Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question
in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in
the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and
(5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the
depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other
things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which
it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the
matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does
not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court
in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must
be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated
as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based
on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest
and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of
in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his
property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these
proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
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Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and
void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests
are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary
to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him
in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which
he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares
of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower
court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter
three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower
court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it
is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however,
of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This
is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art.
11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied
in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will,
it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law,
is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court,
dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will
was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN,
now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and
who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is
not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may
have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard
Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime:
....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case
were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable.
It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional
rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by
the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute
dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate,
77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac.
192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER
JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also
no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States
and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during
which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for
the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective
Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July
21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now
in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the
City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate
that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State
of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from
mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed
his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean
the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in
a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one,
while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to
have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It
is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing
only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as
physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."
Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning,
from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode,
and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention
of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator
may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing
the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But
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appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not
denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee,
on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a
witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's
behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which
is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws
rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision,
is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of
Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose
to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of
Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule
looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not
have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in
the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized
be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the
reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why
the original reference should be the internal law rather than to the
Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a
merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory
avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the
opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look
always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only
way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had
the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been
against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where
the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs,
will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France.
The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There
the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables
calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute
of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer
the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying
the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of
things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of
action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession,
or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this
is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying
its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-
of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law
of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may
arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such
foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it
has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been
the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and
the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as
the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in
toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy
to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as
to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question
which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale
Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article
are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules
of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following
theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right
to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal
statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law
of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination
of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium
in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property
upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds
that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with
the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept
this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states,
and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the
property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of
his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will,
almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is
not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and
the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession,
is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a
personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization,
and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws
rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California
as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code,
then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national
law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws
rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
P a g e 7 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was
a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal
law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli,
40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider
Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by
appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for
two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a
citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and
it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California
Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen
of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed
by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against
appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of
Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia,
Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition
for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the
time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January
31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate,
Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament
on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating
Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with
the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L.
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had
declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also
a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need
for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to
believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the
will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work
injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or
Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the
will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter
Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of
the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the
United States of America with a permanent residence at
4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D)
that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will
and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat
(Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in
the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of
Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines
and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and
Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted
and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the
P a g e 8 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor
of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws
of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of
wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her
unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of
the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late
Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed
probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is
hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said
decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will
annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned
under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be
his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that
the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of
his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According
to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers
which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he
executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal
of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings
case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear.
He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May
29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate
and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on
May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for
reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court.
Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the
future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor's
motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When
the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to
argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the
petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the
petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order,
respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a
will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children
and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent
and her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on
September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court
deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the
Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or
interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C.
Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of
the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or
repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated
instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court
but by way of a motion presented prior to an order for the
distribution of the estate-the law especially providing that
repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within
30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of
the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime
can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in
which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete
disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground
that no evidence was adduced to support the Petition for
Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford
petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a denial of
the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the
fact that the Testator at the time of death was a usual
resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court
of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case
(De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation
that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the
will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No
proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola
P a g e 9 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein
he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and
deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been
substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present
petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record
was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in
order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the
will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate
may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner
argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the
sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis
v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason
why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even
admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for
relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The
fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did
not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and
given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request
should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction
utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
P a g e 10 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since
it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen
and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a
"usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is
now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog
Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307).
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-
appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO
ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private
respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all
acts of the respondent court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order
of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing,
tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to
perform or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the
petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular Administratrix
of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and
pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from
allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any
manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for preliminary
injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of
P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the orders of the
respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner's motion of April 22,
1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of
said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing
petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from different orders of the same
respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of
administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of
Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed
on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses
be first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and
real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and
he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the
physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any
other or additional property as he may think best; to
execute conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or
other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in
such property as he may elect to sell. All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to
him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or
otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now
P a g e 11 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock,
Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and
enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided. He
shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots
therein. and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon,
Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or
sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of
my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and
bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister
shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such
brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to be executor of this, my last will and
testament, and direct that no bond or other security be
required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had
in the probate court, in the administration of my estate,
other than that necessary to prove and record this will and
to return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and
list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings
No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles
Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions
thereof.
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as
Hodges) had been appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he filed
a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE
PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE
WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD
BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his
undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. — That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and
testament, a copy of which is attached to the petition for
probate of the same.
2. — That in said last will and testament herein petitioner
Charles Newton Hodges is directed to have the right to
manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was
placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during
his natural lifetime."
3. — That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein
petitioner was engaged in the business of buying and
selling personal and real properties, and do such acts
which petitioner may think best.
4. — That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no
descendants or ascendants, except brothers and sisters
and herein petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to
inherit the properties of the decedent.
5. — That the present motion is submitted in order not to
paralyze the business of petitioner and the deceased,
especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That
proper accounting will be had also in all these
transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner
C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing
while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by
petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in which said
petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be
paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is named and
appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he was
engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing
while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another
motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES,
MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER
AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings,
thru his undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most
respectfully states:
1. — That according to the last will and testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the
surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the
deceased; has the right to dispose of all the properties left
by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my
said husband, during his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and
he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the
physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any
other or additional property as he may think best;
to execute conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose
of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or
other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in
such property as he may elect to sell. All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to
him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. ...
2. — That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
That during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has
the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties
in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was and
is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal
properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
a motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court,
to allow him to continue in the business of buy and sell,
which motion was favorably granted by the Honorable
Court.
3. — That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N.
Hodges had been buying and selling real and personal
properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges.
4. — That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of
late the herein Executor to have all the sales, leases,
conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the
Hon. Court.
5. — That it is respectfully requested, all the sales,
conveyances leases and mortgages executed by the
Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. and subsequent
sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances
with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within
the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also
be approved;
6. — That the Executor is under obligation to submit his
yearly accounts, and the properties conveyed can also be
accounted for, especially the amounts received.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the
sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by
the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in
consonance with the wishes of the deceased contained in
her last will and testament, be with authorization and
approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14,
1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executor for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken
all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for
approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein
executor of the deceased, renders the following account
of his administration covering the period from January 1,
P a g e 13 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may be found
in detail in the individual income tax return filed for the
estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the
statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income
and expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made
integral part of this statement of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed
that, the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for
the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A", be
approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time
and place of examining the herein accounts be given
notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in
its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the
Executor, the statement of net worth of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for
the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is
approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and
January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise accompanied
by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted
above; and the respective orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and
May 2, 1961, were substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April
21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account just mentioned, the
following assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in
her brief do not appear from all indications discernible in the record to be
disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first
"Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31,
exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second
"Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C.N.
Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return"
for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income
of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third
"Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for the Year
1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the
"Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined
conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94,
divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax
return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed
the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs"
(see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the
will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy
Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges
filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included
as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records
"in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think
or believe they were omitted, and that they were really
P a g e 14 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the
estate he was administering under American law. He did
file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In
Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the
question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing
the will". On the question as to what property interests
passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
"None, except for purposes of
administering the Estate, paying
debts, taxes and other legal charges. It
is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their Community
estate to the devisees and legatees
named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined
and paid."
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his
death, he executed an "affidavit" wherein he ratified and
confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his estate
tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him
by his wife's will.1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory"
dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the assets of his conjugal
partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance
sheet and then stated expressly that her estate which has
come into his possession as executor was "one-half of all
the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90,
Appellee's Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to
quote wholly or at least, extensively from some of the pleadings and orders
whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and
clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised by the parties and a
more accurate appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the
above-mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962,
when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer,
Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges
in his capacity as Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the
aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
A as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the
above-entitled proceedings, to the Honorable Court, most
respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her husband, Charles
Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in an
order issued by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the
said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed Executor and
had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton
Hodges was stricken ill, and brought to the Iloilo Mission
Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on
December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death
certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will
and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real and
personal properties that may remain at the death of her
husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall
be equally divided among their heirs. That there are real
and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges,
which need to be administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well
as that of Charles Newton Hodges, have not as yet been
determined or ascertained, and there is necessity for the
appointment of a general administrator to liquidate and
distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and
legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the
conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges shall be liquidated in the testate
proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal
knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament
of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that
contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges. However, said last will and testament of Charles
Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his
office, and will be presented in due time before this
honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable
that, an Administratrix be appointed for the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties
required by law, to administer, collect, and take charge of
the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both
spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges,
Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration, because the last will and testament of
P a g e 15 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe
or vault, and in the meantime, unless an administratrix
(and,) at the same time, a Special Administratrix is
appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of
being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie
Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had been employed for
around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina
Magno, (should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same time Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident
of the Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy
and well-qualified person to serve the duties of
Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to
act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in
such sum which the Hon. Court believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most
respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be
immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers and duties
provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the
reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A.
Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion
filed by counsel for the Executor dated December 25,
1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A.
MAGNO, is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case,
because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still
kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to
waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having
done so, let letters of Administration be issued to her."
(Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-
parte petition of respondent Magno herself, thru Atty.
Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs
of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived
from the United States of America to help in the
administration of the estate of said deceased" was
appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the estate of
Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be
replaced as such co-special administrator on January 22,
1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of the
same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who had)
arrived from the United States with instructions from the
other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties
or estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp.
47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in
Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of Hodges,2 with
a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges,
albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking
that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-administrator. On the same
date this latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding order of
probate and letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as
prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs.
Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time
or in like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband — I give
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and share alike —". Accordingly, it became
incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly liquidate the
conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon
the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could
be determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers
and sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done,
furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should
be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of which State
she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made official
and sworn statements or manifestations indicating that as far as he was
concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving spouse — "except
for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined
and paid", that the incidents and controversies now before Us for resolution
arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of
Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower
court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in
consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise
perspective from which the trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned
orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is
of valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner,
as appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover and the other with a
yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed
upon by the parties under which the respective administrators of the two
estates were supposed to act conjointly, but since no copy of the said
agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of knowing
when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what specific terms.
P a g e 16 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the order of
September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal,
reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix,
Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the charges contained
in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3,
1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A.
Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a
written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for
and in behalf of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno,
the Court finds that everything that happened before
September 3, 1964, which was resolved on September 8,
1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a
misunderstanding between the representative of the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss
Magno and in order to restore the harmonious relations
between the parties, the Court ordered the parties to
remain in status quo as to their modus operandi before
September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a
meeting with all the parties and their counsels on October
3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty.
Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in
his manifestation shall not be resolved by this Court until
October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards,
except that again, reference thereto was made in the appealed order of
October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as
follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all
doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive
possession thereof and to place its own locks and keys for
security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru
Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that
Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds office and
therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and
prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order
be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks
in the said office, to take immediate and exclusive
possession thereof and place thereon its own locks and
keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of court or
any available deputy to witness and supervise the opening
of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix
Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo
stating therein that she was compelled to close the office
for the reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the
order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo
dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates
should remain in status quo to their modus operandi as of
September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order
not to interrupt the operation of the office of both estates,
the Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent
motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments of
Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for
Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno
to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its
duly authorized representative and deputy clerk of court
Albis of this branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning
October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates
could operate for business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo
dated September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint
account of the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and estates
of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been
deposited in the account of either of the estates should be
withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N.
Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the
amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the Linnie
Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow
the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and
papers she may have in her possession in the same
manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow
Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers it may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
shall have access to all records of the transactions of both
estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges; and in like manner the accountant or any
authorized representative of the estate of C.N. Hodges
shall have access to the records of transactions of the
P a g e 17 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate
of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by
Administratrix Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its
duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or
his duly authorized representative, both estates or any of
the estates should not close it without previous consent
and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED.
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all
collections from the properties in the name of Hodges should be deposited in
a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-
called modus operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to
show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on
pages 188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the
Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N.
Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the
two co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges,
Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs. William Brown and
Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who claim
to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
aforementioned parties entered into an amicable
agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court,
wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of
money were to be paid in settlement of different claims
against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent
they existed) of both estates would be administered
jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the
aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's
claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one
hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-
five percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges or
Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On
February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this
Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964
but in no way changed its recognition of the afore-
described basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of
the estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%)
of the assets claimed by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two
estates exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as to what exactly
are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the
issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-
320 of the Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent
Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her
lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and
Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion
dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the
Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the
purpose of retaining their services to protect and defend
the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings
and the same has been signed by and bears the express
conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane
Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is further prayed that the
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
be directed to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said
fees made chargeable as expenses for the administration
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB
thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the
ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said
Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the
100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or
unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are
representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-
1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28,
1964 asking that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion
filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because
no evidence has been presented in support thereof. Atty.
Manglapus filed a reply to the opposition of counsel for
the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is
claimed that expenses of administration include
reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for services to the
executor or administrator. As a matter of fact the fee
agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and
the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp.
1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for
said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order
dated March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the
lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges,
in like manner the very agreement which provides for the
payment of attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will
also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp.
1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10,
1964 to the reply to the opposition to the Manifestation
and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates of
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly
situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir of
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the
former for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges
predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp.
1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo formally
entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-
1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18,
1964 stating therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an order
requiring the parties to submit memorandum in support
of their respective contentions. It is prayed in this
manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion
dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII,
Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter-
manifestation dated January 5, 1965 asking that after the
consideration by the court of all allegations and arguments
and pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said
manifestation and urgent motion of Attys. Manglapus and
Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965
approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the
attorneys for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and agreement annexed to said motion. The said
order further states: "The Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever
check or checks may be necessary for the above purpose
and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is
ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII,
Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a
manifestation and motion dated January 13, 1965 asking
that the order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by
Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to enjoin
the clerk of court and the administratrix and administrator
in these special proceedings from all proceedings and
action to enforce or comply with the provision of the
aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of said
manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of
January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was
never delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the
sala of Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found
in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin in his office when
said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the
death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son
of the judge and in the presence of Executive Judge Rovira
and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp.
6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for
reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking that the
order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground
that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate
not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-
rated between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting
interests; to the prejudice of the other heirs not
represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services
rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees
(Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July 15,
1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent motion
dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
and other incidents directly appertaining thereto be
considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp.
6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the
pleadings of both the Administratrix and the PCIB, and of
Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes
that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the
reason that the said order has not been filed with deputy
clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the lifetime of
Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the
said manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964
is being treated and considered in this instant order. It is
worthy to note that in the motion dated January 24, 1964
(Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by
Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other
lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual
services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated
February 27, 1964, between the Administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which provides for
retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees
for actual appearances, reimbursement for expenditures
and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court
and said lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279,
Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc.
1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby
declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which
was filed by the attorneys for the administratrix of the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the
agreement annexed thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
hereby directed to be needed to implement the approval
P a g e 19 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
of the agreement annexed to the motion and the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to
countersign the said check or checks as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of
independent but simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on
a motion of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale executed by it as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on
appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for
registered land of the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate
Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-
2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in
representation of the law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and
Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of
Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July
22, 1965 and considering the allegations and reasons
therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale
should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno,
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and to this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps
so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the
deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as
administrator of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his
name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno.3 And this was not an
isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A.
Magno to execute final deeds of sale pursuant to contracts
to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp.
45-46, Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds
of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe
Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the
appellant) were approved by the lower court upon
petition of appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P.
Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had
taken over the bulk of the assets of the two estates,
started presenting these motions itself. The first such
attempt was a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for
Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" dated
July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the
appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and
two (2) cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee
Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-
President and Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was
approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was
followed by another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the
approval of one final deed of sale again signed by appellee
Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again
approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates
having been opened, a flood ensued: the appellant
subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a
multitude of deeds of sales and cancellations of mortgages
signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the
appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No.
1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having
presented for court approval deeds of sale of real
properties signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and
D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated
September 21, 1964 — 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated
November 4, 1964 — 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated
December 1, 1964 — 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated
February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May
7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very extensive
landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions
filed concerning deeds of sale of real properties executed
by C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to constitute
special separate expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos.
1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for the approval
of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges
spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of
February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the
appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for
Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the
allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed
"Contracts to Sell" real property, and the prospective
buyers under said contracts have already paid the price
and complied with the terms and conditions thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both estates,
mortgage debtors have already paid their debts secured
by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and
are now entitled to release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly
by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the
Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of
sale in favor —
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ.
Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose,
Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo
City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid
documents will not reduce the assets
of the estates so as to prevent any
creditor from receiving his full debt or
diminish his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this honorable court
approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of
mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of
the respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its
other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green
Record on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas,
President of appellee Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay
Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had
contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as
Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as
Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes that
payment to both the administrator of the testate estate of
C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the testate estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates
is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both
estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent
Magno was given authority to act alone. For instance, in the other appealed
order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the
respondent court approved payments made by her of overtime pay to some
employees of the court who had helped in gathering and preparing copies of
parts of the records in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to
approve payment of overtime pay dated December 10,
1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to be
a proper charge of administration chargeable to the
testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against
the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The
administrator of the testate estate of the late Charles
Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to countersign the
check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay as
shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the
motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell"
executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him
before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature which are also
on appeal herein are the following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal,
approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee
Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
claims was cancelled by it for failure of Carles to pay the installments due on
January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on
February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner
claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure of said appellee to pay
the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado on
March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August
14, 1961, after the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on March
28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21,
1958, after the death of his wife.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on May
2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10,
1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on
June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26,
1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and
Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to
"contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961,
respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala,
Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966
and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by
Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively,
that is, after the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on March
2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954,
before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled
on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the installments
due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7,
1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after
the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June
29, 1960, for failure of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Pepito
Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by
Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of
sale executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago
Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966
and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell"
signed respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before
the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved
deeds of sale executed by petitioner alone and without the concurrence of
respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any
appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as
appellant thus:
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two
abovecited assignments of error have already been
discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the
order alluded to was general, and as already explained
before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself,
superseded by the particular orders approving specific
final deeds of sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A.
Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well as the
particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale
executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the
appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that
matter, and which are now therefore final.
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more
fundamental and all embracing significance developed. On October 5, 1963,
over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-explanatory motion was filed:
URGENT MOTION FOR AN
ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF
C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE ASSETS
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES
AND C N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF
MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM.
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his undersigned attorneys in
the above-entitled proceedings, and to this Honorable
Court respectfully alleges:
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to
probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and
appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters
Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the
basis of the following allegations in a Motion dated
December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for
the executor C. N. Hodges:
"That herein Executor, (is) not only
part owner of the properties left as
conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges."
P a g e 22 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada,
counsel for the Executory, for the
reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957 which the court
considers well taken, all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of
all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said executor is
further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages of the properties left
by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and
testament of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis
supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the
inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959
wherein he alleged among other things
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice, as herein executor is the
only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated
by the Honorable Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.).
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the
"Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges
through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960
wherein he alleged among other things:
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice as herein executor is the
only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the
"Annual Statement of Account By The Executor for the
Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20,
1961 wherein he alleged:
That no person interested in the
Philippines be given notice, of the time
and place of examining the herein
account, as herein Executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance
with the last will and testament of the
deceased, already probated by this
Honorable Court.
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307;
emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion
of Leon P. Gellada filed only in Special Proceeding No.
1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as
Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said
Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe
and that the real and personal properties of both spouses
may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were
issued to Avelina Magno pursuant to this Honorable
Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962
"With full authority to take possession
of all the property of said deceased in
any province or provinces in which it
may be situated and to perform all
other acts necessary for the
preservation of said property, said
Administratrix and/or Special
Administratrix having filed a bond
satisfactory to the Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition
of Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued Letters of
Administration to:
P a g e 23 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of 4. — That hereto attached are thirteen
Linnie Jane Hodges; (13) copies deeds of sale executed by
the Administratrix and by the co-
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges respectively,
in compliance with the terms and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of
conditions of the respective "contracts
Charles Newton Hodges.
to sell" executed by the parties
thereto."
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the September 16, 1963 are all registered in the name of the
basis of a motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel deceased C. N. Hodges.
on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as
Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and
(pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following order:
belief, has been advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo
thusly:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A.
Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta
For Sale
definitiva de propiedades cubiertas
por contratos para vender, firmados,
en vida, por el finado Charles Newton Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges, cada vez que el precio Hodges.
estipulado en cada contrato este
totalmente pagado. Se autoriza All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First
igualmente a la misma a firmar Come First Served Basis.
escrituras de cancelacion de hipoteca
tanto de bienes reales como
personales cada vez que la
consideracion de cada hipoteca este
totalmente pagada.

"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se

otorguen debe ser sometida para la
aprobacion de este Juzgado."

(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).

[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For

Removal of Joe Hodges]

(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as

attorney for Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:

3. — That since January, 1963, both

estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges have been
receiving in full, payments for those
"contracts to sell" entered into by C. N.
Hodges during his lifetime, and the
purchasers have been demanding the
execution of definite deeds of sale in
their favor.

