Khyativada

used to refer to the Indian Theories of Perceptual Error – khyāti (ख्ययाततत) besides referring to 'fame',
'renown' etc., in Samkhya philosophy refers to the 'erroneous conception' (of the Atman) or 'false
apprehension', and vāda means - 'proposition', 'discourse', 'argument'. These are all theories that deal
with the nature of the object of illusory perception and not with the nature of the subject, whether
the error consists in the object or in the subject’s cognition. There are five principal theories dealing
with perceptual errors, which are:-
• 1) Asat-khyātivāda (apprehension of the non-existent) (Cārvāka) – what is being perceived
(illusory) is really non-existent, the error consists in the apprehension of the unreal or in the
perception of non-existent entities.
• 2) Ātma-khyātivāda (self-apprehension) (Yogacārā Buddhism) – it is the mental state
projected outside as a mental image, the error occurs owing to the externalization of inner
thoughts, by treating the internal object as external (extra-mental) and the error exists not in
the object but in the subject.
• 3) Akhyātivāda (non-apprehension) (Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā) – the error is due to the failure
to distinguish between perception and memory, it is due to the lack of right discrimination
vis-à-vis memory.
• 4) Anyathā-khyātivāda (misapprehension) (Nyāya) – the object perceived under illusion is
real elsewhere, not here in front of the perceiver because of the mind connected with the
object on account of memory, the error is due to wrong understanding of the presented and
the represented, and occurs, as Vachaspati Mishra states - सदन्तरर सदन्तरत्मनया गगृहयतते - when
"one reality is mistaken for another".
• 5) Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda (apprehension of the indescribable) (Advaita) – the object is

neither existent (सतत) nor non-existent (असतत) but indescribable (अतनरर चतनयमत), the illusory
object is a product of ignorance (avidyā) about the substratum and the error is caused due to
Maya which is also indescribable.
An understanding of what is true and what is untrue is an integral part of philosophical study for
acquisition of highest knowledge. Knowledge presupposes a subject of that knowledge and also the
object corresponding to it. The nature of knowledge however depends upon the mind and the
cognitive faculties of the subject as also on the conditions in which the object is situated in relation
to the subject; an error is caused due to a peculiar relation formed by the perceiver and the position
of the object. Inference, a valid mode of cognition, is based on previous perception, and an
erroneous perception negates the value of perception.[1][2] The first three of the afore-listed five
theories admit that the object perceived illusorily is, in one way or the other, existent; the remaining
two, do not accept this contention.[3]
Shankara explains that in Sampat Upasana there is the imposing (aropa) of a superior character on
the inferior whereas in Pratika (adhyasa) Upasana the inferior form is contemplated as Brahman.
Āropa or illusion is 'mis-cognition' (avidyā), 'mis-appearance' (avabhāsa), 'superimposition'
(adhyāsa), a 'misapplication' or a 'mis-presentation' which is not consciously persuaded unlike
misperception and misunderstanding; and in which, neither the agent nor the subject have any
active role to play. But, Aropa is not Adhyasa because there has to be an appearance which can
make the delusive illusory appearance of a particular appearance a distinct possibility.[4]
Badarayana states that:-

परयातभिध्ययानयाततु ततररोतहतर ततरो ह्यस्य बन्धतरपयर ययौ |

"From the meditation on the supreme Lord, however, becomes manifest that which remains
obscured; because the soul’s bondage and freedom are derived from Him." - (Brahma Sutras
III.ii.5)

which is so because bondage comes from the ignorance about the nature of God, and freedom
comes from the knowledge of His reality when as a result of meditation on Him (with attributes)
comes unsurpassable divinity and one becomes the Absolute with all the desires fulfilled.
(Shvetashvatara Upanishad I.11). And that:-

