INDEX

Sr. Page
Description Author
No. No.
1 Fundamentals of Power System Protection Er. PM Shah 1
2 Fundamentals of Generator Protection Prof. BA Oza 14
3 Transformer & Reactor Protection Er. JN Pancholi 31
4 Feeder Protection With Distance Relaying Dr. KK Thakkar 38
Additional Functions to Distance Protection
5 Er. JN Pancholi 49
Relaying
Er. MM Patel
6 Bus Bar Protection 69
Er. AM Shukla
Protection Philosophy & Developments For
7 Er. Nihar S Raj 92
EHV & UHV Sub-Station
Simon Richards
8 Discovering the Digital Substation Denis Chatrefou 98
Saurabh Makwana
Methods Of Power Swing Detection And
9 Er. Janak S Shah 103
Prevention
Vijayan SR
Overview IEC 61850 stand based Substation
10 Sivakrishnudu 110
Automation System
Sayapogu
D.Maheswaran
Development of Communication Technology
11 Geetha Hariharan 118
for Substation Automation
S.Arthanari
12 A C Motor Protection Prakash Z Patel 125
Phasor Measurement Unit Application in the Uttam Mishra
13 140
Power System
14 Testing of IEC 61850 Merging Units Aditya Taneja 147
 Fundamentals of Power System Protection

PM Shah
Retd. Chief Engineer (Gen), GEB

Introduction of Power System

Power System Operation Basic Functions:
Definition of power system:
1. Economic Load Dispatch
 The electricity generators of Power Houses are
2. Commercial Aspects and metering energy and Tariff
connected to EHV switchyard through step up
3. Load Generation Balance - Steady state Operation of
Generator Transformers.
power system
 The EHV switchyards at Power Houses are connected
4. Safe, quick and speedy isolation of fault creating
to EHV lines.
transient disturbance in power system – A role of relay
 The EHV lines are terminated at EHV Transmission
protection system.
substations in different regions.
5. Managing Disaster situations in power system.
 The EHV substations are inter connected to each other
within the state and with neighboring states via EHV A Role of Relay protection systems:
Transmission lines.
The power should reach to customers at proper voltage and
 The EHV voltages are step down at EHV substations
frequency in a safe and secure manner vis-à-vis Power system
for feeding distribution substations.
should not jeopardize / collapse due to abnormal conditions,
 The distribution substations are mainly radial and
feeding electricity via distribution HV and LV lines situations, faults creating transient disturbance.
and Transformers to customers in the District Area. It is, therefore, utmost necessity to have reliable, accurate,
 Thus electricity is generated at low voltage level in the selective, speedy relays and protection systems so that faulty
Power Houses. Then it is stepped up to EHV voltage equipments or lines should quickly isolated maintaining the
level for evacuation and transmission to region and rest of power system in service.
again stepped down to low voltage level to feed
distribution District Area to serve the customers. Also relays and protection system should be secure, and
robust so that unwanted tripping should not occur i.e. mal
 This whole is known as Power System or Power
Network or Power Grid

1
operation which results in unnecessary outages of lines / d. Bus Bars
equipments from service. e. Stuck Breakers
Major elements to be protected individually and as a part f. EHV lines
of power system as a whole. g. HV & LV distribution lines
h. Capacitor Banks
a. Generators
i. Motors
b. Transformers
j. Cables
c. Reactors

Some Type Of Transient Disturbances centres, the frequency would suddenly goes up and
units would trip on over frequency protection of units.
1. At steady state operation of power system, the
And the portion of system having more load centres
generation is equal to load, i.e. frequency of system is
and less generating units would experience the very
equal to 50 Hz. When the frequency goes below 50 Hz,
low frequency and units would trip on under frequency
the load is more than generation and, when the
protection of units. To minimize this type of
frequency goes above 50 Hz, the load is less than
disturbances, the substation is provided with double
generation. The small incremental changes are taken
bus arrangement. The generating unit bays and load
care of by the turbine electro hydro governor at
line bays are equally distributed on each bus. Bus Bar
generating plants or load shedding by definite time
and Stuck Breaker protections are provided so that the
under frequency relays at different locations. Thereby
faulty bus or stuck breaker bus will be isolated quickly
steady state operation of the system is maintained.
and healthy bus and bays will remain in service
But when there is sudden loss of generation due to maintaining the power system intact.
tripping of large unit or number of units, then
3. When transmission lines between two major
frequency would suddenly drop to very low level and
substations trip due to fault, the generation flow to
the fast load shedding is required to maintain the load
major load centre is perturbed. The generation would
generation balance in the system. The protection
flow to the load centre by available other route. If this
system using Under Frequency Relays with df/dt
route has higher impedance than the original route then
feature are provided at different locations in District
power flow would oscillate as generation is intact and
and Region’s radial distribution substations to give
load also intact. The generators try to get new
instant load relief.
equilibrium but may get or may not and they might
2. The de-linking of trunk substation due to bus fault in it swing around the synchronous speed. This results in
create disturbance in the power system. The portion of Power Swing phenomena in power system. In power
system having number of generators but no load swing conditions, the load impedances may enter into

2
 distance protection relay characteristics, which would releases the relay for operation. By the time swing may
maloperate the distance relay. Therefore, power swing recover and if not then distance relay element operates
blocking feature is required in distance relay. It may and extends trip to the breaker.
block the distance relay about 2 seconds. Then again

Know behavior of Generator, Transformer and Lines in Power System

Generator

Power Capability Diagram of Generator

Transmission Lines

Power angle diagram for Transmission lines system

3
Generator

Symmetrical short circuit behavior of generator

4
1. Synchronous Generator Mode
When steam input in turbine is there and DC field is
there, synchronous machine delives the electrical power
through generator transformer to power system. This is
normal operation of synchronous generator.
2. Synchronous Motor Mode
When steam input valve is closed due to trouble on
turbine side or boiler side, there is no steam input in
turbine but the DC field is intact then the machine will
take power from power system and run as synchronous
motor. In this case the turbine is rotating with air in
casing. This is known as air churning of turbine. To
disconnect the generator from power system reverse
power or low forward power protection is provided. This
operation could be tolerated for 15-20 minutes.
3. Asynchronous Induction Generator Mode
When steam input in turbine is there but DC
field is not there due to trouble in DC excitation system
then the machine will run as Asynchronous Generator
(Induction Generator ) taking reactive power from the
system to maintain the excitation. This operation should
not be allowed more than 5-10 minutes. For protection
against this contingency, the field failure protection is
provided which first trips the turbine and then the
Transformer
Transformer over fluxing curve
5
generator breaker on reverse power protection to
disconnect the generator from power system.
4. Asynchronous (Induction) Motor Mode
When there is no steam input in turbine and no DC field
in rotor then the machine will run as an induction motor.
This will draw active and reactive power from system.
This will results in heating of rotor. This operation is
much more detrimental to machine. The machine should
be removed immediately from bar. This is effected by
field failure protection and reverse power protection
provided to generator.
5. Single Phase Motoring of Generator
When generator transformer breaker’s one or two poles
do not open, then in that case single phase motoring
occurs. This creates negative sequence unbalanced
current in generator. The flux produced by it rotates in air
gap with the double frequency. This will heat the rotor
heavily. This situation is taken care of by stuck breaker
protection, which will disconnect all the breakers on the
bus bar to which this machine is connected.
Note: To avoid this situation, normally gang operated
generator breaker is provided which will trip all the 3
poles or in case of trouble, all the 3 poles will not trip.
This will avoid single phase motoring.
6. Over fluxing of generator transformer and as a result the frequency of generator voltage goes on
decreasing. This results into over fluxing of generator
While taking the generator on bar, first rated speed of
transformer. The ratio V/F is increasing which is harmful
turbine is achieved and then excitation is made on for
to it. That is transformer no longer work as inductive coil
building of generated voltage keeping GT breaker in off
developing back emf, and work as resistor creating short
condition before synchronizing the machine with system.
circuit and flowing heavy magnetizing current damaging
In this situation for any reason turbine trip and DC field
the transformer.
breaker does not trip, then turbine speed is costing down
Transformer

Charging inrush current of transformer

Magnetizing Inrush current
 Harmonic Restraint
Harmonic Component % of fundamental
Fundamental 100
2nd 63
3rd 27
4th 5
5th 4

6
 Typical Power System Layout
Atributes to Relay Protection Systems.
 What is Fault ?
A fault is an abnormal state of the power system
mostly short circuit due to failure of electrical
equipment line.
A power system state is healthy when all three phages
are balanced symmetrical.
When a fault occurs the symmetry of a balanced three
phage network is upset resulting in a unbalance current
and voltage appearing in the system. This is a
unhealthy state of power system.
 Types of Faults:-
A. Symmetrical Faults: When fault involves three
phases equally at the same location, creates a
symmetrical fault.
B. Asymmetrical Faults: Single phase to ground,
phase to phase and double phase to ground are
asymmetrical faults.
 A fault might occurs due to :–
a. Lightening and switching surges
b. Ageing of insulation of electrical equipment
c. Overloading of electrical equipment
d. Withstanding number of short circuits shocks
when fault occurs on lines
ZONE-1 – GENERATOR & TRANSFORMER
ZONE-2 – BUS BAR WITH BREAKERS
7
e. Flash over of insulators due to wet and/or
contaminated atmosphere.
f. Conductor or earth wire broken and falling on
other conductor, tower structure.
g. Tree touching to conductor in forest area etc.
 What Relay protection system does?
An immediate step is to be taken to remove the fault
from a power system as quickly as possible. This
removal process executed automatically i.e. without
human intervention. The devices and associated
equipment, instruments that do this job are collectively
known as Relay protection system.
 Relay protection system consists of :–
a. Circuit Breaker – to open contacts for isolation of
faulty section.
b. Current and Voltage Transformers – to provide
signals to relays
c. Relays – a decision making devices.
d. DC batteries – to provide independent source to
trip coils of breaker.
 Zones of protection
Every inch of power system to be protected against the
fault that might occur in it. That is no portion
howsoever small to be left out without protection.
ZONE-3 – EHV LINES
ZONE-4 – BUS BAR WITH BREAKERS
 ZONE-5 – TRANSFORMER AND EHV LINE
Blind zone due to CT location on one side
Overlapping protection around a circuit breaker
 Main Protection
Main protection is unit type which takes care between the
boundaries defined by current transformers locations. For
example generator high impedance relay transformer
biased differential relay, restricted E/F relay, bus-bar
differential relay, carrier aided distance protection relay.
These protections are instantaneous and not required time
grading coordination.
 Backup Protection
Backup protection is non directional O/C and E/F,
directional over current and Earth fault relays, Zone-2,
Zone-3 of distance protection relay. These protections
are required time grading. It is to act when primary main
protection fail to act or the protection of faulty section
failed to operate for fault in its own section.
 Duplicated Main Protection
Main protections are duplicated right from current
transformer cores to relay protection system and trip
coils of breakers including DC sources for EHV lines,
generators and transformers. That is main-1 and main-2
or main and standby protections.
 What is effect of delayed clearing of fault?
If a fault persists for an extended period, the following
undesirable effects are likely to occur:-
8
a. Reduced transient stability margins for power
system.
b. Damage to electrical equipment that are feeding
fault due to heavy short circuit currents, unbalanced
currents flowing through it.
c. Explosion might occur in equipment containing
insulating oil during a short circuit which might also
cause fire hazards.
d. Blackout by a succession of protective actions taken
by different relay protection systems known as
cascade tripping in area / district / region.
e. Reduced stability margins if fault clearing is delayed
during major disturbance in power system.
Major Disturbances are:
 Transmission system faults
 Loss of generating units
 Sudden severe load changes
 Long line switching operations
The above are Transient disturbances. In such
disturbances the power system should remain stable.
That is the speed of rotors of generators temporarily
departed from synchronous speed (constant speed)
should return back to synchronous speed after
clearance of fault. The electro mechanical balance is
again achieved. This is known as Transient stability
of power system.
 One line-diagram of the system

Power-angle curves for the system shown above

Equal-area criterion applied to fault clearing when power is transmitted during the fault.

9
(A) Basic Swing Equation of Rotor Pe = 1.5 sinδ Pu
And rotor swing equation is
2H d²δ = Pa = Pm – Pe Pu
ws dt² 5 * d²δ = 1.0 – 1.5 sinδ PU
180f dt²
Pm = Mechanical input power which is constant. And the initial acceleration is positive equal to
Pe = Electrical output power which determines d²δ = 180f (0.615)
whether rotor accelerates, decelerates or dt² 5
remains at synchronous speed. = 22.14 f elec deg / sec ²
H = Inertia constant mega joules / MVA
Ws = Synchronous speed (iv) Power angle equation after the midpoint P fault is
δ = Machine rotor angle with respect to infinite cleared by both end breakers simultaneously is
bus Pe = 1.5 sinδ Pu
t = time in seconds And rotor swing equation is
Pa = accelerating power 5 * d²δ = 1.0 – 1.5 sinδ PU
180f dt²
(i) When Pe = Pm, the machine operates at steady r1 = 0.808 = 0.385, r2 = 1.5 = 0.714
state synchronous speed. 2.10 2.10
(ii) When Pe changes the rotor deviates from
Smax = 180º - sin-¹1.0 = 138.19º = 2.414 rad
synchronous speed.
1.5
(B) Power Angle Equation Cos δcr = {(Pm/Pmax)(δmax–δ0)+r2cosδmax –
r1cosδ0}
Pe = Pmax Sinδ
r2 - r1
Where Pmax = |E¹1|* |E¹2|
= {(1.0/2.1)(2.414–0.496)+0.714 cos (138.19)
X
0.385cos(28.44º)}
And X is the transfer reactance between a generator and
0.714 – 0.385
infinite bus internal voltages.
= 0.127
(i) Power angle equation for steady state operating
δcr = cos-¹0.127 = 82.726º ≈ 1.426 rad
condition is
δcr = wsPm t²cr + δ0
Pe = (1.05)(1.0) sinδ = 2.1 sinδ = Pm = 1
4H
0.5
tcr = √ 4H (δcr – δ0)
δ = sin-¹ 1.0 = 28.44º = 0.496 rad
wsPm
2.1
And rotor swing equation is =√ 4x5 (1.426 – 0.496)
5 * d²δ = 1.0 – 2.1 sinδ Pu 377 x 1.0
180f dt² = 0.222 sec
(ii) Power angle equation for midpoint P fault on is
Pe = 0.808 sinδ Pu
and rotor swing equation is
5 * d²δ = 1.0 – 0.808 sinδ per unit
180f dt²
As rotor cannot change position instantly upon occurrence
of fault, the rotor angle of is initially 28.44º
Pe = 1.0 – 0.808 sin 28.44º
= 1.0 – 0.385
= 0.615 Pu
And the initial acceleration is positive equal to
d²δ = 180f (0.615)
dt² 5
= 22.14 f elec deg / sec ²

(iii) Power angle equation after the midpoint P fault is

cleared by both end breakers simultaneously is

10

Factors affecting Critical Clearing Time of Faults
1. Excitation systems
When a fault occurs on a system the voltages at all buses
are reduced. At generator terminates the reduced voltages
sensed by the AVR which act to restore the generator
terminal voltages. The boosting the voltage to the field
winding of the generator is increased air gap flux which
creates a restrain torque on rotor which tends to
11
slowdown initial rotor angle swing following fault.
Modern excitations system rapidly respond to bus
voltage reduction and can effect from 10 ms to 30 ms
gain in critical clearing times for three phase faults on the
high side of the generator step up transformer.
2. Turbine valve governor control
Modern electro hydraulic turbine governing system has
ability to close turbine valve to reduce unit acceleration
during severe system faults near the unit. Immediately
 upon detecting differences between mechanical input and b. Biased differential Relays
electrical output, control action initiates the valve closing (v) Pilot Relays
which reduces the power input. A gain of 20ms to 40ms a. Direction comparison Relays
in critical clearing time can be achieved. b. Phase angle comparison Relays
(vi) Frequency Relays
3. Single pole operation of circuit breakers controlling
a. Plain frequency Relays
EHV transmission lines.
b. df/dt Relays
Since single phase faults occur more often than three
List of Protections for Power System Elements
phase faults, relaying schemes, allowing independent or
1. Protections of Generators
selective circuit breaker pole operation, can be used to
clear the faulted phase while keeping the unfaulted i. High Impedance Differential Relay for Generator
phases intact. This can extend the critical clearing time Windings.
by 40 ms to 100 ms depending upon whether two or one ii. Biased Overall Differential Relay for generator and
poles open under fault conditions. Generator Transformer.
4. Faster fault clearing time by using modern numerical iii. Stator E/F Relay.
relays. iv. Field Failure Relay.
5. Series Capacitor Compensated EHV Long Lines. v. Pole Slip Relay.
Reducing the reactance of a long EHV transmission line vi. Back Up Impedance Relay.
by using series capacitors which will increase the vii. Anti-Motoring Relays.
maximum power transferred during system fault viii. Voltage controlled or Restrained Over current
conditions. Relays.
6. Multiple Parallel Lines (Two or More). ix. Under Frequency / Over Frequency Relays.
Increasing the number of parallel lines between two x. Over Voltage / Under Voltage Relays.
points to reduce the reactance for maximum power xi. Generator Transformer Over Flux Relay.
transformed during system fault conditions unless the xii. Inadvertent Energising Protection for Generator.
fault occurs at a paralleling bus. xiii. Generator Transformer Biased Differential Relay.
In a short increased power transformed during a fault xiv. Rotor E/F Relay.
means lower accelerating power for the machine and xv. Negative Sequence Relay.
increased change of electro-mechanical balance for xvi. Breaker Failure Relay.
stability of machine. xvii. Reverse and Forward Power Relays.
7. Bus to Bus connection
2. Protection of Power Transformers and Reactors.
Bus to Bus connection means there should be two or
more different paths of transmission lines at one voltage i. Biased Differential Relay.
level between generating points and major load centers. ii. REF Relay.
That is closed loop without transformer in between. iii. Back up Non-Directional Overcurrent and E/F
8. Interconnectors Relays.
Interconnectors between substations of two or more iv. Back up Impedance Relay for Reactor.
different paths of power flow.
3. Protection of EHV Transmission Lines.
 Type of Relays i. Distance Relays.
(i) Magnitude Relays ii. Back up Directional Overcurrent and E/F Relays.
a. Over current / undercurrent Relays iii. Pilot Relays.
b. Over voltage / under voltage Relays a. Phase Comparison Relays.
c. Overpower / under power Relays b. Directional Comparison Relays.
(ii) Direction Relays
4. Bus Bar And Stuck Breakers Protection
a. Directional over current Relays
b. Directional Earth fault Relays Current transformers and voltage transformers
(iii) Ratio Relays The magnitude of current and voltage in power circuits are
a. Non directional impedance relays too high which cannot be handled by the secondary
b. Directional impedance relays – instruments like relays and meters. Hence instruments
Mho Relays transformers are used to scale down replica of the primary
c. Over flux V/F Relays quantities within the required accuracy for connecting relays
(iv) Differential Relays and meters on its secondary side of instrument transformers.
a. High impendance differential Relays

12
A. Classification of current transformers References:
1. Metering class CTS 1. “Elements of Power System Anbalysis”
Example – Class 0.2, VA burden 15, ISF 5 William D Stevenson, Jr. book
It is to be accurate over a range of 5% to 125% of nominal 2. “GEC Measurement” book-Application Guide
current. 3. “Art of Relaying” Russian book-Asian Edition by
It is to saturate at least then 5 times nominal current so Chernobrov
that the meters not damaged.
Biography:
2. Protection class CTS
Er. PM Shah graduated in
Example: 5P 20, 30 VA
Electrical Engineering from MS
It is to be accurate for 20 times nominal current at the
University, Baroda in 1964.
connected rated burden.
He joined GEB in 1964 as
3. PS class CTS
Deputy Engineer (O&M) and
Example: Ratio 100/1 A
retired as Chief Engineer (Gen)
Vk >= 100 Volts
in 1999. He attended training at
Im <= 30 mA at Vk/2
Power System Training
Rct <= 1.0 Ω
Institute, Bangalore and
4. Core balance CTS
Refresher Course in Relay
CBCTS are used for sensitive earth fault protections
Protection at Rurkee.
where the required sensitivity cannot be obtained using
During his service in GEB, he had worked for Testing &
CTS residual connection or by using CT on neutral earth
Commissioning of Protection Systems up to 210MW units at
connection.
Thermal & Hydro Power Stations. He had also earned a credit
B. Voltage transformers classification
for maiden commissioning and synchronizing of 12
(i) Metering VTS Example: 0.2 class, burden 50 VA
Generating Units of different Power Stations. He had
(ii) Protection VTS Example: 3P class, burden 100 VA
similarly worked for Testing & Commissioning of Protection
(iii) Residual VTS Example: 5 PR class, burden 50 VA
Systems for 400kV & 220kV EHV Lines and Power
Type of VT connections Transformers up to 500MVA.
A. V-V After retirement, he had supervised electrical commissioning
B. Star/star work including synchronizing of 2 x 125MW units of GMDC
C. Star/open delta at Akrimota as Electrical Representative of M/s Desein
D. IVT connection for open delta Consultant Ltd.
Managing Disaster situations in power system
1. Slow Decay in frequency – Automatic load Shedding
by plain under Frequency Relays.
2. Fast Decay in frequency – Automatic load Shedding
by -df/dt relays.
3. Islanding of Small power plants on their own house
load or radial load by –df/dt in case of cascade tripping
may resulting Blackout.
4. Restoration approaches to rebuild the grid.
5. Survival power by D G Sets, Mini Hydro sets
6. Startup power for Auxiliaries of Unit.
7. Resynchronisation of Islanded power system pockets
to rebuild the main power system

13
 Fundamentals of Generator Protection
Prof. Bhuvanesh Oza

Major Faults and Abnormal Conditions in case of  Boiler trips.

Generators  Prime-mover trips.
 Failure of insulation of the stator winding.  All unit auxiliaries are tripped.
 Failure of insulation of the rotor winding. “Class A Trip” annunciation appears.
 Unbalanced loading.
 Field failure. The consequences of certain faults are such that the
 Overload. generator is not required to be isolated from infinite bus
 Overvoltage. immediately; but prime-mover and boiler are tripped
 Failure of prime-mover. immediately. Because of this tripping, the generator will
 Loss of synchronism. lose input and hence the power output will gradually
 Over-speed. reduce. Because of this action the generator does not
speed up and the stored kinetic energy is utilized. The
 Under-frequency. protective scheme, which initiates the sequence as
 Over-heating depicted above is said to be Class B protection.
Protective Schemes employed for Generator: Following actions are initiated when Class B protection
operates:
 Differential protection.
 Inter-turn fault protection.  Boiler is tripped.
 Stator earth fault protection.  Turbine is tripped.
 Overcurrent and earth fault protection. “Class B Trip” annunciation will appear.
 Rotor earth fault protection.
Class A protection will operate through low forward
 Negative phase-sequence protection.
power relay. Low forward power relay is a time delayed
 Field failure protection.
relay. Generally, in large generators, a low forward
 Overload protection.
power relay is used to sense the power output. When
 Overvoltage protection.
the power output reduces to around 0.5% of rated
 Reverse power protection. power, low forward power relay trips and hence Class A
 Pole-slipping protection. protection operates.
 Back-up impedance protection.
 Under-frequency protection. The other faults are such that the generator is only
required to be isolated from the infinite bus. The
Class A, Class B and Class C Protections: generator thus will feed its auxiliaries only (i.e.
If a fault is of very serious nature and impacts the generator will feed house load only). Once the cause of
generator, generator-transformer, prime mover or boiler the fault is found and fault is cleared by relevant
(i.e. the fault is likely to cause a direct and critical breaker, the generator can once again be synchronized
damage to the unit even after isolating the unit from the with the system. Process of synchronizing does not take
infinite bus), the protective scheme that operates is much time. The protective scheme, which thus trips
known as Class A protection. generator breaker only, is known as Class C protection.
Following actions are initiated when Class A protection In appendix-1 is given the list of Class A, Class B and
operates: Class C protections. Also the conditions, which operate
the alarm only, are listed in Appendix-1.
 Generator breaker is tripped.
In the following sections related to the faults and
 Generator field breaker is tripped.
abnormalities for generators, their causes and
 Incomer breakers of unit auxiliary transformer
are tripped. consequences, protection schemes, types of relays used
and relay-setting calculations are discussed.
 Tie breakers between auxiliary station bus and
auxiliary unit bus are closed.

14
Differential Protection:

Principle of Generator Differential Protection

Requirements of Differential Protection: and the machine to be protected are located at the
turbine floor and the relay is located in the control
1. The current transformers CT1 and CT2 need to be
room. Hence, normally, it is not possible to connect
connected with correct polarity.
the relay coil to the equipotential points.
2. The differential protection shall operate sensitively
5. If the connections are not at equipotential points
for internal faults and it shall remain stable against
then the burdens on the two CTs are unequal,
external faults.
although the currents in the two C.T. primaries are
3. CTs on both the sides of generator should have
equal. This may cause the heavily burdened C.T. to
identical saturation characteristics. The non-
saturate during through fault conditions. This
identical CTs may not cause mal-operation for
results in dissimilarity of ratio and phase angle
normal conditions, but can cause inadvertent
errors of the C.T.s producing an out-of-balance
tripping of the generator for very high through fault
(spill) current in the relay coil, which causes
currents.
spurious operation of the relay.
4. Relay coil should be connected to the points, which
6. Differential relay should be immune to harmonics.
are equipotential under normal conditions. The CTs

15
CT and Relay connections for Differential Protection of Generator

16
Numerical Approach to Generator Differential Protection:

For differential protection, current entering the Differential current = Idiff

generator (current at neutral end) and current leaving the = | I 1 -1 2|
generator (current at line end) can be sampled at regular Stabilizing current = I stab = |I1| + |I2|
intervals (sampling rate). The mathematical process
could be explained as follows: If, Idiff > k x I stab , class A protection is initiated.

