System Dynamics Applied to Combat Models

(Lanchester Laws)
Oscar M. Bull
Universidad Andrés Bello, Chile
Facultad de Intereses Marítimos
Halimeda esq. Talasia, Jardín del Mar, Viña del Mar
Phone: +56 (32) 2845295
obull@unab.cl

Abstract

Different mathematical models explain the main features of combats, among them are
models referring to the attrition of the forces involved; numerous battles employing
these models have been recreated. As the matter remains active mainly inside a reduced
community of operational research defense experts, in this study basic models of
Lanchester´s Laws are reviewed, but employing system dynamics concepts and tools,
with the objective being to open the subject to a more diversified audience. System
dynamics also provide easier ways to account for “soft” variables, normally present in
real combat situations. For applying those models a fictitious land combat case between
two forces is presented, enriching the basic models with some additions to test
commander decisions.

Keywords

System Dynamics, Combat Models, Lanchester Equations, War games

1. Introduction
Over the years some mathematical models have been used to explain the main features
of combat, particularly the attrition of the forces involved, from which numerous battles
employing these models have been recreated. Nevertheless their usefulness to the
general audience seems to be limited, as the subject remains inside a reduced
community of operational research experts.
System Dynamics [Forrester, 1961] provides a more understandable and intuitive way
to deal with the subject, and allows opening to a more diversified audience. Also
employing the concepts and tools of System Dynamics facilitates the possibility of
enhancing those equations with “soft” variables: fatigue, diplomacy, information,
economics, relative distances, and so on, all of which are extremely difficult to manage
only with mathematical models. The following study has not the intention to be a
complete description of this matter, and only some basics models will be treated to
promote a discussion inside the community interested in developing further studies.

2. Lanchester´s Laws
Back in 1916 F. W. Lanchester [Lanchester, 1916], a British engineer and inventor,
formulated two differential equations for attrition, explaining different types of warfare.
Also, the Russian M. Osipov [Osipov, 1915], from whom there are no personal
information, deserves credits in this type of study. Deliberately avoiding the
mathematical description of those equations, that can be founded in many references as
 2

the ones indicated; we will concentrate only on their description employing the tools of
System Dynamics.

2.1 Lanchester´s Square Law (Aimed Fire):

Figure 1a shows the causal loop diagram of the simplest form of Lanchester´s Law
indicating the aggregated causes of attrition of combat forces. Figure 1b is the
corresponding stock and flow model. The attrition rate is equal to the number of the
forces remaining on the opposing side multiplied by their respective effectiveness.

Red Eff

Red Eff
+ Initial Blue
+
Blue Attrition Blue Forces
Rate Blue Attrition
Red Forces

- -
Blue Forces
Red Forces
Red Attrition
Red
+ Rate
Attrition
+ Blue Eff
Initial red

Blue Eff

Figure: 1a - Causal Diagram.1b- Stock and flow model of Lanchester´s Square Law

Example 1. - Suppose:

Initial Blue = 2000 (men) Initial Red = 1000 (men) (Blue has twice initial forces)
Blue Eff = 0.001 (1/Hour) Red Eff = 0.002 (1/Hour) (Red has Twice Eff)
Find out who wins, how long the battle lasts; Blue and Red survivors

Blue Forces

Red Forces

Figure 2. Results of the Example 1

Figure 2 shows the outcome of example 1: Blue wins, the battle lasted 620 hours, with
1414 Blue survivors and the Red force is annihilated. It must be noticed that even if the
Blue force has only half of effectiveness, but doubled the quantity of Red soldiers, the
 3

Blue forces will win. From this fact comes the name of Lanchester´s Square. This effect
correspond to one of the main principles employed in all wars, having different phrasing
such that: “Divide and Conquer”, “God is on the side of the big battalions” (Napoleon),
“Superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the result of a combat…the
greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point”,
and so on.
mean Blue killed
per Red shot
Total Red
Firing Rate
+
Red Rate of fire
+ + + per man
Blue Attrition
Rate

-
Red Forces
Blue Forces

-
Red Attrition
Blue Rate of fire
per man
+ + +
Rate
Total Blue
+ firing Rate

mean Red killed

per Blue shot
Figure 3. Causal Diagram of Lanchester´s Square Law

Figure 3 corresponds to the causal loop diagram for land combat where the attrition rate
in both sides is due to the combined effect of the firing rate per man the remaining
forces and the effectiveness of the shots, reflected in the parameter Mean men (Blue or
Red, respectively) killed per each shot. This model will be applied in a later example of
combat.