अत एर चरोपमया ससूयरकयातदरतत |

"Hence also are the illustrations of the sun’s reflection (in water) etc." – (Brahma Sutras
III.ii.19)

which statement, Shankara explains, means that the one with attributes created by limiting adjuncts
is not real but though One and present in all beings is seen as many.[5]
Aropa can be verbal (śabdi), and it can also be based upon sense (arthi) (meaning or implied),
sometimes it is not expressed but is conveyed.[6] Advaita Vedanta does not view the world of
existence as a reality, it is an illusion (aropa), it simply does not exist; it is Anatman which the
Atman accepts as a device for the purpose of self-realization, and for experiencing Divine Unity, the
inseparableness of Atman and Anatman.[7]
The Dvaita School of Madhavacharya does not accept the Advaita illusionistic hypothesis or
interpretation of reality as being deceptive and merely appearance-interpreting. Jayatirtha, while
discussing Khyātivāda, rejects Prabhākara’s view of the fusion of two cognitions i.e. fusion of
percept and memory, resulting in illusory cognition.[8]
Khyātivāda is based on the assumption that misperception is not simply the human failure to
perceive correctly but is something which occurs due to some peculiar special circumstances, and
that cognition can be either correct (pratyaksha) or incorrect (apratyaksha) depending upon the
cognizing activity of the mind. Its theories are concerned with the nature of the object which is
erroneously cognized and whose ontological status they logically examine.[9]

>AtmakhyAti - YogAchAra Bauddha (VijnAnavaada)

>
>asatkhyAti - MAdhyamika Bauddha (shUnyavAda)
>
>akhyAti - PrAbhAkara mImAmsA
>
>anyathAkhyAti - NyAya, Vaisheshika and BhATTa mImAmsA
>
>and anirvachaneeya khyAti - Vedantins (Advaita)
>
>to describe the phenomenon of error, adhyAsa. The adhyAsa bhAshya contains
>a reference to some or all of these vAda-s.

Here are my notes on this topic. I have tried to explore the common ground among
different khyAti vAdas and shown that anirvachanIya khyAti is the most suitable
of
them.

There are a few others that one can add to the list:
sadasatkhyAti of sAMkhya, satkhyAti of the vishiShTAdvaita, and abhinava-
anyathAkhyAti
of dvaita.

Each school has its own theory about illusion, for example, the shukti-rajata,
the illusion
of silver in nacre or rope as snake. A nacre is mistaken for a piece of silver.
A rope is
mistaken for a snake. Shankara says regarding adhyAsa, "atasmin.h tadbuddhiH",
cognition
of one thing as another. This is the common ground among all schools, as far as
illusion
(bhrama) is concerned. If A is mistaken for B, where A is the substratum and B
is the
illusory object superimposed on A, then we have the following possibilities:
1) both A and B are unreal, 2) A is real, but B is unreal, 3) both A and B are
real,
4) A is real, but B cannot be defined as real or unreal or both, 5) A is real,
but B is both
real and unreal. Here "real" is sat and "unreal" asat.

In the asatkhyAti of mAdhyamikas, both the substratum of the error or illusion

and
the object of illusion are unreal (asat). The YogAchAra school holds that both
the
substratum (nacre) and the illusory object (silver) do not exist apart from
their
subjective cognitions, i.e., they are ideas in the mind. This is called
AtmakhyAti.

In early sAMkhya, for example, as expounded by Ishvarakrishna, there is no

theory of
perceptual error. Later contributors such as Aniruddha and VijnAnabhikShu put
forth the
theory of sadasatkhyAti. Aniruddha explains the silver-nacre illusion in his
sAMkhyasUtravritti -
इदद रजतमममत पपररवमतरमवषयतयय सतत अबयधनयतत, रजतमवषयतयय तप असतत बयधयतत,
तसमयतत सदसतर ततवमत ।
In the cognition, "this is silver", the thing before (the observer),
the "this", is real (sat) because it is never sublated, (even after the illusion
ends).
The silver is false (asat), because it is sublated. Therefore, illusion or
erroneous perception is the cognition of both the sat and the asat.