17
Inter-Turn Fault Protection:
Causes and Consequences of Failure of Insulation between Turns:
Protective Scheme

18
Stator Earth Fault Protection:

19
Rotor earth fault protection:

20
21
 DC Control Circuit for Rotor II E/F

Negative Phase Sequence Protection :
The system conditions that would cause these harmful
unbalanced conditions are:
.
1. open-circuiting of the phase or failure of one contact
of circuit breaker.
2. an unsymmetrical fault near the power station which
is not promptly cleared.
3. a fault in the stator winding

22
23
Field Failure Protection:
Over Load Protection:
When the generator is overloaded, the winding
insulation will get overheated to the same proportion as
the overload.
If the permissible temperature limit of the insulation is
exceeded, the insulation will puncture resulting in stator
fault.
So stator winding temperature must be maintained
within safe limits. If a generator is loaded beyond its
rated capacity, usually an alarm is sounded so that the
24
operator can throttle the steam control valve of the
turbine to relieve the generator from overload. A
definite time over current relay can be used for the
protection against overload.
As the overloading will be symmetrical in all the three
phases, single phase relay fed from C.T. on any one of
the phases is sufficient for the purpose. The relay can be
set to operate at 105-110% of rated current of the
generator.
Over Voltage Protection
Apart from transient overvoltage caused by lightning,
etc., the overvoltage can be associated with over speed
or it can be caused by a defective voltage regulator.
The protection against transient high frequency or
impulse overvoltage due to lightning and switching
surges can be offered by lightning arrestors. But
overvoltage relay is required to protect the stator
conductor insulation of the generator against power-
frequency over-voltages.
On modern steam-driven generators, the voltage
regulators act sufficiently fast to prevent serious
overvoltage from occurring when the generator loses its
load and terminal voltage increases either due to
acceleration, or as a consequence of line charging
current.
The most suitable overvoltage relay will have two units;
an instantaneous unit tripping on 25% (steam) or 40%
(hydro) overvoltage, and an inverse time unit starting at
10% overvoltage. The relay will be energized from a
P.T. secondary.
In the modern protective scheme, the operation of an
overvoltage relay, initially causes the alarm to be
sounded and thus warns the operator. Should the
automatic voltage regulator not restore the voltage to
normal within pre-set time, the machine has to be
tripped completely as the overvoltage can deteriorate the
generator insulation. Thus overvoltage protection is a
Class A protection.
Reverse Power Protection:
Steam Turbines:
A steam turbine needs to be protected against
overheating when its steam supply is cut-off and its
generator runs as a motor. The turbine, then, acts as a
pump and the steam is trapped. Hence the turbine blades
get overheated due to windage. In modern steam
turbines the steam may be at a temperature causing red
hot and it is difficult to envisage the steam as a coolant.
However, the heat caused by turbulence of the trapped
steam can de-temper and damage turbine blades.
For small turbines the relays are set to operate when
forward power reduces below 3% of rated power.
25
For large turbines the sensitive setting of 0.5% of rated
power is used. These relays are known as “Low Forward
Power Relays”.
Hydro Turbines:
On reversal of power, the water flow reduces and hence
bubbles are formed causing cavitation in the turbine.
The turbine blades can be damaged due to the forces
generated as a result of cavitation.
Relays are set to operate at about 3% of reversal of
power.
Diesel Engines:
Motoring protection for diesel engines is necessary to
prevent the danger of fire or explosion resulting from
unburnt fuel.
Gas Turbine:
A gas turbine, when it runs as a pump, will load the
generator working as motor. Protection should be
applied based on the motoring load on the system.
Relays are normally set to operate for 10% reversal of
rated power.
A reverse power relay is a time-delayed relay
because of the following reasons:
1. As the overheating of the turbine blades does not
occur instantaneously once the generator starts
motoring, instantaneous tripping is not required.
2. In case of an internal fault in the generator,
differential protection will act instantaneously.
But the busbar will feed the internal fault and if
the reverse power relay is not provided with the
time-delay, it will also operate simultaneously
with the operation of the differential relay. In
such a case, the operators will be in doubt
whether the tripping of the generator is due to
failure of turbine or an internal fault.
The reverse power relay has to operate only due
to failure of prime-mover.
3. Sufficient time-delay should be provided to
prevent undesired operation on transient power
reversals such as those occurring during
synchronizing or system disturbances.
D.C. Control Circuit for Reverse Power Protection:
Pole-Slipping Protection:
Loss of synchronism or pole-slipping is caused by
excessive load, faults in the power system or insufficient
field excitation.
When generator is running at full load, it operates at
some load angle δ1. As the load is increased abruptly
either due to excessive load or fault somewhere in the
26
power system, the generator slows down and if the
generator has not become unstable i.e. working within
its transient stability limit, the rotor of the generator will
regain synchronism at a new load angle δ2 higher than
δ1. But if the poles of the generator have slipped with
respect to the synchronous speed beyond the transient
limit, the generator will continue to slow down and
stability is lost.
The generator has to be protected against this
abnormality.
This is because, the generator (the pole of which have
slipped) can become a cause of danger to the whole
power system. If such a generator is not isolated from
the infinite bus, a cascade tripping of many or all the
Back-up Mho Protection:
Application of Back-up Impedance Relay Application of an Off-set Mho Relay
using Impedance Characteristic
Under Frequency Protection:
Due to inadvertent splitting of the interconnection of the
power system, isolated areas of the system may become
deficient in generation and the frequency of the same
may drop considerably. In order to maintain control of
the system under this condition, some form of load relief
is needed.
If the frequency goes down, the speed of the turbine gets
reduced. Hence the steam may get condensed on the
turbine blades damaging them. The steam-turbine sets
will be damaged badly if the frequency goes down to 46
27
generators of the system may occur. Moreover, the
generator, the poles of which have slipped beyond
stability limit, cannot regain synchronism and hence it is
required to be tripped completely. Hence it is a Class A
protection. The relay is a two input relay fed from CT
and PT both.
Pole-slipping Relay Characteristics
DC Control Circuit of Pole-slipping Protection
Hz in the 50 Hz system. Moreover, the power station
auxiliaries will be overloaded because of reduction in
frequency.
It is a normal practice nowadays to employ automatic
load shedding if the frequency goes down. However, the
under-frequency relays are also used with modern
generator protection practice so that the alarm can be
sounded if frequency drops to a value little below 50Hz.
Moreover, if the frequency drops drastically, the
tripping can be effected.
Effect of Restructuring of Power Systems on
Frequency Control
Recently, in India, concept of Availability Based Tariff
(ABT) has been implemented as a part of restructuring
of power system. Its purpose is to bring discipline in
scheduling generation and inter-state as well as intra-
state transfer of power. The tariff for supply and draw of
power has been correlated with the operating frequency
of the interconnected grid. The punishment for
unscheduled interchange (UI) has been formulated in
terms of UI mechanism.
Miscellaneous Protections:
Over-speed:
When a generator looses its load either due to opening
of its breaker or due to sudden tripping of a long line
emanating from the power station, the generator over
speeds. The speed governor, however, acts to throttle
the steam before any great increase in speed takes place
Bearing Failure and Bearing Overheating:
Failure of oil cooling equipment or failure of lubrication
system may cause bearing overheating and, in turn,
failure of bearing. The temperature of the oil can be
monitored by an instrument with alarm contacts. The
failure of oil cooling equipment is detected in large
machines by comparison of inlet and outlet temperature
of the oil.
Generator Potential Transformer Fuse Failure:
When one of the fuses of potential transformer blows,
the magnitude and phase relation of certain secondary
voltages changes. Such an effect cause certain relays
(such as under voltage relays, distance type relays, etc.)
to operate undesirably. The voltage balance scheme can
be used to prevent undesired operation of critical relays
and to actuate an alarm when a fuse blows.
Auxiliary Failure:
28
in case of steam turbo-alternators. In hydro sets, on the
other hand, the water flow cannot be stopped or
deflected quickly and hence over-speed can occur.
Over-speeds, in such a case of over 150% of normal are
possible. Over-voltage or over-frequency relays can be
employed in case of hydro-alternators.
Stator Overheating:
The main causes of stator overheating are ventilation
failure, overloading, failure of cooling system, short
circuited laminations and failure of core-bolt insulation.
The method used to protect the stator of generator
against overheating is given in figure. The method uses
resistance temperature detectors (RTD) embedded in
slots at different locations in the stator windings. If the
overheating occurs, the resistance of RTD changes,
disturbing the balance of the bridge, thus operates a
relay. The relay can be arranged to sound an alarm and
annunciate the condition in the control room.
Because of failure of auxiliaries like condensate
extraction pump, loss of vacuum is resulted. On loss of
vacuum, it is usual to reduce the load until the condition
is controlled. If however, the vacuum continues to fall
until a dangerous value is reached, a vacuum relay
closes its contacts and the set is automatically shut
down. The failure of auxiliary like induced draught fans
can cause loss of boiler pressure. In this case a steam
pressure device is arranged to remove the load from the
turbine. Many other annunciating and tripping (if
required) devices do not fall under the scope of this
book. Power station control and instrume-ntation deal
with such devices. These devices will automatically
(and if auto control is lost or found slow-acting,
manually also) annunciate the abnormal condition due
to auxiliary failure and also reduce the load on the
generator by throttling steam input to the turbine or trip
the generator if required.
Appendix 1:  Automatic Voltage Regulator Failure Relay Operated.
Class A, Class B and Class C Protections and  Vacuum Failure in Outlet of L.P. Turbine.
Conditions Causing Alarm:
Class B Protections:
Class A Protections:
 Negative Phase Sequence Protection.
 Differential Protection.  Field Failure Protection.
 Stator earth-fault Protection.  Back-up Impedance Protection.
 Inter-turn Fault Protection.  Under Frequency Protection.
 Over Current and Earth-Fault Protection (for small  Generator-transformer oil and winding Tem-perature
generators). Very High (Chapter 6).
 Rotor Second Earth-Fault Protection.  Unit Auxiliary Transformer Back-up Over Current
 Over Voltage Protection. Protection.
 Reverse Power Protection.  Unit Auxiliary Transformer Winding and Oil
 Pole-slipping Protection. Temperature Very High.
 Generator Transformer overall Differential Protection  Excitation Transformer Temperature Very High.
(refer Chapter 6).  Thyristor (Excitation System) Fan Supply Failure.
 Local Breaker Back-up Protection (refer Chapter 10).  Stator Water Conductivity Very High.
 Generator Transformer Restricted Earth Fault  Stator Water Flow Very High.
Protection (refer Chapter 6).  Master Fuel Trip Relay of Boiler has operated.
 Differential Protections of Unit Auxiliary  L.P./H.P. Heater Water Level Very High.
Transformers.  Thrust Bearing (Turbine) Failure.
 Generator-Transformer Over-fluxing Protection  Lubrication Oil (Turbine Bearing) Pressure Very
(refer Chapter 6). Low.
 Generator-Transformer Buchholz Trip (refer Chapter  Boiler Drum Level Very High.
6).  Turbine Bearing temperature Very High.
 Generator-Transformer Pressure Relief Device  H.P. Turbine Inlet Pressure Low.
Operated.  Loss of Boiler Water.
 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Buchholz Trip.  Loss of I.D. Fans.
 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Pressure Relief Device  Loss of F.D. Fans.
Operated.  Condenser Water Level High.
 Unit Auxiliary Transformer OLTC Buchholz Trip.  Excessive Over-firing in Boiler.
 Unit Auxiliary Transformer Instantaneous Over
current Protection. Class C Protections:
 Over Current Protection of Excitation Transformer (of  Generator-Transformer Back-up Earth Fault
static excitation system, if installed). Protection.
 Generator Rotor Overvoltage Relay.  Generator-Transformer Back-up Over-current
 Thyristor Block Failure (of static excitation system). Protection.
 Generator-Transformer and Unit Auxiliary
Transformer mulsifire Protection.

29
Appendix 2:
Biography:
Information required for Designing Protection Scheme
for Generator and for Relay Settings:
Generator:
 Active power rating in kW/MW.
 kVA/MVA rating.
 Voltage rating.
 Full load rated current.
 Through fault withstand.
 Synchronous reactance- Xs.
 Direct axis transient reactance- XdF. Bhuvanesh Ajitram Oza, with a teaching experience of
 Direct axis sub-transient reactance- XdG. over 28 years, is presently an adjunct Faculty at PDPU
 Negative sequence reactance- X2. Electrical Engineering Department. In Past he was
 Zero sequence reactance- X0. working at Birla Vishvakarma Mahavidyalaya
 Nature of cooling the stator winding. Enginnering Collage, Vallabh Vidhyanagar, Gujarat. He
 Nature of cooling of rotor. obtained his BE and ME in Power Systems from BVM
 I22t withstand constant- K. Engineering collage. Previously, he has worked in the
 Generator NPS current withstand. Engineering Cell in GEB for the Design of Relaying
 Allowable slip. system for the Ukai Thermal Power Plant, and has
 Overload withstand. pioneered the development of the power system
protection Laboratory at BVM. The work done in this
Current Transformers:
lab has been accepted internationally by his paper titled
 Class of CT Development of Power System Protection Laboratory
 Knee point voltage. through Senior Design Projects in IEEE Journal on
 Magnetizing current. Power System, Vol. 20, 2 May, 2005. His Current area
 CT secondary resistance. of interest is relay coordination for interconnected
 CT ratio. power systems.
 Actually the CT requirements are engineered based on
generator particulars and type of protections
employed.
Pilot Lead Resistance.
Types of Relays Used for Different Types of
Protections and their technical particulars.
Neutral Grounding Transformer.
 kVA rating.
 Voltage ratings of primary and secondary.
 Continuously rated/intermittently rated.
Type of Earthing of the Neutral:
 Resistance/reactance or any other type of earthing.
 Continuous duty/intermittent duty.
 Voltage rating.
 Current rating/power rating.
Potential Transformer
 Voltage ratio.
 VA rating.

30
 Transformer & Reactor Protection
Er. JN Pancholi
Redt. ADdl. CE (testing), GETCo

Power Transformer & Reactor

167MVA, 1 – ph ( 500 MVA) 400KV POWER TRANSFORMER

Transformer Fault Categories
Core Fault Differential, Buchholz
1. Winding and terminal faults
2. Sustained or unclear external faults
Tank Fault Differential, Buchholz; Tank-Earth
3. Abnormal operating conditions such as overload,
overvoltage and over fluxing
4. Core faults Over fluxing Over fluxing
5. Tank and transformer accessory faults
Types of Protection in Transformer & Reactor Overheating Over Current / Thermal Relay

Fault Type Protection Used Differential Protection

 Overall differential protection may be justified for
Primary Winding larger transformers (generally > 5MVA).
Differential; Over current  Provides fast operation on any winding
Phase – phase fault
 Measuring principle :
Primary Winding  Based on Merz-Price principle,
Phase – earth fault
Differential; REF; E/ F Relay  However, it employs the biasing technique,
to maintain stability for heavy through fault
current
Secondary winding  To avoid mal operation due to spill current because
Differential
Phase-phase fault of OLTC tap position, Magnetic inrush and
dissimilar CT magnetizing characteristics, % Biased
Secondary winding differential protection is used. Biasing allows
Differential; REF; E/ F Relay mismatch between CT outputs due to OLTC.
Phase-earth fault
 It is essential for transformers with tap changing
facility.
Inter turn Fault,
Differential, Buchholz; PRV; OSR
OLTC

31
  Another important requirement of transformer
differential protection is immunity to magnetising in
rush current.
BIAS DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION
 Differential current = I I1-I2 I
 Bias setting = I I1-I2 I /[ ( I1+I2 ) /2 ]

High Impedance Principle

Differential Protection

Voltage Across Relay Circuit VS = IF (RCT + 2RL)

Stabilising resistor RST limits spill current to IS (relay setting)
 RST = - RR where RR = relay burden
Correct application of differential protection requires CT ratio CT knee point
and winding connections to match those of transformer. VKP = 2VS = 2IF (RCT + 2RL)
CT secondary circuit should be a “replica” of primary system. Non-Linear Resistors (Metrosils)
Consider :
(1) Difference in current magnitude
(2) Phase shift
Differential Connections

Metrosil Characteristic
V = CI
 Suitable values of C &  chosen based on :
 Max secondary current under fault
conditions
 Relay setting voltage

32
Star Winding REF
 Relay only operates for earth faults within protected
zone.
 Uses high impedance principle.
 Stability level : usually maximum through fault
level of transformer.
 Recommended setting : 10%
Delta Winding Residual Earth Fault
 Delta winding cannot supply zero sequence current
to system
 Stability : Consider max LV fault level
 Recommended setting : less than 30% minimum
earth fault level
Effect of Magnetising Current:
 Appears on one side of transformer only
 Seen as fault by differential relay
 Normal steady state magnetising current is less than
1% of X’mer full load current generally.
 Transient magnetising inrush could cause relay to
operate
 Solution:
 Makes relay immune to magnetising inrush
 Slower operation may result for genuine
transformer faults if Diff. Relay time delayed
to allow the X’mer to be charged.
 In Numerical relay 2nd. & 5th. Harmonic
Restrain is available during Charging the
X’mer & fault persist then inst. Trip.
33
Over fluxing
 Usually a problem during start-up or shut down of
Generator unit, but it can be for X’mer caused by
loss of load / load shedding etc.
Flux ɸ  V
f
 Effects of over fluxing :
 Increase in magnetising current
 Increase in winding temperature
 Increase in noise and vibration
 Overheating of laminations and metal parts
(caused by stray flux)
 Protective relay responds to V/f ratio
 Stage 1 - Alarm
Stage 2 - Trip
Integral Vectorial and Ratio Compensation
Numerical Diff. Relay:
 The use of digital filtering and intelligent algorithms
has upgraded transformer differential protection
performance.
 Stability against C.T. saturation, inrush-currents and
over fluxing is now much more reliable.
 Integrated numerical ratio and vector group
adaptation belong to the standard.
 Integrated add-on functions now reach from
overload and over current back-up to earth-fault and
over-excitation protection.
 OLTC control and transformer monitoring are also
integrated in devices.
Advantage of Numerical Differential Protection
 No Aux. CT required – Full Load Current, CT ratio
adopted & Vector group to be mention.
 Built in Dir. / Non Dir. Over Current , Over Voltage,
Frequency relay, Over Flux Relay, REF.
 Event logger.
 Disturbance Recorder.
 Time syn. – GPS
 External DR triggering for Transformer Troubles.
It is recommended to provide Two separate relay for Diff. &
REF protection for redundancy to avoid X’mer failure.
Disturbance Record Analysis: Overheating Protection
• DR of 50MVA Star - Star Transformer.
• DR shows there are predominant (52%) third
harmonics contents in fault current.
• No increase in current on HV/ LV side. Also angle
between HV and LV current is 1800. So there was
no suspected fault in the transformer.
• LA is in zone of differential protection.
• LA has leakage current having third harmonics
components(THRC)
• The Numerical relay has feature to block 2nd & 5th
harmonics and not the 3rd harmonics component
due to LA comes under Diff. Zone.
Monitoring:
1. Oil Temp. - Alarm / Trip
2. Winding Temp. – Alarm / Trip
3. Dielectric strength of Oil – BDV
4. Sweep Frequency Renounce Analyzer (SFRA) – MAINTENANCE OF POWER TRANSFORMER
First comm. Graphs to be compare with X’mer
under abnormal tripping.
5. DGA every year with PPM moisture content.
6. Oil level – conservator Tank & OLTC Tank.
7. Tan delta & capacitor values of X’mer & Bushings.
8. Periodic checking of all X’mer troubles, cooling
system.

34
  Protection against Incipient Faults
Buchholz Relay Installation • Buchholz Relay Main Tank.

Transformers

MAINTENANCE OF POWER TRANSFORMER  Measure insulation and winding resistance and

TRANSFORMER BODY compare with designed values to ensure continuity
of winding.
 Bushings:
 Check local heating near clamping / connection COOLING MEDIA / SYSTEM
points, if any. (by thermograph)  Oil:
 Clean porcelain portion of the bushing.  Check oil level.
 Confirm that no strange elements are left on bushing  Oil leakage from any joint OR body part shall cause
after cleaning. loss and creates chance of air coming in direct
 Check mechanical damage, if any. contact of oil. Confirm that no moisture ingress in
 Check oil leakage from bushing, if any. oil.
 Measure IR value of bushing and confirm to be  Check oil break down voltage strength periodically
within limit. (BDV).
 Measure Tan Delta value of the bushing and confirm  Check content of DGA gas in oil periodically.
to be within limit.
 Check properly tightness of Tan delta cap positively  Radiators:
 Core:  Confirm that no. of radiators are attached with
 Material used in core is CRGO having magnetic transformer as per design.
characteristic. On ageing, there are chances to lose  Check oil leakage from welded joint of radiator fins.
this characteristic.  Check oil leakage from radiator valve joints.
 Due to vibration, some times core fixing bolts may  Check oil leakage from drain plugs.
loosen.  Check the function of radiator valve. If not working,
 Above points to be checked during opening of replace it.
transformer for overhauling work. Working of Cooling Pumps & cooling fans.
 Insulation Resistance (IR) of Core to Earth, Bus or Line Reactor
Frame to Earth & Core to Frame.
Protection
 Winding with paper insulation:
 Check ageing of paper insulation as & when 1. Differential Relay (overall)
transformer tank is opened for maintenance work. 2. Back up impedance Relay.
 Confirm that winding terminals are firmly fixed with 3. REF Relay.
bushing / tap changer terminals. 4. Buchhltoz Relay.
5. PRV Devices

35
 6. Oil & Winding Temp. Alarm / Trip
Single Zone Distance Relay is used for Back up
Impedance since Reactor Z will be 2500 – 3800 ohms.
50 – 60% value of Z with Time delay is selected. No
oil pumps for cooling are provided.
Transformer Fire NIFP Protection
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR UNDER FIRE
The only solution against transformer explosions is “
Nitrogen Injection Fire Protection”
Transformer are among the most expensive equipment
located in power plants and substations. They generally
contain a large quantity of combustible substance - oil, which
can also spray fire to nearby installations and caused a power
failure and huge economic losses.
Transformer fires always start outside and never inside, In
Bushings or OLTC. for any internal faults, fire will not start
and in the absence of oxygen arc/fire will be quenched by oil.
Remember oil circuit breakers used previously.
Nitrogen Injection system is Better than CO2 and Water.
Actually the fire prevention system works on the signals of
Gas & Oil Operated relay, Pressure Reducing valve of
transformer & Master trip relay. The signal gives actuation to
inject N2 gas from bottom into the transformer which actually
an inert gas and stirs the oil in the transformer to prevent fire.
Application :
For preventing the transformer from fire, heat sensors are
provided on top of transformer cover (near bushing turrets)
and valves are provided on bottom of the transformer. The
Tripping Logic & Nitrogen Injection:
36
flash point of the oil is considered to be 140 deg C. The
sensor senses the heat from the transformer (before the oil
reaches to its flash point) and gives signal to the box which
houses the N2 cylinder and prevention mechanism. Nitrogen
then gets injected from bottom of the transformer and the oil
from the transformer comes out simultaneously. The oil gets
collected in the sump near to the plinth of the transformer.
The speed of gas injection is base on the oil volume.
Transformer total capacity 10% of oil drain to the oil sump
than nitrogen gas sprayed in transformer to quench the fire
before that many protection present in C&R panel and
transformer like buchholz or PRV or REF or Diff. relay itself
sense inter fault it sense gases and diaform switch it trips the
circuit to protect the transformer.
Principle
1. The first Dynamic pressure peak of the shock wave
created at the Electrical Are ignition activated the
protection before static pressure increases.
2. Conservator shutter closes.
3. The Air isolation prevents oxygen coming in contact
with flammable Oil – Gas mixture.
4. Nitrogen injection may be initiated either manually
or automatically when the Control Panel received
command.
5. Manual or automatic nitrogen injection ends
explosive gas generation and evacuates the explosive
gas to protect maintenance fire & explosion when
opening transformer after incident.
6. The protected oil capacities are immediately
confined under a safe N2 Pressure.
7. Nitrogen injection continues for 45 minutes to
ensure the cooling of the protected oil & gas
production.
8. The repair work can start safely as the tank is free
from explosive gases.
9. Transformer Tank rupture prevention.
10. Depressurize X’mer Tank within millisecond.
Suggestion:
Since most of the Transformers also fail due to OLTC selector switch contacts problems, it is suggested to provide NIFP
connected to OLTC chamber for Injection of Nitrogen from bottom to become Full Proof NIFP system to protect Transformer
from Fire

Er. JN Pancholi joined erstwhile GEB as Jr. Engr. and was initially posted at P&P Department
HO. On promotion to Deputy Engineer, he was associated with the work of Testing,
Commissioning & Troubleshooting of protection systems of Generating Station, 400kV, 220kV
and 132kV s/s. He also rendered his services as maintenance engineers at Ukai & Wanakbori
TPS. He was promoted to EE (Testing) and was posted at Asoj to look after all 400kV s/s and
also 220kV s/s for Testing, Commissioning & Troubleshooting of protection systems. He was
elevated to the post of Superintending Engineer and then Addl.CE at Corporate Office as HOD to
look after the Protection, O&M, R&M and PLCC system of GETCo

37
 Feeder Protection with Distance Relaying
Dr. KK Thakkar, Director (Tech.)
JSL Industries Ltd., Mogar

Unit Protection

38
39
 Type of Comparators

a) Amplitude Comparators
Pulse type
b) Phase Comparators
Integration type
c) Hybrid Comparators

Relay Inputs

40
 1. Phase – phase Fault Units
Inputs
a–b Vab la - lb
b–n Vb-n lb + (k-1) lo
c–n Vc-n lc + (k-1) lo Z Lo
K = ----------
Z L1

Polarising Voltages

Fully Cross-Polarised mho Relay Characteristic with Variations of Zs / ZL Ratio

41
Errors in Distance – measurement
a) Errors in CTs and PTs.
b) Errors in line data.
c) Transient over-reach.
d) Relay error.
Typical Application for the offset mho Relay

Dynamic Test Bench

42
43
CLASSIFICATION OF TEST
a) Routine Tests
b) Type Tests
c) Special Tests
TYPE TESTS
ROUTINE TESTS
a) Operating value test
b) Operating time test ( for time-lag relays only )
c) Quadrature test ( for directional relays only)
d) Insulation test
DIGITAL RELAYS
INTRODUCED IN EARLY 1980’S
 A/D Converter to convert analogue quantity
to Digital
 MICROPROSESSOR to implement
protection algorithm
 Microprocessor may use some kind of
counting technique or use Discrete Fourier
Transform to implement algorithm
 Limited power of microprocessor restricts no
of samples / cycle which in turn restricts the
speed of operation
 Self Diagnostic feature.
 Most of them likely to get replaced by
numerical relays in next few years.

44
Typical Digital Relays

Numerical Relays CB Condition Monitoring

 Employ Specialized digital signal processor as CB State Monitoring
computational hard-ware with associated User-Definable Logic
software tools Broken Conductor Detection
 Input analog signals are converted into digital Measurement of Power System Quantities (Current,
signal and processed according to the Voltage etc.)
applicable algorithm Fault / Event Disturbance recorder
 Processing is carried out in specialized Advantages of Numerical Protection Relays over
microprocessors which are optimized for signal Static
processing application. Several setting groups
 No of µP used as a common hardware to do a Wider range of parameter adjustment
variety of function in a single relay or location Remote communications built in
[Like Distance protection with directional over Internal Fault diagnosis
current, switch on to fault, protection, power Power system measurements available
swing blocking etc.] Distance to fault locator
Typical Distance Relay Features Disturbance recorder
Auxiliary protection functions (broken conductor,
Distance Protection – Several schemes including
negative sequence etc.)
user definable
CB monitoring (state, condition )
Several Setting Groups for protection values User – definable logic
Switch –on-to-Fault Protection Backup protection functions in-built
Power Swing Blocking Consistency of operation times – reduced grading
Voltage Transformer Supervision margin
Negative Sequence Current Protection
Under voltage Protection Disadvantage
Over Voltage Protection  A failure of a numerical relay may cause many
CB Fail Protection more functions to be lost.
Fault Location  Practical experience suggests that numerical
CT Supervision relays are at least as reliable as static or
VT Supervision Electromechanical.
Check Synchronisation
Auto-reclose

45
Additional Features of Numerical Relays
 Measured Values Display ex. Power, Voltage, Power Factor, Frequency etc.
 VT / CT Supervisor
 C B Control / Static indicator
 Disturbance Recorder etc.

Dr. KK Thakkar obtained Masters Degree in Power Systems Engineering from Indian
Institute of Science, Bangalore and Ph.D. (Electrical Engineering) Degree from M.S.
University, Baroda.
He started his career as a lecturer, progressing to be a reader with M.S. University of Baroda
teaching Undergraduate and Post Graduate Courses and guiding Post Graduate Research.
For last 38 years, he has been associated with the industry and at present he is Technical
Director of M/s. JSL Industries Ltd., Mogar. He received training at Indian Institute of
Management, Ahmedabad for General Management (MEP 1980-81).
He was President of Electrical Research and Development Association (ERDA),Vadodara (2004-2006).
He has worked as a member on Relay sectional committee of Bureau of Indian Standards formulating various
National standards on Protective Relays (1977-2010).
He is recipient of “Bharatiya Udyog Ratna Award” presented by National Economic Development & Research
Organisation – Mumbai – December 2007.

46
 Additional Functions to Distance Protection Relaying.
Er. JN Pancholi
Redt. Addl. CE (testing), GETCo

Types of Relays Main II : Non switched Distance or phase comp. Relay

Electromagnetic Relays- Disadvantages 220kV Line
 Low speed
Main-I & II Non switched distance Relay or M-II Dir.
 Ageing effect
IDMT O/C & E/F Num. Relay
 Component failure
 Lack of self supervision 132kV Lines
 Limitations of features
Main-I : Non switched distance Relay
 Bulky
Main-II: Dir. IDMT O/C & E/F Num. Relay
 Excessive Power Consumption
 High burden on CTs 66kV Lines *
Static Relays Non Dir/Dir IDMT O/C and E/F Num. Relay
 Having advantages over E.M relays But still
disadvantages like component failure, non 11kV Lines *
availability of fault data, Characteristics variations Non-Dir/Dir IDMT O/C and E/F Num. Relay
with passage of time etc. *Looking to present scenario of double sources to the s/s,
Numerical Relays Dir. Num. Relays are required.
 Accuracy
 Flexibility Additional functions of Distance Numerical Relays
 Low power Consumption  Independent Zone selection – 5 Zones
 Low burden on CTs  Carrier Protection
 Variety of features like:  Switch on to fault
 SOTF, Voltage Supervision, Power swing Blocking,  Fuse Failure
Selection of Mho / quad. Characteristic, Auto  Auto Reclosure
Reclosure, Fault Locator, Disturbance Recorder -  Fault Locator
Pre Fault & post Fault Data etc  Disturbance Recorder
 Power swing Blocking settings & selection of Zones
Norms of Numerical Relay for Transmission Lines  LBB, Broken Conductor, Dir./Non dir. O/C & E/F ,
765 /400KV Line O/V, U/V, check synchronizing etc
Main I: Non switched Numerical Distance Relay
Disturbance recorder

47
Disturbance recorder & Data

Stepped time-distance characteristics of Distance Relay

 Zone-2 setting- 350 msec.

 Zone-3 setting is 1000 msec.

