International Phenomenological Society

Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality

Author(s): James C. Morrison
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Sep., 1970), pp. 27-46
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105978 .
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 HUSSERLAND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY

"Finally, many people view phenomenology as a continuation of Brentano's

psychology. However highly estimate this work of genius, and however strongly
it (and other writings of Brentano's) has affected me in younger years, it must
still be said that Brentano has remained far from a phenomenology in our
sense.... Nevertheless, he has gained for himself the epoch-making service
of making phenomenology possible. He presented to the modem era the idea
of Intentionality, which he derived out of consciousness itself in immanent
description . . ." 1

The above is generalknowledgein the philosophicalworld. However,

it is often assumedon the basis of these facts alone that Husserl'sdoctrine
of Intentionalityis essentiallythe same as Brentano's.Hence scholarswill
study the latter in order to find out what Husserl'sconceptionof it is
and critics will attempt to refute Husserl and even phenomenologyin
generalby refutingBrentano.This is a mistake.Althoughit is true as a
matter of historicalfact that Husserl was Brentano'sstudent and first
derivedthis idea from him, it is not true that the meaningand importance
each gives to it is the same, even in fundamentals.I believe that a failure
to realizethis has led to a great deal of misinterpretation and misunder-
standingof Husserl and phenomenology.It is the purpose of this essay
to attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenologicalviews are very
differentfrom and far more developedthan Brentano's,and that he even
rejects(whollyor in part) many of the latter's,most importantdoctrines.
In order to clarify this problem I propose to discuss Brentano'swell-
known attemptto distinguishmental and physical phenomenain which
he introducesthe notion of "IntentionalInexistence."I will then take Up
Husserl's views on both the general problem of mental vs. physical
phenomenaand on the more specific one of Intentionality.No attempt
will be made to give a complete account of Husserl's own views on
Intentionality,since to do so adequatelywould imply a discussionof his
whole philosophy.Also, I will concentratealmost exclusivelyon material
from the Logische Untersuchungen,since it is here that he makes most
explicitand detailedreferenceto Brentano.

1 Edmund Husserl, Ideen III, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1952, p. 59.

27
28 RESEARCH
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I.

The basic purpose of Brentano'schapter, "On the Basic Difference

Between Mental and Physical Phenomena" is ". . . the clarification of
the two terms:physical [physisches]phenomenon- mental [psychisches]
phenomenon."2 He begins by assertingthat "The entire world of what
appearsto us falls into two great classes, the class of physical and that
of mentalphenomena."3 Brentanoassumesthis division and its exhaus-
tivenessto be obvious for he never attemptsto arguefor it. The method
he adoptsis simplyto find at least one (perhapsseveral)specificdefining
characteristicof each class, i.e., a characteristicthat all membersof one
class have and no membersof the otherhave. I believe that Brentano,in
the course of his analysis,finds altogethereight defining characteristics
of mental phenomena,althoughhe does not accord all of them equal
significance.From his own, Husserl's and our point of view the most
importantis IntenitonalInexistence.
The first defining characteristicis given in terms of the notion of
presentation(Vorstellung).

(1) "Every presentation of sensation or fantasies offers an example of mental phe-

nomena: and I understand here by presentation not that which is presented
but rather the act of presenting. Thus, the hearing of a tone, the seeing of a
colored object, the sensing of warm or cold, as well as similar fantasy states
are examples .... 4

Here Brentanomakes an importantdistinctionbetweenwhat is presented

and the act of presenting,the implicationbeing that all mentalphenomena
are acts. Further examples of acts include: thinking, judging, remem-
brance, expectation, doubt, fear, and willing.5 Examples of physical
phenomena,on the other hand, are colors, figure, a landscape,warmth
and cold, and pictures(Gebilde)that appearin fantasie.6

2 Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte,Vol. I, Dunker &

Humblot, Leipzig 1874, pp. 102-3. (Hereafter: Psych.)
3 Die gesammte Welt unserer Erscheinungen zerfllt in zwei grosse Classen, in
die Classe physische und in die der psychischen Phinomene." Note Brentano's use
of the term "Erscheinung!';we will see later that its ambiguities lead him into
difficulties. Psych. 101.
4 Psych. 103.
5 Psych. 103.
6 Psych. 104. Note that Brentano does not distinguish here between a sense-
quality (e.g., a color) and a physical object (e.g., a landscape) - both are called
physical phenomena. This ambiguity will be seen to be important later, in that it
seriously confuses his analysis.
 AND BRENTANOON INTENTIONALITY
HEUSSERL 29

(2) "We may accordingly regard it as an indubitably correct determination of

mental phenomena that they are either presentations or (in the sense which
has been explained) rest on presentations as their basis."7