2.2 Lanchester´s Linear Law (Unaimed Fire)

In this case both fires are directed into the operating area, rather than being aimed at a
specific unit, and then the attrition rate of both forces will be proportional to the other
force. If the number of targets is doubled, the number of hits will also be doubled. This
case can be explained by a causal diagram as the one indicated in figure 4. It should be
noted that this attrition coefficient is not the same as the one employed in the square
law, as they have different dimensions, therefore must not be directly compared.
Blue
Attrition
Coeff +
Red Attrition
+ Rate

+ -
Blue Forces Blue Red Forces
Red Forces
contacts

- +
Blue Attrition +
Rate Red
+ Attrition
Coeff

Figure 4. Causal Diagram of Lanchester´s Linear Law

 4

Red Attrition
Coeff
Initial Blue

Blue Forces
Blue Attrition
Rate

Blue Red
Contacts

Red Forces
Red Attrition
Rate
Initial Red

Blue Attrition
Coeff

Figure 5. Model of Lanchester´s Linear Law

Figure 5 indicates the stock and flow model for the Linear Law. The main equations are:
Blue Red Forces contacts = Blue Forces * Red Forces
Blue Attrition Rate = Blue Red contacts * Red Attrition Coeff
Red Attrition Rate = Blue Red contacts * Blue Attrition Coeff

Example 2:

Initial Blue: 2000 (men) Initial Red: 1000 (men)

Blue Attrition Coeff = 0.0001 Red Attrition Coeff (Case a) = 0.0002
Red Attrition Coeff (Case b) = 0.0001

Blue Forces

Red Forces

Figure 6. Results of Lanchester´s Linear Law Example 2. Left Case a, right Case b.

The figure 6 shows the outcome: In Case a, both forces annihilate, even if the Blue
doubled the Red forces but have only half of Attrition Coeff. In Case b, where both
forces have equal Attrition Coeff but the Blue doubles in forces, Blue wins and the Red
forces are annihilated. This model is employed to explain ancient wars, where the forces
involved are only the ones to have personal contact, but also the model results very
useful for modeling guerrilla types of incidents and ambushes. Example 5 deals with
this specific and important case.

2.3 Enriching the Lanchester Basic Models

Aggregating some other information the Lanchester´s models may be enriched: own
casualties, reinforcements, range dependency.
 5

2.3.1 Own casualties

For example the following chart [Lucas, 2009] shows the combat deaths of different
wars referring to troops killed in action, or dead of wounds. Other includes deaths from
disease, privation, and accidents, and includes losses among prisoners of war. Wounded
excludes those who died of their wounds, who are included under Combat Deaths. It is
noted that the percentage of casualties due to non direct combat is far greater than the
direct ones caused by enemy fire; therefore it may be interesting to include those
casualties in a model. The model can accommodate those own casualties, for example
as a percentage of the forces (Figure 7)
<------------Casualties------->
[----Deaths---]
Conflict KIA Other Deaths Wounded Total
Mexican War 1,733 11,550 4,152 17,435
Civil War: Union 110,070 249,458 275,175 634,703
Confederate 74,524 124,000 137,000 335,524
Combined 184,594 373,458 412,175 970,227
Spanish-American War 385 2,061 1,662 4,108
World War I 53,513 63,195 204,002 320,710
World War II 292,131 115,185 670,846 1,078,162
Korean War 33,651 NA 103,284 136,935
Vietnam War 47,369 10,799 153,303 211,471
Gulf War 148 145 467 760

2.3.2 Reinforcements
Also the forces may be reinforced during the battle, either continuously during the
whole battle, or scattered in groups. Both situations are indicated in the stock and flow
model shown in figure 7 and example 3.
Blue own
Blue casualties rate
Reserves Initial Blue