48
Removal of PLCC 55 Volt DC Battery & its Charger.
 By providing 270 - 110/55 volt,10 Amp. Universal
DC/DC convertor & supplying DC from station
supply we can remove 55 volt DC Battery set & its
charger used for PLCC panels.
 It will also reduce maintenance & inventory cost.
Need of Auto Reclosing of Lines:
 Reducing out of service Time - % Availability of
lines are more, Stability & Reliability increased.
49
1: Analysis of Type of Faults:
 Single phase fault – Normally 80-85%, Transient in
nature. Hence high speed A/R used for protected
line, it will enhanced system stability & maintain
Synchronism.
 2-Phase Fault–10-15%, May be permanent fault.
A/R block
  3-Phase. Fault–3-5%, Permanent fault likely due to
Tower collapse or broken Earth wire or Tree falling.
A/R Block.
2: For A/R carrier / Communication (PLCC, Fiber etc)
scheme should be healthy & in service at both end.
3: Condition for Blocked A/R – Carr./PLCC out of
service, CB Air/spring permissive not available,
Tripped on SOTF, B/U, O/V, LBB, Bus bar, Fault
during Reclaim Time, Evolving fault, Non Auto
mode – selection switch, Zone-2/3/3R Trip.
Mode of Recourse:
1. 1- ph Trip, single shot – in this No loss of
Synchronism. Syn. with two healthy phases is there.
2. 3- ph Trip & Reclose – loss of syn. Likely, required
synchronizing check before Auto Reclose.
Normally 1-phase, single shot Auto Reclose is preferable &
in service.
Deionization of Fault Arc in BREAKER Chamber:
This depends upon - System Voltage & Weather condition.
Minimum Deionization Time: (It is to be taken from Breaker
Manufacturer)
66kV Class – 100 msec.
132kV Class – 170 msec.
220kV Class – 280 msec.
400kV Class – 500 msec.
Dead Time Selection: considering safety margin it is set
220kV Class – 800 msec.
400kV Class – 1000 msec.
Reclaim Time: It is set between 20 – 25 sec.
Additional Functions:
 SOTF: If the line is switched on a permanent fault on
the line, this feature instantaneously trip the line if the
fault is anywhere on the Protected line.
 Fuse failure : If any of the PT fuse fails, the distant
protection scheme block the tripping and give an
audible alarm.
 Power Swing: If power swing develops on the line,
distance protection scheme gives audible alarm &
block DPS & if swing persists more than set time limit
then trip the line. As far as possible PSB logic /
Scheme should be same to be adopted in the Grid.
Relay Setting in Num. Relay are possible.
 Fault locator: The fault locators calculate the distance
to the fault and gives display.
50
 Disturbance recorder: The disturbance recorder
produces oscillographic analog signals like voltage and
current as well digital signal and gives the record in
predesignated format.
 Broken Conductor: Opening of jumper in healthy line
gives 5 to 10 sec Time delay Alarm by V2 & I2
measurement logic.
 Over voltage protection :
There are 2 stages of over voltage protection.
Stage-1 is set at 110% with time delay in sec. and
Stage-2 is set at 150% with delay in 150
msec.(instantaneous). This is to prevent over stressing
of the transmission elements like line insulators, CTs,
Bushings, circuit breakers etc.
 Dir. / Non Dir. O/C:
Settings are available with differential characteristic. It
can be set.
 Zone-3 settings are to be set considering Load
Encroachment, PSB keeping safety margin for system
voltage condition i.e. 80% voltage. If require, blinder
can be provided to avoid load encroachment into zone
characteristic.
 LBB Protection:
If while clearing fault, the breaker gets struck up, the
fault current continues to be fed. In such cases, at set
time delay of 200msec, LBB protection operates and
all the breakers of the affected bus are tripped.
Case Study for Effect of SIR on MHO
CHARACTERISTICS RELAY
System Parameters & relay settings:
• Location: 400kV ASOJ s/s, GETCo, Vadodara,
Gujarat, Inia
• Feeder: Asoj-Manjusar line-2
• Line length: 11kM (Short line)
• Line Voltage: 132kV
• Zone-1 setting (Z1) = 1.84 Ohms
• Zone-2 setting (Z2) = 4.04 Ohms
• Zone-3 setting (Z3) = 18.4 Ohms
• Zone-3’ setting (Z’3) = -1.84 Ohms
• Residual compensation factor (Kn) = 0.65
• Line angle = 75o
• Zone-1 operating time (t1) = Inst.
• Zone-2 operating time (t2) = 350ms
• Zone-3 operating time (t3) = 750ms
Steady state Mho characteristic Ph-Gr Fault

Steady state Mho characteristic Consider 2-ph

51
Steady state Mho characteristic 2- Ph Fault

52
Mho Characteristic SIR = 3.09 , Zs=5.7 Ohm

Mho Characteristic (SIR = 3.09) with Ph-Gr Fault

53
Mho Characteristic (SIR = 3.09) with 2- Ph Fault

Mho Characteristic (SIR = 3.09) with 3- Ph Fault

54
Impedance TIMING TEST With SIR 3.09

55
Mho Characteristic SIR = 5.43 , Zs=10.0 Ohm

Mho Characteristic (SIR = 5.43) with Ph-Gr Fault

56
Mho Characteristic (SIR = 5.43) with 2-Ph Fault

Mho Characteristic (SIR = 5.43) with 3-Ph Fault

57
Impedance TIMING TEST With SIR 5.43

Impedance TIMING TEST With SIR 5.43

58
Mho Characteristic (SIR = 8.17) with Ph-Gr Fault

Mho Characteristic (SIR = 8.17) with 2-Ph Fault

Mho Characteristic (SIR = 8.17) with 3 - Ph Fault

59
Impedance TIMING TEST With SIR 8.17

Impedance TIMING TEST With SIR 8.17

60
Mho characteristic with SIR comparison

Summary: Mho Characteristic Poor sensitivity for higher RF/XF

Angle dependent reach for “Resistive” & Less effect to mal-operate on longer line because
“Reactive” coverage the line having higher impedance value
Degree of “Expansion” depends up on the Cross polarization has less significance effect
“SOURCE TO LINE” Impedance ratio (ZS/ZL) Solution:
“Expansion” more when ZS/ZL ratio high Quadrilateral Characteristic
More effect to mal-operate of zone1/2 on shorter
line.
Case Study for Quadrilateral Characteristics Relay
Quadrilateral characteristic:

61
62
 • RFPP = 3.5 Ohms 4.0
Ohms
System Parameters & relay settings: • X1PE = 1.92 Ohms 3.3
• Location: 400kV Asoj s/s, GETCo,Vadodara, India Ohms
• Feeder: Fertilizer Nagar line-2 • R1PE = 0.8 Ohms 1.4
• Line length: 11kM (Short line) Ohms
• Line Voltage: 132kV (VL-L) • RFPE = 25 Ohms 26.0
• Relay type: REL511 Ohms
• Zone1 setting: Zone2 • X0PE = 7.8 Ohms 13.8
setting: Ohms
• X1PP = 1.92 Ohms 3.3 • R0PE = 1.9 Ohms 3.4
Ohms Ohms
• R1PP = 0.8 Ohms 1.4 • Line angle = 75o 75o
Ohms • Zone1 operating time (T1) = Inst.
• T2 = 350 msec.
Quadrilateral characteristic

63
Quard. Characteristic SIR = 2.0 , Zs=50.0 Ohm

Quadrilateral characteristic (SIR=2)

64
Quadrilateral characteristic (SIR=4)

Timing Test for zones (SIR=4

65
Impedance TIMING TEST With SIR 4.0

Summary: Quadrilateral Characteristic  More suitable for shorter/medium line

 Independent adjustable “Resistive” &  High resistive coverage, depends up on the
“Reactive” Reach “Arc” & “Fault resistance”
 It improves sensitivity for high RF/XF
 Eliminate over reach error on CVT transient
Reach Comparison With SIR for Mho & Quad.

SIR R actual by % mho R actual by % quad.

3.09 255 98.2

5.43 416 98.2

8.13 469 98.2

Conclusion
 Quad. Charact. is not affected by change in SIR.
 It is most suitable for Earth Fault on any line length without affecting phase to phase reach.

Er. JN Pancholi joined erstwhile GEB as Jr. Engr. and was initially posted at P&P Department
HO. On promotion to Deputy Engineer, he was associated with the work of Testing,
Commissioning & Troubleshooting of protection systems of Generating Station, 400kV, 220kV
and 132kV s/s. He also rendered his services as maintenance engineers at Ukai & Wanakbori
TPS. He was promoted to EE (Testing) and was posted at Asoj to look after all 400kV s/s and
also 220kV s/s for Testing, Commissioning & Troubleshooting of protection systems. He was
elevated to the post of Superintending Engineer and then Addl.CE at Corporate Office as HOD to
look after the Protection, O&M, R&M and PLCC system of GETCo

66
 BUS BAR PROTECTION
M.M.PATEL, Retd. C.E. (GSECL)
A.M.SHUKLA, Retd. E.E.(GETCO

Busbar Protection

F1

F2

There are fewer faults on

busbars than on other parts
of the power system

Without Busbar Protection

 No dislocation of system due to accidental operation of busbar protection
 Slow Fault Clearance
Busbar faults at F1 and F2 are cleared by remote time delayed protection on circuits feeding the faults:
 Time Delayed Over current or
 Time Delayed Distance Protection

Busbar
Zone

F1 F2

67
With Busbar Protection
• Fast clearance by Breakers at the Busbars
• Where Busbars are sectionalised, protection can limit the amount of system disruption for a Busbar fault

General Busbar Arrangements

Busbar faults are usually permanent

• CAUSES
– Insulation failures
– Circuit breaker failures
– Falling debris
– Isolators operated outside their ratings
– Safety earths left connected
– Current transformer failures
• THEREFORE:
CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHOULD BE TRIPPED AND LOCKED OUT BY BUSBAR PROTECTION

QUALITIES OF BUSBAR PROTECTION  It should be high speed protection so as to minimize

damage and maintain system stability
Busbar protection scheme should possess following things:-
Methods of providing Busbar protection
 It should be completely reliable
 It should be absolutely stable under all types of 1. Remote Time Delayed Protection
severe through fault conditions. 2. Frame to Earth (Leakage) Protection
 It should provide discrimination between sections of 3. Directional Comparison Protection
the busbars to ensure that circuits connected to fault 4. Phase Comparison Protection
busbar alone are isolated 5. Differential Protection:

68
 High Impedance
Low Impedance
System protection used to cover busbars
• In systems where over-current or distance protection
systems are present, busbars will be inherently
protected.
• It should be noted that over-current protection will
only be applied to relatively simple distribution
systems, or as a back-up protection, which gives a
considerable time delay, whereas distance protection
provides cover for busbar faults in its second and
possibly subsequent zones.
• In Any case, the protection acquired is slow and
unsuitable
Frame leakage protection
ADVANTAGES
1. Simple and economic form of protection
Single Zone Frame - Earth Protection
Frame leakage Busbar protection :
69
2.Ideal for the protection of phase segregated
switchgear where earth fault protection only is
required
DISADVANTAGES
1. Insulation is required between switchgear sections
2. It is not possible to discriminate between faults on
two sets of busbars running through common
switchgear frames
3. Care must be taken in construction of the substation
in order to ensure that the fixing bolts do not come in
to contact with the steel reinforcing of the concrete
Frame earth protection scheme
• Only an earth fault system
• Involves measuring fault current from switchgear
frame to earth
• Switchgear insulated by standing on concrete plinth
• Only one earthing point allowed on switchgear
• CT mounted on single earth conductor used to
energise instantaneous relay
• All cable glands must be insulated
External Fault
Frame leakage Busbar protection: Internal Fault
• Suitable for phase segregated indoor metalclad switchgear. Only E/F protection required.

Frame leakage scheme with double insulation barrier

Frame leakage scheme with single insulation barrier

70
Frame leakage protection Check feature
• To differentiate between a genuine busbar fault and
a fault in the secondary winding of a CT
– The check feature provides a second line of
defence
– The check relays pick up for both internal and
external faults
– Both check and discriminating relays must
operate before tripping can occur
Single Zone Frame – Earth Protection with Neutral Check
Typical Trip And Alarm Circuits For Frame Leakage With Double Insulation Barrier And Check Feature
71
• The various methods of obtaining the check feature
are:-
– Neutral check provided by a relay energised
from a single CT in the power system neutral
Residual check provided by a relay energised from a
residually connected CT on the busbar incomers
– Residual voltage check provided by a voltage
relay energised from a broken delta VT supply
• Check relays are normally self-reset in order to
avoid having to reset the relay after each external
fault
Basic Circulating Current Scheme

Differential Protection • associated with a particular zone are all connected to

a relay
• Uses Merz-Price circulating current principle. All
• A single element relay gives earth fault protection
currents entering and leaving Busbar are compared
only
• One set of CTs for each circuit
• A three element relay gives phase and earth fault
protection

Basic Circulting Current Scheme Earth Fault Protection Only

72
Phase And Earth Fault Circulating Current Scheme using Three-Element Relay

High Impedance Protection

• This is a versatile and reliable protection system
applied to many different Busbar configurations
• If CT requirements are met, scheme performance
may be predicted by calculation without heavy
current conjunctive tests
High Impedance Busbar Protection

73
  CT Requirements: Equal ratios
Class ‘X’
 May require stabilising resistors, RST
 May require non-linear resistors (Metrosils)
High Impedance Differential Protection
• Uses equal ratio CTs
• Scheme assumes that with heaviest
• through fault, one CT saturates, the other not
Equivalent Circuit
High Impedance Theory
Assume one CT saturates
Assume relay resistance is high
V = IF (2RL + RCT)
VS > V
Operating Principles
This a unit type of protective scheme in which the currents
entering and leaving the bus-bar installations are compared
continuously. The object is to provide fast operation at a
low fault setting for internal faults and yet retain stability up
to the highest possible value of short circuit current on
through faults. Current transformers on each circuit of the
bus-bar are connected in parallel (phase – segregated),
which will provide a resultant current to operate a relay for
faults internal to the bus-bars installations only.
Theoretically, such a system is unaffected by through faults,
74
To ensure stability, voltage setting of relay circuit made
higher than voltage developed across relay circuit. To
achieve this is an extra relay circuit resistance is required.
This is known as the stabilising resistance.
• Simple system to apply and extend
• High Sensitivity for phase and earth faults
• Extremely stable for external faults
but in practice, the associated current transformers may not
behave ideally when the current exceeds a certain value.
Errors in transformation due to saturation on the CT cores
may be sufficient to cause maloperation, if special
precautions are not taken.
Assuming that due to external fault on line, CT gets
saturated (i.e.) produces no output. This is represented by
short circuit as indicated in figure.
This is the worst condition for the relay from stability point
of view, since the spill current is maximum.
The high impedance principle involves choosing an
impedance high enough to stabilize the relay for this worst
condition.
 Choose IS from min fault current ( 30%)
VS = ISRS + ISRR
ISRS = VS – ISRR
VS
RS = - RR
IS
V VA
RS = S - 2
IS IS

Thus we can choose a value of RS:- Primary Operating Current (P.O.C.)

Knowing 1) Max. & Min Fault Levels, The value of primary operating current should be around
2) CT Circuit Impedances, 30% of minimum fault current available. This ensures
3) Relay Information, sufficient relay current during internal fault conditions for
4) CT Ratio, high speed operation

Internal fault on high impedance scheme

VF = IF.R = IR + nIe with n circuits

IY
= IF. (R CT + R LX ) Primary effective setting
IR
IP = T.(IR+nIe)
Effective setting
Or IP = T.(IR+ nIe+IM+ISR+IV)
IS = IR + 2Ie with 2 circuits

Use of fault setting resistor

I0P = IR + ISR

75
Metrosil limitation of relay voltage

For heavy internal faults large voltages may develope Use of Non Linear Resistors
across relay + Stab. Resistor.
• Under in zone fault conditions it is possible for
>3kV Voltages – must use Metrosil voltages above the relay withstand of 3kV peak to be
VP = produced. “Metrosil” non linear resistors may be
2 2VK (VF - VK )
necessary to limit the peak voltage below this level
VK = Knee point voltage Approx peak volts =
VF = Max. RMS voltage if CT didn’t saturate “Metrosil” characteristic:-
= IF(RCT + 2RL + RST + RR) 2 2VK (VF - VK )
where:- V and I are peak values
For Metrosil: C = constant depending
V = CIβ (D.C.) on metrosil construction
β = constant in range of
0.2 to 0.25
• The values of C and β are chosen to limit metrosil
 voltage to less than 3kV peak at maximum fault
I 
2VS = C  RMS  (A.C.) current
 0.52 
V = CIβ

To ensure primary operating current not adversely affected, • Open circuit connections between CTs and relay
metrosil constant ‘C’ must be sufficiently high to restrict circuit result in unbalance currents which may
metrosil current at relay setting voltage VS. operate the protection.
Typical currents:- • Supervision is applied by a voltage relay across
30mA for use with 1 amp CTs differential relay circuit
100mA for use with 5 amp CTs • Supervision relay is time delayed, gives alarm and
also shorts out bus wires to protect differential relay
CT Wiring Supervision circuit
Typical effective setting is 25 primary amps or 10% of
lowest circuit rating, whichever is greater.
.

76
 Healthy Condition

Supervision Against Open Circuit CTs

CT1 open circuit, I1 flows through magnetising impedance and relay circuit in parallel Voltage measured by supervision relay
V = I1 (R║ZM2║ ZM3║ ZM4)
If Supervision relay setting = VSP
Out-of-balance current to operate the supervision relay

VSP VSP VSP VSP

I= + + +
R Z M2 Z M3 Z M4
Differential Relay Circuit and supervision relay

77
Current Transformers • Lead burdens between various sets of CT’s must be
kept low. Usually bus wires are run in closed ring
• Current transformers must be of low reactance type
between breaker control panels.
(class x) and have identical turns ratio (1 in 100)
– Typical route:-
• They should be of similar design, or if not, of
• CTs to marshalling kiosk
reasonably matched magnetic characteristics
• Marshalling kiosk to isolator auxiliaries
• It is common practice to use CTs having 1 amp
• Loop between marshalling kiosks
secondaries
– Conductor size:-
Current Transformer Wiring Normally 2.5mm2

Effect of CT Location on Busbar Protection Performance

Zones of Protection for Double Bus Station

Check Feature coupler units. check system forms one zone only, covering
whole of busbar systems and not discriminating between
Usually provided by duplication of primary protection using
faults on various sections
second set of CTs on all circuits other than bus section and

78
 .

A second line of defence is considered good practice in protection using a second set of current transformers on all
most schemes of busbar protection is to prevent incorrect circuits other than bus section and bus coupler units.
tripping due to damage to wiring and equipment from The check system its arranged in a similar manner of the
extraneous sources. primary protection, but forms one zone only covering the
A check feature is provided by duplication of the primary whole of the busbars and does not discriminate between
faults in various sections of the busbars.
Isolator Auxiliary Switches

Auxiliary Switches Should: 2) Open after the isolator opens in order to maintain
1) Close before the isolator closes stability on switching

79
ISOLATOR AUXILIARY CONTACTS

Tripping Circuits
• One tripping relay (device 96) is required for each Both main and check relays must be energised before
feeder breaker and 2 for each bus section or bus tripping relays trip all breakers associated with zone.
coupler breakers
Typical Trip Relay Arrangement Double Busbar System

80
 Through Fault Stability
• Busbar protection stability is based on maximum lead resistance) from the relay associated with the
through fault current Zone considered.
• The stability limit is governed by the relay setting It is further assumed that the DC component of the
voltage. Time must not be less than the stability offset primary current completely saturates the second
voltage of the system, which is calculated by CT, while the first one continues to transform perfectly.
assuming that maximum through fault current flows
through one CT and out through a second one, the
latter being the most remote (and hence maximum
Double Busbar With Transfer Facilities

Triple Busbar

81
 1 ½ Breaker Scheme

1 ½ Breaker Bus Protection

82
 Mesh Busbar

Mesh Busbar Protection

83
 Modern Löw Impédance Busbar Protection
• Fast • Duplicate measuring circuits are included
• Modular scheme design allows relays to relate to • Current transformers can be:
each circuit and function of the protection. This – Of different ratio
enables the user to easily understand the principles of – Of relatively small output
application – Shared with other protections
• High sensitivity for phase and earth faults. • Current transformer secondary circuits are not
Protection for each phase can be relatively switched
independent • Continuous supervision of CT circuits and constant
• Earlier schemes were less stable than high impedance monitoring of vital circuits are include
schemes. Modern schemes incorporate saturation
detectors and are extremely stable
Midos Relays for High Impedance Protection
• Differential Relay MCAG34 or MFAC34
• Supervision Relay MVTP31
• Tripping Relay (Hand Reset) MVAJ13
• No Volt Relay MVAX12
• Zone Indication Relay MVAA13

MBCZ 10 Single Bus Protection

84
 MBCZ 10 Double Bus Protection

Low impedance relays - ABB make RADSS relay

1. This is a percentage biased restraint bus differential normally arranged to coincide with the largest line
relay. CT primary current rating.
2. It comes with factory setting. 6. An alarm (Supervising element) is included in the
3. This relay has only main zone. differential circuit to sense CT opening and
4. A separate check zone relay is not provided. A disconnect the trip circuit after a present time delay
simple O/C starting relay SR is included as standard of 5 Sec.
check feature in RADSS. 7. Relay’s performance is unaffected by use of auxiliary
5. This O/C relay is of the same high speed as that of CTs.
main differential relay and has a fixed setting

ABB MAKE RADSS RELAY

Fig-8 Schematic diagram for one phase of a single-zone bus differential relay with feeders LA, LB, LX. The current distribution is shown
for an assumed positive reference half cycle. If feeder LA has the largest pimary rating, a secondary rating with IA3=1A is
normally selected

85
 Internal detaIls of radss relay
Some concluding Remarks
The high impedance as well as low impedance schemes are
well-tried, proven methods of providing protection for the
busbar.
The high impedance scheme is simple and straightforward
to apply, however Rstab is to be re adjusted as and when the
fault level of busbar changes for any reason.
A true low impedance scheme has the advantage that it can
work with CTs of moderate output compared to a high
impedance scheme. The scheme does not impose a high
burden on the CT. Also, the scheme can work with CTs of
unequal ratio.
86
Local Breaker Failure Protection:
Main protective schemes provided for power equipment is
required to operate and clear the fault immediately,
isolating the faulty section of the system.
It is then important that the circuit breaker operates
correctly, clearing the fault quickly by tripping.
However, there is a risk that breaker may not trip (either
due to mechanical sluggishness or due to inability to
interrupt heavy fault current).
Then the fault gets cleared by backup relays at remote
stations.
Increasing power system complexity demands shorter fault • Dependability
clearing times. It is, therefore, necessary to provide breaker – Guaranteed to operate when required
failure relay (also called “Local breaker backup relay” or • Two types of Local Backup can be considered
“stuck breaker protection”). – Relay Backup
This scheme will isolate the bus to which the stuck breaker • Provision of duplicated main protection
is connected, faster. It comprises of O/L & E/L relays with schemes
a timer. – Breaker Backup
• Cannot duplicate the circuit breakers (usually)
Local Backup Protection • Can duplicate trip coils
Why? • Still common physical mechanism failures
• Advantages still possible
– Faster • Breaker Failure Protection
– Improved sensitivity • Used to back trip fault in feeds in case of local
– Minimises network disruption break failure
• Disadvantages • Only initiated when tripping has occurred
– May be affected by local conditions • Sometimes called “Stuck Breaker Protection”
– Accidental Operations (“finger trouble”) or “Back tripping Protection”
• Security – Trip Circuit Supervision should be considered as
– No unwanted operations part of the local backup facility

Typical Schemes
Simple Scheme – Use of BF Current Detector

87
Combined trip logic for LBB and Bus bar protection

Combined trip logic for LBB and Bus bar protection

88
Breaker Fail Timer settings – Operation time, and
– Reset time
Theoretically, in order to set the BF timer we should • Main Protection
consider: – Reset time
• CB Trip Time • Discriminating (Safety) Margin
– Main contact separation time (Arc Out) • Maximum permitted fault clearance times
– Or Resistor contact separation time
• Current Detector
Setting criteria for LBB current check relay and timer

LBB time setting -200ms after LBB pick-up

Current setting for feeder and transformer 20%
Current setting for Generator 5%
Er. MM Patel, obtained his graduation in Electrical Engineering with First Class-Distinction
from LD Engineering College, Ahmedabad in 1971.
He joined GEB as Junior Engineer in 1972 at Dhoraji. He worked in various capacities as Dy.
Engr. up to Chief Engineer at TPS and Corporate Office of GSECL. During his tenure in the
Thermal Power Station, he was instrumental in erection, commissioning, operation &
maintenance of 120MW units at Ukai & Gandhinagar. He was looking after complete
protection and relay testing of 220 and 400 kV switchyard of North Gujarat. While working as
SE (Testing) HO, he was looking after total protection of 400 & 220kV s/s and all power plants
and switchyards of GEB. After retirement he rendered his services as VP(Power Plant) in
private Captive Power Plants up to 201

89
90
 PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY & DEVELOPMENTS FOR
EHV & UHV SUB-STATION
NIHAR S RAJ (HEAD ENGG: UTILITY TRANSMISSION SUBSTATIONS)

1.0 Abstract: stability to avoid any grid issues. This paper basically
focuses on the different philosophies adopted by
Indian Power system is growing complex. There has
various customers in India for substation application.
been a tremendous growth in the load requirements in
the country since the independence, industrial 2.0 Introduction:
development and population growth have emphasized
Substation is a hub of electrical power in power system
on the availability & reliability criteria. Fault levels are
context. This power system component has seen a big
increasing in the grid and power engineers are doing
thrust in faultlevels (till 63kA) and voltage levels (till
their best in having the mix of AC and DC grids.
1200kV). Power and substation control have seen a
Distributed generation is thought as one of the solutions
dramatic change over a period of time, with the advent
to meet the increasing load demands. This is further
of smart, multifunctional & communicative units called
posing challenges with respect to fault levels. As
IED (Intelligent Electronic Devices) that have replaced
substation is a common pool for import and export of
the old technology. The new IED concept along with
energies it becomes very important to have a reliable
LAN based SAS (Substation Automation System) is
protection system which can not only protect the
now seen as “State of Art”.
systems but can also help in maintaining system

Fig 1 Conventional system and IED based station bus system

Internet has also influenced the secondary system of the 3.0 DC System:
substation, these systems communicate for transferring
DC is the heart of the protection system. DC systems
substation data to remote data centers. Technology and
are used in substation for
cost drivers have pushed these developments at faster
 Energizing trip and close coil of the circuit
pace. IEC 61850 have open the gateways of making the
breakers (Clearing the fault)
secondary engineering more modular, inter operable
 Control & Interlocking system (Ensuring
and inter changeable thus catering to the requirements
safety of equipment and personal)
of users and bringing down the cost. This has made the
technology more acceptable to the user, as it taking care  Ensuring safe operation of system
of the all the needs including costs. It is essential for the
Hence the DC system has to be very rugged & reliable.
protection engineer to understand the technology and
In our country the normal DC voltage levels used by
application of the technology. This paper gives the
various customers are 48V DC (-10% TO +15%), 110
basic typical application of different protection
V DC and 220V DC with unearthed system. 48V
philosophies.
voltage has been used for various communication
equipments like PLCC and FOTE. 110V DC system is
used normally till 132kV and some customers have

91
even used this at 220kV system. 220V DC system has
seen its usage right from 132kV till 765kV system. This
voltage can also be used at lower voltages incase future
expansion / up-gradation of voltage is envisaged.
The general DC voltage variation seen is +/- 10%. This
criterion is very important in deciding the cross section
of the cables. Voltage drop criteria is to be critically
checked especially for the big substations to ensure the
safe operation of the system under the fault condition(
energization of trip coil of circuit breaker). Battery
sizing is one critical area where the user has to take the
practical worst conditions to decide the healthy DC
system.
DC system comprise of battery, battery charger and DC
Distribution board. Various users have different
distribution philosophy.
Practice 1: To go with single battery system and have
float cum boost charger
Practice 2: To go with single battery bank and have a
separate float and boost charger
Practice 3: To have 2 x 100% battery bank and have a
float cum boost charger
(a)
Fig 2 Typical DC routing (a) DCDB in control room (b) DCDB in yard
4.0 Line Protection
Lines emanating from substation are either pool in or
out the power. It is very important for the user to
identify the type of line. Following basic parameters
affect the type of protection selection
 Lines are having series compensation or not
o This will affect the impedance
 Type of conductor and Bundle configuration
measurement for the distance relays.
 Line is a single ckt or Double ckt
92
Practice 4: To have 2 x 100% battery bank and have 2
nos of float cum boost chargers
Duration for battery back up
Practice 1: 10 hour back up
Practice 2: 3 – 4 hour back up
Battery sizing philosophy is also varying from customer
to customer. A safe optimized back up would be to
have AC inputs from two different sources as a backup
to failure of the AC source. Further DG of suitable
rating can also be employed. User has to decide the safe
combination of DC system to optimize the cost and
have a suitable reliability of DC system.
For EHV and UHV substations, protections are
generally segregated in Group A and Group B
protections. Group A& B are fed from two different DC
sources.
Kiosk concept is now adopted videly by all customers
bringing station level protection and control in yard.
DC routing philosophies are different by different
customers.
(b)
o Incase of double ckt, lines there will be
mutual coupling which can lead to under
reaching in Zone–2, hence 150% of
coverage is kept for double ckt 400kV
lines to take care of this problem. Care is
to be taken to see that this setting does not
go into the next voltage level.
(Sub-conductor spacing)
o This will effect the impedance of the line
  Line length& number of switchyard equipments o Extremely less line length may call for
to be controlled having differential protection scheme
Above basic parameters will help the designer to selec t the right protection requirement.

Sr. No. Description 33kV 132kV 245kV 400kV 765kV

1 Main protection - O/C + E/F Y N N N N
2 Main Protection - Distance N Y Y Y Y
3 Back up O/C + E/F N Y Y Y Y
4 Main 1 and Main 2 concept * N N Y Y Y
5 Carrier aided tripping N Y Y Y Y
5.1 Phase to Earth coupling NA Y N N N
5.2 Phase to Phase Coupling NA Y Y Y Y
5.3 Inter Ckt coupling NA Y Y N N
6 Implementation of BCPU concept Y Y N N N
7 Single Phase Auto reclosing N N Y Y Y
8 STUB & TEED Protection 3 N N N Y Y
Table 1:“Typical practices” followed by different customers in India
Note : switch on to fault etc. Above are the typical protection
requirements for line, based on the importance of the
1) * = Main 1 and Main 2 both are numerical
load, revenue loss; investment in protection scheme can
distance relays. Both the protections are carrier
also be justified by system engineer.
aided
2) Line differential protection can also be 5.0 Reactor Protection
implemented, requirement of pilot needs to be
Reactor becomes another important and critical load in
taken care. Many customers are now going with
substation. This is used to avoid over voltages in to the
Fiber optic links which is further helpful.
system by absorbing reactive power. Shunt reactors in
3) Applicable for one and half CB scheme
the substations are of two types one is fixed reactors
Other various protection which can be integrated with and another is switched shunt reactor. Shunt reactors
line protection taking help of numerical technology are are helpful in controlling the over voltages but reduce
weak end in-feed, power swing blocking, check the loadability of the line under full load conditions.
synchronization, distance to fault locator, in built Shunt reactors are generally seen at 400kV voltage
disturbance recorder, dead line charging features, levels and above.