Here Brentanomentionsthe traditionalway of definingphysicalphenom-

ena in terms of extension and spatial determinativeness(lrtliche Be-
stimmtheit),the oppositeholdingfor mentalphenomena.8He rejectsthis
solutionbecausehe believes some mental phenomena(tones and smells)
are not extended.Also, it could be arguedthat, duringthe first stages of
our experience,the objectsof sight and other presentationsare not expe-
rienced as localized in space. Conversely,we tend to locate our own
thoughtsin "the space filled by use," i.e., in our bodies.9 Finally, the
above definitionis rejectedbecause it gives only a negativecharacteriza-
tion of mentalphenomena.
(3) "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the
middle ages have called the intentional (or mental mentalle) existence of an
object, and what we, although with a not wholly unambiguousexpression, would
call the reference to a content, direction to an object (by which is not to be
understood a reality) or immanent objectivity."10

That is, each mental phenomenon "contains [enthfilt] in itself something

as an object, thoughnot alwaysin the same way."
"In the presentation something is presented, in the judgment something is af-
firmed or denied, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired,
etc. 92i1

Further, it is not necessary that the object be an external one (iusserer

Gegenstand),for it is possibleto desire not the tone itself but simplythe
hearingof it.12 This raises certainproblemsabout the "levels"of reflec-
tion which Brentanodoes not explicitlygo into. But it is clearly implied
that the "object"of a given act (hearing)can be anotheract (the desire
to hear). Thus, in the case of desiringto hear a tone the tone is a (non-
act) object of the act of hearingwhich is itself the '~object"of another
act, that of desiring.The point Brentanowishes to make is not that a
given act cannot be an object, but that every (mental)act has an object,
somethingit refersto.
7Note that it is neither asserted nor implied that all acts are presentations or
that all mental phenomena are presentations.
8 Psych. 111-2.
9 Psych. 114.
10 Psych. 115.
At Psych. 115.
12 Psych. 117-8.
30 RESEARCH
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(4) "[Mental phenomena] are perceived [wahrgenommen]only in inner conscious-

ness, while in the case of the physical only outer perception is possible."13

Here, inner and outherperceptionare not defined, but one may assume
that the latter involves the bodily sense-organs,the former not. Also,
Brentanoseems to think of inner perceptionas a kind of "introspection"
or inward"reflection."

(5) "If we thus say that mental phenomena are those which are grasped through
inner perception it is thereby implied that its perception is immediately
evident.?14

Further,

"Inner perception ... is really the only perception in the genuine sense of the
word."

The reasonfor the last assertionis that the phenomenaof outerperception

cannot be proven as "true and actual."15 A serious ambiguityarises
here, for it is not clear whether Brentano is saying that this is so for
external perceptionin general (all cases) or only for any given case.
Nevertheless,it seemsthat he is assertingthat the class of mentalphenom-
ena is coextensivewith that of objects of inner perceptionor "genuine"
perceptionand of evident(non-deceptive)perception.

(6) "It is not as if all mental phenomena are internally perceivable by every-
one ...; rather, it is apparent and was explicitly noted by us earlier that no
mental phenomenon is perceived by more than one individual."16

This assertionis closely linked with (5) above. Brentanoseems to think,

that becausemental phenomenaare perceivedby inner perception,and
because only the latter is "genuine"perception,it follows that mental
phenomenaare "private,"accessible only to the individualperson who
has them.By implication,physicalphenomenaare "public"and accessible
(perceivable)by more than one person.

(7) "... They [mental phenomena] are the only phenomena to which an actual as
well as intentional existence belongs."1"

13 Psych. 118.
'4 Psych. 119. (My italics.)
15 Psych. 119.
16 Psych. 119.
17 Psych. 120.
 HUSSERLAND BRENTANOON INTENTIONALITY 31