The PrabhAkara school of mImAMsA says there is non-apprehension (hence the

name, akhyAti) of the distinction between the illusory object (silver) and the
substratum (nacre). Hence the illusion.
शपककशचकपषय गहणद रजतसय च सवयतनतयकण समरणद, "इदद न रजतद" इमत भकदगहसययभयवशच
मततयद कयरणमत । The apprehension of nacre with the eye, the independent recollection of
silver, and the absence of apprehension of the form "This is not silver" to
differentiate
(the thing in front from silver), - these three are jointly the causes.
The nyAya school puts forth the theory of anyathAkhyAti. Here, the silver that
was
perceived at some other place at some other time is now perceived in nacre. This
is
made possible by something called a jnAna-lakShaNa-sannikarSha. Both the silver
and nacre are real, but the silver that is being perceived was actually
perceived at
some other place at some other time. "sarvathA .asatve
pratItyanupapattestatraiva
sattve vA bAdhAnupapattiriti" - If the silver were completely false, it would
not have
appeared (before the observer). If it were present right in the place where it
was
perceived, there would be no sublation (of such a perception).

The mAdhva theory of abhinava anyathAkhyAti says that the silver is false and
the
post-illusion experience "the false silver appeared" shows this. Unlike the
naiyAyikas,
the mAdhvas hold that silver, the illusory object, never occurs anywhere at any
time.
Cognition of a false (nonexistent) object in a substratum (adhiShThAna) is
admitted in
this system. Madhva holds that one cannot deny that a false object can be
cognized
even in illusion.
न च असतर भयनतयवमप पततमतनयरसततमत वयचयमत -मवषणपततवमवमनणरयय
In fact, he explicitly denies what is cognized in an illusion is anirvachanIya,
as the
advaitins claim, and goes on to say that what is cognized in the illusion is
asat.
JayatIrtha clarifies, in his PramANa paddhati, that what is meant is atyanta
asat, a
completely false entity , "atyanta-asadrajatAtmanA pratibhAtItyAchAryAH" . The
following from the
मवषणपततवमवमनणरय of Madhva makes the definition of illusion or bhrama clear:
असतय सतवपततमतय सतरऽसतवपततमतररतयनयथयपततमतरकव भयमनततवयतत । The cognition of a
nonexistent (false) entity as existing and an existing entity as nonexistent is
called bhrama or illusion. This kind of cognizing one thing as another is
illusion.
The Kannada commentary by Shri Vishvesha Tirtha, Mathadhisha of the Pejawar Math
clarifies this further:
ಅಲಲ ನಮಗಗ ತಗತತರದ ಬಗಳಳ ಎಲಲಯತ ತಗತತರದಗತ ಇರರವವದರರರದ ಅದರ ಅಸತತವಗರಬರದರಲಲ ಸರದಗತಹವಗತ ಇಲಲ .
ಆದರತ ಭಭಮಯ ಸಸತಯಲಲ ನಮಗಗ ಅದರ ತಗತತರರತತದಗ.

The vishiShTAdvaita theory of satkhyAti is also called yathArthakhyAti.

According to
this theory, all perceptual knowledge, whether it be of an illusion or
otherwise, is
valid. "satkhyAtirnAma jnAnaviShayasya satyatvam.h." This is the theory of
satkhyAti
which holds that the content (object) of a cognition is real. It recognizes
bhrama or
illusion only by virtue of the fact that there can be no meaningful activity
with regard
to the "illusory" object. The silver that is perceived in nacre is real but it
cannot be part
of any activity, such as picking it up. Therefore, the silver is bhrama.
viShayavyavahArabAdhAt.h bhramatvam.h. How can silver possibly be really present
in nacre? पञतकरणपमकययय पपमथवययमदषप सवरत सवरभतभ यनयद मवदमयनतवयतत । अत एव शपमककयदद रजतयदशसय
मवदमयनतवयतत जयनमवषयसय सतयतवमत । By the process of panchIkaraNa, every element occurs in
every element such as the earth. Therefore, the cognition of silver in nacre is
true, since there is a (small) portion of silver (actually) in the nacre. If the
silver in nacre is real, then it cannot be called illusory silver but real
silver! However, this real silver occurs in a such a small quantity as to be
practically of no use. तत रजतयदशसय सवलपतवयतत तत न वयवहयर इमत ततत जयनद
भमय । Because, the amount of silver (in nacre) is very small (infinitesimal) there
cannot be any activity involving it.The theory of satkhyAti has its basis in
the shrI-bhAShya statement by Ramanuja - "yathArthaM sarvavijnAnamiti vedavidAM
matam.h"