93
 (a)
Fig 2: Typical Reactor protection for one and half CB scheme (a) Bus Reactor (b) Line Reactor
Reactor protection is also differentiated in Group A and
Group B protection. Table below gives a distribution
Sr.No Group A Protection
1 Differential Protection
2 Back Up Impedance Protection
3 Oil Temperature
4 Pressure Relief Trip
5 Fire protection
Table 2: Typical Protection segregation for Reactor
For 400kV there is generally a 3 phase reactor, in case
the substation is made on a hilly terrain where there is a
transportation problems then it may be necessary to go
for a single phase reactor scheme. At 765kV and
1200kV system it is required to go with a single phase
reactor scheme. Based on the criticality of the load
spare reactor may be envisaged which may act as a bus
/ line reactor, provided the reactor ratings are same.
Fig3: Typical reactor switching scheme for 765kv Substation
The typical reactor ratings which are used in Indian
Power systems are 50, 63, 80, 125 MVAR. Incase it is a
bank formation especially at 765kV system, typical
individual phase ratings are 50, 63, 80 MVAR.
6.0 Transformer Protection
Transformer is a very vital element in substation. This
component is responsible for transformation of energy
from one voltage level to another. It is one of the most
costly equipment in substation hence the protection
(b)
of protection as per different customer
philosophies.
Group B Protection
REF Protection
Buchholz Trip
Winding temp Trip
Low/High level trip
Bay Controller
This has also got an impact on the substation layout and
control – protection requirements.
Control &Protection requirements are more critical
which the substation designer have to take care when
single phase reactor banks are present along with the
spare unit. This includes switching of control and
protection requirement when the spare is taken into
service.
requirements of substation have to be looked into
criticality.
Just like reactors, at 765kV system there are single
phase transformer banks each phase rated for 333MVA
or 500MVA, thus forming a 1000MVA or 1500MVA
bank capacity. On 400kV side generally 315MVA
transformer ratings are seen in transmission network,
with increase in demand even 500MVA capacity is
getting installed.
94
Faults in Transformers can be internal faults, external
faults and there can also be abnormal service conditions
like over loading of transformer. Protections are
provided in transformers to protect against these
challenges. Transformers also have inbuilt protections
like Buccholz relay, pressure relief devices, oil surge
Sr.No Group A Protection
1 Differential Protection
2 HV Back up relay
3 HV Overflux
4 Pressure Relief Trip
5 Fire protection
6 Oil temp high trip
7 Pressure relief trip
8 Tertiary Delta protection
Table 3: Typical Protection segregation for transformer
Some customers go for different type of groupings for
above protection based on their requirement.
REF protection is also realized by different protection
schemes.
7.0 Recent trends in Substation Control &
Protection
The present and future requirements of substation
control and protection can not be seen in isolation as
customer has started introducing new technologies
which are either affecting the existing way of control or
are to be integrated into the same system for
consolidating the total data and having a better asset
management. Some points have been mentioned below
Recent customer practice is also to install online
monitoring system for transformers and reactors. This is
to have the online monitoring of assets, which is also
sometime hooked up to SAS system.
Customers are installing control switching (Point of
Wave) devices at 765kV voltage levels for bus reactors,
switchable line reactors and transformers. At 400kV
this device is used for switching in Bus reactors. Usage
of this device needs to be carefully looked into for other
load applications also.
On higher voltage levels, redundant protection concepts
with standalone relays are being used by users. Relays
with dissimilar measuring principle (differential,
distance), relays of different algorithm are being used.
95
detectors, tap changer compartment can also be
provided with protection devices.
Grouping of transformer protections are done in Group
A and Group Bto ensure failure of DC supply keeps the
transformer safe.
Group B Protection
REF Protection
LV Back up relay
LV Over flux
Low/High Oil level trip
Bay Controller
Overload Alarm
OLTC Buchholz trip
Winding temp high trip
Extensive usage of Fiber optic devices have started at
765kV voltage levels, usage of it for differential prote-
ction can be looked into.
With SMART grid implementation there is a need to
have a real time data monitoring, hence a
communication system needs to be selected with care.
Process bus implementation is being planned by
customers. Some utility have already started
implementing it as a part of SMART Grid solutions.
More soft interlocks are being accepted thus reducing
the physical cabling and making the controls simpler to
implement. This has also helped the equipment
manufacturers to avoid the additional burden of
auxiliary contacts.
Optical instrument transformers are being planned by
utilities which will be integrated with substation control
and protection units.
8.0 Conclusion
Control and protection is an art. With modern
numerical relays and careful engineering planning
various reliable and cost effective solution can be
implemented. India has got many different utility &
IPP, all of them have some practices in common while
they do have some different philosophies. Even at the
same voltage level switching configurations are
different which leads to different control and protection
requirement. Transformer, reactors and lines are critical 6) CIGRE 1996 :34-105, “Application of
loads at EHV and UHV levels protection at higher coordinated control, protection and operation
voltage also impact grid stability and hence this art of support system in EHV substation”
protection has a major importance. Typical practices / 7) CIGRE 2010:B5_105, “Future developments
philosophy has been discussed. Many utilities in India in protection, control and monitoring from
have already moved to implement new technologies; manufacturer’s perspective”
field experience from these steps will further help in
Author
framing the common good practices for the Indian grid.
Er. Nihar S. Raj graduated in
9.0 Reference Electrical Engineering from
M.S. University, Vadodara. At
1) The Intelligent Air Insulated Switchgear and
present he is working with
Substations, CEPSI, Malaysia 1997
ABB Ltd, substation design
2) Reliability of protection and control equipment
group as Head of Design &
in the context of compensation
Engineering (Utility Transmi-
3) General Guidelines for 765/400/220/132kV
ssion Substations).
Substation and Switchyard of Thermal/Hydro
Projects. CEA June 2012
He has designed several air & gas insulated substations
4) CBIP Publication no. 296, “Manual on reliable
ranging from 11kV to 800kV. He is also involved for
fault clearanceand back up protection of EHU
design of 800kV GIS, hybrid substation solutions. His
and UHV transmission network. “
area of expertise includes Power Systems & Substation
5) CBIP Publication no. 274, “Protection of
Design. (nihar.raj@in.abb.com ). He is life member of
Generators, Generator Transformers and
Society of Power Engineers (Vadodara Chapter),
220kV, 400kV Networks
member of CIGRE National Study Committee B3, &
has presented several technical papers at various
national & international level conferences.

96
 Discovering the Digital Substation
Simon Richards, Alstom Grid,UK,
Denis Chatrefou, Alstom Grid,France
Saurabh Makwana Alstom Grid,India
Digital devices such as numerical protection relays and digital
systems, such as substation control are prevalent as the
technology of choice in substations today in most countries
worldwide. This article looks at other substation areas, into
which digital technology can permeate such that
progressively transmission substations can become fully
digital in their implementation.
Introduction
Firstly, one might ask “what is a digital substation?”, and this
will yield a variety of possible replies, as there is no standard
definition. Clearly as most substations today are switching
and routing AC power at high/extra high voltage, it is not the
primary flow which is digital. This means that we are talking
about the secondary systems, and all the protection, control,
measurement, condition monitoring, recording and
supervisory systems associated with that primary “process”.
In general terms, a full digital substation is one in which as
much as possible of the data related to the primary process is
digitized immediately at the point where it is measured.
Thereafter, the exchange of that measured data between
devices which may need to subscribe to it is via Ethernet, as
opposed to the many kilometres of copper hardwiring which
may exist in a conventional substation.
In reality, many utilities will wish to move fully digital at a
pace which suits their engineering capabilities and technology
aspirations. This article suggests some of the steps which
could be taken, and how adherence to international standards
to ensure interoperability can be built-in. From the point of
view of the authors and their company, the technology is now
mature, and far beyond the point where it might be deemed
prototype. Fifteen years of prototyping, site trials and
perfection have passed, such that our company is confident to
offer this technology as a real commercial proposition. A
number of contracts in execution are included later in this
article.
Digital substations imply a solution and architecture in which
the substation’s functionality is predominantly now achieved
in the software, with lesser reliance on hardware
implementations such as hardwiring.
Drivers towards digital substations
Some of the areas in which digital technology brings real
benefits are now highlighted:
Increased reliability and availability
The extensive self-diagnosis capability of digital devices
ensures maximised up-time of the substation. Any
degradation in the performance of an asset is pin pointed in
real-time. Inherent redundancy in the system may be
employed to self-heal the operation, which permits
troubleshooting without the need for any primary system
outage.
Optimised operation of assets
97
simon.richards@alstom.com
denis.chatrefou@alstom.com
saurabh.makwana@alstom.com
The intelligence within digital substation schemes, allows
close monitoring of the load flow capacity of plant equipment
compared to its design ratings. This dynamic load analysis
permits operation of lines, cables, transformers and other grid
equipment closer to their limits.
Improved safety
The removal of wired cross-site current transformer circuits
reduces the risk of lethal injury due to inadvertent opening of
the circuit by personnel. The avoidance of oil in instrument
transformers reduces explosion risks too.
Reduced maintenance costs
The digital substation closely monitors all substation assets in
terms of operational conditions, effective load capacity and
asset health indicators. Intelligent systems analyse the data
and provide recommendations on maintenance and repair
actions to conduct. This allows a shift to predictive
maintenance, avoiding unplanned outages and emergency
repair costs. It is in this regard that ongoing operational cost
savings may be made, such that the lifetime total cost of
ownership of the substation will be reduced. Additionally,
asset optimisation and loss-of-life monitoring tools facilitate
the identification of weak areas on the primary system which
need to be reinforced.
Easier renovation and extension of existing substations
Interoperable solutions and the use of fibre optics instead of
copper wires reduce the duration and cost of on-site work for
the refurbishment of secondary equipment. Prudent design of
the substation plans ahead for the mid-life refurbishment of
secondary schemes, when often the primary equipment is left
as-is, given that decades of years of serviceable life may still
remain. This permits the refurbishment activity to take place
with the absolute minimum of primary system outage.
Improved communications capabilities
Data exchange between intelligent devices, intra and inter-
substation is optimized through Ethernet communica-
tions. Smart local and wide area control units (WACU) can
allow data exchange between voltage levels in substations,
and between substations. Direct inter-substation
communication without the need to transit via a control centre
reduces the response times, for fast, real-time applications.
IEC 61850: a crucial technology enabler
Modern sensors and other Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs) must be connected to communicate within the
substation and with the greater grid system at large. In the
past, there were many different protocols and a lot of effort
went into making them communicate. For many years,
insufficient standardisation, fear of degraded reliability and
lack of return on investment slowed down the emergence of a
fully digital substation. But today, the IEC 61850 standard
makes it possible to facilitate interoperability between
different equipment and suppliers
IEC 61850 is the international standard for Ethernet-based needs identified by the industry’s user group (UCA UG), to
communication in substations. It is more than just a protocol, ensure that it caters for all substation needs.
it is a comprehensive standard designed for utilities, to deliver
IEC 61850 allows for the full digitizing of the signals in a
functionality that is not supported in legacy communication
substation and is necessary for the large amount of data to be
protocols. Introduced in 2004, the standard is increasingly
managed and communicated for the real-time management of
accepted across the world, as its main objective is to ensure
a smarter, modern power grid. IEC 61850 is designed for
interoperability between equipment coming from various
interoperability and longevity, in order to be independent
suppliers. IEC 61850 continues to grow and encompass the
from one supplier and one generation of equipment.
The architecture of digital substations
The digital substation architecture may be divided into three levels:

Fig 1 : Architecture levels in a digital substation

A typical digital substation solution incorporates many
components all designed for optimal inter-operability, data
retrieval, protection and control capability and remote settings.
Its architecture can be divided into three levels:
The process level
A digital substation is based on a communicating architecture,
whereby real-time operational measurements and other data
are polled from the primary system. This data is obtained
using sensors, embedded within the primary system, which is
termed as the electrical process. It is communicated to
devices which must act on those measurements by means of a
“process bus”. Most important is that smart devices and
systems within the substation, (protection relays, recorders,
phasor measurement units, bay controllers, wide area
controllers or asset managers), can immediately process this
operational data. By subscribing as clients to this data flow
over an Ethernet process bus, the information from the “eyes
and ears” of the power system is distributed and
communicated much more efficiently to the bay level than in
conventional hardwired schemes.
The process bus is also the link by which the primary
equipment information from out in the yard travels back to
the substation control house – it links the field back to the
substation. In a fully digital architecture, control commands
(switchgear operator commands, protection trips) also are
routed to the primary devices via the process bus, in the
opposite direction.
It will be described later how IEC 61850-9-2 brings non-
conventional instrument transformer technology into play,
breaking the constraints of conventional CTs and VTs. It is
particularly important for the process bus, as it describes how
analogue signals such as phase currents and voltages can be
exchanged as sampled values.
The protection and control level
Between the process bus and the station bus are devices
historically identified as the “secondary equipment”. In the
digital substation, these devices are IEDs (intelligent
electronic devices), interacting with the field via the process
bus, and with other peer devices in the bay, to other bays, and
the digital control system via the station bus.
The station control area
The digital substation station bus is much more than a
traditional SCADA bus, as it permits multiple clients to
exchange data, supports peer-to-peer device communication,

98
and links to gateways for inter-substation wide-area
communication.
IEC 61850-8-1 is the relevant standard for the station bus. It
describes the means to generate and present reports which
may be subscribed to by other devices and HMIs (Human
Machine Interfaces), and the way to communicate peer-to-
peer. The latter is achieved by the exchange of GOOSE
messages between devices on the LAN (Local Area
Network).GOOSE is more often than not used as high-speed
exchange of binary status information/commands.
Fig 2: Example optical CT showing freedom to mount in
In addition to the need for distributed intelligence between different orientations
IEDs at the station level, there is the need to distribute the
(Shown horizontally-mounted here)
information to local or remotely-stationed control operators to
visualise the operational status of the substation. This requires
substation HMIs (human-machine interfaces) and proxy
server links to remote HMIs and control servers to
communicate pertinent data in real-time. One or several
workstations apply the instructions assigned by regional
dispatchers, or can be used as an engineering workstation for
IED configuration, or for local concentration and archiving of
power system data. On-line condition monitoring may have
specific workstations for alerts, and to manage the database
history of each primary device.
Digital Instrument Transformers
The root of many of the limitations of conventional
instrument transformers is the reliance upon an iron core. The
core is a source of inaccuracy, due to the need to magnetise it,
but not to overflux it. In the case of conventional CTs,
achieving the low-level accuracy and dynamic range to
satisfy both measurement and protection duties is a challenge.
Conventional VTs similarly may experience ferro-resonance
phenomena and thermal overstressing can result. Fig 3 : Example flexible optical CT wrapped-around a
bushing
Instead of an iron core, the translation from primary to
secondary measurement may use optical, Rogowski or Analogue Signal Conversion, Merging and Switchgear
capacitive technology, with the optimum choice for AIS (Air- Control
Insulated Substation) and GIS (Gas-Insulated Substation)
driven by the respective digital device size, which in turn Primary converters associated with each CT and VT convert
permits size optimisation of the switchgear. Some examples analogue signals from the primary equipment into digital
of the non-conventional principles are as follows, considering signals. The primary converters interface with merging units
just the CT function here for brevity: to perform all the digital data processing necessary to produce
a precise output data stream of sampled values according to
• Optical sensors (AIS) use the Faraday Effect, whereby a the IEC 61850-9-2 standard.
fibre optic loop sensor carrying a polarised light beam
encircles the power conductor. This light will experience For retrofitting, or where the client has a preference to retain
an angular deflection due to the magnetic field, generated traditional instrument transformers, analogue merging units
by the primary current flow. are available, digitising the CT and VT outputs at any
• Rogowski sensors (GIS) dispense with the conventional convenient kiosk out in the yard.
CT core and instead implement windings as tracks on a Digital controllers (SCU - switch control units) are the fast,
multi-layer printed circuit board. Four quadrants of the real-time interface to switchgear, mounted close to the plant
board are clamped together to form a toroid around the which they command. They replace hardwiring of
primary conductor. The sensor output becomes a low-level inputs/outputs by an Ethernet interface to the yard.
voltage measurement, which can be accurately correlated to
the primary current.

99

Fig 4: Example merging unit
Numerical Protection Relays
In fully-digital architecture, protection relays receive currents
and voltages as IEC 61850-9-2 sampled values, and issue trip
or alarm signals using IEC 61850-8-1 GOOSE.
The authors’ company’s IEDs extend their supervision
facilities to include comprehensive addressing and
plausibility checking of the incoming sampled values from
the process bus. This addresses the fact that the traditional
task of current and voltage sampling is now external to the
device, and is connected via Ethernet. The supervision
compensates for any latency or mismatch in the network,
provides ride-through intelligent compensation in the event of
several missing samples or jitter, and blocks/alarms if the
quality of incoming data would compromise the secure and
reliable protection operation of the IED. This ensures
maximum security, dependability and speed of the protection
scheme.
100
Fig 5: Example process bus protection relay
Digital Control System (DCS)
Any digital substation will need a system by which operation
and control data can be obtained and communicated to
operational personnel by an intuitive interface (typically
termed as an “HMI” – human machine interface). These
personnel may be local to the substation, or at a remote
control centre. This information flow from the substation to
the HMI might be deemed the “monitor” direction, and the
DCS supplements this in the “control” direction by allowing
the operator to interact with the primary plant.
The DCS is the intelligence which binds together the digital
substation. It is central to the flow, management and
presentation of all components in the digital substation. In
the authors’ company, specific focus has been paid to the way
that operational and plant condition monitoring data has been
networked, for the first time, within what would have
traditionally been exclusively a protection and control system.
This avoids the need to overlay multiple Ethernet networks,
as the system is deployed as a generic whole. In addition,
attention has been paid to how data can be presented as
simple dashboards, such that operational staff can clearly see
what is happening on the network, easing subsequent
decision-making on actions to take.
All digital substation architectures can be set up as an IEC
62439 standards-compliant self-healing ring (HSR protocol)
or dual-homing star (PRP protocol); both of which are “bump
less” redundant. This means that data is exchanged between
devices via two diverse paths, and should one of these paths
fail, data is instantly available hot from the other, with zero
delay. Fibre optic networks link all the system’s components,
together and with the operator interface (HMI), through a full
range of Ethernet switches.
Wide area control units (WACU) offer the possibility to
exchange IEC 61850 GOOSE data between voltage levels
within a substation and also between neighbouring
substations.
 Fig 6: Digital Control Systems: the marriage of state-of-the-art software and intelligent electronic devices
Cyber security
Intrusion protection and protection against virus attacks is
recommended to be integrated in all switches and IEDs.
Cyber security provides protection against unauthorised
access to equipment and unauthorised transfer, modification
or destruction of data – whether deliberate or accidental.
Particularly when wide area networks extend beyond the
traditional substation fence, cyber-security measures are
essential. Security procedures, controls, firewalls and role-
based access are all examples of such measures.
On-line condition monitoring and asset management
On-line condition monitoring functions are mainly delivered
for power transformers, circuit breakers, disconnectors and
gas insulated switchgear. Physical parameters are
continuously monitored and real-time measurements are
combined and compared to models in order to generate
specific recommendations regarding operation and
maintenance, as well as alarms when necessary. An interface
with an asset management system yields additional features
such as remaining lifetime or dynamic rating capabilities.
The new architecture enables operational and maintenance
teams to have an overview of the condition of all substations
in real time, and take appropriate and strategic asset
management decisions.
101
Conclusion - Example Commercial Projects
1) Energinet, Denmark – Digital Current Measurement
and Protection
One current application is on Energinet’s transmission system,
in a differential protection application. The protected circuits
are hybrid lines, consisting of 400kV lines, and cabled
portions laid sub-sea. The cables are over 20km in length,
and the operational demands are such that autoreclosing is
required for faults on the overhead lines, but not for faults
within the underground cable sections. The differential
protection is thus used for fast and precise detection of faults
within the cables. The undersea cables run from stations on
the Jutland mainland, on to Funen island and then onwards to
Zealand.
The equipment supply includes 72 optical CT units, 24
merging units and 24 line differential relays which subscribe
to the sampled values in a process bus protection scheme.
The principal reason for selecting to use non-conventional
instrument transformers was due to their low mass and
slimline construction. In the Energinet substations, the optical
CTs are mounted on the same support structures as the cable
bushings themselves. A single structure and foundation per
phase carries the larger mass of the cable, plus the optical CT
support on a cantilever frame.
The scheme has been fully tested and verified for A full range of transmission relays protect the substations,
performance in June 2012 at a special FAT laboratory in interfacing with the digital control system. The architecture
Lyon, France. of the substation incorporates PRP redundancy. Trip and
operational control of switchgear is secured using SCU
2) FSK, Russia – Conventional Analogue Instrument
switchgear control units, completing the full digital
Transformers Interfacing to Full Digital Protection
acquisition and command chain.
and Control
These two contract examples demonstrate the maturity of
In the 110kV and 220kV substation contracts for Nadezhda
the technology, the faith placed in our company by two
in Russia, the primary GIS equipment is supplied by a 3rd
important customers, and hence the readiness for other
party vendor, equipped with conventional instrument
customers to adopt. The authors believe that we are in the
transformers (wound CTs and VTs). This analogue data is
ramp-up phase of digital substation technology, and that the
digitised at source using analogue merging units, and
market will continue to grow, worldwide.
connected cross-site to relays and bay controllers by an IEC
61850-9-2 process bus.

102
 METHODS OF POWER SWING DETECTION AND PREVENTION
Janak Shah
Consultant Engineer – M/s Testing Gear

Abstract-This paper discusses the methods of power

2. Transient Stability Concepts Review
swing detection and prevention.
Transient stability concept will be reviewed with a
1. Introduction simple lossless transmission line connecting two
Power systems under steady-state conditions operate sources corresponding to a generator at a location S
typically close to their normal frequency. A balance
and equivalent network at a location R. It is well
between generated and consumed power exists
during steady-state operating conditions. Power known that the active power, P, transferred from
system faults, line switching, generator generator into the network can be expressed as:
disconnection and the loss or application of large
blocks of load result in sudden changes to electrical
power, where as the mechanical power input to
generators remains relatively constant. These system Where Vs is the sending-end source voltage
disturbances cause oscillations in machine rotor magnitude, Vr is the receiving-end source voltage
angles and can result in severe power flow swings. magnitude, ∂ is the angle difference between the two
Depending on the severity of the disturbances and
sources, and X is the total reactance of the
the actions of the power system controls, the system
may remain stable and return to a new equilibrium transmission line that connects the two sources.
state experiencing a recoverable power swing. With fixed Vs, Vr and X values, the relationship
Severe system disturbances, on the other hand, could
between P and ∂ can be described in a power angle
cause large separation of generator rotor angles,
large swings of power flows, large fluctuations of curve as shown in fig 1:
voltages and currents, and eventual loss of
synchronism between groups of generators or
between neighbouring utility systems. Large power
swings, stable or unstable, can cause unwanted relay
operation at different network locations, which can
aggravate further the power system disturbance and
possibly lead to cascading outages and power
blackouts. Transient Stability studies are aimed to
determine if the system will remain in synchronism
following major disturbances. There is an increase of
awareness to the impacts to the power system
Figure 1: Power Angle Curve
brought by power swing and out-of-step (OOS)
phenomena, and the complexities involved in
applying power swing blocking (PSB) and out-of- Starting from ∂ = 0, the power transferred increases
step tripping (OST) protection. [2] as ∂ increases. The power transferred reaches the
maximum value PMAX, when ∂ is 900. After that
Conventional PSB and OST functions may use dual-
point, further increase in ∂ will result in a decrease
quadrilateral characteristics that are based on the
measurement of the time interval it takes the positive of power transfer.
sequence impedance to cross the two blinders. An During normal conditions, the output of electric
extensive number of power system stability studies
power from the generator produces an electric torque
may be required, taking into consideration different
operating conditions, in order to determine the that balances the mechanical torque applied to the
settings for the dual-quadrilateral PSB and OST generator rotor shaft. The rotor therefore runs at a
functions. This is a costly exercise, and not certain constant speed with this balance of electric and
that all the possible scenarios and operating mechanical torques. When a fault occurs, the amount
conditions were considered. of power transferred is reduced and so the electric
The swing centre voltage (SCV) method calculates torque that counters the mechanical torque. If the
the positive sequence SCV rate of change and does mechanical power is not reduce during the period of
not require any stability studies or user settings for the fault, the generator will accelerate proportionally
the proper blocking of relay elements. This method to the net surplus of torque input. To better explain
is well suited for long, heavily loaded transmission
the physical behaviour of a power system under
lines that pose significant problems for traditional
power swing detection methods. [3]

103
faults or disturbances, consider the simple two line
system of fig 2.
Figure 2: Electrical System used for the illustration
If a three phase fault occurs at the upper line, the
power output is reduce from point D to E, the rotor
therefore accelerates and the surplus power starts
increasing the angular displacement along the new
powertransfer curve to point F as indicated in fig 3.
When breaker A opens the power transfer function
increases to point G. The rate of angular
displacement is reduced but still increasing to point
H when Breaker B opens in Zone 2. The fault is then
cleared, the power output goes to point J and a
decelerating torque appears on the rotor because the
electric power output at J is larger than the
mechanical power input Po. However, because of the
inertia of the rotor, the angle does not go back
immediately. Rather, the system then swings along
the new power transfer function that is lower than
the original because one line is now out, and reaches
point K when the decelerating energy of Area II
equals the accelerating energy of Area I. This is the
so-called equal-area criterion.
Figure 3: Transient Stable Condition
With sufficient damping, the angle difference of the
two sources eventually goes back to a balance point.
104
There is a critical angle for clearing the fault in order
to satisfy the requirements of the equal area criterion
mentioned above. If area II is smaller than area I at
the critical angle, then further increase in angle ∂
will result in an electric power output that is smaller
than the mechanical power input. Therefore, the
rotor will accelerate again and ∂ will increase
beyond recovery. When an unstable condition exists
in the power system, one equivalent generator
rotates at a speed that is different from the other
equivalent generator or the system. Such a condition
is referred to as a loss of synchronism or an out-of-
step condition of the power system.
If such a loss of synchronism occurs, it is imperative
that the generator or system areas operating
asynchronously be separated immediately using
OST defined as 78. [1]
3. Power Swing Phenomena
Power swings are variations in power flow that
occur when the internal voltages of generators at
different locations of the power system slip relative
to each other. Power oscillations are inherent to
occur in power system. They usually arise as a
consequence of an event, for example line switching,
short circuit faults, generators tripping or severe load
drop. During normal operation the magnitude of the
oscillations are usually small and are quickly
damped out. However, during abnormal operation
the oscillation can be more severe and in some cases
even have an increasing magnitude that alerts the
mechanical equilibrium of one or more machines. A
power swing is recovered when, following a
disturbance, the rotation speed of all machines
returns to synchronous speed. A power swing is non-
recoverable when, following a disturbance, one or
more machines do not return to synchronous speed,
thereby loosing synchronism with the rest of the
system.
4. Blinder-Based PSB Schemes
Conventional PSB schemes are based mostly on
measuring the positive sequence impedance at a
relay location. During system normal operating
conditions, the measured impedance is the load
impedance, and its locus is away from the distance
relay protection characteristics. When a fault occurs,
the measured impedance moves immediately from
the load impedance location to the location that
represents the fault on the impedance plane. During
a system fault, the rate of impedance change is very
fast. During a system swing, the measured
impedance moves slowly on the impedance plane.
Power swings can cause the impedance presented to
the distance relay to fall within its operating
characteristics, away from the pre-existing steady-
state load condition, and cause an undesired tripping
of a transmission line.
The main function of the power swing blocking Figure (a): Double Blinders
(PSB) function available in relays is to differentiate Figure (b): Polygons
between fault and power swings, and block distance
relay elements from operating during a power swing.
However, faults that occur during a power swing
must be detected and cleared with a high degree of
selectivity and dependability.

The difference in rate of change of the impedance

vector has been used to detect a power swing and
block the operation of distance protection element
before the impedance enters the protective relay
operating characteristics. This detection method is
based on the fact that it takes a certain time for the
rotor angle to advance because of system inertias. In
other words, the rate of change of impedance vector
is slow during power swings, because it takes a finite
time for the generator rotors to change position with
respect to each other because of their large inertias.
On the contrary, the rate of change of the impedance
vector is very fast during a system fault. [4]
PSB schemes, normally available in the distance
protection relays, use the difference between
impedance rate of change during a fault and during a
power swing to differentiate between a fault and a
swing. For the purpose, two concentric impedance
characteristics, separated by impedance ∆Z, are
placed on the impedance plane and a timer is used to
time the duration of impedance locus as it travels
between them. If the measured impedance crosses
the concentric characteristics before the time
expires, it is considered by the relay as a system
fault. Otherwise, the relay classifies the event as a
power swing.Over the time, the impedance
characteristics designed for power swing
detectionare as shown in fig 4.
Figure (c): Concentric Circles
Figure 4: Conventional Blinder Schemes for Power
Swing Detection
There are number of issues with regards to properly
applying and setting the blinder based PSB relaying
function.
 The PSB inner impedance element must be
placed outside the largest distance protection
characteristic to be blocked.
 The PSB outer impedance element must be
placed away from the load region to prevent
PSB logic operation caused by heavy loads.
These relationships among the impedance
measurements elements are shown in Fig 4(b), in
which concentric polygons are used as PSB
detection elements.
The above requirements are difficult to achieve in
some applications, depending on the relative line-
and source-impedance magnitudes. Figure 5 shows a
simplified representation of one line interconnecting
two generating sources in a complex plane. A swing
locus is bisecting the total impedance.

