BESO vs.

DAGUMAN
Facts:
Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the Complaint-Affidavit
dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the
office of the Local Civil Registrar with the following facts:
(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A. Yman, got married
under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondent’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar;
(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;
(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her
Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not registered;
(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the copies were
taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.
The respondent averred with the following rationale:
(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and Yman. He
also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than ordinary official
attention under present Government policy;
(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married;
(c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman absconded
with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998 found the
respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in office” and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000).
Issues:
The issues raised in this complaint are:
(1) Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and
(2) Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and not
registering the complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.

Held:
(1) Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code
provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent member of the judiciary with the court’s
jurisdiction”. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances
with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:
(1.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
In this case, non of the three instances is present.
(2) Yes. The judge committed negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code, such duty to
register the marriage is the respondent’s duty. The same article provides, “It shall be the duty of the
person solemnizing the marriage… to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later
than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license, and in proper cases,
the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than
those mentioned in Article 8.”.
ARANES VS. OCCIANO
FACTS
Mercedita Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is
thePresiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur who performed
MarceditaArañes’ marriage to the late Dominador R. Orobia even without
a marriage license. Since themarriage was a nullity, petitioner could not inherit her late husband’s
property and receive pensions.In his comment dated February 15, 2000, respondent judge
averred that a certain Juan Arroyo requested him to solemnize a marriage of the parties
on February 17, 2000 in his sala at the MTC Balatan. However, on Feb 17, 2000, Arroyo
informed him that Orobia had difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of traveling to
Balatan and requested him to solemnize the marriage in Nabua, towhich request he acceded.
Respondent judge further averred that while carefully examining the documents, respondent
judge discovered that the parties did not posses the marriage license. He refused to solemnize the
marriagea n d s u g g e s t e d i t s r e s e t t i n g t o a n o t h e r d a t e . B u t t h e p a r t i e s p l e a d e d
a n d s o h e p r o c e e d e d t o solemnize the marriage due to human compassion and fear that
it might aggravate the condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity of the marriage license and admonished the parties that
failure to give it would render the marriage void. On September 12, 2001, petitioner filed her
Affidavit of Desistance attesting that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize their
marriage. She confessed that she filed this Administrative case out of rage.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent judge should be held liable for solemnizing a marriage outside
his territorial jurisdiction and without marriage license despite the petitioner’s Affidavit of Desistance.
HELD
The territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Under Article 3 of The Family Code of the Philippines, one of the
requisites of marriage is the
authority of the solemnizing officer
. W h e r e a j u d g e s o l e m n i z e s a m a r r i a g e o u t s i d e h i s c o u r t ’ s jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3.The judge’s act of solemnizing
the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary
to law and subjects him to administrative liability. Respondent judge should also be faulted for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People v Lara, it was held that a
marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void and that the subsequent
issuance of license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not posses such authority when he solemnized
the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY
Facts:
Complainant Municipal Mayor Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, he solemnized a wedding despite knowing that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. Second, he performed another marriage ceremony outside his court’s jurisdiction. His
jurisdiction was Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, but he solemnized the wedding at his
residence in Dapa.

Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the wedding of a married
man because he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge confirming the fact that
the husband has not seen his first wife for almost 7 years. Regarding the second charge, he did not
violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the FC (marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: “The marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church…and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places…or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement…”

Issues:
Should he have solemnized the wedding to another of a married man on the basis of an affidavit of
presumptive death? – NO

Did the judge have the authority to solemnize the other wedding outside his court’s jurisdiction? –
NO

Ratio:
Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death Necessary
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the FC for the declaration of the death of the absentee. Absent this
judicial declaration, the husband remains married to his first wife. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous marriage under Article 35, par. 4 (those bigamous marriage not
falling under Art. 41).
Authority of the Judge
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided under Art. 7. Judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while not affecting the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Filipina Y. Sy v. CA

Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973. They were blessed with 2 children. When
their marriage did not work they live separately. The petitioner filed a petition for separation of
property and the same was granted. After that their son Fernando starting to live with his father, the
petitioner went to the residence of the respondent and asking his son to go back with her but the son
refused. The petitioner started to spank her son. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from
their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. And so she filed criminal action for
parricide but the RTC rendered its decision to held the respondent liable only to slight physical
injuries. Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent on the
following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than
one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision granted the petition
on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick
to respondent Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. . She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional
Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for
slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of
her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with
her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex
with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such
psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage
and became manifest thereafter. The RTC denied the petition, which was later on affirmed by the
CA. MR was denied as well. Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner, for the first time, is raising
the issue that there is an absence of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony. The date of issue
of the marriage license and marriage certificate is September 14, 1974, while the date of the
celebration of the marriage is on November 15, 1973.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony

Held: Yes. The marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place.
Therefore, the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Article 80 of the Civil
Code is applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, he purported
marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated
in Article 72-79 of the Civil Code. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is VOID from the beginning.

The issue on psychological incapacity is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage is void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized.
ALCANTARA VS. ALCANTARA
FACTS:A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging thaton December 8, 1982 she and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel, who assisted
their wedding for a fee and get married for that same day. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage
ceremony which was celebrated without the marriage license at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila,
on March 26, 1983. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract,
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the
local civil registrar. They then have a child in 1985. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to
cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Respondent, and dismiss the
Petition for lack of merit. Petitioner then submits at the C.A that at the precise time that his marriage with the
respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City
Hall and dealt with a ³fixer´ who arranged everything for them. The wedding took place at the stairsin Manila City
Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.
He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from
Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place.

