1. Montano v. Verceles G.R. No.

168583 July 26, 2010

FACTS: Atty. Montao worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center on October 1, 1994.
Subsequently, he joined the union of rank-and-file employees, the FFW Staff Association, and
eventually became the employee’s union president in July 1997. In November 1998, he was
likewise designated officer-in-charge of FFW Legal Center. During the 21st National Convention
and Election of National Officers of FFW, Atty. Montao was nominated for the position of National
Vice-President. In a letter dated May 25, 2001, however, the Commission on Election (FFW
COMELEC), informed him that he is not qualified for the position as his candidacy violates the
1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws. Election ensued on May 26-27, 2001 in the National
Convention. The convention delegates allowed Atty. Montaos candidacy. He emerged victorious
and was proclaimed as the National Vice-President. On July 13, 2001, Atty. Verceles, as
President of UEEA-FFW and officer of the Governing Board of FFW, filed before the BLR a
petition for the nullification of the election of Atty. Montao as FFW National Vice-President. Atty.
Montao filed his a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Regional Director of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and not the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) has jurisdiction
over the case; that the filing of the petition was premature due to the pending and unresolved
protest before the FFW COMELEC; and that, Atty. Verceles has no legal standing to initiate the
petition not being the real party in interest.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the BLR has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the case was prematurely filed.

Ruling:
1. Yes, the BLR has jurisdiction over the case. Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides
that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union
and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union
and workers association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLRs jurisdiction over the
instant dispute involving member-unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the
provisions of the federations constitution and by-laws.

2. No, the case was not prematurely filed. It is true that under the Implementing Rules, redress
must first be sought within the organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by-
laws. However, this requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying
circumstances. In the case at bench, Atty. Verceles made his protest over Atty. Montaos
candidacy during the plenary session before the holding of the election proceedings. The FFW
COMELEC, notwithstanding its reservation and despite objections from certain convention
delegates, allowed Atty. Montaos candidacy and proclaimed him winner for the position. Under
the rules, the committee on election shall endeavor to settle or resolve all protests during or
immediately after the close of election proceedings and any protest left unresolved shall be
resolved by the committee within five days after the close of the election proceedings. A day or
two after the election, Atty. Verceles made his written/formal protest over Atty. Montaos
candidacy/proclamation with the FFW COMELEC. He exhausted the remedies under the
constitution and by-laws to have his protest acted upon by the proper forum and even asked for
a formal hearing on the matter. Still, the FFW COMELEC failed to timely act thereon. Thus, Atty.
Verceles had no other recourse but to take the next available remedy to protect the interest of the
union he represents as well as the whole federation, especially so that Atty. Montao, immediately
after being proclaimed, already assumed and started to perform the duties of the
position. Consequently, Atty. Verceles properly sought redress from the BLR so that the right to
due process will not be violated. To insist on the contrary is to render the exhaustion of remedies
within the union as illusory and vain.
9. National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP)
v. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 89609, January 27, 1992

FACTS: Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500) workers during milling season and about
three hundred (300) on off-milling season. On November 14, 1984, private respondent National
Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) and employer Dacongcogon entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term of three (3) years, which was to expire on
November 14, 1987. When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and
Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years with
reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment. However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued. On
December 5, 1988, petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines
(NACUSIP-TUCP) filed a petition for direct certification or certification election among the rank
and file workers of Dacongcogon. NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds
that the petition was filed out of time and that there is a deadlock in the CBA negotiation. The
Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss filed by and directed the conduct of certification election.
However, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja, reversed
the decision of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed the petition for being filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom
period.

RULING: NO. Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended
by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that: In a petition involving an
organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective
bargaining union is questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall
immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the last sixty
(60) days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day
freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The sixty-day freedom period based on the original
collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal
of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election. The petition for
certification election filed by NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed
outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired. It
is a rule that only a certified collective bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement duly certified
by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor
Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the
contract-bar rule is applicable. This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or
a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an
existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition
for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within
the freedom period when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose is to ensure stability
in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of
any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the
stipulated original period. Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still
considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly
executed.
17. Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-41955, Dec. 29, 1977

FACTS: Elisco-Elirol Labor Union entered into a CBA with Elizalde Steel. It was later discovered
that the former was not registered with the BLR, and therefore not entitled to the benefits and
privileges embodied in the CBA. Thus, the members of the union later decided in a resolution to
register their union to protect and preserve the integrity of the CBA between Elisco and Elizalde.
By virtue of such resolution, the union applied for registration and a Certification of Registration
was later issued, in which the union acquired a personality and enforced the CBA as the principal
party to the same, representing the workers covered by such CBA. Sometime later, the union
decided that their mother union, the NAFLU, can no longer safeguard the rights of its members
and their interests and welfare can be served best if it will stay independent and disaffiliated from
said mother union. The union disaffiliated and subsequently requested Elizalde to recognize the
union as the SEBA of the employees thereof. Elizalde, without justifiable reason refused to
recognize it and subsequently dismissed the union’s officers and board members. A complaint for
unfair labor practice was later filed by the union against respondents for the latter’s refusal to
bargain collectively. The union also filed a petition before the BLR against respondents Elizalde
and NAFLU be ordered to stop from presenting itself as the collective bargaining agent.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner union must be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative, and not the mother union, NAFLU.

RULING: YES. The local union, Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, NOT the mother union NAFLU
should be recognized as the SEBA of the employer Elizalde Steel. To grant to the former mother
union the authority to administer and enforce their CBA without presumably any members in the
bargaining unit is quite absurd. Elisco¬-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of employees and
members of the local union was the principal party to the agreement. NAFLU as the “mother
union” in participating in the execution of the bar¬gaining agreement with respondent company
acted merely as agent of the local union, which remained the basic unit of the associa¬tion
existing principally and freely to serve the common interest of all its members, including the
freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances so warranted as in the present case.
25. National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) v. Torres, G.R No. 93468, December 29,
1994
FACTS : NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of respondent Bank’s employees occupying supervisory positions. Bank moved
to dismiss the petition on the ground that the supposed supervisory employees were actually
managerial and/or confidential employees thus ineligible to join, assist or form union, and that the
petition lacked the 20 % signatory requirement under the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs,
Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees
hence ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.

RULING: Yes, but only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent
Republic Planters Bank are ineligible to join or assist petitioner National Association of
Trade Union(NATU) – Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist or form
any other labor organization. Art. 212 (m) — Managerial employee is one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are
those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions, if the
exercise of such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. It is the nature of the employee's functions, and not the nomenclature or title
given to his job, which determines whether he has rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial
status. Among the general duties and responsibilities of a Branch Manager is "[t]o discharge his
duties and authority with a high sense of responsibility and integrity and shall at all times be guided
by prudence like a good father of the family, and sound judgment in accordance with and within
the limitations of the policy/policies promulgated by the Board of Directors and implemented by
the Management until suspended, superseded, revoked or modified" . Similarly, the job summary
of a Controller states: "Supervises the Accounting Unit of the branch; sees to the compliance by
the Branch with established procedures, policies, rules and regulations of the Bank and external
supervising authorities; sees to the strict implementation of control procedures . The job
description of a Cashier does not mention any authority on his part to lay down policies, either.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, it is clear that subject employees do not participate in
policy-making but are given approved and established policies to execute and standard practices
to observe,11 leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not. Neither
do the Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers have the power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles
out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. In applying
the doctrine of necessary implication, in the case of Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez,
if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not
be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership."
Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to
be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests are
well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves
are union members.If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages
for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to
act "in the interest of" the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining,
they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound to protect.
33. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association - NATU, FGU Insurance
Group Workers and Employees Association - NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees
Association - NATU, petitioners vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., FGU Insurance
Group, Jose M. Olbes, and Court of Industrial Relations, respondents. G.R. No. L-25291,
January 20, 1971

FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association - NATU, FGU Insurance
Group Workers and Employees Association - NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees
Association - NATU (herein referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of
Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., and the FGU Insurance Group (herein referred to as the Companies) Two
of the lawyers and officers of the Unions namely Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia, tried to
dissuade the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU), to no avail. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with
the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice and were thereafter hired by the companies
- Garcia as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant, and Enaje as personnel manager
and chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the
Unions On October 1957, negotiations for the collective bargaining was conducted but resulted
to a deadlock. From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with
no satisfactory results due to the stalemate on the matter of salary increases. This prompted the
Unions to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies’ unfair labor
practices. On May 20, 1958, the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Building at Plaza Moraga On May 21, Jose M. Olbes, the acting manager and president, sent
individual letters to the striking employees urging them to abandon their strike with a promise of
free coffee, movies, overtime pay, and accommodations. He also warned the strikers if they fail
to return to work by a certain date, they might be replaced in their jobs. Further, the Companies
hired men to break into the picket lines resulting in violence, and the filing of criminal charges
against some union officers and members. When eventually, the strikers called off their strike to
return to their jobs, they were subjected to a screening process by a management committee,
among the members were Garcia and Enaje. After screening, eighty-three (83) strikers were
rejected due to pending criminal charges, and adamantly refused readmission of thirty-four (34)
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike The CIR prosecutor filed
a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies, specifically (1) interfering with the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action; and (2) discriminating
against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis
of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. After the trial, the Court of
Industrial Relations dismissed the Unions’ complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice when they sent
individual letters to the strikers with the promise of additional benefits, and notifying them to either
return to work, or lose their jobs; and
(2) Whether or not the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
striking members of the Unions in readmission of employees after the strike.
RULING:
First issue. The Companies contended that by sending those letters, it constituted a legitimate
exercise of their freedom of expression. That contention is untenable. The Companies are guilty
of unfair labor practice when they sent individual letters to the strikers. It is an act of interference
with the right to collective bargaining through dealing with the strikers individually instead of
through their collective bargaining representatives. Although the Unions are on strike, the
employer is still obligated to bargain with the union as the employees’ bargaining representative.
Further, it is also an act of interference for the employer to send individual letters to the employees
notifying them to return to their jobs, otherwise, they would be replaced. Individual solicitation of
the employees urging them to cease union activity or cease striking consists of unfair labor
practice. Furthermore, when the Companies offered to “bribe” the strikers with “comfortable cots,
free coffee, and movies, overtime work pay” so they would abandon their strike and return to work,
it was guilty of strike-breaking and/or union busting which constitute unfair labor practice. Second
issue. Some of the members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending
criminal charges. However, despite the fact they were able to secure clearances, 34 officials and
members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical
to the Companies. It should be noted, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges
pending against them in the fiscal’s office, arising from the same incidents whence against the
criminal charges against the strikers are involved, were readily readmitted and were not required
to secure clearances. This is an act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process
of rehiring and is therefore a violation of Sec. 4(a)(4) of the Industrial Peace Act The respondent
Companies did not merely discriminate against all strikers in general since they separated the
active room the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines.
Discrimination exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has
been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.
41. DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and ELISEO OCAMPO JR., vs. DEL PILAR
ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION. G.R. No. 170112, April 30, 2008
FACTS: Respondent is the certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and non-
teaching personnel of petitioner. The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union
employees, and requested DEL PILAR to deduct it from employees salaries and wages. Petitioner
refused to effect deductions claiming that non-union employees were not amenable to it. Labor
Arbiter favored the respondent. NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling. CA upheld UNION’s right to collect
agency fees from non-union employees.
ISSUE: WON UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so,
whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.
RULING: Yes. Collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees from
employees who are not union members is recognized by Art. 248 (e) of the Labor Code, if such
non-union members accept the benefits under the CBA. No requirement of written authorization
from the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Art. 248 (e) makes it explicit
that Art.241, par. (o), requiring written authorization is inapplicable to non-union member,
especially in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.
49. Benguet Consolidated Inc vs. BCI Employees & Workers Union-PAFLU, PAFLU, Cid
and Garcia G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968

FACTS: On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (“BBWU”), for and in behalf of
all Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (“BENGUET”) employees in its mines and milling establishment
located at Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract (“CONTRACT”) with
BENGUET. Pursuant to its very terms, said CONTRACT became effective for a period of four and
a half (4-1/2) years and also embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. 3 years later, a
certification election was conducted and BCI Employees & Workers Union (“UNION”) won,
defeating BBWU, and accordingly UNION was certified as the SEBA of all BENGUET employees.
Meanwhile, UNION filed a notice to strike against BENGUET. UNION members who were
BENGUET employees in its the mining camps, went on strike. The strike was attended by
violence, some of the workers and executives of the BENGUET were prevented from entering the
premises and some of the properties of the BENGUET were damaged as a result of the strike.
Eventually, the parties agreed to end the dispute. BENGUET and UNION executed the
AGREEMENT. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (“PAFLU”) placed its conformity
thereto. About a year later, a collective bargaining contract was finally executed between UNION-
PAFLU and BENGUET. Thereafter, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their respective
Presidents to recover said amount of expenses incurred for repair of damaged properties resulting
from the strike on the sole premise that said defendants breached their undertaking in the existing
CONTRACT not to strike during the effectivity thereof. Trial court dismissed the complaint saying
that the CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike clause, did not bind defendants. Failing to get a
reconsideration, BENGUET interposed the present appeal.

ISSUES: (A) WON the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and BBWU
automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification, as sole bargaining representative of all
BENGUET employees. (B) WON defendants are liable for the illegal acts committed during the
course of the strike and picketing by some union members.

RULING: (A) No. Defendants were not contractually bound by the no-strike clause in the
CONTRACT, for they were not parties thereto, they could not be liable for breach of contract to
plaintiff. BENGUET’s reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced. The
“substitutionary” doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed
collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their
bargaining agent. The phrase “said new agent would have to respect said contract” means that
the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective bargaining
contract, except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof. The
“substitutionary” doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly
certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings — like
the no-strike stipulation here — in the collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed
union. To consider UNION contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would therefore violate
the legal maxim that res inter alios acta alios nec prodest nec nocet (a contract cannot adversely
affect the rights of one who is not a party to the contract.) Everything binding on a duly authorized
agent, acting as such, is binding on the principal; not vice-versa, unless there is mutual agency,
or unless the agent expressly binds himself to the party with whom he contracts. Here, it was the
previous agent who expressly bound itself to the other party, BENGUET. UNION, the new agent,
did not assume this undertaking of BBWU. (B) No. The rule of vicarious liability has been
expressly legislated out. The rule now is that for a labor union and/or its officials and members to
be liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation in or authorization or ratification of the
illegal acts. While the lower court found that some strikers and picketers resorted to intimidation
and actual violence, it also found that defendants presented uncontradicted evidence that before
and during the strike, the strike leaders had time and again warned the strikers not to resort to
violence but to conduct peaceful picketing only. Assuming that the strikers did not heed these
admonitions coming from their leaders, the failure of the union officials to go against the erring
union members pursuant to the UNION and PAFLU constitutions and by-laws exposes, at the
most, only a flaw or weakness in the defense which, however, cannot be the basis for plaintiff
BENGUET to recover.
57. FVC LABOR UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (FVCLU-PTGWO) v. SAMA-SAMANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA
SA FVC-SOLIDARITY OF INDEPENDENT AND GENERAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
(SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO) GR No. 176249 ; November 27, 2009