To clarifythis characteristicBrentanorefersto a view held by Bain that

the notion that an unperceived(and also unperceivable?)physical world
acts on the mind is self-contradictory.Perceptioncannot be the effect
(Wirkung)of the unperceivedand we cannot say what an object is inde-
pendent of perception.Bain's position here seems similar to that of
Berkeley,who also held that the conceptof "materialsubstance"is absurd
and self-contradictory.Brentano, on the other hand, resists this view,
for, if it is true, how could the belief in externalobjectsexistingindepen-
dent of perceptionand "causing"our perceiving of them ever arise?
Further,BrentanoaccusesBain of confusingthe sensation(Empfindung)
in the sense of what is presentedwith the (act) of sensing, a distinction
Brentanohimself takes great pains to make. For Brentano,physicalob-o
jects exist outsidethe mind but neverthelessthey have only an intentional
existence,ie., they are the objects of a possible perception.This view
has the twofold virtue of avoiding the self-contradictoryconcept of at
unperceivedand unperceivablephysical ojbect while at the same time
retainingthe obvious and importantdistinctionbetweenwhat is perceived
and the act of perceivingit. Thus, there is no temptationto say (with
Bain and Berkeley)that physical objectsare "partof" or "containedin"
our perceptionof them.'8 To this extent Brentanomay be said to hold
some form of "idealism,"though certainlynot a subjectivistBerkelean
kind.
Finally, BrentanodiscussesSpencer'sview that a distinguishingchar-
acteristicof mental phenomena is that they emerge in consciousness
successivelyone at a time, whereasphysicalphenomenaare synchronous,
i.e., they occur more than one at a time.'9 Brentanodoes not accept this
view completely,for he points out that Spencermust be thinkingof the
life (consciousness)of only one organism,20for clearly in the case of
two organismseach can have a (different)sensationor perceptionat the
same time. Furthermore,Brentanoholds this can also be true for only
one organism.For example, one can have a presentationand make a
judgmentabout it at the same time.2' It is necessaryto distinguishunity
and simplicity(which Spencer failed to do) and to realize that neither
necessarilyexcludes the other.22Mental phenomena,though not simple
in the sense of occurringonly one at a time, always appear as a unity,
i.e., appearas belongingto one consciousness.The implicationalso seems
to be that this consciousnessretainsits unity over a periodof time during
18 Psych. 120-2. Note that this seems inconsistent with (3) above.
19 Psych. 122-3.
20 Psych. 123.
21 Thus, while seeing red I can judge, "I see red."
w Psych. 125.
32 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
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the life of the organism.Thus, the final definingcharacteristicof mental

phenomenais.:

(8) Mental phenomena always appear to consciousness as a unity.23

I will now summarizewhat I believe are the basic definingcharacter-

istics of mentalphenomenafor Brentano.
(1) All mental phenomenaare acts
(2) All are either presentationsor have these as their basis
(3) All have the characteristicof IntentionalInexistence(consciousness
= consciousness-of)
(4) All are perceivedonly in inner consciousness
(5) All are evident(nondeceptive)
(6) All are "private"
(7) All have actual as well as intentionalexistence
(8) All always appearas a unity
Having succeededin distinguishingtheir respective "subject-matters"
(the rangeof entitieswhichthey study)Brentanois able to definepsychol-
ogy and physical science. Physical science is the science of physical
phenomena(excludingimages), i.e., all those phenomenawhich "emerge
in sensation(Empfindung)."Further,such a science assumes that sensa-
tions are the effect of a three-dimensionalspatialand temporalworld on
our sense organs.But as the science of physical phenomenait does not
describe the "absolute nature" of this world, but only ascribes to it
certain "powers".24By implicationphysical phenomena are not these
"powers"themselves.25Conversely, psychology is the science of all
mental phenomenabut also includes in its subject matter certain non-
mentalones, e.g., images,though these are consideredonly as the "con-
tent"of mental phenomena.26
Before turningto Husserl I would like to point out what seem to me
to be obvious and fundamentalconfusions and inconsistenciesin Bren-
tano's discussion. Note, for example, his assertion above that mental
phenomena are the "effects" of a spatiotemporalworld. First, what
reasd~s are there for believing or even assumingthis to be true, and
second,are the "objects"constitutingthis world physicalones? They cer-

23 Psych. 126.
24 Psych. 128.
25 Psych. 129.
26 Psych. 129-30. It is not clear why images are physical phenomena. The most

plausible interpretationwould seem to be because they lack Intentional Inexistence.

The fact that they are "extended"is ruled out since Brentano does not accept non-
extendedness as definitive of the mental. Psych. 111-15.
 ANDBRENTANO
HuSSERL ONINTENTIONALITY 33

tainly are not physicalphenomena.Are we left, then, with two "realms"

