was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the
road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his
Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire
and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.[17]

Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not see any
one on the road flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores executed a sketch[19] depicting the
relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they
had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where
the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron
where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He
could not tell how many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware
that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind
them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he
instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel
Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this point,
he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he
(Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house as instructed
and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and
Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.[20] This was
corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men,
together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney
and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.[21]

INJURIES Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined
the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from
the occipital region of Villanuevas head as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he
noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last between 10 and
30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and
he theorized that this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim,
assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the firearm
was fired from the level of the assailants waist; but if the victim was seated, the position of his
thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet
would be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet
would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the
patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head one
consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3)
gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from
the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion
of the right leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm;
and third one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach
and the intestines

YAPYUCOM ET AL ADMIN CHARGED AND DISMISSED

DEFENSE As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target
vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it
to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its
left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire
warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the
tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons
house directly at the subject jeepney.[39]

Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed
at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco
and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two
injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby
St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate
and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw
jeepney was likewise gone.[40]

ISSUE whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in
the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police
and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the
victims with the intent of killing them.[52]

SANDIGANBAYAN GUILTY HOMICIDE. With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco,

Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate
offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal
Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of
frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those
cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in
respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma.

The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which
brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under
the guise of maintaining peace and order;[54]

the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of conspiracy as established by the
fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the suspect
vehicle as though having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsangs
residence.

HELD
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise
of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the
accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or
office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. [106] The
justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the
accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or
with fault or negligence.[107]
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code do not obtain in this case.

The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as
a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot
otherwise be taken without bloodshed

Although the employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force,
petitioners in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity
to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why
they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their
over-anxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they
exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve,
thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and
exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of
which could not have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces
certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact
which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. A
proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the culpability
required to commit the crime[125] or the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[126]

IV.

whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been
established beyond cavil of doubt.
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is
interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the
occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture
depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as
Yapyucos testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the
motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later
on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in
court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was
frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the
victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos
claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against members of law
enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at
around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that
Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in
court emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a
crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is established by evidence
purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.[142] The question of motive is important in
cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed
the act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the
deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the deed.[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not
intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service
firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the
jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons
lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a
firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there
are instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was
not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a
specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself
but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.[144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and
.30 caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets
were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers
thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon
while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target
the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even
assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do not
appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless
elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the
firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the
driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be
precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to
fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their
authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle
by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The
evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned towards the
latter.

This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who
was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel,
together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the
shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable
to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.

V.

Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the
deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos alternative
claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:

First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be
proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and
design.

VI.

The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in

the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup
and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal
together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the
unharmed victims.[154] The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill
had materialized in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects
to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is
no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted
by petitioners.

Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,

JOHN ERIC LONEY, G.R. No. 152644
STEVEN PAUL REID and
PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ VS PEOPLE

The Facts: Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.

TAILINGS GUSHED OUT Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit
in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end.
On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days,
the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers.

DOJ In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article 91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5
and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
1067),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control
Decree of 1976 (PD 984),[7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.[11]

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations
were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a
single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of
Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations
contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.

MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997(Consolidated Order), granting partial

reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.

The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29

May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to
be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge
for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it
maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners
manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of not guilty
pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.

RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the
Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984
and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other
respects.

this court is of the opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of
the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate
and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not
the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine
tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers
was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each
charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this
jurisdiction that
A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the
other. x x x.

[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each
crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not although they stemmed from
a single act.[15]

CA AFFIRMED RTC

[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case
at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of
four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.

This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the laws by which
the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the
elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a
single act. x x x
ISSUES (1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property should stand; and

(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.

HELD No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one
offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states.

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense.[21]

Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of
charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves
outright denial.

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed from
and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru
dumping of mine tailings and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the
other charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence is common among them.

The contention has no merit.

As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. [24] The only
limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense

In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is

the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River
System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the
offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This
element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution
Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One
can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual
pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance
Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage
to property.

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the
existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of
any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was
unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent
damage to property.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the
willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms
and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the
Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the
Mogpog and Boac Rivers.

ART 365 RPC-lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and

imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property Moreover, the
offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those
punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]

==a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot
absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What
makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
crimes are the special laws enacting them.
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner, --DECREASED VOTES OF PIMENTEL –MALA IN SE
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

FACTS Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995
senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and
Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:

That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B.
Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor
Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and
Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial
candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998)
votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159)
precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417,
008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred
twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No.
008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand
seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

RTC ACQUITTED ALL except petitioner who was convicted

CA AFFIRMED MODIFIED PENALTY INCREASED

NO MOTIVE Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous,
based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and
(2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of
an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUE Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala
prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD MALA IN SE. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated
in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty
of an election offense:

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member
of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes
or deduct such tampered votes.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the
volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and
intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has
the burden of proving its existence.

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced
the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his
capacity as secretary of the board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one
who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing
the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous
entry in the COC.18

Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea
how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes
instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern
was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise
maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the
concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of
the law.19

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private
complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not
relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of
the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said
provision.20

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate
court.

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23

ART 4

GARCIA VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 171951 August 28, 2009

AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS MURDER

FIDEL AND ARMANDO DRIKING SPREE AT BOGIEAt approximately 11:00 a.m. on

September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the
apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the house of Manuel K. Chy. At
around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke
machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time that the group acceded.
Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was heard to have said in
the Ilocano vernacular, "Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac dayta." (This Manny is
arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)6

MARRIAGE OF ADOR On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage
of Ador Tacuboy not far from Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop
singing lest they be told off again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, "Talaga a
napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," meaning, "This Manny is really arrogant, I
will not let him live long."7

CONVENED-STORE OF ADELAYet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the
group convened at the house of Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon
mused over the drinking session on the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with
Chy. Enraged at the memory, petitioner blurted out "Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a
Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)8 Later that
afternoon, the group headed to the store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner
proposed that they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of
Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and there, decided to have some drinks.

PUNCHED CHY At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally,
was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached
petitioner who suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, "Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka
naman [inaano]?" (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing anything to you.)9 But petitioner kept on
assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy
continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower
back portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.

DEAD ON ARIVAL MYOCARDIAL INFRACTION When Chy found an opportunity to escape,

he ran towards his house and phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina
about the mauling and complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon reaching Chy’s house, the
policemen knocked five times but nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked
the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced
dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.

RTC homicide.

CA AFFIRMED

ISSUE:whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.

HELD: YES.

CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)20

At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum,
however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight
physical injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his
death.21 Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would acquaint us
with the causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that preceded it. In
open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chy’s myocardial infarction:

The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium27 caused
by a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis28 or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered
the middle and thickest layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary
occlusion from sudden emotion

PROXIMATE CAUSE the emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate
constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the
myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a)
the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the
unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful
acts.31lawph!l

In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him
with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does
not alter petitioner’s liability for his death

el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado:

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different
from the one he intended;36 "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who
is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).37 Thus, the circumstance that
petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from
criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)38 of the Revised Penal Code.39 Nevertheless,
we must appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical
injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual
death of the victim, if the latter’s heart was in good condition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MACARIO A. ULEP, accused-appellant.
FACTS ASUNCION ULEP DIED. On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the evening, in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted
upon her on that very day by her husband, accused Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief
of Police of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who
allegedly died of a heart attack. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the
house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives,
friends, and the husband of the deceased, Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an
autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the daughter of
the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference.

AUTOPSY At the behest of the daughter, the request for an autopsy was made shortly before
the burial. Accordingly, the police chief and Dr. Eliseo Bonoan, a physician, caught up with the
funeral Procession at the Catholic cemetery and thereupon conducted an autopsy on the
deceased.

Two weeks after the burial, two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. A
statement was prepared and signed by the accused and was subsequently sworn to before
Fiscal Cesar Abaya of Ilocos Norte.

ADMITTED KILLING BY ELBOWING In this statement, marked as Exhibit "A", he admitted that
he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was
uttering indecent words. The following day, PC sergeant Damian Bautista of Camp Juan, Laoag
City conducted another investigation of accused Macario Ulep. His statement was reduced to
writing and then subscribed to before Fiscal Abaya. He reiterated that the cause of death of his
wife, Asuncion Pablo, was his elbowing her on her breast.

VOMITTED AND WENT TO BED Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their
home at 5:30 in the afternoon. She vomitted and then went to bed, The accused then left for the
fields and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and found his wife dead on her bed. He
reported this death to their barrio captain.

ALBULARYO Despite these statements, (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt, Ulep
retracted his statement in court by narrating that more than a year before that, and while his wife
went to have their palay milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and
pinned his wife on her breast. With the pain in her chest, she was treated by a country quack
doctor or "arbularyo."

ISSUE Was her death a result of cardiac arrest and primary shock due to fractured ribs?

DEFENSE The appellant alleges that the gradual weakening of the heart due to a long standing
illness of the body system caused the cardiac arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo.

PROSEC the prosecution attributed these blows as the proximate cause of the cardiac arrest
and primary shock which resulted in the wife's death, the defense assails this theory of the
prosecution in the following manner:

HELD The cause of death was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and primary shock. We agree
and see no fault in this finding made in the necropsy report of Dr. Bonoan.
 First, there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. This indicates that the
elbow blows were not of sufficient force to fracture the ribs. This is so because a
fracture necessarily results in the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and
it is the extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion. 2 Dr. Blanco
attributes the absence of swelling or contusion on the chest, where the fractures
were found, to the fact that the fracture conditions Were of long standing; that is,
some repairs has happened and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling
to disappear (t.s.n., p. 180).

Second, even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found by Dr.
Bonoan were present, the same could have not caused cardiac arrest and
primary shock. This is so because only extravasated blood was present around
the immediate area of the fractures, This means that the fractures were not
depressed or that the fractured ends did not cave-in, so as to injure the heart and
impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest. The claim of Dr. Bonoan that the
chest is pliant and is like an accordion which can be compressed is puerile to say
the least. Even so, the elbow blows of the accused could not have caused a
compression of the chest wall, no matter how pliant it could be. And even on the
theory that the fractures were caused by stamping the foot on a piece of wood
placed on the chest, while the victim was lying on her back, still the fractures
could not have injured the heart or impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest,
because the fractures, were not depressed fractures or cave-in fractures. The
fractures merely caused the extravasation of blood within the fractured areas.
And neither would the fractures cause primary shock because they were merely
complete fractures; which means a mere breakage that would not cause the
stoppage of the heart, because it does not tend to compress the heart. 3

And third, although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at the points
of fracture, the same could not have caused cardiac arrest or primary
shock because the lacerations were limited to the pleura. The points of
fracture did not cave-in or were not depressed and they did not injure or impede
the heart to cause cardiac arrest. Neither did the lacerations of the pleura cause
primary shock because blood did not spill into the pleura, which indicates that the
hemorrhage was nil. This is so because the serous fluid in the pleura -as not
reddish.

On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution shows that the deceased
died of cardiac arrest because of the weakening of the heart due to a long
standing process or condition in her body system. Thus the theory of the
defense is strengthened by the very evidence of the prosecution. 4.

BLOOD CLOT Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of
clotted blood in the heart and blood vessels as well as the congestion of the meningeal
vessels. The appellant bares that this is a sign of the hardening of the heart. Dr. Bonoan of the
prosecution disclosed that there were no signs of circulatory weakening and that blood clots
were not found adherent to the heart and such being the condition there could be no
abnormality and thus he further declares that such clots are normally found in the heart of a
dead person or in any part of the circulatory system. 7
From all these observations, findings, and an incisive study of the necropsy report, the
cause of death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and primary shock caused
by the strong pressure applied on the upper front chest bone. This happens when one
steps, kneels or presses the body of a victim against a wall. The man-size blows coming
from the elbow of the aggressor upon a thin-framed woman can only bring about fatal
results.

We have previously stated that:

Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused —

(a) is the efficient cause of death; or

(b) accelerated his death; or

13
(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.

Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."

We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two
medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and that cardiac arrest and
primary shock took away the life of the victim, Asuncion Pablo.

RODOLFO BELBIS AND BRUCALES VS PEOPLE

FACTS. Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga,
Tiwi, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house and proceeded to the
area assigned to him. Later on, around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir (Veronica), Jose's live-in
partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood
at his back and shorts.

It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales),
while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him.

He was also found positive for alcoholic breath, his blood level was monitored and was given
I.V. (intravenous) fluids and antibiotics. He was finally discharged on December 15 1997. Dr.
Reduta issued Jose prescriptions and instructed the latter to go back to the hospital after the
medicines prescribed are consumed. Jose remained bedridden and should have returned to the
hospital on December 22, 1997, but failed to do so due to financial constraints. During that time,
the wounds of Jose were not yet fully healed.

He was brought back to the same hospital on January 7, 1998 and was diagnosed by Dr. Corral
as having advanced Pyelonephritis, his kidney was inflamed and with pus formation and
scarring.
He was returned to St. Claire Medical Clinic and was advised to go to Manila. However, Jose
died at 10:00 p.m. of the same day.

Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

HELD

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense.18 Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

From the above testimony, it is apparent that the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
ceased when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was
still some struggle involved between the victim and petitioner Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the
latter, who was in possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor.
Retaliation is not the same as self-defensE

IT hard to believe based on the location of the stab wounds, all at the back portion of the body
(right lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttock, medial aspect and left buttock, lateral aspect),
that petitioner Rodolfo was defending himself. It would have been different if the wounds
inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim's body.

Thus, it can be concluded that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been
afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his
death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.

As to the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the same does not deserve merit.

URBANO VS IAC

TICKLER: Irrigation canal quarrel Filomeno Urbano vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court
and People of the Philippines G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FACTS: On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He
found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal.
Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier
and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A
quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with
the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement.
Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier.
Rushed to HOSP On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had
lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which
infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day.
HOMICIDE Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and
on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of
the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

CRIME CHARGED: HOMICIDE

RTC: HOMICIDE
CA: HOMICIDE

ISSUE: Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death

HELD: NO, The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. - A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom." If the wound of Javieri inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have
been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on
the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the
second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound
was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the
victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by
the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. There is a likelihood
that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

PEOPLE VS ORLITO VILACORTA=NOT PC SHARPENED BAMBOO STICK-SLIGHT PI

FACTS Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was tending her sari-sari store
located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers
at Mendejas store. At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at
Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz
on the left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke
and was left in Cruzs body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja
gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her
neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body.[5] Mendeja and Aron then
brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.[6]

DIED Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound. [7] Dr. Belandres
specifically described the cause of Cruzs death

RTC Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.

CA AFFIRMED.

HELD We are not persuaded. ONLY SLIGHT PI

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found
to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the
stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus
infection, and not the stab wound.

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of
January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical
Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms
of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The
prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at
the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other
hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between
January 23 to February 14, 2002.

There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and
the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms
of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the
stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days
later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short
incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with
two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%)
mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely
the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have
been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was
stabbed to the time of his death.

SLIGHT PI: However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight
physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and
form part of those constituting the offense of murder.[25]

TREACHERY: We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being

sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved during trial.