Facts: FVCLU-PTGWO the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the
FVC Philippines, Incorporated (company) signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with the company. At the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term and pursuant to the CBA,
FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA and modified, among
other provisions, the CBAs duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the renegotiated CBA provides that
this re-negotiation agreement shall take effect beginning February 1, 2001 and until May 31, 2003
thus extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4) months. Nine (9) days before
the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term (and four [4] months
and nine [9] days away from the expiration of the amended CBA period), Sama-Samang
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations
(SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for
certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA. Med-
Arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the 60-day
period counted from the May 31, 2003 expiry date of the amended CBA.
Issue/s: Whether or not the extension of the period of the CBA has a legal effect to the exclusive
bargaining representation status of the recognized bargaining agent.
Ruling: No, extension of the period of the CBA has no legal effect to the exclusive bargaining
representation status of the recognized bargaining agent. The legal question before us centers
on the effect of the amended or extended term of the CBA on the exclusive representation status
of the collective bargaining agent and the right of another union to ask for certification as exclusive
bargaining agent. The question arises because the law allows a challenge to the exclusive
representation status of a collective bargaining agent through the filing of a certification election
petition only within 60 days from the expiration of the five-year CBA. Article 253-A of the Labor
Code provides that no petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor
and Employment outside of the sixty day period immediately before the date of expiry of such
five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. This Labor Code provision is implemented
through Book V, Rule VIII of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code which states: provided that
the sixty-day period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected
by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement. FVCLU-
PTGWO has taken the view that its exclusive representation status should fully be in step with
the term of the CBA and that this status can be challenged only within 60 days before the
expiration of this term. We hold this FVCLU-PTGWO position to be correct, but only with respect
to the original five-year term of the CBA which, by law, is also the effective period of the unions
exclusive bargaining representation status. While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs
original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in
excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions exclusive collective bargaining
status.
65. San Miguel Corporation v NLRC (GR NO. 119293, June 10, 2003)

FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees,
executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all
disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable
no-strike no-lockout agreement. On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo
Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike
against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal
transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5)
labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-
elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice. The next day, IBM filed another
notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal
transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and
members, and (5) other acts of unfair labor practice. The Galvez group subsequently requested
the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda group, to which the latter
opposed, alleging Galvez’s lack of authority in filing the same. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion
for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised
non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct
from each other. After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that
the real issues involved are non-strikeable (illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal
union disputes). Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups,
converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation. While separate preventive mediation
conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike
vote. Petitioner opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote
Illegal, invoking the case of PAL v. Drilon, which held that no strike could be legally declared
during the pendency of preventive mediation. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued another
letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of strike into a case of
preventive mediation and emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center only on an
intra-union conflict, which is not strikeable. Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of
their strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike. In reply, NCMB issued a letter again
advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have
been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance with the notice
requirement. Despite this and the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, IBM went
on strike. The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth
P29.98 million in daily lost production. Petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended
Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress
and Egress Order and Deputization Order.

ISSUE: Whether NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to enforce, by injunction, the
parties’ reciprocal obligations to submit to arbitration and not to strike.

RULING: Yes. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to
“enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or
to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual
any decision in favor of such party x x x.” Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of
injunction may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the present
case, NCMB converted IBM’s notices into preventive mediation as it found that the real issues
raised are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMB’s duty to exert “all efforts at
mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably,” and in line with the
state policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor disputes. In accordance with the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing the
notices of strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v. Drilon, where we declared a strike
illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike, in view of the NCMB’s conversion of the notice therein
into a preventive mediation case.
Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the NCMB ordered the
preventive mediation on May 2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost the notices of strike it had
filed. Subsequently, however, it still defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation was
ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike.
73. NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(NACUSIP)-TUCP, petitioner, vs. DIR. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila, FEDERATION OF UNIONS OF RIZAL
(FUR)-TUCP, and CALINOG REFINERY CORPORATION (NASUREFCO), respondents. G.R.
No. L-67485 April 10, 1992

FACTS: Petitioner (NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the

rank and file workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation. Private respondent Federation of Unions
of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP is a labor organization duly registered, while private respondent Calinog
Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the certified exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file workers of the private respondent Calinog Refinery Corporation
by virtue of the certification election. Petitioner (NACUSIP)-TUCP union filed a petition for
deadlock in collective bargaining with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The parties agreed
to submit the petition for deadlock to compulsory arbitration. But, Private respondent FUR-TUCP
filed a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of private respondent
company. Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa ordered that an election be held. Petitioner maintains that
the filing of a petition for certification election during the pendency of a bargaining deadlock is
prohibited.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed during the pendency of a
bargaining deadlock submitted to arbitration or conciliation ?

