Snap elections to be organized on September 6, as foreign partners are urged

not to abandon reason when weighing the consequences of the June 8 power-
grab

In the Republic of Moldova, the past 48 hours have been the dawn of an
unprecedented political crisis, resulting from Moscow’s plans to gradually de-
stabilize and weaken its neighborhood and, most importantly, orchestrated by the
political parties which many Moldovan citizens have invested with genuine trust -
the pro-Russian Socialist Party (PSRM) and the purportedly pro-European bloc
ACUM, led by Maia Sandu (Action and Solidarity Party) and Andrei Năstase
(Dignity and Truth Party). Virtually overnight, after three months of failed political
negotiations following the February 24 general elections, PSRM and ACUM
struck a deal to support each other’s - and the Kremlin's - interests, in spite of the
country’s Supreme Law - Constitution, long desired democratic standards and,
ultimately, the Moldovan citizens’ votes.

What seemed like a forced power-grab on Saturday, June 8, had even deeper roots
of illegality and political immorality, which cannot be ignored: from the country’s
president’s unlawful political involvement, to attempts of negotiating a Russian-
imposed agenda in exchange for money, only to finally take advantage of the
political dilettantism of ACUM. This non-paper is aimed at summarizing the
facts and presenting arguments on how and why the illegal power-grab
orchestrated by the Kremlin, with PSRM and ACUM at the forefront, defies
Moldova’s democracy and rightful institutions. This is also a call on
Moldova’s foreign partners not to abandon reason when weighing the
dramatic consequences of Saturday’s power-grab.

A ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, issued on

Sunday, June 9, provisions that President Igor Dodon must be suspended due to
temporary incapacity of exercising his duties, following a trail of unconstitutional
decisions which have triggered an unprecedented political and institutional crisis in
the Republic of Moldova. The Constitutional Court also ruled that acting Prime
Minister Pavel Filip must assume presidential prerogatives, in order to bring the
matter of the Parliament’s dissolution before the Court. Upon the Constitutional
Court’s subsequent decision to dissolve the Parliament, interim President
Pavel Filip has decided that snap elections must be organized on September 6,
arguing that “the power lies with the people”, thus marking a first concrete
step towards ending the political crisis in Chișinău.

Faced with impeachment, Igor Dodon’s reaction is as worrying as indicated

by multiple military experts - Igor Dodon said that the only option for citizens
is “external and internal mobilization, tough pressure and resistance towards
usurpations”. Military experts have been arguing that pro-Russian Igor
Dodon may request a Russian military intervention, mirroring former
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s failed strategy in 2014. Only this
time there are solid reasons to believe that Dodon would succeed - not only
that he has reportedly spent the night of June 8-9 inside the Russian Embassy
in Chișinău, but Russian troops , 1500 solders, are just a few kilometers away
in Transdniestria.