P a g e 24 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and
belief, has paid and still is paying sums of money to sundry
persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys
manifested during the hearings before this Honorable
Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N.
Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging to the
deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by
C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession as
sole owner of all of said assets during the administration
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on the ground that he
was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last Will and
Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and
accounting of her administration as Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of
the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations
made by Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P.
Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least
fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased
spouses and the rents, emoluments and income
therefrom belong to the Higdon family who are named in
paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully
prays that this Honorable Court, after due hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and
accounting of all of the funds, properties and assets of any
character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession,
with full details of what she has done with them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character remaining in her
possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the
aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she first
secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly
authorized representative, such as the undersigned
attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact of
a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N.
Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of
the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any
compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem
just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-
administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein
petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator,
pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court,
and because the above motion of October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due
to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION,
INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR
HEARING AND RESOLVE "URGENT
MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND
DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF
THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL
THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED
LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C. N.
HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23,
1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings
No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through
the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An
Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of
C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The Conjugal
Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents,
Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI
Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis
of an amicable agreement entered into on January 23,
1964 by the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912,
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the dispute over who
should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing
letters of administration to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N.
Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the
two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and
Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim
to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
P a g e 25 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
aforenamed parties entered into an amicable agreement,
which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the
parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were
to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two
estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed)of
both estates would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A.
Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5,
1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive
possession and ownership of one-hundred percent
(10017,) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent [75%]
of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges
situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-
935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court
amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way
changes its recognition of the aforedescribed basic
demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets
claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to
Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This
Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the
Motion of October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J.
Gibbs was absent in the United States, this Honorable
Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the hearing
of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of
C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been able to properly carry
out its duties and obligations as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges because of the following acts,
among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those who claim
to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if
she is in exclusive control of all of the
assets in the Philippines of both
estates including those claimed by the
estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in
part by her locking the premises at
206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on
August 31, 1964 and refusing to
reopen same until ordered to do so by
this Honorable Court on September 7,
1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as
though she alone may decide how the
assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges
should be administered, who the PCIB
shall employ and how much they may
be paid as evidenced in party by her
refusal to sign checks issued by the
PCIB payable to the undersigned
counsel pursuant to their fee
agreement approved by this
Honorable Court in its order dated
March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives
access to and turns over possession of
the records and assets of the estate of
C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of
the Higdon Family, Mr. James L.
Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the
cashing of his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses
to execute checks prepared by the
PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the
estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in
part by the check drawn to reimburse
the PCIB's advance of P48,445.50 to
pay the 1964 income taxes reported
due and payable by the estate of C.N.
Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable
Court, particularly those of January 24 and February 1,
1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of
Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it
has
"full authority to
take possession of
all the property of
the deceased C. N.
Hodges
"and to perform all other acts
necessary for the preservation of said
property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB
claims the right to the immediate exclusive possession and
control of all of the properties, accounts receivables, court
cases, bank accounts and other assets, including the
documentary records evidencing same, which existed in
the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death,
December 25, 1962, and were in his possession and
registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets
in the Philippines registered in the name of Linnie Jane
Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges,
Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on December
25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge
are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or
were derived therefrom since his death on December 25,
1962.
P a g e 26 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all of the rights of the
previously duly appointed administrators of the estate of
C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C.
N. Hodges' death, this Honorable
Court appointed Miss Avelina A.
Magno simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1307) to replace the deceased
C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957
was appointed Special Administrator
(p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307) and on
July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S.
P. No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate
of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this
Honorable Court appointed Harold K.
Davies as co-special administrator of
the estate of C.N. Hodges along with
Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the
conformity of Avelina A. Magno,
Harold K. Davies resigned in favor of
Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1672) who thereupon was
appointed on January 22, 1963 by this
Honorable Court as special co-
administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P.
No. 1672) along with Miss Magno who
at that time was still acting as special
co-administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without
objection on the part of Avelina A.
Magno, this Honorable Court
appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando
P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the
estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 &
85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this
Honorable Court of December 25, 1962, took possession
of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the two estates.
Legally, Miss Magno could take possession of the assets
registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone only in her
capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N.
Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on
February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol
as the co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they
legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the full
and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate
of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24, 1964
of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol, the PCIB legally became the only party entitled to
the sole and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting
and this Honorable Court approved same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies
dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI
Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its
face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno
acting as "Administratrix of the Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special
Administratrix of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas
lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N.
Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a
Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon
family who claim to be the only heirs
of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33,
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable
Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23,
1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-
1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp.
1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable
Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned
lawyers are aware of no report or
accounting submitted by Avelina A.
Magno of her acts as administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or
special administratrix of the estate of
C.N. Hodges, unless it is the
P a g e 27 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
accounting of Harold K. Davies as
special co-administrator of the estate
of C.N. Hodges dated January 18, 1963
to which Miss Magno manifested her
conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno
agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting
February 1, 1964, at
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her
services as an employee of both
estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964
and the orders of this Honorable Court of same date, the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is
entitled to the exclusive possession of all records,
properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the
date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the
possession of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and
which then passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her
capacity as Special Co-Administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P.
Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the
reasonable request of PCIB concerning the assets of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as
an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August
31, 1964. On September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB
access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated
September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7,
1964 ordered Miss Magno to reopen the aforesaid
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the PCIB
access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this
Honorable Court is again in physical possession of all of the
assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is
not in exclusive control of the aforesaid records,
properties and assets because Miss Magno continues to
assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6,
continues to use her own locks to the doors of the
aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City
and continues to deny the PCIB its right to know the
combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated
within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the
fact that said combinations were known to only C. N.
Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and paid
on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the
assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the
Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel at no
time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid
assessment and the payment of the corresponding
Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid Motion
of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive
possession and control of all of the records, properties and
assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges were ordered by this Honorable Court in
special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and
delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession
of them before his death and asserted and exercised the
right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the
sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully
petitions that this Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the
earliest possible date with notice to all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and
accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of any
character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession,
with full details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of
the funds, properties and assets of any character
remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the
aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno and her
representatives to stop interferring with the
administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB
and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the
estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal as such
by the PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
P a g e 28 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and
Quimpo and others allegedly representing Miss Magno
from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges without
the express permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds
just and equitable in the premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of
Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred
to as PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the
undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges
and Linnie Jane Hodges, American citizens originally from
the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated
considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and
in the States of Texas and Oklahoma, United States of
America. All said properties constituted their conjugal
estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges
spouses, this Honorable Court, in its orders dated March
31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and
categorically ruled that said spouses had lived and worked
for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had, therefore,
acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they
retained until the time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in
the City of Iloilo her Last Will and Testament, a copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests in
said will pertinent to the present issue are the second,
third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in full
hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath
all of the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated, or located, to my
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to
have and to hold unto him, my said
husband during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that
my husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate
during his lifetime, and he is hereby
given the right to make any changes in
the physical properties of said estate
by sale of any part thereof which he
think best, and the purchase of any
other or additional property as he may
think best; to execute conveyances
with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or
for any other term or time, any
property which he may deem proper
to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other
minerals, and all such deeds or leases
shall pass the absolute fee simple title
to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All
rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him, and he
is further authorized to use any part of
the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire. It is provided herein,
however, that he shall not sell or
otherwise dispose of any of the
improved property now owned by us
located at, in or near the City of
Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the
full right to lease, manage and enjoy
the same during his lifetime, as above
provided. He shall have the right to
sub-divide any farmland and sell lots
therein, and may sell unimproved
town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I
give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my
estate both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the
City of Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges
designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary
using the identical language she used in the second and
third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City,
predeceasing her husband by more than five (5) years. At
the time of her death, she had no forced or compulsory
heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived
also by various brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will
(supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to as the
HIGDONS.
P a g e 29 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to
probate the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N.
Hodges as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957, this
Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N.
Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order
of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the
intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should be
governed by Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges,
intended Philippine laws to govern her
Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides
that "the national law of the person
whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property
may be found", shall prevail. However,
the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is
the "national law" of the testatrix,
Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the
domiciliary law (Philippine law — see
paragraph 2, supra) should govern the
testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over movables
(personal properties), and the law of
the situs of the property (also
Philippine law as to properties located
in the Philippines) with regards
immovable (real properties). Thus
applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as
approved and applied by our Supreme
Court in the case of "In The Matter Of
The Testate Estate of Eduard E.
Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31,
1963, Philippine law should apply to
the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to
the successional rights to her estate
insofar as
her movable and immovable assets in
the Philippines are concerned. We
shall not, at this stage, discuss what
law should govern the assets of Linnie
Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and
Texas, because the only assets in issue
in this motion are those within the
jurisdiction of this motion Court in the
two above-captioned Special
Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or
community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be
divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the
entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting
their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles
Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own
right as partner in the conjugal partnership. The other one-
half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate constituted the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the
conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets
pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear and
specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by
income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her
death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides
that "all rents, emoluments and income from said estate
shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as
he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by
specific provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents,
emoluments and income" must be credited to the one-half
(1/2) portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N.
Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted
exclusively of no more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal
estate, computed as of the time of her death on May 23,
1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code
provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no
ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right
and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half
(1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary
disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect
this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is
entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way
of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore,
immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or
seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of
the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership
share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime)
plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges'
death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband
C.N. Hodges as her sole and exclusive heir with full
authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and
owner of all the assets constituting her estate, except only
with regards certain properties "owned by us, located at,
in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without
relying on our laws of succession and legitime, which we
have cited above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary
designation of his wife, was entitled to the entirely to his
wife's estate in the Philippines.
P a g e 30 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the
rights of the successor are transmitted from the death of
the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately
upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the convenience of
this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a
graph of how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges
should be divided in accordance with Philippine law and
the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N. Hodges,
shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He
operated all the assets, engaged in business and
performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the
conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had
been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie
Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December
25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole
possession and control, and registered in his name alone,
not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and
sanctioned expressly and impliedly by various orders of
this Honorable Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court
ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was engaged, and to
perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased
was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the
basis of the following fact, alleged in the verified Motion
dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as
attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all
the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.'
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken,
all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are
hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of the latter." (CFI
Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the
verified inventory and accounting submitted by C. N.
Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14,
1959 wherein he alleged among other things,
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice, as herein executor is the
only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated
by the Honorable Court." (CFI Record,
Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78;
emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the
verified "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N.
Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21,
1960 wherein he alleged, among other things.
"That no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be
given notice as herein executor is the
only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and
testament ofthe deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court."
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 81-
82; emphasis supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the
verified "Annual Statement of Account By The Executor
For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on
April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given
notice, ofthe time and place of examining the herein
account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the
last will and testament ofthe deceased, already probated
by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of
Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by law, but in accordance
with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need
to liquidate the conjugal estate of the spouses. The
entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to him
exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned
and authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage,
operate and control all the conjugal assets as owner.
P a g e 31 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did
in connection with the estate of his wife, this Honorable
Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and
distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as sole heir in
accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will.
Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still
exists as a legal and juridical personality, it had no assets
or properties located in the Philippines registered in its
name whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N. Hodges
on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth
paragraph, provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate both real
and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon,
Emma Howell,
Leonard Higdon,
Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era
Boman and
Nimray Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest,
residue and remainder", at least to the extent of the
Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS,
assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid
and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted
provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without merit
because said provision is void and invalid at least as to the
Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights
of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to the properties,
which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from
his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned
provision in the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not
merely a usufructuary right, but
absolute title and ownership to her
estate. In a recent case involving a
very similar testamentary provision,
the Supreme Court held that the heir
first designated acquired full
ownership of the property
bequeathed by the will, not mere
usufructuary rights. (Consolacion
Florentino de Crisologo, et al., vs.
Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876,
February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the
New Civil Code clearly provide that no
charge, condition or substitution
whatsoever upon the legitime can be
imposed by a testator. Thus, under the
provisions of Articles 900, 995 and
1001 of the New Civil Code, the
legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of
the estate of the deceased spouse.
Consequently, the above-mentioned
provision in the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges is clearly invalid insofar as the
legitime of C. N. Hodges was
concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of
the 1/2 portion of the conjugal estate,
or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of
the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds
of substitution provided for and
authorized by our Civil Code (Articles
857-870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes
referred to as vulgar substitution
(Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary
substitution (Article 863). All other
substitutions are merely variations of
these. The substitution provided for
by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly
no obligation on the part of C. N.
Hodges as the first heir designated, to
preserve the properties for the
substitute heirs. (Consolacion
Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs.
Manuel Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is
a vulgar or simple substitution.
However, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitution can be
valid, three alternative conditions
must be present, namely, that the first
designated heir (1) should die before
the testator; or (2) should not wish to
accept the inheritance; or (3) should
be incapacitated to do so. None of
these conditions apply to C. N.
Hodges, and, therefore, the
substitution provided for by the
above-quoted provision of the Will is
not authorized by the Code, and,
therefore, it is void. Manresa,
commenting on these kisses of
substitution, meaningfully stated that:
P a g e 32 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
"... cuando el testador instituyeun
primer heredero, y por fallecimiento
de este nombra otro u otros, ha de
entenderse que estas segundas
designaciones solo han de llegar a
tener efectividad en el caso de que el
primer instituido muera antes que el
testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera
intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed.,
pag. 175.) In other words, when
another heir is designated to inherit
upon the death of a first heir, the
second designation can have effect
only in case the first instituted heir dies
before the testator, whether or not
that was the true intention of said
testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die
before Linnie Jane Hodges, the
provision for substitution contained in
Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the
provision for substitution in the Will,
C. N. Hodges' inheritance to the
entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges
estate is irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death,
the entirety of the conjugal estate appeared and was
registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the
presumption is that all said assets constituted his estate.
Therefore —
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as
substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the other
1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can
not be affected by any testamentary disposition), their
remedy, if any, is to file their claim against the estate of C.
N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the present time to
full custody and control of all the conjugal estate of the
spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist
under separate administration, where the administratrix
of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious
right to object and intervene in matters affecting
exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial
and reception of evidence, this Honorable Court declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is
composed exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the
conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the
date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained
exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share as partner in the
conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal
estate accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to
C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the
spouses located in the Philippines, plus all the "rents,
emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now
constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of
distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special
Proceedings No. 1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive custody, control
and management of all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has no
right to intervene or participate in the administration of
the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on
December 21, 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and, through undersigned counsel, unto this
Honorable Court most respectfully states and manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie
Jane Hodges were American citizens who died at the City
of Iloilo after having amassed and accumulated extensive
properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges
executed a last will and testament (the original of this will
now forms part of the records of these proceedings as
Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp.
17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the
City of Iloilo at the time survived by her husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in her last
will and testament;
P a g e 33 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been
priorly filed and duly heard, this Honorable Court issued
an order admitting to probate the last will and testament
of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-
25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others
who may have any claims against the decedent, Linnie
Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and
posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the
reglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago
lapsed and expired without any claims having been
asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said
estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges
already admitted to probate contains an institution of
heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath
all of the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated or located, to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges to have and to hold unto him,
my said husband, during his natural
lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that
my husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate
during his lifetime, and, he is hereby
given the right to make any changes in
the physical properties of said estate,
by sale of any part thereof which he
may think best, and the purchase of
any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general
or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time,
any property which he may deem
proper to dispose of; to lease any of
the real property for oil, gas and/or
other minerals, and all such deeds or
leases shall pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest so
conveyed in such property as he elect
to sell. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong
to him, and he is further authorized to
use any part of the principal of said
estate as he may need or desire. It is
provided herein, however, that he
shall not sell or otherwise dispose of
any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near the
City of Lubbock Texas, but he shall
have the full right to lease, manage
and enjoy the same during his lifetime,
above provided. He shall have the
right to subdivide any farm land and
sell lots therein, and may sell
unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I
give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of
my brothers and/or sisters named in
item Fourth, above, prior to the death
of my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, then it is my will and bequest
that the heirs of such deceased
brother or sister shall take jointly the
share which would have gone to such
brother or sister had she or he
survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament
already above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-
estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or
the naked title over the same estate to her relatives
named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the
admission to probate of her last will and testament, but
during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said
Charles Newton Hodges with full and complete knowledge
of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon him by the
will since he was then acting as Administrator of the estate
and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges,
unequivocably and clearly through oral and written
declarations and sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct
over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant to her last will and
testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or their
heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon,
Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two being the
P a g e 34 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon,
Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal
ages, American citizens, with residence at the State of
Texas, United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on
May 23, 1957, she was the co-owner (together with her
husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-
half interest in their conjugal properties existing as of that
date, May 23, 1957, which properties are now being
administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately
by the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but
all of which are under the control and supervision of this
Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation
of the interests of husband and wife in the combined
conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or
segregation up to the present, both interests have
continually earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
emoluments and income", the entire estate having been
continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if
they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the
combined conjugal estate was earning "rents,
emoluments and income" until her death on May 23,
1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more charges
or expenditures which are purely personal to her in
nature, and her estate kept on earning such "rents,
emoluments and income" by virtue of their having been
expressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated by
Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed
for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of
Charles Newton Hodges in the combined conjugal estate
existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned
exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and
income" as that of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane
Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges,
expenditures, and other dispositions which are purely
personal to him in nature, until the death of Charles
Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges as they
exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly
entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%) as
compared to the portion to which the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be
exactly determined by the following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the
assets of the combined conjugal
estate as they existed on the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957
— one-half of these assets belong to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the
"rents, emoluments and income" of all
these assets — again one-half of these
belong to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after
making a deduction of charges,
disbursements and other dispositions
made by Charles Newton Hodges
personally and for his own personal
account from May 23, 1957 up to
December 25, 1962, as well as other
charges, disbursements and other
dispositions made for him and in his
behalf since December 25, 1962 up to
the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition
now insofar as the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate,
segregate them from the conjugal estate, and distribute
them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
moved and prayed that this Honorable Court, after a
hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion, issue
an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon,
Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as
the sole heirs under the last will and testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges and as the only persons entitled to her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges in accordance with the system enunciated in
paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from
the combined conjugal estate and its delivery to the
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for
distribution to the heirs to whom they properly belong and
appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965
aforequoted, as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion
and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a
motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
P a g e 35 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
1. That it has received from the counsel for the
administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for Official Declaration
of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there
are matters pending before this Honorable Court, such as:
a. The examination already ordered by
this Honorable Court of documents
relating to the allegation of Avelina
Magno that Charles Newton Hodges
"through ... written declarations and
sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated life-estate
and usufruct over the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An
Accounting and Delivery to the Estate
of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the
Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the
Rents, Emoluments and Income
Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the
aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14,
1964, detailing acts of interference of
Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of
fact, all facts involved therein being matters of record, and
therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons
may have could be very easily threshed out in the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate
proceedings and two administrators only results in
confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly because the
bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to
answer for the funds and property which she has
inofficiously collected and held, as well as those which she
continues to inofficiously collect and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs
affects and inconveniences not only the estate but also
third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant
allegations of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and
deliver to the administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges
all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately
order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the
administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for
declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are
resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the
respondent court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390)
dated April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB praying that (1)
Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and
deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents,
emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the
consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina
Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator
PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters
hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are
matters pending before this court such as (a) the
examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of
documents relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno
that Charles Newton Hodges thru written declaration and
sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting
and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the assets
of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus
all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c)
various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d)
manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-
judicial involving no issues of facts and only require the
resolution of question of law; that in the motion of
October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion dated
December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney
for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N.
Hodges is not only part owner of the properties left as
conjugal but also the successor to all the properties left by
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the
Court in consonance with the wishes contained in the last
will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory
and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges thru counsel
Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959
stating therein that executor C. N. Hodges is the only
devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance
with the last will and testament already probated by the
Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual
statement of accounts submitted by the executor C. N.
Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960
wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the
only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the
annual statement of accounts submitted by executor, C. N.
Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty.
Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated that executor
Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the
estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the assets belonging to
the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges situated in the Philippines; that administratrix
Magno has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the
testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April
27, 1966 of administratrix Magno has been filed asking
that the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the
motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and reception
of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the
examination of documents which are in the possession of
administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of
the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5,
1963 (as well as the other motion) dated September 14,
1964 have been consolidated for the purpose of
presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing
on the determination of the heirs of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the
motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial
question to the motions dated October 5 and September
14, 1964 because if said motion is found meritorious and
granted by the Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5,
1963 and September 14, 1964 will become moot and
academic since they are premised on the assumption and
claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N.
Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further
questioning the determination of heirs in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early
as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for official
declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of
any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in
the administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs
of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming her estate and not the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11,
1966 of the PCIB has been filed alleging that the motion
dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment
of the hearing and consideration of the motion for official
declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to declare
the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for
administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the
PCIB all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
spouses which has come to her possession plus all rents
and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of
administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been filed
alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only
sought the approval of all conveyances made by C. N.
Hodges and requested the Court authority for all
subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C. N.
Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1957 only
approved the conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C.
N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any claim
in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a
motion to declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie
Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than five (5) years
after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further
alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no order of
adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior
express declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of
heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has
been made.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion
and of the PCIB as well as those in the opposition and
rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the
opposition and rejoinder to be well taken for the reason
that so far there has been no official declaration of heirs in
the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no
disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966
is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order,
petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December
11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament of
the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the
late Charles Newton Hodges was the
sole heir instituted insofar as her
properties in the Philippines are
concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested
upon the said late Charles Newton
Hodges rights over said properties
which, in sum, spell ownership,
absolute and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges
was, therefore, "not only part owner
of the properties left as conjugal, but
also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid
motion was granted by this Honorable Court "for the
reasons stated" therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not
only "all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages
executed by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also all
"the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages ..." be approved and authorized. This
Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for
the reasons stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the
same, and not only approved all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton
Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left
by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X",
Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges had already been factually, although not legally, closed with the virtual
declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the
properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex
G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said motion
for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that there is no
justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or
modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to
above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on
August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on August
9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate
estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution
herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment
by respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green
Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent orders of
January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232,id.) October 27, 1965, (pp.
227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.)
repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that
deeds executed by petitioner to be co-signed by
respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27,
1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.)
enjoining the deposit of all collections in a joint account
and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No.
1 above which included the denial of the reconsideration
of this order of October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.)
directing the payment of attorney's fees, fees of the
respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of February
16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.)
allowing appellee Western Institute of Technology to
make payments to either one or both of the
administrators of the two estates as well as the order of
March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated
approving deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman,
Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan,
(see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together with the two
separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-
308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying
reconsideration of said approval.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow
Record on Appeal, approving similar deeds of sale
executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor
of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no
motion for reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306,
Yellow Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to surrender
to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido,
Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates
of title covering the lands involved in the approved sales,
as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different
matters, just as they affect distinctly different individuals or persons, as
outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are,
therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner has
to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in
connection with these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight
(LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of
them covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition, thus making it feasible and more practical for
the Court to dispose of all these cases together.4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G.
IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA
AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR
WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES,
PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO
C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH
WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104)
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND
OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE
EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED
OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES,
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL
AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS
TO SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS
OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH
WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE
IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED
WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL
RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE
INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR
CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED
BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS
AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL
WHICH HE EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL LIII to LXI

DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT,
BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED
OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA
XLIV to XLVI BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR
CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED AND GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, LXII
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM
WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
COMPLIED WITH.
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY
THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT,
XLVII to XLIX PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, LXIII

CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd,
AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR
THE HEARING THEREOF WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER
THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED
NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR
GENERAL RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE
PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS
OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION
OF PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY
IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A
PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS
NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE
ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY
THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND
NOT BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS
NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO
THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.
LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT
OF COMPENSATION TO THE PURPORTED
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH
ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS
OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF
THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE
AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS
TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A
COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp.
73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the
factual setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt was
made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as
administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place,
and that respondent court did actually order such proposed replacement, but
the Court declared the said order of respondent court violative of its injunction
of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution of
September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas,
one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed
administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated
October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a motion had been filed with
respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion
alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been
acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband.
Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent
Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution
of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said
petitioner annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to
have been filed with respondent court, informing said court that in addition to
the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the
heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges
representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not
possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges
estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged
tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering,
however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues
and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and,
moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it
of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become final
by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it
necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of
the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition in view of the existence of
the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before
Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there is a common thread
among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless
resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of
more or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual
appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking account anymore
of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would be
involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is
logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not
adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not a special civil
action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in
instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is
alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is
indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of the given case,
appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay,
augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work
attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with
practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or
determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the
common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded availability of
appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would
naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more
simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly,
respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorariand
prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in its
main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded
its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further recognizing after
December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of respondent
Magno. Main ground for such posture is that by the aforequoted order of
respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and
exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of
her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in Special
Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention
of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of
Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the consequent formal
unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to be done to
completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Mrs. Hodges since then.
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such
pose is patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14,
1957 the sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no
suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the
probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function, and
this Court is not disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to be
less than definite, plain and specific in making orders in such regard, if for no
other reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and
most of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should know with
certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing
from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case
may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent
litigations similar to those that have developed unnecessarily in the present
cases. While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the
estate of a deceased person have already actually distributed among
themselves their respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone
concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it
would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of
declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special proceeding
instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights
of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or
administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved
already of all functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite
orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section
1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made.
— When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice,
shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in
a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed
ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of
distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those
entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until
after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration,
allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but
logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and
specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not
of the court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to
the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected
that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such
persons as are entitled by law to the residue. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397,
citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs.
Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84
Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
(corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an
intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of
distribution directing delivery of the residue to the
persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if
any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban,
68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts,
pleadings and orders before Us that the above indispensable prerequisites for
the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had
already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued.
As already stated, We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading to the
issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27, 1957,
Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the motion of
December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law contemplates.
We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the
petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the
death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general advance
authorization to enable said "Executor — to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will and
testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of
adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law.
In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the
order in question did not pray for any such adjudication at all. What is more,
although said motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly added that
"herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose
of the properties in the Philippines — during his lifetime", thereby indicating
that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than either the
enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular portion of the
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
dispositions of his wife's will which were to be operative only during his
lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal estate, pending the
termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to in
said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section
2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial
implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication
or distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected
thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to
dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation,
when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be
prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B,
1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined
to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully
persuaded that the quoted allegations of said motions read together cannot
be construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in the
will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have not been
disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently
acted upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the contrary, on
November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western
Institute of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically
held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in both cases (Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this
connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind
of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full
on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that
"C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the
order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and
distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno
filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should
correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the
indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her
whole estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full powers of
dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the
condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to
her brothers and sisters. In effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to
Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose of
during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion,
he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested by
petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any
degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would
remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the
testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of
the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of
whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as Executor, of
May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said
motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded, could not have
had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of
the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers
and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that
the fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be
attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of them, as
admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had
been notified, they could not have taken said motions to be for the final
distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able,
pending such final distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his
lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the
bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the
broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the
conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that the trial court could have
acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of the clear
language of the will but also because none of the interested parties had been
duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the
orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read
in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring
them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September
19, 1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in
support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere formality,
inasmuch as said orders amounted to the order of adjudication and
distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be
drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial
court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of adjudication and
distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased
filed their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in
that decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la
encuentra procedente bajo la condicion de que no se hara
entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes
de que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de
acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo de
Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido
nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones.
Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes
que correspondan a cada heredero segun el testamento.
Creo que no es obice para la terminacion del expediente
el hecho de que la administradora no ha presentado hasta
ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan
exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son
legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan
prestado fianza para responder de las gestiones de su
cargo, y aparece en el testamento que la administradora
Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber
lugar a la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara
asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio
Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria
Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon Ventenilla,
Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose
Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas
Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en
representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y
Froilan, hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas que
la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente
de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de
deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de
sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas
8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
aprueba el pago hecho por la administradora de los gastos
de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la
donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a
Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en
sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la
fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la
entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone
en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto; 5.o,
y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por
terminada la administracion, revelandole toda
responsabilidad a la administradora, y cancelando su
fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be
but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by
petitioner do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor and nature as the
order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its
issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing
could have been more violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of
accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and M,
respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the
only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated," there is "no (other) person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given
notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in
an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her
brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not
legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges
knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the terms of his wife's will
did not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough circumstances extant
in the records of these cases indicating that he had no such intention to ignore
the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru
counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants
and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving
spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even promised that
"proper accounting will be had — in all these transactions" which he had
submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that
he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by
respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first
"Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of
December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed
an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958
on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath,
the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31,
exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second
"Annual Statement of Account by the Executor" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C. N.
Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return"
for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income
of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third
"Annual Statement of Account by the Executor for the year
1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the
"Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of
P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual evenly between him and the
estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97,
exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 92-93, id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed
the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs"
(see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the
will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy
Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges
filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included
as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records
"in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not
think or believe they were omitted, and that they were
really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate
from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death,
more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole
estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one
can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the
eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he
would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and
sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return
in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And assuming
that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the
Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without
purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these proceedings, We might say
here that We are inclined to the view that under the peculiar provisions of his
wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had
to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the
remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his
death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such
remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal
revenue authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions
of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned statements
of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed the
motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as
"Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was
alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament
of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death
of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally
divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was Hodges'
lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his
understanding of the situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could
somehow be reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada
dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in the
Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in
the above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of
Hodges himself, who verified the motion. Said allegations read:
1. — That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29,
1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. — That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were enumerated.
However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of
Executor during the hearing, the name Roy Higdon was
mentioned, but deceased. It was unintentionally omitted
the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon
and son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan,
Texas, U.S.A.
3. — That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs
of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were
omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the
estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of
the Hon. Court to insert the names of Aline Higdon and
David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the
said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1
to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer — Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real
attitude of Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are
documents, copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno's answer,
which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the
right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United
States Taxation authorities, identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer)
and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M,
Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an
election between (1) the provisions made in his or her
favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory
interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the
will and electing to take dower, curtesy, or a statutory
interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person or
persons filing the return, is any action described under
question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No
(Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests
passing to surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate,
paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It is the
intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and
legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes
and expenses of administration are finally determined and
paid. (Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at
the time the United States Estate Tax Return was filed in
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I
renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the
rents, emoluments and income from said estate, as shown
by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of
said return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this
affidavit and made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I
do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in
Schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim
and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the
said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my
deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made
to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said
Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer —
Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence
in the court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the purpose of
the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence in
the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed
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above from the circumstances related to the orders of May 27 and December
14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering they are supposed to be
copies of their originals found in the official files of the governments of the
United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension
that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-
vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the
other heirs of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask the
court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her
whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the
contingent interest of her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof
upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to
assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of
his wife and, as such, had in mind the following admonition made by the Court
in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said
lands continued to be conjugal property in the hands of
the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the
Civil Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and
this court in construing this provision in connection with
section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its
amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has
repeatedly held that in the event of the death of the wife,
the law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating
the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego)
(Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7
Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez
vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297;
Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs.
Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566;
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval
the case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416,
417), in which that court discussed the powers of the
surviving spouse in the administration of the community
property. Attention was called to the fact that the
surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal
property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of
unique character who is liable for any fraud committed by
him with relation to the property while he is charged with
its administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to
Act No. 3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him
stands out more clearly in view of the fact that he was the
owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal
estate which he was charged to administer. He could
therefore no more acquire a title by prescription against
those for whom he was administering the conjugal estate
than could a guardian against his ward or a judicial
administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of
Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure, with relation to
prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ...
in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust." The
surviving husband in the administration and liquidation of
the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of
the highest order and is not permitted by the law to hold
that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for
whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of
administration and liquidation. No liquidation was ever
made by Lasam — hence, the conjugal property which
came into his possession on the death of his wife in
September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a
continuing and subsisting trust. He should have made a
liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. One of the
conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil
Procedure) is possession "under a claim of title exclusive
of any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim
would be a manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced
that Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be
inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing future
dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would
necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the provisions of
Rule 89 governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and
how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may be
secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said
orders should be declared ineffective either way they are understood,
considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as
adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the
surface, relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule 89, is that from such
point of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no more than some
non-jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident
fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the estate, such
as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes
due it; and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are objecting to
said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial court of
the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor
impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority
contained in said orders. This solution is definitely preferable in law and in
equity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in
the deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not cause any prejudice to
anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the
innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar
pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the
estate of his wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in the
balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"."
Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records before
Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases,
that the same consists of considerable real and other personal kinds of
properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole
owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and authority to dispose of
any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death,
such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there
is no pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all
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of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he
had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the
death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is
Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such
estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the
Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever been
legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez
without authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by
Our resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB
itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said respondent's
status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing
to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar as
the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time
of Hodges' death, their conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated and,
inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus commingled pro
indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each of
the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the
estate of Hodges, who should administer everything, and all that respondent
Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the
remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered to
her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some
properties included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a
decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in
the proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title; for which as a
rule it is required that an ordinary action should be filed, since the probate
court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between
the estate of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an heir
claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the
situation obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of a third party
the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present
cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate
of Hodges over all the properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share
of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the orders of the trial court
issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more
specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often mentioned
above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is
something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate
jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not
all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges
depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that
respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the said
issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the root
orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their true
significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not
the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon
the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his
wife instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present
problems confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was the failure
of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the
time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final
adjudication of her estate and the closure of the proceedings. The record is
bare of any showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early
settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough
indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact her share
of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his
death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the
proceedings, his interests in his own half of the conjugal properties remained
commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously,
such a situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion
of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his death. Having
these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such
procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his
estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in
question, which would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating
the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without
unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers
and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any
particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection
of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and
from this point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there
should be no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand,
however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among
those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the criterion
in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone but, more
importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one
assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking
both of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges'
own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his wife,
practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both estates should be
administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their segregation
from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to
allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was
duty bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section
2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor of an executor shall
not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without saying
that this provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like PCIB
here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last
sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of
spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or
permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of
sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former
rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such
liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which
are now embodied in the rule just cited.
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Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already
the pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and,
more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will who
had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was
terminated earliest, which was not difficult to do, since from ought that
appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate
not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges
himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible prejudice
of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence
of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who
are now faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had
Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this
problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced that
the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB
or any administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the
properties in question. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that what
would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act
conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is
PCIB's contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition
in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a
certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs.
Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article
859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863
thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision
for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal
or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article
859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no
obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part
thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to
the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question
are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said
disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code
section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will
"so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible default
is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes
for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges
cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from
his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously
with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory
insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with
reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it
bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by
him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them6 only during
his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely
dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was
not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon
his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct
alone of her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she
bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof,
although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was
no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any
portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal
impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine
law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving
spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had
no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil
Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of
the conjugal partnership properties may be considered as her estate, the
parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code7 should be
applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was
a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16,
construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi,
what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more
than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as
already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she
could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil
Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a
resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to
change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and
contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being
indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the
distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according
to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal
partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno
further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under
the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching
on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance
of which petitioner seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as
to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest of settling the
estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting
claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets,
however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the evidence
submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their
respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions
on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to
be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and
just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in
fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of
documents relied upon by respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a
number of still other conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to
raise but which it is not proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the
parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be
threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held
therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing
the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated
will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the
petition for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which
corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and
taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
provisions of the latter,8 and regardless also of whether or not it can be proven
by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree,
it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges
himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties which should
constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or
distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings
1307; (2) that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of what are the
pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of
fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions of the parties as
to the effect of said laws has reference to the supposed legitime of Hodges —
it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno
claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of
these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of
Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of
the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws
being questions of fact, and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate
of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of
the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and
consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases
to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven
later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that
Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs.
Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical
conclusion, there having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution
yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that respondent Magno remains and
continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing
opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not
properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not Hodges had in fact
and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or
in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by
the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be
the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more
than the one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding
above about the existence of properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges
rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal
partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their
briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it
should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more
concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in
support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and
factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to
present such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing
of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has
not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it
should do so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less
than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it
may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as
to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling
here also that, since there is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable
laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of the
undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should
be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law
provides, it is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the
validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After
nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at this stage and in the
state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than
real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim
that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be
less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are
the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance,
one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be
taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute
between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances
when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such
as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled
upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim
otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.)
In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins
West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that
jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was
submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia
Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to
by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with
the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must
be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book
from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority
of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the
records of the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have
presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda
regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs.
Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain provisions regarding
succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case
and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous
conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the
meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was
executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of
Illinois — we note that it does not affirmatively appear
from the transcription of the testimony adduced in the
trial court that any witness was examined with reference
to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will.
The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was
properly executed by examining section 1874 of the
Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of
Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426;
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and he may have assumed that he could take judicial
notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken.
That section authorizes the courts here to take judicial
notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative
department of the United States. These words clearly have
reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and
we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this
provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of
the various American States. Nor do we think that any such
authority can be derived from the broader language, used
in the same section, where it is said that our courts may
take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge
"similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we
think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the
Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may
have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on
the point in question, such error is not now available to
the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state
any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois
is different from what the court found, and, secondly,
because the assignment of error and argument for the
appellant in this court raises no question based on such
supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted
upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State
of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon
application made within six months under section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to
appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The
petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in
question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and
personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely
a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is
accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we
are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which
might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that
this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of
the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any
controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted
for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such
virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of
what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the
instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties
that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be applied, the
amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have
fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact,
under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any consequence,
unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB,
the petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the
Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in
controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee
is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may not now or later
pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967,
PCIB states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that
"intestate and testamentary successions both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", while the law of Texas (the
Hodges spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas),
in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary
law (in this case Philippine law) governs the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case
also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties
located in the Philippines), governs with respect to
immovable properties, and applying therefore the 'renvoi
doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable
Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-
16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that
Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions
contained in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to
her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to
immovables situated in the Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased,
Linnie Jane Hodges, was an American citizen. There is also
no question that she was a national of the State of Texas,
U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her
domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this
has already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of
the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res
adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re
Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
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property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points
towards the national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing succession
"both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its
conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law
governs the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables or personal property, while the law
of the situs governs with respect to immovable property.
Such that with respect to both movable property, as well
as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the law
of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as
enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the
case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31,
1963), there can be no question that Philippine law
governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as
the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to
movables, as well as immovables situated in the
Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the
conjugal or community property of the spouses, Charles
Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death
of the latter, is to be divided into two, one-half pertaining
to each of the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus,
upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the
conjugal partnership property immediately pertained to
Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by
virtue of any successional rights. There can be no question
about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of
the Civil Code provides:
If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to
one-half of the hereditary estate of
the deceased spouse, and the testator
may freely dispose of the other half.
If the marriage between the surviving
spouse and the testator was
solemnized in articulo mortis, and the
testator died within three months
from the time of the marriage, the
legitime of the surviving spouse as the
sole heir shall be one-third of the
hereditary estate, except when they
have been living as husband and wife
for more than five years. In the latter
case, the legitime of the surviving
spouse shall be that specified in the
preceding paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened
by a fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor
by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil
code). It is clear, therefore, that in addition to one-half of
the conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal
share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately
entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire
conjugal property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at
issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the
following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the
Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a matter of res
adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi
doctrine, Philippine law governs the successional rights
over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of
the Hodges properties pertains to the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not questioned by
the respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, automatically inherited one-half of the
remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his
legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was
inherited by the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under
the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon
the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution
'provision of the will of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges,
did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25,
petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his
sole ownership of the Hodges properties and the probate
court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in
fact assumed such ownership and such was the status of
the properties as of the time of his death (pp. 29-34,
petition).
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Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in
the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of
Texas, there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should
be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to
these cases of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the corresponding laws
of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should control.
On that basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
is the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties,
considering that We have found that there is no legal impediment to the kind
of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and
sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same constitutes an
inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's
position that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively
on two propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges'
testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and
(2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and December
14, 1957, the trial court had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her
husband the whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers
and sisters, both of which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings,
briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the laws of
Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything
under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas
virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court
are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them
or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them."
(5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further
proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more
than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1)
whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such
as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges
has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the
Court that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies
between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to
elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after
the death of his wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any
express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to
dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the
conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges.
After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such
dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be
individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be
of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it
appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957
that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of
properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of
the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his own
share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to
the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or
other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties
taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the
products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will
expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products
should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to
her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of
Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging
to his estate considering that being only the administrator of the estate of
Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of
his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal
properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership automatically
ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under
discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the
death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's
administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of Mrs. Hodges
should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and
distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant
PCIB's brief would readily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly on the
contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all
the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal partnership,
allegedly with the sanction of the trial court per its order of December 14,
1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of
which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed
orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in accordance with law. Such
being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be
untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for
the time being the two estates should be administered conjointly by the
respective administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said
assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There are
certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the respective orders in
question, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification.
For instance, some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or
without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB
further claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the
probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure followed was not
in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with
the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained
commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower court to
liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated
from that of Hodges is not to say, without any qualification, that she was
therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these
appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial court. As a
matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that
should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter
should not have authority to act independently from her. And considering that
the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by
allowing the two administrators to act independently of each other, in the
various instances already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has
to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be
able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they may all be
legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe
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the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to
the substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and
undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be
forestalled. In other words, We have to determine, whether or not, in the light
of the unusual circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be more
pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to cause the least
disturbance in rights already being exercised by numerous innocent third
parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with the
letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on
account of the confusion that might result later from PCIB's continuing to
administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the
existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to
function in the meantime with a relative degree of regularity, that the Court
ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the
injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and
December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely
barred from any participation in the administration of the properties herein
involved. In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this
decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that
the respective administrators therein "act conjointly — none of them to act
singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature
deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or administering
all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges'
estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position
which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the
other parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this
date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due
regard, as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has
filed in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged
failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for
reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears
to Our mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the more complicated
ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the
assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion
thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August
6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving
properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as
Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect,
the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the
order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27,
1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in
the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N.
Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the
account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic)
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the
estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno — allow the PCIB to
inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her
possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to
allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and
papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the transactions of
both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like
manner, the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C.
N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane
Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-
295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the
motion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to.
(pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line
with the Court's above-mentioned resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying
the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly,
with what We have said the trial court should have always done pending the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as
already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this decision, to
be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint
action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding
out to have been done and should be done until the two estates are separated
from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing
assignments of error must be, as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal
with expenditures made by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of
Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit
additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the
payment of attorneys fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as
constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of
overtime pay paid to six employees of the court and three other persons for
services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the
administration to be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The
reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses of administration per
the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for
reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp.
231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-
456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and
LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the
agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and James L.
Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First
Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the
Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had agreed "to
prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain
cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo —, more
specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 —" (pp. 126-129, id.) and
directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks
maybe needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the
motion" as well as the "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges — to
countersign the said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.),
reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order of
February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error to the
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lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as
it orders that "PCIB should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in
favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned
errors is that there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which
the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were
in effect expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already
demonstrated in Our resolution above of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining
issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the final
result will surely be that there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs.
Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore,
that said appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons
whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for her own services as
administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as
substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had
the authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in the manner she had
done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness
of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion
exercised by the probate court in determining the same. We have gone over
the agreement, and considering the obvious size of the estate in question and
the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional
standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon require the
exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal
services to the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of
them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels'
services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of
advances to such heirs and a premature distribution of the estate. Again, We
hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of
Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the interests involved in
her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of
Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the estate
of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete
stranger and it is without personality to question the actuations of the
administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges.
Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates
are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in
the agreement in question will prejudice any portion that would correspond
to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who
should have a say on the attorney's fees and other expenses of administration
assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly
represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan
and have not otherwise interposed any objection to any of the expenses
incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact,
as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, including the
attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination and
segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under
discussion is that at this stage of the controversy among the parties herein,
the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed
administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally
common and identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno
and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact, such
an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both. The
possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial.
Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest between them arise in the
future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very well take
care of in the course of the independent proceedings in Case No. 1307 after
the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive
any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should
correspond to the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of
Hodges have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the
estate has no creditors and the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes,
except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already been
paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount
of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it may be added that,
although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an
administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable
later on by the estate, in the final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand,
the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would be
idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the
probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to
LXXVI should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various
deeds of sale of real properties registered in the name of Hodges but executed
by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges,
purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts
to Sell" previously executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23,
1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated
on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G.
Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala,
executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18,
1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on
September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21,
1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo
Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan,
executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10,
1959 and the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title
No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as
pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have dominion over
all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties
respectively covered by said sales that he executed the aforementioned
contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his death, the implementation of
said contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and
not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same
theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales, in which the
respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by
Hodges before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee
Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of
Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by
Hodges after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation in the
immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention
cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 11* all proceeds of
remunerative transfers or dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his
wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore,
subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense
that should there be no showing that such proceeds, whether in cash or
property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by
Hodges to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not
thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his death, they automatically
became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in
question involve transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently,
the payments made by the appellees should be considered as payments to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her
heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during
the lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first blush, it would
appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility.
Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily
have tremendous repercussions and would bring about considerable
disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued already in favor of
innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined
to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation involving them by
overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of
which would not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially
correspond to each and all of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are
involved; as much as possible, they should not be made to suffer any prejudice
on account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more,
the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate court for
approval, and from already known and recorded actuations of said court then,
they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on their motions, since
appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her,
been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one of the subject
estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were
executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously
authorized or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of her act as
administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her either
conjointly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of
Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees merely followed
precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned
orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly fatal
infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales
are equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only
one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her
death or, to be more exact, one-half of her estate as per the inventory
submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous,
varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB
claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict
with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds
of sale executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those
corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been actually
under her control and administration had Hodges complied with his duty to
liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the
only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred
to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have
the requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges,
definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after
the death of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his wife,
he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the
provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by
appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple reason that by the very
orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957
and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court
"to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which
he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which
according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling
personal and real properties", and "to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament
of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if Hodges acted then as
executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these
blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of such grant of
authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its
main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he
acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned
orders would still suffice.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell"
upon which the deeds in question were based were executed by Hodges
before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons
already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain
or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any
supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court may be
invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not
objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in
nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of
rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the
impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the
assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by
the respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and conditions
embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just
discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments in
accordance with the respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the
others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S.
Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by
PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view of
the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is
again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in
question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held
above that, it being evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal
properties, much more than the properties covered by said deeds, would
inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal
complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such estate.
From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions, whether or not
it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made
by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and,
whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate
were strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the
government because of the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since
there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties or that
they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the
instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII,
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it
are fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the deeds executed by Magno
pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its
functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the
said estate of the right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2)
that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate
court, the power to determine the contending claims of third parties against
the estate of Hodges over real property," since it has in effect determined
whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective contracts to sell
executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were
complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court
has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as
determinative of the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee
Magno's having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB and allowed
the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive.
Since We have already held that the properties covered by the contracts in
question should be deemed to be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and
not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these incidents.
Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are
the real parties in interest having the right to oppose the consummation of the
impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones who are precisely
urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion
VIII, have no basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the
trial court requiring PCIB to surrender the respective owner's duplicate
certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and
otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates
and to issue new transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees,
suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was
within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by
withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding
registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders
favoring appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled, said
institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell
executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was
in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments
on account of its purchase, hence it received under date of October 4, 1965
and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from
PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as administrators of
the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it
made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all
your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would
"appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring this account
up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311,
Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after
alleging that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue
installments but uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that
XIX it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pending
XL, resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this
motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted
in the narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either
of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant — can pay to
both estates or either of them", considering that "in both cases (Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said
order. From the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not served
with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered
and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
November 20, 1965, and that what the order grants is different from what is
prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that the
matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court
and that the order authorized payment to a person other than the
administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We
must assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had
acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other
hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three
days after the date set for hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that
appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was
denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We
are not convinced that the relief granted is not within the general intent of the
Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this
point is that they are mere reiterations of contentions We have already
resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add,
perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower
court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all these appeal s by PCIB,
that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property
executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being
implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that
Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be
taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in
the cases of the sales herein involved, the interested parties are in agreement
that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule
just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission
clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of herein
appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the said
contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not
controlling, for if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere
unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines,
2nd paragraph) thepactum commissorium or the automatic rescission
provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy, unless there has
been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd
ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in connection with
the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the
issues herein taken up and resolved are rather numerous and varied, what
with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less
than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper
understanding of the import and extent of our rulings herein contained, it is
perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made
together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects.
. combined income of the conjugal partnership and then
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as
well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about
five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on different
occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and
administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to
hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the
condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the
remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d)
and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges
was appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of
the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in
which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties) and
to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living."
Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been
probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor
thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered
that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages
of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is
further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the
latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding
statements of account of his administration, with the particularity that in all
his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person interested in
the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be
given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges
until December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs.
Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her
husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and
bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision naturally made it
imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that
the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of
Hodges' own death, may be readily known and identified, no such liquidation
was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason for such
omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of
the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the
merely divided the same equally between himself and the
estate of the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he
also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate income
tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
of such combined income, thus reporting that the estate
of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently
omit in its order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the
name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already
deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper
correction "in order that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon
may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they
were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11,
1957, he expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except
brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving
spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", thereby
indicating that he was not excluding his wife's brothers
and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and
manifestations to the United States inheritance tax
authorities indicating that he had renounced his
inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs, which
attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an
alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the
Philippines and in which he even purportedly stated that
his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his rights
under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate
from any liability for the payment of income taxes on
income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges", his wife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon
motion of herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was
appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of
the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will
of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the
real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to
waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26,
1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a
certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and
when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time
appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P.
Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually
by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding
jointly, with each administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of
modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and
signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the
same to the court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise.
Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each
of them began acting later on separately and independently of each other,
with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers whom
it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate
independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing
in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate,
to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without
considering whether or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the
portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own
lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth
with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the
assumption that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of
these independent and separate actuations of the two administrators were
invariably approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the
differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than
anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the
deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association with them,
made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator
separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present judicial
controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December
14, 1957 as well as the approval by the court a quo of the annual statements
of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the
mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno
had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate
left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a
petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders
allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate
of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing,
as detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the
provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner
therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch
as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be enforced.
It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses
were both residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in
Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs.
Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal
partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in
accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code.
Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB
to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court
approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as administratrix
of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and
incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and executing
deeds of sale in favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still
registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding
"contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned
on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on
the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two estates
belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's
orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally
adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were
no more than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
executor of the will of his wife in due course of administration. As to the point
regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to
her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her
share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly
to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code,
she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas
under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of
Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal
partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had
as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his wife and,
therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters
effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just
summarized, We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27, 1957
and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate of
his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
as consisting of properties, which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do
actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs. Hodges in the
conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of
her will, any portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her
husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters share
and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to
the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make
thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said
orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time
said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet reached the point when
a final distribution and adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested
parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would be
done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of
portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly
permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to
third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes
have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant
in the record, and on the assumption that Hodges' purported renunciation
should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and
sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the
time of her death, minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of
therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December
25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative
dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof,
whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his
wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of
them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the
pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under
them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the
parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for
the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that
could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not
be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference
in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB
being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-
fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that
there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at
the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the matter
would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in
estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than
as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of
foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted
fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs.
Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective
hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand,
Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by
said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters
as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter
would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his
lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof
at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit
only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged
to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of
testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple
case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution
of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency
of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution
of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited
by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her
brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on
(1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear
that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not
it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his
inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in
the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position
to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues,
and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution
in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate,
however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this
stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the
terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their
conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his
lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by
PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the
Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be
her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her
husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to
conclude that in predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed
therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her
brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix
thereof, the trial court acted correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels
however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

determination of the specific properties constituting her estate, the two
administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of
September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its
decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by
appellee Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of administration and
attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there is such an estate
of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said
orders should be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by
the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the
size and value of the properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and administration expenses
in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by
appellee Magno, as administratrix, covering properties registered in the name
of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be
made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges
before the death of his wife, on the one hand, and those premised on
contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We
hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds
of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be
implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said
payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously
reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size
and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would
exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of
sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as pertaining to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the
situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, including the government, the
Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a
pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed orders
should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no
personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And
inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or
the government has objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to
these parties, there exists no reason for said orders to be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the
husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared
legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on
October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8,
1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth
always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such
administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and
shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other
of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment,
the trial court should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently
combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof
of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial
court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein
adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered
to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307,
while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said
respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be
administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without
prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its
removal as administrator12; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the
final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved
for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete
segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result
from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed
to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing
opinion.
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-
one additional appeal docket fees, but this decision shall nevertheless become
final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective
notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING,
in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of
the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.
82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is
recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered
regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and
legal issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and
legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses,
as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the Separate Opinions
husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from
said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative
dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance of the appealed orders
of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned
by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's writ of preliminary
injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6,
19671 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September 8,
19722 which directed that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N.
(Charles Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-appellee
Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) should act always conjointly never independently from each other, as
such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force and made part of
the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal
contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court on August 1,
1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23, 1957 and
(over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death on December 25,
1962 — during which time both estates have been pending settlement and
distribution to the decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now)
— that the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957 (supplementing
an earlier order of May 25, 1957)3 in granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor
of his wife Linnie's estate to continue their "business of buying and selling
personal and real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under his
obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of
his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done except to formally close her
estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so
that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters
as her designated heirs after him,4 — is wholly untenable and deserves scant
consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in
the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer exists any separate estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14, 1957
goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her
executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and
identity of his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his
own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered the
whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the entire
period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his own
death on December 25, 19625 and against the identical acts and
judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB
sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole
administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated
position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as well
as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is
merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her
brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate
court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its order of December 14,
1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must
therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and untenable
contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which
respondent Avelina Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent
Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307) and sanctioning
her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts
executed by her with the various individual appellees, which involve basically
the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a
separate estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue
to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail — a result of the Court's main
opinion at bar that there doesexist such an estate and that the two estates
(husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by their respective
administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-
27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-
37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered
to be added after payment of the corresponding docket
fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal
enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this
decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately
rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation
obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issues
of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has effectively
and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-
fourthof the community properties of the said spouses, as
of the time of the death of the wife on May 23,
1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons
from said date until his death, provided, first, that with
respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate,
unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no
deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8,
1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is
lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing
that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A.
Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from
each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the
same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in
force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of
their respective estates; provided, that upon the finality of
this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed
to the partition of the presently combined estates of the
spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs.
Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the
remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her
estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered
to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special
Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain
under the joint administrative of said respondent and
petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas
the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall
be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by
the trial court of thepending motions for its removal as
administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final
resolution of the two issues
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further
hearing and determination, and the
corresponding completesegregation and partition of the
two estates in the proportions that may result from the
said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the
court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the
views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing
opinion.8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters with right of
representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her
estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the
Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-
half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and
legally renouncedhis inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until
his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerative dispositions or
sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of
by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if
he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his
wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even
if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall
pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in her will
to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her
husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion over all her estate during
his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..."9 and that she
bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose
of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not
free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie
Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion"
over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N.
Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under
Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with
a resolutory term whereunder his right to the succession ceased in diem upon
arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her
brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder
their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the suspensive
term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all
remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's death remain
an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers and sisters,
I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of
any part or all of his wife's estate — "completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of
the main opinion, supra — and thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her
institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to
her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband." If according to the main
opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute
dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by
the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from
making such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the
partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or
community properties constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate, which
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges'
death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up
to now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the numerous
items, transactions and details of the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two
prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to
Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is not
entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally renounced
his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of
the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition and
segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties
to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts,
effects and consequences of the testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane
Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the
pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do not
appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs
and should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years without
any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for
their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been
reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as
concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some
assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an expeditious
closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as
one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two assumptions most
favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate
court must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the
laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens)
whereby the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses
would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of
our Civil Code (which provides that the national law of the decedents, in this
case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the result that her estate
would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since
the legitime of her husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties
or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not then
be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N.
Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under his
wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee
Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of
Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence,
her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of
the conjugal properties which is one-halfthereof and that in any event, Hodges
had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein
involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the
parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however that this
cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the
parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear
and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also,
the genuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent Magno [re
Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on
these two conflicting claims and issues which it deems "are not properly
before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that
remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in
the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of
Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is
no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has
validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and
in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the prompt
settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance — considering that the
estates have been long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively
— it was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the
guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite the closing
of the protracted estates proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the
heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its resolution of
this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely
the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the
resolution of the two questions of renvoiand renunciation, i.e. as to whether
C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the
inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a
consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed
out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the
purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her
heirs in accordance with her duly probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing
the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary
dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of
properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the end results,
depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the
probate court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not
entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that
he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should help
clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving
the onlyremaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth
of the community properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally
determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly
since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus of
the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state,
represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges'
own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate of his wife,
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practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
have equal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution
thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband
the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or
community property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the
conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained
authorization from the probate court
to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and
personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs.
Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistentlyreported the
considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or
coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs.
Hodges' estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid
the income taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he
could not in law do this, had he adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself,
thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that
"Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties
themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and
acts, therefore, all transactions made by Hodges after his wife's death were
deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's
death were for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and
community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that
no gratuitousdispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's
estate should be deducted from her separateestate as held in the main
opinion. On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be charged
to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or right to
make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her
brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession upon his death, not to
mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court per
its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal
partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the account of
their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike
and not to make any free dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges
himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been conducted, on the same
premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or
co-ownership, share and share alike — since the conjugal partnership
remained unliquidated — which is another way of saying that such
transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect
to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife
Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal stake and
share in the conjugal partnership which was not only left unliquidated but
continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's
approval by Hodges during the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale
executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be "signed jointly" by
respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its order
authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges to either estate, since
"there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued
conjoint administration by the administrators of the two estates of the
deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates should be administered
jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each
other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a
determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved
issue of how much more than the minimum of one-fourth of the community
or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate
depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed
consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein
involved" be held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence"
in order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate
court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the various documents
annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S.
Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's
estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his
inheritance under his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs
designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving husband of
the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the
will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel)
allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he
reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all
right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate" and
further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm,
and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said
return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to
receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my
deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my
estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie
Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to
formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the State
of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her husband C.
N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their respective deaths
on May 23, 1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his
inheritance from his wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will (her
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brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and
reiterated expressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later
for the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes
on income which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a
valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal
effectivity established by the probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges
must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore
acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties
since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple
substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30 and by virtue
of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N.
Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by force of his renunciation, Mrs.
Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her
husband's death are called immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then
pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective estates, with each
estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate and
inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like
expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents'
respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in
their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since most
laws and our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to
have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from his
wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or
"reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary law of the Hodges'
spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges'
estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957"
would have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist of three-
fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-
fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime
granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil
Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs.
Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for
such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that the Texas law
which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the
surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate
would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other half
pertaining to C. N. Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and
conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of
administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph
6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will,
the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it
was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to
Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same
was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and
sole heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their
Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to preserve
anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted
co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the
provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership"
nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and
sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons
her whole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and
sisters as his co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and
sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate as
well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters
as substitutes for Hodges because she willed that they would enter into the
succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion
concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges,
subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges
was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers
and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there
would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and
sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would
be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the arrival
of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he
does not become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would
"enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted" (Hodges)
under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus
accelerating their succession to her estate as a consequence of Hodges'
renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would
"during his natural lifetime ... manage, control, use and enjoy said estate" and
that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She
further willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of her estate,
and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal notwithstanding
"any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties
acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate, which at the time
of his death would pass in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as
the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to
have and to hold with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate,
by sale ... and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think
best ... . All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to
him and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the
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improved property now owned by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... .
He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and
may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband,
Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman
and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that "(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers
and/or sisters ...prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone
to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded
above that all transactions and sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death were by operation of the law of trust as well as
by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and
share alike, with the express authorization of the probate court per its orders
of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the
conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even after her
death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have
had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate
to whose succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and
permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with
"conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a
term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the
effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or
cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called
to the succession until the arrival of the period or its
expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into
possession of the property until after having given
sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted
heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the
succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of
the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers'
and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs commenced ex die,
i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned)
of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose
arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be uncertain. A term may
have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the day
when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive
effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He
adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is
not a condition but a term. If the arrival of the term would commence the right
of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his right,
it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive
term, the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case of a
resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for
a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years counted from Linnie's
death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve the only remaining
issue (involving the two questions of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove
discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the
deceased spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs
duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for
said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come to terms for the
adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of the up to now
unliquidated community properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses
(derived from their unliquidated conjugal partnership) rather than to get
bogged down with the formidable task of physically
segregating and partitioning the two estates with the numerous transactions,
items and details and physical changes of properties involved. The estates
proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name their respective
attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning
the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them — which can be
done then on their own without further need of intervention on the part of
the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of
the income and cash and liquid assets of the estates in such manner as may be
agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two
estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should not prove difficult,
considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of
the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been acquired by
the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain
other heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with
Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the removal of
petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate, 45 apparently impatient
with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running battle
between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice
of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these
guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well as the parties
towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the
distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly
entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired
objective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the
Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert
themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are
presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and
administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even
adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal
submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a yellow cover). As
stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal issue
raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a separate
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estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be administered by has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one
respondent Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative (31) additional appeal docket fees.
and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno),
the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees
approving sales contracts and other acts of administration executed and
with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice Barredo insofar as
performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been
it dismisses the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-
necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
27896 and affirms the appealed orders of the probate court in cases L-27936-
37.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure
of the two records on appeal to show on their face and state the material data
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy.
that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day reglamentary period as
Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his
required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside
deceased wife's estate — which question, still to be decided by the said
by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon
probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its
the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically
applicability in the present case — the said estate consists of one-half, not one-
the same main issues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been timely
fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth
taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded with the determination of the
nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because the
thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's
estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal properties, is still
records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing
under administration and until now has not been distributed by order of the
the timeliness of the appeals.
court.

Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and

The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion
jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the writer's concurrence in that the
of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum share is a misnomer and
question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of
is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually be
substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not
declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in
to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the
favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share,
rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation"48 — which calls for
or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which
"adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain
constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute
their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial
ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition, resolutory or
justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs
who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount Linnie's entire conjugal share.
considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled respondents'
objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy
of certiorari and prohibition" — "despite the conceded availability of appeal"
— on the ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues
involved in all these thirty-three appeals — (which) deal with practically the
same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a
single special civil action . . . " 50 Separate Opinions

(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action
at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of the
Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed
orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and
acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the main
opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one (31) additional appeal
docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the question of whether it
would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or prohibitive by requiring
the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order
questioned when the resolution of all such incidental questioned orders
involve basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence of a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously resolved
or determined in a single special civil action" (for which a single docket fee is
required) as stated in the main opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the
basic issues and the magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance of the appealed orders
of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned
by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's writ of preliminary
injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6,
19671 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September 8,
19722 which directed that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N.
(Charles Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-appellee

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) should act always conjointly never independently from each other, as
such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force and made part of
the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal
contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court on August 1,
1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23, 1957 and
(over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death on December 25,
1962 — during which time both estates have been pending settlement and
distribution to the decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now)
— that the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957 (supplementing
an earlier order of May 25, 1957)3 in granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor
of his wife Linnie's estate to continue their "business of buying and selling
personal and real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under his
obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of
his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done except to formally close her
estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so
that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters
as her designated heirs after him,4 — is wholly untenable and deserves scant
consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in
the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer exists any separate estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14, 1957
goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her
executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and
identity of his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his
own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered the
whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the entire
period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his own
death on December 25, 19625 and against the identical acts and
judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB
sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole
administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated
position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as well
as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is
merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her
brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate
court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its order of December 14,
1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must
therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and untenable
contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which
respondent Avelina Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent
Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307) and sanctioning
her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts
executed by her with the various individual appellees, which involve basically
the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a
separate estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue
to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail — a result of the Court's main
opinion at bar that there doesexist such an estate and that the two estates
(husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by their respective
administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-
27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-
37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered
to be added after payment of the corresponding docket
fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal
enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this
decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately
rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation
obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issues
of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has effectively
and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-
fourthof the community properties of the said spouses, as
of the time of the death of the wife on May 23,
1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons
from said date until his death, provided, first, that with
respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate,
unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no
deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8,
1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is
lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing
that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A.
Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from
each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the
same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in
force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of
their respective estates; provided, that upon the finality of
this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed
to the partition of the presently combined estates of the
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs.
Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the
remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her
estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered
to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special
Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain
under the joint administrative of said respondent and
petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special
Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas
the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall
be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by
the trial court of thepending motions for its removal as
administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final
resolution of the two issues
of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further
hearing and determination, and the
corresponding completesegregation and partition of the
two estates in the proportions that may result from the
said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the
court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the
views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing
opinion.8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters with right of
representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her
estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the
Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-
half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and
legally renouncedhis inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the
community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until
his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerative dispositions or
sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of
by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if
he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his
wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even
if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall
pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in her will
to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her
husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion over all her estate during
his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..."9 and that she
bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose
of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not
free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then." 10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie
Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion"
over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N.
Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under
Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with
a resolutory term whereunder his right to the succession ceased in diem upon
arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her
brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder
their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the suspensive
term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all
remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's death remain
an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers and sisters,
I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of
any part or all of his wife's estate — "completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of
the main opinion, supra — and thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her
institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to
her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband." If according to the main
opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute
dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by
the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from
making such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the
partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or
community properties constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate, which
task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges'
death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up
to now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the numerous
items, transactions and details of the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two
prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to
Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is not
entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally renounced
his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of
the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community
properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition and
segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties
to complete Linnie's separate estate.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts,
effects and consequences of the testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane
Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the
pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do not
appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs
and should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years without
any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for
their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been
reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as
concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some
assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an expeditious
closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as
one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two assumptions most
favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate
court must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the
laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens)
whereby the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses
would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of
our Civil Code (which provides that the national law of the decedents, in this
case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the result that her estate
would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since
the legitime of her husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties
or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not then
be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N.
Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under his
wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee
Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of
Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence,
her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of
the conjugal properties which is one-halfthereof and that in any event, Hodges
had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein
involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the
parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however that this
cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the
parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear
and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also,
the genuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent Magno [re
Hodges' renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on
these two conflicting claims and issues which it deems "are not properly
before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that
remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in
the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of
Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is
no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has
validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and
in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the prompt
settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance — considering that the
estates have been long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively
— it was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the
guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite the closing
of the protracted estates proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the
heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its resolution of
this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely
the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the
resolution of the two questions of renvoiand renunciation, i.e. as to whether
C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the
inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a
consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in
this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed
out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the
purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her
heirs in accordance with her duly probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing
the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary
dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of
properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the end results,
depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the
probate court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not
entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that
he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should help
clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving
the onlyremaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth
of the community properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally
determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly
since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus of
the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state,
represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges'
own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate of his wife,
practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
have equal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution
thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband
the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or
community property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the
conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained
authorization from the probate court
to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and
personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs.
Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistentlyreported the
considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or
coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Hodges' estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid
the income taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he
could not in law do this, had he adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself,
thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that
"Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties
themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and
acts, therefore, all transactions made by Hodges after his wife's death were
deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's
death were for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and
community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that
no gratuitousdispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's
estate should be deducted from her separateestate as held in the main
opinion. On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be charged
to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or right to
make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her
brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession upon his death, not to
mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court per
its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal
partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the account of
their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike
and not to make any free dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges
himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been conducted, on the same
premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or
co-ownership, share and share alike — since the conjugal partnership
remained unliquidated — which is another way of saying that such
transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect
to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife
Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal stake and
share in the conjugal partnership which was not only left unliquidated but
continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's
approval by Hodges during the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale
executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be "signed jointly" by
respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its order
authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges to either estate, since
"there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to
whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued
conjoint administration by the administrators of the two estates of the
deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership," 23since "it is but logical that both estates should be administered
jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each
other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a
determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved
issue of how much more than the minimum of one-fourth of the community
or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate
depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed
consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein
involved" be held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence"
in order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate
court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the various documents
annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S.
Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's
estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his
inheritance under his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs
designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving husband of
the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the
will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel)
allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he
reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all
right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate" and
further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm,
and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said
return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to
receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my
deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my
estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie
Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to
formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the State
of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her husband C.
N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their respective deaths
on May 23, 1957 and December 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his
inheritance from his wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will (her
brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and
reiterated expressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later
for the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes
on income which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a
valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal
effectivity established by the probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges
must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore
acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties
since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple
substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code 30 and by virtue
of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N.
Hodges) does not become an heir" 31 by force of his renunciation, Mrs.
Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her
husband's death are called immediately to her succession.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then
pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective estates, with each
estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate and
inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like
expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents'
respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in
their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since most
laws and our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to
have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from his
wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or
"reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary law of the Hodges'
spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges'
estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957"
would have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist of three-
fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-
fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime
granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil
Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs.
Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for
such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that the Texas law
which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the
surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate
would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other half
pertaining to C. N. Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and
conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their
respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of
administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph
6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will,
the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it
was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to
Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same
was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and
sole heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their
Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to preserve
anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted
co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the
provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership"
nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and
sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons
her whole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and
sisters as his co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her)
husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and
sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate as
well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters
as substitutes for Hodges because she willed that they would enter into the
succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion
concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges,
subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges
was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers
and sisters-in-law." 34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there
would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and
sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would
be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the arrival
of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he
does not become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would
"enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted" (Hodges)
under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus
accelerating their succession to her estate as a consequence of Hodges'
renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would
"during his natural lifetime ... manage, control, use and enjoy said estate" and
that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She
further willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of her estate,
and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal notwithstanding
"any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties
acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate, which at the time
of his death would pass in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as
the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to
have and to hold with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate,
by sale ... and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think
best ... . All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to
him and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the
improved property now owned by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... .
He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and
may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband,
Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman
and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that "(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers
and/or sisters ...prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone
to such brother or sister had she or he survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded
above that all transactions and sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's
death were by operation of the law of trust as well as
by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and
share alike, with the express authorization of the probate court per its orders
of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the
conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even after her
death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have
had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate
to whose succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and
permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with
"conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a
term." 41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the
effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or
cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called
to the succession until the arrival of the period or its
expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into
possession of the property until after having given
sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted
heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the
succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of
the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers'
and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs commenced ex die,
i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned)
of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose
arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be uncertain. A term may
have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the day
when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive
effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall
cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He
adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is
not a condition but a term. If the arrival of the term would commence the right
of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his right,
it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive
term, the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case of a
resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for
a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years counted from Linnie's
death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve the only remaining
issue (involving the two questions of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove
discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the
deceased spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs
duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for
said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come to terms for the
adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of the up to now
unliquidated community properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses
(derived from their unliquidated conjugal partnership) rather than to get
bogged down with the formidable task of physically
segregating and partitioning the two estates with the numerous transactions,
items and details and physical changes of properties involved. The estates
proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name their respective
attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning
the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them — which can be
done then on their own without further need of intervention on the part of
the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of
the income and cash and liquid assets of the estates in such manner as may be
agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two
estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should not prove difficult,
considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of
the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been acquired by
the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain
other heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with
Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the removal of
petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate, 45 apparently impatient
with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running battle
between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice
of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these
guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well as the parties
towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the
distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly
entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired
objective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the
Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert
themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are
presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and
administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even
adopt harsher measures." 46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal
submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a yellow cover). As
stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal issue
raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a separate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be administered by
respondent Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative
and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be
administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno),
the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court
approving sales contracts and other acts of administration executed and
performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been
necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure
of the two records on appeal to show on their face and state the material data
that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day reglamentary period as
required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside
by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon
the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
the same main issues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been timely
taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded with the determination of the
thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's
records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing
the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and
jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the writer's concurrence in that the
question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of
substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not
to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the
rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation"48 — which calls for
"adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain
their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial
justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount
considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled respondents'
objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy
of certiorari and prohibition" — "despite the conceded availability of appeal"
— on the ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues
involved in all these thirty-three appeals — (which) deal with practically the
same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a
single special civil action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action
at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of the
Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed
orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and
acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the main
opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one (31) additional appeal
docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the question of whether it
would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or prohibitive by requiring
the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order
questioned when the resolution of all such incidental questioned orders
involve basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence of a
separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously resolved
or determined in a single special civil action" (for which a single docket fee is
required) as stated in the main opinion. 51 Considering the importance of the
basic issues and the magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer
has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one
(31) additional appeal docket fees.
[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000.]
NENG "KAGUI KADIGUIA" MALANG, Petitioner, v. HON. COROCOY MOSON,
Presiding Judge of 5th Shari’a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI
MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG,
FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA
KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and MABAY GANAP
MALANG, Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the issue of
whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the
property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the
effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter,
"P.D. 1083" or "Muslim Code"). The question is raised in connection with the
settlement of the estate of the deceased husband.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday)
Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael
Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang
was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aida’s dowry (mahr or majar).
Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and
Aida already had two children when he married for the second time another
Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child
was born out of Hadji Abdula’s second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was
pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were
childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai
(Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, TaIayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a
daughter named; Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that
place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and selling
of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula
married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but
he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married
petitioner Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives
he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were
childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and
selling of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in
Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by
tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut Planters Bank,
Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City,
Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed
with the Shari’a District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of
his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of
her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that
his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula
and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which
are titled in Hadji Abdula’s name "married to Neng P. Malang," and a pick-up
jeepney.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On February 7, 1994, the Shari’a District Court ordered the publication of the
petition. 1 After such publication 2 or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad
Ulyssis Malang ("Hadji Mohammad", for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji
Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters
that his father’s surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving
spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving
spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji
Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as "Teng Abdula," son; (f) Hadji
P a g e 75 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as "Keto Abdula," son, (g) Fatima
Malang, also known as "Kueng Malang," daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son,
and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis
Malang alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang,
had helped their father in his business, then they were more competent to be
administrators of his estate. 3 outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the decedent. 19
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang,
Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an
opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of
Hadji Mohammad. 4 because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim
On April 7, 1994, the Shari’a District Court issued an Order appointing Hadji
Mohammad administrator of his father’s properties outside Cotabato City. The
same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang as joint
administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required
to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. 5 On April 13, 1994, letters of
administration were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the
required bond. He took his oath on the same day. 6 The following day, Hadji
Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence, they
were allowed to take their oath as administrators. 7 On April 25, 1994 and May
3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula
had outstanding deposits with nine (9) major banks. 8 Petitioner prayed that
the managers of each of those banks be ordered to submit a bank statement
of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula. 9 The Shari’a District Court having
granted the motions, 10 Assistant Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha of
United Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that as of April 24, 1994, the
outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five hundred
twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight centavos
(P1,520,400.48). 11 The Senior Manager of the Cotabato branch of Metrobank
also certified that as of December 18, 1993, "Hadji Abdula Malang or
Malindatu Malang" had on savings deposit the balance of three hundred
seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos
(P378,493.32). 12 PCIB likewise issued a certification that Hadji Abdula had a
balance of eight hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current account as of
August 11, 1994. 13
During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure
that required immediate medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she filed a
motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to withdraw
from UCPB the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that
shall constitute her advance share in the estate of Hadji Abdula. 14 After due
hearing, the Shari’a District Court allowed petitioner to withdraw the sum of
two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00). 15
On May 12, 1994, the Shari’a District Court required petitioner and Hadji
Ismael as joint administrators to submit an inventory and appraisal of all
properties of Hadji Abdula. 16 In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael
submitted an inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven
(7) residential lots with assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00,
an agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey
residential buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential building. 17 All these
properties were declared for taxation purposes in Hadji Abdula’s
name.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji Abdula
"married to Neng Malang" had seven (7) residential lots with a total assessed
value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued at
P30,000.00 and bank deposits. 18
In the Memorandum that she filed with the Shari’a District Court, petitioner
asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle
and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with Article 160 of
the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located
On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that
all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for various
reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with petitioner
women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous
marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a
bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship. Second, the decedent
adopted a "complete separation of property regime" in his marital relations;
while his wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis
contributed to the decedent’s properties, there is no evidence that petitioner
had contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the
presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal
properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the
decedent was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the properties are not
conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled
in the name of the decedent "married to Neng Malang" because such
description is not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property.
Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the
properties belonged "to the estate of decedent," she was estopped from
claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were conjugal in
nature just because some of the properties were titled in Hadji Abdula’s name
"married to Neng Malang." Fifth, if it is true that the properties were conjugal
properties, then these should have been registered in the names of both
petitioner and the decedent. 20
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Shari’a District Court presided by Judge
Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married
eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be
applied if there is more than one wife because "conjugal partnership
presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law
relationship." The court further found that the decedent was "the chief, if not
the sole, breadwinner of his families" and that petitioner did not contribute to
the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The
description "married to Neng Malang" in the titles to the real properties is no
more than that the description of the relationship between petitioner and the
decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong
to the conjugal partnership of gains. The court stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the
properties in question. To sustain the contention of the petitioner that the
properties are her conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to
the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of the marriage of
the petitioner with the decedent, there were already three (3) existing
marriages. Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had
agreed that the property regime between them will be governed by the regime
of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null and void for it is
against the law, public policy, public order, good moral(s) and
customs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation
P a g e 76 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage ARTICLE 145. Finality of Decisions. — The decisions of the Shari’a District
settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no Courts whether on appeal from the Shari’a Circuit Court or not shall be final.
evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of
had begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent. 21
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing "an original
Thus, the Shari’a District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in action of certiorari with the Supreme Court." 24
the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly disposed of the
case as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. She contends that the Shari’a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:chanrob1es District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula
virtual 1aw library Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang,
Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the properties
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b)
funeral expenses in the amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the holding that said properties are not conjugal because under Islamic Law, the
amount of P2,040.80; regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of
stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in contract.25cralaw:red
Talayan, Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be
distributed and adjudicated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library As petitioner sees it, "the law applicable on issues of marriage and property
regime is the New Civil Code", under which all property of the marriage is
a) Jubaida Kado Malang 2/64 of the estate presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Shari’a Court,
meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership as
b) Nayo Omar Malang 2/64 of the estate incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and
held the applicable property regime to be complete separation of property
c) Mabai Aziz Malang 2/64 of the estate under P.D. 1083.

d) Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang 2/64 of the estate Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is
one of first impression — this is a singular situation where the issue on what
e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang 14/64 of the estate law governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated prior to the
passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Shari’a court for the
f) Ismael Malindatu Malang 14/64 of the estate Court’s resolution — the Court decided to solicit the opinions of two amici
curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Puno 26 and former Congressman Michael O.
g) Datulna Malang 14/64 of the estate Mastura. 27 The Court extends its warmest thanks to the amici curiae for their
valuable inputs in their written memoranda 28 and in the hearing of June 27,
h) Lawanbai Malang 7/64 of the estate 2000.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang 7/64 of the estate Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few
of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are established by
Total 64/64 the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events
or judicial decrees affecting civil status. 29 It also explains why the evidence in
3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang by the instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
way of advance be charged against her share and if her share is not sufficient,
to return the excess; and What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight
marriages, counting the three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the
Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months from receipt of this enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives — namely,
order. Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai — all divorces of which took place before
the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18,
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four
wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that begot with Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws
Order. The oppositors objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995; the were in force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula:
Shari’a District Court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 22 the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. 23 However, on January 19, ("R.A. 394"), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18,
1995, she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal on the 1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977;
strength of the following provisions of P.D. No. 1083:chanrob1es virtual 1aw and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.
library
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall
resolution of the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92.
with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us could result
in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well as cast profound However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed
implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance
herein. Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must reopen in order with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon
to supply the factual gaps or, in Congressman Mastura’s words, "missing links", recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at any
that would be the bases for judgment and accordingly, allow respondent court time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said
to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of
imperative on our part to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and the non-Christian provinces.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent
court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims
are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code,
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition — P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the
concerning the property regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of
the effectivity of the Muslim Code — was interposed in relation to the Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims
settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of estates of thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in
Muslims whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may accordance with said Code.
easily result in the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus
convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim
presented and identify such collateral issues as are required to be resolved in
a settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts it, Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code;
the Court does not often come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence
will be greatly enriched by a discussion of the "watershed of collateral issues" The Effect of People v. Subano and People v. Dumpo
that this case presents. 30
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which
The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby sanctioned multiple marriages. 32 It is also not to be disputed that the only
present in question form: (1) What law governs the validity of a Muslim law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims
marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the Muslim alike was the Civil Code of 1950.
Code? (2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the
Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the Court’s pronouncements in People v. The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification 33 of Muslim
Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect personal laws, 34 also provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its
Muslim marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (4) enactment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple marriages
celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the succession to ARTICLE 186. Effect of code on past acts. — (1) Acts executed prior to the
the estate of a Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of
took effect? (6) What laws apply to the dissolution of property regimes in the their. execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided,
cases of multiple marriages entered into before the Muslim Code but dissolved shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired
(by the husband’s death) after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are or liability incurred thereby.
Muslim divorces effected before the enactment of the Muslim Code
valid?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; 35 accordingly, every case of
amicus curiae Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. 36 Article 186
reference of respondent court, and for the direction of the bench and aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
bar:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of
a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code — in respect of civil acts
First Collateral Issue: The Law[s] Governing Validity of that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the
The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous
was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the marriage. "Bigamous or polygamous marriages" are considered void and
marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code 31 recognized the right of Muslims to inexistent from the time of their performance. 37 The Family Code which
contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites, by providing superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a
that — subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment
declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void. 38 These provisions
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is
provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced. or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the relations between husband and wife.
enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the
Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage ARTICLE 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all
can exist at any given time property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is
paraphernal.
In People v. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not
parricide, since — ARTICLE 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.

(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that ARTICLE 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and
the defendant has three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law, 39 of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for
the crime of parricide.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary ARTICLE 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.
In People v. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when,
legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was not
duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
appears that the consent of the bride’s father is an indispensable requisite to by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
the validity of a Muslim marriages and as Mora Dumpo’s father categorically salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.chanrob1es virtua1
affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the 1aw 1ibrary
Court held that such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not
for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in
bigamy. Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the man and woman living together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. 41 Situating these rulings to
second marriage contained all the essential requisites to make it valid, a the instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of
conviction for bigamy would have prospered. 40 the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdula’s marriages celebrated subsequent
to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil
Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such
marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their
of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively. 42
Absent such proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired during
This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our the subsistence of a valid marriage — and in the Civil Code, there can only be
holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by one validly-existing marriage at any given time — is conjugal property of such
the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs subsisting marriage. 43
the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the
time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following
law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, provisions of the said Code are pertinent:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes
substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
and after August 3, 1988. of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
(2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife, and (3) when and
how the subject properties were acquired. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
1aw library Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of
any property shall .be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
ARTICLE 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of family and of the household.
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code
the consent of the other, until after the termination of the provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
cohabitation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
ARTICLE 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common legitimate.
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first
termination of the cohabitation. one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the child.
ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint This physical impossibility may be caused:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of (1). By the impotence of the husband;
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint (2). By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way
deposits of money and evidences of credit. that access was not possible;

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co- (3). By the serious illness of the husband.
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly ARTICLE 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary adulteress.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the
in bad faith. governance of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of
Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties "live legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:chanrob1es
together as husband and wife" the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
they "live exclusively with each other as husband and wife." Also, in contrast
to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of ARTICLE 58. Legitimacy, how established. — Legitimacy of filiation is
the Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for established by the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the
instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties mother at the time of the conception of the child.
prove their "actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry" and
only to the extent of their proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza ARTICLE 59. Legitimate children. —
v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo v. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related
cases are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares (1). Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate.
that the share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his
property regime of such existing marriage. allegation.

Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and (2). Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or
within two years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be
Dissolution of Property Regimes legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than
that of physical impossibility of access between the parents at or about the
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code time of the conception of the child.
which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate
succession and the respective shares of the heirs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw ARTICLE 60. Children of subsequent marriage. — Should the marriage be
1ibrary dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her
‘idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior
Meanwhile; the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former
parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.
the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.
ARTICLE 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. — If, after the dissolution of
The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant by her former husband, she
force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived shall, within thirty days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy,
or born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of death on December 18, 1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the
birth.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined
provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. by the first corollary, issue are conjugal properties and should be liquidated
Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this being the law
include:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(a). The husband, the wife; b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the
Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal
(b). The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother; properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under
the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as
(c). The daughter and the son’s daughter in the direct line; determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective
evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively.
(d). The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine
brother. c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedent’s son, by the rules on co-ownership.
she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such
descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate. 44 The respective d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding
shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula
for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083. are his exclusive properties.

Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the 4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in
intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdula’s legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as
Effectivity of the Muslim Code determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as determined
under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death, will govern the determination of their
provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from respective shares.
June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969. 45 Thus, a
Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to
June 13, 1969.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary resolve in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary issues herein presented
and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence should be
From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages
issues as to further situate the points of controversy in the instant case for the performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of
guidance of the lower court. Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in
accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus indicating which marriage
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by the first,
of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact
validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was periods of actual cohabitation ("common life" under a "common roof") of each
celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing of the marriages during which time the parties lived together; (4) the
undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the marriages identification of specific properties acquired during each of the periods of
were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of
which only one marriage can exist at any given time. acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing the asset as
owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce children (legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the
depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce under dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and
R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and 2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
void if it took place from June 14, 1969. 46 1ibrary

2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards
the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who among
the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The children
conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the first
corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be
determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the
applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his
Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of
petitioner to decedent took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the law applicable
on the issue of marriage settlement, 47 but espouses that customs or
established practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with
the force of law to the instant case. 48 Congressman Mastura’s disquisition
has proven extremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in which
Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted, particularly the
interconnectedness of law and religion for Muslims 49 and the impracticability
of a strict application of the Civil Code to plural marriages recognized under

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Muslim law. 50 Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant
case applying such laws and rights as are in existence at the time the pertinent
civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable to supplant governing law with
customs, albeit how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply
a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning the distribution of property
between divorced spouses upon one of the spouses’ death. 51
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Shari’a
District Court of Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE,
and the instant petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence
and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in
this Decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000.]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1
modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City
2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Alicia"),
as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-
five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United
States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4 "(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States
and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines
Sur. 5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York. 6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo
was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited
the Philippines. 7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was
"living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente. 8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the
child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank. 9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946,
the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family
allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and
all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be
suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo
would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public
Pedro Osabel. 10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County
of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of
the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided
in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15
Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and
unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo,
Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and
165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether
real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed
to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of
by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my
Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act,
any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute
should served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree
in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any
real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of
them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament." 17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate. 18
"Bicol Star." 26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision,
thus:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente
for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled
to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under
Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly,
all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3)
months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her
to be performed.

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the "On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence
testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19 could not be granted.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court "SO ORDERED." 27
admitted the will to probate. 20
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. aforequoted decision. 28
21
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were
she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were not legally adopted by him. 29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23 portion of the estate. 30

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-
755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. 24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial
court gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25cralaw:red
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she

P a g e 83 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not
cohabitation. sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’
"SO ORDERED." 32 hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.
38
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. 33 First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated
in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law.
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, 34 denied the motion for lack of There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
merit. United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens
and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the
Hence, this petition. 35 law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. 39 Second, there is no
showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by
The Issue New York State law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere
raised, 36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
N. Llorente? children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one
case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
deceased. cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The Applicable Law The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) here obtaining.
execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed. Validity of the Foreign Divorce

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 40 we held that owing to the nationality principle
foreign law. embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
The Civil Code clearly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
"ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, their national law.
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 41 that
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained
"ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable
of the country where it is situated. and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
may be found." (Emphasis ours) on the status of persons.