Blue
Forces Blue Attrition
Blue
reinforcement Rate

Red Eff
Time to arrive
Blue Reserves
Blue Eff

Red
Red Attrition Forces
Rate Red
Initial Red Reinforcement

Red own Starting Time Red Reserves

casualties rate to arrive Red Arrival Rate
Reserves

Figure 7. Model including reinforcements and own casualties to the Lanchester´s

Square Law
The main equations are:
Blue Attrition Rate = Red Eff * Red Forces + Blue Forces * Blue own casualties rate
Red Attrition Rate = Blue Eff * Blue Forces + Red Forces*Red own casualties rate
Blue reinforcement = Blue Reserves * (PULSE (Time to arrive Blue Reserves, TIME
STEP) / TIME STEP+PULSE (Time to arrive Blue Reserves +100, TIME STEP) /
TIME STEP)
Red Reinforcement = Red Reserves Arrival Rate
Red Reserves Arrival Rate = 10 * PULSE (Starting Time to arrive Red Reserves, 100)
 6

Example 3: Reinforcements
Initial Blue & Red = 1000
Blue and Red Eff =0.01
Blue and Red Casualty Rate= 0.001
Both sides start to reinforce at time 20.
Blue reinforce with 500 men at time 20 and 500 men at time 120 (Total 1000)
Red reinforce continuously at a rate of 10 men / Hour from time 20 to time 120 (Total
1000)

The results are shown in figure 8.

Outcomes
2,000

1,600

1,200
Unit

Blue Force

800

400

Red Force
0
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300
Time (Hour)
Blue Forces : Current Red Forces : Current

Figure 8. Results of Example 3. Reinforcements to the Lanchester´s Linear Law

In this case both forces start to be reinforced at time 20. The Red one continuously and
the Blue ones in two groups of 500 soldiers each, arriving at times 20 and 120. The
results, for this event is that the Red forces are defeated. Of course the situation may
change if one or more of the parameters changes. The important lesson given in this
example is the easiest way to model any of those alternatives, employing system
dynamics.

2.3.3 Range dependency

Another consideration that may be included into the models is the difference in
efficiency of the shots due to the different maximum effective distances of the guns. In
the following example we consider two forces approaching with some relative speed
and with difference into the effective distance of their weapons. For this case we are
using the Lanchester´s Square model, but this addition can be applicable to any model,
useful not only for the maximum distance but also for modeling an increase in the
probability of hits with the decreasing distance to the opposing force. The stock and
flow model is shown in figure 9.
 7

Enriching Lanchester
(range dependent attrition coefficients)
max effective
red distance
red
distance
ratio red eff mult
<Time>
Red Eff

Distance
Relative Blue Forces
speed Blue Attrition
Initial Blue Rate
blue distance
ratio

max effective blue eff mult

Blue distance
Red Forces
Red Attrition
Rate Initial Red

Blue Eff

Figure 9. Attrition dependent of the range of the weapons

The main equations are:

Blue Attrition Rate = Red Eff*Red Forces*red eff mult
red eff mult = WITH LOOKUP (red distance ratio)
red distance ratio = Distance /max effective red distance
Red Attrition Rate = Blue Eff*Blue Forces*blue eff mult
blue eff mult = WITH LOOKUP (blue distance ratio)
blue distance ratio = Distance /max effective blue distance
Distance = INTEG (Relative speed)

Example 4: Range dependency

Initial Blue & Red = 10 unit Blue and Red Eff=0.01
Max. Effective Red Distance = 60 Max. Effective Blue distance = 40
Outcomes
10

6
Unit

Red Force
4

2 Blue Force

0
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
Time (Minute)
Blue Forces : Current Red Forces : Current

Figure 10. Results of example of attrition dependent on the range of the weapons
 8

The Blue force is annihilated because the superiority in effective distance of the Red
weapons allows the Red starting earlier the firing.

2.3.4 Heterogeneous Forces

Another possibility of enriching the model is to have more than two forces. In the
example indicated in figure 11 are considered 3 forces: US Tanks, US Helicopters and
Iraqis Tanks, with their different efficiencies against each others. In this same way, if
required, may be added more forces and/or be combined with the enrichments just
described.