of the physical,"objects"and phenomena?This leads to a radicaldualism
which implies that no direct knowledge of the world which "causes"
physicalphenomenais possible.It is also highlyunlikelythat any indirect
knowledgeby inference is possible. At least, Brentano does not assert
thereis or can be and he seems to thinkwe are left in completeignorance
of it. We assumethat such a worldexists,but say nothingaboutits nature,
other than it is three-dimensionalspatiallyand temporally.And further,
how can we know this?Surelythis assumptionproducesabsurdity,in that
there would be two spatiotemporal"worlds,"that of mental and physical
phenomenaand that of the world of which they are the effect. The fact
that Brentanorejectsspace and time as definingcharacteristicsof physical
and mental phenomenarespectivelyis not to the point here, for no one
can deny that these phenomenaappearto us in space and time and thus
have these characteristics.Brentano seems to have fallen into a rather
crudeform of representationalrealismwhich is subjectto preciselythose
criticismsby Bain (and Berkeley)which he himself had earlierrejected
both as being necessarilyvalid in themselvesand as applyingto his own
position.
Anotherway of puttingthis same point is that Brentanohas here (and
at other places in his analysisalso) lost sight of the notion of intentional
existence and inexistence.For in ascribingthe latter to all (and only)
mentalphenomenaand in asserting(againstBain) that physicalphenom-
ena exist "outside"the mind and have only an intentionalexistence (i.e.,
are the objects of a possible perception)he was in effect denyingboth a
subjectiveidealism - all reality is "mental"- and the existence of an
unperceivable"cause"of phenomena,a "thing-in-itself."In other words,
a consistent applicationof the notion of IntentionalInexistence would
necessarily deny the possibility of assuming or even thinking of an
unperceivable"world-in-itself." This situationis made even more serious
when one considershis assertionthat no mental phenomenonis perceiv-
able by more than one person. That is, all mental phenomenaare by
nature"private."This, togetherwith the assertionthat only innerpercep-
tion is genuineperceptioncomes very close to solipsism,for it seems to
imply that all one can ever perceive are the "contents"of one's own
mind, and that since physical phenomena are unperceivablethey are
thereforeunknowable!Needless to say, such a view is absurdand would
render impossiblea science of both mental and physical phenomena.I
am not claimingthat any of Brentano'sdefiningcharacteristicsof mental
phenomena((1) to (8) above) are in themselves inconsistentwith one
another,but only that certainother thingshe says, includingsome of his
explanationsof them, lead to serious inconsistenciesand confusions. I
34 RESEARCH
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suggestfurtherthat the basic sourceof most (if not all) of these problems
is an insufficientgraspof IntentionalInexistenceand a consequentfailure
to carrythroughits full implications.And this bringsus to Husserl and
Intentionality.
II.

Husserlappendeda supplementto the second volume of the Logische

Untersuchungen called "Outerand Inner Perception- Physicaland Men-
tal Phenomena."In it he begins by giving a short "history"of the devel-
opmentof recentscientificand philosophicalviews about perceptionand
epistemologyfrom the experiences and beliefs of "naive man." Since
many of Brentano'sbasic theses fall withinthe scope of this "history"it
makes a good startingplace for our discussionof Husserl'scriticismand
the developmentof his own conceptionof Intentionality.27
Husserl claims that the naive man distinguishesouter and inner per-
ception, and does so on the basis of a distinction of their respective
"objects."Thus, the formeris perceptionof externalthings (Dinge), their
properties,relations,etc., and the latter is perceptionof the self and its
propertiesand relations.28Philosophically,this naive belief is expressed
by Descartes in terms of the dualism of mens vs. corpus and Locke's
distinctionbetween sensationand reflection. Sensationis the perception
of externalthings by means of the body, i.e., the sense organs, whereas
reflection (inner perception)is turned towardsthe mind and its "ideas"
and does not employ the bodily senses. Further,the distinctionbetween
the two kinds of perceptionis drawn on the basis of a differencein the
way they arise. Externalperceptionresults from the effects of external
thingson the sense organsand innerperceptionthroughreflectionon our
own minds.29In addition, outer perceptionis regardedas intrinsically
deceptive(or at least alwayscapableof deception)while innerperception
is evident. Because of this, it is implicitlyaccepted that only inner per-
ceptionis "worthyof the name."Throughfindinga descriptivecharacter-
istic applyingto all instancesof the one class and to none of the other it
was believed possible to distinguish psychology from the sciences of
nature.30Descartes,by emphasizingthe evident, nondeceptivenature of
inner perception- while I doubt I cannot doubt that I doubt - and the
27 It is interesting to note the remarkable similarity of Husseri's "history" with
Ryle's account of the "genesis"of the "Myth of the Ghost in the Machine." Gilbert
Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London 1960, Chap. I.
28 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, Pt. 2, 3rd ed., Max
Niemeyer, Halle 1922, p. 222. (Hereafter: L.U.)
29 L.U. 11, 2. 223.
30 L.U. U, 2. 224.
 HUSSERLANDBRENTANO
ONINTENTIONALITY 35