RULING: NO, a petition for certification election cannot be filed during the pendency of a
bargaining deadlock submitted to arbitration or conciliation. The Deadlock Bar Rule provides that
a petition for certification election can only be entertained if there is no pending bargaining
deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of
strike or lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and
the management. In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to arbitration
when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for certification election. The petition for
certification election should fail in the presence of a then pending bargaining deadlock.
81. TODAY'S KNITTING FREE WORKERS UNION vs. DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, TODAY'S KNITTING COMPANY, INC., PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL UNION COUNCIL G.R. No. L-45057, February 28, 1977
FACTS: Philippine National Union Council, on April 1, 1976, filing with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a petition for the holding of a certification election. Along with this were 200 signatures
of Company’s employees confirming such petition. A petition for intervention on behalf of
petitioner Today’s Knitting Free Workers Union. It saw no need for a certification election,
asserting that it had already been voluntarily recognized by the management as the bargaining
representative. Today’s Knitting Company apparently affirmed the assertion that intervenor union,
now petitioner, had been recognized by management as representing the minority of the workers.
Respondent Union countered with the allegation that there was no legal bar to the petition for
certification. Med-Arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez issued an order granting the petition for certification
election. The matter was then appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Appeal was deniedl. It
ordered a certification election to be conducted by the Bureau within twenty days from receipt of
the resolution. Hence this certiorari and prohibition petition with this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arbiter erred in granting the petition of a certificate elections inspite of
the company’s recognition that another union is the bargaining representative.
HELD: NO. ART.257 of the Labor Code is applicable here. Requisites for certification election
Any petition for certification election filed by any legitimate labor organization shall be supported
by the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt
and verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification
election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all
the employees in the unit. What is required is that the petition for certification election should
have in its favor “the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
The duty then cast on the Detector of Labor Relations is to ascertain whether there has been such
a compliance. There is no doubt in this case there was evidence that more than a total of two-
hundred signatures were obtained by respondent Union in seeking such a certification election.
The respondent Director having satisfied himself that the codal requisite had been met, he had
no choice but to order such certification. In the language of the above provision, "it shall be
mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit." There is, therefore,
no basis for the contention that a duty is cast on respondent Director to allow a rival labor
organization, such as petitioner, to verify the authenticity of such signatures. At any rate, if there
is any doubt as to the required number having been met, what better way is there than the holding
of a certification election to ascertain which union really commands the allegiance of the rank-
and-file employees.
89. San Miguel Corporation, Inc v. San Miguel Corp. Employees Union-PTWGO, G.R. No.
168569, October 5, 2007
FACTS: Some employees of San Miguel Foods Inc. (SMFI) brought grievance against Finance
Manager Gideo Montesa for discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor practice and harassment.
SMFI failed to act on the complaint which prompted San Miguel Corporation Employees Union
PTWGO (the Union) to file a case with the National Labor Relations Commission against SMFI,
its President Amadeo Veloso and Montesa. It prayed that SMFI et al. be ordered to promote the
therein named employees with the corresponding pay increases or adjustment including payment
of salary differentials plus attorney’s fees, and to cease and desist from committing the same
unjust discrimination in matters of promotion. SMFI filed a motion to dismiss on the alleged ground
that the grievance issue should be resolved in the grievance machinery provided in the collective
bargaining. The Union opposed the motion to dismiss. The NLRC dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not complaints for violation of seniority rule under the CBA falls within the
Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction
RULING: Yes. As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248 (i), for violation of a CBA, this
Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code, provides that violations of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. As reflected in the above-quoted allegations of the Union in its Position Paper, the
Union charges SMFI to have violated the grievance machinery provision in the CBA. The
grievance machinery provision in the CBA is not an economic provision, however, hence, the
second requirement for a Labor Arbiter to exercise jurisdiction of a ULP is not present. The Union
likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security provision in the CBA,
specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI “appointed less senior employees to positions at its
Finance Department, consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are
deserving of said appointment. As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less
senior employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or more qualified. It
may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or flagrant violation of the seniority rule
under the CBA, a ULP over which the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. SMFI, at all events, questions
why the Court of Appeals came out with a finding that it (SMFI) disregarded the seniority rule
under the CBA when its petition before said court merely raised a question of jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals having affirmed the NLRC decision finding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
over the Union complaint and thus remanding it to the Labor Arbiter for continuation of
proceedings thereon, the appellate court said finding may be taken to have been made only for
the purpose of determining jurisdiction.
97. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. INC., v. MANGGAGAWA NG
KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS and the COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 162783/ July 14,
2005
FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. (PLDT) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the telecommunications business. Private respondent Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) is a labor union of rank and file employees in PLDT. The
members of respondent union learned that a redundancy program would be implemented by the
petitioner. Thereupon it filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) on 04 November 2002 for unfair labor practice. On 11 November 2002, another Notice
of Strike was filed by the private respondent, which contained the following: UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES, to wit: PLDT’s alleged restructuring of its GMM Operation Services. A number of
conciliation meetings, conducted by the NCMB, National Capital Region, were held between the
parties. However, these efforts proved futile. On 23 December 2002, the private respondent
staged a strike. On 31 December 2002, three hundred eighty three (383) union members were
terminated from service pursuant to PLDT’s redundancy program. On 02 January 2003, the
Secretary, Patricia Sto. Tomas, issued an Order certifying the labor dispute at the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration and directing to return to work within 24 hours all striking employees except
those who were terminated due to redundancy. The private respondent filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
granted the petition and set side and nullified the said order of the Secretary of Labor. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject order of the Secretary of Labor excluding the Return-To-Work
Order the workers dismissed due to the redundancy program is valid.
RULING:No. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the certification of
the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists with an order for workers to
return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Time and again, the Court has held that when
an official bypasses the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same
will not be maintained if the
intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated. Records would show that the strike occurred
on 23 December 2002. Article 263(g) directs that the employer must readmit all workers under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Since the strike was held on the
aforementioned date, then the condition prevailing before it, which was the condition present on
22 December 2002, must be maintained. Undoubtedly, on 22 December 2002, the members of
the private respondent who were dismissed due to alleged redundancy were still employed by the
petitioner and holding their respective positions. This is the status quo that must be maintained.
105. Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Assoc. (TMPCWA) v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 158786 &
158789, October 19, 2007
FACTS: The Union filed a petition for certification election among the Toyota rank and file
employees with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). On February 21, 135
Union officers and members failed to render the required overtime work, and instead marched to
and staged a picket in front of the BLR office. The Union, in a letter of the same date, also
requested that its members be allowed to be absent on February 22 to attend the hearing and
instead work on their next scheduled rest day. This request however was denied by Toyota.
Despite denial of the Union’s request, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on
February 22 and 23 in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-
union stance of Toyota. Due to the deliberate absence of a considerable number of employees
on February 22 to 23, Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower in its manufacturing and
production lines, and was unable to meet its production goals resulting in huge losses. On the
next day, the Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike for union busting amounting to
unfair labor practice. On March 1, the Union nonetheless submitted an explanation in compliance
with the February 27 notices sent by Toyota to the erring employees. Consequently, on March 2
and 5, Toyota issued 2 memoranda to the concerned employees to clarify whether or not they are
adopting the March 1, 2001 Union’s explanation as their own. The employees were also required
to attend an investigative interview, but they refused to do so. On March 16, Toyota terminated
the employment of 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of
Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code. In reaction to the dismissal of
its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on March 17. Subsequently, from March
28 to April 12, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta.
Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants. On
March 29, Toyota filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO with the
NLRC. It sought free ingress to and egress from its Bicutan and Sta. Rosa manufacturing plants.
Acting on said petition, the NLRC issued a TRO against the Union. Meanwhile, Toyota filed a
petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC arbitration branch, and prayed that the erring
Union officers, directors, and members be dismissed. On April 10, the DOLE Secretary assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC.
In said Order, the DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers to return to work at their regular
shifts by April 16. On the other hand, it ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees under
the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its option, put them under payroll
reinstatement. The parties were also enjoined from committing acts that may worsen the situation.
The Union ended the strike on April 12. The union members and officers tried to return to work
on April 16 but were told that Toyota opted for payroll-reinstatement authorized by the Order of
the DOLE Secretary. Meanwhile, on May 23, despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretary’s
certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a protest rally in front
of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defiance of the April 10 Order. Then,
on May 28, around Union members staged another protest action in front of the Bicutan Plant. At
the same time, some payroll-reinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plant’s
main entrance, and were later joined by other Union members. On June 5, notwithstanding the
certification Order, the Union filed another notice of strike.
ISSUE: Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal
strikes
RULING: Yes. A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. Applying pertinent legal provisions and
jurisprudence, we rule that the protest actions undertaken by the Union officials and members are
not valid and proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government for redress of their
complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code. The Union’s position is weakened
by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies.” It is obvious that the February 21 to
23 concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under
Art. 263 of the Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a
notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case
of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3)
notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the
strike illegal.
113. Bitlex Phils. Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corp., G.R
No. 155679, 19 December 2006

FACTS: The Petitioners in this case are officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union and Filflex
Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union. The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of
the employees of corporations. Respondents are sister companies engaged in the garment
business. Respondents joined the welga ng bayan which lasted for several days which prompted
the respondent to file a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with
procedural requirements. Respondents maintained that the work stoppage was illegal since the
following requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of notice
of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote to the
Department of Labor and Employment. Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked out by
respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a
ride and the apprehension that violence would erupt between those participating in the welga and
the authorities, respondent’s workers were prevented from reporting for work.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Participating in a Welga ng Bayan Constitutes Illegal Strike.