Finally, the advaita theory of anirvachanIyakhyAt holds that the illusory

object, silver,
cannot be categorized as sat or asat or both sat and asat. It cannot be sat,
because
it is sublated upon perceiving the substratum as it is. It cannot be asat,
because it
was perceived as existing during the illusion phase. An asat entity cannot be
perceived
even in an illusion. GauDapAdAchArya says (mANDUkya kArikA 3.28):
असतर मयययय जनम ततवतर ननव यपजयतक ।
वनधययपपतर न ततवकन मयययय वयऽमप जययतक ॥
There can be no birth of a purely nonexistent thing either through mAyA or in
reality.
A barren-woman's son cannot be born either through mAyA or in reality.
Therefore, by implication, the thing that is illusory and superimposed, e.g. a
snake
on a substratum, e.g. a rope, cannot be asat or nonexistent, because a
nonexistent
thing is never cognized as occurring in a substratum. If it is not asat, then
can it be
sat? It cannot be sat as explained above. Therefore, it must be different from
both sat
and asat, i.e. anirvachanIya or something that cannot be described.

This anirvachanIyatva concept is derived from Shankara's statement in the

adhyAsa
bhAShya, considering all views on adhyAsa (superimposition): "सवरथयमप तवनयसययनयधमयरवभयसतयद
न वयमभचरमत". Among all these views, what is common is the appearance of attributes
of
one thing in another. For example, nacre appears to have attributes of silver. A
rope
appears to have attributes of a snake.
The bhAShyaratnaprabhA explains:

एतकषप मतकषप परत परयवभयसतवलकणसदवयदमयह - सवरथयमप मतवमत ।

अनयथयखययमततवयमदपकयरमववयदकऽपयधययसय परत परयवभयसतवलकणद न जहयतततयथरय ।

शपकयवपररकसय रजतसय दकशयनतरक बपदद वय सतवययरगयतत, शभनयतवक पतयकतवययरगयतत ,

शपकद सतवक बयधययरगयतत ममथययतवमकवकमत भयवय ।

In all these views (of adhyAsa, illusion), the common characteristic is the
appearance

of one thing in the place of another thing. This is indicated in the bhAShya as
"in all

ways". Even the khyAti vAda's of other schools, such as anyathAkhyAti of nyAya,
the

characteristic of one thing appearing in the place of another is never given up.
(However,
the khyAti vAda's of other schools are defective.) In the illusion of silver in
nacre,

the silver is directly perceived in nacre and therefore it is not a suitable

explanation to say

that the silver was perceived in another place or it exists only as a

(subjective) cognition

or only in memory. (This refutes the theories of anyathAkhyAti of nyAya, the

AtmakhyAti

of YogAchAra, and the akhyAti of prAbhAkara mImAMsA.)

If it is shUnya or void or asat (as claimed by the mAdhyamika school or the

mAdhva

school), then it is not possible for it (silver) to be perceived. If the silver

really exists in

nacre (as claimed by the satkhyAti of the vishiShTAdvaitins), then its sublation
is not

possible (when the illusion ends). (Also, it cannot be sadasat, as claimed by

the

sAMkhya school because that would be a contradiction.) (Since the khyAti vAda's
of

other schools are refuted), what remains as the correct khyAti vAda is that of

mithyAtva or anirvachanIyatva.