105
 ii. Set the inner resistive blinders outside the
Figure 5: Effects of Source and Line Impedance on
the PSB Function
Figure 5(a) depicts a system in which line
impedance is large compared to system impedances,
and Figure 5(b) depicts a system in which line
impedance is smaller than the system impedances.
It is observed from fig 5(a) that swing locus could
enter the relay characteristics, to be blocked on
power swing, before the phase angle difference of
the source voltages reaches 120 degrees, i.e. even
during a recoverable power swing. It becomes
difficult to set the inner and outer PSB impedance
elements in this case. Especially when line is heavily
loaded, the necessary PSB settings are so large that
the load impedance could establish incorrect
blocking. To avoid incorrect blocking resulting from
the load, lenticular distance relay characteristic, or
blinders that restrict the tripping area of the mho
elements are being applied. On the other hand, the
system in Fig 5(b) becomes unstable before the
swing locus enters the Z2 and Z1 relay
characteristics. Here, it is relatively easy to set the
inner and outer PSB impedance elements.
The separation between PSB impedance elements
and the timer setting that used to differentiate a fault
from a power swing are also not trivial to calculate.
Depending on the system conditions, it may be
necessary to run extensive stability studies to
determine the fastest power swing and proper PSB
impedance element settings. The rate of slip between
two systems is a function of the accelerating torque
and system inertias. In general, the relay cannot
determine the slip analytically because of the
complexity of the power system. However, by
performing stability studies and analyzing the
angular excursions of system as a function of time,
one can estimate an average slip in degrees/s or
cycles/s. This approach may be appropriate for
systems whose slip frequency does not change
considerably.
For setting a polygon characteristic, guidelines in
general are outlined as follows:
i. Set the outer characteristic resistive blinders
inside the maximum possible load with some
safety margin.
most overreaching protection zone that is to
be blocked when a swing condition occurs.
Normally, the distance elements that issue a
trip without a time delay are blocked. These
elements include the Zone 1 instantaneous
tripping element and the Zone 2 element that
is used in a communications-assisted tripping
scheme.
Based on the outer and inner blinders set in the
previous steps, the PSB timer value can be
calculated from the following equation where,
Ang6R and Ang5R are machine angles at the
outer and inner blinders reaches, respectively,
as shown in fig 6.
Figure 6: Equivalent Two-Source Machine
Angles during OOS
Where the information required is, Z1S-Local
Source Impedance, Z1L-Line Impedance, Z1R-
Remote Source Impedance and Fslip-Maximum
Slip Frequency assumed (Typically 4 to 7 Hz).
In a complex power system, to obtain the power
source impedance values is difficult, as it varies
constantly as the network changes. The source
impedance could also change drastically during
a major disturbance and at a time when the PSB
is called upon to take the proper actions.
Normally, very detailed system stability studies
are necessary to consider all contingency
conditions in determining the most suitable
source impedance to set the conventional PSB
function.
For a long line with heavy loads, the load region
is closed to the distance element that needs to be
blocked during power swing condition. In this
condition, the spacing between the inner and

106
 outer blinders may be small enough to cause a
significant timing error for a power swing. [4]
Fortunately, most numerical distance relays
allows some form of programming capability to
address these special cases. However, to set the
relay correctly, stability studies are required; a
simple impedance based solution is not possible.
5. Swing-Center-Voltage
Swing Center Voltage (SCV) is defined as the
voltage at the location of a two-source equivalent
system where the voltage value is zero when the
angles between two sources are 1800 apart. Fig 7
illustrates the voltage phasor diagram of a general
two source system.

Figure 8: SCV during an OOS condition

The magnitude of the SCV changes between 0 and 1

Figure 7: Voltage Phasor Diagram of the two source
system
SCV is shown as the phasor from origin o to the
point o’. In OOS condition after some disturbance,
the angle difference of the two sources, θ(t), will
increase as a function of time. SCV can be
represented as equation (1). Assuming an equal
source magnitude, SCV can be represented as,
per unit of system nominal voltage. With a slip
frequency of 5 Hz, the voltage magnitude is forced
to zero every 0.2 seconds. Under normal conditions
the magnitude of the SCV remains constant.
One popular approximation of the SCV obtained
through the use of locally available quantities is,
Where, |Vs| is magnitude of locally measured
voltage and ⱷ is the angle difference between Vs and
local current as shown in fig 9.

SCV(t) is the instantaneous SCV. Equation (1) is a

typical amplitude-modulated sinusoidal waveform.
SCV with an average frequency of 50 Hz and a
constant slip frequency of 5 Hz is shown in fig 8. In
the case of OOS situation, frequency of a sinusoidal
input is different from that assumed in its phasor
calculation resulting in oscillations in phasor
magnitude. However, the amplitude calculation in
fig 8 is smooth because the positive sequence
quantity effectively averages out the amplitude
oscillations of individual phases.
Figure 9: Vcosⱷ is a projection of local voltage Vs,
on local current I

In fig 9, we can see that Vcosⱷ is a projection of Vs,

on to the axis of I. For a homogeneous system with
the system impedance angles close to 90 degrees,
Vcosⱷ approximates well the magnitude of the SCV.
For the purpose of power swing detection, it is the
rate of change of the SCV that provided the main
information of the system swings. Therefore, some

107
difference in magnitude between the system SCV
and its local estimate has little impact in detecting
power swings.
Using (1) and keeping in mind the approximation in
(2), the relation between the SCV and phase angle
difference, θ, of two source voltage phasors can be
simplified as,
In (3), E1 is the positive sequence magnitude of the
source voltage, Es, as shown in fig 9. SCV1 is used
in power swing detection for the benefit of its
smooth amplitude during a power swing on the
system. The magnitude of the SCV is at its
maximum when the angular difference between the
two sources is zero. Conversely, it is at its minimum
(or zero) when the angular difference between two
source is 180 degrees. With this property, the power
swing can be detected by calculating the rate of
change of the SCV. The time derivative of the SCV1
is given by (4).
Equation (4) provides the relation between the rate
of change of the SCV and the two machine system
slip frequency, dθ/dt. Note that the derivative of the
SCV voltage is independent from the network
impedances. In fig 10, SCV1 and rate of change of
SCV1 are plotted, assuming a constant slip
frequency of 1 radian/s.
Figure 10: SCV1 and its rate of change with unity
source voltage magnitudes
When the angle of the two machines is zero, the rate
of change of SCV is also zero. The maximum value
of the derivative of the SCV occurs when θ is 1800
[3]
The following two differences between the system
swing centre voltage and its local estimate are
required to be noted:
108
1. When there is no load flowing on a
transmission line, the current from a line
terminal is basically the line-charging current
that leads the local terminal voltage by about
90 degrees. In this case, the local estimate of
the SCV is close to zero and does not
represent the true system swing center
voltage.
2. The local estimate of the SCV has a sign
change in its value when the difference angle,
θ, of two equivalent sources goes through
zero degrees. This sign change results from
the reversal of the line current (i.e. ⱷ changes
180 degrees when θ goes through the 0-
degree point). The system SCV does not have
this discontinuity. [4]
Conclusion
1. The contents of two methods of power swing
detection discussed above are mainly the
glimpses from the different topics from the
references below.
2. Conventional PSB functions are based on
blinder schemes.
3. Extensive system stability studies and
detailed source information viz. Local Source
Impedance, Line Impedance, Remote Source
Impedance and Maximum Slip Frequency are
necessary in setting this function based on
blinder schemes.
4. In modern complex interconnected systems, it
is difficult to get equivalent source
impedance. The source impedance is also
constantly changing because of addition of
new generation or up gradation of the existing
generating units.
5. Assumptions are required to be made about
the worst-case power swing slip rate, unless
historical or other data are available.
6. The second method is based on the SCV and
is not dependent on any system source
impedance or line impedance.
7. This method does not require any system
studies to be conducted and, as such, does not
required any user-defined settings.
8. The quantity of Vcosⱷ, a local estimate of
SCV, was first introduced by Ilar in Brown
Boveri Publication, 1997 [8]. The quantity
was used by Schweitzer Engineering
Laboratoriesengineers to find out an alternate
solution to the Double-Blinder Power Swing
Detection Characteristic [3, 4].
References:
[1] Ariza. James, Megger USA and Gers. Juan M,
GERSUSA, USA, “Setting and Testing of
Power Swing Blocking and Out-of-Step relays
considering Transient Stability Conditions”
[2] Nike Shanku, GenciSharko, MarjelaQemali,
“Graphical method for estimating impact of
 distance line protection into electrical power
system stability” April 2010
[3] Normann Fischer, Gabriel Benmouyal,
DaqingHou, DemetriosTziouvaras, John Byrne
– Finley and Brian Smyth, Schweitzer
Engineering Laboratories Inc. “Do system
impedances really affect power swings” IEEE-
2012
[4] Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Inc
Canada, ID USA, CA USA, “Zero-Setting
Power Swing Blocking Protection”
[5] Umar Naseem Khan and Lu Yan, “Power swing
phenomena and its detection and prevention”
[6] Armando Guzman, VenkatMynam, Greg
Zweigle, “Backup Transmission Line Protection
for Ground Faults and Power Swing Detection
using Synchrophasors”
[7] “Elements of Power System analysis” by
Stevenson
[8] F. Ilar, “Innovations in the detection of power
swings in Electrical Networks”, Brown-Boveri
Publication CH-ES 35-30.10E, 1997.
109
Janak S Shah received his
BE in Electronics from
MS University of Baroda,
India in 1981. He started
his career with GEB
(Gujarat Electricity Board)
in 1983 and till 2005
he was involved in
commissioning of 210 MW Thermal Generating
units, Protection Testing & Commissioning at
Thermal/Hydro Generating Stations and
Transmission substations, and SCADA system
Commissioning and Implementation at State Load
Despatch Centre. From 2005 onwards he was with
Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation, India, as
Dy. Engineer, Transmission Protection Testing. In
2008 he Joined Dubai Electricity and Water
Authority, Dubai and served as Sr. Engineer –
Transmission Protection Engineering till 2012.
Presently, he is providing consultancy services for
Transmission Protection System under the head M/s
Testing Gears, Baroda, India.
 Overview of IEC 61850 standard based Substation Automation System
Vijayan.SR
Asst. Vice-president, Technology
Substation Automation Systems
ABB Limited, Bangalore, India.
ABSTRACT
IEC 61850 standard based Substation Automation Systems (SAS)
are no longer a rarity in India. Many utilities have gone in for such
systems in the last few years and more utilities are likely to do so in
the near future. Considering long term investments, utilities prefer to
have systems that can integrate devices from different
manufacturers and get the benefits of it. This need for
interoperability among different devices has met by the international
standard IEC 61850 - “Communication Networks and Systems in
Substations” First edition, 2003. All major manufacturers have
implemented this standard in their Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs). Recently have released a revised edition of International
standard IEC 61850-“Communication networks and systems for
power utility automation” Edition 2.0 in 2010.
This paper briefly describes an overview of IEC 61850 based
Substation Automation Systems. The paper also covers the
importance of Cyber security for Substation Automation system.
KEYWORDS
IEC 61850, Legacy protocols, MMS, GOOSE
1. INTRODUCTION:
Till 2005 Substation Automation was not a priority for most utilities
in India. Among others, the use of proprietary protocols by
manufacturers was a factor inhibiting the growth of Substation
Automation. With the release of the new international standard IEC
61850 - “Communication Networks and Systems in Substations” in
2004, a few utilities in India have started to specify automation
systems; and in the last 7 years a very large number of SA systems
have been ordered. The lead in this direction was taken by Power
Grid Corporation of India Limited (POWERGRID), the largest
transmission utility in India. Later other utilities like GETCO, NTPC,
KPTCL, TNEB and MSETCL have realized the benefits of the
standard and have installed IEC 61850 based substation
automation systems. Their aim is to ensure that the features and
benefits of the standard are fully exploited, while at the same time
meeting all their functional requirements.
The recent attacks on Industrial control and Automation systems
and power automation systems at various places in the world have
made the power utilities to start thinking about the cyber security for
their installed as well new systems.
2. OVERVIEW OF IEC 61850 STANDARD
IEC 61850 Standard refers to the substation automation systems
and defines the communication between intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs) in substations as well as the related system
requirements. The main goals of this standard are:
i. Interoperability
ii. Free allocation of functions
iii. Long-term stability through the separation of applications
from communication technology
The set of rules are defined in the standard which are independent
of vendor for realizing the interoperability between functions as well
as devices used for protection, monitoring, control and automation
in substations. Interoperability means the capability of two or more
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) from one or several vendors to
110
Sivakrishnudu Sayapogu
Sr. Engineer
Substation Automation Systems
ABB Limited, Bangalore, India.
exchange information and use it in performing their functions and
for correct operation.
Together with the possibility of free allocation of functions, this
feature paves the way for vast range of possible solutions for
protection and Substation Automation Systems.
Through the separation of the relatively slowly growing substation-
specific applications from the fast advancing communication
technology by the Abstract Communication Services Interface
(ACSI), the standard can easily be adapted to future developments
whilst leaving existing database and functions untouched. This
warrants long-term stability of the standard as well as sustainability
of users’ investments.
Figure 1 – IEC 61850 specifying approach
Being a comprehensive standard, IEC 61850 also covers design
aspects, protocol requirement, testing guidelines, etc. In order to
exploit its full benefits in any specific case, its application required
careful consideration of both customer requirements and available
equipment.
This standard aims to ensure the following features:
i. The complete communication profile is based on
IEC/IEEE/ISO/OSI communication standards, if available.
ii. The protocols used will be open and will support self-
descriptive devices. It should be possible to add new
functionality.
iii. The standard is based on data objects related to the needs
of electric power industry.
iv. The communication syntax and semantics are based on the
use of common data objects related to the power system.
v. The communication services can be mapped to different
state-of-the art protocols.
vi. The communication standard considers the implications of
the substation being one node in the power grid.
vii. The complete topology of an electrical system, the
generated and consumed information, and the information
flow between IEDs is specified, using the machine readable
language.
The standardization approach of IEC 61850 series is to mix the
strengths of the following three methods:
i. Functional decomposition
ii. Data flow modeling
iii. Information modeling
Functional decomposition is used to understand the logical
relationship between components of distributed functions, and is
presented in terms of logical nodes (LNs) that describe the
functions, sub functions and functional interfaces.
Data flow modeling is used to understand the communication
interfaces that must support the exchange of information between
distributed functional components and the functional performance
requirements.
Information modeling is used to define the abstract syntax and
semantics of the information exchanged , and is presented in terms
of data objects classes and types, attributes, abstract object
methods (services), and their relationship.
The functions in the substation automation system can be assigned
to three levels: the station levels, bay level and process level.
The logical communication interfaces with in substation and
between substations are presented in figure 2.
Figure 2 – Interface model within substation and between
substations
The meanings of the interfaces are as follows:
IF1: protection-data exchange between bay and station level.
IF2: protection-data exchange between bay level and remote
protection.
IF3: data exchange within bay level.
IF4: CT and VT instantaneous data exchange (especially samples)
between process and bay level.
IF5: control-data exchange between process and bay level.
IF6: control-data exchange between bay and station level.
IF7: data exchange between substation (level) and a remote
engineer’s workplace.
IF8: direct data exchange between the bays especially for fast
functions such as interlocking.
IF9: data exchange within station level.
IF10: remote control-data exchange between substation (devices)
and a remote Network Control Centre (called NCC – beyond the
scope of this standard).
IF 11: the control-data exchange between different substations
The devices of a power utility automation system may be physically
installed on different functional levels (station, bay, and process).
This refers to the physical interpretation of Figure 2.
Process level devices are typically remote I/O s, intelligent sensors
and actuators.
Bay level devices consist of control, protection or monitoring units
per bay.
Station level devices consist of the station computer with a
database, the operator’s workplace, interfaces for remote
communication, etc.
111
The IEC 61850 standard document defines the various aspects of
the Substation communication networks in 10 major sections as
shown in Table 1.
Table 1 - Structure of the IEC 61850 Standard
Part # Title
1 Introduction and Overview
2 Glossary of terms
3 General Requirements
4 System and Project Management
5 Communication Requirements for Functions and Device
Models
6 Configuration Description Language for Communication
in Electrical Substations Related to IEDs
7 Basic Communication Structure for Substation and
Feeder Equipment
7.1 Principles and Models
7.2 Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI)
7.3 Common Data Classes (CDC)
7.4 Compatible logical node classes and data objects
classes
8 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM
8.1 Mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to
ISO/IEC 8802-3
9 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
9.1 Sampled Values over Serial Unidirectional Multi-drop
Point-to-Point Link
9.2 Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
10 Conformance Testing
Parts 3, 4, and 5 of the standard start by identifying the general and
specific functional requirements for communications in a substation
These requirements are then used as forcing functions to aid in the
identification of the services and data models needed, application
protocol required, and the underlying transport, network, data link,
and physical layers that will meet the overall requirements.
The major architectural construct that IEC 61850 adopts is that of
“abstracting” the definition of the data items and the services, that
is, creating data items/objects and services that are independent of
any underlying protocols. The abstract definitions then allow
“mapping” of the data objects and services to any other protocol
that can meet the data and service requirements. The definition of
the abstract services is found in part 7.2 of the standard and the
abstraction of the data objects (referred to as Logical Nodes) is
found in part 7.4. In as much as many of the data objects are made
up of common pieces (such as Status, Control, Measurement,
Substitution), the concept of “Common Data Classes” or “CDC” was
developed which defined common building blocks for creating the
larger data objects. The CDC elements are defined in part 7.3.
Given the data and services abstract definitions, the final step was
one of “mapping” the abstract services into an actual protocol.
Section 8.1 defines the mapping of the abstract data object and
services onto the Manufacturing Messaging Specification – MMS
and sections 9.1 and 9.2 define the mapping of the Sample
Measured Values (unidirectional point-to-point and bi-directional
multipoint accordingly) onto an Ethernet data frame. The 9.2
document defines what has become known as the Process Bus.
From a system perspective, there is a significant amount of
configuration that is required in order to put all the pieces together
and make them work. In order to facilitate this process and to
eliminate much of the human error component, an XML based
Substation Configuration Language (SCL) was defined in part 6. It
allows the formal description of the relations between the substation
automation system and the substation (switchyard). At the
application level, the switchyard topology itself and the relation of
the switchyard structure to the SAS functions (logical nodes)
configured on the IEDs can be described. Each device must provide
an SCL file that describes the configuration of itself.
Although the scope of IEC 61850 was originally focused “inside” the
substation, discussions are underway to look at defining IEC 61850
for the Substation to Master communication protocol. In addition,
applications are in service that uses various components of IEC
61850 for wide area substation-to-substation communication.
For modeling per phase (for example switches or instrument
transformers), one instance per phase shall be created; for
modeling protection per zone or level, one instance per zone or
level shall be created also.
Table 2 – List of logical node groups

Finally, part 10 of the document defines a testing methodology in

order to determine “conformance” with the numerous protocol
definitions and constraints defined in the document.

The rest of this paper goes into some focused details of the various
parts of the IEC 61850 standard.

3. DATA MODELING APPROACH

Legacy protocols have typically defined how bytes are transmitted

on the wire. However, they did not specify how data should be
organized in devices in terms of the application. This approach
requires power system engineers to manually configure objects and
map them to power system variables and low-level register
numbers, index numbers, I/O modules, etc. IEC 61850 is unique. In
addition to the specification of the protocol elements (how bytes are
transmitted on the wire), IEC 61850 provides a comprehensive
model for how power system devices should organize data in a
manner that is consistent across all types and brands of devices.
This eliminates much of the tedious non-power system configuration
effort because the devices can configure themselves. For instance,
if you put a CT/VT input into an IEC 61850 relay, the relay can
detect this module and automatically assign it to a measurement
unit without user interaction. Some devices use an SCL file to
configure the objects and the engineer need only import the SCL file
into the device to configure it. Then, the IEC 61850 client
application can extract the object definitions from the device over
the network. The result is a very large savings in the cost and effort Each logical node contains one or more elements of Data. Each
to configure an IEC 61850 device. element of data has a unique name. These Data Names are
determined by the standard and are functionally related to the
The IEC 61850 device model begins with a physical device. A power system purpose. For instance, a circuit breaker is modeled
physical device is the device that connects to the network. The as an XCBR logical node. It contains a variety of Data including Loc
physical device is typically defined by its network address. Within for determining if operation is remote or local, OpCnt for an
each physical device, there may be one or more logical devices. operations count, Pos for the position, BlkOpn block breaker open
The IEC 61850 logical device model allows a single physical device commands, BlkCls block breaker close commands, and CBOpCap
to act as a proxy or gateway for multiple devices thus providing a for the circuit breaker operating capability.
standard representation of a data concentrator.

Figure 3 – IEC 61850 Data modeling

Each logical device contains one or more logical nodes. A logical

Figure 4 - Anatomy of Circuit Breaker (XCBR) Logical Node in
node (see figure 3) is a named grouping of data and associated
IEC 61850-7-4
services that is logically related to some power system function.
There are logical nodes for automatic control the names of which all
begin with the letter “A”. There are logical nodes for metering and
Each element of data within the logical node conforms to the
measurement the names of which all begin with the letter “M”.
specification of a common data class (CDC) per IEC 61850-7-3.
Likewise there are logical nodes for Supervisory Control (C),
Each CDC describes the type and structure of the data within the
Generic Functions (G), Interfacing/Archiving (I), System logical
logical node. For instance, there are CDCs for status information,
nodes (L), Protection (P), Protection Related (R), Sensors (S),
measured information, controllable status information, controllable
Instrument Transformers (T), Switchgear (X), Power Transformers
analog set point information, status settings, and analog settings.
(Y), and Other Equipment (Z). Each logical node has an LN-
Each CDC has a defined name and a set of CDC attributes each
Instance-ID as a suffix to the logical node name. For instance,
with a defined name, defined type, and specific purpose. Each
suppose there were two measurement inputs in a device to
individual attribute of a CDC belongs to a set of functional
measure two 3-phase feeders. The standard name of the logical
constraints (FC) that groups the attributes into categories. For
node for a Measurement Unit for 3-phase power is MMXU. To
instance, in the Single Point Status (SPS) CDC described in Figure
delineate between the measurements for these 2 feeders the IEC
6, there are functional constraints for status (ST) attributes,
61850 logical node names of MMXU1 and MMXU2 would be used.
substituted value (SV) attributes, description (DC) attributes, and
Each logical node may also use an optional application specific LN-
extended definition (EX) attributes. In this example the status
prefix to provide further identification of the purpose of a logical
attributes of the SPS class consists of a status value (stVal), a
node.
quality flag (q), and a time stamp (t).
Logical nodes are grouped according to the logical node groups
listed in Table 2. The names of logical nodes shall begin with the
character representing the group to which the logical node belongs.

112
 Table 3 - IEC 61850 Mapping to MMS

Figure 5 - Anatomy of the Single Point Status (SPS) Common

Data Class in IEC 61850-7-3

The IEC 61850 model of a device is a virtualized model that begins

with an abstract view of the device and its objects and is defined in
Table 4 - IEC 61850 Partial service mapping
IEC 61850 part 7. Then, this abstract model is mapped to a specific
protocol stack in section IEC 61850-8-1 based on MMS (ISO9506),
TCP/IP, and Ethernet. In the process of mapping the IEC 61850
objects to MMS, IEC 61850-8-1 specifies a method of transforming
the model information into a named MMS variable object that
results in a unique and unambiguous reference for each element of
data in the model. For instance, suppose that you have a logical
device named “Relay1” consisting of a single circuit breaker logical
node XCBR1 for which you want to determine if the breaker is in the
remote or local mode of operation. To determine this you would
read the object shown in figure 6

.
Figure 6 - Anatomy of an IEC 61850-8-1 Object Name

4. MAPPING TO REAL PROTOCOLS

The abstract data and object models of IEC 61850 define a

standardized method of describing power system devices that
enables all IEDs to present data using identical structures that are
directly related to their power system function. The Abstract
Communication Service Interface (ACSI) models of IEC 61850
define a set of services and the responses to those services that
enables all IEDs to behave in an identical manner from the network
behavior perspective. While the abstract model is critical to
achieving this level of interoperability, these models need to be
operated over a real set of protocols that are practical to implement
and that can operate within the computing environments commonly
found in the power industry. IEC 61850-8-1 maps the abstract In addition to the mapping to the application layer, Part 8.1 defines
objects and services to the Manufacturing Message Specification profiles for the “other” layers of the communication stack that are
(MMS) protocols of ISO9506. Why a protocol was originally dependent on the service provided (as shown in figure 8 below). Of
designed for manufacturing used? Because MMS is the only public note on the various profiles: the Sampled Values and GOOSE
(ISO standard) protocol that has a proven implementation track applications map directly into the Ethernet data frame thereby
record that can easily support the complex naming and service eliminating processing of any middle layers; the MMS Connection
models of IEC 61850. While you can theoretically map IEC 61850 to Oriented layer can operate over TCP/IP or ISO; the Generic
any protocol, this mapping can get very complex and cumbersome Substation Status Event (GSSE) is the identical implementation as
when trying to map IEC 61850 objects and services to a protocol the UCA GOOSE and operates over connectionless ISO services;
that only provides read/write/report services for simple variables all data maps onto an Ethernet data frame using either the data
that are accessed by register numbers or index numbers. This was type “Ethertype” in the case of Sampled Values, GOOSE,
the reason that MMS was chosen for UCA in 1991 and is the TimeSync, and TCP/IP or “802.3” data type for the ISO and GSSE
reason that it was kept for IEC 61850. MMS is a very good choice messages.
because it supports complex named objects and a rich set of
flexible services that supports the mapping to IEC 61850 in a
straightforward manner.

The mapping of IEC 61850 object and service models to MMS is

based on a service mapping where a specific MMS service/services
are chosen as the means to implement the various services of
ACSI. For instance, the control model of ACSI is mapped to MMS
read and write services. Then the various object models of IEC
61850 are mapped to specific MMS objects. For instance, the IEC
61850 logical device object is mapped to an MMS domain. Table 3
below summarizes the mapping of IEC 61850 objects and Table 4
the ACSI mapping to MMS.