unreliabilityof the senses, was led to the conclusionthat the objects of

outer perception have only a phenomenal or "intentional" existence.31
We can thus divide phenomenainto two classes, but not the objects in
themselveswhich we suppose to "support"them, i.e., souls and bodies
(Seelen and Kirper). The latter are "transcendent" and on the the level
of pure descriptionwe make no judgmentsabout them.32As should be
obvious, these views apply to a great extent to Brentano, and Husserl
makesexplicitreferenceto him by sayingthat IntentionalInexistencewas
given as a positive characteristicof inner mental phenomena.This is a
purely descriptive characteristicand thus has the obvious virtue of
avoidingany referenceto a transcendent"metaphysical"world.33 The
mental and the physical are conceived of as phenomenagiven through
appearances(Gegebenheitder Erscheinungen).But as appearancesthey
are thoughtof as appearancesof something,that is, as effects of (trans-
cendent)bodies on our souls throughthe sense organs.This may suffice
as a general"history"of Brentano'sviews and the philosophicaltradition
in whichthey were deveoped.Let us now turn to Husserl'scriticismsand
transformationsof them.
First, Husserlsays that Brentanoholds that:
(a) inner perception mental = evident.
(b) outer perception = physical = nonevident (truigerisch).
That is, the class of entities denotedby each of the three terms in (a) is
coextensive,the same being true for the class denotedby the three terms
in (b).34 Although Brentanois here in accord with much of the philo-
sophicaltraditionHusserlfeels convincedthat not all these equivalences
are valid.For Husserl,inner and outerperceptiondo not have completely
"the same epistemologicalcharacter."Not every perception of the I
(des Ichs) is evident,if by I we mean the commonsense notion of one's
own empiricalpersonality.35His example is that certain mental states
(Zustdnde)are not evident since they are perceivedas having a location
in the body. For instance,a pain is experiencedas in my tooth and not
(say) in my foot. Here, inner and outer perceptionare intimatelyand
intrinsicallybound up in the total experience or perception, and any
possibilityof deceptionin one aspect is immediatelycarriedover to the
other.Furthermore,the deceptivenessis not simplya matterof our defec-

31 L.U. II, 2. 225.

32 L.U. II, 2. 226.
33 L.U. II, 2. 227.
34 L.U. HI, 2. 232.
35 L.U. II, 2. 231. One might suppose that Husserl has in mind here the falli-
bility of "introspection."
36 PHILOSOPHY
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tive "interpretation" of what is "given"(e.g., a careless introspection).36

As the converseof his criticismof the equivalencebetweeninner per-
ceptionand evidenceHusserlcriticizesthat betweenouter perceptionand
nonevidence.Brentanois rightin sayingthat much outer perception(e.g.,
of a house) is not evident.37However, it does not follow from this that
all outer perceptionas such is not evident. Brentano fails to make a
distinctionbetweenthe perceptionas relatedto the object(Gegenstand)-
the house - and perceptionas related to the "lived sensible contents"
(erlebten sinnlichenInhalteri).The latter are the presentingsensations
(Empfindungen)and since, when perceivinga physicalobjectwe make no
judgmentabout them,38we cannot be deceived about them. If, on the
other hand,we do turn our attentionto these sensiblecontentswe can be
mistaken.39The point, however, is that since the sensible contents are
physical phenomenahere is case of an evident outer perception. Al-
thoughHusserldoes not here give an examplewhat he seems to have in
mind is the following.When perceivinga house I have a sensationof its
color (say red). Ordinarily,I am "directedupon" the house and not my
perceivingof it. Thus, in makinga judgmentI would say, "The house is
red." However,if I turn my attention- reflect upon - my perceivingthe
house I am turnedtowardthe sensiblecontentof my perception(not the
house itself). Thus, I am concernedwith how the house appearsto me,
and in makinga judgmentI judgenot aboutthe house but aboutits mode
of appearance("The house looks red"). Here, the redness is conceived
of as a sensation- as a physicalphenomenon- and not as an objective
property.It is physical(and not mental)in the sense that it is neitheran
act nor is it intentional.But since I am not judgingabout the house as
it reallyis, but only about how it looks to me, I cannotbe mistaken,i.e.,
the perceptionis evident.
Having denied Brentano's equivalences between inner and evident
perceptionand outer and nonevidentperceptionHusserlgoes on to make
a fundamentalrevisionof Brentano'saccount.