People vs. Adriano GR NO. 205228, July 15, 2015 –TOYOTA COROLLA-CRV-ABERTIO
ICTUS

FACTS: On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., POI Garabiles and P02 Santos were on their
way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla
(Corolla) heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the maroon Honda CRV car in
front of them. When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of
the Corolla shot the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal. The Four (4)
armed men (accused) then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of
the CRV (Cabiedes). During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near
the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four accused hurried back to the Corolla
and immediately left the crime scene. Bothe Cabiedes and Bulanan died from the fatal gun
wounds. The police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of Rivera, who
admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the several
cars he owns in his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano
arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1
Garabiles as one of the four assailants. He was immediately arrested and brought to the
Provincial Special Operations Group.
CRIME CHARGED: 2 counts of MURDER (Cabiedes and Bulanan)

RTC RULING: CONVICTED Adriano for: Murder - Cabiedes Homicide – Bulanan

CA RULING: RTC Ruling Affirmed Murder - Cabiedes Homicide - Bulanan

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Art 4 pursuant to the
doctrine of Aberratio Ictus.

HELD: YES. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is
responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether
foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa
de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any
particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the
method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate.
Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts
committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not
exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct
consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.

TICKLER: Discipline of Minor

People vs. Sales G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011. DEL CASTILLO, J
Facts: Brothers Noemar and Junior then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home
without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother,
Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay
of 15 Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return
home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8
o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant
then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their
house. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him
and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was
already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. As there was no vehicle and because
another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant
brought his son back to their house.
CRIME CHARGED: Parricide and slight physical injuries RTC Ruling: Guilty of committing the
crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not
consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is
no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. Court of
Appeals’ Ruling: Affirmed

Issue(s): Is there criminal liability under Art. 4?

Held: Yes Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code states: Art. 4. Criminal liability.—Criminal liability shall be incurred: By any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting
upon him physical injuries committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating
suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son,
Noemar, is thus clear. There was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the
savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while
they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in
hisface, head and legs that immediately caused his death. “The mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where
the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually
produce the death of the victim [Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused.] Appeal denied, judgment affirmed with modifications.

TICKLER: Empty Room, Impossible Crime SULPICIO INTOD vs COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

FACTS: In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, with his three companions (Jorge
Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig) went to the house of one Salvador Mandaya
and asked the latter to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they
had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. Intod told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them,
otherwise, he would also be killed. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Intod
and his company, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of
his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, they
fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home
was then occupied by her son-inlaw and his family. No one was in the room when the accused
fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. Intod and his companions were positively
identified by witnesses. One witness even testified that before the men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will
come back if you were not injured".

CRIME CHARGED: Attempted Murder RTC Ruling : Attempted Murder CA Ruling: Attempted
Murder ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of attempted murder or impossible crime
provided under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the RPC?

HELD: The liability of the accused is that of an impossible crime under Article 4, paragraph 2.
The Revised Penal Code, penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against
person or against property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.
Under said article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. The case
at bar belongs to this category. Accused shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the accused failed to
accomplish his end. Respondent relied in American jurisprudence to make the Supreme Court
sustain the judgment of attempted murder against the accused. However, the decisions in said
cases cannot be relied upon to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the
Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible
crimes.In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for
impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes
and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized
by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. The factual situation in the
case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense
was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4.

TICKLER: Dishonored Check Jacinto vs. People G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009

FACTS: In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino,
handed Gemma Jacinto Banco De Oro (BDO) Check No. 0132649 in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check was payment for Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc. Jacinto
was then the collector of Mega Foam. The check was deposited in the Land Bank account of
Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle. Jacqueline is the sister of Jacinto.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from
one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue
checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH.
Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline to make check payments to Mega
Foam payable to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso. The reason for the
call was to inform Generoso that the subject BDO check had been dishonored. Ricablanca then
phoned Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to inform
Jacqueline about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Valencia then
told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask
Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash
and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, Jacinto and Jacqueline. Ricablanca, upon
the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco. Thereafter, Dyhengco talked to Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed
handed Jacinto a BDO check. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Jacinto and
Valencia were arrested by NBI agents. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against
the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle.

The defense denied having taken the subject check. CRIME CHARGED: Qualified theft RTC
found Jacinto, Valencia and Jacqueline Capitle guilty of the crime of qualified theft CA found
Jacinto and Valencia guilty but Jacqueline was acquitted *Only Jacinto filed Petition for Review
on Certiorari

ISSUE: Whether or not the acussed can be held liable for qualified theft

HELD: No. For a person to be liable for qualified theft, the personal property subject of the theft
must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is
further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. Jacinto is guilty of an impossible crime.
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. To be impossible, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. In this case, Jacinto
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against
property. Jacinto's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the
fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was
not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to Jacinto at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by Jacinto turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the
value of said dishonored check. As of the time that petitioner took possession of the check
meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it
not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. Hence, Jacinto is found guilty of an
impossible crime.

PEOPLE VS TAN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN, accused-appellant.

FACTS The boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even before his
parents received the ransom note. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of 8 years and
led to the conviction of the two accused. 1

in the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque
street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his
assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and
rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into
a building to get the certificate.

Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him
to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they
took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the
market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr.
Enrique Agra, the boy's father.

This aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his
relationship with the boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly
suspicious because of the physical differences between the two and the wide gap between their
ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers
alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging
the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers
might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was
on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital
ambulance and already looking for him. 2

RANSOMAt about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and
warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was
familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police,
which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3

The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan.

The defense of both accused was denial and alibi.

RTCboth accused guilty

Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an
impossible crime which he says is not punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph of
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate
or ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or property but against liberty,
he argues that it is not covered by the said provision.

HELD Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of
inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim
did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived
Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of
increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would
not have been possible under the new Constitution.

According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a
loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe
him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help. 19 The
refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-

appellant.

FACTS

on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat,
Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work, proceeded to the market in El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they decided to
head for home instead. They went to the national highway, stood at the right side facing east
towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and waited for a ride there. They flagged down an
approaching passenger jeepney which, however, swerved dangerously towards them. At this
juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man kamo
" (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney shouted
back, "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two
gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right side of the
jeepney. Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead
speeded towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando
was brought by his companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were
informed that Rolando needed blood transfusion and so they transferred him at around
11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city. Jjsc

DIED Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor
found the victim's blood pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was
heavily bandaged. He decided to operate on the victim when the latter's blood pressure
stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the
victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause of Rolando's death was
"secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot
wounds", or briefly, massive loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal
circumstances, the wound would not necessarily cause death but in this case where the
wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He clarified that the victim
sustained only one gunshot wound which entered at the front portion of the right knee and
exited at the back of the right knee, causing two wounds.[5]

POLICE discovered that appellant Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP
Company based at San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among the passengers of the
errant jeepney.

RTC MURDEREdpmis

On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant asserts
that the trial court erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point,
we agree. For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be
proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.[14] In this case, the shooting was done at
the spur of the moment. As observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning
curses at the driver and the passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous
response to the cursing, as appellant correctly claimed.[15] Treachery cannot be appreciated
where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from
a deliberate act of the will.[16]

Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator
of the crime. He claims he was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not
positively tested.

Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the
lack of prompt and proper medical attention given.

To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime
committed is only homicide, not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the
applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion temporal.

PEOPLE VS TALAMPAS

FACTS Prosecution witness Jose Sevillo (Jose) who allegedly witnessed the incident in
question, testified that on July 5, 1995 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, he together with
Eduardo Matic (Eduardo) and Ernesto Matic (Ernesto) were infront of his house, along the road
in Zona Siete (7), Wawa, Malaban, Bian, Laguna, repairing his tricycle when he noticed the
appellant who was riding on a bicycle passed by and stopped. The latter alighted at about three
(3) meters away from him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a revolver, and
poked the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The
appellant again fired his gun three (3) times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his
back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the ground with his face down. Another shot hit Eduardo
on his nape and fell down on his back (patihaya). Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he
(Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims to the hospital.

On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had
been Eduardo Matic (Eduardo), not victim Ernesto Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then
with Ernesto at the time of the incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he had
parried the blow; that he and Eduardo had then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they
had grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he had thus struggled with
Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and hit Ernesto during their
struggling with each other; that the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he
had then seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled the scene
when people had started swarming around.

RTC HOMICIDE
CA affirmed the conviction
ISSUE: WON TALAMPAS IS GUILTY
Ruling YES.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending
himself.[9]

In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The
established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas
who had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a
target of Talampas attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In
reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against Talampas.
Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim (Ernesto), thereby
rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as
a defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,[10] the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal,
exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury
to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result
flowing out of a legal act.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not
excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim
amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him
from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es
causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused).[13] Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[14] criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERMOGENES FLORA AND

EDWIN FLORA, accused-appellants.

FACTS Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes Flora alias "Bodoy," had a violent
altercation with a certain Oscar Villanueva. Oscars uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two.

BDAY On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to celebrate the birthday of
Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant
Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago, attended the party with his brother
and co-appellant Edwin Flora, alias "Boboy". Also in attendance were Rosalie Roma, then a
high school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte, a
neighbor of the Romas, was there too.

SHOT The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On signal by
Edwin Flora, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot grazed the
right shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The second shot hit
Ireneo Gallarte who slumped onto the floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter,
"si Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring to Hermogenes Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a
knife at her neck, threatened to kill her before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.

The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in Longos, Kalayaan,
Laguna, where Emerita and Ireneo died.[6]

RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime of double murder and attempted murder

HELD when Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma
and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for Emeritas death and Flors injuries. Hermogenes
cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he
intended.[27]

TREACHERY We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by treachery. In
order for treachery to exist, two conditions must concur namely: (1) the employment of means,
methods or manner of execution which would ensure the offenders safety from any
defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) such means, method
or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen by the offender. [28] When
Hermogenes Flora suddenly shot Emerita and Ireneo, both were helpless to defend themselves.
Their deaths were murders, not simply homicides since the acts were qualified by treachery.
Thus, we are compelled to conclude that appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder for the deaths of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and
guilty of attempted murder of Flor Espinas.

Is the other appellant, Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother, Hermogenes? For the
murder of Ireneo Gallarte, was there conspiracy between appellants

NOT FOR EMERITA AND FLOR: However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible
for the death of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows
conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO VIOLIN, REMEGIO

YAZAR, CESAR ALLEGO (at large) and EUTIQUIO CHERRIGUENE,accused.
ANTONIO VIOLIN, REMEGIO YAZAR and EUTIQUIO CHERRIGUENE, accused-appellants.
On 1 January 1986 Dioscoro Astorga Jr. was killed while his brother Darmo Astorga was
wounded in Bgy. San Jose in the island of Daram, Samar.
FACTS on 31 December 1985 Darmo Astorga was at the house of his sister in Bgy. Muoz,
Catbalogan, Samar, together with Dolores Bolos Astorga, Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and Benito
Astorga. Dioscoro Jr. was the Commander of the Police Station of Daram. At around 6:00
o'clock in the evening, Cesar Allego, Punong Barangay of San Jose, Daram, arrived seeking the
help of Dioscoro Jr. in settling a dispute he had with a certain Mrs. Agas, also a resident of Bgy.
San Jose. Acceding to Allego's request on the condition that he be conducted back to
Catbalogan that same night, Dioscoro Jr. left for Bgy. San Jose with his brother Darmo and
Cesar Allego. But before leaving they stopped by the wharf and drank three (3) bottles of beer
each. While the Astorga brothers were drinking, Allego walked to a motorboat docked nearby
and conversed with Antonio Violin, Eutiquio Cherriguene and Remegio Yazar.
The Astorgas and Allegos left for Bgy. San Jose at around 9:00 o'clock that evening on
board the motorboat owned by Violin who together with Cherriguene and Yazar was among the
passengers of the boat. Upon reaching Bgy. Pait, Violin disembarked but agreed to meet Cesar
Allego later at a public dance in Bgy. San Jose. Dioscoro Jr., Darmo, Allego, Cherriguene and
Yazar proceeded to Bgy. San Jose and arrived there at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening.
Yazar and Cherriguene went with the group to the house of Allego but left immediately after the
latter promised to follow them to the public dance later that evening. Allego then summoned
Mrs. Agas to a meeting; unfortunately she had not yet returned from the sea where she had
gone fishing. Since there was nothing else to do, Dioscoro Jr. requested Allego to take him and
his brother back to Catbalogan but Allego refused purportedly due to lack of transportation. Left
with no recourse Dioscoro Jr. and Darmo were constrained to spend the night in Bgy. San Jose
at the house of Allego who left them to attend the public dance.
The following morning, at around four o'clock, 1 January 1986, Dioscoro Jr. and Darmo
were roused from their sleep by Allego who invited them to partake of some food and liquor. At
that time Violin, Cherriguene and Yazar were already drinking beer in the kitchen. After a few
rounds Allego asked Violin to buy more beer. Violin left followed by Cherriguene and Yazar.
 Shortly after Dioscoro Jr. stood up to urinate but was told by Allego to relieve himself
outside the house because he would be using the comfort room himself. Dioscoro Jr. went out
leaving Darmo alone in the kitchen. All of a sudden Darmo heard several gunshots. Alarmed, he
ran towards the door but was met on the way by Dioscoro Jr. who was bleeding, staggering and
about to fall. Dioscoro Jr. told him to hide or he might also be shot by the three Violin,
Cherriguene and Yazar. Darmo then crawled and hid himself under a table measuring about
three (3) feet wide, seven (7) feet long and two (2) feet and four-and-a-half (4-1/2) inches tall.
From this position he saw violin standing at the kitchen door, firing at Dioscoro Jr. and shouting
Tapos ka, ayos na an singkwenta mil pesos (P50,000.00) nga bayad ni Cata (You are already
through, the fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) paid by Cata is already finished.)[9] A stray bullet
fired from the firearm of Violin grazed the right side of Darmo's head. At that instant, Yazar also
fired at Dioscoro Jr. saying Kapitan, waray na kamo kuntra hit election, waray na kuntra iton
mga Figueroa.[10] Cherriguene who positioned himself outside the kitchen window also fired at
Dioscoro Jr. The three (3) assailants then looked for Darmo but could not find him. Failing thus,
they left towards the direction of the coconut trees behind the house.
When Darmo came out of his hiding place and saw his brother dead he looked for the
latter's firearm but could not find it. He proceeded to the kitchen where he found a bolo. Then he
went out of the house searching for the three (3) malefactors. When he could not find them he
went back to the house and saw Allego sprawled inside the bathroom crying. Darmo asked
Allego to bring him to Catbalogan but the latter did not respond. Not long after, people milled
around the crime scene. One of them, a barangay councilor, assisted Darmo and took him back
to Catbalogan where the latter informed relatives about what happened to him and his brother,
after which he proceeded to the hospital for treatment.
Dr. Honorata L. Gabon autopsied the cadaver of Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and ascertained the
cause of death as cardiorespiratory failure secondary to severe hemorrhage resulting from his
multiple gunshot wounds.[11]
Darmo asserted that the murder of his brother was politically motivated. Their father was at
that time the mayor of Daram and the deceased Dioscoro Astorga Jr. was being groomed to
take his place. The ex-mayor of Daram, Miguel Figueroa, was planning a political comeback
while Violin, Cherriguene and Yazar, aside from being employees of the Figueroas, were his
avid followers. Cesar Allego was the nephew of vice-mayoralty candidate Emilio Allego who was
supposed to run under the ticket of Miguel Figueroa.
In support of this theory, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Mateo Villaganes and
Nestor Pahayahay to the effect that Miguel Figueroa and Catalino Figueroa had earlier
approached hit men for a contract on Dioscoro Jr.'s head.[12]
DEFENSE tells a different story, invoking alibi for all the accused-appellants.
RTC the killing to be qualified by treachery and aggravated by craft and abuse of superior
strength.[17]
HELD CRAFT We disagree. For craft cannot be considered aggravating herein since the use of
intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused[18] was not established. There is no
showing that the accused employed stealth and covert machinations to camouflage their evil
intentions.
TREACGERYWe sustain however the finding that the attack was attended with treachery. The
victim was not afforded the opportunity to defend himself while the assailants themselves
ensured that the crime would be consummated with the least risk to their persons. The three (3)
conspirators pounced upon their victim as soon as he stepped out of the house. The latter had
no inkling at all that he would be assaulted by them considering that they were all guests of
Cesar Allego. This is indicative of treachery which qualifies the crime to murder. On this score
the trial court should not have factored in abuse of superior strength as an independent
aggravating circumstance. When treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.
This we ruled as early as 1914.[19]
The court in the frustrated murder charge found