Gulf War: Blue: US Tanks + US Helos; Red: Iraquies Tanks

Iraq Eff against

Initial US US Tanks
Tanks
Gulf War
US Tanks 600
US Tanks
Attrition Rate 34 US Tanks Lost

450
US Tanks Eff Irak Tanks Attrition

Tanques
Initial Iraq
Tanks 300
17 US Helos Lost
Iraq Tanks
Iraq Tanks 150
Attrition rate

US Helos Eff 0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Time (Day)
US Tanks : Current
US Helos Iraq Tanks : Current
US Helos
Attrition Rate US Helos : Current
Initial US
Helos
Iraq Eff against
US Helos

Figure 11. Heterogeneous forces

To obtain those results for this case of heterogeneous forces it was considered the
following data:
Iraq Tanks Attrition rate = US Helos Eff * US Helos + US Tanks Eff * US Tanks
Initial US Tanks = 500 Initial US Helos = 100 Initial Iraq Tanks = 300
US Helos Eff = 0.8 Iraq Eff against US Helos = 0.1
US Tanks Eff = 0.4 Iraq Eff against US Tanks = 0.2

2.4 Guerrilla Warfare

Also it may be incorporated both linear and square law for modeling guerrilla warfare.
The attrition of the conventional forces correspond to the square law, as the guerrilla are
able to fire to the conventional forces in full view, therefore the conventional losses are
proportional to the number of the guerrilla firing, but the conventional forces are unable
to target the guerrillas and must fire blindly into the area the guerrilla occupy. In these
circumstances the guerrilla losses will be proportional to the number of ambushed
forces and the number of guerrilla occupying the area. The model of this case and
results of example 5 are shown in figure 12.
 9

Rate of Fire of
Blue Forces
Probability of
Guerrilla killed
Initial Guerrilla Outcomes
Red Guerrillas 20,000
Guerrilla
Attrition Area of 16,000
concentration Blue Force
12,000

M en
Area
Blue Red Ratio
Contacts 8,000
Area of
Operations 4,000 Red Guerrillas

Blue Forces 0
Blue Forces 0 240 480 720 960 1200
Attrition Initial Blue Time (Day)
Forces
Blue Forces : Current
Red Guerrillas : Current
Probability of Blue
Forces killed Rate of Fire of
Guerrilla

Figure 12. Guerrilla warfare

The main equations are:
Area Ratio = Area of concentration / Area of Operations
Guerrilla Attrition = Area Ratio * Blue Red Contacts * Rate of Fire of Blue Forces *
Probability of Guerrilla killed
Blue Forces Attrition = Red Guerrillas * Probability of Blue Forces killed * Rate of Fire
of Guerrilla
The Area Ratio has reduced the effectiveness of the conventional troops because the
total probability of unaimed fire hitting a lesser ambushing force is much smaller than
the probability of aimed fire hitting full exposed conventional troops.

Example 5. Guerrilla warfare

Initial Blue Forces = 20000 Initial guerrilla = 5000

Rate of Fire of Blue Forces = 10 Rate of Fire of Guerrilla = 10
Probability of Blue Forces killed = 0.001 Probability of Guerrilla killed = 0.001
Area of concentration= 2 Area of Operations = 100000

2.5 Application of the Lanchester equations to a simulated combat

A scenario for a simple land combat model

We will simulate the combat between two opposing forces, the Blue and the Red
[Coyle, 1996]. The Blue forces consists of 1200 initial men in the front line, with their
complete ammunition stock; 2000 soldiers in Reserve, with their ammunition ready to
be transported in 30 trucks to be shared between reserve forces and ammunition. It
should be noted that the Blue Reserve forces only have a limited transport capability, to
share among the reserve soldiers and their ammunition. Also the Blue forces have 20
armored helicopters to be employed mainly to attack the Red reinforcements, in order to
deter and to make difficult their advance to the front line.
 10