113

(Type x) is the Message type and performance class defined in IEC
61850-5
Figure 7 – Overview of IEC 61850 functionality and associated
communication profiles
The message types and performance classes specified in IEC
61850-5 are mapped as shown in Figure 9:
Type 1 (Fast messages)
Type 1A (Trip)
Type 2 (Medium speed messages)
Type 3 (Low speed messages)
Type 4 (Raw data messages)
Type 5 (File transfer functions)
Type 6 (Time synchronization messages)
5. PROCESS BUS
As technology migrates to “next generation” low-energy voltage and
current sensors, the ability to digitize the base quantities at the
source and transmit the resulting sample values back to the
substation becomes a need. In addition to Sampled Values, the
ability to remotely acquire status information as well as set output
controls is very desirable. IEC 61850 addresses this need through
the definition of Sampled Measured Values services and the
implementation of a Process Bus. The Process layer of the
substation is related to gathering information, such as Voltage,
Current, and status information, from the transformers and
transducers connected to the primary power system process – the
transmission of electricity. IEC 61850 defines the collection of this
data via two different protocol definitions, namely, Part 9.1 which
defines a Unidirectional Multidrop Point-to-Point fixed link carrying a
fixed dataset and Part 9.2 which defines a “configurable” dataset
that can be transmitted on a multi-cast basis from one publisher to
multiple subscribers.
Figure 8-Sample Measured Value Concept
Figure 8, above, shows the basic concept of the Process Bus.
Signals from voltage and current sources (low or high energy) as
well as status information are input into a “Merging Unit” (MU). The
Merging Units in a station sample the signals at an agreed,
synchronized rate. In this manner, any IED can input data from
multiple MUs and automatically align and process the data. At this
time, there is an implementation agreement that defines a base
sample rate of 80 samples per power system cycle for basic
protection and monitoring and a “high” rate of 256 samples per
114
power system cycle for high frequency applications such as power
quality and high resolution oscillograph.
Part 9.1 specifies a pre-configured or “universal” dataset as defined
in IEC60044-8. This dataset includes 3-phase voltage, bus voltage,
neutral voltage, 3-phase currents for protection, 3-phase currents
for measurement and two 16-bit status words. Note that the analog
data values are mapped into 16 bit registers in this mapping.
Part 9.2 is a more generalized implementation of Sampled
Measured Values (SMV) data transfer. In 9.2, the dataset or
“payload” is user-defined using the SCL. As a dataset, data values
of various sizes and types can be integrated together. Note that the
existing implementation agreement proposed a data value size of
32 bits with a scale factor of 1 count = 1ma.
Both 9.1 and 9.2 specify mapping directly onto an Ethernet
transport (see figure 4 above). Depending on the sample data rate,
anywhere from 1 to 5 devices can be mapped onto a single 100MB
Ethernet link. Multiple 100MB Ethernet data streams can then be
combined into a single Ethernet switch with a 1GB backbone. In this
configuration, 50 or more datasets can be published to multiple
subscribers.
In order to increase the overall performance of multicast message
reception (for example GOOSE, GSSE, and Sampled Values), it is
preferable to have the media access controller (MAC) hardware
perform the filtering. The hash algorithms in the various integrated
circuits do vary. It is recommended, as a system integrator, to
evaluate the impact of these algorithms when assigning destination
multicast addresses.
Vendors of IEC 61850-8-1 or IEC 61850-9-2 implementations that
send these types of messages should provide recommendations of
addressing based upon the MAC IC’s hash algorithms. One such
recommendation might appear as follows:
The multicast addresses (octet string of size 6) used within this
standard will have the following structure.
i. The first three octets are assigned by IEEE with 01-0C-CD.
ii. The fourth octet will be 01 for GOOSE, 02 for GSSE, and
04 for multicast sampled values.
iii. The last two octets will be used as individual addresses
assigned by range defined in Table 5.
Table 5 – Recommended multicast addressing example
6. SUBSTATION CONFIGURATION LANGUAGE
IEC 61850-6-1 specifies a Substation Configuration Language
(SCL) that is based on the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) to
describe the configuration of IEC 61850 based systems. SCL
specifies a hierarchy of configuration files that enable multiple levels
of the system to be described in unambiguous and standardized
XML files. The various SCL files include system specification
description (SSD), IED capability description (ICD), substation
configuration description (SCD), and configured IED description
(CID) files. All these files are constructed in the same methods and
format but have different scopes depending on the need.
Even though an IEC 61850 client can extract an IED’s configuration
when it is connected to that IED over a network, there are several
scenarios where the availability of a formal off-line description
language can bring very large benefits to users outside of
configuring IEC 61850 client applications. These benefits include:
i. SCL enables off-line system development tools to generate
the files needed for IED configuration automatically from
the power system design significantly reducing the cost
and effort of IED configuration by eliminating most, if not
all, manual configuration tasks.
ii. SCL enables the sharing of IED configuration among users
and suppliers to reduce or eliminate inconsistencies and
misunderstandings in system configuration and system
requirements. Users can provide their own SCL files to
ensure that IEDs are delivered to them properly
configured.
iii. SCL allows IEC 61850 applications to be configured off-line
without requiring a network connection to the IED for client
configuration.
SCL can be used as best fits each user’s requirements. A user can
decide to use CID files to provide help in IED configuration using its
existing system design processes. Or SCL can be used to
restructure the entire power system design process to eliminate
manual configuration, eliminate manual data entry errors, reduce
misunderstanding between system capabilities and requirements,
enhance the interoperability of the end system, and greatly increase
the productivity and effectiveness of power system engineers.
7. IEC 61850 SUBSTATION MODEL
Putting the pieces together results in the substation architecture as
shown in figure 10. At the “process” layer, data from
Optical/Electronic Voltage and Current sensors as well as status
information will be collected and digitized by the Merging Units
(MUs). MUs could be physically located either in the field or in the
control house. Data from the MUs will be collected through
redundant 100MB fiber optic Ethernet connections. The collection
points will be redundant Ethernet switches with 1GB internal data
buses and 1GB uplinks that support Ethernet priority and Ethernet
Virtual LAN (VLAN). VLAN allows the Ethernet switch to deliver
datasets to only those switch ports/IEDs that have subscribed to the
data. In migrating to Process Bus implementations, manufacturers
will need to provide the ability to integrate data from existing CTs
and PTs with the data from the newer Optical/Electronic sensors.
Redundant synchronization clock architecture will also have to be
addressed. In this architecture, upon detection of failure of Clock 1,
Clock 2 will have to automatically come on line and continue
providing sampling synchronization.
At the substation level, a Station Bus will exist. Again, this bus will
be based today on 10MB Ethernet with a clear migration path to
100MB Ethernet. The Station Bus will provide primary
communications between the various Logical Nodes, which provide
the various station protection, control, monitoring, and logging
functions. Communications will operate on either a connection
oriented basis (e.g. – request of information, configuration, etc.) or a
connection-less basis (IEC Generic Object Oriented Substation
Event - GOOSE). Again, redundant communication architecture is
recommended as application of IED to IED data transmission puts
the communication system on the critical path in case of a failure.
Figure 8 - IEC 61850 Substation Architecture
Finally, this architecture supports remote network access for all
types of data reads and writes. As all communication is network
enabled, multiple remote “clients” will desire access the wide variety
of available information. Typical clients would include local HMI,
operations, maintenance, engineering, and planning. The remote
access point is one logical location to implement security functions
such as encryption and authentication. This implementation
unburdens the individual IEDs from performing encryption on
internal data transfers but still provide security on all external
transactions.
8. BENEFITS OF IEC 61850
One of the significant challenges that substation engineers face is
justifying substation automation investments. The positive impacts
that automation has on operating costs, increased power quality,
and reduced outage response are well known. But little attention is
paid to how the use of a communication standard impacts the cost
to build and operate the substation. Legacy communication
protocols were typically developed with the dual objective of
providing the necessary functions required by electric power
systems while minimizing the number of bytes that were used by
the protocol because of severe bandwidth limitations that were
typical of the serial link technology available 10-15 years ago when
many of these protocols were initially developed. Later, as Ethernet
and modern networking protocols like TCP/IP became widespread,
these legacy protocols were adapted to run over TCP/IP-Ethernet.
This approach provided the same basic electric power system
capabilities as the serial link version while bringing the advantages
of modern networking technologies to the substation. But this
approach has a fundamental flaw: the protocols being used were
still designed to minimize the bytes on the wire and do not take
advantage of the vast increase in bandwidth that modern
networking technologies deliver by providing a higher level of
115
functionality that can significantly reduce the implementation and
operational costs of substation automation.
IEC 61850 is unique. IEC 61850 is not a former serial link protocol
recast onto TCP/IP-Ethernet. IEC 61850 was designed from the
ground up to operate over modern networking technologies and
delivers an unprecedented amount of functionality that is simply not
available from legacy communications protocols. These unique
characteristics of IEC 61850 have a direct and positive impact on
the cost to design, build, install, commission, and operate power
systems. While legacy protocols on Ethernet enable the substation
engineer to do exactly the same thing that was done 10-15 years
ago using Ethernet, IEC 61850 enables fundamental improvements
in the substation automation process that is simply not possible with
a legacy approach, with or without TCP/IP-Ethernet. To better
understand the specific benefits we will first examine some of the
key features and capabilities of IEC 61850 and then explain how
these result in significant benefits that cannot be achieved with the
legacy approach
8.1. Key Features
The features and characteristics of IEC 61850 that enable unique
advantages are so numerous that they cannot practically be listed
here. Some of these characteristics are seemingly small but yet can
have a tremendous impact on substation automation systems. For
instance, the use of VLANs and priority flags for GOOSE and SMV
enable much more intelligent use of Ethernet switches that in and of
itself can deliver significant benefits to users that aren’t available
with other approaches. For the sake of brevity, we will list here
some of the more key features that provide significant benefits to
users:
i. Use of a Virtualized Model: The virtualized model of
logical devices, logical nodes, ACSI, and CDCs enables
definition of the data, services, and behavior of devices to
be defined in addition to the protocols that are used to
define how the data is transmitted over the network.
ii. Use of Names for All Data: Every element of IEC 61850
data is named using descriptive strings to describe the
data. Legacy protocols, on the other hand, tend to identify
data by storage location and use index numbers, register
numbers and the like to describe data.
iii. All Object Names are Standardized and Defined in a
Power System Context: The names of the data in the IEC
61850 device are not dictated by the device vendor or
configured by the user. All names are defined in the
standard and provided in a power system context that
enables the engineer to immediately identify the meaning of
data without having to define mappings that relate index
numbers and register numbers to power system data like
voltage and current.
iv. Devices are Self-Describing: Client applications that
communicate with IEC 61850 devices are able to download
the description of all the data supported by the device from
the device without any manual configuration of data objects
or names.
v. High-Level Services: ACSI supports a wide variety of
services that far exceeds what is available in the typical
legacy protocol. GOOSE, GSSE, SMV, and logs are just a
few of the unique capabilities of IEC 61850.
vi. Standardized Configuration Language: SCL enables the
configuration of a device and its role in the power system to
be precisely defined using XML files.
8.2. Major Benefits
The features described above for IEC 61850 deliver substantial
benefits to users that understand and take advantage of them.
Rather than simply approaching an IEC 61850 based system in the
same way as any other system, a user that understands and takes
advantage of the unique capabilities will realize significant benefits
that are not available using legacy approaches.
i. Eliminate Procurement Ambiguity: Not only can SCL be
used to configure devices and power systems, SCL can
also be used to precisely define user requirement for
substations and devices. Using SCL a user can specify
exactly and unambiguously what is expected to be provided
in each device that is not subject to misinterpretation by
suppliers.
ii. Lower Installation Cost: IEC 61850 enables devices to systematic approach to cyber security through its operations on a
quickly exchange data and status using GOOSE and GSSE global level.
over the station LAN without having to wire separate links
for each relay. This significantly reduces wiring costs by Interactions between the substation automation system corporate
more fully utilizing the station LAN bandwidth for these networks and the outside world are usually handled on the station
signals and construction costs by reducing the need for level, which means that ensuring a high level of security on the
trenching, ducts, conduit, etc. station level is vital to the security of the substation automation
system itself. Therefore, we have to use best-in-class firewalls,
intrusion detection or prevention systems, or VPN technology. All
iii. Lower Transducer Costs: Rather than requiring separate communication from the outside world to a substation can, for
transducers for each device needing a particular signal, a instance, be protected by using a firewall and/or VPN-enabled
single merging unit supporting SMV can deliver these communication. Systems can additionally be divided into multiple
signals to many devices using a single transducer lowering security zones as needed to further improve security.
transducer, wiring, calibration, and maintenance costs.
The key requirements that need to be covered by a secure
substation automation system are:
iv. Lower Commissioning Costs: The cost to configure and
commission devices is drastically reduced because IEC i. Confidentiality can be maintained by preventing the
61850 devices don’t require as much manual configuration unauthorized access to Information
as legacy devices. Client applications no longer need to
manually configure for each point they need to access ii. Integrity can by maintained by preventing the unauthorized
because they can retrieve the points list directly from the modification or theft of information
device or import it via an SCL file. Many applications
require nothing more than setting up a network address in iii. Availability can be maintained preventing the denial of
order to establish communications. Most manual service and ensuring authorized access to information
configuration is eliminated drastically reducing errors and
rework. iv. Non-Repudiation or Accountability can be maintained by
preventing the denial of an action that took place or the
claims of an action that did not take place.
v. Lower Equipment Migration Costs: Because IEC 61850
defines more of the externally visible aspects of the devices .The available international standards on cyber security of industrial
besides just the encoding of data on the wire, the cost for control and substation automation system and the release status
equipment migrations is minimized. Behavioral differences are listed in Table 6.
from one brand of device to another is minimized and, in
some cases, completely eliminated. All devices share the Table 6 - Cyber security Standards for Substation Automation
same naming conventions minimizing the reconfiguration of System
client applications when those devices are changed.
Standard Main Focus Status
vi. Lower Extension Costs. Because IEC 61850 devices
don’t have to be configured to expose data, new extensions
are easily added into the substation without having to NIST SGIP- Smart Grid Interoperability Panel On-going *
reconfigure devices to expose data that was previously not CSWG – Cyber Security Working Group
accessed. Adding devices and applications into an existing
IEC 61850 systems can be done with only a minimal
impact, if any, on any of the existing equipment. NERC CIP NERC CIP Cyber Security Released,
regulation for North American On-going *
power utilities
vii. Lower Integration Costs. By utilizing the same networking
technology that is being widely used across the utility IEC 62351 Data and Communications Partly
enterprise the cost to integrate substation data into the Security released,
enterprise is substantially reduced. Rather than installing On-going *
costly RTUs that have to be manually configured and
IEEE Cyber Security Requirements for On-going*
maintained for each point of data needed in control center
PSRC/H13 & Substation Automation,
and engineering office application, IEC 61850 networks are
SUB/C10 Protection and Control Systems
capable of delivering data without separate communications
front-ends or reconfiguring devices.
IEEE 1686 IEEE Standard for Substation Finalized
Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs) Cyber Security
viii. Implement New Capabilities. The advanced services and
Capabilities
unique features of IEC 61850 enables new capabilities that
are simply not possible with most legacy protocols. Wide ISA S99 Industrial Automation and Partly
area protection schemes that would normally be cost Control System Security released,
prohibitive become much more feasible. Because devices On-going *
are already connected to the substation LAN, the
incremental cost for accessing or sharing more device data
becomes insignificant enabling new and innovative
applications that would be too costly to produce otherwise.

9. CYBER SECURITY FOR SUBSTATION AUTOMATION

SYSTEM

The new generation of automation systems utilizes open standards

such as IEC 60870-5-104, DNP 3.0 and IEC 61850 and commercial
technologies, in particular Ethernet and TCP/IP based
communication protocols. They also enable connectivity to external
networks, such as office intranet and internet. These changes in
technology have brought huge benefits from an operational
perspective, but they have also introduced cyber security concerns
previously known only from office or enterprise IT systems.

Cyber security risks were inherited by adopting open IT standards,

but fortunately, so were the cyber security mechanisms that have
been developed in a large number of enterprise environments to
address these risks. These mechanisms allow for the design and
development of cyber security solutions specifically for control
systems – such as substation automation systems –utilizing proven
technology.
Many vendors have identified cyber security as a key requirement
and are committed to providing customers with products, systems
and services that clearly address this issue. Vendors take a
Figure 9 – Scope of Cyber security Standards applicable for
Substation Automation System.
10. SUMMARY
IEC 61850 is now released to the industry. Utilities throughout the
world had accepted the standard and getting the benefits of IEC
61850 standard based substation automation systems such as
Interoperability, Interlock logics implementation using GOOSE
messages etc. Ten parts of the standard are now International

116
Standards. This standard addresses most of the issues that
migration to the digital world entails, especially, standardization of
data names, creation of a comprehensive set of services,
implementation over standard protocols and hardware, and
definition of a process bus. Multi-vendor interoperability has been
demonstrated and compliance certification processes are being
established. Discussions are underway to utilize IEC 61850 as the
substation to control center communication protocol. IEC 61850 will
become the protocol of choice as utilities migrate to network
solutions for the substations and beyond.

Implementation of the cyber security solution to substation

automation will protect the system from external and internal threats
and also ensures safe and reliable operation.

11. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors gratefully acknowledge “THE SOCEITY OF POWER

ENGINEERS (INDIA)”, Vadodara Chapter for giving an opportunity
for presenting the paper.

12. REFERENCES

[1] Ralph Mickiewicz, SISCO, Inc. Sterling Heights, MI USA

“Technical Overview and Benefits of the IEC 61850 Standard for
Substation Automation”

[2] Peter Rietmann, Tetsuji Maeda, Petra Reinhardt, ABB

Switzerland, “Applying IEC 61850 to Substation Automation
th th
Systems” GRIDTECH-2007, New Delhi, 5 -6 Febraury,2007.

[3] Peter Leupp, Claes Rytoft ABB Corporate general, “Special

report on IEC 61850”

Standards:
[1] IEC 61850 - Communication networks and systems for power
utility automation, Edition 2.0, 2010

[2] IEC 62351 - Power systems management and associated

information exchange –Data and communications security, First
Edition 2007.

117
 DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY FORSUBSTATION AUTOMATION
D.Maheswaran Geetha Hariharan
dmaheswaran@lntecc.com gh@lntecc.com arthanari@lntecc.com
Larsen & Toubro Construction
Power Transmission and Distribution
1.0 ABSTRACT
Communication system is the backbone for any substation
automation system. Earlier days the substations were manually
controlled / operated and remote operations were all hardwired
through control switches. With the development in
communication system, automation system also gained
importance in substations. Immediately after its entry, a
variety of proprietary protocols ruled the market for a long
time making SAS user unfriendly. In this paper we intend to
discuss the development of communication systemsin
substation automation system. The various communication
protocols available in market are discussed. Also the
challenges faced by the system leading to development of a
common protocol i.e. IEC 61850, the benefits and system
architecture with IEC 61850 SAS system are elaborated. The
architecture for integration of the existing non IEC 61850 SAS
system with new IEC 61850 system is also demonstrated.
1.1 Introduction
In the present scenario, EHV substations, both Air insulated
substation (AIS) and Gas insulated substation (GIS) are now
being made as unmanned or minimum manned.Modern
numerical relays with IEC 61850 protocol and the state-of-the-
art substation automation system have taken charge of the
complete system. The basic benefitsof automation in
substations are as follows.
- Reducing time and costs
- Long term expandability of systems
- Reducing complexity
- Less maintenance
-Simplify the engineering and installation
The man machine interface (MMI) implements, all control and
communication functionality. The Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IED), communication protocols and communications
methods work together as a system to attain substation
automation.
2.0 COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
A communication protocol is a system of digital message
formats and rules for exchanging messages between
computing systems.Communicating systems use well-defined
formats for exchanging messages. Each message has an exact
meaning intended to provoke a particular response of the
receiver. Thus, a protocol must define the syntax, semantics,
and synchronization of communication; the specified behavior
is typically independent of how it is to be implemented. A
protocol can therefore be implemented as hardware, software,
or both. Communication protocols have to be agreed upon by
the parties involved. To reach agreement, a protocol may be
developed into a technical standard. A programming language
describes the same for computations, so there is a close
analogy between protocols and programming languages.
Substation Protocols available worldwide are shown in
figure1.
118
S.Arthanari
Figure-1, Communication Protocols available worldwide
2.1 PROFIBUS
PROFIBUS (Process Field Bus) is a standard for field bus
communication in automation technology and was first
promoted in 1989 by BMBF (German department of education
and research) and then used by Siemens. This was used by
Siemens as their proprietary protocol. PROFIBUS is not an
openly published and royalty-free protocol as MODBUS.
There are two variations of PROFIBUS which are in use
today; viz., the most commonly used PROFIBUS DP, and the
lesser used, application specific, PROFIBUS PA
PROFIBUS DP (Decentralized Peripherals) is used to operate
sensors and actuators via a centralized controller in production
(factory) automation applications.
PROFIBUS PA (Process Automation) is used to monitor
measuring equipment via a process control system in process
automation applications. This variant is designed for use in
explosion/hazardous areas (Ex-zone 0 and 1). The PROFIBUS
PA protocol conforms to the European Standard EN50170.
The Physical Layer (i.e. the cable) conforms to IEC 61158-2,
which allows power to be delivered over the bus to field
instruments, while limiting current flows so that explosive
conditions are not created, even if a malfunction occurs. The
number of devices attached to a PA segment is limited by this
feature. PA has a data transmission rate of 31.25 kbit/s.
However, PA uses the same protocol as DP, and can be linked
to a DP network using a coupler device. The much faster DP
acts as a backbone network for transmitting process signals to
the controller. This means that DP and PA can work tightly
together, especially in hybrid applications where process and
factory automation networks operate side by side. Differences
between Profibus PA and Profibus DP are in the physical
layer.
Profibus DP is RS-485 and fiber optic, and can run at a variety
of speeds from 12 MBPS down to ~40 kbps. The service is
only suitable for small data amounts. This protocol is still
being used in process industry. However, as mentioned earlier,
this is not an open protocol.
2.2 MODBUS
Modbus is a serial communication protocol originally
published by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979 for
use with its programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Simple
and robust, and it is now a commonly available means of
connecting industrial electronic devices. Modbus is often used
to connect a supervisory computer with a remote terminal unit
(RTU) in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems. Each device intended to communicate using Modbus
is given a unique address. A Modbus command contains the
Modbus address of the device it is intended for. Only the
intended device will act on the command, even though other
devices might receive it (an exception is specific
broadcastablecommands sent to node 0 which are acted on but
not acknowledged). All Modbus commands contain checking
information, ensuring that a command arrives undamaged. The
basic Modbus commands can instruct an RTU to change a
value in one of its registers, control or read an I/O port, as well
as commanding the device to send back one or more values
contained in its registers. Limitations of Modbus
communication is listed below.
(i) Since Modbus was designed in the late 1970s to
communicate to programmable logic controllers, the
number of data types is limited to those understood by
PLCs at the time. Large binary objects are not
supported.
(ii) No standard way exists for a node to find the
description of a data object, for example, to determine
if a register value represents a temperature between 30
and 175 degrees.
(iii) Since Modbus is a master/slave protocol, there is no
way for a field device to "report by exception" (except
over Ethernet TCP/IP, called open-mbus) - the master
node must routinely poll each field device, and look for
changes in the data. This consumes bandwidth and
network time in applications where bandwidth may be
expensive, such as over a low-bit-rate radio link.
(iv) Modbus is restricted to addressing 247 devices on one
data link, which limits the number of field devices that
may be connected to a master station
(v) Modbus transmissions must be continuous which limits
the types of remote communication devices to those that
can buffer data to avoid gaps in the transmission.
(vi) Modbus protocol provides no security against
unauthorized commands or interception of data
2.3 Local Operation Networks (LON)
LON Works (local operation network) is a networking
platform specifically created to address the needs of control
applications. The platform is built on a protocol created by
Echelon Corporation for networking devices over media such
as twisted pair, power lines, fiber optics, and RF. It is used for
the automation of various functions within buildings such as
lighting and HVAC. The reliability of network is high
because the failure of one device in the network does not
affect the functioning for other. High rate of data transmission
is possible. If the communication line fails, the entire network
system breaks down.
viii. Schemes for transfer of files
2.4 Distributed Network Protocol (DNP)
DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol) is a set of
communications protocols used between components in
process automation systems. Its main use is in utilities such as
electric and water companies. It was developed for
communication between various types of data acquisition and
control equipment. It plays a crucial role in SCADAsystems,
where it is used by SCADA Master Stations, Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs), and Intelligent Electronic Devices
119
(IEDs). It is primarily used for communications between a
master station and RTUs or IEDs. ICCP, the Inter-Control
Centre Communications Protocol (a part of IEC 60870-6), is
used for inter-master station communications. The DNP3
protocol has significant features that make it more robust,
efficient, and interoperable than older protocols such as
Modbus, at the cost of somewhat higher complexity.
2.5 IEC 60870 Protocol
IEC 60870 part 5 is one of the IEC 60870 set of standards
which define systems used for tele-control (supervisory
control and data acquisition) in electrical engineering and
power system automation applications. Part 5 provides a
communication profile for sending basic tele-control
messages between two systems, which uses permanent
directly connected data circuits between the systems.
i. IEC 60870-5-101 Transmission Protocols, companion
standards especially for basic telecontrol tasks
ii. IEC 60870-5-102 Companion standard for the transmission
of integrated totals in electric power systems (this standard
is not widely used)
iii. IEC 60870-5-103 Transmission Protocols, Companion
standard for the informative interface of protection
equipment
iv. IEC 60870-5-104 Transmission Protocols, Network access
for IEC 60870-5-101 using standard transport profiles
IEC 60870-5-101/102/103/104 are companion standards
generated for basic telecontrol tasks, transmission of
integrated totals, data exchange from protection equipment &
network access of IEC101 respectively.
2.5.1 IEC 60870-5-101 Protocol
IEC 60870-5-101 [IEC101] is a standard for power system
monitoring, control & associated communications for
telecontrol, teleprotection, and associated telecommunications
for electric power systems
i. Supports unbalanced (only master initiated message) &
balanced (can be master/slave initiated) modes of data
transfer.
ii. Link address and ASDU (Application Service Data Unit)
addresses are provided for classifying the end station and
different segments under the same.
iii. Data is classified into different information objects and
each information object is provided with a specific address.
iv. Facility to classify the data into high priority (class-1) and
low priority (class-2) and transfer the same using separate
mechanisms.
v. Possibility of classifying the data into different groups (1-
16) to get the data according to the group by issuing
specific group interrogation commands from the master &
obtaining data under all the groups by issuing a general
interrogation.
vi. Cyclic & Spontaneous data updating schemes are provided.
vii. Facility for time synchronization
2.5.2 IEC 60870-5-103 Protocol
IEC 60870-5-103 is a standard for power system control and
associated communications. It defines a companion standard
that enables interoperability between protection equipment
and devices of a control system in a substation. The device
complying with this standard can send the information using
two methods for data transfer - either using the explicitly
specified application service data units (ASDU) or using
generic services for transmission of all the possible devices. Control and interlock will be created through
information. The standard supports some specific protection hardwired control cable.
functions and provides the vendor a facility to incorporate its
own protective functions on private data ranges.
2.5.3 IEC 60870-5-104 Protocol
IEC 60870-5-104 protocol is an extension of IEC 101 protocol
with the changes in transport, network, link & physical layer
services to suit the complete network access. The standard
uses an open TCP/IP interface to network to have connectivity
to the LAN (Local Area Network) and routers with different
facility (ISDN, X.25, Frame relay etc.) can be used to connect
to the WAN (Wide Area Network). Application layer of IEC
104 is preserved same as that of IEC 101 with some of the
data types and facilities not used. There are two separate link
layers defined in the standard, which is suitable for data
transfer over Ethernet & serial line (PPP - Point-to-Point
Protocol). The control field data of IEC104 contains various
types of mechanisms for effective handling of network data
synchronization
2.6 Automation scenario in Substation prior to IEC 61850
Initial days of substation automation featured the automation
of substation with the protocol of the suppliers of the system.
Each supplier had its own proprietary protocol. This was Figure-2, Conventional control panel
initially acceptable to utilities across the world. However as
the need for expansion of substation started, the SAS become 3.2 Stage-2, RTU based substation automation system.
a major hurdle as supplier could not interface products of Initially when the concept of automation in substation was
other suppliers. This forced, utilities to approach the same formulated the system was Remote terminal unit (RTU)
supplier leading to commercial disadvantages and lack of based. The signal from various relay (static or
flexibility. This brought in the need for common protocol by electromagnetic), switching devices were wired to input and
all the suppliers so that both users and suppliers are benefited. output (I/O) card in the RTU through control cable. The time
IEC 61850 is the protocol that came into existence as a result. stamping is done at RTU level and then the signals are sent to
2.7 IEC 61850 PROTOCOL the SAS processer (Refer appendix -1 for architecture). The
alarm, event list, mimic etc. appears in the HMI in the control
Multiple protocols exist for substation automation, which room. The control operation can be done from this HMI. In
include many proprietary protocols with custom case needed, these signals can be sent to remote centre or
communication links. Interoperation of devices from different central control room through pair cable or FO cables. The
vendors would be an advantage to users of substation RTU communicates to SAS through IEC 60870-5-101 or 104
automation devices. An IEC project group of about 60 or 103 protocols.
members from different countries worked in three IEC 3.3 Stage 3, Substation automation system BCU in IEC
working groups from 1995. They responded to all the 61850 protocol
concerns and objectives and created IEC 61850. The
objectives set for the standard were: Compared to the stage 2,in stage 3, the RTU is replaced by
i. A single protocol for complete substation considering numerical relays and the bay control units. The IEDs
modeling of different data required for substation. (intelligent electronic devices) that is, relays and BCUs are
ii. Definition of basic services required to transfer data so connected to the Ethernet ring through Ethernet switches. The
that the entire mapping to communication protocol can be servers are also connected through Ethernet switches. The
made future proof. connection to RLDC or remote station happens through
iii. Promotion of high interoperability between systems from gateways connected in the ring through IEC 60870-5-101 or
different vendors. 104 protocols. In case interfacing with the existing station is
iv. A common method/format for storing complete data. required, the same can be done through additional gateways.
v. Define complete testing required for the equipment which These protocols can run over TCP/IP networks or substation
conforms to the standard. LANs using high speed switched Ethernet to obtain the
3.0 EVOLUTION OF SUBSTATION AUTOMATION necessary response times below four milliseconds for
SYSTEM protective relaying. Typical architecture is shown below in
figure (3).
3.1 Stage-1, Conventional control & relay panel
Conventional control panel is provided with hardwired
control system with mimic indication and switches for
operation. Figure-2 shows the conventional panel
arrangement with mimic and annunciators. Switch position
will be viewed visually through indication lamp. Manual
operated switches will be there to control the switching

120
 Figure-3, IEC 61850 Architecture
4.0 SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM (SAS)
The substation automation system (SAS) enables to control
and monitor all the substation equipment from remote control
centre as well as local panels. The major activities of SAS are,
i. Acquisition of all electrical parameters in substation
ii. Status data of all switching equipment
iii. Control of all switching equipment
iv. Interlocking to ensure safe operation
v. Time synchronization
vi. Interfacing with RLDC/SLDC with respect to control and
data transfer, network & load management, load shedding
vii. Asset management
4.1 Components
The following components are playing a major role in
substation automation system.
i. Intelligent electronic device(IED)
-Devices that implements functions in a substation,
such as protection relay.
ii. Bay controller Unit (BCU)
-A device that controls all devices related to a single
bay and communicates with relays for functionality
iii. Human Machine Interface (HMI)
-Typically an industrial PC with operator console for
local control and system configuration
iv. Communication interface
-Implemented in the HMI, the Bay controller or in an
IED.
v. Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
-Telemetry and remote control device
4.2 Control hierarchy
Control hierarchy in substation is as follows
- Local equipment level
- Bay control unit level or Control panel with mimic
- Operating station at switchyard control (Station level)
- Remote control centre level of grid RLDC or SLDC
The operation will be possible by only one operator at a time.
Control level in substation is shown in Figure-4. Clear control
priorities will prevent operation at the same time from more
than one of the various control levels. The priority will always
be on the lowest enabled control level. Between control level 1
and control level 2, all the signals will be connected through
hard wired control cables. The signal flow between control
level 2 and 3 will be connected through fiber optic cables
FOTE or PLC Communication.
121
Figure-4, Control level in substation automation
4.3 Facilities available
The following facilities are available in SAS
i. Mimic
Typical SAS human machine interface (HMI) screen is
indicated below in Figure 5. The main single line diagram of
the station is displayed in the screen. The position of switching
devices, the metering signals, power flow details etc. are
displayed.
Figure-5, HMI interface screen
ii. Interlocking
The SAS checks for all interlocks before executing a
command. The interlocks are built in soft in addition to
hardwired interlocks wired in panels.
iii. Control
All the switching equipment such as circuit breakers, isolators,
earth switches can be opened or closed/ tripped through SAS
from the control room. The operation of tap changer of
transformers is also possible through SAS. The position of
allswitching devices is displayed in the HMI of SAS. The
system checks the interlocks internally and executes the
ON/OFF command.
iv. GOOSE Signal transfer
Relays with IEC 61850 are with GOOSE (Generic Object
Oriented System Events) signal transfer facility without any
system requirement. Status of equipment from one IED to
other IED will be transferred through FO cable with direct
relay to relay communication even in case of automation
system/software fail condition. This function will avoid
running copper cables to get other feeders equipment status.
Figure-6 explains the GOOSE signal transfer system. A device
can send information by multicasting and other devices in the
network loop which are subscribers receive this message. In
below picture, device X is sending information to the network
and device Z is receiving the signal. Device Y is not
subscribed any signal from device X, so it will not receive any
signal from device X.