RULING: Yes. Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an
extended sympathy strike. Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on
a day they are scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an
illegal work stoppage. There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their
intention, or that they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24,
1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection. Even assuming arguendo that in staging
the strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal,
for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. In fine, the legality of
a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means by
which it is carried out.
121. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586

FACTS: This case involves the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San
Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage
Rationalization Act. The Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) represented 4,500 employees of
San Miguel Corp. (SMC) demanding for a correction of the significant distortion in the worker’s
wages. This demand was unheeded by company hence the union members refused to render
overtime services until the distortion has been corrected by SMC. It appears that the employees
working hours/schedule has been freely observed by the employees for the past 5 years and due
to the abandonment of the longstanding schedule of work and reversion to the eight-hour shift
substantial losses were incurred by SMC. The Union contends that their refusal to work beyond
eight hours was a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct distortion.
ISSUE: Was there an illegal strike?

RULING: Yes. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are
concerned are: strikes — the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute; picketing — the marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by
the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and
boycotts — the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade
others to a like refusal. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly
undertake is the lockout — the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute, In
this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to
strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue
to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the
legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor.
It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by
law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an
establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law
or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and
comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or
lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The legislative intent
that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or
arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or
management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16, Chapter
I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled
voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, "Any issue
involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout." The Union was thus prohibited
to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in non-peaceful concerted activities for the
settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of wage distortions, or for that matter; any other
issue "involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-
employee relations." The partial strike or concerted refusal by the Union members to follow the
five-year-old work schedule which they had therefore been observing, resorted to as a means of
coercing correction of "wage distortions," was therefore forbidden by law and contract and, on this
account, illegal.
129. NISSAN MOTORS PHIL., INC. v. SEC. OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. No. 158190-
91, June 21, 2006

FACTS: Respondent Union filed 4 notices of strike with the NCMB. The fist notice was on the
ground of alleged ULP for the suspension of about 140 company employees following the
disruptive protest action arising from its demand for payment of the second half of their 13th month
pay. The second strike was on the ground of bargaining deadlock. DOLE issued an order
assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. The union filed its third notice of strike on the ground of
illegal lockout, illegal suspension, and union busing. DOLE issued an order directing the strike to
be consolidated with the first two notices reiterating the injunction in the assumption of jurisdiction.
The union then filed the fourth notice of strike on account of the forced leave,
coercion/intimidation, union busting, and nonpayment of salaries. DOLE issued an order directing
the strike to be consolidated with the three notices of strike reiterating the injunction in the
assumption of jurisdiction. Despite the injunctions, the Union went on actual strike, picketing, and
slowdown. The DOLE secretary sustained the dismissal of the union officers and 140 company
employees. CA reinstated the 140 rank and file union members. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the 1401
rank and file members of the union?

RULING: NO. The union members have not committed any illegal acts during the strike
notwithstanding the illegality of the strike on account of its violation of DOLE’s injunction order.
While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as
having lost his employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers
for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction between union officers and
members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal
acts during the strike. And lest it be forgotten, the law invests the Secretary of Labor and
Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption
order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved. CA
acted within the bounds of the law and certainly rendered a judicious solution to the dispute when
she spared the striking workers or union members from the penalty of dismissal.
137. Pastor Dionisio Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999
FACTS: Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists
(SDA) is a religious corporation while petitioner was a Pastor of the SDA until 31 October 199.
Petitioner Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty eight (28) years from 1963
to 1991. He held the position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October
1991. Petitioner received several communications from Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros
Mission asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings
collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to
remit the same to the Negros Mission. Petitioner answered that he should not be made
accountable for the unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor Buhat and
Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the
collecting at that time.On October 16, 1991, Austria went to the office of Pastor Buhat, who was
the president of the Negros Mission, to persuade Buhat to convene the Executive Committee to
settle a dispute between Pastor Austria and Pastor David Rodrigo. But that meeting ended in a
heated confrontation between Austria and Buhat. A fact-finding committee was created to
investigate petitioner. The fact-finding committee conducted an investigation of petitioner.
Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and
commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as
grounds for the termination of his services. Petitioner filed a complaint on before the Labor Arbiter
for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. The SDA, appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. The NLRC vacated
the findings of the Labor Arbiter. But the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original decision.
The SDA filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. Notable in the motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondents is their invocation, for the first time on appeal, that
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioner due to the constitutional
provision on the separation of church and state since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical
affair to which the State cannot interfere. The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case,
reversed itself once again, sustained the argument posed by private respondents and,
accordingly, dismissed the complaint of petitioner.
ISSUES: Whether or not such termination is valid.
HELD: NO. The issue being the legality of petitioner's dismissal, the same must be measured
against the requisites for a valid dismissal, namely: (a) the employee must be afforded due
process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, and; (b) the
dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Without the
concurrence of this twin requirements, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code
and the Rules Implementing the Labor Code further require the employer to furnish the employee
with two (2) written notices, to wit: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side; and, (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established
to justify his termination. The first notice, which may be considered as the proper charge, serves
to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. The
second notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him. Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are conditions sine
qua non before dismissal may be validly effected. Private respondent failed to substantially
comply with the above requirements. With regard to the first notice, the letter which notified
petitioner and his wife to attend the meeting cannot be construed as the written charge required
by law. A perusal of the said letter reveals that it never categorically stated the particular acts or
omissions on which petitioner's impending termination was grounded. In fact, the letter never even
mentioned that petitioner would be subject to investigation. The alleged grounds for the dismissal
of petitioner from the service were only revealed to him when the actual letter of dismissal was
finally issued. It cannot be said that petitioner was given enough opportunity to properly prepare
for his defense. While admittedly, private respondents complied with the second requirement, the
notice of termination, this does not cure the initial defect of lack of the proper written charge
required by law. SC ruled that there was no breach of trust. Private respondents allege that they
have lost their confidence in petitioner for his failure, despite demands, to remit the tithes and
offerings amounting to P15,078.10, which were collected in his district. A careful study of the
voluminous records of the case reveals that there is simply no basis for the alleged loss of
confidence and breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code,
the breach of trust must be willful. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. It should be genuine and not simulated. This ground has never been
intended to afford an occasion for abuse, because of its subjective nature. The stenographic notes
show that Pastor Austria was able to remit all his collections to the treasurer of the Negros
Mission. Furthermore, in the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which private respondents
failed to demonstrate, between petitioner and his wife, petitioner cannot be made accountable for
the alleged infraction committed by his wife. With respect to the grounds of serious misconduct
and commission of an offense against the person of the employer's duly authorized
representative, we find the same unmeritorious and, as such, do not warrant petitioner's dismissal
from the service. Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. For misconduct to
be considered serious it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial
or unimportant. Based on this standard, we believe that the act of petitioner although improper,
cannot be considered as grave enough to be considered as serious misconduct. After all, as
correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, though petitioner committed damage to property, he did
not physically assault Pastor Buhat or any other pastor present during the incident of 16 October
1991. Hence, there is no basis for the allegation that petitioner's act constituted serious
misconduct or that the same was an offense against the person of the employer's duly authorized
representative. The final ground alleged by private respondents in terminating petitioner, gross
and habitual neglect of duties, does not require an exhaustive discussion. Suffice it to say that all
private respondents had were allegations but not proof. Aside from merely citing the said ground,
private respondents failed to prove culpability on the part of petitioner. In fact, the evidence on
record shows otherwise. Petitioner's rise from the ranks disclose that he was actually a hard-
worker. Private respondents' evidence, which consisted of petitioner's Worker's Reports, revealed
how petitioner travelled to different churches to attend to the faithful under his care. Indeed, he
labored hard for the SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a dismissal from the service for a
non-existent cause.SC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was terminated
from service without just or lawful cause.
153. Sarona v. NLRC, G.R No. 185280, January 18, 2012