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they be reversed. 43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from
must be alleged and proved. 37 his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to
the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of Validity of the Will
the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
The Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

P a g e 84 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
"ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (Emphasis
ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and
children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." 44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether
the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent’s national
law. 45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination
of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the
parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of
the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO
SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Sison and Aruego for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November
1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy,
China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the
deceased is more than P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the
Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China,
leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy,
Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana,
Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second
marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special
proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued
to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will
and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines
on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied
because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the
hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss
of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of
the will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to
prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil., 793). In spite of the fact that
a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the
taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7
February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the
hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed
the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation,
claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late
father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the
deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and
probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay
filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will
executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will
executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his
mother Maria Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate
of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of
their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to
Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño and the
subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by
the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such
assignments cannot be threshed out in this proceedings which is concerned
only with the probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January
P a g e 85 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7
February 1938 was no bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or
before the expiration of ten years.
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the
execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is
proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally
destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor
unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof
must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal
of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other
wills are filed and recorded.
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an
attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was
an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this
alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was one of the
witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B.
Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the
testator's signature the attesting witnesses signed and each of them signed
the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the presence of
the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th,
50th, 55th and 63rd interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the
drafting thereof (answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the
contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that
language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-
interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the lost will was
revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to the
25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B.
Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of the draft
(Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-
interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of Alberto Barretto in November
1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th
interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B.
Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction" (answers to the 81st,
82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the
"Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" (answers
to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs.
Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read
the translation (answers to the 67th interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read
the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers
to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her
brother Apolonio Suntay she learned that her father left a will "because of the
arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing along with him certain
document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our father
Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24
February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document
in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the
will by her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to
Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and
Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that
portion, then he turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p.
528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the part of
the will on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544,
t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her
father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n.,
hearing of 19 January 1948), before the last postponement of the hearing
granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los Reyes
Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32,
t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the
envelope Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s.
n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50,
t. s. n., Id.).
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio
Teodoro And returned by the latter to the former because they could not
agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office straight
from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to
the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934 (p.
273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her
brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t.
s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948), must not be true.
Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying
against her own interest, still the fact remains that she did not read the whole
will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only
the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and
Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination
that she read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her
testimony in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned
over or handed the document to Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto
in November 1929 when the will was signed, then the part of his testimony
that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You
had better see if you want any correction" and that "after checking Jose B.
Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and
executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of
the will, because it must have been corrected before and all corrections and
additions written in lead pencil must have been inserted and copied in the final
draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the draft
(Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the
appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the
provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he
learned to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from
reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that
he read the supposed will or the alleged will of his father and that the share of
the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p. 229,
t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to oppose the
appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had
acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her
deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229,
P a g e 86 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the original will or just the copy thereof
(Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired
all the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only
child by the second marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it
may, his testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take two-
thirds of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and
the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict
legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio,
Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the surviving
widow and her child Silvino.
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed
in the envelope (Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not
revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls
short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be
"clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible
witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or
upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he
prepared or drew up two mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the
rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez
for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking up the
final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel
Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-
4, 449, t. s. n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B.
Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the former asked him to draw up
another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the rough
draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel
Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of
Jose B. Suntay copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.);
that the handwritten insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not
his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the first will made
up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or
three months after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449,
t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the China Banking
Building on Dasmariñas street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a
Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that
occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following words were
written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after
the signing of the will it was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together
with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the envelope was
sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398,
401, 441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in
his house one Saturday in the later part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh
and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on
the following Monday Go Toh went to his law office bringing along with him
the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he
would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that
Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his house or in his law
office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no
occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in
connection with the complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the
alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of
Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B. Suntay
at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part
as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the
same assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio
Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words, "Because I
can not give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was signed.
I have to bring that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t.
s. n., Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy,
China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws
of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper
Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court
having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the
hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the
Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed
and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as
if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court
must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of
wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid
will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There
is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions
propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic
of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the
appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of
Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert
on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted,
the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-
examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district
court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy
does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure
in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as
those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and
for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both
to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were
known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice
was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476,
P a g e 87 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the
standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all
interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such
interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as
follows:
ORDER:
SEE BELOW
The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the
interrogated parties, who declare that there are no errors, after said
minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of
the 35th year of the Republic of China in the Civil Section of the
Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
HUANG KUANG CHENG
Clerk of Court
CHIANG TENG HWA
Judge
(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).
does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot
be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance
of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as
proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the
will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
court of this country.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, A. Reyes, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
As a preliminary statement we may well refer to the case of Maria Natividad
Lim Billian, petitioner and appellant, vs.Apolonio Suntay, Angel Suntay,
Manuel Suntay, and Jose Suntay, oppositors and appellees, 63 Phil., 793-797,
in which the following decision was rendered by this Court on November 25,
1936, holding that the will executed by Jose B. Suntay who died in the City of
Amoy, China, on May 14, 1934, was lost under the circumstances pointed out
therein, and ordering the return of the case to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for further proceedings:
On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy, China. He
married twice, the first time to Manuela T. Cruz with whom he had
several children now residing in the Philippines, and the second time
to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son.
On the same date, May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the
deceased by his first marriage, filed the latter's intestate in the Court
of First Instance of Manila (civil case No. 4892).
On October 15, 1934, and in the same court, Maria Natividad Lim
Billian also instituted the present proceedings for the probate of a
will allegedly left by the deceased.
According to the petitioner, before the deceased died in China he
left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A) containing his will and,
also another document (Exhibit B of the petitioner) said to be a true
copy of the original contained in the envelope. The will in the
envelope was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs. Go Toh,
Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. On
August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as attorney-in-fact of the petitioner,
arrived in the Philippines with the will in the envelope and its copy
Exhibit B. While Go Toh was showing this envelope to Apolonio
Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first marriage of the deceased,
they snatched and opened it and, after getting its contents and
throwing away the envelope, they fled.
Upon this allegation, the petitioner asks in this case that the
brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay, children by the
first marriage of the deceased, who allegedly have the document
contained in the envelope which is the will of the deceased, be
ordered to present it in court, that a day be set for the reception of
evidence on the will, and that the petitioner be appointed executrix
pursuant to the designation made by the deceased in the will.
In answer to the court's order to present the alleged will, the
brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay stated that they
did not have the said will and denied having snatched it from Go Toh.
In view of the allegations of the petition and the answer of the
brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay, the questions
raised herein are: The loss of the alleged will of the deceased,
whether Exhibit B accompanying the petition is an authentic copy
thereof, and whether it has been executed with all the essential and
necessary formalities required by law for its probate.
At the trial of the case on March 26, 1934, the petitioner put two
witnesses upon the stand, Go Toh and Tan Boon Chong, who
corroborated the allegation that the brothers Apolonio and Angel
appropriated the envelope in the circumstances above-mentioned.
The oppositors have not adduced any evidence counter to the
testimony of these two witnesses. The court, while making no
express finding on this fact, took it for granted in its decision; but it
dismissed the petition believing that the evidence is insufficient to
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establish that the envelope seized from Go Toh contained the will of
the deceased, and that the said will was executed with all the
essential and necessary formalities required by law for its probate.
In our opinion, the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the
document contained in the envelope. Oppositors' answer admits
that, according to Barretto, he prepared a will of the deceased to
which he later become a witness together with Go Toh and Manuel
Lopez, and that this will was placed in an envelope which was signed
by the deceased and by the instrumental witnesses. In court there
was presented and attached to the case an open and empty
envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto, Go Toh and
Manuel Lopez. It is thus undeniable that this envelope Exhibit A is
the same one that contained the will executed by the deceased-
drafted by Barretto and with the latter, Go Toh and Manuel Lopez as
attesting witnesses. These tokens sufficiently point to the loss of the
will of the deceased, a circumstance justifying the presentation of
secondary evidence of its contents and of whether it was executed
with all the essential and necessary legal formalities.
The trial of this case was limited to the proof of loss of the will, and
from what has taken place we deduce that it was not petitioner's
intention to raise, upon the evidence adduced by her, the other
points involved herein, namely, as we have heretofore indicated,
whether Exhibit B is a true copy of the will and whether the latter
was executed with all the formalities required by law for its probate.
The testimony of Alberto Barretto bears importantly in this
connection.
Wherefore, the loss of the will executed by the deceased having
been sufficiently established, it is ordered that this case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in obedience
to this decision, without any pronouncement as to the costs. So
ordered
On June 18, 1947, Silvino Suntay, the herein petitioner, filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan praying "that an order be issued (a) either
directing the continuation of the proceedings in the case remanded by the
Supreme Court by virtue of its decision in G. R. No. 44276 and fixing a date for
the reception of evidence of the contents of the will declared lost, or the
allowance, filing and recording of the will of the deceased which had been duly
probated in China, upon the presentation of the certificates and
authentications required by Section 41, Rule 123 (Yu
Chengco vs. Tiaoqui supra), or both proceedings concurrently and
simultaneously; (b) that letters of administration be issued to herein petitioner
as co-administrator of the estate of the deceased together with Federico
Suntay; and (c) that such other necessary and proper orders be issued which
this Honorable Court deems appropriate in the premises." While this petition
was opposed by Federico C. Suntay, son of the deceased Jose B. Suntay with
his first wife, Manuela T. Cruz, the other children of the first marriage, namely,
Ana Suntay, Aurora Suntay, Concepcion Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de
Suntay, Manuel Suntay and Emiliano Suntay, filed the following answer stating
that they had no opposition thereto; "Come now the heirs Concepcion Suntay,
Ana Suntay, Aurora Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de Suntay, Manuel Suntay,
and Emiliano Suntay, through their undersigned attorney, and, in answer to
the alternative petition filed in these proceedings by Silvino Suntay, through
counsel, dated June 18, 1947, to this Honorable Court respectfully state that,
since said alternative petition seeks only to put into effect the testamentary
disposition and wishes of their late father, they have no opposition thereto."
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered on April 19,
1948, the following decision:
This action is for the legalization of the alleged will of Jose B. Suntay,
deceased.
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of this case, it is
necessary to state the background on which the alternative petition
of the herein petitioner Silvino Suntay has been based.
The decision of the Supreme Court (Exhibit O), in re will of the
deceased Jose B. Suntay, 63 Phil., 793-797, is hereunder produced:
(As quoted above)
The above quoted decision of the Supreme Court was promulgated
on November 25, 1936 (Exhibit O).
The Clerk of the Court of Court of First Instance of Bulacan notified
the parties of the decision on December 15, 1936; and the case was
set for hearing on February 12, 1937, but it was transferred to March
29, 1937 (Exhibit O), on motion of the then petitioner Maria
Natividad Lim Billian (Exhibit F). Again, it was postponed until
"further setting" in the order of court dated March 18, 1937, upon
motion of the petitioner (Exhibit H).
In the meantime, the deposition of Go Toh was being sought (Exhibit
H).
The hearing of the case was again set for February 7, 1936, by order
of the court dated January 5, 1938, upon motion of Emiliano Suntay
and Jose Suntay, Jr. On the same day of the hearing which had been
set, the petitioner, then, Maria Natividad Lim Billian, sent a telegram
from Amoy, China, addressed to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan moving for the postponement of the hearing on the ground
that Atty. Eriberto de Silva who was representing her died (Exhibit
K). The court, instead of granting the telegraphic motion for
postponement, dismissed the case in the order dated February 7,
1938 (Exhibit L).
On July 3, 1947, the petitioner Silvino Suntay filed a motion for the
consolidation of the intestate Estate of the deceased Jose B. Suntay,
Special Proceeding No. 4892 and the Testate Estate of Jose B.
Suntay, Special Proceeding No. 4952, which latter case is the subject
of the said alternative petition. The motion for the merger and
consolidation of the two cases was granted on July 3, 1947.
That oppositor, Federico C. Suntay, in the Testate Proceeding filed a
motion to dismiss the alternative petition on November 14, 1947,
which was denied by the court in its resolution of November 22,
1947. The said oppositor not being satisfied with the ruling of this
court denying the motion to dismiss, filed before the Supreme Court
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a petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction, which
was dismissed for lack of merit on January 27, 1948.
In obedience to the decision of the Supreme Court (Exhibit O) and
upon the alternative petition of Silvino Suntay, and, further, upon
the dismissal of the petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary
injunction, the court was constrained to proceed with the hearing of
the probate of the lost will, the draft of which is Exhibit B, or the
admission and recording of the will which had been probated in
Amoy, China.
The evidence for the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, shows that Jose B.
Suntay married twice; first to Manuela T. Cruz who died on June 15,
1920 and had begotten with her Apolonio, now deceased,
Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano and
Jose, Jr., all surnamed Suntay, and second, to Maria Natividad Lim
Billian with whom he had as the only child Silvino Suntay, the
petitioner herein.
Some time in November 1929, Jose B. Suntay executed his last will
and testament in the office of Atty. Alberto Barretto in Manila, which
was witnessed by Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and Go Toh. The
will was prepared by said Alberto Barretto upon the instance of Jose
B. Suntay, and it was written in the Spanish language which was
understood and spoken by said testator. After the due execution of
the will, that is signing every page and the attestation clause by the
testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, the will
was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A), sealed and on the said
envelope the testator and the three subscribing witnesses also
signed, after which it was delivered to Jose B. Suntay.
A year or so after the execution of the will, Jose B. Suntay together
with his second wife Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino Suntay
who was then of tender age went to reside in Amoy, Fookien, China,
where he died on May 14, 1934. The will was entrusted to the
widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian.
Upon the death of Jose B. Suntay on May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay,
the oldest son now deceased, instituted the Intestate Proceedings
No. 4892, upon the presumption that no will existed. Maria
Natividad Lim Billian who remained in Amoy, China, had with her the
will and she engaged the services of the law firm of Barretto and
Teodoro for the probate of the will. Upon the request of the said
attorneys the will was brought to the Philippines by Go Toh who was
one of the attesting witnesses, and it was taken to the law office of
Barretto and Teodoro. The law firm of Barretto and Teodoro was
composed of Atty. Alberto Barretto and Judge Anastacio Teodoro.
The probate of the will was entrusted to the junior partner Judge
Anastacio Teodoro; and, upon the presentation of the sealed
envelope to him, he opened it and examined the said will
preparatory to the filing of the petition for probate. There was a
disagreement as to the fees to be paid by Maria Natividad Lim Billian,
and as she (through Go Toh) could not agree to pay, P20,000 as fees,
the will was returned to Go Toh by Judge Anastacio Teodoro after
the latter had kept it in his safe, in his office, for three days.
Subsequently, the will inside the envelope was snatched from Go
Toh by Manuel Suntay and Jose, Jr., which fact has been established
in the decision of the Supreme Court at the beginning of this
decision. Go Toh could recover the envelope (Exhibit A) and the
piece of cloth with which the envelope was wrapped (Exhibit C).
The Testate Proceeding was filed nevertheless and in lien of the lost
will a draft of the will (Exhibit B) was presented as secondary
evidence for probate. It was disallowed by this court through Judge
Buenaventura Ocampo, but on appeal the Supreme Court remanded
the case to this court for further proceeding (Exhibit C).
In the meantime, a Chinese will which was executed in Amoy
Fookien, China, on January 4, 1931, by Jose B. Suntay, written in
Chinese characters (Exhibit P) was discovered in Amoy, China,
among the papers left by Jose B. Suntay, and said will had been
allowed to probate in the Amoy District Court, China, which is being
also presented by Silvino Suntay for allowance and recording in this
court.
The said petition is opposed by Federico C. Suntay on the main
ground that Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino Suntay have no
more interest in the properties left by Jose B. Suntay, because they
have already sold their respective shares, interests and
participations. But such a ground of opposition is not of moment in
the instant case, because the proposition involved herein in the
legalization of the lost will or the allowance and recording of the will
which had been probated in Amoy, China.
It is now incumbent upon this court to delve into the evidence
whether or not Jose B. Suntay, deceased, left a will (the draft of
which is Exhibit B) and another will which was executed and another
will which was executed and probated in Amoy, China.
There is no longer any doubt that Jose B. Suntay while he was still
residing in the Philippines, had executed a will; such is the conclusion
of the Supreme Court in its decision (Exhibit O). That the will was
snatched and it has never been produced in court by those who
snatched it, and consequently considered lost, is also an established
fact.
The contention of the oppositor, Federico C. Suntay, is that the will
that was executed by Jose B. Suntay in the Philippines contained
provisions which provided for equal distribution of the properties
among the heirs; hence, the draft (Exhibit B) cannot be considered
as secondary evidence, because it does not provide for equal
distribution, but if favors Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino
Suntay. He relies on the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto who
declared that the first will which he drafted and reduced into a plain
copy was the will that was executed by Jose B. Suntay and placed
inside the envelope (Exhibit A).
Granting that the first will which Atty. Alberto Barretto had drafted
became the will of Jose B. Suntay and it was snatched by, and,
therefore, it had fallen into the hands of, Manuel Suntay and the
brothers of the first marriage, it stands to reason that said Manuel
Suntay and brothers would have been primarily interested in the
production of said will in court, for obvious reasons, namely, that
they would have been favored. But it was suppressed and "evidence
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" (Section 69 (e),
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court). The contention, therefore, that the
first will which was drafted by Atty. Barretto was the one placed
inside the envelope (Exhibit A) is untenable.
It might be said in this connection that the draft of the will (Exhibit
B) has been admitted by Atty. Alberto Barretto as identical in
substance and form to the second draft which he prepared in
typewriting; it differs only, according to him, in style. He denied that
the insertions in long hand in the said draft are in his own
handwriting; however, Judge Anastacio Teodoro averred that the
said insertions are the handwriting of Atty. Alberto Barretto. But
when Atty. Alberto Barretto was asked to show any manuscript of
his for purposes of comparison, he declined to do so alleging that he
did not have any document in his possession showing his
handwriting notwithstanding the fact that he was testifying in his
own house at 188 Sta. Mesa Boulevard, Manila. He further testified
that the first will be drafted contained four or five pages, but the
second draft contained twenty-three pages; that he declared in one
breath that he did not read the will any more when it was signed by
the testator and the attesting witnesses because it would take up
much time, and in the same breath he declared that he checked it
before it was signed; and that he destroyed the draft of the first will
which was in his own handwriting, but he delivered the draft of the
second will which he prepared to Jose B. Suntay in the presence of
Manuel Lopez, now deceased.
Whether or not the final plain copy of the draft of the will (Exhibit B)
was executed by the testator, Jose B. Suntay, and attested by the
subscribing witnesses, Atty. Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and Go
Toh, is the pivotal point in this instant case. Judge Anastacio Teodoro
testified that he opened the sealed envelope when it was given to
him by Go Toh preparatory to the presentation of the petition for
the probate of the said will. As the lawyer entrusted with that task,
he had to examine the will and have it copied to be reproduced or
appended to the petition. He could not do otherwise if he is worth
salt as a good lawyer; he could not perform the stunt of "blind flying"
in the judicial firmament. Every step must be taken with certainty
and precision under any circumstances. He could not have talked
about the attorney's fees with Go Toh, unless he has not examined
the will beforehand. And, declaring that it was the exact draft of the
will that was inside the envelope (Exhibit A), the testimony of Atty.
Alberto Barretto to the contrary notwithstanding.
The testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro is corroborated by Go
Toh, one of the attesting witnesses, in his deposition (Exhibit D-1).
Ana Suntay, one of the heirs and who would be affected adversely
by the legalization of the will in question, also testified on rebuttal
that she saw the original will in the possession of Manuel Suntay,
immediately after the snatching. She read it and she particularly
remembers the manner in which the properties were to be
distributed. Exhibit B was shown to her on the witness stand and she
declared that the provision regarding the distribution of the
properties in said Exhibit B is the same as that contained in the
original will. Said testimony of Ana Suntay, therefore, belies the
testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto.
With respect to the proof of lost or destroyed will, Section 6 of Rule
77 provides as follows:
"No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the
execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is
proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or it is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally
destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor
unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof
must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal
of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other
wills are filed and recorded."
Section 8 of the same Rule provides as follows:
"If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing that the subscribing
witnesses are dead or insane, or that none of them resides in the
Philippines the court may admit the testimony of other witnesses to
prove the sanity of the testator, and the due execution of the will;
and as evidence of the due execution of the will, it may admit proof
of the handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing witnesses,
or any of them."
Manuel Lopez as one of the subscribing witnesses is dead. Atty.
Alberto Barretto and Go Toh are still living. The former testified
during the hearing, while Go Toh's deposition was introduced in
evidence which was admitted. In the absence of the testimony of
Manuel Lopez, deceased, the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro
and Ana Suntay was received.
It is an established fact that the will, draft of which is Exhibit B, was
lost or destroyed; that it was executed and valid and that it existed
at the time of the death of Jose B. Suntay. These circumstances also
apply to the will (Exhibit P) which was executed in Amoy, China.
The contents of the Chinese will is substantially the same as the draft
(Exhibit B). Granting that the will executed in the Philippines is non-
existent as contended by the oppositor, although the findings of this
court is otherwise, the will executed and probated in China should
be allowed and recorded in this court. All the formalities of the law
in China had been followed in its execution, on account of which it
was duly probated in the Amoy District Court. There is no cogent
reason, therefore, why it should not be admitted and recorded in
this jurisdiction.
The said will (Exhibit P) in Chinese characters is presented as an
alternate in case the will executed in the Philippines would not be
allowed to probate, or as a corroborative evidence that the will, the
draft of which is Exhibit B, has been duly executed in the Philippines
by Jose B. Suntay.
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court covers the allowance of will proved
outside of the Philippines and administration of estate thereunder.
Section 1 of said rule provides:
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"Wills proved and allowed in the United States, or any state or
territory thereof, or in foreign country, according to the laws of such
state, territory, or country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by
the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines."
Section 2 of the same rule provides:
"When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court
having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the
hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance."
This court has delved deep into the evidence adduced during the
hearing with that penetrating scrutiny in order to discovery the real
facts; it had used unsparingly the judicial scapel; and it has
winnowed the evidenced to separate the grain from the chaff. All
the facts lead to the inevitable conclusion that Jose B. Suntay, in his
sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress or undue
influence, executed the will which is lost, the draft of which is Exhibit
B, with all the necessary formalities prescribed by law. He, likewise,
executed the second will (Exhibit P) in Amoy, China, which has been
duly probated in Amoy District Court,-a corroborative evidence that
the testator really executed the will. Copies of the said wills duly
certified and under the seal of the court are appended hereto,
marked Exhibits B and P, and they form part of this decision.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court is of the opinion
and so declares that the draft of the will (Exhibit B) is, to all legal
intents and purposes, and testament of the deceased Jose B. Suntay.
With costs against the oppositor, Federico C. Suntay.
Oppositor Federico C. Suntay filed on May 20, 1948, a motion for new trial and
to set aside the decision rendered on April 19, 1948, to which the petitioner
filed an opposition, followed by a reply filed by the oppositor and an answer
on the part of the petitioner. Without reopening the case and receiving any
new or additional evidence, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on
September 29, 1948, promulgated the following resolution setting aside his
first decision and disallowing the wills sought to be probated by the petitioner
in his alternative petition filed on June 18, 1947:
This is a motion for new trial and to set aside the decision legalizing
the will of Jose B. Suntay and allowing and recording another will
executed by him in Amoy, China.
By virtue of this motion, this court is constrained to go over the
evidence and the law applicable thereto with the view of
ascertaining whether or not the motion is well founded. Both parties
have presented extensive memoranda in support of their respective
contentions.
This court has gone over the evidence conscientiously, and it
reiterates its findings of the same facts in this resolution, whether or
not the facts established by the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, warrant
the legalization of the lost will and the allowance and recording of
the will that was executed in Amoy, China, is therefore, the subject
of this instant motion.
A. As to the legalization of the Lost Will. — There is no question in
the mind of this court that the original will which Jose B. Suntay,
deceased executed in the Philippines in the year 1929 was lost
(Exhibit O, Decision of the Supreme Court). The evidence adduced
by the petitioner during the hearing has established through the
testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro and that of Go Toh (an
attesting witness) that the will was executed by Jose B. Suntay,
deceased, with all the formalities required by law. For the purpose
of legalizing an original and existing will, the evidence on record is
sufficient as to the execution and attesting in the manner required
by law.
Section 8 of Rule 77 provides as follows:
"SEC. 8. Proof when witnesses dead or insane or do not reside in
the Philippines. — If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing that
the subscribing witnesses are dead or insane, or that none of them
resides in the Philippines, the court may admit the testimony of
other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator, and the due
execution of the will; and as evidence of the execution of the will,
may admit proof of the handwriting of the testator and of the
subscribing witnesses, or any of them."
Section 11 of said rule also provides as follows:
"SEC. 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where
contest. — If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses
present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and
examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must
be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of the subscribing
witnesses are present in the Philippines, but outside the province
where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If all
or some of the subscribing witnesses produced and examined testify
against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having
attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may
be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was
executed and attested in the manner required by law."
The three attesting witnesses were Manuel Lopez, deceased Alberto
Barretto and Go Toh. The last two witnesses are still living; the
former testified against and the latter in favor. In other words, the
attesting witness, Go Toh, only, testified in his deposition in favor of
the due execution of the will. Hence, the petitioner presented
another witness, Judge Anastacio Teodoro, to establish and prove
the due execution of the said will. Ana Suntay was also presented as
a witness in rebuttal evidence. The testimony of Go Toh in his
deposition as an attesting witness, coupled with the testimony of
Judge Anastacio Teodoro who was able to examine the original will
that was executed by Jose B. Suntay, deceased, when it was given to
him by Go Toh for the purpose of filing the petition in court for its
legalization, and could recognize the signatures of the testator as
well as of the three attesting witnesses on the said original will is
sufficient to convince the court that the original will was executed
by the deceased Jose B. Suntay with all the formalities required by
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
law. The original will, therefore, if it was presented in court to
probate would be allowed to all legal intents and purposes. But it
was not the original will that was presented, because it was lost, but
an alleged draft (Exhibit B) of the said original will which does not
bear the signature of the testator and any of the attesting witness.
The original will was duly executed with all the formalities required
by law, but it was unfortunately lost; and the curtain falls for the
next setting.
The Court is now confronted with the legalization of the lost will —
whether or not the draft (Exhibit B) should be admitted as secondary
evidence in lieu of the lost will and allowed to probate.
Section 6. Rule 77 provides as follows:
"SEC. 6. Proof of lost or destroyed will — Certificate thereupon. — No
will shall be proved as a lost will or destroyed will unless the
execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is
proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally
destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor
unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof
must be distinctly stated and certified by the Judge, under the seal
of the court and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other
wills are filed and recorded." (Emphasis Court's)
From the above quoted provision of the law, it is clear that the
petitioner should not only establish the execution and validity of the
will, its existence at the time of the death of the testator or its
fraudulent and accidental destruction in the lifetime of the testator
without his knowledge, but also must prove its provisions clearly and
distinctly by at least two credible witnesses. The exact language of
the clause in the above quoted provision of the law is "nor unless its
provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses." The legalization of a lost will is not so easy, therefore, as
that of an original will. The question, therefore, is boiled down to,
and projected on the screen, in a very sharp focus; namely, the
execution and validity must be established and the provisions must
be clearly and distinctly proved by at least credible witnesses.
Granting that the execution and validity of the lost will have been
established through the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro and
Go Toh, and perhaps superficially by the rebuttal witness, Ana
Suntay, does it follow that the provisions of the lost will have been
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses? A
careful review of the evidence has revealed that at most the only
credible witness who testified as to the provisions of the will was
Judge Anastacio Teodoro, and yet he testified on the provisions of
the lost will with the draft (Exhibit B) in his hands while testifying. It
may be granted, however, that with or without the draft of the will
(Exhibit B) in his hands, he could have testified clearly and distinctly
on the provisions of the said lost will, because he had kept the will
in his safe, in his office, for three days, after opening it, and he is well
versed in Spanish language in which the will as written. But did the
attesting witness Go Toh, testify in his deposition and prove clearly
and distinctly the provisions of the lost will? He did not, and he could
not have done so even if he tried because the original will was not
read to him nor by him before or at the signing of the same. It was
written in Spanish and he did not and does not understand the
Spanish language. Neither was there any occasion for him to have
the contents of the said will, after its execution and sealing inside
the envelope (Exhibit A), read to him because it was opened only
when Judge Teodoro had examined it and then subsequently
snatched from Go Toh. Ana Suntay on rebuttal did not, likewise,
prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of the said lost will
because she has not had enough schooling and she does possess
adequate knowledge of the Spanish language as shown by the fact
that she had to testify in Tagalog on the witness standing.
It is evident, therefore, that although the petitioner has established
the execution and validity of the lost will, yet he had not proved
clearly and distinctly the provisions of the will by at least two
credible witnesses.
B. As to the Allowance and Recording of the will Executed in Amoy,
China. — Jose B. Suntay, while he was residing in China during the
remaining years of his life, executed also a will, written in Chinese
characters, the translation of which is marked Exhibit P. It was
allowed to probate in the District Court of Amoy, China. The
question is whether or not the said will should be allowed and
recorded in this jurisdiction.
Section 1 of Rule 78 provides as follows:
"SEC. 1. Will proved outside Philippines any be allowed here. — Will
proved and allowed in the United States, or any state or territory
thereof, or in a foreign country, according to the laws of such state,
territory, or country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper court of First Instance in the Philippines."
Section 2 of the same Rule also provides:
"SEC. 2. Notice of hearing for allowance. — When a copy of such will
and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a
petition for allowance in the Philippines by the executor or other
persons interested, in the Court having jurisdiction, such court shall
fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance."
Sections 41 and 42 of Rule 123 provides as follows:
"SEC. 41. Proof of Public or official record. — An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is within the United States or its territory, the
certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district
or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by
the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer having a
seal of the office and having official duties in the district or political
subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of
his office. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
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country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the United States stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office."
F. "SEC. 42. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy
of writing is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court."
In the case of Yu Changco vs. Tiaoqui, 11 Phil. 598, 599, 600, our
Supreme Court said:
"Section 637 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that will proved and
allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country,
may be allowed, filed, and recorded in the Court of First Instance of
the province in which the testator has real or personal estate on
which such will may operate; but section 638 requires that the proof
of the authenticity of a will executed in a foreign country must be
duly "authenticated". Such authentication, considered as a foreign
judicial record, is prescribed by section 304, which requires the
attestation of the clerk or of the legal keeper of the records with the
seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a
certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate that the
signature of either of the functionaries attesting the will is genuine,
and, finally, the certification of the authenticity of the signature of
such judge or presiding magistrate, by the ambassador, minister,
consul, vice consul or consular agent of the United States in such
foreign country. And, should the will be considered, from an
administrative point of view, as a mere official document 'of a
foreign country', it may be proved, 'by the original, or by a copy
certified by the legal keeper thereof, with a certificate, under the
seal of the country or sovereign, that the document is a valid and
subsisting document of such country, and that the copy is duly
certified by the officer having the legal custody of the original. (Sec.
313, par. 8)."
In the case of Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, 611, 612, and 613, our
Supreme Court said:
"It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed
in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia
govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of
Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg,
Charles E., Vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director
of the National Library. But this was far from compliance with the
law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
(1918), 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was not showing that the book from which an extract
was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State
of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original under the seal
of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the
extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the
alleged will was executed.
"It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator
had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands.
The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the
recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner.
"While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney
for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court
to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the
petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing
purporting to be the last will and testament of Edward Randolph Hix,
deceased, was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk
of Randolph County, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly
proven by the oaths of Dana Vansley and Joseph L. Madden, the
subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and filed.
It was shown by another document that in vacation, on June 8, 1929,
the clerk of court of Randolph County, West Virginia, appointed
Claude E. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the
estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased ... However this may be no
attempt has been made to comply with the provisions of sections
637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for no hearing on
the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and
allowed in West Virginia has been requested. ... ."
Granting that the will of Jose B. Suntay which was executed in Amoy,
China, was validly done in accordance with the law of the Republic
of China on the matter, is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the
existence of such law in China as a prerequisite to the allowance and
recording of said will? The answer is in the affirmative as enunciated
in Fluemer vs. Hix, supra, and in Yanez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 29
Phil., 606. In the latter case, the Supreme Court said:
"A foreign law may be proved by the certificate of the officer having
in charge of the original, under the seal of the state or country. It
may also be proved by an official copy of the same published under
the authority of the particular state and purporting to contain such
law. (Secs. 300 and 301, Act No. 190.), (Syllabus.)
The provisions of section 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190) are as follows:
"SEC. 300. Printed laws of the State or Country. — Books printed or
published under the authority of the United States, or one of the
States of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting to
contain statutes, codes, or other written law of such State or country
or proved to be commonly admitted in the tribunals of such State or
country an evidence of the written law thereof, are admissible in the
Philippine Islands are evidence of such law."
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"SEC. 301. Attested copy of foreign laws. — A copy of the written law
or other public writing of any state or country, attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal
of the state or country, is admissible as evidence of such law or
writing."
The petitioner has presented in evidence the certification of the
Chinese Consul General, Tsutseng T. Shen, of the existence of the
law in China (Exhibit B-3), relative to the execution and probate of
the will executed by Jose B. Suntay in Amoy, China (Exhibit P). Is that
evidence admissible, in view of the provisions of Sections 41 and 42
of the Rules of the Rules of Court. Is the said certification of the
Chinese Consul General in the Philippines a substantial compliance
with the provisions of the above mentioned section 41 and 42 of our
Rules of Court?
This court has its doubts as to the admissibility in evidence of the
Chinese Consul General in the Philippines of the existence of the
laws of Republic of China relative to the execution and probate of a
will executed in China. Such law may exist in China, but —
"An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidence by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. ... If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the United States stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office." (Sec. 41 of Rule 123.)
The law of the Republic of China is a public or official record and it
must be proved in this jurisdiction through the means prescribed by
our Rules of Court. It is, therefore, obvious that the Chinese Counsel
General in the Philippines who certified as to the existence of such
law is not the officer having the legal custody of the record, nor is he
a deputy of such officer. And, if the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United States
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
It is clear, therefore, that the above provisions of the Rules of Court
(Rule 123, sec. 41) not having been complied with, the doubt of this
court has been dissipated, and it is of the opinion and so holds that
the certification of the Chinese Consul General alone is not
admissible as evidence in the jurisdiction.
The evidence of record is not clear as to whether Jose B. Suntay, who
was born in China, but resided in the Philippines for a long time, has
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization, or he remained a citizen
of the Republic of China. The record does not, likewise, show with
certainty whether or not he had changed his permanent domicile
from the Philippines to Amoy, China. His change of permanent
domicile could only be inferred. But the question of his permanent
domicile pales into insignificance in view of the overtowering fact
that the law of China pertinent to the allowance and recording of
the said will in this jurisdiction has been satisfactorily established by
the petitioner.
Both the petitioner and the oppositor have extensively urged in their
respective memorandum and in the oral argument in behalf of the
oppositor the question of estoppel. The consideration of the points
raised by them would open the door to the appreciation of the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will which is not of moment
at the present stage of the proceeding. While the probate of a will is
conclusive as to the compliance with all formal requisites necessary
to the lawful execution of the will, such probate does not affect the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will. With respect to the
latter the will in governed by the substantive law relative to descent
and distribution. (In re Johnson, 39 Phil., 157).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and upon reconsideration, the
previous decision rendered in this case allowing the will (Exhibit B)
and allowing and recording the foreign will (Exhibit P) is set aside;
and this court is of the opinion and so holds that the said two wills
should be, as they are hereby disallowed. Without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is very significant that in the foregoing resolution, the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan "reiterates its finding of the same facts in this resolution," and
merely proceeds to pose the sole question "whether or not the facts
established by the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, warrant the legalization of the
lost will and allowance and recording of the will that was executed in Amoy,
China." The somersault executed by the trial court is premised on the ground
that "although the petitioner has established the execution and validity of the
lost will, yet he has not proved clearly and distinctly the provisions of the will
by the least two credible witnesses"; and that, assuming that the will of Jose
B. Suntay executed in Amoy, China, was in accordance with the law of the
Republic of China, the certification of the Chinese Consul General in the
Philippines as the existence of such law is not admissible evidence in this
jurisdiction. In effect the resolution on the motion for reconsideration
promulgated by the trial court, and the decision of the majority herein, adopt
the position that the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro as to the
provisions of the lost will, while credible and perhaps sufficient in extent, is
not corroborated by the witnesses Go Toh and Ana Suntay and, therefore, falls
short of the requirement in section 6, Rule 77, of the Rules of Court that the
provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
witnesses." That this requirement was obviously construed, to mean that the
exact provisions are to be established, may be deduced from the following
dialogue between his Honor, Judge Potenciano Pecson, and attorney Teofilo
Sison, new counsel for oppositor Federico C. Suntay, who appeared for the
first time at the ex parte hearing of the oppositor's motion for new trial on
September 1, 1949:
COURT: However, Rule 77, Section 6, provides in proving a lost will,
the provisions of the lost will must be distinctly stated and certified
by the Judge.
ATTY. TEOFILO SISON: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: That presupposes that the judge could only certify to
the exact provisions of the will from the evidence presented.
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ATTY. TEOFILO SISON: That is our contention, provided that
provision is clearly established by two credible witnesses so that the
Court could state that in the decision, we agree, that is the very
point.
(t. s. n. 75, Session of Sept. 1, 1948)
The sound rule, however, as we have found it to be, as to the degree of proof
required to establish the contents of a lost or destroyed will, is that there is
sufficient compliance if two witnesses have substantiated the provisions
affecting the disposition of the testator's properties; and this is especially
necessary to prevent the "perpetration of fraud by permitting a presumption
to supply the suppressed proof," to keep a wrong-doer from utilizing the rule
as his "most effective weapon," or to avoid the enjoyment of a "premium from
the rascality of one whose interests might suggest the destruction of a will."
Section 1865 of the Code requires that the provisions of a lost will
must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses before it can be admitted to probate; but this section must
receive a liberal construction (Hook vs. Pratt, 8 Hun. 102-109) and
its spirit is complied with by holding that it applies only to those
provisions which affect the disposition of the testator's property and
which are of the substance of the will.
The allegations of the contents of the will are general, and under
ordinary circumstances, would be in sufficient; but the fact alleged,
if proven as alleged, would certainly authorize the establishment of
the will so far as its bequests are concerned. To require that a copy
of the will or the language of the bequests, in detail, should be
pleaded, where no copy has been preserved, and where the memory
of the witnesses does not hold the exact words, would not only deny
the substance for mere form, but would offer a premium upon the
rascality of one whose interests might suggest the destruction of a
will. As said in Anderson vs. Irwin, 101 Ill. 411: "The instrument in
controversy having been destroyed without the fault of the
defendant in error ... and there not appearing to be any copy of it in
existence, it would be equivalent to denying the complainant relief
altogether to require her to prove the very terms in which it was
conceived. All that could reasonably be required of her under the
circumstances could be to show in general terms the disposition
which the testator made of his property by the instruments; that it
purported to be his will and was duly attested by the requisite
number of witnesses." In Allison vs. Allison, 7 Dana 91, it was said in
speaking of the character and extent of proof required in such a
case:" nor is there any just ground to object to the proof because
the witnesses have not given the language of the will or the
substance thereof. They have given the substance of the different
devises as to the property or interest devised, and to whom devised
and we would not stop, in the case of a destroyed will, to scan with
rigid scrutiny the form of the proof, provided we are satisfied of the
substance of its provisions." (Jose vs. Casler 139 Ind. 392, 38 N. E.
812).
The evidence in the case falls short of establishing the existence of
such a writing, except as it may be presumed, under the maxim
Omnia preasumuntur in odium spoliateris." There was evidence
tending to show that the second will of Anne Lambie was in the
possession of Francis Lambie, and that it came to the hands of the
proponents, warranting the inference that it has been suppressed or
destroyed. If from this evidence the jury found such paper destroyed
the law permits the presumption that it was legally drawn and
executed, notwithstanding the terms of the statute, which requires
the revoking instrument to be formally executed. If a will be lost,
secondary evidence may be given of its contents; if suppressed or
destroyed, the same is true; and, if necessary the law will prevent the
perpetration of a fraud by permitting a presumption to supply the
suppressed proof. We cannot assent to the proposition that the
statute is so right as to be the wrongdoer's most effective weapons.
The misconduct once established to the satisfaction of the jury, it is
no hardship to the wrongdoer to say. "Produce the evidence in your
possession, or we will presume that your opponent's contention is
true." When one deliberately destroys, or purposely induces another
to destroy, a written instrument subsequently become a matter of
judicial inquiry between the spoliator and an innocent party, the
latter will not be required to make strict proof of the contents of such
instrument in order to establish a right founded thereon. Brook, Leg.
Max. 576, Preston vs. Preston, 132, Atl. 55, 61. (Re Lambie's Estate,
97 Mich, 55,56 N. W. 225)
Judged from the standard set forth in the foregoing authorities, and bearing in
mind that the circumstances of this case lead to the only conclusion that the
loss of the will in question is of course imputable to those whose interests are
adverse to the petitioner and the widow Lim Billian, we have no hesitancy in
holding the view that the dispositions of the properties left by the deceased
Jose B. Suntay is provided in his will which was lost or snatched in the manner
recited in the decision of this Court in the case of Lim Billian vs. Suntay, 63