Figure-6, GOOSE Signal Transfer

v. Select before execute

The command for operation of any field equipment shall
Figure-7, Typical SAS architecture
always be given in two stages. One is selection of the object
and the next is command for operation. Under all mode of At bay level, the Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) are
operation except emergency operation, final execution shall provided for bay level functions regarding control, monitoring
take place only when selected and command for operation is and protection, inputs for status indication and outputs for
released. If any operation is not permissible, the operation commands. Each bay control IED is independent from each
command will be rejected, and a fault log will be generated. other and its functioning will not be affected by any fault
occurring in any of the other bay control units of the station.
vi. Status supervision and Measurement
The data transfer from bay level equipment to station level
Position of earth switch, Circuit breaker, isolator and will take place via fiber optic cable to ensure disturbance free
Transformer tap changer will be supervised and displayed communication. At station level, the entire station is
continuously. The analogue value acquired in the bay controlled and supervised from the station human machine
control/protection unit will be displayed on the station HMI interface (HMI). It is also possible to control and monitor the
and in the control centre. The values will be updated every 2 bay from the bay level equipment at all times. The station
seconds. level contains the station oriented functions, which cannot be
vii. Event and alarm handling customized at bay level, e.g. alarm list or event list related to
Events and alarms are generated either by the IEDs, or by the entire substation, gate way for RLDC/SLDC
station level unit. All the events and alarms will be recorded communication. The GPS time synchronizing signal for the
separately and displayed continuously. The alarms and events time synchronization of the entire system is to be provided in
will be time tagged with a time resolution of 1 ms. the substation.
viii. User authority levels 4.5 Features of IEC 61850 –Interoperability
It is possible to restrict access within a certain user The features of IEC 61850 protocol is explained below. Figure
authorization group. Each group will be given access right to a 8 Shows the features of IEC 61850 protocols.
certain level of operation and maintenance and is password
restricted.
In case of wrongly acquired operation or an interlocking
failure prohibits, necessary interlock override function will be
used to control the CB and isolator. Switching operations will
be within the responsibility of the person authorized.
ix. Reports
Complete report of the alarm, events, and power
measurements, number of operation and status of equipment
will be available in SAS HMI and can be printed.
4.4 Architecture
The SAS is operated based on a decentralized architecture and
on a concept of bay oriented, distributed intelligence. The Figure -8, features of IEC 61850 Protocol
typical SAS architecture is shown in Figure 7. The SAS
architecture is structured in two levels in a substation, i.e. in i. One standardised communication for all needs in the
station level and a bay level. substation
ii. Fully supports all substation automation functions
comprising control, protection and monitoring
iii. Is a global standard and the key to interoperable solutions

122
 iv. Architecture is future proof and facilitates future
extensions, therefore it safeguards investments
v. Ability to reuse typical functions and/or bay designs
vendor independent
vi. Defines the availability requirements, environmental
conditions and the auxiliary services of the system
vii. Specifies the engineering process and its supporting tools,
system life cycle and the quality assurance requirements
viii. Provides engineering and maintenance support by means
of the substation configuration language based on XML,
i.e. documentation included
ix. Vendor-independent engineering-data exchange
x. States the conformance tests to be carried out on the
products Figure-10, Substation A with IEC 61850 protocol
xi. Flexibility allows optimisation of system architectures Station A RTU (Slave) and Station B (Master) IEC 61850
(scalable technology) based system are connected via IEC 101 protocol through
xii. Uses commercially available hardened communication Gateway.
components (Industrial Ethernet)
xiii. Common use of infrastructure This panel demonstrates the interconnection of all the latest
communication protocol such as IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-
5. UPGRADE / RETROFIT OF SAS WITH EXISTING 101, IEC 60870-5-103, MODBUS etc. System architecture is
PROTOCOL shown figure-11.
The automation systems in late 1990s were accomplished with
static/ EM relays and wasRTU based. During bay
additions/deletions in these existing substations, the SAS
system also needs to be upgraded. The new bays added will be
with numerical relays and BCUs, compatible to IEC 61850.
Hence the old system needs to be integrated with the new
system.
The below display wall located in L&T’s laboratory at
Chennai demonstrates the integration of old with new system.
The Display Wall represents 2 different substations named as
Station A and Station B interconnected through transmission Figure-11, System Architecture
Lines. Station A is with a conventional Remote Terminal Unit
The Work station of Station B with SCADA unit represents
(RTU) system communicating via IEC 60870-5-103 protocol
the Remote station for controlling and monitoring of switching
(Figure-9). Station A consists of
devices of both Stations A and B.
i. Distance relay
ii. Over current / earth fault relay The two Current Differential relays communicate over fiber
iii. Current differential relay optic cables.
The above relaysare Siemens make and they communicate 6. FUTURE TRENDS IN COMMUNICATION
PROTOCOL
with the RTU via IEC 103 protocol.
Currently IEC is working to upgrade the present IEC 61850 to
integrate and be a common standard for the Protocols between
Control centers as well as to RLDCs. The below figure-12,
shows the future trends in substation automation protocol

Figure-9, Substation A with IEC 103 protocol

Station B represents the present day Station communicating

via IEC 61850 protocol (Figure-10). Station B consists of
i. Bay Control Unit (BCU)
ii. Over current / earth fault relay Figure-12, Future trends in SAS
iii. Current differential relay
iv. MODBUS compatible metering device 7. CONCLUSION

123
In this paper an attempt has been made to highlight the 8.0 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
evolution and the necessity of a common protocol for
protection & control communication between & among The authors wish to thank our PT&D colleagues for their
substations with Control Centers. support in preparing this paper.
It shall be noted that for easy explanation purposes some of 9.0 REFERENCES
the manufacturers relays/devices has been given as examples –
by this one should not construe that these are the only prima i. IEC 61850 – Communication networks and system in
facie but there are various relays/devices available with other substations.
leading manufacturers also and one should not forget the ii. IEC 60870-Telecontrol equipment and systems-
purpose of this IEC 61850 – which is to give freedom for the Transmission protocols.
user to choose the relay type and manufacturer irrespective of
the makes available with them as existing.

Appendix -1 ,Architecture of RTU based Substation Automation system

124
 AC M O T O R P R O T E C T I O N
Er. Prakash Z. Patel
Deputy Engineer, GSECL, Ukai TPS

AC Motor Protection b. Extended start protection

1) Introduction
2) Modern relay design
3) Thermal (Overload) protection
4) Start/Stall protection
5) Short circuit protection
6) Earth fault protection
7) Negative phase sequence protection
8) Wound rotor induction motor protection
9) RTD temperature detection
10) Bearing failures
11) Under voltage protection
12) Loss-of-load protection
13) Additional protection for synchronous motors
14) Motor protection examples
1. Introduction
There are a wide range of ac motors and motor
characteristics in existence, because of the numerous duties
for which they are used. All motors need protection, but
fortunately, the more fundamental problems affecting the
choice of protection are independent of the type of motor
and the type of load to which it is connected. There are some
important differences between the protection of induction
motors and synchronous motors, and these are fully dealt
with in the appropriate section.
Motor characteristics must be carefully considered when
applying protection; while this may be regarded as stating
the obvious, it is emphasised because it applies more to
motors than to other items of power system plant. For
example, the starting and stalling currents/times must be
known when applying overload protection, and furthermore
the thermal withstand of the machine under balanced and
unbalanced loading must be clearly defined.
The conditions for which motor protection is required can be
divided into two broad categories: imposed external
conditions and internal faults. Table: 1 provides details of all
likely faults that require protection.
External Faults Internal faults
Unbalanced supplies Bearing failures
Under voltages Winding faults
Single phasing Overloads
Reverse phase sequence
Table 1: Causes of motor failures
2. M O D E R N R E L AY D E S I G N
The design of a modern motor protection relay must be
adequate to cater for the protection needs of any one of the
vast range of motor designs in service, many of the designs
having no permissible allowance for overloads. A relay
offering comprehensive protection will have the following
set of features:
a. Thermal protection
c. Stalling protection
d. Number of starts limitation
e. Short circuit protection
f. Earth fault protection
g. Winding RTD measurement/trip
h. Negative sequence current detection
i. Under voltage protection
j. Loss-of-load protection
k. Out-of-step protection
l. Loss of supply protection
m. Auxiliary supply supervision
(items k and l apply to synchronous motors only)
In addition, relays may offer options such as circuit breaker
condition monitoring as an aid to maintenance.
Manufacturers may also offer relays that implement a
reduced functionality to that given above where less
comprehensive protection is warranted (e.g. induction
motors of low rating).
The following sections examine each of the possible failure
modes of a motor and discuss how protection may be
applied to detect that mode.
3. Thermal (Over Load) Protection
The majority of winding failures are either indirectly or
directly caused by overloading (either prolonged or cyclic),
operation on unbalanced supply voltage, or single phasing,
which all lead through excessive heating to the deterioration
of the winding insulation until an electrical fault occurs. The
generally accepted rule is that insulation life is halved for
each 10° C rise in temperature above the rated value,
modified by the length of time spent at the higher
temperature. As an electrical machine has a relatively large
heat storage capacity, it follows that infrequent overloads of
short duration may not adversely affect the machine.
However, sustained overloads of only a few percent may
result in premature ageing and insulation failure.
Furthermore, the thermal withstand capability of the motor
is affected by heating in the winding prior to a fault. It is
therefore important that the relay characteristic takes
account of the extremes of zero and full-load pre-fault
current known respectively as the 'Cold' and 'Hot'
conditions.
The variety of motor designs, diverse applications, variety
of possible abnormal operating conditions and resulting
modes of failure result in a complex thermal relationship. A
generic mathematical model that is accurate is therefore
impossible to create. However, it is possible to develop an
approximate model if it is assumed that the motor is a
homogeneous body, creating and dissipating heat at a rate
proportional to temperature rise. This is the principle behind
the ‘thermal replica’ model of a motor used for overload
protection.

125
In general, the supply to which a motor is connected may
contain both positive and negative sequence components,
and both components of current give rise to heating in the
motor. Therefore, the thermal replica should take into
account both of these components, a typical equation for the
equivalent current being:
where
I1 = positive sequence current
…
Equation 1 takes into account the ‘cold’ and ‘hot’
characteristics defined in IEC 60255, part 8.
Some relays may use a dual slope characteristic for the
heating time constant, and hence two values of the heating
time constant are required. Switching between the two
values takes place at a pre-defined motor current. This may
be used to obtain better tripping performance during starting
on motors that use a star delta starter. During starting, the
motor windings carry full line current, while in the ‘run’
126
I2 = negative sequence current and
K =Negative sequence rotor resistance
Positive sequence rotor resistance
at rated speed. A typical value of K is 3.
Finally, the thermal replica model needs to take into account
the fact that the motor will tend to cool down during periods
of light load, and the initial state of the motor. The motor
will have a cooling time constant, τr , that defines the rate of
cooling. Hence, the final thermal model can be expressed as:
condition, they carry only 57% of the current seen by the
relay. Similarly, when the motor is disconnected from the
supply, the heating time constant τ is set equal to the cooling
time constant τr.
Since the relay should ideally be matched to the protected
motor and be capable of close sustained overload protection,
a wide range of relay adjustment is desirable together with
good accuracy and low thermal overshoot.
Typical relay setting curves are shown in Figure 1.
4. START/STALL PROTECTION
When a motor is started, it draws a current well in excess of
full load rating throughout the period that the motor takes to
run-up to speed. While the motor starting current reduces
somewhat as motor speed increases, it is normal in
protection practice to assume that the motor current remains
constant throughout the starting period. The starting current
will vary depending on the design of the motor and method
of starting. For motors started DOL (direct-on-line), the
nominal starting current can be 4-8 times full-load current.
However, when a star-delta starter is used, the line current
will only be 1/√3 of the DOL starting current.
Should a motor stall whilst running, or fail to start, due to
excessive loading, the motor will draw a current equal to its’
locked rotor current. It is not therefore possible to
distinguish between a stall condition and a healthy start
solely on the basis of the current drawn. Discrimination
between the two conditions must be made based on the
duration of the current drawn. For motors where the starting
time is less than the safe stall time of the motor, protection is
easy to arrange.
However, where motors are used to drive high inertia loads,
the stall withstand time can be less than the starting time. In
these cases, an additional means must be provided to enable
discrimination between the two conditions to be achieved.
4.1 EXCESSIVE START TIME/LOCKED ROTOR
PROTECTION
A motor may fail to accelerate from rest for a number of
reasons:
- loss of a supply phase
- mechanical problems
- low supply voltage
127
- excessive load torque etc.
A large current will be drawn from the supply, and cause
extremely high temperatures to be generated within the
motor. This is made worse by the fact that the motor is not
rotating, and hence no cooling due to rotation is available.
Winding damage will occur very quickly –either to the
stator or rotor windings depending on the thermal
limitations of the particular design (motors are said to be
stator or rotor limited in this respect). The method of
protection varies depending on whether the starting time is
less than or greater than the safe stall time. In both cases,
initiation of the start may be sensed by detection of the
closure of the switch in the motor feeder (contactor or CB)
and optionally current rising above a starting current
threshold value – typically 200% of motor rated current. For
the case of both conditions being sensed, they may have to
occur within a narrow aperture of time for a start to be
recognised. Special requirements may exist for certain types
of motors installed in hazardous areas (e.g. motors with type
of protection EEx ‘e’) and the setting of the relay must take
these into account. Sometimes a permissive interlock for
machine pressurisation (on EEx ‘p’ machines) may be
required, and this can be conveniently achieved by use of a
relay digital input and the in-built logic capabilities.
4.1.1 START TIME < SAFE STALL TIME
Protection is achieved by use of a definite time over current
characteristic, the current setting being greater than full load
current but less than the starting current of the machine. The
time setting should be a little longer than the start time, but
less than the permitted safe starting time of the motor.
Figure 2. illustrates the principle of operation for a
successful start.
4.1.2 START TIME => SAFE STALL TIME there is both a small) decrease in current drawn by the motor
during the start and the rotor fans begin to improve cooling
For this condition, a definite time over current characteristic
of the machine as it accelerates. If a start is sensed by the
by itself is not sufficient, since the time delay required is
relay through monitoring current and/or start device closure,
longer than the maximum time that the motor can be
but the speed switch does not operate, the relay element uses
allowed to carry starting current safely. An additional means
the safe stall time setting to trip the motor before damage
of detection of rotor movement, indicating a safe start, is
can occur. Figure 3(a) illustrates the principle of operation
required. A speed-sensing switch usually provides this
for a successful start, and Figure 3(b) for an unsuccessful
function. Detection of a successful
start.
start is used to select relay timer used for the safe run up
time. This time can be longer than the safe stall time, as

4.2 STALL PROTECTION
Should a motor stall when running or be unable to start
because of excessive load, it will draw a current from the
supply equivalent to the locked rotor current. It is obviously
desirable to avoid damage by disconnecting the machine as
quickly as possible if this condition arises. Motor stalling
can be recognised by the motor current exceeding the start
current threshold after a successful start – i.e. a motor start
has been detected and the motor current has dropped below
the start current threshold within the motor safe start time. A
subsequent rise in motor current above the motor starting
current threshold is then indicative of a stall condition, and
tripping will occur if this condition persists for greater than
the setting of the stall timer. An instantaneous over current
relay element provides protection.
In many systems, transient supply voltage loss (typically up
to 2 seconds) does not result in tripping of designated
motors. They are allowed to reaccelerate upon restoration of
the supply. During re-acceleration, they draw a current
similar to the starting that may be several seconds. It is thus

128
above the motor stall relay element current threshold. The
stall protection would be expected to operate and defeat the
object of the re-acceleration scheme.
A motor protection relay will therefore recognise the
presence of a voltage dip and recovery, and inhibit stall
protection for a defined period. The under voltage protection
element (Section 11) can be used to detect the presence of
the voltage dip and inhibit stall protection for a set period
after voltage recovery. Protection against stalled motors in
case of an unsuccessful re-acceleration is therefore
maintained. The time delay setting is dependent on the
reacceleration scheme adopted and the characteristics of
individual motors. It should be established after performing
a transient stability study for the reacceleration scheme
proposed.
4.3 NUMBER OF STARTS LIMITATION
Any motor has a restriction on the number of starts that are
allowed in a defined period without the permitted winding,
etc. temperatures being exceeded. Starting should be
blocked if the permitted number of starts is exceeded. The
situation is complicated by the fact the number of permitted
‘hot’ starts in a given period is less than the number of
‘cold’ starts, due to
the differing initial temperatures of the motor. The relay
must maintain a separate count of ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ starts. By
making use of the data held in the motor thermal replica,
‘hot’ and ‘cold’ starts can be distinguished.
To allow the motor to cool down between starts, a time
delay may be specified between consecutive starts (again
distinguishing between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ starts). The start
inhibit is released after a time determined by the motor
specification. The overall protection function is illustrate in
Figure 4.
129
5. SHORT-CIRCUIT PROTECTION
Motor short-circuit protection is often provided to cater for
major stator winding faults and terminal flashovers. Because
of the relatively greater amount of insulation between phase
windings, faults between phases seldom occur. As the stator
windings are completely enclosed in grounded metal, the
fault would very quickly involve earth, which would then
operate the instantaneous earth fault protection. A single
definite time over current relay element is all that is required
for this purpose, set to about 125% of motor starting current.
The time delay is required to prevent spurious operation due
to CT spill currents, and is typically set at 100ms. If the
motor is fed from a fused contactor, co-ordination is
required with the fuse, and this will probably involve use of
a long time delay for the relay element. Since the object of
the protection is to provide rapid fault clearance to minimize
damage caused by the fault, the protection is effectively
worthless in these circumstances. It is therefore only
provided on motors fed via circuit breakers.
Differential (unit) protection may be provided on larger HV
motors fed via circuit breakers to protect against phase-
phase and phase earth faults, particularly where the power
system is resistance-earthed. Damage to the motor in case of
a fault occurring is minimised, as the differential protection
can be made quite sensitive and hence detects faults in their
early stages. The normal definite time over current
protection would not be sufficiently sensitive, and sensitive
earth fault protection may not be provided. The user may
wish to avoid the detailed calculations required of
capacitance current in order to set sensitive non-directional
earth
fault overcurrent protection correctly on HV systems or
there may be no provision for a VT to allow application of
directional sensitive earth fault protection. There is still a
lower limit to the setting that can be applied, due to spill depends largely on the system earthing, so the various types
currents from CT saturation during starting, while on some will be dealt with in turn.
motors, neutral current has been found to flow during
It is common, however, to provide both instantaneous and
starting, even with balanced supply voltages, that would
time-delayed relay elements to cater for major and slowly
cause the differential protection to operate. However, non-
developing faults.
directional earth fault over current protection will normally
be cheaper in cases where adequate sensitivity can be 6.1 SOLIDLY-EARTHED SYSTEM
provided.
Most LV systems fall into this category, for reasons of
6. EARTH FAULT PROTECTION personnel safety. Two types of earth fault protection are
commonly found – depending on the sensitivity required.
One of the most common faults to occur on a motor is a
For applications where a sensitivity of > 20% of motor
stator winding fault. Whatever the initial form of the fault
Continuous rated current is acceptable, conventional earth
(phase-phase, etc.) or the cause (cyclic overheating, etc.),
fault protection using the residual CT connection of Figure 5
the presence of the surrounding metallic frame and casing
can be used. A lower limit is
will ensure that it rapidly develops into a fault involving
imposed on the setting by possible load unbalance and/or
earth. Therefore, provision of earth fault protection is very
(for HV systems) system capacitive currents.
important. The type and sensitivity of protection provided

where: during a motor start, but short enough to provide effective

Ist = starting current referred to CT secondary
I0 = relay earth fault setting (A)
Rstab = stabilising resistor value (ohms)
Rct = d.c. resistance of CT secondary (ohms)
Rl = CT single lead restistance (ohms)
k = CT connection factor
= 1 for star pt at CT
= 2 for star pt at relay
Rr = relay input restistance (ohms)
The effect of the stabilising resistor is to increase the
effective setting of the relay under these conditions, and
hence delay tripping. When a stabilizing resistor is used, the
tripping characteristic should normally be instantaneous. An
alternative technique, avoiding the use of a stabilising
resistor is to use a definite time delay characteristic. The
time delay used will normally have to be found by trial and
error, as it must be long enough to prevent maloperation
protection in case of a fault.
Co-ordination with other devices must also be considered. A
common means of supplying a motor is via a fused
contactor. The
contactor itself is not capable of breaking fault current
beyond a certain value, which will normally be below the
maximum system fault current – reliance is placed on the
fuse in these circumstances. As a trip command from the
relay instructs the contactor to open, care must be taken to
ensure that this does not occur until the fuse has had time to
operate. Figure 6(a) illustrates incorrect grading of the relay
with the fuse, the relay operating first for a range of fault
currents in excess of the contactor breaking capacity. Figure
6(b) illustrates correct grading. To achieve this, it may
require the use of an intentional definite time delay in the
relay

