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G.R. No.

163443 November 11, 2008



Facts: In the Order dated June 28, 2001[7] , the Director of CSCROVII invalidated Quirog's
appointment as PGDH-OPA upon finding that the same was part of the bulk appointments issued by
then Governor Relampagos after the May 14, 2001 elections allegedly in violation of Item No.
3(d)[8] of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001. The Order pointed out that the prohibition
against the issuance of midnightappointments was already laid down as early as February 29, 2000
in CSC Resolution No. 000550.[9]

Both Relampagos and Quirog moved for reconsideration of the CSCROVII Order, alleging that when
the latter took her oath of office on June 1, 2001, CSC Resolution No. 010988 was not yet effective
as it took effect only on June 4, 2001. They argued that the subject appointment cannot be
considered a midnight appointment because it was made days before the expiration of Relampagos'
term, and that Quirog was already the acting Provincial Agriculturist a year prior to said
appointment or since June 19, 2000.[10] Besides, so they asserted, since Quirog had already taken
her oath of office, assumed her duties and collected her salary for the month of June, 2001, she had
already acquired a legal, not merely equitable, right to the position in question, which cannot be
taken away from her either by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and
with previous notice and hearing.

Issue: Does the prohibition against midnight appointments apply to those made by
chief executives of local government units?

Ruling: In a decision[11] dated July 23, 2001, the CSCROVII denied Quirog's and Relampagos'
motion for reconsideration for lack of legal personality to file such pleading, citing Section 2, Rule VI
of CSC Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998. The CSCROVII explained that only the
appointing officer may request reconsideration of the disapproval of an appointment by the Civil
Service Commission. Even if Relampagos was the one who appointed Quirog, he could not file a
motion for reconsideration because his term as governor had already expired.

Aggrieved, the petitioners in G.R. No. 163443 appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
where their joint appeal was docketed as Adm. NDC No. 01-88.

On November 20, 2001, the CSC issued Resolution No. 011812,[12] which granted the said joint
appeal and set aside the order and decision of the CSCROVII. More specifically, the Resolution

WHEREFORE, the joint appeal of former Governor Rene L. Relampagos and Liza M. Quirog is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated July 23, 2001 of the Civil Service Commission-Regional
Office No. VII and CSCRO No. VII Order dated June 28, 2001 are hereby set aside. Said Regional
Office is enjoined to approve the appointment of Quirog to the position of Provincial Government
Head, Office of the Provincial Agriculturist, Province of Bohol.

ABC –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011

Facts: This is a special civil action for certiorari alleging that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated
August 3, 2010, which reinstated the petition to cancel the registration and accreditation
of petitioner ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List, and directed the
Commission Secretary to schedule a hearing on the petition.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no longer had jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List after it
was already proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010
per National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009 promulgated on May 31, 2010.
And since there is no dispute that ABC Party-List has been proclaimed by the
COMELEC as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010; therefore,
as per that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, any question as to its qualification
should be resolved by the HRET and not by the COMELEC. Petitioner asserts that once a
party-list group has been proclaimed winner and its nominees have taken their oath, the
COMELEC should be divested of its jurisdiction over both the party-list group and its
Issue: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over contests relating to the qualifications
of the proclaimed ABC Party-List representative and over the cancellation of its party-list
Ruling: Yes, Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution clearly mandates the
COMELEC to have jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of registration of any
political party, organization or coalition. Section 2 (5) states that the COMELEC has the
power and function to Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered . . . that may be
prescribed by law.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
COMELEC’s authority over the case is also reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941,
which provides that ” the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following

BANAT –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 177508, Aug. 7, 2009

Facts: the petitioner petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction was filied questioning the constitutionality of Republic
Act 9369 and enjoining the COMELEC for implementing the statute. Petitioner filed the
petition specifically sections 34, 37, 38 and 43 of RA 9369 to be unconstitutional. Both
the petitioner and respondent contend the section 43 which allows the Comelec the
exclusive power to investigate is a violation of the election laws and alleging the section
43 is unconstitutional.

Did the Constitution give the COMELEC the “exclusive power” to investigate and
prosecute cases of violations of election laws?

