ISSUE No.

006
May 2019

ISSUE No. 007

May 2019

Operating Restrictions High Voltage Fuse Switch Units

(Update to ISSUE No. 2015-08)

Powerco Requirements
An RMU fused switch is designed to be able to open the fuse unit and access the HRC fuse carrier
through an access hatch in the lid while the internal bus-bars are live and until the Perth incident, this
was standard practice. It is not possible to determine if the fuse units are mechanically intact before
doing so and whilst shattering of this type of HRC fuses is not common, the potential severe outcome
of any similar occurrences introduces an intolerable safety risk to the operator.

The Perth findings reinforce that the following operational restrictions should remain in place for
all units containing HV oil-insulated fuse-switches across Powerco’s network:

• Any activity which requires lifting the fuse access lid of any HV oil insulated fuse-switch must
only be carried out once the fuse switch unit has been completely isolated from the
electricity supply. Isolation is to be made from other switch units

• If a fuse has, or could have, operated within any HV oil insulated fuse-switch, no work is to be
done on the fuse switch until the fuse switch has been completely isolated from the HV. All work
must be completed, and the lid closed before the fuse-switch unit is returned to service

• Re-livening of the fuse-switch or switch unit, after the activities in the first or second bullet points,
have been carried out, shall only be performed using a remotely located switch

EXAMPLES:
Background
In February 2015 a serious incident involving a Long and Crawford fuse-switch unit occurred in
Western Australia. Tragically, the incident resulted in a double fatality and injured several other
people. The Government of WA released an order specific to all owners and operators of, and
persons working on, oil-insulated HV fuse-switch units. In summary, this required that all HV oil-
insulated fuse-switch units must be completely isolated from the electricity supply before any
person accesses the fuse-switch unit.

Powerco also adopted these operational restrictions through the release of Safety Notice 2015-008
and applied them to all HV oil-insulated fuse-switches owned and operated across Powerco’s network
including but not limited to the following types:

• Long & Crawford fuse switches of all types

• Reyrolle type ROK, ROKSS
• ABB NZ type SDAF3, SDAF
• Andelect type SDAF3, SDAF
• Astec type SDAF3, SDAF
• Lucy type FRMU

Update
The following summary findings of the Perth investigation were released in April 2018.

HV fuses in a Long & Crawford oil insulated RMU forming part of the electrical network in a
shopping centre attempted to clear a fault. In doing so, one of the fuses shattered. The fuses are
designed to operate quickly for high fault currents. For low-level fault currents, the HRC fuse will
trigger the striker pin which will trip the fuse switch unit. In this case, the fault current was low; the
pyrotechnic striker did operate but its pin failed to fully extend. There was a delay in the tripping,
leading to the fuse overheating and its porcelain enclosure shattered which separated it from its
metallic end-caps.

Electricians attended the site on 2 February 2015 to investigate the loss of supply to a section of
the shopping centre. They found that the fuse had shattered and sought assistance from another
electrician who had more experience on this type of switchgear. On 3 February 2015, four
electricians opened the fuse access cover to inspect the damaged fuse. While opening the cover,
one of the separated metallic end-caps was dislodged.

The end-cap sank in the oil tank and made contact between one of the live 11kV busbars and the
earthed tank. This created an electrical short circuit and arc fault, a catastrophic explosion and the
expulsion of hot oil which ignited into a fireball inside the switchroom. The four electricians all
received horrific burns from the explosion and subsequent oil-fueled fire. They all managed to exit
the switchroom. One died at the scene, another was transported to the hospital but died later that
day. The two survivors spent months in hospital receiving treatment for severe burns.

Please ensure this notice is shared amongst your teams.

Questions?
Contact: Alisha Picard | HSEQ Operations Manager

Phone: 021 748 087

Email: alisha.picard@powerco.co.