The defendant Antonio Violin in firing his armalite rifle at Dioscoro Astorga Jr. also hit his
younger brother Darmo on his head particularly on the right parietal region which injury would
have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical assistance rendered him. The
crime committed is frustrated murder because there was treachery and the defendants who
conspired to kill the Figueroa[20] brothers performed all the acts of execution but did not produce
the result, the death of Darmo Astorga, due to a cause entirely independent of their will.[21]

Again we cannot agree. The crime of slight physical injuries[22], not frustrated murder, was
committed against Darmo Astorga. Antonio Violin fired at Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and not at
Darmo. There is not the slightest indication that at that time Violin knew that Darmo was hiding
under a table. Darmo himself admitted that he was injured by a stray bullet [23] which grazed the
right parietal region of his head. The wound was diagnosed as superficial [24] and required
treatment only for three (3) days.[25]

TICKLER: Step-father, Peeping brother People of the Philippines vs. Freedie Lizada G.R.
Nos. 143468-71 January 24, 2003

FACTS: Accused-appellant Lizada is the step-father of the private complainant Analia Orillosa.
Lizada was charged with 4 counts of rape committed on or about August 1998 (Crim Case No.
99-171390), November 1998 (99-171391), October 1998(99-171392), and September 1998 (99-
17193). All 4 Information allege that the crime was committed against Analia by embracing her,
kissing her, touching her private parts, removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of
her trying to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her.
The day after the last rape incident, Analia submitted herself to genitalia examination, the
medicolegal concluded that there was no evident sign of extragenital physical injuries and that
the hymen was intact and orifice small as to preclude complete penetration.

RAPEDuring trial, the collective testimony of private complainant and Rossel (9-year old
brother) was that on November 1998, Lizada was wearing a pair of shorts but was naked from
waist up, entered the room of Analia, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty,
mashed her breast, and touched her sex organ. However, Lizada saw Rossel peeping through
the door and dismounted. He then left the room of Analia. Defendant maintains that the
prosecution failed to adduce the required quantum of evidence and that the physical evidence
(medical findings) belies private complainant’s claim of having been deflowered by accused-
appellant on 4 different occasions. CRIME CHARGED: 4 counts of rape RTC: Convicted of 4
counts of rape; death penalty (thus automatic review to SC)

ISSUE: Is Lizada guilty of 4 counts of consummated rape?

RULING: No, Lizada is only guilty of 3 counts of consummated rape and 1 attempted rape. As
to the 3 rape incidents (August, October and September), Lizada is guilty of
consummated rape because the fact that the hymen of private complainant remains
intact is immaterial. Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the
mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that
there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. As to the November rape
incident, Lizada is guilty only of attempted rape. The essential elements of an attempted felony
are as follows: 1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; 3. The
offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; 4. The nonperformance of all
acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. The first
requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: (1) That there be external
acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

Further, acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from

preparatory acts which consists of devising means or measures necessary for
accomplishment of a desired object or end. In light of the facts established by the
prosecution, the Court believes that Lizada intended to have carnal knowledge of private
complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere
preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the
execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime
of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution
however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because
of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only
of attempted rape

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
FACTS At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his
beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last
named street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed
him under custody.

HELD the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a
logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation.
The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no
doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by
means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the
wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman
Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not
sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable
connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed
which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and
punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried
to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by
means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to
commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take
possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In
the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused
may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the
accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the
wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident
intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his
final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical
injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to
justify a concrete finding.1avvphil.ñet

Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the
commission of the offense, are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its
execution, and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense."

Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892 —
that in order to declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it
is necessary that their objective be known and established, or that said acts be of
such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective
necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for the
designation of the offense: . . . .

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration
does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling

Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private
person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will.

BALEROS VS PEOPLE

RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", …) along
A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou
Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.

In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right
in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.

Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece
of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her
mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this
…the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she
then squeezed.

The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx.
Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan
ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out
during their struggle was the feel of her attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper garment was of
cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He … was
wearing a t-shirt and shorts … Original Records, p. 355).

To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo
Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.

It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue …
(TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left
opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her
room going through the left bedroom window, the one without iron grills which leads to Room
306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).

Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate …, was friendly
until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita,
mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).

Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building
at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with “‘…a
marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted
letters the word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine and Surgery’” (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and
black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested
permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that
time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the
room.

He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G
Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] …. S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the
security guard’s logbook …:

"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter
from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be
our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here

(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."

That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by
Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….

Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by
the time CHITO’s knocking on the door woke him up, …. He was able to fix the time of CHITO’s
arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was
awakened by the knock at the door ….
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23)
when he let the latter in. …. It was at around 3 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991
when he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista
(Bernard), ….

xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and thereat was shown by Bernard the
open window through which the intruder supposedly passed.

Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to
CHITO …. He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not
being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.

CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was
in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to
see if the others were there. xxx.

People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning …. They likewise invited
CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned ….

DEFENSE For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself.
He denied

RTC the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting petitioner of attempted rape CA
AFFIRMED

ISSUE whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.

HELD NO After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable
jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner’s acquittal, but not necessarily because
there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who
pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.

whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth
while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.1avvphil.net

As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent
or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that
there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what
reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate
intention, is anybody’s guess.
UNJUST VEXATION Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not
determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as
light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching television in his
house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was
stirring trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with
Alejandro and a certain Dionisio Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince the petitioner
to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along the way, they dropped by the houses
of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.

Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing with him
two scythes, one in each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away
and the latter two complied. The petitioner wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno
blocked his way and asked him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he
held in his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand
was used to hack the latter’s neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken
to the hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense of
more than P10,000.00 for hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills.17 He further claimed
that after the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and was thus deprived of
his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.18

Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral aspect
neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised wound left hand dorsal aspect 4 cm".19 Benigno was
initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was discharged on September 23,
1998.20 From Dr. Ardiente’s recollection, since the scythe used in the hacking was not sterile,
complications and infections could have developed from the big and open wounds sustained by
Benigno, but fortunately did not.21

RTC F HOMICIDE

CA AFFIRMED Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number
of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted
on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the
offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner attacked
Benigno with deadly weapons, two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was directed to the neck of
Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and unsuspecting Benigno was swift and sudden. The
latter had no means, and no time, to defend himself.

Issue whether or not the RTC and the Ca –less serious pi

HELD In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his
victim’s life.
The use of a scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal
intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a
single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person
and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in
Benigno’s neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were
potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing
injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.

This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is negated by
the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What
could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more desistance to speak
of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention
provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will.1âwphi1

All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s
conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.

People vs Labiaga G.R. No. 202867, July 15, 2013

Facts: Version of the prosecution At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio
Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay
Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which
was part of their house. Shortly thereafter, Regie Labiaga alias “Banok”, shot the latter. Gregorio
called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, Labiaga shot Judy in
the abdomen. The two other accused, Alias Balatong Barcenas and Demapanag were standing
behind the Labiaga. Labiaga said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on
arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.

SUPERFICIAL WOUNDS Dr. Jose Edwin Figuraexamined Gregorio after the incident. He found
that Gregorio sustained only superficial wound in his right forearm and in his right
shoulder.

6 Version of the defense Labiaga contended that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed
with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun
jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the
shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.

CRIME CHARGED: Murder and Frustrated Murder RTC RULING: Murder and Frustrated
Murder CA RULING: Murder and Frustrated Murder ISSUE: Whether Or Not The Accused Is
Liable For Frustrated Murder? SC RULING: NO. The SC held that it should be convicted of
attempted murder, and not frustrated. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages
in the commission of felonies:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People, we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this
manner: 1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the
offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does
not perform all the acts of execution. 2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on
the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a
cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance.20 In frustrated
murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it
not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the
wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the
accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. In the instant
case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was
admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident. Since
Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.

TICKLER: Frustrated Theft, Tide Detergent Valenzuela v. People GR No. 160188, June 21,
2007

FACTS: Petitioner Valenzuela was seen by the security guard Lago wearing an identification
card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart and unloading
cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand outside the supermarket and thereafter
returned inside the supermarket, five minutes later, emerged with more cartons of Tide
Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Petitioner hailed a taxi, boarded the same and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. The cartons of Tide Ultramatic were placed inside the taxi. Lago
proceeded to stop the taxi and asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security
guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene. Petitioner and
Calderon both claimed having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity. Petitioner testified
he and his cousin had been at the parking lot when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot.
The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start running, at which point he
was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office. CRIME CHARGED:
Consummated Theft.

RTC RULING: Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. CA RULING: Affirmed. (Petitioner argued that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. However, in its Decision, the Court of
Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s conviction. Hence the present Petition
for Review, which expressly seeks that petitioner’s conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated
Theft.) ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated theft only since he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose of the stolen articles.

HELD: No. The accused is guilty of consummated theft. The determination of whether a
crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of
execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the
felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the
felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the
particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes
the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel
the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. Art. 308. Who are
liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent. Theft is likewise committed by: 1. Any
person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to
its owner; 2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and 3. Any person
who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather
cereals, or other forest or farm products. Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft,
and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed.

Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.42 So,
in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as
to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of theft
under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that theft
is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter’s
consent." The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a
constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308,
whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the
felony. Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with
intent to gain, of personal property of another without the latter’s consent. Unlawful taking, or
apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Thus, Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated. The adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of
the stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense for the accused
which does not reflect any legislated intent, since the Court would have carved a viable means
for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy
classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible
to free disposal by the thief.

JOVITO CANCERAN VS PEOPLE-magic flakes-ponds pala

Version of the Prosecution

on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Caneeran approach one of the counters in Ororama;
that Caneeran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid
P1,423.00; that Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked; that upon
inspection by Ompoc and the packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not
Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20;
that Caneeran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching the Don Mariano gate,
Caneeran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney; that after being questioned, he tried to
settle with the guards and even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he tried to take;
that Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal belongings were deposited in the office of
Arcenio.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Version of the Defense

Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo
merchandiser of La Tondena, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in Ororama to buy
medicine for his wife. On his way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a male person
of around 20 years of age requested him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier; that he
did not know the name of this man who gave him P1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled
Magic Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the unnamed person because he was struck
by his conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of the said two boxes; that after paying
at the cashier, he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney; that three persons
ran after him, and he was caught; that he was brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he
was mauled and kicked by one of those who chased him; that they took his Nokia 5110 cellular
phone and cash amounting to P2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring, while
a certain Amion took his necklace.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RTC consummated Theft in line with the ruling of the Court in Valenzuela v. People8
CA debunked Canceran's contention that there was no taking because he merely pushed
the cart loaded with goods to the cashier's booth for payment and stopped there. The
appellate court held that unlawful taking was deemed complete from the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if he had no opportunity to dispose of the
same.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

ISSUES
1] whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the
information; and 2] whether there was double jeopardy.

HELD Constitutional Right of the Accused to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of
Accusation against Him.

"Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one's personal property, is the element
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful
taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at
all."18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves
into the concept of 'taking' itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such
degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the
acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished."19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged
with "Frustrated Theft" only. Pertinent parts of the Information read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons
of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at P28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center,
represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus performing ail the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of theft as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of some cause independent of accused's will x x x.
 [Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to
charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the
crime was never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that
Canceran was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may
only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was
charged in the complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted
in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on
which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the
nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict
him of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is
tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right."20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him. 21 An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted
stage. In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of
consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the
overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not
charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he so protests.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the additional allegation, but,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of accused's will,
that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented
them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, x x
x26 This averment, which could also be deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the
charge nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the
accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that the charge against him
was consummated theft.

No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the ruling of the
CA.

TICKLER: Frustrated Rape, New People’s Army People vs Agapito Quinanola GR No.
126148, May 5, 1999
FACTS: Catalina Carciller her cousin 15-year-old Rufo Ginto and another male companion
named Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance at around ten o'clock in the evening of 05 March
1994 in Sitio Bangag Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu. Catalina was just then fifteen (15) years and four
(4) months old. About an hour later they left the party and were soon on their way home. The
three unsuspecting youngsters stopped momentarily to rest at a waiting shed beside the Tangil
Elementary School. Accused Agapito Quiñanola a.k.a. "Petoy" and accused Eduardo Escuadro
a.k.a. "Botiquil" who were both armed with guns suddenly turned up Quiñanola beaming his
flashlight at the trio while Escuadro stood by focused his attention on Catalina. Quiñonala
announced that he and Escuardo were members of New People's Army ("NPA").

Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He ordered the duo to lie face
down on the ground and then urinated at them. While Escuadro was fixing the zipper of his
pants, Diaz and Ginto were able to escape and ran away. Meanwhile Quiñanola with his gun
pointed at Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina heard a gunfire but
Quiñanola assured her that it was only an exploding firecracker. When Escuadro again showed
up, Catalina asked about her two friends. Quiñanola replied that he had ordered them to go
home. Catalina begged that she herself be allowed to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked
the path towards the road behind the school. Then, unsuspectingly, Quiñanola forced Catalina
to sit on the ground. She resisted but Quiñanola, pointing his gun at her, warned her that if she
would not accede to what he wanted he would kill her. Catalina started to cry. Quiñanola told
Escuadro to remove her denim pants. Catalina struggled to free herself from Escuadro's hold
but to no avail. Escuadro ultimately succeeded in undressing her. Quiñanola unzipped his pants
and laid on top of her while Escuadro held her legs Quiñanola "started to pump, to push and
pull" ven as Catalina still tried desperately to free herself from him. She felt his organ "on the
lips of (her) genitalia." When Quiñanola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took his turn by placing
himself on top of Catalina. Catalina could feel the sex organ of Escuadro "on the lips of (her)
vulva" while he made a push and pull movement. Quiñanola, who stood by, kept on smoking a
cigarette. Escuadro and Quiñanola scampered immediately after Catalina's ordeal. Failing to
find her pair of pants and panty. Catalina was left wearing her T-shirt and brassieres. Catalina
just then sat down, not knowing what to do, until she finally started to run home fearing that she
might be followed. Upon reaching home, Catalina went upstairs and, afraid that the culprit would
still come after her, hid herself behind the door. Baffled by Catalina's strange behavior, her
mother and her elder sister took turns interrogating her. Catalina finally said that she was raped
but she would not reveal the names of the persons who had committed the dastardly act
because of their threat.1âwphi1.nêt Guillermo Zozobrado learned from his wife, Catalina's
sister, that Catalina had been raped. He promptly repaired to the municipal hall of Dumanjug to
report the crime. Policemen were immediately dispatched to the Carcillers' residence. Still in a
state of shock, Catalina initially kept mum about it; later, when the police officers returned at
daytime, she was able to respond to questions and to disclose that "Petoy," referring to Agapito
Quiñanola, and "Botiquil," the other accused Eduardo Escuadro, were the persons who ravished
her. The officers later invited her to the police station to identify a suspect whom she positively
identified to be "Botiquil" or Eduardo Escuadro. Living Case Report No. 94-MI-7, 8 prepared by
Dr. Tomas P. Refe, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") of
Region 7, Central Visayas, who conducted the physical examination of Catalina on 07 March
1994, showed that there was "no evidence of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of
the Subject." The report concluded that the hymenal orifice, about 1.8 cms. in diameter, was "so
small as to preclude complete penetration of an average-size adult penis in erection without
producing laceration.
Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the accused, in their defense, interposed
alibi, ill motive on the part of an "uncle" of the complainant, and insufficient identification. The
court found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "frustrated rape".

ISSUE: Whether or not accused are guilty of frustrated rape

HELD: NO. In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal knowledge" unlike its
ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of rape is
deemed consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female
organ or, as once so said in a case, by the "mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis
capable of consummating the sexual act." Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal
Code presently so stands, there is no such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, the
Court has explicitly pronounced: Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the
offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from
that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. We have set the uniform
rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of
the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction.

People V. Orande G.R. Nos. 141724-27, November 12, 2003

FACTS: Orande was the common law husband of Jessica's mother Girlie. Appellant, a
pedicab driver, started living with Girlie and her three children sometime in 1993. To earn a
living, Girlie sold fish at the Paco Market, buying her stock from the Navotas fish market late at
night and sometimes in the early hours of the morning. The first incident of rape occured when
Jessica (9 yrs and 4months old) was then watching television while her brothers and sisters
were sleeping beside her. Appellant armed with a knife, grabbed Jessica's right hand and
lasciviously jabbed her palm with his finger. He ordered her to undress which she obeyed out of
fear. Appellant then removed his pants, placed himself on top of complainant and succeeded in
partially penetrating her.. The second rape occurred When Jessica (11 yrs and 3 months old)
and her siblings were left in the house watching television. Soon after, appellant arrived and
sent the children, except Jessica, to play outside. Left alone with Jessica, appellant removed his
clothes, pulled out a balisong and ordered Jessica to undress. Appellant reached his orgasm
shortly after penetrating her slightly. He stood up with semen still dripping from his penis. The
third rape is when Jessica was 12 years and 6 months old. She arrived from school at around
11:00 a.m. While she was changing her clothes, appellant ordered Jessica's brother and sister
to visit their mother at the Paco Market and sent his children to play outside the house.
Thereafter, he placed himself on top of her, partially penetrated her until he ejaculated. The last
rape is when Jessica was at home with her siblings who were all asleep. Appellant told
Jessica that they would again do what they did before but she refused, saying that she
might get pregnant. Appellant brandished his balisong and threatened to kill her. His
penis slightly penetrated her vagina. Jessica pushed him away and told him she wanted
to sleep. A teacher of Jessica, Mrs. Adoracion Mojica, noticed the unusual treatment of Jessica
by appellant. When confronted by Mrs. Mojica, Jessica admitted that appellant had raped her
several times. Mrs. Mojica called up Jessica ’s aunt, Mrs. Antonina de la Cruz, and narrated to
her what Jessica had confesse d. Mrs. De la Cruz then accompanied Jessica to the police
station to file a com plaint and to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), Child Protection Unit, to
be examined. Complainant charged appellant with raping her four times between Januar y 1994
and November 1996. Incidentally, prior to the filing of the aforementioned cases, Jessica also
filed a criminal case against her mother, Girlie de la Cruz C astro, and the appellant for child
abuse. For his defense, appellant advanced denial and alibi. Appellant argued that since
Jessica disapproved of his relationship with her mother, she had the motive to falsely accuse
him of raping her. Further, he pointed out the improbability of the alleged first and fourth
incidents of rape inasmuch as the make-up of the room made it impossible for Jessica's siblings
not to wake up during the commission of the crime. Appellant further contended that Jessica's
failure to cry out for help, knowing that her mother's relatives were in the same house, made her
story of rape unbelievable. CRIME CHARGED: 2 simple rape

1 statutory rape 1 frustrated rape

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused with the crime of frustrated
rape.

HELD: Yes. In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essent ial elements of
the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be d one by the offender, because
he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated. In a long line of cases, We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation
of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the
hymen or lac eration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execut ion was
performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.
Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever
be committed. The victim testified t hat she felt pain and her vagina bled, indisputable
indications of slight penetration or, at the very least, that the penis indeed touched the labia and
not merely str oked the external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be found guilty of (c
onsummated) rape and not merely frustrated or attempted rape.

People vs Pareja GR No. 188979, September 5, 2012

FACTS: At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old
nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sister’s room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her
nape and neck. AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. The appellant
removed AAA’s clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs.
The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted
her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant
stopped when AAA’s cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellant’s upper thigh as the latter was
about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she
disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately after, the appellant left the room. AAA covered
herself with a blanket and cried. On the same day, AAA went to the house of her older sister,
DDD, and narrated to her what happened. Thereafter, AAA and her two siblings went to the
Women and Children’s Desk and reported the incident. The accused Christopher Pareja was
then charged of the crime of rape. The accused argued that the lower courts erred in convicting
him for the crime of rape e, as the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of
his penis into the victim’s vagina.

RTC Ruling: Rape CA Ruling: Rape ISSUE: Whether or not the rape was consummated.

HELD: No. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. It instead convicted him of attempted
rape, as the evidence on record show the presence of all elements of the said crime. Rape is
consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female
organ.” Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most,
it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness. The prosecution failed to present
sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required penile penetration. AAA’s testimony
did not establish that the appellant’s penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. Aside
from AAA’s testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could
confirm whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victim’s labias. In the
absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot
be convicted of consummated rape. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states
that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by
overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico,29 we ruled that when the
"touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is
committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness. In the present
case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts:
kissing AAA’s nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on
top of her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellant’s acts
demonstrated the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victim’s private
parts. As the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish the required penile penetration which is required in the consummation of the
crime of rape, Pareja is only convicted of the crime of attempted rape.

TICKER: Tent, AAA & BBB Norberto Cruz vs. People G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Norberto Bartolome and his wife were engaged in the selling of plastic wares
and glass wares in different municipalities around the country. Norberto and his wife employed
AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then
celebrating its fiesta.

Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. At around 1:00 o'clock in the
morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she
felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private
part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked.
Norberto ordered her not to scream or she'll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and
pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto
twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told
her not to tell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to
seek help from the house boy but she failed to wake him up. Thirty minutes later, when AAA
returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her
companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left
and went outside. Crime charged: Attempted Rape (with respect to AAA) & Acts of
Lasciviousness (with respect to BBB) RTC Ruling: Petitioner was found guilty of both crimes.
CA Ruling: Petitioner was found guilty with respect to the crime of attempted rape but was
acquitted with respect to the crime of acts of lasciviousness due to insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner argued that the record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his
penis was poised to penetrate her. ISSUE: Is the petitioner guilty of the crime of attempted
rape?

HELD: NO. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all
the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is
beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly
connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape,
must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination
without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape. The petitioner climbed
on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and
mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his
designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his
intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs
towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of
double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily,
his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have
sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ
deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony. As a rule, preparatory acts are
not punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained equivocal or
of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with
certainty what the perpetrator's intent really was.

The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on
top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her
vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence
showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of
her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her.

ART 8 CONSPIRACY

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag,
Davidson Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy
Per curiam decision
FACTS:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the
expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were
torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were
covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified
as Marijoy.After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police
having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and
James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial
court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told
him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and
James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed
where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped
their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus
Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former.
They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they
started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her
into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and
became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other
appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants
assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was consipiracy.
James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were
committed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.
HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such point to a joint design and community of interest. The appellants’ actions showed that
they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the
trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

PEOPLE VS GARCHITORENA and JESSIE GARCIA and joey pamplona

CHARGED MURDER The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an

Information[3] dated January 22, 1996, filed with the RTC for the crime of Murder,
FACTS CALLED BY ACCUSED GARCIA Dulce Borero testified that on September
22, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, she was selling balut at Sta.
Inez, Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna. Her brother, Mauro
Biay, also a balut vendor, was also at the area, about seven (7) arms length
away from her when she was called by accused Jessie Garcia. Borero testified
that when her brother Mauro approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand
of her brother behind his back and Jessies companions- accused Arnold
Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing her brother Mauro
repeatedly with a shiny bladed instrument. Joey was at the right side of the
victim and was strangling Mauro from behind.Witness saw her brother Mauro
struggling to free himself while being stabbed by the three (3) accused., until
her brother slumped facedown on the ground. Arnold then instructed his two
co-accused to run away.

MORE THAN ONE BLADED INSTRUMENT Witness specified the eight (8) stab
wounds suffered by the victim one in the neck, two in the chest, one below
the armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the left
thigh and also a laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According to the
expert witness, the nature of stab wounds indicate that it may have been
caused by more than one bladed instrument.

DEFENSE DENIAL
DRUGS she examined the accused Arnold-found that he had been using
prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two (2) years prior to the
stabbing incident in 1995.

CA herein accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

murder is AFFIRMED in its entirety.

DEFENSE NO CONSPIRACY Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was

no conspiracy, as there was no evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two
accused-appellants or that he participated in their criminal designs.[21]
HELD We are not persuaded. In this case, conspiracy was shown because
accused-appellants were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of
their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twisted his arms;
in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him
on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from
them, but they were too strong. All means through which the victim could
escape were blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. The three
accused-appellants prior act of waiting for the victim outside affirms the
existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused
rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the intent and the character of their participation,
because the act of one is the act of all.[23]
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated
against the accused-appellants

PEOPLE VS RESTITUTIO CARANDANG MILAN AND CHUA

two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in Criminal Cases No.
Q-01-100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063
FACTS DRUG DEAL In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit
of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of
accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house
at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City.
ALIGHTED AND SURROUNDED MILANS HOUSE When the team reached the place
at around 4:00 p.m.,[6] they alighted from their vehicles and surrounded Milans
house. when the group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan
immediately shut the door.[7]
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and
propelling them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo shouted Walang
gagalaw! Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who
dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the suddenness of the attack,
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to return fire and were instantly killed by
the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right behind SPO2 Red, was
still aiming his firearm at the assailants when Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1
Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, Sugurin
mo na! Milan lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire
his gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the house and pulled SPO1
Montecalvo out.[8]
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr. Insp.
Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt.
Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the time of the
incident.[9] SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese General Hospital.
TULFO Milan stepped out of the house and was also brought to a hospital,[10] but
Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house for several hours. There
was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of Carandang and Chua, during
which they requested for the presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media
man Ramon Tulfo.[11] It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when
Carandang and Chua surrendered.[12] SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were found dead
inside the house, their bodies slumped on the floor with broken legs and
gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds.[13]
According to SPO1 Montecalvos account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese General
Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet from the right portion of his nape.

RTC Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of murder and one count of
frustrated murder: The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua
acted in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the
established fact that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2
Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally
responsible therefor. The trial court explained that Carandang, Milan and Chuas
actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police officers.

CA two (2) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
I.The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy among the
appellants in the case at bar.

II.Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting them of the crime of murder and frustrated murder instead of
homicide and frustrated homicide only, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery not having been duly proven to have attended the commission of the
crimes charged.[30]

DEFENSE the fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid
turn of events should have ruled out a finding of conspiracy.[34] They claim that
the incident happened so fast, giving them no opportunity to stop Carandang.[35]
Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered Sugurin mo na! to Milan, appellants
argue that no crime was committed due to the same as all the victims had
already been shot when said words were shouted.[37] Furthermore, it appears to
have been uttered as a result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and did not
inherently carry with it inducement or temptation.[38]
HELD In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims
(Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves,
allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas
directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such
instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant
to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking
SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead,
these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the
minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by
direct participation.
Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of
conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy
to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full
opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very
moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject
felony.[47]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO
MALOGSI,*

CHARGED MURDER

FACTS DADAO ET AL SHOT YACAPIN on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening WINTESS
saw accused Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and [A]lfemio Malogsi helping
each other and with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their
house at Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon.

RTC murdering Pionio Yacapin.

CA AFFIRMED

ISSUE whether or not THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF SS

HELD With regard to appellants’ assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were
conducted on their persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only
declare that such a statement is misguided considering that it has been established in jurisprudence
that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun.16 It should also be noted
that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held firearms which were
used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao
purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter two tested
negative for powder burns because they were never accused of having fired any gun.
Nevertheless, the evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a
community of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired with
one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal liability
attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which
delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to
commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made
criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct
proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the
mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one
is the act of all. (Citation and emphasis omitted.)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ESTANLY OCTA y BAS, Accused-Appellant.---CUTE DAW

CHARGE crime of kidnapping for ransom.

FACTS HONDA CIVIC Johnny Corpuz (Johnny) and Mike Adrian Batuigas (Mike Adrian) were on
board a Honda Civic Car colored silver with Plate No. UPT 697 travelling on Buenos Aires St.,
Sampaloc, Manila when their way was blocked by a Mitsubishi box type Lancer car colored
red-orange. The four (4) armed occupants of the Lancer car alighted. Johnny did not open the
door of the Honda Civic car but one of the armed men fired his pistol at the left window of the
civic car, thus compelling Johnny to open the locked door of the car. The armed men went
inside the car and Johnny was ordered to transfer at the back seat at that time. Inside the car,
Johnny was handcuffed, blindfolded and was even boxed. The armed men asked for the
names and telephone numbers of his mother-in-law. The armed men called his mother-in-law
giving the information that Johnny was in their custody and they would just meet each other
at a certain place. They travelled for a while and then they stopped and Johnny was brought
to a safehouse.