Phil., 798-797, had been more than sufficiently proved by the testimony of
Judge Anastacio Teodoro, Go Toh, and Ana Suntay, supported conclusively by
the draft of the lost will presented in evidence as Exhibit "B", and even by the
testimony of oppositor Federico C. Suntay himself.
It is to be recalled that the trial Judge, in his first decision of April 19, 1948,
made the following express findings with respect to the testimony of Judge
Teodoro: "Judge Anastacio Teodoro testified that he opened the sealed
envelope when it was given to him by Go Toh preparatory to the presentation
of the petition for the probate of the said will. As the lawyer entrusted with
that task, he had to examine the will and have it copied to be reproduced or
appended to the petition. He could not do otherwise if he is worth his salt as
a good lawyer. He could not perform the stunt of "blind flying" in the judicial
firmament. Every step must be taken with certainty and precision under any
circumstances. He could not have talked about the attorney's fees with Go
Toh, unless he has not examined the will beforehand. And, when he was
shown Exhibit B, he did not hesitate in declaring that it was the exact draft of
the will that was inside the envelope (Exhibit A), the testimony of Atty. Alberto
Barretto to the contrary notwithstanding."
We should not forget, in this connection, that in the resolution on the motion
for reconsideration the trial Judge reiterated the findings in his decision,
although as regards the testimony of Judge Teodoro admittedly "the only
credible witness who testified as to the provisions of the will," he observed
that Judge Teodoro had the draft Exhibit "B" in his hands while testifying. We
cannot see any justifying for the observation, assuming that Judge Teodoro
consulted the draft, since even the trial Judge granted that he "could have
testified clearly and distinctly on the provisions of the said lost will, because
he had kept the will in his safe, in his office, for three days, after opening it,
and he is well versed in Spanish language in which the will was written." As a
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matter of fact, however, it is not true that Judge Teodoro had the draft in
question before him while testifying as may be seen from the following
passages of the transcript:
Q. And, have you read that will which was inside this envelope,
Exhibit A? — "A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember more or less the contents of the will?
ATTY. FERRIN: With our objection, the best evidence is original will
itself, Your Honor.
ATTY. RECTO: We are precisely proving by means of secondary
evidence, the contents of the will, because according to the
Supreme Court, and that is a fact already decided, that the will of
Jose B. Suntay was lost and that is res adjudicata.
COURT: Witness may answer.
WITNESS: I remember the main features of the will because as I said
I was the one fighting for the postponement of the hearing of the
intestate case because I was asked by Don Alberto Barretto to secure
the postponement until the will that was executed by the deceased
is sent here by the widow from China, with whom we communicated
with several letters, and when the will arrived. I had to check the
facts as appearing in the will, and examined fully in connection with
the facts alleged in the intestate, and there was a striking fact in the
intestate that Apolonio Suntay has..
ATTY. FERRIN: (Interrupting) May we ask that the witness answer
categorically the questions of Atty. Recto, it seems that the answers
of the witness are kilometric ...
ATTY. RECTO: Sometimes the question cannot be answered fully
unless the witness would relate and give all the facts.
COURT: The Attorney for the Administrator may move for the
striking out of any testimony that is not responsive to the question.
ATTY. FERRIN: That is why, our objection, the answer is out of the
question.
COURT: Atty. Recto may propound another question.
ATTY. RECTO: I heard the witness was saying something and he has
not finished the sentence, and I want to ask the Court just to allow
the witness to finish his sentence.
COURT: You may finish.
WITNESS: "A. There was a sentence, the point I was trying to check
first was whether the value of the estate left by the deceased was
SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) as Apolonio Suntay made it
appear in his petition, and when I looked at the original will, I found
out that it was several hundred thousand pesos, several thousands
of pesos, hundreds of pesos, that was very striking fact to me
because the petition for intestate was for SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P60,000.00), and I came to know that it was worth more than SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P700,000.00) PESOS.
Q. Do you remember, Judge, the disposition of the will, the main
disposition of the will? — "A. Yes, because our client were the
widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian, and his son, Silvino, the only son
in the second marriage, that was very important for me to know.
Q. How were the properties distributed according to that will?- "A.
The properties were distributed into three (3) parts, one part which
we call legitima corta, were equally distributed to the ten (10)
children, nine (9) in the first marriage, and one (1) in the second
marriage with Maria Natividad Lim Billian. The other third, the
betterment was given to four (4) children, Concepcion, and Apolonio
getting a quiet substantial share in the betterment, around SIXTY
THOUSAND (P60,000.00) for Concepcion, Apolonio the amount of
SEVENTY THOUSAND (70,000,00) PESOS or little over, and then
about ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS of the
betterment in favor of Silvino, the minor of the second marriage, and
to Jose equal to Concepcion.
Q. So the betterment, as I understand from you went to four (4)
children?-"A. Yes.
Q. Silvino in the second marriage, Concepcion, Apolonio and Jose in
the first marriage? — " A. Yes.
Q. What about the free disposal?-" A. The free disposal was disposed
in favor of the widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino, his
minor son in equal parts..
Q. What about, if you remember, if there was something in the will
in connection with that particular of the usufruct of the widow? —
"A. It was somewhat incorporated into the assets of the estate left
by the deceased.
Q. Do you remember the number of pages of which that will
consisted? — "A. Twenty-three (23) pages.
Q. Do you remember if the pages were signed by the testator? — "A.
Yes, sir, it was signed.
Q. And the foot of the testament or the end of the testament, was it
signed by the testator? — "A. Yes, sir, and the attestation clause was
the last page signed by the three instrumental witnesses, Alberto
Barretto, one Chinaman Go Toh, and Manuel Lopez, my former
Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy.
Q. Do you remember if there witnesses signed on the different pages
of the will? — "A. Yes, sir, they signed with their name signatures.
Q. Showing you this document consisting of twenty-three (23) pages
in Spanish and which document appears already attached to this
same testamentary proceedings and already marked as EXHIBIT B,
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will you please tell the Court if and for instance on page eight (8) of
this document, pagina octavo, it says, there are handwritings in
pencil, some of which read as follows: "Los cinco-octavos (5/8)
partes corresponds a mi hijo Emiliano", can you recognize whose
handwriting is that? — "A. From my best estimate it is the
handwriting of Don Alberto Barretto.
Q. About the end of the same page eight (8) pagina octavo, of the
same document Exhibit B, there is also the handwriting in pencil
which reads: "La otra sexta parte (6.a) corresponde a Bonifacio
Lopez", can you recognize that handwriting? — "A. Yes, sir, this is
the handwriting of Don Alberto Barretto, and I wish to call the
attention of the Court to compare letter "B" which is in capital letter
with the signature of Don Alberto Barretto in the envelope, "Alberto
Barretto" and stroke identifies one hand as having written those
words.
Q. Will you please go over cursorily this document, Exhibit B
composed of twenty-three (23) pages and please tell the Court if this
document had anything to do with the will which according to you
was contained in the envelope, Exhibit A? — "A. This is exactly the
contents of the original will which I received and kept in my office
inside the safe for three (3) days, and I precisely took special case in
the credits left by the deceased, and I remember among them, were
the De Leon family, and Sandiko, well known to me, and then the
disposition of the estate, divided into three (3) equal parts, and I
noticed that they are the contents of the will read.
His Honor, Judge Pecson, was positive in his first decision that "the testimony
of Judge Anastacio Teodoro is corroborated by Go Toh, one of the attesting
witnesses, in his deposition (Exhibit D-1)." Yet in setting aside his first decision,
he remarked that Go Toh's testimony did not prove clearly and distinctly the
provision of the lost will, because: "He did not, and he could not have done so
even if he tried because the original will was not read to him nor by him before
or at the signing of the same. It was written in Spanish and he did not and does
not understand the Spanish language. Neither was there any occasion for him
to have the contents of the said will, after its execution and sealing inside the
envelope (Exhibit A), read to him, because it was opened only when Judge
Teodoro had examined it and then subsequently snatched from Go Toh."
The later position thus taken by Judge Pecson is palpably inconsistent with the
following unequivocal statements of Go Toh contained in hid disposition taken
in Amoy, China, on April 17, 1938, and in oppositor's Exhibit "6":
26. State what you know of the contents of that will.
. . . . Regarding (1) expenditures (2) Philippine citizenship; (3)
Distribution of estates among children (4) Taking care of grave lot;
(5) guardianship of Silvino Suntay and (6) after paying his debts he
will have approximately 720,000 pesos left. This amount will be
divided into three equal parts of 240,000 pesos each. The first part
is to be divided equally among the ten children born by the first and
second wives and the second part among the three sons Silvino
Suntay, 75,000 approximately; Apolonio Suntay, 50,000 pesos
approximately; Jose Suntay and Concepcion Suntay, 36,000 each
approximately. The third part is to be divided between Maria Lim
Billian and Silvino Suntay; each will get approximately 110,000
pesos. Silvino Suntay will get a total of 210,000 pesos approximately,
Maria Natividad Lim Billian a total of 290,000 approximately, and
Apolonio Suntay a total of 80,000 approximately, Concepcion Suntay
and Jose Suntay will get 60,000 pesos each approximately. The rest
of the children will get approximately 29,000 each. The way of
distribution of the property of Jose B. Suntay, movable and
immovable, and the outstanding debts to be collected was arranged
by Jose B. Suntay.
xxx xxx xxx
78. On the occasion of the execution of the testament of Jose B.
Suntay, state whether or not you say Exhibit B — ... Yes.
79. In the affirmative case, state if you know who had the possession
of Exhibit B and the testament the first time you saw them on that
occasion. — ... Yes, I know who had possession of them.
80. Can you say whether or not Jose B. Suntay happened to get those
documents later on, on that same occasion? — ... He got them after
the execution.
81. Please name the person who gave those documents to Mr.
Suntay. — ... Alberto Barretto gave the documents to Jose B. Suntay.
82. Did the person who gave those documents to Suntay say
anything to him (Suntay) at the time of giving them? — ... Yes.
83. If so what was it that he said, if he said any? — ... He said, "You
had better see if you want any correction."
84. What did Mr. Suntay do after those documents were given to
him? — ... Jose B. Suntay looked at them and then gave one copy to
Manuel Lopez for checking.
85. State whether or not Mr. Suntay gave one of those documents
to another man. — ... Yes.
86. In the affirmative case, can you say which of the two documents
was given and who the man was? — ... Yes he gave Exhibit B to
Manuel Lopez.
87. State whether or not Mr. Suntay said something to the man to
whom he gave one of those documents. — ... Yes.
88. In the affirmative case can you repeat more or less what Mr.
Suntay said to that man? — ... He told him to read it for checking.
89. State if you know what did the man do with one of those
documents given to him. — ... He took it and read it for checking.
90. What did in turn Mr. Suntay do with the other one left with him?
— ... Jose B. Suntay looked at the original and checked them.
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91. What was done with those documents later on if there was
anything done with them? — ... After checking, Jose B. Suntay put
Exhibit B in his pocket and had the original signed and executed.
92. What was done with the testament of Jose B. Suntay after it was
signed by the testator and its witnesses? — ... It was taken away by
Jose B. Suntay. (Exhibit D, D-1.)
Q. Did you know the contents of this envelope? — "A. I knew that it
was a will.
Q. But did you know the provisions of the will? — "A. It is about the
distribution of the property to the heirs.
Q. Did you know how the property was distributed according to the
will? — "A. I know that more than P500,000 was for the widow and
her son, more than P100,000 for the heirs that are in the family.
(Exhibit "6", p. 28).
Q. You stated that you were one of the witnesses to the will and that
the will was written in Spanish. Was it written in typewriting or in
handwriting of somebody? — "A. That will was written in
typewriting.
Q. Did you read the contents of that will, or do you know the
contents of that will? — A. No, sir, because I do not know Spanish.
Q. How do you know that it was the will of Jose B. Suntay ? — "A.
Because I was one of the signers and I saw it." (Exhibit "6", p. 19.)
22. Do you understand the language in which that will was written?
— ... I know a little Spanish.
23. Do you talk or write that language? I can write and talk a little
Spanish. (Exhibits D, D-1.)
As to Ana Suntay's corroborating testimony, Judge Pecson aptly made the
following findings: "Ana Suntay, one of the heirs and who would be affected
adversely by the legalization of the will in question, also testified on rebuttal
that she saw the original will in the possession of Manuel Suntay immediately
after the snatching. She read it and she particularly remembers the manner in
which the properties were to be distributed. Exhibit B was shown to her on
the witness stand and she declared that the provision regarding the
distribution of the properties in said Exhibit B is the same as that contained in
the original will. Said testimony of Ana Suntay, therefore, belies the testimony
of Atty. Alberto Barretto." And yet in the resolution on the motion for new
trial, the trial Judge had to state that "Ana Suntay on rebuttal did not, likewise,
prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of the said lost will, because she has
not had enough schooling and she does not possess adequate knowledge of
the Spanish language as shown by the fact that she had to testify in Tagalog
on the witness stand." The potent error committed by Judge Pecson in
reversing his views as regards Ana's testimony, is revealed readily in the
following portions of the transcript:
P. Cuantas paginas tenia aquel documento a que usted se refiere?
— "R. Probablemente seria mas de veinte (20) paginas.
P. No serian treinta (30) paginas? — "Abogado Recto: La testigo ha
contestado ya que mas de veinte (20).
Juzgado: Se estima
Abogado Mejia:
P. Usted personalmente leyo el documento" — "R. Yo leyo mi
hermano en presencia mia.
P. La pregunta es, si usted personalmente ha leido el documento? —
" R. Si, lo he visto.
P. No solamente le pregunto a usted si Vd. ha visto el testamento
sino si usted ha leido personalmente el testamento? — "R. Si la parte
de la adjudicacion lo he leido para asegurarme a que porcion
corresponde a cada uno de nosotros.
P. Puede usted repetir poco mas o menos esa porcion a que se hacia
la distribucion del alegado testamento? — "R. Como ya he
declarado, que las propiedades de mi difunto padre se habian
dividido en tres partes, una tercera parte se nos adjudica a nosotros
diez (1) hijos en primeros nupcias y segunda nupcia, la segunda
tercera parte los adjudica a la viuda y a Silvino, y la otra tercera parte
se lo adjudica a sus hijos como mejora a Silvino, Apolonio,
Concepcion y Jose.
P. Eso, tal como usted personalmente lo leyo en el documento? —
"R. Si Señor.
P. Quiere usted tener la bondad, señora, de repetir poco mas o
menos las palabras en ese documento que se distribuia las
propiedades del defundo padre usted como usted relata aqui?
"Abogado Recto: Objetamos a la pregunta por falta de base, porque
elle solamente se fijo en la parte como se distribuian las propiedades
pero no ha dicho la testigo que ella lo ha puesto de memoria, ni Vd.
ha preguntado en que lenguaje estaba escrito el testamento ...
Juzgado: Se estima.
Abogado Mejia:
P. Sabe usted en que lenguaje estaba redactado el documento que
usted leyo personalmente? — "R. En Castellano.
P. Puede usted repetirnos ahora en Castellano algunas frases o
palabras como se hizo la distribucion en aquel supuesto
testamento? —
Abogado Recto: Objecion, por falta de base, uno puede entender el
español y sin embargo no podra repetir lo que ha leido, y no se sabe
todavia si ha estudiado el español bastante hasta el punto de poder
hablarlo.
Juzgado: Se estima.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
Abogado Mejia
P. Usted dijo que estaba puesto en castellano el supuesto
testamento que Vda. leyo, usted poso el castellano? — "R. Yo
entiendo el castellano, pero no puedo hablar bien.
P. Usted estudio el castellano en algun colegio? — "Rj. Si, señor, En
Sta. Catalina.
P. Cuantos años? — "R. Nuestros estudios no han sido continuous
porque mi padre nos ingresaba en el colegio y despues nos sacaba
para estar afuera, y no era continuo nuestro estudio.
P. Pero en total, como cuantos meses o años estaba usted en el
colegio aprendiendo el castelano? — "R. Unos cuatro o cinco años.
P. Entonces usted puede leer el castellano con facilidad, señora? —
"R. Si, castellano sencillo puedo entender y lo puedo leer.
P. Usted entiende las preguntas que se le dirigian aqui en castellano
sin interpretacion o sin el interprete? — "R. Si, Señor.
P. Puede usted contestar en castellano? — "R. Bueno, pero como de
contestar, por eso quiero que la pregunta se me traduzca antes. asi
puedo contestar debidamente. (t.s.n. pp. 533-534.)
We are really at a loss to understand why, without any change whatsoever in
the evidence, the trial Judge reversed his first decision, particularly when he
announced therein that "it is now incumbent upon this court to delve into the
evidence whether or not Jose B. Suntay, deceased, left a will (the draft of
which is Exhibit B) and another will which was executed and probated in Amoy,
China." His action is indeed surprising when we take into account the various
circumstancial features presently to be stated, that clearly confirm the
testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro, G. Toh and Ana Suntay, or otherwise
constitute visible indicia of oppositor's desire to frustrate the wishes of his
father, Jose B. Suntay.
In our opinion the most important piece of evidence in favor of the petitioner's
case is the draft of the lost will, Exhibit "B." Its authenticity cannot be seriously
questioned, because according to the trial Judge himself, oppositor's own
witness, Atty. Alberto Barretto, admitted it to be "identical in substance and
form to the second draft which he prepared in typewriting." Indeed, all the
"A's" and "B's" in the handwritten insertions of the draft are very similar to
those in Barretto's admittedly genuine signature on the envelope, Exhibit "A."
The finding of Judge Pecson on the point in his first decision (reiterated
expressly in the resolution on the motion for new trial), should control, not
only because it is in accordance with the evidence but because the oppositor
had failed and did not even attempt to have the trial Judge reconsider or
reverse his factual conclusions. The draft, Exhibit "B," having been positively
identified by the witnesses for the petitioner to be an exact copy of the lost
will of Jose B. Suntay, is therefore conclusive. Oppositor's effort to show that
said draft was never signed in final form, and was thought of merely to deceive
petitioner's mother, Lim Billian, and that the will actually executed and put in
the envelope, Exhibit "A", provided that the testator's estate would be divided
equally among his heirs, as in the case of intestacy, was necessarily futile
because, if this allegation is true, the will would not have been "snatched"
from Go Toh — and the loss certainly cannot be imputed to the widow Lim
Billian or the petitioner; the snatched will would have been produced to put
an end to petitioner's and his mother's claim for greater inheritance or
participation under the lost will; and the envelope containing the first will
providing for equal shares, would not have been entrusted to the care and
custody of the widow Lim Billian.
It is very noteworthy that out of the nine children of the first marriage, only
Angel, Jose and Federico Suntay had opposed the probate of the will in
question; the rest, namely, Ana, Aurora, Concepcion, Lourdes, Manuel and
Emiliano Suntay, having expressly manifested in their answer that they had no
opposition thereto, since the petitioner's alternative petition "seeks only to
put into effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their late father."
This attitude is significantly an indication of the justness of petitioner's claim,
because it would have been to their greater advantage if they had sided with
oppositor Federico Suntay in his theory of equal inheritance for all the children
of Jose B. Suntay. Under the lost will or its draft Exhibit "B", each of the Suntay
children would receive only some P 25,000.00, whereas in case of intestacy or
under the alleged will providing for equal shares, each of them would receive
some P100,000.00. And yet the Suntay children other than Angel, Jose and
Federico had chosen to give their conformity to the alternative petition in this
case.
Another unequivocal confirmation of the lost will is the will which Jose B.
Suntay executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on January 4, 1931, and probated
in Amoy District Court, China, containing virtually the same provisions as those
in the draft Exhibit "B". What better evidence is there of an man's desire or
insistence to express his last wishes than the execution of a will reiterating the
same provisions contained in an earlier will. Assuming that the Chinese will
cannot be probated in the jurisdiction, its probative value as corroborating
evidence cannot be ignored.
Oppositor himself had admitted having read the will in question under which
the widow Lim Billian was favored; and this again in a way goes to corroborate
the evidence for the petitioner as to the contents of the will sought to be
probated.
COURT:
Q. Have you read the supposed will or the alleged will of your father?
— "A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q. Can you tell the court the share or participation in the inheritance
of Maria Natividad Lim Billian according to the will? —
A. Yes sir, she will inherit, I think, two-thirds (2/3) of the estate, in
other words she is the most favored in the will, so when they sold
that, they sold everything, they are selling everything even the
conjugal property. (t. s. n. 228-229.)
The decision of the majority leans heavily on the testimony of Atty. Alberto
Barretto, forgetful perhaps of the fact that the trial Judge gave no credence to
said witness. It should be repeated that Judge Pecson reiterated in the
resolution on the motion for new trial all his findings in the first decision. If as
Atty. Barretto testified, Lim Billian was entitled under the will actually signed
by Jose Suntay only to P10,000.00, in addition to properties in China value at
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
P15,000.00, the fees of P25,000.00 admittedly asked by him would absorb her
entire inheritance; and this would normally not be done by any law
practitioner. Upon the other hand, there is evidence to the effect that Atty.
Barretto might have become hostile to the petitioner and his mother Lim
Billian in view of the latter's refusal to agree to the amount of P25,000.00 and
her offer to pay only P100.00. There is also evidence tending to show that as
early as 1942, Atty. Barretto was paid by oppositor Federico Suntay the sum
of P16,000.00 which, although allegedly for services in the testate
proceedings, was paid out of the personal funds of said oppositors to supply
Atty. Barretto's needs. This circumstances perhaps further explains why the
latter had to support the side of Federico Suntay.
We have quoted in full the decision of this court in the "snatching" case and
the first decision of Judge Pecson in this case, both in the hope and in the belief
(1) that the first would reveal the manner by which those adversely affected
had planned to prevent the last wishes of the deceased Jose B. Suntay from
being carried on, and (2) that the second, by the facts correctly recited therein
and by the force and accuracy of its logic would amply show the weakness and
utter lack of foundation of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration.
We have set forth at length pertinent portions of the testimony of various
witnesses to demonstrate more plainly the plausibility of the original decision
of Judge Pecson, and the latter's consequent bad judgment in having forced
himself to accomplish a somersault, a feat which the majority, in my opinion,
have mistakenly commended. We have found this to be one of the cases of
this court in which we have had occasion to participate, where there can be
absolutely no doubt as to the result — outright reversal — for which, with due
respect to the majority opinion, we vote without hesitancy.
Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
5 November 1954
PADILLA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on 31 July
1954, affirming the decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which
disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in November 1929 and
the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4
January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay, without pronouncement as to costs, on
grounds that will presently be taken up and discussed.
Appellant points to an alleged error in the decision where it states that —
. . . This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the
filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof, . . .
because according to him the "will was lost before not after (the) filing of the
petition." This slight error, if it is an error at all, does not, and cannot, after the
conclusions and pronouncements made in the judgment rendered in the case.
In his alternative petition the appellant alleges:
4. That on October 15, 1934, Marian Natividad Lim Billian, the
mother of herein petitioner filed a petition in this court for the
allowance and probate of a last will and testament executed, and
signed in the Philippines in the year 1929 by said deceased Jose B.
Suntay. (P. 3, amended record on appeal.)
If such will and testament was already lost or destroyed at the time of the filing
of the petition by Maria Natividad Lim Billian (15 October 1934), the appellant
would have so stated and alleged. If Anastacio Teodoro, a witness for the
appellant, is to be believed when he testified —
. . . that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19
January 1948), ... Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De Los Reyes
Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit
C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 19470 . . .
and —
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to
Anastacio Teodoro and returned by the latter to the former because
they could not agree on the amount of fees, . . .
then on 15 October 1934, the date of the filing of the petition, the will was not
yet lost. And if the facts alleged in paragraph 5 of the appellant's alternative
petition which states:
That this Honorable Court, after hearing, denied the aforesaid
petition for probate filed by Maria Natividad Lim Billian in view of
the loss and/or destruction of said will subsequent to the filing of
said petition and prior to the hearing thereof, and the alleged
insufficiency of the evidence adduced to established the loss and/or
destruction of the said will, (Emphasis supplied, P. 3, amended
record on appeal.)
may be relied upon, then the alleged error pointed out by the appellant, if it is
an error, is due to the allegation in said paragraph of his alternative petition.
Did the appellant allege the facts in said paragraph with reckless abandon? Or,
did the appellant make the allegation as erroneously as that which he made in
paragraph 10 of the alternative petition that "his will which was lost and
ordered probated by our Supreme Court in G. R. No. 44276, above referred
to?" (P. 7, amended record on appeal.) This Court did not order the probate of
the will in said case because if it did, there would have been no further and
subsequent proceedings in the case after the decision of this Court referred to
had been rendered and had become final. Be that as it may, whether the loss
of the will was before or subsequent to the filing of the petition, as already
stated, the fact would not affect in the slightest degree the conclusions and
pronouncements made by this Court.
The appellant advances the postulate that the decision of this Court in the case
of Lim Billian vs. Suntay, G. R. No. 44276, 63 Phil., 793, constitutes res
judicata on these points: (a) that only one will was prepared by attorney
Barretto, and (b) that the issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether
the draft (Exhibit B) is a true copy or draft of the snatched will, and contends
that these points already adjudged were overlooked in the majority opinion.
The decision of this Court in the case referred to does not constitute res
judicata on the points adverted to by the appellant. The only point decided in
that case is that "the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the
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document contained in the envelope." In the opinion of this Court, this
circumstance justified "the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents
and of whether it was executed with all the essential and necessary legal
formalities." That is all that was decided. This Court further said:
The trial of this case was limited to the proof of loss of the will, and
from what has taken place we deduce that it was not petitioner's
intention to raise, upon the evidence adduced by her, and other
points involved herein, namely, as we have heretofore indicated,
whether Exhibit B is a true copy of the will and whether the latter
was executed with all the formalities required by law for its probate.
The testimony of Alberto Barretto bears importantly in this
connection. (P. 796, supra.)
Appellant's contention that the question before the probate court was
whether the draft (Exhibit B) is a true copy or draft of the snatched will is a
mistaken interpretation and view of the decision of this Court in the case
referred to, for if this Court did make that pronouncement, which, of course,
it did not, such pronouncement would be contrary to law and would have been
a grievous and irreparable mistake, because what the Court passed upon and
decided in that case, as already stated, is that there was sufficient evidence to
prove the loss of the of the will and that the next step was to prove by
secondary evidence its due execution in accordance with the formalities of the
law and its contents, clearly and districtly, by the testimony of at least two
credible witnesses.1
The appellant invokes Rule 133 to argue that Rule 77 should not have been
applied to the case but the provisions of section 623 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190), for the reason that this case had been commenced
before the Rules of Court took effect. But Rule 133 cited by the appellant
provides:
These rules shall take effect on July 1, 1940. They shall govern all
cases brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings
in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the
court their application would not be feasible or would work injustice,
in which event the former procedure shall apply. (Emphasis
supplied.)
So, Rule 77 applies to this case because it was a further proceedings in a case
then pending. But even if section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure were to
be applied, still the evidence to prove the contents and due execution of the
will and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration
must be established "by full evidence to the satisfaction of the Court." This
requirement may even be more strict and exacting than the two-witness rule
provided for in section 6, Rule 77. The underlying reason for the exacting
provisions found in section 623 of Act No. 190 and section 6, Rule 77, the
product of experience and wisdom, is to prevent imposters from foisting, or at
least to make for them difficult to foist, upon probate courts alleged last wills
or testaments that were never executed.
In commenting unfavorably upon the decree disallowing the lost will, both the
appellant and the dissenting opinion suffer from an infirmity born of a
mistaken premise that all the conclusions and pronouncements made by the
probate court in the first decree which allowed the probate of the lost will of
the late Jose B. Suntay must be accepted by this Court. This is an error. It must
be borne in mind that this is not a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a
judgment of the Court of Appeals on questions of law where the findings of
fact by said Court are binding upon this Court. This is an appeal from the
probate court, because the amount involved in the controversy exceeds
P50,000, and this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction must review
the evidence and the findings of fact and legal pronouncements made by the
probate court. If such conclusions and pronouncements are unjustified and
erroneous this Court is in duty bound to correct them. Not long after entering
the first decree the probate court was convinced that it had committed a
mistake, so it set aside the decree and entered another. This Court affirmed
the last decree not precisely upon the facts found by the probate court but
upon facts found by it after a careful review and scrutiny of the evidence,
parole and documentary. After such review this Court has found that the
provisions of the will had not been established clearly and distinctly by at least
two credible witnesses and that conclusion is unassailable because it is solidly
based on the established facts and in accordance with law.
The appellant and the dissent try to make much out of a pleading filed by five
(5) children and the widow of Apolonio Suntay, another child of the deceased
by the first marriage, wherein they state that —
. . . in answer to the alternative petition filed in these proceedings
by Silvino Suntay, through counsel, dated June 18, 1947, to this
Honorable Court respectfully state that, since said alternative
petition seeks only to put into effect the testamentary disposition
and wishes of their late father, they have no opposition thereto. (Pp.
71-72, amended record on appeal.)
Does that mean that they were consenting to the probate of the lost will? Of
course not. If the lost will sought to be probated in the alternative petition was
really the will of their late father, they, as good children, naturally had, could
have, no objection to its probate. That is all that their answer implies and
means. But such lack of objection to the probate of the lost will does not
relieve the proponent thereof or the party interested in its probate from
establishing its due execution and proving clearly and distinctly the provisions
thereof at least two credible witnesses. It does not mean that they accept the
draft Exhibit B as an exact and true copy of the lost will and consent to its
probate. Far from it. In the pleading copied in the dissent, which the appellant
has owned and used as argument in the motion for reconsideration, there is
nothing that may bolster up his contention. Even if all the children were
agreeable to the probate of said lost will, still the due execution of the lost will
must be established and the provisions thereof proved clearly and distinctly
by at least two credible witnesses, as provided for in section 6, Rule 77. The
appellant's effort failed to prove what is required by the rule. Even if the
children of the deceased by the first marriage, out of generosity, were willing
to donate their shares in the estate of their deceased father or parts thereof
to their step mother and her only child, the herein appellant, still the donation,
if validly made, would not dispense with the proceedings for the probate of
the will in accordance with section 6, Rule 77, because the former may convey
by way of donation their shares in the state of their deceased father or parts
thereof to the latter only after the decree disallowing the will shall have been
rendered and shall have become final. If the lost will is allowed to probate
there would be no room for such donation except of their respective shares in
the probated will.
The part of the deposition of Go Toh quoted in the motion for reconsideration
which appellant underscores does not refer to Go Toh but to Manuel Lopez.
Even if Go Toh heard Manuel Lopez read the draft (Exhibit B) for the purpose
of checking it up with the original held and read by Jose B. Suntay, Go Toh
should not have understood the provisions of the will because he knew very
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
little of the Spanish language in which the will was written (answer to 22nd
and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory). In fact, he testifies in
his deposition that all he knows about the contents of the lost will was
revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to 25th
interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories); that Jose B. Suntay
told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of the draft [Exhibit
B] (answers to 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory); that Mrs.
Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read
the translation (answer to the 67th interrogatory); that he did not read the will
and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft [Exhibit B] (answers to X-6
and X-20 cross-interrogatories). We repeat that —
. . . all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the
alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned
of them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from
reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
This finding cannot be contested and assailed.
The appellant does not understand how the Court came to the conclusion that
Ana Suntay, a witness for the appellant could not have read the part of the will
on adjudication. According to her testimony "she did not read the whole will
but only the adjudication," which, this Court found, "is inconsistent with her
testimony in chief (to the effect) that "after Apolonio read that portion, then
he turned over the document of Manuel, and he went away." (P. 528, t. s. n.,
hearing of 24 February 1948.) And appellant asks the question: "Who went
away? Was it Manuel or Apolonio?" In answer to his own question the
appellant says: "The more obvious inference is that it was Apolonio and not
Manuel who went away." This inference made by the appellant not only is not
obvious but it is also illogical, if it be borne in mind that Manuel came to the
house of Apolonio and it happened that Ana was there, according to her
testimony. So the sentence "he went away" in Ana's testimony must logically
and reasonably refer to Manuel, who was a caller or visitor in the house of his
brother Apolonio and not to the latter who was in his house. If it was Apolonio
who "went away," counsel for the appellant could have brought that out by a
single question. As the evidence stands could it be said that the one who went
away was Apolonio and not Manuel? The obvious answer is that it was
Manuel. That inference is the result of a straight process of reasoning and clear
thinking.
There is a veiled insinuation in the dissent that Alberto Barretto testified as he
did because he had been paid by Federico C. Suntay the sum of P16,000.
Federico C. Suntay testifies on the point thus —
Q. You mentioned in your direct testimony that you paid certain
amount to Atty. Alberto Barretto for services rendered, how much
did you pay? — A. Around SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00).
Q. When did you make the payment? — A. During the Japanese time.
Q. Did you state that fact in any accounts you presented to the
Court? — A. I do not quite remember that.
. . . (P. 180, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947.)
Q. When you made that payment, was (it) your intention to charge
it to the state or to collect it later from the estate? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. More or less when was such payment made, during the Japanese
time, what particular month and year, do you remember? — A. I
think in 1942.
Q. And you said you paid him because of services he rendered? — A.
Upon the order to the Court.
Q. And those services were precisely because he made a will and he
made a will which was lost, the will of Jose B. Suntay? ... (P. 181, t. s.
n., supra.) — A. I think I remember correctly according to ex-
Representative Vera who is the administrator whom I followed at
that time, that was paid according to the services rendered by Don
Alberto Barretto with regard to our case in the testamentaria but he
also rendered services to my father.
Q. At least your Counsel said that there was an order of the Court
ordering you to pay that, do you have that copy of the order? — A.
Yes, sir, I have, but I think that was burned. (P. 184, t. s. n., supra.).
So the sum of P16,000 was paid upon recommendation of the former
administrator and order of the probate court for services rendered by Alberto
Barretto not only in the probate proceedings that also for services rendered
to his father. But if this sum of P16,000 paid to Alberto Barretto upon
recommendation of the previous administrator and order of the probate court
for professional services rendered in the probate proceedings and to the
deceased in his lifetime be taken against his truthfulness and veracity as to
affect adversely his testimony, what about the professional services of
Anastacio Teodoro who appeared in this case as one of the attorneys for the
petitioner-appellant? (P. 2, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947.)Would that not
likewise or by the same token affect his credibility? It is the latter's interest
more compelling than the former's?
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, A. and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
[G.R. NO. 139868 : June 8, 2006]
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, v. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-
DALAYGON, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey O Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were
American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have
an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died,
leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
designated as executor.1The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan's
Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as
executor due to Richard's renunciation of his appointment. 2 The court also
named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3
P a g e 103 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with
whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to probate by the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in
Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of Audrey's estate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in real estate with improvements
located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued
at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey's name with
a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors,
Inc. worth P64,444.00.5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the
Orphan's Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha
or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices,
as ancillary administrator.
Richard's will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty.
Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion
to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October
23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey's estate, with Richard being
apportioned the - undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in
A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle,
the - undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors,
Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial
court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an
Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT
No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names
of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (' undivided interest) and Kyle (' undivided
interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares
to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing
the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary
administrator for distribution to the heirs.12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT
No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also
filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard's - undivided interest in the
Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated
to Richard's three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground
that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire -
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent's opposition, and in its Order dated
December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the
Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard's entire - undivided
interest in the Makati property to respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an
amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court's Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary
duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the
distribution of Audrey's estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued
that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati
property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely - thereof, and
since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the
A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now
pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent's allegations. Petitioner
contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition
before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge
of the State of Maryland's laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner
alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children
that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares."
Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final
and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial
court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are
hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O Neill Guersey in favor of
the estate of W. Richard Guersey; andcralawlibrary
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City
Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard
Guersey.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA
per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19
Hence, the herein Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF
THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA,
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG
BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND
CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT
COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O NEIL GUERSEY'S
ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a
final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters
involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all
courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters
therein determined," and the same has already been executed.21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his
duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing
of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State
of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine
laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard
to the terms of Aubrey's will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.22
Respondent argues that petitioner's breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary
administrator of Aubrey's estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to
respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of
Aubrey's will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot
stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was
his duty to know the relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the
project of partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of
the provision of Aubrey's will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only
after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888
for the settlement of Richard's estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected
by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested
in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993,
before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable
law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the
ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment
was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment
of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four
years from the discovery of the fraud.29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the
annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The
CA found merit in respondent's cause and found that petitioner's failure to
follow the terms of Audrey's will, despite the latter's declaration of good faith,
amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil
Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner
should have distributed Aubrey's estate in accordance with the terms of her
will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey's
estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey
and Richard Guersey's adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent's cause of action had already prescribed
because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of
Audrey's will,30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the
other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no
opportunity to question petitioner's acts since she was not a party to Special
Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the
estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect
her interest.31
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of
the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent's knowledge of the terms of
Audrey's will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of.
Rather, it is petitioner's failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of
the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-
year period should be counted from the time of respondent's discovery
thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard's
estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the
project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.32Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse
into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she
came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner's acts. Obviously,
respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the
annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the
same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,33the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile
imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129,
where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real
contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in
which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.
In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side
of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is
extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the
acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never
been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a
P a g e 105 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and
open the case for a new and fair hearing.34
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court.35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate. As such, he
occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to
exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance
of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the
estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence,
care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability
exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which
his conduct is to be judged.36
Petitioner's failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey's estate
according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No.
9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey's death, she was
residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will
and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the
Orphan's Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated
and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief
Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan's Court of Baltimore
City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of
State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of
the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of
Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder,
states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall
grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed,
and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just
debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such
will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be
disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines
belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as
ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that
such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the
trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the
terms of Audrey's will. The obvious result was that there was no fair
submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the
evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith.
The Court cannot accept petitioner's protestation. How can petitioner
honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of
Audrey's will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that
Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by
respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big
legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine
the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as
ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust
reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his
fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that
the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as
Audrey's heirs, and distributing Audrey's estate according to the project of
partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and
deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule
that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its
rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case
from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of Audrey's estate. The CA likewise observed that the
distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom
petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA
correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities,
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of
the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam v. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in
the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins v.
Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing
principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his
P a g e 106 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject
estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O Neill Guersey. Considering the
principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes
without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent
laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the
national law of Audrey O Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the
court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate
in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his
actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct
examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of
Audrey O Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's
concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff's adopted daughter
Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's action
appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendant's position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedent's last will, combine to create a circumstance that
is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's omission to
prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter's last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair
submission of the real issues involved in the case.41(Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but
a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner's abject failure to discharge
his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner's pleasure as to which law
should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear.
Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property
through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner's omission was beyond
her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of
petitioner's omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse
consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases
like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to
parties who are deprived of their rights.42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as
follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public
General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent
shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass
directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for
administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that
"unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to
the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the
subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand,
declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under
the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as
expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the
following: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash
amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey's
death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire
Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course,
assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a
legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property
which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special
Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof
in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial
notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held,
viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and
we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of
Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign
law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in
evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II,
and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit
"B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael
Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the
above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above
circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been
brought to record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed
project of partition of Richard's estate, not to mention that petitioner or any
other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or
validity of said law, then Audrey's and Richard's estate should be distributed
according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to
respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v.
Manarang,45 wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the
same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the
court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in
the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after
they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted
P a g e 107 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having
meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner's motive in equitably distributing Audrey's
estate cannot prevail over Audrey's and Richard's wishes. As stated in Bellis v.
Bellis:46
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount
of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.47
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey
were American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although
records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati
property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to
acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of
the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and
entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court
clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to
American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands
of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the
acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against
acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution
under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by
hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-
born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII,
Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain,
except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a
former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw
in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on
to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the
acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as
the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands
has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and
the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his
duties as an official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127876. December 17, 1999.]
ROXAS & CO., INC., v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL
DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF
NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, JR., J.:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by
petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the
government under Republic Act No. 6657 the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1998.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner
of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all
located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024
hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234
and 0354. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No
924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda
Caylaway is 867,4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-
44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.
The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President
Corazon C Aquino. In February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. As head of the provisional
government, the President exercised legislative power "until a legislature is
elected and convened under a new Constitution." 1 In the exercise of this
legislative power the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No 131
instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order
No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the
program.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took
over legislative power from the President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act
No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act
was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June
15, 1988.
Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent
DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of
E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Hacienda Palico
On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled
"Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to "Jaime
Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico" 3 Therein, the MARO invited
petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to
P a g e 108 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional Director reiterating its request for
"scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the Comprehensive conversion of the two haciendas. 14
Agrarian Reform Program." 4
Despite petitioner’s application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded
On October 25, 1989, the MARO completed three (3) Investigation Reports with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as
after investigation and ocular inspection of the Hacienda. In the first Report, compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash
the MARO found that 270 hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and LBP bonds. 15 On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985
and 470 were "flat to undulating (0-8% slope)" and actually occupied and of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership
cultivated by 34 tillers of sugarcane. 5 In the second Report, the MARO Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA’s were distributed to
identified as "flat to undulating" approximately 339 hectares under Tax farmer beneficiaries. 16
Declaration No. 0234 which also had several actual occupants and tillers of
sugarcane; 6 while in the third Report, the MARO found approximately 75 Hacienda Banilad
hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0354 as "flat to undulating" with 33 actual
occupants and tillers also of sugarcane. 7 On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu,
Batangas, sent a notice to petitioner addressed as
On October 7. 1989, a "Summary Investigation Report" was submitted and follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
signed jointly by the MARO representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and by the "Mr. Jaime Pimentel
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The Report recommended that
333,0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition at Hacienda Administrator
a value of P6,807,622.20. 8 The following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more
Summary Investigation Reports were submitted by the same officers and Hacienda Banilad
representatives. They recommended that 270,0876 hectares and 75,3800
hectares be placed under compulsory acquisition at a compensation of Nasugbu, Batangas" 17
P8,109,739.00 and P2,188,195.47, respectively. 9
The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary compulsory acquisition under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of
Miriam D. Santiago sent a "Notice of Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was the other schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer,
addressed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance thereto. 18