"It is certain that the sphere of concepts inner and outer, evident and non-
evident perception do not coincide. The first pair is determined through the
concepts of mental and physical, however one may now separate them; the
second characterizesthe fundamental epistemological opposition which we have

36 L.U. II, 2. 232.

37 We have seen above that it is not clear whether for Brentano outer percep-
tion can be of a house, a physical object, or whether it is always and only of
physical phenomena, there being a radical "gulf' between these. Objects are the
transcendent cause of phenomena and not (say) logical constructions out of them.
38 We judge about the house.
39 L.U. a, 2. 237.
 HUSSERLAND BRENTANOON INTENTIONALITY 37

studied in Investigation VI: the opposition between adequate perception (or

intuition [Anschauung] in the narrowest sense) . . and the merely supposed,
inadequate perception... ." 40

What Husserl wants to do is to replace Brentano's set of incorrect

equivalenceswit hanotheron the basis of the notions of adequate vs.
inadequateperception. This amounts to asserting that the distinction
between the mental and the physical is not to be drawn in terms of
evidencebut ratherin termsof adequacy.Thus, for Husserl:
inner perception mental = adequate
outer perception= physical= inadequate
To clarify the distinctionbetween evidence and adequacy (which can
easily be confused, as in the case of Brentano) Husserl says, that the
oppositeof the evident.is the deceptive(triigerisch),whereasthe opposite
of the adequateis "incompletefulfillment"(unvolikommeneErfifllung).41
To say that a perceptionis inadequateis simply to say that what is per-
ceived is not perceivedcompletely.That is, at a given time there is some
aspector propertyof the objectwhich is not "given"or presentedto me,
that does not appear.42Conversely,in adequateperceptionthe object is
perceivedcompletely,just as it is.43
The distinctionbetweenadequateand inadequateperceptionis obvious
in the case of the perceptionof a physical object. The lattes cannot in
principlebe perceivedadequatelyfor it is always seen from a point of
view - in perspectives(Abschattungen)- and there are an infinitenumber
of such perspectiveswhich are perceivable.To say that a physicalobject
could be perceivedadequatelywould amountto saying (for Husserl)that
at a given time it could be seen from all possible (an infinitenumberof)
points of view.44And this is obviouslyimpossibleboth in itself and for
a perceiver(like ourselves)who is himself located in space. Further,to
say (as Husserl does) that outer perceptionof physical objects is not
evidentis simplyto say that at any giventime I could be deceived,though
this does not imply that we could be deceived at all times. Thus, for
Husserl,there is no problemof the "reliability"of the senses in general,
as there was for Descartes.(Husserlwould no doubt agree that the pos-
sibilitythat we can be deceivedin some cases implies that there must be
40 L.U. II, 2. 239.
41 L.U. II, 2. 239.
42 Of course, it might appear at a later occasion and must be able (in principle)

to appear at some occasion, but these considerations are not relevant here.
43 L.U. II, 239 ff.
e This absurdity is the converse of the "realist"one of a thing-in-itself, i.e., of
an object that unperceivable, that is, what it is independent. of perception in
general
38 PHILOSOPHY
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
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in principleat least one case in which we are not deceived). In short,

Husserl rejects what we have designated as Brentano'sfifth defining
characteristicof mentalphenomena,that they are evident.
In Chapter I of the Fifth Investigationin Vol. II of the Logische
UntersuchungenHusserl begins by distinguishingthree different tradi-
tional conceptionsof consciousness.45
(a) Consciousnessis the "total actual phenomenologicalpermanenceof
the mental J.' 46
(b) "Consciousnessas inner awareness [Gewahrwerden]of one's own
mental lived-experiences[psychischenErlebnissen]."
(c) 'Consciousnessas the comprehensivedesignationfor every kind of
'mentalact' or 'intentionallived-experience."'
I would like first to take up relevantaspectsof (c), for it is here I think,
that the most importantof Husserl'scriticismsof Brentanoemerge.
(c) We saw above that Brentano accepted this as a defining character-
istic of mental phenomena(designatedas (1) in our list above). We are
faced with a twofold problemat the start. Is consciousnecsessentiallyan
act and what is the relationshipbetween conscious acts and what Bren-
tano means by mental phenomena?Husserl mentionstwo basic criteria
of the mentalfor Brentano,which by implicationhe believes are the most
importantfor him. The first is IntentionalInexistence. Moreover, for
Brentanothere are three basic classes of mental phenomena:presenta-
tions, judgments,and feelings. Husserl interpretsthese as ways of inten-
ding an object.48Thus, one way of intendingan objectis to present(e.g.,
perceive)it, anotheris to make a judgmentabout it, etc.
Husserl'sfirst objectionto this is that not all mental phenomenaare
acts, and hence not all are intentional.49 Laterin his discussion50 Husserl
uses the example of a feeling of being burned to illustratethis point.
Such a feeling, he says, is like the contents of sensations(Empfindungs-
inhalten)of smoothness,red, and roughness.A pain (say) can be located
in the body, and in this loose sense "refers"to an object (say my tooth),

