June 28, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration.

 This is an MR of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 [which in turn denied petitioners' Ad
Cautelam MR (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) ]
 Verdict: MR = DENIED
o Clearly, the MR is really a second motion for reconsideration in relation to the
resolution dated February 15, 2011
o the MR raises issues entirely identical to those the petitioners already raised in their
Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, to wit:

I. With due respect, neither the Rules of Court nor jurisprudence allows the Honorable Court
to take cognizance of Respondent Municipalities multiple motions. By doing so, the
Honorable Court therefore acted contrary to the Rules of Court and its internal
procedures.
II. Contrary to the ruling of the Honorable Court in the Assailed Resolution, the controversy
involving the Sixteen (16) Cityhood laws had long been resolved with finality; thus, the
principles of immutability of judgment and res judicata are applicable and operate to
deprive the Honorable Court of jurisdiction.
III. Contrary to the Assailed IV. Resolution of the Honorable Court, the sixteen (16) Cityhood
laws neither repealed nor amended the Local Government Code. The Honorable Court
committed an error when it failed to rule in the V. Assailed Resolution that the Sixteen
(16) Cityhood Laws violated Article X, Sections 6 and 10 of the Constitution.
IV. With due respect, the constitutionality of R.A. 9009 is not an issue in this case. It was error
on the part of the Honorable Court to consider the law arbitrary. DIC

[NOTE: Only argument IV was raised for the 1st time but the SC ruled that is neither relevant nor
decive in this case )]

Dissenting opinions:

CARPIO, J.

1. The Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

 The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other law. There is only
one Local Government Code.
 Notably, each Cityhood Law provides in its Separability Clause that if any of its provisions
is "inconsistent with the Local Government Code," the other consistent provisions "shall
continue to be in full force and effect." The clear and inescapable implication is that
any provision in each Cityhood Law that is "inconsistent with the Local Government
Code" has no force and effect — in short, void and ineffective. Each Cityhood Law
expressly and unequivocally acknowledges the superiority of the Local Government Code,
and that in case of conflict, the Local Government Code shall prevail over the Cityhood
Law.
  Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government Code shall
prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate and distinct from the
Local Government Code. In other words, the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts
of the Local Government Code but are separate and distinct laws.
 As such, the Cityhood Laws cannot stipulate an exception from the requirements for the
creation of cities, prescribed in the Local Government Code, without running afoul of the
explicit mandate of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. aDSHCc

2. The Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

 The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
 The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009.
 This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited
to existing conditions only.

3. Respondent municipalities must comply with the P100 million income requirement under the
prevailing LGC.

 compliance with the old requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution which
expressly commands that "no . . . city . . . shall be created . . . except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code."
o Therefore, respondent municipalities in order to validly convert into cities must
comply with the P100 million income requirement under the prevailing Local
Government Code

4. The increased income requirement of P100 million is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.

5. Failure of 59 existing cities to post P100 million annual income does not render the P100
million income requirement difficult to comply

 Obviously, these cities were already cities prior to the amendment of the Local
Government Code providing for the increased income requirement of P100 million.

6. The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

 Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue
Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution. caSEAH
 "respondent municipalities have a total population equivalent to that of Davao City only,
or around 1.3 million people. Yet, the IRA that pertains to the 16 municipalities
(P4,019,776,072) is more than double that for Davao City (P1,874,175,271). . . . As a result,
the per capita IRA alloted for the individual denizen of Davao is even less than half of the
average per capita IRA of the inhabitants of the sixteen (16) municipalities (P1,374.70
divided by P3,117.24)."
Sereno, J.

 There is no substantial interest of justice or compelling reason that would warrant the
reversal of the First Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. There is no
injustice in preventing the conversion of the sixteen municipalities into cities at this point
in time.
 In fact, justice is more equitably dispensed by the stringent application of the current
legislative criteria under the Local Government Code (LGC), as amended by Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009), for creating cities without distinction or exception.
 The method of revising the criteria must be directly done through an amendatory law of
the LGC (such as RA 9009), and not through the indirect route of creating cities and
exempting their compliance with the established and prevailing standards. By
indiscriminately carving out exemptions in the charter laws themselves, Congress
enfeebled the normative function of the LGC on the legislative power to create cities.