FACTS: In 2003, petitioner Timoteo Sarona , who was hired by Sceptre Security Agency as a
security guard sometime in April 1976, was asked by Sceptre’s Operation Manager to submit a
resignation letter and to fill up Royale’s employment application form as the same were
supposedly required for applying for a position at Royale Security Agency. After several weeks of
being in floating status, Royale’s Security assigned the petitioner at Highlight Metal Craft, Inc.
(Highlight Metal) from July 29, 2003 to August 8, 2003. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred
and assigned to Wide Wide World Express, Inc. (WWWE, Inc.). The petitioner was then informed
that his assignment at WWWE, Inc. had been withdrawn because Royale had allegedly been
replaced by another security agency. The petitioner, however, shortly discovered that Royale was
never replaced as WWWE, Inc.’s security agency. He learned that his fellow security guard was
not relieved from his post. On September 21, 2003, the petitioner was once again assigned at
Highlight Metal, albeit for a short period from September 22, 2003 to September 30, 2003.
Subsequently, when the petitioner reported at Royale’s office on October 1, 2003, he was
informed that he would no longer be given any assignment per the instructions of the General
Manager of Sceptre. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal on October 4, 2003.
Labor Arbiter Jose Gutierrez (LA Gutierrez) ruled in the petitioner’s favor and found him illegally
dismissed. The allegation of the petitioner’s abandonment was negated by his filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal three (3) days after he was informed that he would no longer be given any
assignments. The respondents were ordered to pay the petitioner backwages, which LA Gutierrez
computed from the day he was dismissed, or on October 1, 2003, up to the promulgation of his
Decision on May 11, 2005. On Appeal, the NLRC concurred with the Labor Arbiter’s finding that
the petitioner was illegally dismissed but modified the monetary award in the petitioner’s favor by
reducing the amount of his backwages from ₱95,600.00 to ₱15,600.00. The NLRC determined
the petitioner’s backwages as limited to three (3) months of his last monthly salary, considering
that his employment with Royale was only for a period for one (1) month and three (3) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s backwages should be limited to his salary for three
months?

RULING: No, petitioner’s backwages should not be limited to his salary for three months.
Backwages is a remedy affording the employee a way to recover what he has lost by reason of
the unlawful dismissal. In awarding backwages, the primordial consideration is the income that
should have accrued to the employee from the time that he was dismissed up to his reinstatement
and the length of service prior to his dismissal is definitely inconsequential. As early as 1996, this
Court, in Bustamante, et al. v. NLRC, et al., clarified in no uncertain terms that if reinstatement is
no longer possible, backwages should be computed from the time the employee was terminated
until the finality of the decision finding the dismissal unlawful. The Court holds Royale liable to
pay the petitioner backwages to be computed from his dismissal on October 1, 2003 until the
finality of this decision. Nonetheless, the amount received by the petitioner from the respondents
in satisfaction of the previous decision shall be deducted accordingly.
161.PHIL DIAMOD HOTEL v MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EEs UNION GR
NO 158075 JUNE 30, 2006
FACTS: Respondent union filed a petition seeking certfication as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its member. DOLE-
NCR denied the petition for failure to comply with the legal requirements and that the CE was
seen to fragment the EEs of the ER. The union’s president notified ER of its intention to negotiate
a CBA for its members. ER advised the union that it was not certified by the DOLE as the
exclusive bargaining representative and ER could not recognize the union as such.
As a result, the union filed a Notice of Strike. Then the parties proceeded to conciliation, however
day before a scheduled conciliation meeting, the union suddenly went on strike! The Union
officers participated in the staging of the strike. ER filed a petition to declare the strike
illegal. Both NLRC and CA held the strike was illegal.
Argument of union: it sought to bargain for its members only and that the ER’s refusal to bargain
would prompt the union to engage in concerted activities
Principle: Dismissal of union officers for staging and participating in illegal strike
Doctrine: As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging
and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code which
provides that “. . .[a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status . . .”
Principle: Ordinary striking worker cannot be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike.
Doctrine: An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer
who may be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an
illegal act during a strike
Principle: Award of backwages – in cases of ULP strikes, rests on court’s discretion and only in
exceptional cases.
Doctrine: When in case of strikes, and according to the Court of Industrial Relations even if the
strike is legal, strikers may not collect their wages during the days they did not go to work, for the
same reasons if not more, laborers who voluntarily absent themselves from work to attend the
hearing of a case in which they seek to prove and establish their demands against the company,
the legality and propriety of which demands is not yet known, should lose their pay during the
period of such absence from work. The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and
capital or management and employee is that of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.” If there
is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer
was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended. It is
hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the
employer’s time. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Principle: “No backwages rule”; Exceptions
Doctrine: Jurisprudential law, however, recognizes several exceptions to the “no backwages
rule,” to wit: when the employees were illegally locked to thus compel them to stage a strike; when
the employer is guilty of the grossest form of ULP; when the employer committed discrimination
in the rehiring of strikers refusing to readmit those against whom Survey of Jurisprudence on
Termination and Security of Tenure Page 77 there were pending criminal cases while admitting
nonstrikers who were also criminally charged in court; or when the workers who staged a voluntary
ULP strike offered to return to work unconditionally but the employer refused to reinstate them
169. TOYOTA MOTORS PHIL. vs. NLRC, G.R. NO. 158786, OCTOBER 19, 2007
FACTS: Toyota Motor Phils.Workers Assoc. (Union) is a legitimate labor organization duly
registered with DOLE and is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file
employees. The Union applied and was granted the immediate holding of a certification election
and was later recognized by the NCMB as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
Toyota rank and file employees. Toyota challenged said Order via an appeal to the DOLE
Secretary. Pending Toyota’s appeal, the Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota which the
latter denied. On February 22 & 23, 2001, Despite denial of the Union’s request, more than 200
employees staged mass actions on in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest the
partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota which resulted to substantial company losses. On March
16, 2001, Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees. In reaction to the dismissal of its
union members and officers, the Union went on strike on March 17, 2001. Subsequently, from
March 28, 2001 to April 12, 2001, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of
Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers who reported for work
from entering the plants. On April 10, 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. In said Order, the
DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers to return to work at their regular shifts by April 16,
2001. On the other hand, it ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees under the same
terms and conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its option, put them under payroll
reinstatement. Meanwhile, on May 23, 2001, at around 12:00 noon, despite the issuance of the
DOLE Secretary’s certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a
protest rally in front of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defiance of the
April 10, 2001 Order. Then, on May 28, 2001, around forty-four (44) Union members staged
another protest action in front of the Bicutan Plant. At the same time, some twenty-nine (29)
payroll-reinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plant’s main entrance, and were
later joined by other Union members. When the parties were asked to submit their position papers,
only Toyota heeded the order and the NLRC declared the strikes illegal.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal
strikes.
(2) Whether or not separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in
the illegal strikes.
RULING:
1. A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. While we recognize the right of every person or a group to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such
right is governed by existing laws, rules and regulations. There are prerequisites for a valid strike
under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, and the Union failed to comply with the following requirements:
(1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership
in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them
renders the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the
strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment
of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. With respect to the strikes committed from
March 17 to April 12, 2001, those were initially legal as the legal requirements were met.
However, on March 28 to April 12, 2001, the Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta.
Rosa plants and blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. This is a
palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or
which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. While it may be
conceded that there was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants, the fact still remains that
the Union and its members picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the Company
premises. This is a patent violation of the assumption of jurisdiction and certification Order of the
DOLE Secretary, which ordered the parties “to cease and desist from committing any act that
might lead to the worsening of an already deteriorated situation.” While there are no work
stoppages, the pickets and concerted actions outside the plants have a demoralizing and even
chilling effect on the workers inside the plants and can be considered as veiled threats of possible
trouble to the workers when they go out of the company premises after work and of impending
disruption of operations to company officials and even to customers in the days to come.
2. No. The general rule is that when just causes for terminating the services of an employee under
Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay. The apparent
reason behind the forfeiture of the right to termination pay is that lawbreakers should not benefit
from their illegal acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled to “whatever rights, benefits
and privileges [s/he] may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement
with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice” or under the Labor Code and other
existing laws. This means that the employee, despite the dismissal for a valid cause, retains the
right to receive from the employer benefits provided by law, like accrued service incentive leaves.
With respect to benefits granted by the CBA provisions and voluntary management policy or
practice, the entitlement of the dismissed employees to the benefits depends on the stipulations
of the CBA or the company rules and policies. As in any rule, there are exceptions. One exception
where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly dismissed is when the court
finds justification in applying the principle of social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution.
The new Constitution contains a separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and
human rights with a separate sub-topic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of
labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national economy and the
welfare of the people in general. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement
of the lot of the workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in
proper cases even if the dismissal be for cause. We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense
involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may
not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or
whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. A contrary rule would, as the
petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring
employee for his offense. There are two exceptions when the NLRC or the courts should not grant
separation pay based on social justice: Serious misconduct (which is the first ground for dismissal
under Art. 282); or Acts that reflect on the moral character of the employee. What is unclear is
whether the ruling likewise precludes the grant of separation pay when the employee is validly
terminated from work on grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code other than serious
misconduct.
177. Dusit Hotel Nikko vs. Renato M. Gatbonton G.R. No. 161654 May 5, 2006
FACTS: On November 21, 1998, respondent Renato M. Gatbonton was hired as Chief Steward
in petitioner Dusit Hotel Nikko’s Food and Beverage Department, signing a three-month
probationary employment contract until February 21, 1999. The standards by which he would be
assessed to qualify for regular employment were explained to him at the start of his employment.
The hotel alleged that at the end of the probation period, Ingo Rauber, Director of its Food and
Beverage Department, recommended a two-month extension of Gatbonton’s probationary period
observing that Gatbonton failed to meet the qualification standards for Chief Steward. At the end
of the 4th month, on March 24, 1999, Rauber informed Gatbonton that the latter had poor ratings
on staff supervision, productivity, quantity of work, and overall efficiency and did not qualify as
Chief Steward. Gatbonton requested another month or until April 22, 1999 to improve his
performance, to which Rauber agreed but allegedly refused to sign the Performance Evaluation
Form. Neither did he sign the Memorandum on the extension. On March 31, 1999, a notice of
termination of probationary employment effective April 9, 1999, on the above alleged grounds
was served on Gatbonton. On April 12, 1999, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of wages, with prayers for reinstatement, full backwages, and damages, including
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gatbonton was illegally dismissed.