Ruling: The COMELEC’s “exclusive power” can be seen in Section 265 of BP 881
which gives the commission to conduct a preliminary investigation and prosecute
election offenses and likewise allows the comelec to seek help from other “prosecuting
arms of government”. This power to prosecute and investigate election by the comelec is
not by virtue of the constitution but rather by BP 881, a legislative enactment. “the
prompt investigation, prosecution and dispositions of election offenses constitute an
indispensable part of the task securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible

Penera vs. COMELEC

GR No. 181613
September 11, 2009


Penera and private respondent Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the May
2007 elections. Andanar filed a petition for disqualification against Penera as well as the candidates for Vice-
Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. Andanar
claimed that a day before the start of the authorized campaign period, Penera and her partymates went
around the different barangays announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them.
Penera, on the other hand, claimed that the motorcade was the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces
where the filing of candidacy was preceded by a motorcade, and that no speech was made by any person
and there was only background marching music and a grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of
the candidates in the motorcade.


What is premature campaigning? May premature campaigning be committed by a person who is

not a candidate?


A person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as
candidate in the coming election. After the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate constitute premature campaigning.

Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly provides that “it
shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or any party, or association of persons,
to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign period.” Very
simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.

Funa vs COA
On Feb 15, 2001, Pres. Arroyo appointed Guillermo Carague as COA chairman for a
term of seven years. Carague’s term of office started on Feb 2, 2001 set to end on Feb 2,
On Feb 7, 2004, Arroyo appointed Reynaldo Villar as the third member of the COA for
a term of seven years starting Feb 2, 2004 until Feb 2, 2011. Following the retirement of
Carague on Feb 2, 2008, and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, the
latter was designated as acting chairman and eventually as Chairman on April 18, 2008.
He then claimed that his new appointments as COA’s chairman guaranteed him a fresh
term of seven years which is to end on year 2015. He then justified that President
Noynoy had not named a replacement, Villar said he would stay for as long as it takes.

What are the rules on appointment/re-appointments in the CSC, COMELEC, and COA?
In the case at bar, there are three rules set:
1. Members of the Commission (COA, COMELEC, and CSC) who are appointed for a
full term of seven years and who served the entire period are barred from
reappointment to any position in their respective commissions.
2. It is explicitly stated in “appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
(death, resignation, disability, or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less
than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms
laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). Reappointment here means a movement to
one and the same office.
3. Only a commissioner who resigns after serving in the commission for less than
seven years is allowed for an appointment to the position of chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.

La Carlota City –versus- Atty. Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012

On March 10, 1994, Atty. Rex Rojo, a member of the Sanggunian Panlungsod
(SP) of La Carlota City, applied for the vacant position of SP Secretary. On the
March 17, 2004 session of the SP, Rojo tendered his irrevocable resignation as
SP Member. At that time, Vice-Mayor Rex Jalandoon (Jalandoon), as presiding
officer, and six members of a twelve-member sanggunian were present.

On March 18, 2004, Jalandoon appointed Rojo as SP Secretary and the latter
immediately took his oath of office. On March 26, 2004, the appointment ban for
the May 2004 elections took effect. On April 27, 2004, the Civil Service
Commission Field-Office (CSCFO) disapproved Rojo’s appointment due to
incomplete requirements. Jalandoon appealed the disapproval to the CSC
Regional Office. In a Decision dated September 20, 2004, the CSC Regional
Office No. 6 reversed and set aside the CSCFO’s earlier ruling considering that
the appointment of Rojo sufficiently complied with the publication requirement,
deliberation by the Personnel Selection Board, certification that it was issued in
accordance with the limitations provided for under Section 325 of R.A. 7160 and
that appropriations or funds are available for said position.

The 2004 elections resulted in the efforts of the newly elected Mayor and Vice-
Mayor of La Carlota City sought to affirm the disapproval of Rojo’s appointment,
alleging that there had been no quorum when Rojo tendered his resignation
before the SP. Since Rojo’s resignation could not have been validly accepted for
lack of quorum, it was argued that Rojo continued to be an elective official who
was ineligible for appointment to a public office under the Constitution.

Did the appointment of the respondent contravene Section 7, Article IX-B of the

The Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service
Commission that since the respondent’s appointment was validly issued on 18
March 2004, then the appointment did not violate the election ban period which
was from 26 March to 9 May 2004. Indeed, the Civil Service Commission found
that despite the lack of signature and certification of the Human Resource
Management Officer of La Carlota City on respondent’s appointment papers,
respondent’s appointment is deemed effective as of 18 March 2004 considering
that there was substantial compliance with the appointment requirements.

Clearly, the appointment of respondent on 18 March 2004 was validly issued considering
(1) he was considered resigned as Sangguniang Panlungsod member effective 17
March 2004 as there was a quorum such that the irrevocable resignation of
respondent was validly accepted;
(2) he was fully qualified for the position of Sanggunian Secretary; and,
(3) there was substantial compliance with the appointment requirements.