The Red forces are only 1000 initial men in the front line of the battle (i.e. 200 soldiers
less than the Blue combatant), and 2000 soldiers on reserve, to be committed at the
request of the Tactical Commander. The Red Reserves have sufficient transport and
ammunition for sustaining the whole combat.
We will be testing the following tactical decision:
The Red Tactical Commander will take advantage of his transport facilities and will
commit the reserves as soon as the battle starts, accepting the heavy casualties that may
be caused by the action of the Blue helicopters.
The Blue Tactical Commander is confident about the 20% difference of the initial
forces for providing a winning edge, and the action of the helicopters for difficulty the
Red reinforcement. Also been conscious of his limited transport capability will commit
his reserves only if the Blue forces are matched by the Red ones, i.e. at a Red/Blue
Ratio=1. In this event, he will give the orders to commit the reserves leaving to the
Reserves Commander and the Logistic Commander to deal with the Transport
Commander for sending to the front line the soldiers and their ammunition.
The following causal diagram shows this scenario. In the center is the Lanchester model
previously explained with their corresponding additions to consider the reinforcements,
the transport of men and ammunitions in the Blue side (in the Red side the ammunitions
transport is omitted as no new information will provide), and the action of the Blue
Helicopters against the Red reserves.

Blue acceptance
+
Force Ratio + Red rate of
Red/Blue fire per man
Blue Mean Blue killed +
Force Ratio Total Red
reserve per red shot
+ forces Firing Rate + + + Red
- + Red Reserve Red Reserve
Force Ratio + Reserve
- Blue + Arrival Rate Commitment rate
Trigger Red - Forces
+ Attrition -
Forces
Blue Reserve + Blue Reserve +
- -
Commitment Rate Blue -
Arrival Rate
Forces Red Delay Reserves
+ Attrition +
+ + +
Transport for Total Blue +
Troop Movement Desired - Firing Rate Blue
Ammunition Mean Red killed
Blue ammunition + Helos
+ per Blue + per blue shot
+ per man
- Desired
+ + Blue rate of
Ammunition Stock
Total Blue fire per man
Transport +
capacity -
Ammunition Stock
- discrepancy Blue
- ammunition
+ + Stock
+
Transport for +
Ammunition
Movement
+ Ammunition Ammunition
Dispatch Rate + Arrival Rate

Figure 13. Causal loop diagram of the combat scenario

The CLD is shown in Figure 13 and the stock and flow model in Figure 14.
 11

Blue Reserve Men

per Truck

Blue Reserve Time to deploy Initial Red

Red rate of fire Mean Blue killed Red reserves Transport
Forces per red shot
Blue Reserve per man
Initial Blue Initial Blue Red Transport
Commitment Rate
Reserves Capacity
Red Reserve
++ Transport
Blue Forces
Blue Reserve
Initial Blue Blue Attrition
arrival Rate
Transport capacity Rate

Blue Reserves Red Reserves

Transport Rate Men per Truck

Blue Blue Transport Reserve

Transport Transport % Red Forces Red Reserve
Delay Capacity
Assign Red Red reserve Forces
+ Attrition arrival Rate Red Red Reserve
Initial red Reserve
Mean Red killed Rate Initial Red Attrition Rate
commitment
Blue Ammunition per blue shot + Rate Reserves
Transport Rate
Attrition Rate
Blue rate of per Helo
Delay Multiplier <Time>
Ammunition per fire per man
Truck
<Blue Forces>
Blue Blue Helos Blue helos
Ammunition Attrition
Stock
Blue Ammunition Blue Ammunition
Arrival Rate Initial Blue
Comsumption Rate Helos

Figure 14. Combat model

After initiating the combat, at less than 4 hours, the Red forces matched the Blue ones.
The action of the helicopters were not sufficient to detain the Red reserves incorporation
to the front line, and even with the delay, the incorporation of their reserves were
enough to counter against the attrition rate caused by the Blue forces.