"Roxas y Cia, Limited On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an "Invitation to Parties" again to
Pimentel inviting the latter to attend a conference on September 21, 1989 at
Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes the MARO Office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the MARO’s investigation
over Hacienda Banilad. 19
Manila, Metro Manila." 10
On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was held, the MARO
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico submitted two (2) Reports. In his first Report, he found that approximately 709
were subject to immediate acquisition and distribution by the government hectares of land under Tax Declaration Nos. 0237 and 0236 were "flat to
under the CARL; that based on the DAR’s valuation criteria. The government undulating (0-8% slope)." On this area were discovered 162 actual occupants
was offering compensation of P3.4 million for 333,0800 hectares; that and tillers of sugarcane. 20 In the second Report, it was found that
whether this offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform approximately 235 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 were "flat to
the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case undulating," on which were 92 actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane. 21
of petitioner’s rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR
shall conduct summary administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the
to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner accepts conference were representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the
respondent DAR’s offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on behalf of the landowner. 22 After the
accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take immediate possession meeting, on the same day, September 21, 1989, a Summary Investigation
of the land. 11 Report was submitted jointly by the MARO, representatives of the BARC, LBP,
and the PARO. They recommended that after ocular inspection of the
Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director property, 234,6498 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 be subject to
sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda compulsory acquisition and distribution by CLOA. 23 The following day,
entitled "Request to Open Trust Account." Each Memoranda requested that a September 22, 1989, a second Summary Investigation was submitted by the
trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico same officers. They recommended that 737.2590 hectares under Tax
be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latter’s rejection on its Declaration Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsory
offered value. 12 acquisition for distribution. 24

Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary,
conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non- sent to petitioner two (2) separate "Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda
agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. 13 On July 14, 1993, Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition

P a g e 109 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the 34
Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed
to:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed
petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian
"Roxas y Cia. Limited reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner’s withdrawal of the VOS
on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such
7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg. as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18
degrees and that the land is undeveloped. 35
Makati, Metro Manila."25cralaw:red
Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11,
Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 1993, petitioner filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico
729.4190 hectares and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares. 26 and Banilad. 36 On July 14, 1993, Petitioner, through its President, Eduardo
Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway in
On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land light of the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Valuation Manager a "Request to Open Trust Account" in petitioner’s name as
compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. 27 A second "1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department
"Request to Open Trust Account" was sent on November 18, 1991 over of Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated
723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda. 28 March 1, 1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles "are not
feasible and economically sound for further agricultural development."cralaw
On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 virtua1aw library
and P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as
compensation for petitioner’s land in Hacienda Banilad. 29 2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas
approving the Zoning Ordinance reclassifying areas covered by the referenced
On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico titles to non-agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation with
and Banilad. government agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform], and the
requisite public hearings.
Hacienda Caylaway
3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May March 8, 1993 approving the Zoning Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of
6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of Nasugbu.
867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles — TCT Nos. T-44662, T-
44663, T-44664 and T-44665. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through 4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the
the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Municipal Planning and Development, Coordinator and Deputized Zoning
Resolutions accepting petitioner’s voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, Administrator addressed to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the
particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-44663. 30 The Resolutions were Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas has no objection to the conversion of the
addressed to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural." 37

"Roxas & Company, Inc. On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with
respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of
7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. the CLOA’s issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons.
Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are
Aguirre, Legaspi Village located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for
agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had
Makati, M.M." 31 reclassified the land to non-agricultural.