CALLED JOHNY’S WIFE After Johnny and Mike were kidnapped, the kidnappers communicated
with Johnny’s wife Ana Marie Corpuz (Ana Marie) giving the information that they have intheir
custody her husband Johnny and her brother Mike Adrian

PACER Ana Marie sought the assistance of the PACER [Police AntiCrime and Emergency
Response] and stayed in a PACER safehouse located at P. Tuazon, Cubao, Quezon City. During
her stay, she had several communications with her husband’s kidnappers. The latter started
demanding the amount of ₱20 million for the release of her husband and her brother but the amount
was considerably reduced up to the time that Ana Marie was able to raise the amount of
₱538,000.00 which was accepted by the kidnappers.
QUIAPO-RED LIPS BEER HOUSE 10PMFinally, on September 30, 2003 at 10PM, the kidnappers
set up the manner on how the ransom money would be delivered. Ana Marie travelled to Quiapo
Church, then to Quezon City circle up to SM Fairview and to Robinsons Fairview. She was made to
stop at Red Lips Beer House and go to the nearby Caltex Auto Supply where she would see a
man wearing a red cap and who would ask her "saan yong padala ni boss". She was instructed
to deliver the wrapped bundled ransom money to the man wearing red cap. When she saw the man
with red cap, she was asked for the money. At first, she did not give the money because she wanted
to be sure that she was giving the money to the right man. Using her own cellphone, she called up
the man who had been instructing her all along and asked him to confirm if the man in front of her is
the right man to give the ransom money to, saying "kausapin mo muna ito kung siya ba." The man in
the phone and the man in the red cap talked for a while in another dialect which Ana Marie did not
understand. When she asked the man to give back her cellphone to her, he refused and, instead
instructed her to give the money to him. She described the man wearing red cap to be goodlooking,
lightly built, in his early 20s, around 5’4" in height and with dimples, which she later identified in court
as accused Estanly Octa.

RELEASED Johnny was released by his captors after the payment of ransom money. He was
detained for the duration of six (6) days. After his release, he removed his blindfold and handcuffs
but he could hardly regain his sight and see things. He flagged down a private pick-up and learned
that he was in Camarin, Caloocan City. He asked a favor that he be driven to Meycauayan, Bulacan
where he took a jeepney to Monumento, and from there, he took a taxi bound home. When he was
released, his brother-in-law Mike Adrian was also released.4

DEFENSE he was still in Daet, Camarines Norte working as a welder in the welding shop of his
uncle Edwin delos Reyes.

RTC accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap and deprive JOHNNY L.CORPUZ and MIKE ADRIAN
BATUIGAS, a minor, of their liberty and against their will by means of threats and intimation with the
use of firearms, and then bring them through the use of a motor vehicle to a house, wherein they
were detained for a period of six (6) days, and that the abduction of the said victims was for the
purpose of extorting Php538,000.00 was actually delivered to the above-mentioned accused in
exchange for the release of the victims.

The trial court also viewed the act of receiving ransom money as sufficient evidence to
establish accused-appellant’s conspiratorial act in the kidnapping for ransom of the victims
in this case.13

CA AFFIRMED

accused-appellant had been rightly found to be a co-conspirator in this case. At the time he
received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still
illegally detained by the kidnappers. Accused-appellant’s act of taking the ransom money was an
overt act made in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.19.20

ISSUES WON CA erred in finding him to be a conspirator to the crime charged;22 and

HELD We deny accused-appellant’s appeal.

To hold an accused guilty as a co-

principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.

Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in

the absence of concrete proof that he actually participated in the execution of the essential elements
of the crime by overt acts indispensable to its accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money
transpired only after the kidnapping had been consummated and was not an essential element of the
crime.We disagree.

Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to

have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. x x

Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused-appellant
was the one who received the ransom money x x x then the commonality of purpose of the acts of
accused-appellant together with the other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the
common design or purpose to commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom.

Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a

principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659 x x x.32(Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant received the
ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still
being illegally detained by the kidnappers.33While his receipt of the ransom money was not a
material element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was in fact the
main reason for kidnapping the victims.34

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L.
ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.

FACTS SIGMA RHO VS SCINITLLA ATTACKED BY MASKED MEN seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.

CHARGE MURDER An information1 for murde against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano,
Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219.

Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead
pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
because his mask fell off.13

Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions.14
RAN TO EDUC BLDGHe was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.15 Just
before reaching it, he looked back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla
holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion was..18 The attack lasted about thirty (30)
to forty-five (45) seconds.19

According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when
Venturina shouted.20He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks,
running toward them.21 He was stunned, and he started running.22 He stumbled over the protruding
roots of a tree.23 He got up, but the attackers came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and
baseball bats until he fell down.24 While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2) of the
attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not wearing any
masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.26

He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men
coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group also beat him up.28 He did not move until
another group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.29

When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.30 Several bystanders brought
him to the U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his
wounds and fractures.31

According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho,.32 He ran when they attacked, but
two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead
pipes.33 While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and
Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to
the Main Library.35 He then decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back
toward Beach House.36 There, he saw Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was
beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit
Venturina.38 When they saw him, they went toward his direction.39 They were about to hit him when
somebody shouted that policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.40

Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could
bring Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary.

According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he
heard someone shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead
pipes and baseball bats.46 Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces.47 He was
about to run when two (2) of the attackers approached him.48 One struck him with a heavy
pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the
blows from the lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left
forearm.50He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back
to Beach House Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano.52 He
decided to go back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see
any of his fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them.54 He ended up going to their
hang-out instead to meet with his other fraternity brothers.55 They then proceeded to the College of
Law where the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident.56

Leandro Lachica=One of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that he received information
that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and were regrouping
in SM North.61 Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify
their attackers.62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63 Lachica saw Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan.64 They had no choice but to
get away from the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held
a meeting.65

NBO On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge
their complaints with the National Bureau of Investigation.66

RTC finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla,
and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder
acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and
Raymund Narag.102 The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension.103

= of the ten accused, some were sufficiently identified and some were not.

CA affirmed108 the decision of the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring109 an one
(1) dissenting.110

ISSUE whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.

HELD The presence of conspiracy

makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder

In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of
Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro
Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their
liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against
Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.

It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer
chased by the attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing
them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than
to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on
Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill."159

Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.

This is erroneous.

It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the
accused-appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161

The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the
others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the
moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the
presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their
attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and
whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight
physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness
of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only
intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from
the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that
intent to kill.
1âwph i1

For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina
and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel
Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.

CHARGED of illegal transport5 of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu,

Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla

RTC Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel
Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other
lawful cause.

SEARCH BY POLICE 500 KG SHABUsearch conducted by police officers on the vehicles driven by
Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an ambulance with plate number
SFK-372, as the police officers have already acquired prior knowledge that the said vehicles were
suspected to be used for transportation of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon,
the information turned out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles
more than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride.7

HELD The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the
testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the two vehicles,
the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon
en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the
checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by
police officers. Through the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside
the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles.

Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further
inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were
scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla
told the police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him
pass.9 His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks
turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.10 This discovery prompted the
operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the
van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain
view, the operatives noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in
the ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for
inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was
rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks
of methamphetamine hydrochloride.11

The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial court for failure on
the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that
Dequilla’s and Yang’s mere presence inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to
prove that they were also conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.12

CA finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to transport
several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their respective vehicles. The
singularity of their intent to illegally transport methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily
shown when Morilla agreed to drive the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila
together with Mayor Mitra, who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.13

HELD

(1) whether he may be convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans allegation of
conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove his culpability as
alleged in the Information.15

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.20 To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.21

Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is
not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs.

This argument is misplaced.

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be
and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.22In this case, the
totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor
Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with
several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was
able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s
turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary
check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to
open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not
have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.

JACA VS PEOPLE
FACTS
On March 4, 1998, City Auditor Rodolfo Ariesga created a team of auditors, with the task of
conducting a surprise audit8 of the cash and other accounts handled by all accountable officers
assigned at the Cash Division, Office of the City Treasurer. Among these disbursing officers was
Rosalina G. Badana, who was the paymaster in charge of paying the salaries of the employees in
eight (8) different departments or offices in the Cebu City government.9 ?r?l1

While Badana reported for work in the early morning of March 5, 1998, she immediately left upon learning
of the planned surprise audit to be conducted that day; she has not reported for work since.10 ?r?l1

The audit teams cash examination covered the period from September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998. Cecilia
Chan and Cecilia Tantengco, the audit team leader and assistant team leader, respectively, conducted an
examination of the cash and other accounts in Badanas custody.11 The audit team reported that Badana
incurred a cash shortage of P18,527,137.19. Based on the procedure in the processing of cash advances,
the audit team found out that the failure of the petitioners to observe the provisions of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1445,12 RA No. 716013 and the rules and regulations governing the grant, utilization and liquidation
of cash advances under Commission on Audit (COA) Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002"facilitated,
promoted, if not encouraged, the commission of malversation of public funds."14 ?r?l 1

On March 13, 1998, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
(Ombudsman)15 a complaint against Badana for malversation of public funds and for violation of RA Nos.
3019 and 6713.16 The complaint resulted in administrative and criminal investigations.17 ?r?l1

HELDVConspiracy and conviction

In Sistoza, the Court already intimated on the possibility of committing a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019 through gross and inexcusable negligence, and of incurring collective criminal responsibility through a
conspiracy.

Furthermore, even if the conspiracy were one of silence and inaction arising from gross inexcusable
negligence, it is nonetheless essential to prove that the breach of duty borders on malice and is
characterized by flagrant, palpable and willful indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.104 ?r?l1

As earlier discussed, considering that the gravity of negligence required by law for a violation of Section 3(e)
of RA No. 3019 to exist falls short of the degree of bad faith or partiality to violate the same provision, a
conspiracy of silence and inaction arising from gross inexcusable negligence would almost always be inferred
only from the surrounding circumstances and the parties acts or omissions that, taken together, indicate a
common understanding and concurrence of sentiments respecting the commission of the offense.105 The
duties and responsibilities that the occupancy of a public office carry and the degree of relationship of
interdependence of the different offices involved here determine the existence of conspiracy where
gross inexcusable negligence was the mode of commission of the offence.

For emphasis, the petitioners are all heads of their respective offices that perform interdependent
functions in the processing of cash advances. The petitioners attitude of buck-passing in the face
of the irregularities in the voucher (and the absence of supporting documents), as established by
the prosecution, and their indifference to their individual and collective duties to ensure that
laws and regulations are observed in the disbursement of the funds of the local government of Cebu can
only lead to a finding of conspiracy of silence and inaction, contemplated in Sistoza. The Sandiganbayan

Finally, it bears stressing that the separate acts or omissions of all the accused in the present case
contributed in the end result of defrauding the government. Without anyone of these acts or omissions, the
end result would not have been achieved. Suffice it to say that since each of the accused contributed to
attain the end goal, it can be concluded that their acts, taken collectively, satisfactorily prove the existence
of conspiracy among them.106 ?r?l 1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petitions for lack of merit and thereby AFFIRM the
decision dated December 16, 2004 and the resolution dated February 1, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24699.

GMA VS PEOPLE
HELD
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas
and Uriarte

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony, and decide to commit it.23 In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere
means to commit a crime.

As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for
it.24The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article
136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141
(conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a
crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or
their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.

We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious
one.25Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to
cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in
the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.26 Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which
requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However,
conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second
form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to
have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.27 Implied
conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the
acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a
joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.28 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have
performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being
shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held
responsible for the results of his own acts.

review of the records of the case compels us to reject the Sandiganbayan's declaration in light of the
information filed against the petitioners, and the foregoing exposition on the nature, forms and
extent of conspiracy. On the contrary, the Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior
to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a
chain conspiracy.
In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the
State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges
against each of them.

e opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were
insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime.
Without GMA's participation, he could not release any money because there was then no budget
available for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount
to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the conspiracy to commit
plunder was unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for the Court to rule that because the
Prosecution failed to properly allege the elements of the crime, as well as to prove that any implied
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was
no conspiracy to commit plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be criminally
responsible only for their own respective actions, if any.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL U.

PAGALASAN alias Mike, RONNIE CABALO alias Romy, ALADIN
CABALO, FERDINAND CORTEZ, a JOHN DOE identified only as
FERNANDO, and a PETER DOE identified only as Bong, accused.
MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias Mike, appellant.
CHARGE convicting appellant Michael U. Pagalasan of two counts of
kidnapping for ransom of George Lim and his 10-year-old son Christopher
Neal Lim and sentencing him to double death.

The Antecedents: Sps LIm hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez, from the
Valiant Security Agency to provide security services to the family. On
September 4, 1994, at 11:00 p.m., the spouses and their children were in the
masters bedroom watching television. The couples housemaid, Julita Sarno,
was in the kitchen. She heard knocks on the kitchen door. Thinking that it was
Ferdinand, she opened the door. Four men, about 55 to 56 tall, each armed
with handguns, two of whom were holding hand grenades, barged into
the kitchen. The four intruders wore bonnets over their faces. With them
was Ferdinand, whose hands were tied behind his back. When asked by
the masked men where her employers were, Julita responded that they
were in their bedroom. On orders of the intruders, she knocked on the
bedroom door. When Georges daughter opened the door, three of the
masked men barged into the room, while the fourth masked man
remained in the sala of the house. The three masked men shouted to
[2]

George and Desiree: Walang mangyayari sa inyo basta ibigay ninyo ang
kailangan namin. (Nothing will happen to you provided you give us what we
want.) They ransacked the house, getting cash and valuables. The masked
[3]

men gave Desiree a handwritten note, and dragged George and Christopher
[4]
Neal Lim out of the bedroom through the sala to the garage, where Georges
Nissan car was parked for the night. George saw Ferdinand in the sala with
his hands tied behind his back. One of the masked men ordered George to
hand over the key to his vehicle, to board the car and occupy the back seat
along with Christopher. Father and son did as they were told. Two of the
masked men positioned themselves on either side of George and
Christopher. The third man drove the car, while the fourth sat on the
passengers seat beside the driver. The car cruised along the national
highway. When the car was nearing the Gambalan Kitchenette, George
and Christopher were blindfolded. The masked men told them that they
would be brought to Polomolok. After about fifteen minutes, the car stopped
at Sitio Tupi. The two men who were seated at the back and the masked man
seated beside the driver alighted from the car, bringing Christopher with
them. George was transferred to the front seat beside the driver. George was
told that he would be transported to Maasim.