This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Mayor Rogelio Debulgado and his wife Victoria
Debulgado against Civil Service Commission for gravely abusing its discretion in withdrawing and
disapproving petitioner Victoria’s promotional appointment as the General Services Officer of the Office of
General Services 1 of the City Government of San Carlos, of which her appointment was executed by her
own husband, the mayor of the same City mentioned above.
The Civil Service Commission contended that the appointment is in violation of the statutory prohibition
against nepotic appointments as contained in Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987(also known as E.O. No. 292).

Does the prohibition and rule against nepotism apply to original appointments and promotions?

Yes. The court ruled that the textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast
in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to
make any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government, as well as any branch or
instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of
exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list:
(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity;
(b) teachers;
(c) physicians; and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The purpose of Section 59, is precisely to take out of the discretion of the appointing and recommending
authority the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.
In the case at bar, the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria by her husband, petitioner Mayor,
falls within the prohibited class of appointments: the prohibited relationship between the appointing
authority (petitioner Mayor) and the appointee (wife Victoria) existed at the time the promotional
appointment was issued.

Cipriano –versus- COMELEC,G.R. No. 158830, Aug. 10, 2004 - Jacky

On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.[1]
On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363
adopting the recommendation of the Commission’s Law Department to deny due course to or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, including
petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the
other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where
they intended to run, she even won the elections[2]
Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was
not deleted from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was
proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38,
Pasay City.[3] She took her oath of office on August 14, 2002.[4]
On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. She argued that a certificate of
candidacy may only be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any
registered candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646. According to petitioner, the report of
the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to or cancel one’s
certificate of candidacy. Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due process when her
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing. Petitioner
further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to act on the cancellation of
her certificate of candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of the Commission that
has authority to decide election-related cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Finally,
she contended that she may only be removed by a petition for quo warranto after her
proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman

Describe the three-fold powers of the Commission on Elections?


The Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have the power to
summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum and otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and
delegate such power to any officer. Any controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections
shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding
petition giving rise to said controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof
shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court,
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

The court disagrees. The Commission may not, by itself, without the properproceedings,
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. Whena candidate files
his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receiveand acknowledge its
receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code,thus:Sec. 76.
Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt
. - The Commission, provincialelection supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the
Commission or the boardof election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the
ministerial duty to receiveand acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has
ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course
to petitioner‘s certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commissionmay
look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing ontheir
face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usualand proper
cognizance of said body. Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Codeallows any
person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel acertificate of
candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false. Itstates:Sec. 78.
Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by any personexclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as requiredunder Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
afternotice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

In Re-Gross Violation by Escala, A.M. No. 2011-04-SC July 5, 2011 – Irene

Respondent was appointed by the Court as SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division,
OAS on July 14, 2008. His application papers show he has experience and training as a police
officer, having been employed as Chief Inspector of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation
Security Group at the time of his appointment in the Supreme Court.Immediately upon his
appointment on July 14, 2008, respondent was allowed to assume office and perform his duties,
for reasons of exigency in the service although he has yet to comply with the submission of all the
documentary requirements for his appointment.During the course of his employment, an
anonymous letterreached the OAS reporting the respondent’s gross violation of the Civil Service
Law on the prohibition against dual employment and double compensation in the government
service. The letter alleged that respondent accepted employment, and thus received salaries and
other benefits, from the Court and also from the PNP of which he remained an active
member.The OAS’ inquiries on this allegation confirmed that prior to his employment at the Court,
respondent was an active member of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security Group –
2nd Police Center for Aviation Security at the Manila Domestic Airport in Pasay City, with a
permanent status and rank of Police Chief Inspector. Taking the chance to explore his
opportunities and skills outside of the police service, he applied for the position of SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, OAS. While employed in the Court and receiving his
regular compensation, he continued to be a bonafide member of the PNP assigned with the
Aviation Security Group with the same status and rank of Police Chief Inspector until the date
when he optionally retired on September 30, 2009.The OAS was also informed that the Internal
Affairs Office (IAO) of the PNP is likewise carrying out a separate probe and investigation on
respondent for the same alleged gross violation of the Civil Service Law.Considering the
seriousness of the matter, respondent was preventively suspended by the Court pending the
results of the IAO’s investigations and the separate administrative investigation of the OAS.

Did the respondent violate the prohibition against dual employment and double compensation in
the government service?