Up until the pivotal decision of the Constitutional Court on June 9, this week’s
events are key to understanding the political situation in Chișinău and why
the international community should take a stand and prevent the hijacking of
the country’s democratic course.
WHAT HAPPENED THIS WEEK:
· On June 5, Maia Sandu’s PAS decided to support Zinaida Greceanîi, the
candidate endorsed by pro-Russian president Igor Dodon, as Speaker of the
Parliament, in exchange for PSRM supporting an ACUM cabinet. It is worth
noting that Zinaida Greceanîi, as Prime Minister in 2009, has abusively and
unilaterally broken diplomatic ties with Romania, by introducing visas for
Romanian citizens and by expelling, declaring non grata the Romanian
Ambassador from the Republic of Moldova. The Speaker’s office is key for the
Socialists in order to be able to shape parliamentary politics and introduce
legislation directed by Moscow. Moreover, according to political sources,
ACUM’s decision was ‘inspired’ by Dmitry Kozak, Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s envoy, who paid a visit to Chișinău on June 3.
· Pro-Russian Igor Dodon and the party he has been illegally backing, as the
Moldovan legislation requires the president to renounce all political positions, also
met with Kozak. In order to win some time for delivering on the agreed strategy,
PSRM announced that a decision concerning the party’s further involvement in a
governing coalition would be announced on June 7.
· In the meantime, Igor Dodon traveled to Russia, in an attempt to convince the
Russians to support a coalition with the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), led
by Vlad Plahotniuc. Videos released by PDM on June 8 of a conversation of a one
before between Dodon and Plahotniuc show that the Russian side has strictly
conditioned a PSRM-PDM coalition on the implementation of a plan that
concerned the country’s federalization and Socialist rule.
· The outrageous plan was presented in full by the Democratic Party, with
Plahotniuc confirming negotiations with Dodon and saying that “a PDM-PSRM
coalition was almost ready. I can present additional proof if needed. But it failed
last-minute, when I refused to sign a document on the country's federalization. To
sign that document only for the sake of a coalition with PSRM would have been an
act of treason towards my country and would have meant that I've become an
accomplice to Dodon's heinous plan for Moldova. I am not a perfect man. I have
made mistakes. But I did not accept to negotiate anything against the country and
the citizens.”
· Instead of responding to ACUM’s renewed offer of collaboration, Igor
Dodon cut his visit to the Russian Federation short to deliver the Russians’
message to Vlad Plahotniuc and present several controversial proposals to the
PDM leader, including - funding for PSRM of 6 to 700,000 USD per month
and PDM’s support for the federalization strategy in exchange of Russia
dropping accusations against Vlad Plahotniuc.
· Not only have the proposals been rejected by the PDM leader, but Plahotniuc
and others also drew attention on Dodon’s questionable legitimacy as a president,
considering the illegal money that came from Russia to fund his and his party’s
political ascension. Plahotniuc declared on June 8 that “Dodon and PSRM do not
have the legitimacy to participate to a parliamentary majority, as they received
funding from abroad both during the electoral campaign and outside of it. We can
prove they tried to betray their country.”
· On June 7, PDM announced the meeting with PSRM, suggesting already that
the negotiation was unsuccessful and that both sides needed to further analyze their
positions. PSRM was in no rush to respond to ACUM’s renewed invitation to
negotiations, prompting ACUM to understand PSRM’s duplicity and to publicly
address the Socialists’ unwillingness to hold constructive talks.
· But in the meantime, against a backdrop of public pressure and multiple calls
for stability, in contrast with Igor Dodon’s call for snap elections, ACUM decided
to accept PSRM’s terms and enter a coalition established later that night. Among
the terms agreed between PSRM and ACUM, press reports revealed that ACUM
was ready to support PSRM’s grab of key portfolios - defense, reintegration,
domestic affairs, foreign affairs and the control of the intelligence service.
· On June 7, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova had
already ruled that, in view of closing any ambiguities, the deadline for newly-
elected parliamentary parties to form a majority coalition was of three
months (as already indicated in a previous ruling) and that Moldova’s Civil
Code and legal practice clearly shows that 30 days are considered “a month”
in legal terms. Thus, according to the Court, the deadline for a new majority
coalition was already met on June 7, deeming all decisions made after the June 7
deadline as breaches of the Constitutional Court’s rulings.
· On June 8, while PSRM and ACUM were meeting in parliament to
decide upon the institution’s leadership and to swear in an unconstitutional
government, PDM published video footage of the meeting between Dodon and
Plahotniuc, accusing the pro-Russian president of treason and of attempting
to orchestrate an illegal power-grab in the Republic of Moldova. PDM’s
accusations were based on Dodon’s proposals, as presented to Vlad Plahotniuc,
political collaboration and financial interests in relation with the Russian
Federation, as well as subsequent interference with political negotiations.
· Despite the Constitutional Court’s warnings, PSRM and ACUM force the
formation of a majority coalition and appoint Zinaida Greceanîi as Speaker of the
Parliament on June 8. Afterwards, the two political parties appoint Maia Sandu as
Prime Minister, accept the nomination of a new list of ministers and pass a set of
decisions, including the dismissal of the heads of the intelligence service and the
anti-corruption authority. The Constitutional Court reacted by reaffirming that all
decisions were unconstitutional. The Democratic Party, which leads the interim
government of Moldova, reacted by accusing PSRM and ACUM of attempting to
organize a coup.
· In the new, unconstitutional governing formula, PSRM assumed the defense
and reintegration portfolios, as well as the leadership of the state’s security service.
Fearing snap elections that would allow political competitors to tap on PSRM’s
illegal connections in Russia during a new electoral campaign, PSRM was
determined to form a new coalition and cut demands. Fear of losing credibility
also determined Igor Dodon to launch ridiculous accusations that the videos
presented by PDM were digitally manipulated and the federalization proposal
was PDM’s idea first. What was even more outrageous was that Putin’s envoy
Dmitry Kozak, who had himself supported the federalization of Moldova for
years, went public to confirm these suppositions.
· The accusations of forging videos and documents were ridiculous - first of all
because Igor Dodon’s statements were easy to understand from the videos and
reflected positions that Russia has been signaled for years - especially as Russian
actors know that the cases they opened against Vlad Plahotniuc lack legal grounds
and credibility.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT:

From June 7 onward, the Constitutional Court of Moldova has warned that
all political decisions in view of forming a new government in Moldova would
go against the country’s constitutional order. In this context, no political
party, especially one acting upon the Kremlin's agenda and against the
Moldovan people, should be above the Constitution. Thus, despite Maia
Sandu’s appointment as Prime Minister being saluted by political family party
EPP, Moldova’s development partners should make no mistake: Maia Sandu’s
government is a government backed by the Russian Federation, sworn in illegally
and unable to sustain Moldova’s democratic path for a full mandate, after ACUM’s
concessions and considering the party’s lack of political experience.

ACUM’s decisions have been motivated by hatred against the PDM-led

government and came after multiple refusals to engage with PDM in order to
secure a pro-Western path for the Republic of Moldova. But the compromise of
entering a coalition with the party informally led by a pro-Russian president with
no legitimacy may prove too heavy for Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase. This is
why, on top of the unconstitutional nature of Saturday’s decisions, snap elections
represent the only legal and viable course of action for the Republic of Moldova.
From June 8 onwards, PDM has been encouraging peaceful protests in support of
the country’s legal course, attended by the people who have been asking for the
country’s return to the constitutional order. PDM has called for calm and civility,
recommending protesters not to engage in any violent actions. In the meantime, the
PDM-led interim government has committed to ensure the proper functioning of
state institutions.

Yet multiple questions still need to be addressed, starting with how Igor
Dodon plan does to drive “internal and external mobilization”, with Russian
troops on-call. How credible is a governing coalition built on illegal Russian
money, with pro-Russians hiding behind the pro-European face of political
beginners Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase, while ignoring the country’s
Constitutional Court and denying the people their right to decide where
political parties failed?

This is why it is key for the Republic of Moldova that its development
partners do not abandon reason when weighing the dramatic consequences of
Saturday’s power-grab, and acknowledge the gravity of the largest party in
the Republic of Moldova, the one that attracted and may finally devour the
pro-European forces, staying on Moscow’s payroll for years.