In the meantime, SPO2 Federico Pao, the duty officer of Police

Precinct No. 2, received a radio report that George Lim and his son
Christopher had been kidnapped.
Mobile CHECKPOINT- directed to establish a mobile checkpoint at the
intersection of the national highway and a dirt road (Espina Road). The three
policemen boarded a Tamaraw mobile car and parked it at the said
intersection. At about thirty meters from the checkpoint, the masked driver of
the Nissan vehicle saw the police car.Instead of running the car through
the checkpoint, the driver stopped and switched off its headlights. He
removed his bonnet and Georges blindfold, warning the latter not to
make any false move. George looked at the driver, who turned out to be
the appellant Michael Pagalasan.
The three police officers approached the car. Daga-as went to the
right side of the car beside the passenger seat, while Villanueva went to
the left side, near the drivers seat. For his part, Timbao proceeded to the
cars rear end. Daga-as and Villanueva identified themselves to George
and Michael as police officers on the lookout for a certain George Lim
and his son who had been kidnapped in General Santos City. Daga-as
inquired from George what his name was, and George replied that he was
Albert Lim. The driver identified himself as Michael Pagalasan. George gave a
false first name because he was afraid Michael might shoot him. Daga-as
noticed that Georges fingers were trembling. Villanueva knocked at the
door on the drivers side, and tried to open the same, but it was
locked. When Michael himself opened the door, Villanueva pulled him
out of the vehicle and brought him to the mobile car. Michael was
suddenly in the custody of the policemen. George then identified himself
as one of the kidnapped victims. He also told the policemen that his son
was still with the other kidnappers.
The policemen brought Michael and George to the police station where
Ferdinand was being interrogated by police investigators. Ferdinand told
George that he had nothing to do with the kidnapping, but before he
could explain further, he was whisked into the investigation room
In his confession, Michael admitted that upon orders of Ronnie
Cabalo, he and three other men, Aladin (Ronnies brother), a Muslim
known as Ferdinand, and Bong (a resident of Purok Islam), had
kidnapped George and his son Christopher. Ronnie Cabalo instructed
Michael to use Georges vehicle to transport father and son to the banana
plantation where Aladin, Ferdinand and Boy would alight with Christopher,
and to thereafter return George to his house. Aladin had given him a handgun
for his use. Ferdinand Cortez was in cahoots with them. He was at first
reluctant to obey Ronnie, but relented when he was told not to be afraid and
to use the grenade in case of trouble. George told him that he had already
given money to Aladin, and that Michaels companions had taken some pieces
of jewelry from him and his wife before they left the Lim residence.
In the light of Michaels confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo,
Ronie Puntuan and Fernando Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp
Fermin Lira Barracks, General Santos City. In the meantime, on September 6,
1994, George received another handwritten letter, ordering the release of
Michael and Ronie Puntuan because they were innocent, and
demanding P3,000,000 for Christophers release. [11]

On September 9, 1994, George received another handwritten letter

dated September 9, 1994, this time from MUBARAK II or 2 informing him
and his wife that the kidnappers did not want the military to be involved
nor innocent people to be prejudiced. The spouses were also warned that
their son would not be released alive unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in three
days.[12]

RESCUED In the morning of the following day, September 10, 1994,

Christopher was rescued by policemen without any ransom being paid.
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM MTC Michael was charged with kidnapping for
ransom and violation of PD 1866 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
General Santos City.[15]
MTC finding probable cause for charging the accused with kidnapping for
ransom.
CHARGE IN RTC An Information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against
Michael on October 17, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Branch 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11062. On November 3,
1994, Michael, Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin Cabalo, Ferdinand Cortez, a certain
John Doe identified as Fernando, and Peter Doe were charged with
kidnapping for
RTC the trial court rendered judgment acquitting Ferdinand Cortez and
convicting Michael of kidnapping for ransom,
The trial court ruled in Criminal Case No. 11098 that with or without the
confession of Michael, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable
doubt that he, in conspiracy with three others, kidnapped George and
Christopher.
HELD
The appellant is guilty of
kidnapping Christopher
under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy the darling of the modern
prosecutors nursery. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree
[39]

to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of

[40]

incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. Why? because secrecy and concealment are essential features of a
successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design. conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
[43]

reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in

pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
[44]
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. [45]

=the precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by

reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects. For one
thing, the temporal dimension of the conspiracy is of particular
importance. Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until
the object is attained, unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons
the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to the effect that the
conspiracy ends at the moment of any conspirators arrest, on the
presumption, albeit rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has
been thwarted, no other overt act contributing to the conspiracy can
possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested conspirator is
concerned. [47]

Also, while conspirators are responsible for consequent acts

growing out of the common design they are not for independent acts
growing out of the particular acts of individuals.[56]

In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the appellant
and his three cohorts were armed with handguns; two of them had hand
grenades, and all of them had masks over their faces. They gained entry into
the Lim residence after overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and the
housemaid Julita, and tying their hands behind their backs. One of the
masked men remained in the sala, while the three others barged into the
bedroom of George and Desiree, and kidnapped George and his ten-year-old
son Christopher. The appellant and his cohorts forced father and son to board
Georges car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his
cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the
direction of Maasim.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his
cohorts before, during and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof
that the appellant and his three companions conspired with each other to
attain a common objective: to kidnap George and Christopher and detain
them illegally. The appellant was a principal by direct participation in the
kidnapping of the two victims.

The appellant is also guilty

of slight illegal detention of
George under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code.
 Although the appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped George
and Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs, the
appellant is guilty of two separate crimes: kidnapping under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, and slight illegal detention under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant and his co-conspirators were
animated by two sets of separate criminal intents and criminal resolutions in
kidnapping and illegally detaining the two victims. The criminal intent in
kidnapping Christopher was separate from and independent of the criminal
intent and resolution in kidnapping and detaining George for less than three
days. In the mind and conscience of the appellant, he had committed two
separate felonies; hence, should be meted two separate penalties for the
said crimes: one for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code and another for slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
same code. The felony of slight illegal detention is necessarily included in
[82]

the crime of kidnapping for ransom; thus, the appellant may be convicted of
the former crime under an Information for kidnapping for ransom. [83]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-Appellants.

FACTS. CHARGE MURDER

Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door,
passed by him and went out of the back door.7A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from
Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and saw
Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the
screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit
several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to
chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house
and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3.
Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor.
Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while
Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.8

FATAL SKULL INJURY Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull
proved fatal.16

DEFENSE Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in
Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who
appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the
construction site on 28 February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment
the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and
hit Pasion. They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila
right after the incident. He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000.17 During the
cross-examination, Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.18
Motive Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however
resigned on 26 February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta,
Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw
Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t know
Bokingco very well.19

RTC accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,

CA AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as

conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER

The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of Bokingco in its
dispositive portion of its Amended Decision,

A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of the
prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.

Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold him guilty
as co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy.

The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.

HELD We disagree.

Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is
necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together after killing
her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.

Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment
where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly
ordering her to open the pawnshop vault

It cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s
actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed
against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.47

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to
leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the
crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were
united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed
Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while
Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the
pawnshop. 1avvphi1
Bokingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked
Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.

All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to
implicate him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH CASTILLO

and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, appellants.
CHARGE Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention [2]

FACTS Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of Mr. and
Mrs. Luis De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F. Paraaque,
Metro Manila (p. 26, tsn, August 3, 1995). In the morning of said date, Femie, another
housemaid of the Cebreros and Barias relative, bathed and dressed up Rocky, the
couples six year old son and afterwards advised Baria that someone, who was also a
Cebrero househelper, will fetch Rocky (p. 28, supra). At about 8:00 a.m., a tricycle
arrived. On board was a woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and who gave her
name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 26, supra). Baria assisted Rocky to board the
tricycle. The tricycle brought Rocky and the woman, whom Rocky pointed to in court
and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 9, tsn, August 3, 1995), to a
nearby Mcdonalds. Thereat, they were joined by another woman (p. 13, supra) whom
Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo (p. 9, supra).
The three proceeded to a house far from the Mcdonalds (p. 13, supra) where Rocky
slept four times (p. 14, supra).

At about 5:30 p.m. of March 1, 1995, Luis Cebrero arrived home from work. When
his son DJ arrived, he informed his father that Rocky did not attend school. Luis
Cebrero asked Baria (pp. 4-5, tsn, August 22, 1995) who told him that Rocky was
fetched at home by a woman to attend a birthday party (p. 5, supra). Informed thereof,
Mr. Cebrero then called up his friends and went to the police station to report that his
son was missing (p. 9, supra).

At about 7:30 p.m. that night, Luis Cebrero received a telephone call from a woman
saying, Ibigay mo sa akin ang ATM card mo o ang bata (p. 10, supra). Luis replied,
Kailangan ko ang bata. The woman asked how much money was in his ATM and Luis
replied P40,000.00. Luis then requested to talk to his son but the woman said, Hindi
puwede, malayo dito ang anak mo at tatawag na lang uli ako (p. 10, supra).

Luis Cebrero decided to connect a tape recorder to his phone. On March 2, 1995, at
about 7:20 p.m., his phone rang. The caller was a woman telling him, Bigyan mo ako
nang isang million, to which he replied, Hindi ko kayang ibigay ang isang million.
The caller told Luis that she will call back later on (pp. 11-12, supra).
The Cebreros informed the authorities that two of their maids were hired from an
agency, the General Services, Inc. at Paraaque. Major Ordoyo of the Intelligence
Security Group, Philippine Army (PA) sent Sergeants Rempillo and Iglesias to the
agency to verify this. The two were furnished by General Services, Inc. with the
personal data of the maids named Elizabeth Castillo and Jasmine Nuez

When the caller did not contact Luis Cebrero the following day, March 3, 1995, he
instructed his wife to raise some money. From the bank, Mrs. Cebrero
withdrew P800,000.00 in P1,000.00 denomination. The bank provided Mrs. Cebrero a
list containing the serial numbers of the money withdrawn (pp. 15-16, supra).

On March 4, 1995, at about 9:30 p.m., Luis Cebrero received a telephone call. The
caller was a woman who asked, Ano nasa iyo na ba ang pera? Luis answered, Hindi
ko kayang ibigay sa iyo ang halagang iyon, kalahati lang ang kaya kong ibigay. The
caller said, Sige, puede na yan (p. 17, supra) and instructed Luis Cebrero to be in
Paco, Obando, Bulacan, alone, at about 2:00 a.m.; that at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, is a
Farmacia Dilag and beside it is a street which Luis must follow until he reaches the
church called Sabadista where he should drop the money (p. 18, supra). Luis Cebrero
received another call on that same night instructing him to stop in front of the
Farmacia Dilag and walk on the street beside it going to a chapel and to drop the
money on the chapels terrace (p. 19, supra).

Informed of the place for the pay-off, on March 4, 1995, Major Ronnie Eleazar,
briefed his men on Rockys kidnapping and assigned them their respective tasks in the
stakeout they will undertake around the pay-off area (pp. 6-7 tsn, January 30, 1996).
After positioning themselves near the stakeout site, a car arrived and stopped in front
of the chapel. The man alighted and placed a bag in front of the chapel and
immediately left (p. 10, supra). After about forty (40) minutes, two women appeared,
proceeded to where the bag was dropped. On seeing the bag, the women laughed and
left. After about two (2) minutes, the two women returned, picked up the bag and
immediately left (pp. 11-12, supra). The ISG team searched the area around the drop-
off place but the two women were nowhere to be found (p. 17, supra). In court, Sgt.
Delena pointed to and identified Castillo and Padayhag as the two women he saw in
front of the chapel in Obando, Bulacan and who, later on, picked up the bag dropped
by Luis Cebrero (p. 12, supra).

At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero was at home when a tricycle
stopped in front of his house. Somebody knocked at the door and when Luis Cebrero
opened it, he saw his son, Rocky (pp. 23-24, tsn, August 22, 1995).

RTC Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as charged. [4]
CA IS convinced that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused

HELD We affirm the trial courts judgment convicting Castillo. However, we

acquit her co-accused Padayhag.

Appellant Castillos Liability-GUILTY

Appellant Padayhags Liability

Padayhags sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching

Rocky and bringing him to where Castillo was waiting for them. Padayhag
then went strolling with the two, went to the house of Castillos sister together
with Castillo and Rocky, and then later left the house. From this fact alone, the
prosecution would have us rule that Padayhag acted in conspiracy with
Castillo. The prosecution contends that without Padayhags help, Castillo
could not have abducted Rocky.
We are not persuaded.
There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted
in concert with Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an
accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a
sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely links
the accused to the commission of the crime without any space for
baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through. Indeed, [26]

conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime

itself.
[27]

Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1)

singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective.
The two must concur. Performance of an act that contributes to the goal
of another is not enough. The act must be motivated by the same
unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient
indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a
common design. [28]

Padayhags act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity

with Castillos plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants
testified that Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag that
Padayhags boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were
to visit Padayhags boyfriend that the two met. When they met, Padayhag
realized that Castillo had deceived her:
After the two spent the day together, Castillo beseeched Padayhag to
fetch Rocky citing as reason her love for the child and a desire to spend time
with the boy. Padayhag is a young lass from the province who only finished
Grade Two. Padayhag was thus easily misled by the more worldly Castillo.
Padayhags testimony reveals her naivet:
In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the liability of
an individual as a conspirator should focus on all acts before,
during and after the commission of the crime. We have done precisely that,
[33]

and it is precisely why we rule for her innocence. After her stroll with Castillo
and Rocky, she left when Castillo brought the boy to her sisters house in
Caloocan. She never visited nor contacted Castillo afterwards. She
[34]

remained at her house and refused to go with Castillo when the latter
suddenly tried to coax her to go to Dipolog. None of the money used as
ransom was found in her possession. Her involvement in the pay-off was
never established. The testimony of two prosecution witnesses, Sgt. De Lena
and Sgt. Iglesias, claiming that Padayhag was with Castillo when the latter
picked up the ransom in Obando, is contradicted by Castillos admission in
open court that she brought along a certain Mila and not Padayhag. In [35]

addition, the testimonies of these two police officers suffer from their failure to
explain how they suddenly lost track of the two women who took the ransom
in front of their very eyes.
All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy.
We also find that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In People v. Gonzales we held:
[36]

In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence
stands as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal
law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact
[37]

establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be

[38]

removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to

[39]

convict. Within this framework, the prosecution must prove its case beyond
[40]
any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The
presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.
The failure to prove Padayhags involvement as a conspirator reveals how
tenuous the evidence is linking her to the crime. Padayhags culpability hinges
on how her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him to Castillo formed part of a
concerted effort to kidnap the child. The act of fetching the boy, by itself, does
not constitute a criminal offense. By itself, it is not even sufficient to make her
an accomplice. For a person to be considered an accomplice there must be a
community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal, the
co-accused concurs with the latter. Mere commission of an act which aids the
perpetrator is not enough.

GO TAN VS TAN
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, , barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective
Order (TPO)[6] against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita
L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.

RTC TPO

The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would
be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

ISSUES WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES

PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE
INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE
ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.[17]
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8
of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be
included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

HELD The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that
the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which
by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts
of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through
another,

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be

applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether
respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an
exercise in superfluity.

TICKLER: Technical Discussion; wheel conspiracy

Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevilas vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 145927,
August 24, 2007

FACTS: Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia
Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of
MPH Region VII, met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an
ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from government coffers. Mangubat had found
a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments
(LAA), vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other
government officials and employees. In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of
LAAs and Requisition for Supplies and Equipments (RSE) so that the amount covered by each
general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor;
the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year to provide the
supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or
adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in
excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial
balances submitted to the Regional Office. Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join
him. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays.
Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26%
of the gross amount. Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers and
General Journal thru negative entrieS to conceal the illegal disbursements.