45 L.U. II, 1. 346. Husserl does not assert nor does he imply that this threefold
division is exhaustive; nor does he identify his own position with any one of them.
A close study of his important works shows that he appropriates elements from
all three but goes far beyond them in developing his own highly original views.
46 "Bewusstsein als der gesamte reelie phinomenologische Bestand des empiri-
schen Ich..."
47 L.U. HK,X. 366.
48 Vorstellungen, Urteilen and Gemfithsbewegungen.
L.U. II, 1. 367.
49 L.U. 1I, 1. 364. The implication seems to be that if a mental phenomenon
is an act then it is necessarily intentional; also, all intentional phenomena are acts.
50 L.U. II, 1. 388 ff.
 HUSSERLAND BRENTANOON INTENTIONALITY 39

but such a "referring"is not at all act-like in character.In short, pain

sensationsand some other feelings are not acts. However, some feelings
are acts,>e.g.,,that of being pleased (Gefallen).51To be pleased is to be
pleased about something,whetherthis be a real, existing object, a fact,
a mere possibility,or whatever.Brentano,of course, would have to con-
clude,that because some sensationsand feelings are nonintentionalthey
are not acts and hence not mental phenomena.But Husserl thinks this
to be obviouslyfalse. Hence we must deny that all mental phenomena
are acts.
Again Husserl thinks it necessaryto revise radicallyBrentano'ster-
minology.We saw earlier that he introducedthe terms adequate-inade-
quate perceptioninstead of evident-nonevidentto bring out an essential
differencebetween mental and physical phenomena. Now he suggests
that the term mentalphenomenonbe avoided altogetherand in its place
be used that of intentionallived-experiences(intentionaleErlebnisse).52
A furtherdistinctionmust be made between the constitutivecontents of
consciousnessand lived-experienceson the one hand,-and the (say)
perceivedobject on the other. The object is in no sense a content or
constitutivepart of my consciousnessor of my lived-experiences.For
instance,when I perceive a thing (e.g., a box) I perceive it and not my
sensationsor experiencesof it. If I am perceivingat differenttimes my
sensationsmay (and do) change, but I am neverthelessperceivingthe
same box. Thus, the box, as the objectof an intentionalact of conscious-
ness is not the same as, nor is it reducibleto, my experiencesand sensa-
tions of it.53 The latter are immanent"contents"of my consciousness,
the formeris transcendent.54
In addition,just as lived-experiencesand contents of consciousness5&
must be distinguishedfrom the object or objective of consciousness,so
contentsmust be sharplydistinguished,, not be confusedwith the acts of
consciousness,e.g., that act of perceivingthe box.56
Husserlnow points out that it is very misleadingto speak as Brentano
does of the object which is perceived as "enteringinto" (treten) con-
51 L.U. II, 1. 388.
52 L.U. II, 1. 378.
53 In this sense Husserl is not a phenomenalist, though we shall see later other
senses in which he is sympathetic to this view.
54 L.U. II, 1. 382 ff. To say that an object is transcendent does not mean (for
Husserl) that it is beyond the possibility of experience. All it means in the present
context is that the object is not a lived-experience, is not "mental."
55 The relation between contents (Inhalten) of consciousness and lived-experiences
(Erleibnisse)is not wholly clear. For instance, are both acts?
56 L.U. II, 1. 380-1. We thus have the following rough schema: act-content-
object.
40 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

sciousness,as being "takenup," "contained"(enthalten)in consciousness

or the intentionallived-experience.&7 Such expressionsblur the distinction
between the content and the object. A perceived physical object (or
"phenomenon")is not "in" consciousnessor a "part"of it - it is always
transcendent.The immanentcontents which belong to the constituents
of an intentionallived-experienceare not themselves intended by the
latter,i.e., they are not the objectof the act. I do not see color sensations
or color experiencesbut colored things. The thing is thus not a "bundle
of impressions"or an "idea." We should avoid all talk of immanent
objects.Only the acts and contentsof consciousnessare immanent.&8
To concludethe discussionof consciousnessas act or lived-experience
I will mentionbriefly a point made by Husserl in regardto Brentano's
doctrinethat all mentalphenomenaare eitherpresentationsor are based
on them (definingcharacteristic(2) above). Husserlundertakesa labori-
ous and difficultanalysisof the notion of presentation,its relationshipto
judgment,etc., but I will here cite only one small part of it, the distinc-
tion betweentwo conceptionsof presentation.The first distinctionis that
a presentationis an act, e.g., of judging,or wishing;the second is that a
presentationis the matter of an act (Actmaterie),i.e., what is judged
about or wished for.&9Now, every intentionalconsciousact has a matter
as its object or objective.If, in Brentano'sthesis that all mentalphenom-
ena are either presentationsor are based on them only the second
meaningof presentationis used, then his view is acceptableto Husserl.60
However,what is needed is an analysisof presentation,which Brentano
certainlydoes not give.
(a) Consciousnessis the total phenomenalcontent of the mental I.61
Accordingto this view, the;act, contents and lived-experiencesof the I
are real occurrences(Vorkomnisse)and are constantlychanging,coming
into being and passing away. Examples are perceptions,fantasy presen-
tations, doubt, acts of thinking,pains, etc.62 But again Husserl warns
that we must be carefulto distinguishthese consciousmentalexperiences
from their "objects." For example, a color sensation, perceived or
imagined,is a content of consciousnessbut the colored object is not. It
will be rememberedthat Brentanobegan his discussionof the difference
betweenmentaland physicalphenomenaby asserting,"The entire world
of what appearsto us [unsererErscheinungen]falls into two great clas-