RULING: Gatbonton was illegally dismissed and he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, and other privileges as well as to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Petitioner did not present proof that
his employment was validly extended. Rauber agreed to an extension but there was no signature
on the Performance Evaluation Form and the Memorandum on the extension. A probationary
employee can be legally terminated either: (1) for a just cause; or (2) when the employee fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known to him
by the employer at the start of the employment. It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations
that a probationary employee engaged to work beyond the probationary period of six months, as
provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, or for any length of time set forth by the employer
(in this case, three months), shall be considered a regular employee. This is clear in the last
sentence of Article 281. Any circumvention of this provision would put to naught the State’s
avowed protection for labor.
185. Premiere Development Bank vs. NLRC and Teodora Labanda GR No. 114695 / July 23,
1998
FACTS: Ramon Ocampo (depositor of petitioner bank) issued a check in favor of and for deposit
to the account of CBISCO (also a depositor of petitioner bank). After the check and the deposit
slip were presented to private respondent Labanda (bank teller), it was turned over to the branch
cashier for verification of the fund balance. The check was posted by Mr. Torio (bookkeeper). But
instead of posting it to CBISCO account, it was posted to the account of Mr. Ocampo treating it
as On-Us check. The wife of Mr. Ocampo together with the auditor from CBISCO went to
petitioner bank and complained to petitioner that her husband was being held accountable for the
amount. It was only then that the petitioner bank discovered the misposting of the check issued
by Mr. Ocampo, resulting in the overstatement of his outstanding daily balance. Due to such
incident, petitioner send a demand letter to Labanda requesting her to explain in writing the
misposting and erroneous crediting of the subject check in issue within 3 days from receipt
thereof, and in case she fails to do so, necessary action shall be taken against her. Petitioner
bank conducted investigation and found Labanda and Torio primarily liable for the incident. These
findings prompted the bank to send a letter to Labanda requiring her to shoulder 20% of the
amount lost via salary deduction. However she objected to such, reasoning out that was the
breadwinner in the family. Subsequently, Labanda was placed under preventive suspension
pending investigation of the incident. She wrote a letter to the bank requesting information on the
duration of her suspension and asked for expeditious investigation. In response, the bank
informed her that the period of her suspension shall last until the investigation is completed and
a decision is made thereon. Labanda manifested that she will not sign any of preliminary
statements she made unless with the consent and advice of her husband. Another letter was sent
to her informing that her refusal to sign authenticate preliminary statements was a clear indication
of her unwillingness to cooperate or an effort to hide something or suppress the truth. The dates
of the hearing were rescheduled by petitioners many times. Later, petitioner received a letter from
private respondent demanding payment of actual damages for their alleged arbitrary, illegal and
oppressive acts. However, petitioners did not heed the demand. Labanda filed a complaint for
damages before the court. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was denied and then filed a
motion for reconsideration but was still denied. It then filed a petition for certiorari with CA but was
dismissed. The decision became final and executory. After 8 months from the finality of CA’s
decision and 2 years from the alleged termination of her employment, Labanda filed an illegal
dismissal case before the Labor Arbiter on the ground that her dismissal was without lawful cause
and without due process. The LA dismissed the case and rule that, with the filing of her complaint
with the RTC, she on her own, terminated her employment with the bank and thus she was not
dismissed by her employer. On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled
that the indefinite suspension of Labanda amounted to constructive dismissal. NLRC denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners. Thus they filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of a complaint for damages by private respondent Labanda
against the petitioners amounts to abandonment and thus was not illegally dismissed.
Ruling: NO. NLRC correctly observed that the preventive suspension beyond the maximum
period amounted to constructive dismissal. Thus by placing her on indefinite suspension,
complainant was unduly deprived of her right to security in employment which is her only means
of livelihood. NLRC further ruled that Labanda did not abandon her work. To constitute
abandonment, 2 elements must concur: 1.) Failure to report to work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason and 2.) Clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Her failure
to report for work was due to her indefinite suspension. Her inability to report for work was not
voluntary but was rather the result of her indefinite suspension which in reality was a constructive
dismissal. The question of whether the employee has abandoned his work is a factual issue.
Petitioners failed to show that the findings of fact of the NLRC are not supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, such findings must be accorded respect and finality on appeal.
193. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. JOY C. CABILES, G.R. No.
170139, August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for Taiwan
Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she
agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without
prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get
her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that
Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner
and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling
of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding
her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s
fees