Yes. The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed,
from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is contained in Section 7,
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which provides:Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Furthermore, the prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the government
service is further specified under Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292: Section 1: No appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters or their subsidiaries, unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position; Section 2: No elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation,
unless specifically authorized by law.
Lastly, Section 5, Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, specifically provides
that:The full-time position in the Judiciary of every court personnel shall be the personnel’s
primary employment. For purposes of this Code, “primary employment” means the position that
consumes the entire normal working hours of the court personnel and requires the personnel’s
exclusive attention in performing official duties.
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the
following requirements:
(a)The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or
conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b)The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not
incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
(c)The outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court
personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review
or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d)The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidential information acquired while performing duties; and
(e)The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government,
unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside
employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not
accept the outside employment.

Serana –versus- Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, Jan. 22, 2008– Claire


Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of
the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official
functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for
which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.Petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not
a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the
student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did
not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade
27.The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since
she had the general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office.Moreover, the Charter of the University of
the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well-
established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or
board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.

Is compensation an essential element of public office?

No. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. The Ombudsman contends that
petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of
administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. At most, compensation is just merely
incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No.
1606 and jurisprudence.

Article IX-D the commission on audit

Title: Funa vs. COA Chair. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

Facts: On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

appointed Guillermo N. Carague as Chairman of the Commission on Audit
(COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987
Constitution. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to
end on February 2, 2008. Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the third member of
the COA for a term of seven years starting February 2, 2004 until
February 2, 2011.Following the retirement of Carague on February 2,
2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar
was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April
14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and
appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was
to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment
papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA
Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse,
Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the
chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him
a fresh term of seven years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in
fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2,
2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed
to that position.

Issue : Whether or not Villar’s promotional appointment as COA

Chairman, after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year
term as COA commissioner, is valid? And if valid for how long can he

Ruling: The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional. The appointment

of then Commission on Audit (COA) Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to
the position of COA Chair to replace Guillermo N. Carague who ended his
seven-year term with the Commission.

Villar’s appointment violated sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

which reads: “The Chairman and Commissioners on Audit shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor.”
“Then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7-
year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible
in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4
years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however,
to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding
appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the
Constitution of giving to every appointed so appointed subsequent to
the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To
recapitulate, a COA Commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for
a period less than seven years cannot be appointed as chairman when
such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year
term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is
not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than seven years under the constitutional ban,” ruled the Court.
The Court construed Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution as
The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the
first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven
years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional;
the appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven
years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the
distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution;

Members of the Commission who were appointment for a full term of seven
years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment
to any position in the Commission.

BSP vs. COA (G.R. No. 177131; Date: June 7, 2011)

FACTS: The Commission on Audit (COA) argues that the Boys Scout of the Philippines
(BSP) is under its jurisdiction because it is a public corporation as stated in its original
Charter (Commonwealth Act 111), and it has been designated that BSP is an attached
agency to DECS. Thus, pursuant to Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
BSP, being a public corporation, is subject to audit from COA.
The BSP argues that COA does not have any jurisdiction over it. Such argue is based on
RA 7278’s amendment of its original charter as well as removal of substantial
government participation in its organization. Furthermore, it does not receive any funding
from the government. In such case, BSP is not a government-owned, controlled, or a
subdivision of the government.
ISSUE: Are the funds and property owned or held by the BSP subject to the audit
authority of the COA pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the BSP is a public corporation, thus, its funds are
subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction for the following reasons:
 The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, October 31, 1936) created the
BSP as a “public corporation” to serve a public purpose, and is an
implementation of a State Policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the 1987
 The BSP is considered a juridical person, thus, a Public Corporation under
Par. 2, Art. 44 of the Civil Code.
 The 1987 Administrative Code clearly designated BSP as an attached agency
to DECS. An Attached agency is defined as having lateral relationships with
the government, with a representative from the government sitting on the
board either as a chairman or member.
 Art. XII, Sec. 16 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to BSP because its
operations are public and not economic in nature.
 That the constitutionality of BSP’s charter is not the lis mota of this case,
because it was not raised by either parties, but rather was raised by a
dissenting opinion of an Associate Court Justice. Being this case, the Court
will not decide to declare the decision and resolution of the COA because the
requisites for Declaration of Unconstitutionality were not met in this case.
 Lastly, even if BSP does not receive any funds from the government, it does
not mean that it will never receive any funds from the government in the
future. Sec 8 of the amended Charter of BSP permits government donations.
The lack of government donations and funding does not designate BSP as a
private corporation.

Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.


Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of
Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. Lim was the incumbent congressman of the 3rd district
while Gonzalez was former Governor of Albay, having been elected to said position in 2004 but
lost his re-election bid in 2007.

On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
(COC)[3] was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a
Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that
he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. It was further alleged that Gonzalez’s late
registration of his certificate of birth with the Civil Registry of Ligao City on January 17, 2006,
even if accompanied by an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship, was not done within a
reasonable time as it was in fact registered 45 years after Gonzalez reached the age of majority
on September 11, 1961.


As to disqualification cases against candidates for Congress when does the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC begin and end?


The Supreme Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of
citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been
duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the
House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to the candidate’s election and qualifications ends, and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)’s own jurisdiction begins.
BOCEA –versus- Teves, G.R. No. 181704, Dec. 6, 2011 - Aila


On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed

into law R.A. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005, R.A. No. 9335
was enacted to optimize the revenue generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. 9335 are
tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights
of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association
(BOCEA) directly filed the present petition before this Court against
respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales, in his
capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as BIR


Is R.A. 9335 [aka Attrition Act of 1995] contrary to the concept that “public
office is a public trust”?

No. The OSG argues that the classification of BIR and BOC employees as
public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and substantial
distinction since the revenue generated by the BIR and BOC is essentially
in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the State, while the revenue
produced by other agencies is merely incidental or secondary to their
governmental functions; that in view of their mandate, and for purposes
of tax collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No. 9335
complies with the “completeness” and “sufficient standard” tests for the
permissive delegation of legislative power to the Board; that the Board
exercises its delegated power consistent with the policy laid down in the
law, that is, to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters were set in order that the Board
may identify the officials and employees subject to attrition, and the
proper procedure for their removal in case they fail to meet the targets
set in the Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR
and BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly
accorded by R.A. No. 9335.
Does R.A. 9335 [aka Attrition Act of 1995] violate security of tenure?

No. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and
right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed
that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not
a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided
a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is
germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon
compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG
added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of

Civil Service Commission (CSC) vsMagnaye

G.R. 183337
April 23, 2010

Facts: In March 2001, Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as
Utility Worker I at the Office of Economic Enterprise [Operation of Market] (OEE) then was
detailed to the Municipal Planning and Development Office.In the May elections of that year,
Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul L. Bendaña, who assumed office on June 30, 2001.
Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the OEE. On July 11, 2001, he
was again detailed at the Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in the
implementation of a Survey on the Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning Project.On August 13,
2001, the new mayor served him a notice of termination from employment effective the
following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity.
Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office and regional office but
both the petition was dismissed. Magnaye sought recourse through a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals which ruled in his favor adopting the stance of the OSG.The OSG argued
that Magnaye’s termination was illegal. The notice of termination did not cite the specific
instances indicating Magnaye’s alleged unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. It was only
on July 29, 2003, or almost two years after Magnaye’s dismissal on August 13, 2001 that his
former Department Heads, Engr. Magsino and Engr. Masongsong, submitted an assessment and
evaluation report to Mayor Bendaña, which the latter belatedly solicited when the Magnaye
appealed to the CSC Regional Office. The OSG claimed that Magnayewas denied due process
because his dismissal took effect a day after he received the notice of termination. No hearing
was conducted to give Magnaye the opportunity to refute the alleged causes of his dismissal.

Issue: Do probationary employees enjoy security of tenure?

Ruling: Yes. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not
just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the right to
strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and a living wage but also to security of
tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is emphatic in saying that, "no officer or employee of the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Consistently,
Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process."
Our Constitution, in using the expressions "all workers" and "no officer or employee,"
puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means
that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary
employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment,
they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. The
CSC’s Omnibus Rules cited that a decision or order dropping a probationer from the service for
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary
period "is appealable to the Commission." This can only mean that a probationary employee
cannot be fired at will.

Partisan Political Activity
- No offender or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any

 Right to self organization shall not be denied to government employees.

 SSSea vs ca While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees
to organize, it does not state this includes the right to strike.
 CSC Powers -The civil service com, as the central personal agency of the
government, shall stbalblish a career service and adopt
 The general objective of
 Oath
 Salary standardization
 In Nazareno vs Dumaguete - True, it s bthe ministerial duty of the government to
pay for the appointees salaries while the latter
 In csc vs cruz the employee must be found innocent of the charges and his suspension
 People vs villapando
 In la Carlota city No, The appointment of respondent was validly issued considering that
he was considered resign
 Political Opportunism –unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCC’S or
their subsidiaries.
 Double compensation