ISSUE:1. Was the absence of the marriage license before the marriage shall render the marriage void?
Whether or not the marriage license issued in Carmona Cavite was valid.

HELD: To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract
between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the
probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even
then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage
license ina city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage
does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads: T
his is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982. Likewise, the issue raised
by petitioner -- that they appeared before a ³fixer´ who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
ceremony before a certain Rev.Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will
be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizingofficer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizingofficer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said officialhas fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED
SYED AZHAR ABBAS,vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS,
SUMMARY: Pakistani national annulling marriage to Filipina alleging no valid marriage license.
FACTS: Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) seeks annulment of his marriage to Gloria Goo-
Abbas (Gloria), alleging the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Art. 4,Family Code, as a ground.
In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated tha tML 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. Atthe trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria in Taiwan and married her there, and
arrived in the Philippines, where his mother-in-law entered him into a ceremony which he claimed that he did not know was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and
that he had never resided in that area. The record in the MCR of Carmona certifies that 9969967 was the number of another
marriage license issued to another couple. Thus, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the MCR of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as ML 9969967, and the same MCR had certified that no marriage license had been
issued for Gloria and Syed. It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
ML 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the
license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed
on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria appealed to the CA, which granted her appeal and declared her marriage to Syed
valid and subsisting. The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The
CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.
Syed filed a MFR to the CA, which was denied. Hence, the current petition to the SC.

ISSUEW/N the absence of a valid marriage license still renders a marriage valid

DECISION: (GRANTED THE PETITION) The Court cited Arts. 3, 4, and 35(3) of the Family Code. Respondent Gloria
failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the MCR of
Carmona which had allegedly issued said license, which issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple. In the case of Cariño v.Cariño,
following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the LCR that their office had no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion
that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
 REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
Respondent.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they
applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They
had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in
order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March
1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went
back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Respondent filed a complaint
for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she
is married to petitioner and that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her
as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also
averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the
child. Trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and
thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower
court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until
a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. The appellate court also ruled that
since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the
State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the
parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be
raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings
before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and
his wife

ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second.

HELD: Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause is the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
 The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous
cohabitation• to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to
support. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child.

NINAL V. BADAYOG

Note: This digest is for the exemption to marriage license doctrine. Case is also discussed under declaration of
nullity.

Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE, INGRID, ARCHIE
& PEPITO NIAL, JR.) . Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After Pepito’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect their
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC said the Family Code was silent, obscure and inefficient in resolving: a)
petitioner’s cause of action, b) WON Pepito’s second marriage was null and void and c) WON the plaintiffs are
stopped from assailing the validity of the 2nd marriage considering it was dissolved by Pepito’s death. He ruled that
the action should have been filed before Pepito’s death.

Issue: WON they Pepito Nial and Norma Badayog were exempt from a marriage license.

Held: No. Not having met the marriagle license requirement, their marriage is null and void.
Ratio: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC),
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.
There is no dispute that the marriage of Pepito to Norma Badayog was celebrated without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." The only
issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-
year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime
during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-
year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and Badayog’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife".
 BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ

Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children.
However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta,
Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao
and David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to incessant quarrels, they both
left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived together as husband and wife
for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law
against Sanchez. Upon the complaint, the respondent denied that he knew about the prior marriages between
the two parties and that he only merely relied on the affidavit executed by the parties that they cohabitated for
seven years. Thus he filed a petition to dismiss the case for lack of merit. However, the office of the court
administrator finds him guilty and asks him to pay a certain fine. The respondent judge set aside his previous
comment and alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not David Manzano’s marriage with Payao is valid in accordance to Art.34?

RULING: For Article 34 of the Family Code (legal ratification of marital cohabitation) to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were “separated.” Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s
and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who
have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not sever
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated
by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
 REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT

On November 24, 1986 Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay CityHall. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both ofthem are legally capacitated and that they
cohabited for atleast five years when in factthey only barely known each other since February 1986.On 1993,
Jose filed a complaintfor Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that their
marriagewas sham, as to no ceremony was celebrated between them; that he did not execute thesworn
statement that he and Felisa had cohabited for atleast five years; and that hisconsent was secured through
fraud. His sister, however, testified as witness that Josevoluntarily gave his consent during their marriage. The
complaint was dismissed onRegional Trial Court stating that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality ofhis marriage for lack of marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had livedtogether from
1986 to 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought thedeclaration of nullity; The RTC ruled that
Jose’s action had prescribe. It cited Art 87 ofthe New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment
must be commenced bythe injured party within four years after the discovery of fraud. Jose appealed to the
Courtof Appeals which rendered a decision declaring their marriage void ab initio for absenceof marriage
license. Felisa sought a petition for review praying that the Court of Appeal’sAmended decision be reversed
and set aside

ISSUE: WON the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation rendered the marriage void for lack of
marriage license?

RULING: YES. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the
law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article
76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also
prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also
noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February
or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was
only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.