ISSUE: WON Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that
the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the
existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any
other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is
a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or
a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would
warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
201. UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION V. FERDINAND ACIBO, ET.
AL, G.R. No. 186439, January 15, 2014
Complainants filed before the LA complaints for regularization, entitlement to the benefits under
the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),and attorney’s fees. The LA dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The LA held that the complainants were seasonal or project workers
and not regular employees of URSUMCO.The NLRC reversed the LA’s ruling; it declared the
complainants as regular URSUMCO employees and granted their monetary claims under the
CBA. The NLRC pointed out that the complainants performed activities which were usually
necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of URSUMCO, and had been repeatedly
hired for the same undertaking every season. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling finding the
complainants to be regular employees of URSUMCO, but deleted the grant of monetary benefits
under the CBA.
Whether the respondents are regular employees of URSUMCO. The Court ruled that respondents
are regular seasonal employees of URSUMCO. Where the circumstances evidently show that the
employer imposed the period precisely to preclude the employee from acquiring tenurial security,
the law and this Court will not hesitate to strike down or disregard the period as contrary to public
policy, morals, etc."32 In such a case, the general restrictive rule under Article 280 of the Labor
Code will apply and the employee shall be deemed regular. Clearly, therefore, the nature of the
employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer or on the procedure for
hiring and the manner of designating the employee. Rather, the nature of the employment
depends on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the nature
of the employer’s business, the duration and scope to be done,33 and, in some cases, even the
length of time of the performance and its continued existence.
209. Rogelio Caramol v. National Labor Relations Commission and Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co. of Manila, Inc., G.R. No. 102973, August 24, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner Rogelio Caramol, a worker hired by respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
of Manila, Inc., (ATLANTIC GULF), on a "project-to-project" basis but whose employment was
renewed forty-four (44) times by the latter, seeks the reversal of the decision of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 31 October 1991 in NLRC NCR 00-01-
04703-88 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter had
earlier declared respondent ATLANTIC GULF guilty of unfair labor practice, ordered it to cease
and desist from further committing unfair labor practice against petitioner, declared illegal the
constructive dismissal of petitioner and directed respondent ATLANTIC GULF to immediately
reinstate petitioner to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages
in the amount of P68,826.94 as of 29 November 1989. The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter
show that petitioner was hired by respondent ATLANTIC GULF on 2 June 1983 for the position
of rigger. Until the occurence of the strike on 10 May 1986, his last assignment was at respondent
ATLANTIC GULF's plant in Batangas. Petitioner claims that because of his involvement in
unionism, particularly in actively manning the picket lines, he was among those who were not re-
admitted after the strike. On the other hand, respondent ATLANTIC GULF contends that petitioner
was one of the several thousands of workers who were hired on a "project-to-project" basis and
whose employment was covered by Project Employment Contract for a particular project and for
a definite period of time. On 15 May 1986 private respondent dispensed with the services of
petitioner claiming as justification the completion of the Nauru project to which petitioner was
assigned and the consequent expiration of the employment contract. The NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision. It ruled that petitioner is a project employee falling under the exception
of Art. 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, explaining that — . . . As correctly asserted by
respondent-company, Mr. Caramol's services have been fixed for a specific project shown in the
contracts of employment. The principle of party autonomy must not be interfered with absent any
showing of violation of law, public policy and jurisprudence. "A contract duly entered into should
be respected, since a contract is the law between the parties" (Pakistan International Airlines
Corp. v. Ople, G.R. No. 61594, Sept. 28, 1990). The exception under Article 280 of the Labor
Code is precisely designed to meet an exigency like in the case at bar. . . .Under the Labor Code
as well as the Civil Code of the Philippines, "the validity and propriety of contracts and obligation
with a fixed or definite period are recognized, and imposes no restraints on the freedom of the
parties to fix the duration of a contract, whatever its object, be it specie, food or services, except
the general admonition against stipulations contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order or
public policy" (Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, G.R. No. 48494, Feb. 5, 1990). . . .Contract workers
are not considered regular. Their services depend upon availability of a project to be undertaken.
Thus, it would be unjust to retain an employee in the payroll while waiting for another project. . . .
Petitioner now insists that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion and committed serious errors
of law and that its questioned decision is contrary to the jurisprudential doctrine enunciated
in Magante v. NLRC where it was held that the "project" employee therein was deemed a regular
employee considering the attendant circumstances, i.e., the employee was assigned to perform
tasks which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;
said assignments did not end on a project to project basis, although the contrary was made to
appear through the signing of separate employment contracts; there were no reports of
termination submitted to the nearest public employment office every time employment was
terminated due to the completion of the project.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a regular employee.
HELD: Yes. There is no question that stipulation on employment contract providing for a fixed
period of employment, such as "project-to-project" contract, is valid provided the period was
agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating
his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the
former over the latter. However, where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have
been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be
struck down as contrary tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary
to public policy, morals, good custom or public order. In the case before us, we find sufficiently
established circumstances showing that the supposed fixed period of employment by way of a
project-to-project contract has been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the
petitioner. Accordingly, such arrangement must be struck down as contrary to public policy. With
the successive contracts of employment where petitioner continued to perform the same kind of
work, i.e., as rigger throughout his period of employment, it is clearly manifest that petitioner's
tasks were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of private respondent.
There can therefore be no escape from the conclusion that petitioner is a regular employee of
private respondent ATLANTIC GULF.
217. ALU-TUCP vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION (NSC), G.R. No. 109902, August 2, 1994

FACTS: Petitioners had been employed by respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC) in
connection with its Five Year Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II). On 5 July 1990, petitioners filed
separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC,
Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after
hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 7 June 1991, declared petitioners "regular project
employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity
exists," but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials. Both parties appealed to
the NLRC from that decision. The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter's
decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter's holding that petitioners were project employees since they
were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program, the
completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation
was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside
the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and
factual basis. Hence, this present petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are properly characterized as "project employees" rather than
"regular employees" of NSC.

RULING: Yes. From the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, the principal test for
determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as
distinguished from "regular employees," is whether or not the "project employees" were assigned
to carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration (and scope) of which were specified
at the time the employees were engaged for that project. The services of project employees are
co-terminous with the project and may be terminated upon the end or completion of the project
for which they were hired. Regular employees, on the other hand, are legally entitled to remain in
the service of their employer until that service is terminated by one or another of the recognized
modes of termination of service under the Labor Code. It is well established by the facts and
evidence on record that herein 13 complainants were hired and engaged for specific activities or
undertaking the period of which has been determined at time of hiring or engagement. In the
realm of business and industry, “project” could refer to: (1) A particular job or undertaking that is
within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate,
and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company; or (2) A particular job or
undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. Such job or undertaking
must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of
the employer. Both types of job or undertaking begin and end at determined or determinable
times. During the time petitioners rendered services to NSC, their work was limited to one or
another of the specific component projects which made up the FAYEP I and II. There is nothing
in the record to show that petitioners were hired for, or in fact assigned to, other purposes, e.g.,
for operating or maintaining the old, or previously installed and commissioned, steel-making
machinery and equipment, or for selling the finished steel products. Moreover, petitioners’ claim
that their service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as regular employees is
without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had
gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project
employees. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that
an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee,
relates to casual employees, not to project employees. Therefore, the petition for Certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.