Blue vs Red
2,000

1,500
Blue Forces
Men

1,000 Red Forces

500
The Red commander started to
commit their reserves

0
0 0.40 0.80 1.20 1.60 2 2.40 2.80 3.20 3.60 4
Time (Hour)
Blue Forces : square Red Forces : square

Figure 15. Results at 4 hours of combat

Following the previous planning, the Blue Tactical Commander orders to commit the
Reserves, consisting in soldiers and their ammunitions. Their split in the transport is left
to the field commanders. Here we may have at least two opposing events:
 12

a. - The Blue Reserve Commander insist to have his forces in the front line at once,
requesting the maximum possible transport:

Blue vs Red
4,000 The Blue Reserve
Commmander wanted to
start the reinforcement
3,000
at maximun rate,
requesting 80% of the
Men

2,000 Blue Forces Transport

1,000 Red Forces

0.8 Trucks for soldiers,
0.2 for Ammunition
0
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
Time (Hour)
Blue Forces : square Red Forces : square

Stocks
2,000 Men Lack of
Lack of ammunition,
ammunition,
2M
400 diminished the
diminished the firing
firing rate
rate

1,000 Men
1M
200

0 Men
0
0
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
Time (Hour)
Blue Reserve Forces : square Men
Red Reserve Forces : square Men
Blue Ammunition Stock : square
Red Transport Capacity : square

Figure 16. Results with 80% of transport for soldiers

The outcome of this event is shown in the simulation; a complete defeat of the Blue
forces, mainly due to the lack of ammunition, which will be diminishing the firing rate
of the soldiers.

b. - The Logistic Commander obtains the maximum transport:

Blue vs Red ..or may be the Blue
2,000 Logistic Commmander
wanted to start
1,500
transporting ammunition
Red Forces at maximun rate,
requesting 70% of the
Men

1,000
Transport
500 Blue Forces
0.3 Trucks for Soldiers,
0 0.7 for Ammunition
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time (Hour)
Blue Forces : square Red Forces : square

Stocks
2,000 Men
2M Plenty of ammunition, keeping
400 the maximun firing rate
1,000 Men
1.5 M
200
…but low rate of
0 Men reinforcement
1M
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time (Hour)
Blue Reserve Forces : square Men
Red Reserve Forces : square Men
Blue Ammunition Stock : square
Red Transport Capacity : square

Figure 17. Results for 70% of trucks for ammunitions

 13

In this case the Blue also will be defeated; now the Blue forces will have plenty of
ammunition in the front line but not enough soldiers.
As we see from the above figures 16 and 17, both commanders are doing their best
efforts to comply with the orders, for the benefits of the war, and their efforts are
plausible, but we see that any of those events causes a complete defeat of the Blue
forces, with very heavy casualties.
Looking more closely to this part of the causal diagram (Figure 18) it is shown that the
split of the Blue transport between Men and Ammunition is a high leverage point, as it
affects the complete outcome of the combat, therefore the Tactical Commander should
not delegate the authority to any other field commander, as he is the only one
empowered to take decisions at “system level”.
This is one of the central aspects of System Dynamics referring to the system view that
should be taken in the decisions, and where the proper tools employed in this discipline
helps in understanding the important aspects of the systems.

Blue acceptance
+ Red rate of
Force Ratio +
Red/Blue fire per man
Blue Mean Blue killed +
Force Ratio Total Red
reserve per red shot
+ forces
- + Firing Rate +
Force Ratio +
- Blue
Trigger
+- Attrition
Red
- Forces
Blue Reserve + Blue Reserve +
Blue -
Commitment Rate Arrival Rate
Forces Red
+ Attrition
+
+ +
Total Blue +
Transport for
Troop Movement Desired - Firing Rate
Ammunition Mean Red killed
Blue ammunition +
+ per Blue + + per blue shot
per man
- - Desired
Ammunition Stock + + Blue rate of
Total Blue fire per man
Transport
+
capacity
Ammunition Stock -
- discrepancy
- - Blue
+ + ammunition
Transport for + Stock
+
Ammunition
Movement
+ Ammunition Ammunition
Dispatch Rate + Arrival Rate

Figure 18. Causal diagram of the combat scenario indicating the leverage of the
decision of transport splitting
 14

c.- The Tactical Commander understands the importance of the issue and makes his
own decision, not delegating to their subordinates commanders, as shown below:

Blue vs Red
2,000
Blue Forces Tactical Commander
1,500 decision:
0.5 Trucks for Soldiers,
0.5 for Ammunition
Men