130
If a more sensitive relay setting is required, it is necessary to
use a core balance CT. This is a ring type CT, through
which all phases of the supply to the motor are passed, plus
the neutral on a four-wire system. The turns ratio of the CT
is no longer related to the normal line current expected to
flow, so can be chosen to optimise the pickup current
131
required. Magnetising current requirements are also
reduced, with only a single CT core to be magnetized
instead of three, thus enabling low settings to be used.
Figure 7 illustrates the application of a core-balance CT,
including the routing of the cable sheath to ensure correct
operation in case of core-sheath cable faults.
6.2 RESISTANCE-EARTHED SYSTEMS
These are commonly found on HV systems, where the
intention is to limit damage caused by earth faults through
limiting the earth fault current that can flow. Two methods
of resistance earthing are commonly used:
6.2.1 LOW RESISTANCE EARTHING
In this method, the value of resistance is chosen to limit the
fault current to a few hundred amps – values of 200A-400A
being typical. With a residual connection of line CT’s, the
6.2.2 HIGH RESISTANCE EARTHING
In some HV systems, high resistance earthing is used to
limit the earth fault current to a few amps. In this case, the
system capacitive charging current will normally prevent
conventional sensitive earth fault protection being applied,
as the magnitude of the charging current will be comparable
with the earth fault current in the event of a fault. The
solution is to use a sensitive directional earth fault relay. A
core balance CT is used in conjunction with a VT measuring
the residual voltage of the system, with a relay characteristic
angle setting of +45°. The VT must be suitable for the relay
and therefore the relay manufacturer should be consulted
over suitable types – some relays require that the VT must
be able to carry residual flux and this rules out use of a 3-
limb, 3-phase VT. A setting of 125% of the single phase
capacitive charging current for the whole system is possible
using this method. The time delay used is not critical but
must be fast enough to disconnect equipment rapidly in the
132
minimum sensitivity possible is about 10% of CT rated
primary current, due to the possibility of CT saturation
during starting. For a core-balance CT, the sensitivity that is
possible using a simple non-directional earth fault relay
element is limited to three times the steady-state charging
current of the feeder. The setting should not be greater than
about 30% of the minimum earth fault current expected.
Other than this, the considerations in respect of settings and
time delays are as for solidly earthed systems.
event of a second earth fault occurring immediately after the
first. Minimal damage is caused by the first fault, but the
second effectively removes the current limiting resistance
from the fault path leading to very large fault currents.
An alternative technique using residual voltage detection is
also possible, and is described in the next section.
6.3 INSULATED EARTH SYSTEM
Earth fault detection presents problems on these systems
since no earth fault current flows for a single earth fault.
However, detection is still essential as over voltages occur
on sound phases and it is necessary to locate and clear the
fault before a second occurs. Two methods are possible,
detection of the resulting unbalance in system charging
currents and residual overvoltage.
6.3.1 SYSTEM CHARGING CURRENT UNBALANCE
Sensitive earth fault protection using a core-balance CT is
required for this scheme. Figure 8 shows the current
distribution in an Insulated system subjected to a C-phase to
earth fault and Figure .9 the relay vector diagram for this
condition. The residual current detected by the relay is the
sum of the charging currents flowing in the healthy part of
the system plus the healthy phase charging currents on the
faulted feeder – i.e. three times the per phase charging
current of the healthy part of the system. A relay setting of
30% of this value can be used to provide protection without
the risk of a trip due to healthy system capacitive charging
currents. As there is no earth fault current, it is also possible
to set the relay at site after deliberately applying earth faults
at various parts of the system and measuring the resulting
residual currents.
If it is possible to set the relay to a value between the
charging current on the feeder being protected and the
charging current for the rest of the system, the directional
facility is not required and the VT can be dispensed with.
The comments made in earlier sections on grading with
fused contactors also apply.
. factors, but the negative sequence impedance is more easily
6.3.2 RESIDUAL VOLTAGE METHOD
A single earth fault results in a rise in the voltage between
system neutral and earth, which may be detected by a relay
measuring the residual voltage of the system (normally zero
133
for a perfectly balanced, healthy system). Thus, no CT’s are
required, and the technique may be useful where provision
of an extensive number of core-balance CT’s is impossible
or difficult, due to physical constraints or on cost grounds.
The VT’s used must be suitable for the duty, thus 3-limb, 3-
phase VT’s are not suitable, and the relay usually has alarm
and trip settings, each with adjustable time delays. The
setting voltage must be calculated from knowledge of
system earthing and impedances, an example for a resistance
earthed system is shown in Figure 10.
Grading of the relays must be carried out with care, as the
residual voltage will be detected by all relays in the affected
section of the system. Grading has to be carried out with this
in mind, and will generally be on a time basis for providing
alarms (1st stage), with a high set definite time trip second
stage to provide backup.
6.4 PETERSEN COIL EARTHED SYSTEM
Earthing of a HV power system using a reactor equal to the
system shunt capacitance is known as Petersen Coil (or
resonant coil) earthing. With this method, a single earth fault
results in zero earth fault current flowing (for perfect
balance between the earthing inductance and system shunt
capacitance), and hence the system can be run in this state
for a substantial period of time while the fault is located and
corrected.
7. NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE PROTECTION
Negative phase sequence current is generated from any
unbalanced voltage condition, such as unbalanced loading,
loss of a single phase, or single-phase faults. The latter will
normally be detected by earth fault protection, however, a
fault location in a motor winding may not result in the earth
fault protection operating unless it is of the sensitive variety.
The actual value of the negative sequence current depends
on the degree of unbalance in the supply voltage and the
ratio of the negative to the positive sequence impedance of
the machine. The degree of unbalance depends on many
determined. Considering the classical induction motor
equivalent circuit with magnetising impedance neglected of
Figure 11:
Now, if resistance is neglected (justifiable as the resistance
is small compared to the reactance), it can be seen that the
negative sequence reactance at running speed is
approximately equal to the positive sequence reactance at and it is noted that a typical LV motor starting current is
standstill. An alternative more meaningful way of 6xFLC. Therefore, a 5% negative sequence voltage (due to,
expressing this is:
134
say, unbalanced loads on the system) would produce a 30%
negative sequence current in the machine, leading to
excessive heating. For the same motor, negative sequence
voltages in excess of 17% will result in a negative sequence
current larger than rated full load current.
Negative sequence current is at twice supply frequency.
Skin effect in the rotor means that the heating effect in the
rotor of a given negative sequence current is larger than the
same positive sequence current. Thus, negative sequence
current may result in rapid heating of the motor. Larger
motors are more susceptible in this respect, as the rotor
resistance of such machines tends to be higher. Protection
against negative sequence currents is therefore essential.
Modern motor protection relays have a negative sequence
current measurement capability, in order to provide such
protection. The level of negative sequence unbalance
depends largely upon the type of fault. For loss of a single
phase at start, the negative sequence current will be 50% of
the normal starting current. It is more difficult to provide an
estimate of the negative sequence current if loss of a phase
occurs while running. This is because the impact on the
motor may vary widely, from increased heating to stalling
due to the reduced torque available .
A typical setting for negative sequence current protection
must take into account the fact that the motor circuit
protected by the relay may not be the source of the negative
sequence current. Time should be allowed for the
appropriate protection to clear the source of the negative
sequence current without introducing risk of overheating to
the motor being considered. This indicates a two stage
tripping characteristic, similar in principle to over current
protection. A low-set definite time-delay element can be
used to provide an alarm, with an IDMT element used to trip
the motor in the case of higher levels of negative sequence
current, such as loss-of-phase conditions at start, occurring.
Typical settings might be 20% of CT rated primary current
for the definite time element and 50% for the IDMT
element. The IDMT time delay has to be chosen to protect
the motor while, if possible, grading with other negative
sequence relays on the system. Some relays may not
incorporate two elements, in which case the single element
should be set to protect the motor, with grading being a
secondary consideration.
8. FAULTS IN ROTOR WINDINGS
On wound rotor machines, some degree of protection
against faults in the rotor winding can be given by an
instantaneous stator current over current relay element. As
the starting current is normally limited by resistance to a
maximum of twice full load, the instantaneous unit can
safely be set to about three times full load if a slight time
delay of approximately 30 milliseconds is incorporated. It
should be noted that faults occurring in the rotor winding
would not be detected by any differential protection
applied to the stator.
9. RTD TEMPERATURE DETECTION
RTD’s are used to measure temperatures of motor windings
or shaft bearings. A rise in temperature may denote
overloading of the machine, or the beginning of a fault in
the affected part. A motor protection relay will therefore
usually have the capability of accepting a number of RTD
inputs and internal logic to initiate an alarm and/or trip when
the temperature exceeds the appropriate set point(s).
Occasionally, HV motors are fed via a unit transformer, and
135
in these circumstances, some of the motor protection relay
RTD inputs may be assigned to the transformer winding
temperature RTD’s, thus providing over temperature
protection for the transformer without the use of a separate
relay.
10. BEARING FAILURES
There are two types of bearings to be considered: the anti-
friction bearing (ball or roller), used mainly on small motors
(up to around 350kW), and the sleeve bearing, used mainly
on large motors.
The failure of ball or roller bearings usually occurs very
quickly, causing the motor to come to a standstill as pieces
of the damaged roller get entangled with the others. There is
therefore very little chance that any relay operating from the
input current can detect bearing failures of this type before
the bearing is completely destroyed. Therefore, protection is
limited to disconnecting the stalled motor rapidly to avoid
consequential damage. Refer to Section2 on stall protection
for details of suitable protection.
Failure of a sleeve bearing can be detected by means of a
rise in bearing temperature. The normal thermal overload
relays cannot give protection to the bearing itself but will
operate to protect the motor from excessive damage. Use of
RTD temperature detection, as noted in Section 9, can
provide suitable protection, allowing investigation into the
cause of the bearing running hot prior to complete failure.
11. UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION
Motors may stall when subjected to prolonged under voltage
conditions. Transient under voltages will generally allow a
motor to recover when the voltage is restored, unless the
supply is weak. Motors fed by contactors have inherent
under voltage protection, unless a latched contactor is used.
Where a specific under voltage trip is required, a definite
time under voltage element is used. If two elements are
provided, alarm and trip settings can be used. An interlock
with the motor starter is required to block relay operation
when the starting device is open, otherwise a start will never
be permitted. The voltage and time delay settings will be
system and motor dependent. They must allow for all
voltage dips likely to occur on the system during transient
faults, starting of motors, etc. to avoid spurious trips. As
motor starting can result in a voltage depression to 80% of
nominal, the voltage setting is likely to be below this value.
Re-acceleration is normally possible for voltage dips lasting
between 0.5-2 seconds, depending on system, motor and
drive characteristics, and therefore the time delay will be set
bearing these factors in mind.
12. LOSS-OF-LOAD PROTECTION
Loss-of-load protection has a number of possible functions.
It can be used to protect a pump against becoming
unprimed, or to stop a motor in case of a failure in a
mechanical transmission (e.g. conveyor belt), or it can be
used with synchronous motors to protect against loss-of-
supply conditions. Implementation of the function is by a
low forward power relay element, interlocked with the
motor starting device to prevent operation when the motor is
tripped and thus preventing a motor start. Where starting is
against a very low load (e.g. a compressor), the function
may also need to be inhibited for the duration of the start, to
prevent mal operation.
The setting will be influenced by the function to be
performed by the relay. A time delay may be required after
pickup of the element to prevent operation during system
transients. This is especially important for synchronous
motor loss-of supply protection.
13. ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SYNCHRONOUS
MOTORS
The differences in construction and operational
characteristics of synchronous motors mean that additional
protection is required for these types of motor. This
additional protection is discussed in the following sections.
13.1 OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION
A synchronous motor may decelerate and lose synchronism
(fall out-of-step) if a mechanical overload exceeding the
peak motor torque occurs. Other conditions that may cause
this condition are a fall in the applied voltage to stator or
field windings. Such a fall may not need to be prolonged, a
voltage dip of a few seconds may be all that is required. An
out-of-step condition causes the motor to draw excessive
current and generate a pulsating torque. Even if the cause is
removed promptly, the motor will probably not recover
synchronism, but eventually stall. Hence, it must be
disconnected from the supply.
The current drawn during an out-of-step condition is at a
very low power factor. Hence a relay element that responds
to low power factor can be used to provide protection. The
element must be inhibited during starting, when a similar
low power factor condition occurs. This can conveniently be
achieved by use of a definite time delay, set to a value
slightly in excess of the motor start time.
The power factor setting will vary depending on the rated
power factor of the motor. It would typically be 0.1 less than
the motor rated power factor i.e. for a motor rated at 0.85
power factor, the setting would be 0.75.
13.2 PROTECTION AGAINST SUDDEN RESTORATION
OF SUPPLY
If the supply to a synchronous motor is interrupted, it is
essential that the motor breaker be tripped as quickly as
possible if there is any possibility of the supply being
14.1.1 Thermal protection
The current setting ITH is set equal to the motor full load
current, as it is a CMR rated motor. Motor full load current
can be calculated as 211A, therefore (in secondary
quantities):
Use a value of 0.85, nearest available setting.
136
restored automatically or without the machine operator’s
knowledge.
This is necessary in order to prevent the supply being
restored out of phase with the motor generated voltage. Two
methods are generally used to detect this condition, in order
to cover different operating modes of the motor.
13.2.1 UNDERFREQUENCY PROTECTION
The under frequency relay element will operate in the case
of the supply failing when the motor is on load, which
causes the motor to decelerate quickly. Typically, two
elements are provided, for alarm and trip indications. The
under frequency setting value needs to consider the power
system characteristics. In some power systems, lengthy
periods of operation at frequencies substantially below
normal occur, and should not result in a motor trip. The
minimum safe operating frequency of the motor under load
conditions must therefore be determined, along with
minimum system frequency.
13.2.2 LOW-FORWARD-POWER PROTECTION
This can be applied in conjunction with a time delay to
detect a loss-of-supply condition when the motor may share
a busbar with other loads. The motor may attempt to supply
the other loads with power from the stored kinetic energy of
rotation.
A low forward power relay can detect this condition. See
Section 12 for details. A time delay will be required to
prevent operation during system transients leading to
momentary reverse power flow in the motor.
14. MOTOR PROTECTION EXAMPLES
This section gives examples of the protection of HV and LV
induction motors.
14.1 PROTECTION OF A HV MOTOR
Table 19.2 gives relevant parameters of a HV induction
motor to be protected. Using a MiCOM P241 motor
protection relay, the important protection settings are
calculated in the following sections.
The relay has a parameter, K, to allow for the increased
heating effect of negative sequence currents. In the absence
of any specific information, use K=3.
Two thermal heating time constants are provided, τ1 and τ 2.
τ 2 is used for starting methods other than DOL, otherwise it
is set equal to τ 1. τ 1 is set to the heating time constant,
hence τ 1= τ 2=25mins.
Cooling time constant τ r is set as a multiple of τ 1. With a
cooling time constant of 75mins,
τr=3xτ1
14.1.2 SHORT CIRCUIT PROTECTION
Following the recommendations of Section 5, with a
Starting current of 550% of full load current, the short
circuit Element is set to 1.25 x 5.5 x 211A = 1450A. In
terms of the relay nominal current, the setting value is
1450/250 = 5.8 IN.
There is a minimum time delay of 100ms for currents up to
120% of setting to allow for transient CT saturation during
starting and 40ms above this current value. These settings
are satisfactory.
14.1.3 EARTH FAULT PROTECTION
It is assumed that no CBCT is fitted. A typical setting of
30% of motor rated current is used, leading to an earth fault
relay setting of
0.3 x 211/250 = 0.25IN.
A stabilising resistor is required, calculated in accordance
with Equation 2 to prevent mal operation due to CT spill
current during starting as the CTs may saturate. With the
stabilising resistor present, instantaneous tripping is
permitted.
The alternative is to omit the stabilising resistor and use a
definite time delay in association with the earth fault
element. However, the time delay must be found by trial and
error during commissioning.
14.1.4 LOCKED ROTOR/EXCESSIVE START TIME
PROTECTION
137
The current element must be set in excess of the rated
current of the motor, but well below the starting current of
the motor to ensure that a start condition is recognised (this
could also be achieved by use of an auxiliary contact on the
motor CB wired to the relay). A setting of 500A (2 x IN) is
suitable. The associated time delay needs to be set to longer
than the start time, but less than the cold stall time. Use a
value of 15s.
14.1.5 STALL PROTECTION
The same current setting as for locked rotor protection can
be used – 500A. The time delay has to be less than the hot
stall time of 7s but greater than the start time by a sufficient
margin to avoid a spurious trip if the start time happens to
be a little longer than anticipated. Use a value of 6.5s. The
protection characteristics for Sections 14.1.1-5 are shown in
Figure 12.
14.1.6 NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE PROTECTION
Two protection elements are provided, the first is definite
time-delayed to provide an alarm. The second is an IDMT
element used to trip the motor on high levels of negative
sequence current, such as would occur on a loss of phase
condition at starting. In accordance with Section 19.7, use a
setting of 20% with a time delay of 30s for the definite time
element and 50% with a
TMS of 1.0 for the IDMT element. The resulting
characteristic is shown in Figure 19.13. The motor thermal
protection, as it utilises a negative sequence component, is
used for protection of the motor at low levels of negative
sequence current.
14.1.7 OTHER PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS is not justifiable to provide a VT specially to enable these
features to be implemented.
If the relay can be supplied with a suitable voltage signal,
stall protection can be inhibited during re-acceleration after 14.2 PROTECTION OF AN LV MOTOR
a voltage dip using the under voltage element (set to 80-85%
LV motors are commonly fed via fused contactors and
of rated voltage). Under voltage protection (set to
therefore the tripping times of a protection relay for over
approximately 80% voltage with a time delay of up to
current must be carefully co-ordinated with the fuse to
several seconds, dependent on system characteristics) and
ensure that the contactor does not attempt to break a current
reverse phase protection can also be implemented to provide
in excess of its rating. Table 3(a) gives details of an LV
extra protection. Unless the drive is critical to the process, it
motor and associated fused contactor. A MiCOM P211
motor protection relay is used to provide the protection.

14.2.1 CT ratio This data does not include the thermal (heating) time
constant of the motor. In these circumstances, it is usual to
The relay is set in secondary quantities, and therefore a
set the thermal protection so that it lies just above the motor
suitable CT ratio has to be calculated. From the relay
starting current. The current setting of the relay, Ib , is found
manual, a CT with 5A secondary rating and a motor rated
using the formula
current in the range of 4-6A when referred to the secondary
of CT is required. Use of a 150/5A CT gives a motor rated Ib = 5 x In/Ip
current of 4.4A when referred to the CT secondary, so use
where
this CT ratio. 14.2.2 Over current (short-circuit) protection
The fuse provides the motor over current protection, as the In = motor rated primary current
protection relay cannot be allowed to trip the contactor on Ip = CT primary current
over current in case the current to be broken exceeds the
Hence, Ib = 5 x 132/150 = 4.4A
contactor breaking capacity. The facility for over current
protection within the relay is therefore disabled. With a motor starting current of 670% of nominal, a setting
of the relay thermal time constant with motor initial thermal
14.2.3 Thermal (overload) protection
state of 50% of 15s is found satisfactory, as shown in Figure
The motor is an existing one, and no data exists for it except 14.
the standard data provided in the manufacturers catalogue.

138
14.2.4 Negative sequence (phase unbalance) protection
The motor is built to IEC standards, which permit a negative
sequence (unbalance) voltage of 1% on a continuous basis.
This would lead to approximately 7% negative sequence
current in the motor (Section 7).
As the relay is fitted only with a definite time relay element,
a setting of 20% (from Section 7) is appropriate, with a time
delay of 25s to allow for short high-level negative sequence
transients arising from other causes.
14.2.5 Loss of phase protection
The relay has a separate element for this protection. Loss of
a phase gives rise to large negative sequence currents, and
therefore a much shorter time delay is required. A definite
time delay of 5s is considered appropriate. The relay settings
are summarised in Table 3(b).

139
 PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT APPLICATION IN THE POWER SYSTEM
Uttam Mishra
Doble Engineering Company
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of phasor measurement units to the
power industry in the early 1990s is helping
revolutionize the way we analyze and control power
systems. The use of phasor measurement units, called a
SynchroPhasor, takes detailed measurements of the
power system quantities at different locations
throughout the power grid. All the measurements taken
are time-stamped by a precision timing device, and are
finding new applications for protection and control.
System events can be studied and analyzed, using PMU
information gathered from the power system at different
points, as long as the information is properly time-
stamped and recorded. Testing for correct operation and
accuracy of the PMU’s installation and performance has
become a challenge to field personnel. Verification of
the PMUs
PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT: HISTORY,
DEFINITION
A phasor measurement unit is a device that measures the
electrical quantity like voltage, current and frequency.
They provide this information in vector form which has
a magnitude and angle. A vector graphically represents
a sinusoidal waveform in a time domain. By applying a
Fourier filter to the collected sinusoidal waveform
provides the same information to the user in a vector
format.
The definition of a synchrophasor, according IEEE
C37.118, is "A phasor calculated from multiple data
samples using a standard time signal as a reference for
the measurement." The standard protocol for time
TOTAL VECTOR ERROR (TVE)
Total vector error is the difference of an actual vector compared to the measured vector:
Total vector error consists of magnitude and phase angle
error. The allowable TVE, as defined by IEEE
C37.118–1 when testing a PMU, is 1%. A TVE of 1%
is equal to .573°, (0.01*360°/2 ). For a 60 Hz system,
140
reference is Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) and is
commonly supplied from GPS.
Presently Phasor measurement units are installed at
NRLDC. In WRLDC and SRLDC it is working as demo
unit. In next stage installation of 18 PMUs, 1 PDC by
National Load Despatch Centre have been planned. In
addition to this, 26 PMUs and 4 PDCs have been
planned by other Regional Load Despatch Centres for
their respective regions. Thus after completion of all the
pilot projects, there would be 53 PMUs and 6 PDCs in
India.
PMU Testing:-
Goal: under various conditions, make sure that the
reported each PMU data message matches the expected
values for each Phasor Vector, Frequency Deviation and
Rate Of Change Of Frequency (ROCOF).
Why it is required?
 Errors in station sensors (CTs, PTs)
 Time synchronization accuracy (GPS receiver
clocks – crystal used, drift, ageing, etc)
 Inherent error in the PMU device over time
How it is achieved?
– Standard test set
• Capable of generating GPS based synchronized
signals
• Accurate GPS clock capable of generating both
IRIG-B and 1PPSsignal output
• Stable system frequency generation and or
compensation
• Should have at least 10th of accuracy as mentioned
in compliance of C37.118 for each conditions
the total time error allowed is 26.5 µs and for a 50 Hz
system, is 31.8 µs. The figure below shows the concept
of TVE in a graphical form.
Test Set up:
(PC, F6150 and PMU each have IP addresses)
Protection Suite F6150: Waveform definitions, start
time
Protection Suite PMU: Request configuration, start
transmission
F6150 PMU: Generated waveforms
PMU Protection Suite: Configuration response, phasor
data stream
Steady-state compliance
Steady state compliance tests shall be performed by
comparing the phasor estimates obtained under steady-
state conditions to the corresponding theoretical values
of Xr and Xi and calculating total vector error. Steady-
state conditions are where Xm, ω, and ɸ of the test
signal, and all other influence quantities are fixed for the
period of the measurement. (Note that for off-nominal
frequencies, the measured phase angle will change even
though the test signal phase ɸ is constant.)
Dynamic compliance – modulation tests, ramp test
f(nT) = nTω0/2p - ka (ω/2p) sin (ωnT-p)
Δf(nT) = - ka (ω/2p) sin (ωnT-p)
d/dt[f(nT)] = - ka (ω2/2p) cos (ωnT-p)
141
The modulation tests shall be performed with ω, kx and
ka as specified in Table 4. The modulation frequency
shall be varied in steps of 0.2 Hz in the range specified
in the table. The maximum TVE shall be measured over
at least one full cycle of modulation, and must be within
the specified limits for Class P and Class M compliance.
The PMU shall be tested with ramp of frequency
applied to balance three phase input signals (voltages
and currents). The ramp rate and duration as well as the
response error should be under limits. Note that the
maximum TVE may be exceeded during the allowed
transition time.
Frequency and rate of change of frequency
compliance
Frequency and rate of change of frequency
measurement under steady-state conditions shall be
tested using test nominal signals and constant frequency
but with different frequencies. At each measurement
point the frequency shall be held constant long enough
before each measurement that all transients due to
changing the frequency have settled out (the frequency
will be constant during measurement so rate of change
of frequency should be 0).
Evaluating compliance results
The utility or test lab may set the performance
requirements for their particular needs. In general, the
IEEE requirements that are listed above are used for
pass-fail of an instrument. However some users may
have special requirements based on the needs of a
particular application or problem being monitored. In
those cases, these tests are general enough they can be
used with modified limits to cover most situations.
Additional tests may be required, which could be either
PMU APPLICATIONS
PMUs are a very promising technology for the
protection applications of the future. There are some
wide area protection schemes, such as load shedding,
which are in use today. For normal protection, PMU
technology has some limitations. Though steady-state
requirements of a PMU are well-defined, transient
behavior of a PMU is not well-defined, and various
units operate differently under transient conditions. Due
to the slow response time of PMU technology, it has
been applied mostly for backup protection applications.
The backup applications where present PMU technology
has been applied are power system stability, two ended
fault location algorithms, system diagnostics, distributed
bus bar protection, load shedding, line reclosing
selectivity, and wide area frequency monitoring. Some
of the applications are described in this paper.
POWER SWING DETECTION
One of the most promising applications of PMU is in the
power swing detection. When a fault occurs on a
system, the power transfer between two buses where the
fault occurred increases. At each end of a line that
connects separate buses, voltages can become unstable
and continuously change at both ends. The change in
bus voltages is caused by power swing, and the angle
between the buses will oscillate. By observing the angle
142
a modification of these test types or something entirely
new. These tests or a variation of these tests have been
used since 2005. They have worked well and produce
consistent results. Most PMUs will pass the basic
measurement tests. Differences largely show up in the
filtering and response times. Certainly all results should
be examined, but pay special attention to the out-of-
band filtering, the step responses, and bandwidth.
and applying equal area criteria to the power curve, it
can be determined whether it is a recoverable power
swing (stable power swing) or unrecoverable power
swing (unstable power swing). If it's a recoverable
power swing, which can be determined by measuring
the angle swing between the two buses, appropriate
actions can be taken. If it is determined to be an
unrecoverable power swing, a different set of actions or
criteria can be determined to isolate the problem. Some
power swing conditions, whether stable or unstable, can
be determined by using a special algorithm. This is only
possible by making real-time measurements and making
decisions in real-time, which is provided by the PMU
technology.
SPECIAL INTEGRITY PROTECTION SCHEME (SIPS)
Special Integrity Protection Scheme, such as load-
shedding schemes, requires measurement of voltage and
current throughout the system. Based on the system
wide measurements, appropriate actions can be taken.
Traditional schemes were based upon predetermined
sequences of actions based on assumed extreme
conditions. The extreme conditions and actual system
conditions are different so the effectiveness of the SIPS
scheme is somewhat compromised. PMUs provide
actual data in real-time, which can determine corrective
actions to keep the system intact. Wide area stability and
voltage control systems can use PMU data to make
intelligent decisions and prevent wide area blackouts.
This is the biggest area of potential growth of PMU
applications today.
DISTANCE TO FAULT LOCATION
Distance-to-fault location calculation is another area that
is very promising. Single-ended algorithms for detecting
fault locations have been readily available technology
for several years, but having a double ended algorithm,
determined by information provided by PMUs placed
throughout the power system is a very desirable
In the above figure, Vs and V are the sending and
receiving end voltages respectively measured protection
at each end. RF is the fault resistance and “m” is the
The equivalent negative sequence network is as shown in the following figure.
Using PMU at both end of the line, it provides all the data of
143
application. Thanks to today's communi-cation
technology advancements and accurate time-stamped
power system values provided by PMUs, system
performance can be measured and verified to help
determine fault locations. Using negative sequence
values provided by most PMUs, it is very easy
determine distanced to fault location for all types of
fault except three phase fault. For three phase faults,
positive sequence values are used. Following figure
indicates the equivalent power system network for the
fault condition.
distance to fault (0.5 for 50% of fault). ZL is the positive
sequence impedance of the line.
voltages and currents seen at each end of the line. The above
figure allows us to calculate value of ‘m” as shown below.
From the above equation, the value of “m” can be calculated as shown below.
Using PMU data the distance to fault calculation can be
done with high accuracy as data from both end of the
lines are available. With the single ended fault locators
the errors in the calculations are quite high. Lack of
information provided from the other end provides as
much as 10 to 15% error in fault calculations. Three
terminal line applications can have as much as 38%
error. Since 2008, Taiwan power employs PMUs based
on double-ended algorithms for fault locations. PMUs
are installed on 345kV and 161kV power systems.
There have been 40 events evaluated to date. The fault
location accuracy, using PMU technology with a two
terminal lines algorithm, is 1.878%, compared to the 10
to 15% with single-ended fault location algorithms.
Accuracy of three terminal line PMU algorithm
applications is 1.35%, compared to 40% for single
ended fault location algorithms.
In addition to fault location calculations, real-time
decisions of reclosing functions can be made when there
is a mix of overhead lines and underground cables. If
the distance to fault location suggests faults in the
overhead section, reclosing can be initiated while if the
AUTOMATIC GENERATION SHEDDING SCHEME (AGSS)
Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) in Mexico uses PMU's to help understand power system responses.
144
fault location algorithm indicates fault in the cable
section, reclosing can be blocked.
UNDERSTANDING SYSTEM RESPONSE
PMU data has also been used to determine system
response on a New Zealand power system. A PMU was
placed at a 400 MW thermal power station (G1) and at a
smaller hydro-generation station (G2). Two 220 KV
transmission lines connected the two buses. A test was
performed by removing 200 MW of power from G1 to
measure the frequency response of the generator
controls and how they responded. When the 200 MW of
generation was removed at G1, it was found that both
generators had and identical frequency response and the
system compensated it correctly and the frequency
adjusted to normal. The data to determine the response
was collected from both PMUs and analyzed based on
accurate timestamping, to determine the system
response. So PMU data can be very useful in
understanding the system and as it provides time
stamped data, the post event evaluation can be very
quick.
In Mexico, most of the generation is at one end of the
country, while most of the load is in the center of the
country. The power is transmitted over 400 KV
network. The network is shown in the diagram above.
It was observed from the simulation that loss of a 400
KV line could put this system in out of step conditions.
So to protect against it, the scheme needed to measure
the angle of the separation and make sure it trips the
generation, when necessary. By carrying out
experiments, it was determined that, when both lines are
out of service, the angle separation between bus and
generator is 14°. When one line is out of service, the
angle of separation is 7°. CFE implemented an
automatic generation shedding scheme (AGSS) to
implement a scheme to shed the generation when the
angle of separation reached 10° or greater.
SYSTEM DIAGNOSIS
In one of the northeast US utility PMUs were placed at
both ends of a line differential scheme. Communication
between the two ends of the protection was not a
dedicated fiber instead the utilities communication
network was used to communicate current information
at each end of the line. When the scheme was
commissioned, the differential current just after
commissioning was almost at a tripping threshold. It
was assumed at that time that it was due to line charging
The diagram below shows the reference waveform.
145
current, which is seen at only one end of the system and
not at both ends of the line. The engineers assumed that
when the line is loaded this differential current will go
away.
As the load grew, the differential current grew to reach
just below tripping level thresholds. Engineers believed
the errors may be due to phasing error or
communication asymmetry between the two ends of the
system. Metering commands were given to the
microprocessor-based relay to help determining phasing
errors. It was found that both end of the relay provided
the similar data when metering command was executed.
Microprocessor relay typically uses Va as the reference
voltage for the phasing. So both end of the relay
provided similar information. This does not mean there
is no phasing error. If each voltage is rolled by 120° in
sequence means A connected to B, B connected to C
and C connected to A, it will provide the same phasing
at both of the relay. So metering command will not be a
good solution to determine the possibility of the rolled
phasor. PMU data here can be very useful in
determining the phases of the voltages at each end.
When data from the PMU were taken from each end, it
was concluded that phases are not rolled. PMU provides
the data with time stamping. It uses cosine of 900 as a
reference. Means when it receives a 1 PPS signal it
considers that point as cosine waveform at 900
By using data from PMUs located at each bus, they
were able to determine the cause of error. After
observing the data collected, phasing error was ruled
and it was determined that the error was mainly due to
communication asymmetry between two ends of the
communication scheme. The total error observed was in
the range of 2.5 mSec which was the main cause of
differential current.
By using PMU data, it provides the real time data with
universal time stamping. This way the data becomes
very useful in analysis of the power system event.
CONCLUSION
Phasor measurement units presents a very promising
technology for the future and it will be just a matter of
time that this technology will solve many problems and
will provide a technology to do the protection in a more
productive ways. It’s a very effective protection
platform. The present time applications are limited
where the fast operating time is not a must. The
operating time of the PMU is within 100-200 mSecs and
is very useful in few of the applications described in this
paper.
146
The filtering of the data to extract phasor is the one that
slows the down the response time of the PMU. Also
different PMU behaves differently under transient
conditions is the other factor limits the protection
application of the PMUs.
Double ended fault location algorithm provides a very
good solution to improve the productivity of the existing
maintenance personnel. Doble ended algorithm provides
very accurate information on the power system faults
which helps the patrolling of the line. Doble ended fault
location algorithm does not suffer from the limitations
of the single ended algorithm.
The availability of the Phasor throughout the power
system in a real time helps system operator to control
the power flow at the same time provides the protection
scheme designer a way to implement Remedial Action
Protection Scheme, load shedding scheme, under
frequency load shedding scheme etc. Availability of the
real time phasor data throughout the system allows
planning engineers to validate their state estimation
results as well as the state estimation can be
implemented in real time.
 Testing of IEC 61850 Merging Units
Omicorn

The Sampled Values Concept

MU for Conventional CTs & PTs

"9-2LE" Profile Non Conventional Sensors

•"Implementation Guideline" based on IEC 61850-7-2 and

IEC 61850-9-2
•Nickname: 9-2LE – "Light Edition"
•For protection & metering
•Minimum number of parameters

•Low requirements on hardware

•4 voltages + 4 currents (3 phases + neutral)
•80 samples per cycle (protection & metering)

•256 samples per cycle (PQ)

The Signal Processing Chain Non Conventional Sensor Output

•What are the properties?
•We do not exactly know
•Non conventional sensor + MU
•From same manufacturer
•No interoperability
•Not accessible for testing
•Testing the entire signal chain
•Primary injection
Testing
Primary Injection
•CIGRÉ SC B5, WG 24
•"Protection Requirements on Transient Response of
Voltage and Current Digital Acquisition Chain"
•Chapter about testing
The Easy Case
•Conventional CTs and VTs
•Merging unit accepts secondary signals
•100V ...120V
•1A, 5A
•Testing by injecting secondary signals
•CT & VT testing is a separate issue
147
Closing the Testing Loop This spectrum is filtered to to retrieve the fundamental
component.
The frequency-selective measurement suppresses the noise .

Automatic MU and Channel Detection Tests to Perform with the CPC 100
•Ratio and polarity
•Check wiring (channel and MU assignment)
•Check MU settings
•Detects defects in the CT which influence the ratio
•Frequency selective current/voltage measurement
•Noise immunity
•More accurate RMS measurement
•Noise level measurement
•Check for noise on a channel without injection
•Magnitude response of the signal processing chain
•15 to 400 Hz
A unique test signal is injected. The CPC 100 searches for
the unique signal within all available SV streams on the CPC 100 & SV Summary
network to identify the correct channel for testing.
•Closed loop testing
•Of entire signal processing chain
•Optimized for commissioning
•Wiring check
•Setting check
•Auto detection
•Frequency selective
•Noise immunity
•Noise detection
Frequency Selective Measurement
The CPC 100 calculates the frequency spectrum of the
signal.

148