On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued two separate In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case
Memoranda to the LBP Regional Manager requesting for the valuation of the involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to
land under TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-44663. 32 On the same day, respondent agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the
DAR through the Regional Director sent to petitioner a "Notice of Acquisition" Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. 38
over 241.6777 hectares under TCT No. T-44664 and 533.8180 hectares under
TCT No. T-44663. 33 Like the Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No.
Acquisition was addressed to petitioner at its office in Makati, Metro Manila. 32484. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and
the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, Petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J.
Roxas, set a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawings its VOS of Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three hectares was denied by
Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly the MARO on November 8, 1993.
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-
agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was Petitioner’s petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 28, 1994.
applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. 39 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on

P a g e 110 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
January 17, 1997 by respondent court. 40
Hence, this recourse. Petitioner assigns the following
errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS PREMATURE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN VIEW OF THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF THE
RESPONDENTS’ ACTS, THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE CAUSED BY SAID ILLEGAL
ACTS, AND THE ABSENCE OF A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW — ALL OF WHICH ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE SAID
DOCTRINE.
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER’S LANDHOLDINGS ARE SUBJECT TO COVERAGE UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, IN VIEW OF THE UNDISPUTED
FACT THAT PETITIONER’S LANDHOLDINGS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO NON-
AGRICULTURAL USES BY PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1520 WHICH
DECLARED THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE,
AND THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU RE-
CLASSIFYING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF PETITIONER’S LANDHOLDINGS AS NON-
AGRICULTURAL. BOTH OF WHICH PLACE SAID LANDHOLDINGS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF AGRARIAN REFORM, OR AT THE VERY LEAST ENTITLE PETITIONER
TO APPLY FOR CONVERSION AS CONCEDED BY RESPONDENT DAR.
C. RESPONDENT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE
THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE RESPONDENT DAR VOID FOR FAILURE TO OBSERVE
DUE PROCESS, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS BLATANTLY DISREGARDED
THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LANDS UNDER R.A. 6657,
MORE PARTICULARLY, IN FAILING TO GIVE DUE NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER
AND TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC AREAS SOUGHT TO BE
ACQUIRED.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER WAS BRAZENLY AND ILLEGALLY DEPRIVED OF
ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT PAID JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE IT WAS
UNCEREMONIOUSLY STRIPPED OF ITS LANDHOLDINGS THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CLOA’S TO ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES IN VIOLATION OF
R.A. 6657. 41
The assigned errors involve three (3) principal issues: (1) whether this Court
can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioner’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; (2) whether the acquisition proceedings over the
three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law; and (3) assuming the
haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, whether
this court has the power to rule on this issue.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In its first assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals
gravely erred in finding that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means
of administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances
when judicial action may be resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions
are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative
body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the respondent acted
in disregard of due process; (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
(8) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when
strong public interest is involved; (10) when the subject of the controversy is
private land; and (11) in quo warranto proceedings. 42
Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a
violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrative remedies
before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA’S) to
farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioner’s land without just
compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is
evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. 43 Before this may be awarded
to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the State from the
landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned
upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit
by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title
remains with the landowner. 44 There was no receipt by petitioner of any
compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government.
The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law
provides that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or "LBP bonds." 45
Respondent DAR’s opening of trust account deposits in petitioner’s name with
the Land Bank of the Philippines does not constitute payment under the law.
Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust
account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of
compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was
marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings,
respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due
process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA’s to farmer
beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the
petitioner.
II. The Validity of the Acquisition Proceedings Over the Haciendas
Petitioner’s allegation of lack of due process into the validity of the acquisition
proceedings themselves. Before we rule on this matter, however, there is need
to lay down the procedure in the acquisition of private lands under the
provisions of the law.
A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R.A. 6657
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL), provides for two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory
and voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
is set forth in Section 16 of R.A. 6657, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be
followed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the
DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal
delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
P a g e 111 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding
value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other
pertinent provisions hereof.
b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal
delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative
shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the
landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and
surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land
acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). 46 Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in
compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and
the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process
must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR issued on July 26, 1989
Administrative Order NO. 12, Series of 1989, which set the operating
procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"II. OPERATING PROCEDURE

d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer with the assistance of the pertinent
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit library
evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is 1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty area of responsibility. The masterlist shall include such information as required
(30) days after it is submitted for decision. under the attached CARP Masterlist Form which shall include the name of the
landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an 2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of other
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The accomplished forms:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries. a) CARP CA Form 1 — MARO Investigation Report

f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court b) CARP CA Form 2 — Summary Investigation Report of Findings and
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation."cralaw Evaluation
virtua1aw library
c) CARP CA Form 3 — Applicant’s Information Sheet
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the
landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After d) CARP CA Form 4 — Beneficiaries Undertaking
identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by
personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the e) CARP CA Form 5 — Transmittal Report to the PARO
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same
acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and are true and correct.
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the
certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of 3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/meeting
transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder.
price. If the landowner rejects the DAR’s offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR Invitations to the said conference/meeting shall also be sent to the
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representative(s), the Land Bank
compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and other interested parties to discuss
interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen the inputs to the valuation of the property. He shall discuss the MARO/BARC
days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or
case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just suggestions of the participants thereon. The landowner shall also be asked to
compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall be signed by all
in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit participants in the conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF.
the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR
shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a 4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The (PARO).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may
question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination B. The PARO shall:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
of just compensation.

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
1. Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the
land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. 47 The valuation worksheet
and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the
PARO and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these
forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular
inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection and
verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds 500,000
per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with
the duly accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to the
Central Office. The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be
furnished a copy each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD), shall:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review,
evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property covered by the
case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and
duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in
the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized
representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject
property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or through registered
mail within three days from its approval. The Notice shall include, among
others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just
compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR’s offered value, the BLAD shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition.
However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just
compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided under
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the
DARAB’s decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to
the Secretary for approval the required Order of Acquisition.
4. Upon the landowner’s receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon
deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or non-
response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of
Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the DAR,
through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution to
qualified beneficiaries."cralaw virtua1aw library
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural
lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required
information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF)
for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice
of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the
land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-
beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views,
suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the
landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection
and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the
computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00 Upon determination of the
valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his
recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office,
specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall
review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property. The
BLAD shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative, a Notice of Acquisition for the subject property. 48 From this
point, the provisions of Section 16 of R.A. 6657 then apply. 49
For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1)
the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent
to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries
and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and
(2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the
CARL.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter
of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated.
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State’s
police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. 50 But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are
deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender
of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary 51 The Bill Of Rights
provides that" [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." 52 The CARL was not intended to take away property
without due process of law. 53 The exercise of the power of eminent domain
requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first
sprung, was amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993
by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to the conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said
amendments.
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 entitled "Revised Rules Governing the
Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell and
Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to R.A. 6657," requires
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"B. MARO
1. Receives the duly accomplished CARP Form Nos. 1 & 1.1 including
supporting documents.
2. Gathers basic ownership documents listed under 1.a or 1.b above and
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

prepares corresponding VOCF/CACF by landowner/landholding. particular landholding. The MARO notifies the landowner as well as
representatives of the LBP, BARC and prospective beneficiaries of the date of
3. Notifies/invites the landowner and representatives of the LBP, DENR, BARC the ocular inspection of the property at least one week before the scheduled
and prospective beneficiaries of the schedule of ocular inspection of the date and invites them to attend the same. The MARO, LBP or BARC conducts
property at least one week in advance. the ocular inspection and investigation by identifying the land and landowner,
determining the suitability of the land for agriculture and productivity,
4. MARO/LAND BANK FIELD OFFICE/BARC interviewing and screening prospective farmer beneficiaries. Based on its
investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC prepares the Field Investigation Report
a) Identify the land and landowner, and determine the suitability for which shall be signed by all parties concerned. In addition to the field
agriculture and productivity of the land and jointly prepare Field Investigation investigation, a boundary or subdivision survey of the land may also be
Report (CARP Form No. 2), including the Land Use Map of the property. conducted by a Survey Party of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to be assisted by the MARO. 55 This survey shall delineate
b) Interview applicants and assist them in the preparation of the Application the areas covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT), areas retained by the
For Potential CARP Beneficiary (CARP Form No. 3). landowner, areas with infrastructure, and the areas subject to VOS and CA.
After the survey and field investigation, the MARO sends a "Notice of
c) Screen prospective farmer-beneficiaries and for those found qualified, Coverage" to the landowner or his duly authorized representative inviting him
cause the signing of the respective Application to Purchase and Farmer’s to a conference or public hearing with the farmer beneficiaries,
Undertaking (CARP Form No. 4). representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR, Department of Agriculture (DA), non-
government organizations, farmer’s organizations and other interested
d) Complete the Field Investigation Report based on the result of the ocular parties. At the public hearing, the parties shall discuss the results of the field
inspection/investigation of the property and documents submitted. See to it investigation, issues that may be raised in relation thereto, inputs to the
that Field Investigation Report is duly accomplished and signed by all valuation of the subject landholding, and other comments and
concerned. recommendations by all parties concerned. The Minutes of the
conference/public hearing shall form part of the VOCF or CACF which files shall
4. MARO be forwarded by the MARO to the PARO. The PARO reviews, evaluates and
validates the Field Investigation Report and other documents in the
a) Assists the DENR Survey Party in the conduct of a boundary/subdivision VOCF/CACF. He then forwards the records to the RARO for another review.
survey delineating areas covered by OLT, retention, subject of VOS, CA (by
phases, if possible), infrastructures etc., whichever is applicable. DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was amended by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993.
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993 provided, among others,
b) Sends Notice of Coverage (CARP Form No. 5) to landowner concerned or his that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
duly authorized representative inviting him for a conference.
"IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
c) Sends Invitation Letter (CARP Form No. 6) for a conference/public hearing
to prospective farmer-beneficiaries, landowner, representatives of BARC, LBP, "Steps Responsible Activity Forms/
DENR, DA, NGO’s, farmers’ organizations and other interested parties to
discuss the following matters:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Agency/Unit Document

Result of Field Investigation (Requirements)

Inputs to valuation A. Identification and

Issues raised Documentation

Comments/recommendations by all parties concerned. x x x

d) Prepares Summary of Minutes of the conference/public hearing to be

guided by CARP Form No. 7. 5 DARMO Issues Notice of Coverage CARP

e) Forwards the completed VOCF/CACF to the Provincial Agrarian Reform to LO by personal Form No.
Office (PARO) using CARP Form No. 8 (Transmittal Memo to PARO).
delivery with proof of 2
x x x."cralaw virtua1aw library
service, or by registered
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on both Voluntary Offer to
Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) transactions involving lands mail with return card,
enumerated under Section 7 of the CARL. 54 In both VOS and CA transactions,
the MARO prepares the Voluntary Offer to Sell Case Folder (VOCF) and the informing him that his
Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF), as the case may be, over a

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

property is now under

investigation to be
CARP coverage and for
conducted on the subject
LO to select his retention
property.
area, if he desires to avail
7 DARMO With the participation of CARP
of his right of retention;
BARC the LO, representatives of Form No.
and at the same time
LBP the LBP, BARC, DENR 4
invites him to join the
DENR and prospective ARBs, Land Use
field investigation to be
Local Office conducts the investigation Map
conducted on his property
on subject property to
which should be
identify the landholding,
scheduled at least two
determines its suitability
weeks in advance of said
and productivity; and
notice.
jointly prepares the Field
A copy of said Notice CARP
Investigation Report (FIR)
shall be posted for at least Form No.
and Land Use Map.
one week on the bulletin 17
However, the field
board of the municipal
investigation shall proceed
and barangay halls where
even if the LO, the
the property is located.
representatives of the
LGU office concerned
DENR and prospective
notifies DAR about
ARBs are not available
compliance with posting
provided, they were given
requirement thru return
due notice of the time and
indorsement on CARP
date of the investigation to
Form No. 17.
be conducted. Similarly, if
6 DARMO Sends notice to the LBP, CARP
the LBP representative is
BARC, DENR Form No.
not available or could not
representatives and 3
come on the scheduled
prospective ARBs of the
date, the field
schedule of the field
P a g e 115 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

investigation shall also be

team shall submit its
conducted, after which the
report of findings which
duly accomplished Part I
shall be binding to both
of CARP Form No. 4 shall
DAR and LBP, pursuant
be forwarded to the LBP
to Joint Memorandum
representative for
Circular of the DAR,
validation. If he agrees to
LBP, DENR and DA
the ocular inspection
dated 27 January 1992.
report of DAR, he signs
8 DARMO Screens prospective ARBs CARP
the FIR (Part I) and
BARC and causes the signing of Form No.
accomplishes Part II
the Application of 5
thereof.
Purchase and Farmers’
In the event that there is a
Undertaking (APFU).
difference or variance
9 DARMO Furnishes a copy of the CARP
between the findings of
duly accomplished FIR to Form No.
the DAR and the LBP as
the landowner by personal 4
to the propriety of
delivery with proof of
covering the land under
service or registered mail
CARP, whether in whole
with return card and posts
or in part, on the issue of
a copy thereof for at least
suitability to agriculture,
one week on the bulletin
degree of development or
board of the municipal
slope, and on issues
and barangay halls where
affecting idle lands, the
the property is located.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
conflict shall be resolved
LGU Office concerned CARP
by a composite team of
notifies DAR about Form No.
DAR, LBP, DENR and
compliance with posting 17
DA which shall jointly
requirement thru return
conduct further
endorsement on CARP
investigation thereon. The

P a g e 116 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to
Form No. 17. representatives of the LBP, BARC, DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries.
The field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the
B. Land Survey participation of the landowner and the various representatives. If the
landowner and other representatives are absent, the field investigation shall
proceed, provided they were duly notified thereof. Should there be a variance
10 DARMO Conducts perimeter or Perimeter
between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be placed
under agrarian reform, the land’s suitability to agriculture, the degree or
And/or segregation survey or
development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a composite
team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct further
DENR delineating areas covered Segregation
investigation. The team’s findings shall be binding on both DAR and LBP. After
the field investigation, the DAR Municipal Office shall prepare the Field
Local Office by OLT, "uncarpable Survey Plan
Investigation Report and Land Use Map, a copy of which shall be furnished the
landowner "by personal delivery with proof of service or registered mail with
areas such as 18% slope
return card." Another copy of the Report and Map shall likewise be posted for
at least one week in the municipal or barangay halls where the property is
and above, unproductive/
located.
unsuitable to agriculture,
Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the
Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law. They also include the
retention, infrastructure.
Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and
subsequently amended in DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A.O. No. 1,
In case of segregation or
Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner
that his property shall be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise
subdivision survey, the
his retention right; it also notifies him, pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of
1990, that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and representatives
plan shall be approved by
of the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of the
field investigation, the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR
DENR-LMS.
A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner
that a field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted where he and
C. Review and the other representatives may be present.

Completion of B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad

Documents
11 DARMO Forwards VOCF/CACF
to DARPO. Form
6 claims that Jaime Pimentel, administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was
x x x."cralaw virtua1aw
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the identification process and
increased the number of government agencies involved in the identification
and delineation of the land subject to acquisition. 56 This time, the Notice of
Coverage is sent to the landowner before the conduct of the field investigation
and the sending must comply with specific requirements. Representatives of
the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) must send the Notice of Coverage to the
landowner by "personal delivery with proof of service, or by registered mail
with return card," informing him that his property is under CARP coverage and
that if he desires to avail of his right of retention, he may choose which area
he shall retain. The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the landowner to
attend the field investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from notice.
The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and
determining its suitability for agriculture and its productivity. A copy of the
Notice of Coverage shall be posted for at least one week on the bulletin board
of the municipal and barangay halls where the property is located. The date of
In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C.
Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled "Invitation to Parties" dated
CARP September 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the
administrator of Hacienda Palico. 57 The invitation was received on the same
No. day it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received at the bottom
left corner of said invitation. With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR
notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended
library the conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting
on behalf of petitioner corporation. 58 The Minutes was also signed by the
representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. 59 No letter of
invitation was sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda
Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent
DAR. 60
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), sent to the various parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to
the conference, DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more
than a month earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order
No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be sent to the
landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries
and other interested parties. The procedure in the sending of these notices is
important to comply with the requisites of due process especially when the
owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation,
61 and therefore has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders,

P a g e 117 | 120
Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
officers and employees.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to
the landowner by "personal delivery or registered mail." Whether the
landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may
be sent by personal delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish.
The DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the proceedings
before the DAR the distinction between natural and juridical persons in the
sending of notices may be found in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is
governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
Notices and pleadings are served on private domestic corporations or
partnerships in the following manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. — If
the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or
a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors or partners."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If
the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or
a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors."cralaw virtua1aw library
Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic
corporation before the DARAB and the regular courts are served on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These
persons are those through whom the private domestic corporation or
partnership is capable of action. 62
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of
petitioner corporation. Is he, as administrator of the two Haciendas,
considered an agent of the corporation?
The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make it
reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice
in an action against it. 63 Service must be made on a representative so
integrated with the corporation as to make it a priori supposable that he will
realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
served on him, 64 and bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the
action. 65 Petitioner’s evidence does not show the official duties of Jaime
Pimentel as administrator of petitioner’s haciendas. The evidence does not
indicate whether Pimentel’s duties is so integrated with the corporation that
he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know what he should do
with any legal papers served on him. At the time the notices were sent and the
preliminary conference conducted, petitioner’s principal place of business was
listed in respondent DAR’s records as "Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila,"
66 and "7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, Metro Manila."
67 Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place of business of petitioner.
Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza Cervantes, Manila nor in Cacho-
Gonzales Bldg., Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official functions and
actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two
hundred kilometers away from Metro Manila.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Curiously, respondent DAR had information of the address of petitioner’s
principal place of business. The Notices of Acquisition over Haciendas Palico
and Banilad were addressed to petitioner at its offices in Manila and Makati.
These Notices were sent barely three to four months after Pimentel was
notified of the preliminary conference. 68 Why respondent DAR chose to
notify Pimentel instead of the officers of the corporation was not explained by
the said Respondent.
Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of petitioner corporation,
and the notices and letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner
through him, there is no showing that Pimentel himself was duly authorized
to attend the conference meeting with the MARO, BARC and LBP
representatives and farmer beneficiaries for purposes of compulsory
acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings. Even respondent DAR’s evidence does
not indicate this authority. On the contrary, petitioner claims that it had no
knowledge of the letter-invitation, hence, could not have given Pimentel the
authority to bind it to whatever matters were discussed or agreed upon by the
parties at the preliminary conference or public hearing. Notably, one year after
Pimentel was informed of the preliminary conference, DAR A.O. No. 9, Series
of 1990 was issued and this required that the Notice of Coverage must be sent
"to the landowner concerned or his duly authorized representative." 69
Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its
haciendas, the areas found actually subject to CARP were not properly
identified before they were taken over by respondent DAR. Respondents insist
that the lands were identified because they are all registered property and the
technical description in their respective titles specifies their metes and
bounds. Respondents admit at the same time, however, that not all areas in
the haciendas were placed under the comprehensive agrarian reform
invariably by reason of elevation or character or use of the land. 70
The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two
haciendas, but only portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024
hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were targetted for acquisition. Hacienda
Banilad has an area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares were subject
to CARP. The haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various
tax declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as "sugarland,"
and "forest, sugarland, pasture land, horticulture and woodland." 71
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice of Acquisition
specifically requires that the land subject to land reform be first identified. The
two haciendas in the instant case cover vast tracts of land. Before Notices of
Acquisition were sent to petitioner, however, the exact areas of the
landholdings were not properly segregated and delineated. Upon receipt of
this notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no idea which proportions
of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisition, which portions it could
rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were compact or
contiguous, and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Even
respondent DAR’s evidence does not show that petitioner, through its duly
authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and
investigation that was to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there
proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify
its retention areas in those portions to be acquired compulsorily. The right of
retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the
CARL, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 6. Retention Limits. — . . .
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner; Provided, however, That in case
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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession

the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall
have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the
same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case
the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a
leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case
the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses
his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant
must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the
landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five hectares out of the
total area of his agricultural land subject to CARP. The right to choose the area
to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, pertains to the
landowner. If the area chosen for retention is tenanted, the tenant shall have
the option to choose whether to remain on the portion or be a beneficiary in
the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.
C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway
area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. In two separate
Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the
Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over two of these four titles. 75
The land covered by the two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only
648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. 76 Petitioner
claims it does not know where these portions are located.
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered
by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner,
was not denied participation therein. The results of the survey and the land
valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to
attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly
authorized representative. 77 To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not
lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice requirements, before
the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however,
cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an
essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very
least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.

Petitioner was also left in the dark with respect to Hacienda Caylaway, which III. The Conversion of the three Haciendas
was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS). The VOS in the instant case
was made on May 6, 1988, 72 before the effectivity of R.A. 6657 on June 15, It is petitioner’s claim that the three haciendas are not subject to agrarian
1988. VOS transactions were first governed by DAR Administrative Order No. reform because they have been declared for tourism, not agricultural
19, series of 1989, 73 and under this order, all VOS filed before June 15, 1988 purposes. 78 In 1975, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520
shall be heard and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for declaring the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in
in Executive Order No. 229, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Nasugbu including the subject haciendas, were allegedly reclassified as non-
agricultural 13 years before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. 79 In 1993, the
"III. All VOS transactions which are now pending before the DAR and for which Regional Director for Region IV of the Department of Agriculture certified that
no payment has been made shall be subject to the notice and hearing the haciendas are not feasible and sound for agricultural development. 80 On
requirements provided in Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, dated March 20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, the Sangguniang Bayan
26 July 1989, Section II, Subsection A, paragraph 3. of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted Resolution No. 19 reclassifying certain areas of
Nasugbu as non-agricultural. 81 This Resolution approved Municipal
All VOS filed before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL, shall be Ordinance No. 19, Series of 1992, the Revised Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu
heard and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in 82 which zoning ordinance was based on a Land Use Plan for Planning Areas
Executive Order No. 229. for New Development allegedly prepared by the University of the Philippines.
83 Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the
"x x x."cralaw virtua1aw library Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8, 1993. 84

Section 9 of E.O. 229 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Petitioner claims that Proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld by respondent
DAR in 1991 when it approved conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a
"SECTION 9. Voluntary Offer to Sell. — The government shall purchase all tourist area known as the Batulao Resort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in
agricultural lands it deems productive and suitable to farmer cultivation Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist belt. 85 Petitioner presents
voluntarily offered for sale to it at a valuation determined in accordance with evidence before us that these areas are adjacent to the haciendas subject of
Section 6. Such transaction shall be exempt from the payment of capital gains this petition, hence, the haciendas should likewise be converted. Petitioner
tax and other taxes and fees."cralaw virtua1aw library urges this Court to take cognizance of the conversion proceedings and rule
accordingly. 86
Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of
private land as set forth in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. We do not agree. Respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process in the
229 merely reiterates the procedure of acquisition in Section 16 R.A. 6657. In acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the
other words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the identification of the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its
land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the
landowner, representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR.
Does this mean that these requirements may be dispensed with regard to VOS
filed before June 15, 1988? The answer is no. At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of
Procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land use
First of all, the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that the conversion was the DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990. Under this A.O., the
land, landowner and beneficiaries of the land subject to agrarian reform be application for conversion is filed with the MARO where the property is
identified before the notice of acquisition should be issued. 74 Hacienda located. The MARO reviews the application and its supporting documents and
Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total conducts field investigation and ocular inspection of the property. The findings

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Arts 16-798, Wills and Succession
of the MARO are subject to review and evaluation by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conduct further filed investigation and
submit a supplemental report together with his recommendation to the
Regional Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same. For lands
less than five hectares, the RARO shall approve or disapprove applications for
conversion. For lands exceeding five hectares, the RARO shall evaluate the
PARO Report and forward the records and his report to the Undersecretary for
Legal Affairs. Applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares are approved or
disapproved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
The DAR’s mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in
Section 4 (j) and Sections 5 (l) of Executive Order No, 129-A, Series of 1987 and
reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the
Office of the President. The DAR’s jurisdiction over applications for conversion
is provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or
disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4 (j) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"B. Section 5 (l) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural
lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses.
"C. Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under
certain conditions, the conversion of agricultural lands.
"D. Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of
the President provides that "action on applications for land use ‘conversion on
individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of the DAR, which
shall utilize as its primary reference, documents on the comprehensive land
use plans and accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the
local government units concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy,
pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A." 87
Applications for conversion were initially governed by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series
of 1990 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of
Private Agricultural Lands and Non-Agricultural Uses," and DAR A.O. No. 2,
Series of 1990 entitled "Rules of Procedure Governing the Processing and
Approval of Applications for Land Use Conversion." These A.O.’s and other
implementing guidelines, including Presidential issuances and national policies
related to land use conversion have been consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07,
Series of 1997. Under this recent issuance, the guiding principle in land use
conversion is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"to preserve prime agricultural lands for food production while, at the same
time, recognizing the need of the other sectors of society (housing, industry
and commerce) for land, when coinciding with the objectives of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice,
industrialization and the optimum use of land as a national resource for public
welfare." 88
"Land Use" refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation,
development and management. "Land Use Conversion" refers to the act or
process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some
other use as approved by the DAR. 89 The conversion of agricultural land to
uses other than agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with
the occupants of the land. They involve factual findings and highly technical
matters within the special training and expertise of the DAR. DAR A.O. No. 7,
Series of 1997 lays down with specificity how the DAR must go about its task.
This time, the field investigation is not conducted by the MARO but by a special
task force, known as the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (CLUPPI-DAR Central Office). The procedure is that once an
application for conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the Notice of Posting.
The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate to the fact
of posting. The CLUPPI conducts the field investigation and dialogues with the
applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the information necessary
for the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates
on the merits of the investigation report and recommends the appropriate
action. This recommendation is transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the
Undersecretary, or Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more
than fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary. The
procedure does not end with the Secretary, however. The Order provides that
the decision of the Secretary may be appealed to the Office of the President
or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made to the
Secretary, and from the Secretary to the Office of the President or the Court
of Appeals as the case may be. The mode of appeal motion for
reconsideration, and the appeal fee, from Undersecretary to the Office of the
Secretary shall be the same as that of the Regional Director to the Office of the
Secretary." 90
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 91
Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner’s application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on
the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and
Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL
lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the
requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this
Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer
beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative
process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be
given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA’s were issued to 177 farmer
beneficiaries in 1993. 92 Since then until the present, these farmers have been
cultivating their lands. 93 It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness
and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land
they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the
rightful owner of the land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR’s
failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with the guidelines set
forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is
hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and
determination of petitioner’s application for conversion.
SO ORDERED.
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