1,000

500 Red Forces

0 The Blue Reserves rate of

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 arrival was superior to the Red
Time (Hour)
Blue Forces : square Red Forces : square
The combat lasted 150 hr. as
Stocks planned, with complete defeat of
2,000 Men Red
2M
400

1,000 Men
1M The Blue Ammunition lasted
200 almost up to the end

0 Men
0
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time (Hour)
Blue Reserve Forces : square Men
Red Reserve Forces : square Men
Blue Ammunition Stock : square
Red Transport Capacity : square

Figure 19. Results of the combat after Tactical Commander decision

In this case the outcome of the combat is a Blue success. System Dynamics have shown
that the application of their concepts applied to a combat situation as shown in this
simple scenario, may help to the commanders in devising sound tactical concepts and
procedures.

To end up the case, we can adapt from ‘Policies, Decisions and Information Sources for
Modeling’, Jay Forrester page 52 in Modeling for Learning Organizations, the
following lesson that applies to the example just described:

“A Commander sets the stage for action by choosing which information sources to
take seriously and which to ignore. A Commander’s success depends on both,
selecting the most relevant information and on using that information effectively.
How quickly or slowly is information converted into action? What is the relative
weight given to different information sources in light of desired objectives? How are
these desired objectives created from available information?”

3. Conclusions
We had reviewed several combat models, coming from different sources, but adapting
to employ system dynamics concepts and tools. The objectives of the models are a
recurrent subject in the system dynamist world and had been treated in different studies.
The combat models objectives are not as different as the general models of any science,
but it would not be a complete treatment of this subject if we not recall again. A combat
model is a fair representation of reality observed in each battle. It helps in tactical
planning, even having a limited power to foresee battle details. To be useful must be
 15

able to implement and produce credible results. It must be built upon assumption
grounded in sound tactical theory. The model should allow to the user the opportunity to
vary inputs concerning the allocation and deployment of the platforms. One of the
normal weaknesses of modeling is trying to include as much details as possible,
sometimes absolutely unnecessary, which only obscure the main issues. In a real battle
there are so many unforeseen factors that probably are useless trying to include in a
model many details, and loosing the main aspects. The concept of “bounded rationality”
[Morecroft, 2007] in the decisions is applicable as well in a battle environment, as the
commander takes his decision based upon in few pieces of information and normally
with time pressures. McGunnigle and Lucas [McGunnigle John, 1999] addressed the
military value of information in conflict, developing some experiments, one of them
resulting that many military decision makers do not always use information optimally.
Ghaffarzadegan [Ghaffarzadegan, Lynies, Richardson, 2009] review the benefits of
using small system dynamics models to address public policy questions and obtain
insightful and important lessons. These same concepts are applicable to combats
models. All those characteristics made System Dynamics very suitable for modeling
combat situations, unfortunately not widely employed, at least in the open literature.
This study tries to overcome these failures and hopes futures works in this important
field could make be available to the general audience.

References

Coyle, R. G. System Dynamics Modelling, A Practical Approach, Chapman &

Hall/CRC, 1996
Forrester, J. Industrial Dynamics, Pegasus Communications, Inc. 1961, 1999
Ghaffarzadeggan Navid, Lyneis John, Richardson George, Why and How Small
Dynamics Models Can Help Policymakers: A review of Two Public Policy Models,
Systems Dynamics Conference, 2009
Lanchester, F., Aircraft in Warfare: the Dawn of the Fourth Arm, Constable and Co.
Ltd. 1916
Lucas Thomas, Dr. Naval Postgraduate School. Personal communication. 2009
McGunnigle John, An Exploratory Analysis of the Military Value of Information and
Force, Naval Postgraduate School, MSc Thesis, 1999
Morecroft, J. Strategic Modelling and Business Dynamics, A feedback systems
approach, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 2007
Morse & Kimball, Methods of Operations Research, MIT Press, First Edition Revised,
1950
Naval Postgraduate School, Operations Research Department, Aggregated Combat
Models, February 2000.
Osipov M. The Influence of the Numerical Strength of Engaged Forces on Their
Casualties, October 1915.
Washburn Alan, Lanchester Systems, US Naval Postgraduate School, April 2000.