A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC), were traced back to Rolando Mangubat, Regional
Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of
Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds
amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and
delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the
national highways within the Cebu First Highway Engineering District (HED). Despite the
enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the district, as found
out by the NBI, did not show any improvement. As testified to by several barangay captains, the
road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national
highway. Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in
the additional amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon the
said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of
Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and
confederated with them. The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose
Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were
accordingly sentenced by the Sandiganbayan. The other conniver, Delia Preagido, after being
found guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On the basis of her
testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions were obtained, and
criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused. On the other hand, petitioners were
both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District.
Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881,
2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries
of materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers.
Fund releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general
vouchers. On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos.
2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932. Crime Charged: Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents 6 counts for Fernan and 9 counts for Torrevillas
Sandiganbayan: Guilty as charged ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were co-conspirators
with the other accused

HELD: Conviction affirmed. On the Participation of the petitioners

The fake tally sheets, delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials,
and other related documents signed on separate occasions by petitioners, which were attached as
supporting documents to corresponding general vouchers; the alleged amounts and quantities of
road construction materials delivered; and the specific fake general vouchers, checks, and other
pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal disbursement of funds. On the part of
petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery
receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related
documents which became part of the supporting documents that led to the issuance of
general vouchers and eventually the disbursement of public funds. The tally sheets are
statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of materials for the
construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on supposed project sites on
given dates at specific places.
As a result of petitioners' signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other supporting documents--which became
the basis for payment to suppliers--public funds were released via general vouchers and checks
to the said suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not make any deliveries in accordance with
projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs. No actual repairs done The inescapable
conclusion from the testimonies of the barangay captains and residents of Cebu whose
respective barangay are traversed by the national highway is that there were no actual
major repair works undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by
crushed limestone (anapog). Clearly, there were no deliveries of supplies and materials for
asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally sheets and other supporting
documents signed by petitioners. The satisfaction of the elements of the crime charged Their
signing of tally sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for
road repair and construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their official
positions, especially considering that they had the duty to inspect the purported deliveries and
ascertain the veracity of the documents and the statements contained in them. The tally sheets
bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts which the petitioners had the
duty to verify and confirm. These tally sheets were attached as supporting documents to fake
LAAs and subsequently became the bases for the disbursement of public funds to the damage
and prejudice of the government. Indubitably, there exists not even an iota of doubt as to
petitioners' guilt. The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents
are present in the cases against petitioners, as follows: 1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and
Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road construction and maintenance were
delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said
supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented. In
doing so, petitioners:

1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses; 1.2.
Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers; and 1.3. Made
untruthful statements in several narrations of fact. 2. Damage: The government
disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the case of
Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies.
Petitioners acted with conspiracy with one another In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we
categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called
"wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub")
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the
"chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in
which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer. We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases
resembles the "wheel" conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the
massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single hub,
namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose
Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate
"spokes" of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel. A total
of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to
Rolando Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional
 Highway Engineer, also of Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in
the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers
purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials
allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First
HED.

State witness Ruth Paredes, Supervising COA Auditor, elaborated on the procedure regarding the
award of the contract more specifically to the payment of the contractor or supplier. Once the
Request for Supplies and Equipment is approved by the Regional Office, the Request for
Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the request for funds is signed by the District Engineer
pursuant to the approved plans and budget and signed by the district accountant as to availability
of funds. The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the contract to the
lowest bidder. The Purchase Order (PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. Upon
delivery of the supplies and materials, the supplier bills the district office for payment.
Consequently, the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher which must be
accompanied by the following documents: a. The ROA; b. ThePO; c. The abstract of Bid
together with the Bid quotations; d. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and e.
The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier. After the preparation and submission of the
general voucher and the supporting documents, the disbursing officer shall prepare and draw a
check based on said voucher. The check is countersigned by an officer of the district office
and/or the COA Regional Director based on the amount of the check. Thus, it is clear that
without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot be prepared and
completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made
and issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation cannot be
committed and successfully consummated. Thus, petitioners' acts in signing the false tally
sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa
thru falsification of public documents. Surely, there were ghost or false deliveries of
supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies of the barangay captains,
officials, and residents of the areas where the materials were allegedly used. In sum, the
required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the
accused including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained.

People VS REGALARIO

Article 11: Justifying Circumstances TICKLER: Nightstick/bahi, Barangay Officials

People vs Ramon Regalario, Marciano Regalario, Sotero Regalario, Bienvenido Regalario
and Noel Regalario G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009

FACTS: 5 Accused are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay and related to one another
by consanguinity. On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held
in the barangay pavilion. Sotero and Bienvenido were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several
times with their respective nightsticks, locally known as bahi. Sevilla ran towards the house of
Mariano while being chased by Sotero and Bienvenido. He was then waylaid by Ramon and at
this point, Marciano and his son Noel came out of their house. Noel was carrying a seven-inch
knife. The five, armed with their nightsticks, they took turns in hitting the victim until he
slumped to the ground face down. Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. When Sevilla was
not moving, Marciano first ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up.
Bienvenido and Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope.

Defense: When Ramon approached a group where the disturbance was taking place, Sevilla
suddenly emerged from the group, fired a shot at him. He was hit at the left shoulder. To
disable Sevilla from firing more shots, which might prove fatal, he struck Sevilla with his
nightstick at the back of his head. Sevilla reeled backward and leaned on the bamboo fence. To
prevent Sevilla from regaining his balance, Ramon continued to harass him with blows of his
nightstick. Sevilla retreated backward but Ramon kept him busy parrying the blows which hit his
arms and front part of the body. But even in the course of such harassment, Sevilla was able to
fire a second shot which missed Ramon. When they reached the end of the road pavement,
Sevilla lost his footing on edge of the pavement and fell down. Sotero then arrived and shouted
to Ramon to stop beating Rolando. But Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun so Sotero
plunged at Rolando and they wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun. The gun went
off but no one was hurt. Bienvenido was instructed by Marciano to effect the arrest of Sevilla for
the crime of shooting Ramon. According to Bienvenido, they were taught in their training
seminar to just use a rope in lieu of handcuffs because they could not be supplied with it. So, he
tied the hands and feet of Rolando Sevilla for fear that he might be able to escape.

CRIME CHARGED: Murder RTC RULING: Murder with the aggravating circumstance of
scoffing at the corpse of the victim. However, accused are entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which offset the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at his
corpse CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the RTC but did not appreciate the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender ISSUE: Can Ramon invoke self-defense?

RULING: No. The three (3) elements of self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself,
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, without unlawful aggression,
there can be no selfdefense, either complete or incomplete. When unlawful aggression ceases,
the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not
a justifying circumstance. By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the
back of the latter’s head and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that
moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the
continuation of the offensive stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was
clearly no longer any danger, but still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. Ramon’s
claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on the neck, four
(4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions on different parts
of the victim’s body. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun at Ramon, the
number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the force used
against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or prevent him from
doing harm to others.

Notes: The collective act of the accused-appellants is sufficient to make them co-principals
to the killing, Abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance was appreciated.
They took advantage of their superiority in number and arms in killing the victim, as
shown by numerous wounds the latter suffered in different parts of his body. They tied him
hog-style after rendering him immobilized. This action constituted outraging or scoffing at
the corpse of the victim. The accused did not surrender spontaneously\

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG, Accused-Appellant.

DOCTRINE: The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the record does not
substantiate the attendance of treachery. But he may not benefit from the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense if there was no unlawful aggression from the victim.

FACTS: A young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan,
shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which
was about 30 meters from his own house, and B who was already prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of
Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his
left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards
Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident. He went
home afterwards.

Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them fighting in
April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have his day and I will kill him.4 ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra r

DEFENSE: Dulin testified that as he (Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother,
stabbed him on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan: Uncle,
you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper
level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they
grappled for the weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan
with the weapon, and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he
(Dulin) regained consciousness only the next day at the hospital.

Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the barangaycaptain
would summon him to bring Batulan home each time the latter got drunk at night.

Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
authenticated the hospital records showing that Dulin had also been injured.13ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

RTC: MURDER; APPRECIATED INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE AS PRIVILEGE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

CA: MURDER chanroblesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

ARGUMENT: Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder, considering the
RTC’s appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance; and that even if self-
defense should be unavailing, he could be found guilty only of homicide because it was the victim who had
first attacked by stabbing him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim did not mean that he had
not been justified in killing the victim.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF
THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.

SC: HOMICIDE

HELD: I.There was no self-defense. Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-
defense. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had
dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going inside the
house of Danao, where they again grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not
amount to aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that point.
Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation against
Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that
the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the
aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor.23 As such, there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.

II.Incomplete self-defense was not proved. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the
elements of incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against him. With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the moment that Dulin
divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-defense. Moreover, as borne out by
his stabbing of Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but
instead to inflict injury on Batulan.

PEOPLE VS FONTANILLA

FACTS Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste,
Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with
a piece of wood called bellang.[2] Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla
hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting
Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of
Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their
father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.[3]

CHARGED WITH MURDER

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the
incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a
nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although
he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his
fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked
him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking
up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victims head, causing the
latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his
house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.[9]

RTC MURDER The RTC rejected Fontanillas plea of self-defense by

observing that he had no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the
victim a mortal wound causing his death[12] due to the victim attacking him
only with bare hands.
CA AFFIRMED holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable
element of unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police
at the earliest opportunity, or even after he was taken into custody, negated the plea
of self-defense; and that the nature of the victims injury was a significant physical
proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just
to defend himself.[16]

HELD A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful
aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head
with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victims fistic attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained
some injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or
gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the
hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical
certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him.[26] In contrast, the
physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on
the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons
used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais
revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from
Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested
the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend
himself.[27]

JOSUE VS PEOPLE

FACTS On May 1, 2004, at around 11:15 in the evening, Macario, a barangay tanod, was buying
medicine from a store near the petitioner’s residence when he saw the petitioner going towards
him, while shouting to ask him why he had painted the petitioner’s vehicle. Macario denied the
petitioner’s accusation, but petitioner still pointed and shot his gun at Macario. The gunshots
fired by the petitioner hit Macario’s elbow and fingers. As the unarmed Macario tried to flee
from his assailant, the petitioner still fired his gun at him, causing him to sustain a gunshot
wound at his back. Macario was then rushed to the Chinese General Hospital for medical
treatment. Dr. Tiongson confirmed that Macario sustained three (3) gunshot wounds: (1) one
on his right hand, (2) one on his left elbow, and (3) one indicating a bullet’s entry point at
the posterior of the chest, exiting at the anterior line. Dr. Calalang took note of the tiny
metallic foreign bodies found in Macario’s x-ray results, which confirmed that the wounds were
caused by gunshots. Further, she said that the victim’s injuries were fatal, if not medically
attended to. Macario incurred medical expenses for his treatments.

DEFENSE For his defense, the petitioner declared to have merely acted in selfdefense. He
claimed that on the evening of May 1, 2004, he, together with his son Rafael, was watching
a television program when they heard a sound indicating that the hood of his jeepney was
being opened. He then went to the place where his jeepney was parked, armed with a .45
caliber pistol tucked to his waist. There he saw Macario, together with Eduardo Matias and
Richard Akong, in the act of removing the locks of his vehicle’s battery. When the petitioner
sought the attention of Macario’s group, Macario pointed his .38 caliber gun at the petitioner and
pulled its trigger, but the gun jammed and failed to fire. The petitioner then got his gun and used
it to fire at Macario, who was hit in the upper arm. Macario again tried to use his gun, but it still
jammed then fell on the ground. As Macario reached down for the gun, the petitioner fired at him
once more, hitting him at the back. When Macario still tried to fire his gun, the petitioner fired at
him for the third time, hitting his hand and causing Macario to drop his gun. The petitioner got
Macario’s gun and kept it in his residence.

RTC AND CA F HOMICIDE

ISSUE: WON JOSUE ACTED IN SD.

HELD. NO. In the present case, particularly significant to this element of “unlawful
aggression” is the trial court’s finding that Macario was unarmed at the time of the
shooting, while the petitioner then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol. According to
prosecution witness Villanueva, it was even the petitioner who confronted the victim, who was
then only buying medicine from a sari-sari store. Granting that the victim tried to steal the
petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal safety. At one point
during the fight, Macario even tried to run away from his assailant, yet the petitioner continued
to chase the victim and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the mortal wound on
his chest. Contrary to the petitioner’s defense, there then appeared to be no “real danger to his
life or personal safety,”15 for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise justified him
in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense, emanated from Macario’s end. The weapon
used and the number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, in relation to the nature and
location of the victim’s wounds, further negate the claim of self-defense. For a claim of self-
defense to prosper, the means employed by the person claiming the defense must be
commensurate to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. Considering the petitioner’s use of a deadly
weapon when his victim was unarmed, and his clear intention to cause a fatal wound by still
firing his gun at the victim who had attempted to flee after already sustaining two gunshot
wounds, it is evident that the petitioner did not act merely in self-defense, but was an aggressor
who actually intended to kill his victim.

NOEl TOLEDO VS PEOPLE---maingay daw grupo ni ricky-stones at house

FACTS On September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo.
When he went home to Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the afternoon (TSN, September 4,
1998, p. 2), appellant saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky
Guarte drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents.
Appellant’s house is about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant
requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise. Thereupon, appellant proceeded
inside his house and went to sleep (ibid., p. 3). Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s
brother arrived at the Guarte house and asked for any left-over food (TSN, August 5, 1998, p. 3).
Eliza prepared dinner for him and after Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by
Ricky (TSN, April 26, 1996, p. 5). Gerardo’s home is about twelve (12) meters away from the Guarte
home (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 11). Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex
and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had not laid down for long when they
heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times
(TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 2-3)

Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw appellant stoning their house. Ricky
went out of the house and proceeded to appellant’s house. Ricky asked appellant, his uncle, why he
was stoning their house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his (appellant’s)
house and, without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo (TSN, August 5, 1998,
p. 8). Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was stabbed, shouted for help
(TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 13). Lani heard Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed outside the
house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body with his hands. Lani helped
Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky
replied that it was appellant who stabbed him. Then Docloy Cortez arrived at the scene on board his
tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital

At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Noralie Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night. Ricky
had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being operated on
(TSN, November 24, 1997, pp. 2, 6-7

RTC HOMICIDEE CA AFIRMED

Defense accident and self defense1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful
aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his
bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide based on the
evidence on record.

HELD It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the
said defenses are intrinsically antithetical.11 There is no such defense as accidental self-defense
in the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of
the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme
and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it
ends.12 Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance
with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from
both criminal and civil liabilities.13 On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances
under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom
of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.14 The basis of the
exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and
intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits
a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions
which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act.15 An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event
or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.16

First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him and
the victim would have caused the door to fall on the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to
adduce real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any physical
injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.

Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the victim must have fallen on top
of the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner could have hit the stomach of the victim. The
claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed by the door belies his
claim that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.

Third. When he surrendered to the barangay captain and to the policemen, he failed to relate to
them that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim:

Fourth. There is no evidence that the petitioner surrendered either the bolo that accidentally hit the
victim or the balisong held by the deceased to the barangay captain or the police authorities. Such
failure of the petitioner negates his claim that his bolo accidentally hit the stomach of the victim and
that he acted in self-defense.22

Fifth. To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof,
namely. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude.24 We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete:

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky.
While it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which
would give a semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however,
is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one
purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no
weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from
Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner
did he manifest any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s
want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant’s doorstep is supported by the fact that
only one weapon was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to
appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky. Thus, appellant’s version of the events does not
support a finding of unlawful aggression

Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life
necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there
must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-
defense must fail.

Sixth. With the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is
guilty of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.26
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ VS PEOPLE-sykes binaril kalaguyo

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of his
deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.

FACTS petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s
Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner was already inside the building, he went
to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the
configuration of the eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer
terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner
was already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed
to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun
ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun.
Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot
finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after
shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.

After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young
children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he
received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.

RTC HOMICIDE

CCA AFFIRMED

ISSUE whether the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for
Homicide.

HELD THREE ELEMENTS

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was
employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.

In the case at bar, other than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to
show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the
confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried
to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his
life.

Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired,
and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already
ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After
petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak
of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC,
petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do
so, thus:

In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted that he
1avv phi 1

wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then
took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had
the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun
initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by
the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no
longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense
is committed A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the
unlawful aggression has ceased

Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s) headbut
he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be
corroborative of it.In contrast, the two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not
impeached, both gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself
from the accused who was then already in possession of the gun.18

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the present victim
no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer
in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of
the offender. Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to
inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression
had already ceased.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey,
the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and
extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert.

The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the
discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the
use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense

It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim
who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the
circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an
imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute
unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled
rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his
lifeand limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja
v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).26

If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite
any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also
immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor
where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities
as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet,
petitioner never did any of that.

We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling
with Jeffrey, and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times,
the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. HOMICIDE
RODOLFO GUEVARRA AND JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide under
two Informations which read:

DEFENSE
Testimony of Rodolfo

Rodolfo, who was then fifty–five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordoñez and David Ordoñez, together with their companion,
Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his house and tricycle.
Through the back door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the basement or “silung” and shouted at the
three men to stop. David saw him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a “panabas,” hitting him on
the palm of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the “solera” of his house,
and hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and
David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his
house until the policemen arrived.

Version of the Prosecution

As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who survived the hacking.

Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother David and Philip
went to. birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners’ compound. He was walking twenty (20)
meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed
by Joey with. bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from
where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back.
Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners’ compound and kept on hacking him. He
was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.

Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners’ house and damaged Rodolfo’s tricycle. They
did not likewise destroy the petitioners’ gate, which was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it
while he was being pulled by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and
stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside the petitioners’ gate were
saying, “Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out.”16

After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David died in the
hospital while being treated for his wounds.

The RTC’s Ruling frustrated homicide and homicide.

The CA’s Ruling AFFIRMED NO UNLAWFUL AGGREESSION

the CA found that Erwin and David committed no unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke the actions of the
petitioners; that “[a]ggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there is.
real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self–defense or to others whom that person
is seeking to defend.”20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners’ claims that David challenged Joey to a
fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the CA held that these acts do not
constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners’ actions as no real or actual danger existed as the
petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.

The CA further held that the petitioners’ plea of self–defense was belied by the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on his arm and back, and David,
who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds
logically indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self–defense but a determined homicidal
aggression on the part of the petitioners.21

ISSUES WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF–DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF–DEFENSE.
esVi rtua lawlib rary
Our Ruling We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of
October 24, 2005.

The petitioners’ intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by their
victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the
means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.28 The CA
aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death,
and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution’s theory that the
petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29 In fact, the petitioners admitted at the
pre–trial that “the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordoñez would have caused his death were it not for
immediate medical attendance.”30

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by the
petitioners’ compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by
Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the
petitioners’ compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners’ gate was destroyed. The manner by which
the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin’s testimony that his brother David, who was then
clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners’ compound. These circumstances, coupled with the
nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self–
defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.

============

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. OSCAR SEVILLANO Y RETANAL –sta messa long bench

Factual Antecedents Victim Pablo Maddauin, were seated on a long bench having their usual chit-
chat at the vacant lot situated at 4th Street Guadal Canal, St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. Witness Jose was
the watchman of this property. While conversing, they saw appellant coming towards their direction.
Appellant could not walk straight and appeared to be drunk. Without warning, appellant pulled out a knife
from his waist and stabbed the victim on the chest. Jose and Carmelita tried to restrain the appellant
from attacking the victim, but Jose experienced leg cramps and lost his hold on appellant. Appellant turned
again on the victim and continued to stab him several times more. The victim was heard asking appellant,
“Bakit?”. Carmelita shouted for help. The victim’s wife came to the scene and embraced appellant as she
wrestled for the knife. Thereafter, [the] victim was brought to the University of the East Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Medical center; but unfortunately, he died that same day.4 cralawlawlibr ary

Appellant, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to absolve
himself from criminal liability. He averred that on that fateful afternoon, he went to the vacant lot where
the victim and his friends usually hang-out to feed his chicken. While thereat, the victim, whom he
described to have bloodshot eyes, walk towards him and stepped on his injured foot. While he was on
his knees because of the pain, he saw the victim draw a knife. The latter thereafter stabbed at him while
uttering: “Ikaw pa, putang ina mo,” but missed his target. As he and the victim grappled for the knife, the
latter was accidentally stabbed. When he saw blood oozing out of the victim, he became apprehensive of
the victim’s relative to such extent that he fled the scene and hid to as far as Bulacan where he was
eventually apprehended. chan roble

RTC murder for the death of Pablo Maddauin (Pablo)

CA AFFIRMED with modification on the amount of damages awarded.

The CA likewise sustained the trial court’s findings that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present
in the case. It held that although the attack on the victim was frontal, it was deliberate, sudden and
unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or to defend
himself.8
cra lawred

Issues WON HE ACTED IN SD

Our Ruling NO:

 First. Unlawful Aggression; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. cralawlawlibrary

Appellant’s version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him was found
by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower court’s conclusion. Assuming arguendo that
there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the imminence of that danger had
already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no
longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the need for him to kill the victim or the
former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no
longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.13 The fact that the victim suffered many stab
wounds in the body that caused his demise, and the nature and location of the wound also belies and
negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.14 c ralaw red

PEOPLE VS GENOSA

Facts:

Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason
why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be
suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the
killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
PARRICIDE
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the
accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel
or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression

art EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

RAYMUND MADALI and RODEL MADALI, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS CHARGED MURDERFor the death of AAA,4 Raymund, Rodel and a certain Bernardino
"Jojo" Maestro (Bernardino) were charged before the RTC with the crime of Murder

BBB, who made a living by selling goods aboard ships docked at the Romblon Pier, and who was
constantly assisted by her 15-year-old son AAA, was on a ship plying her wares. AAA, together with
Jovencio and Raymund, was there helping his mother.7 Sometime later, Raymund and AAA left the
ship. Jovencio stayed a little longer.8

At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Jovencio and another friend named Michael Manasan sat
beside the Rizal monument in the Poblacion of Romblon, located between the Roman Catholic
Church and Lover’s Inn. Michael had just left Jovencio when Raymund, Rodel, Bernardino and the
victim AAA arrived. After meandering around, the group proceeded to climb the stairs, atop of which
was the reservoir just beside the Romblon National High School. The victim, AAA, ascended first;
behind him were Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and witness Jovencio. As soon as they reached the
reservoir, Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted
out, "Join the rugby boys." AAA replied, "That’s enough." Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a
fresh and hard coconut frond. AAA lost his balance and was made to stand up by Raymund, Rodel
and Bernardino. Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same
coconut frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he received punches to his head and body
from Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. The punishments proved too much, as AAA lost
consciousness.

Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied to a dog
chain. With the contraption, the three malefactors pulled the body up a tree.

Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio could only muster a faint voice saying
"Enough" every single-time AAA received the painful blows. Bernardino, who seemed to suggest
finishing off the victim, remarked, "Since we’re all here, let’s get on with it." Before leaving the
scene, the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the incident to anyone, or he would
be next.

RTC rendered a guilty verdict against the three accused. HOMICIDE

CA AFFIRMED REFERRED to Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," which exempts from criminal liability a minor fifteen
(15) years or below at the time of the commission of the offense, Raymund’s case was
dismissed. Rodel’s conviction was sustained, and he was sentenced to six months and one
day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, but the imposition of
said penalty was suspended pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344. The judgment provides:

HELD As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from
criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to
Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. — If it has been determined that the
child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial
contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents
or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to
the local social welfare and development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in
consultation with the child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians
or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to
any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official
or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare
and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein
has been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or
abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program,
the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social
Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The
Child and Youth Welfare Code."

Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who
was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code

While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.

As to Rodel’s situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is
necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – x x x.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.24 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.

CA could not have been more accurate when it opined that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel,
together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they
would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in
secrecy. He fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under
18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the
proper period.

FACTS The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in

Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba,
who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu

BUYBUSTthe team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4,

Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two
poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the
act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each
other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-
buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers
went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been
completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the
appellant as he was leaving the place.

The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence
of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the
appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to
the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the
appellant on the ground.
INVENTORY After the operation, and in the presence of the
same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the items
recovered from the appellant

TWO SEPARTE INFO

Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

RTC GUILTZ

The CA affirmed

HELD Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it
appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The
appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or
when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the
promulgation of the RTC's Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant
was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with
Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[31] and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,[32] the laws
that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the
imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to
death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension
of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its
retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is

under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
 suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however,
That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

xxxx

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while
Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied
even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same
law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21. The provision states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child
in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict
with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
 period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can
no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his
suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is
highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show
that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence,
when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the
case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of
Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of
minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of
Article 192 of P.D. 603.[34]

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under

Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:[35]

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps

and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
mandated in Section 98[36] of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165
merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is
provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has
adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal
Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon,[37] thus:

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in
imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied
in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the
special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the
offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from
or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties
then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the
minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be
impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose
main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance
with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the
provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could
not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the
penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the
scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory
effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is

defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty
therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in
this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical
and absurd to posit otherwise.

xxxx

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and

consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with
the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in
Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the
participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree.
Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as
provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two
degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68
should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under
the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No.
6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been
contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a

penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith.
Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two
penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in
degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the
former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and
since the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties
in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no
further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise
consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public
censure remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be

appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or
even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation
of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in
the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any
event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness
of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue
to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be
forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the
concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.[38]
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority [39] can now be
appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the
minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty
should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW),
the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor
aggravating circumstance.[40] -----
PEOPLE VS AGACER
Factual Antecedents
FACTS Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in
Dungeg, Santa Ana, Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a
section of his farm and preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the
coming planting season. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy,
Rafael Morgado and brothers Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a
separate section of the same ricefield harvesting Cesarios palay.

According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment

while Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby
banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved
backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were
working. However, Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesarios rice
seedlings. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice
seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced
the latter to retreat again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric,
signaled Cesario to come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters
away from the group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and,
without warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost
simultaneously, Elynor took aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his
mark. As Cesario fell, appellants fled towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot
rang. Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where the appellants ran towards the
direction of Cesarios fallen body. Appellants then immediately left the scene of the crime
onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle.
After these events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in
different directions. Genesis then reached Barangay Capanikian and informed Cesarios
son, Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the death of his father. At around 3:00 p.m., Cesarios
friends in said barangay went to the scene of the crime and retrieved his corpse. During
the autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were found, mostly on the chest of Cesarios
cadaver. According to the Medico-Legal Officer, the fatal gunshot wounds were inflicted
by the use of a firearm capable of discharging several slugs simultaneously.

Version of the Defense The appellants denied the accusations against them and claimed
that Florencio only acted in self-defense and in defense of relatives
RTC MURDER

CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects.

Our Ruling

Conspiracy was sufficiently established

Appellants failed to discharge their burden to

prove Florencios claim that he acted in self-
defense and in defense of relatives.

Florencio admits that he shot Cesario but invokes defense of himself and of his relatives
to escape criminal liability.

The Court is not convinced.

ISSUE: Should the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor

of appellant Franklin? RULING: YES, Franklin is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on
December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime
on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the offender is a
minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed on the accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending
such leniency and compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted
with less discernment. This is regardless of the fact that his minority was not proved during the
trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for our consideration, since to rule
accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.

VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Facts
Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital
(hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients
daughter, Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the
Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990. As of 4 June 1992, the
[6]

Statement of Account shows the total liability of the mother in the amount
[7]

of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital
from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount
of P418,410.55. The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted
[8]

to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein

she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of
[9]

the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable
to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount
of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all
dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to
insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the
complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the
demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven
(7) Informations subject of the instant case. [10]

For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to
issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital
bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities,
such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to
inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of
her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. She
also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. The
debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she
would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother,
and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a
promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to
effect her mothers immediate discharge. [11]
Rtc finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing
her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:

CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks

CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the
penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty
thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in
each case. [15]

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses

of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals
knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds.It held that B.P. 22
makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special
offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. [16]

Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no

valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were
issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother. [17]

In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court

applied the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals wherein this Court declared
[18]

that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e.,
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection
of the social order.
[19]

ISSUE WON THE DEFENSE OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR IN ISSUING

CHECKS IS TENABLE.

HELD NO.We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys
conviction.
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear
must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at
least equal to that committed.[24]

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such
gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It [25]
should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or
limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be
[26]

speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must

[27]

show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be
[28]

of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. [29]

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checksa condition
the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the
inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated
by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-
threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged
unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her
death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or
insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument
without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice
but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities
available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted
that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she
[30]

was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had
all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks
without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her
counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks
because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem. Besides, [31]

apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to
cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of
her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application
in this case.
 We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to
exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to
be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one
done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it. [32]

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or

anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated
or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have
[33]

taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her

own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security
instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater
injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or
imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the
[34]

issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay
her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had
Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done
without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear
that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury
prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the
Civil Case for damages filed by Tys mother against the hospital is wholly
[35]

irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings
therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be
supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender
reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the
checks, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued
for valuable consideration. Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
[36] [37]

creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for
a consideration or for value. In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove
[38] [39]

that the checks were issued without consideration. She must present
convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her
burden of proof. Valuable consideration may in general terms, be said to
consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an obligation to
give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as
the maker or indorser. [40]

In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities
of the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to
pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her
signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility
for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her
personal obligation because she was not the patient, and therefore there was
no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al. tells us
[41]

that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say

that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is
sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a
detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is
enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some
detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of
George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement.Appellee
accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting
obligation for the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient
consideration for the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the
[42]

checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to

merely guarantee the obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the
[43]

making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. As this Court
[44]

held in Lim v. People of the Philippines, what is primordial is that such issued
[45]

checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the
appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:

Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.  The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.

Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
[46] [47]

Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did
not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge
necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the
drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential
element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is
the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof
is inconsequential. [48]

In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals wherein [49]

this Court inquired into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and
the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the
circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not
warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts
therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In
the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit
in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the
deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or
lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate need so they may
be accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim
of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The
maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as
collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual
account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual
account or for value. Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and
Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in payment of
the hospital bills of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of
imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender
nor that she acted in bad faith.Administrative Circular 12-2000, adopting the
[50]
rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Lim v. People, authorizes the non-
[51] [52]

imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain

conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of
Administrative Circular 13-2001 which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is
[53]

stated therein:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the

application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances
of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as
the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the
Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does

not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22;
(2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice,
or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and
the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment. [54]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding
petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to
pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject
of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered
to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of
the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Aus