57 Psych. 115-6.
58 L.U. II, 1. 371-5.
59 L.U. II, 1. 456.
60 L.U. II, 1. 458.
61 L.U. II, 1. 346.
62 L.U. IL 1. 347.
 HUSSERLAND BRENTANOON INTENTIONALITY 41

ses. . ." 63 The use of the ambiguousterm "appearance"can be very

misleading,and we saw that Brentanohimself was not free of confusion
in this respect,e.g., in his failureto realizethe transcendentnatureof the
physical object and his tendency to reduce the physical to the mental
by speakingof the latter as being "containedin" consciousness,and as
"enteringinto" consciousness.64It is reasonableto assumethat a failure
to distinguishedthe differentmeaningsof appearanceis (at least partly)
at the source of these confusions.Husserl, on the other hand, is quite
clear on this point. Appearance,he says, can mean either the appearing
(erscheinen)of an object or the appearing(erscheinende)object. The
formeris a "mental"lived-experience,the latter not. The appearanceof
a thing(Dingerscheinung) is a lived-experience,but the thing that appears
is not. Expressed a bit differently,when I perceive a thing the thing
appearsto me (in a certainway), but what I perceiveis not the appear-
ance (of the thing) but the thing.65By implication,appearancesare not
"things,"and what I perceive are not them but simply the thing that
appears.Also, thingsexist when I (or anyone else) do not perceivethem,
but "appearances"exist only in perception,which simply means that to
say that it is being perceivedby someone in a certainway. "The appear-
ances themselvesdo not appear,they are experienced."66 One gets the
impressionin reading Brentano that phenomenaand appearancemean
basicallythe same thing. Such a view tends towards subjectiveidealism
and untimatelysolipsism, and also leads one to posit a thing-in-itself
"behind"the apearancesor phenomena,as perhapseven "causing"them.
Husserl,in denying that objects are appearancesor phenomena,avoids
fallinginto this position.
(b) Consciousis the inner awarenessof one's own mental lived-experi-
ences.67On this view (perhapsthe most familiarin naive thought)con-
scious "accompanies"the contents and lived-experiencesand is related
to them in such a way that they are its "objects."68 Accordingto this,
consciousnessmeans much the same as inner perception,69a term Bren-
tano frequentlyused, and which we gave as his fourth defining charac-
teristic of mental phenomena.Husserl, on the other hand, as wei have
alreadyseen, stronglyobjectsto the termsinnerand outerperception,and
prefers to subsitutefor them the concepts of adequate vs. inadequate

63 Psych. 101.
64 Psych. 115.
65 L.U. II, 1. 349 ff.
66 L.U. II, 1. 350.
T L.U. II, 1. 346.
68 Consciousness is conceived here as an "inner light."
69 L.U. II, 1. 354 ff.
42 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

perception. In regard, then, to our awareness of our lived-experiences,

such awareness can be adequate, but need not be. Thus, if our perception
is adequate then it is of my own lived-experiences, but the reverse does
not necessarily follow. In other words, I can fail to have an adequate per-
ception of a given lived-experience, but the latter are the only things of
which adequate perception is possible.70
Further, the I, for Husserl, is an empirical object (empirischer Gegen-
stand). As such, it is "reducible" to the contents and unity of conscious-
ness. But we can distinguish the momentary I (the empirical contents of
consciousness at a given time) from the I as that which remains and
persists through time. This distinction is analogous to that (in the physical
world) between the appearance of a thing and the thing that appears. The
latter also persists through time and remains a unity through its several
appearances. A basic difference between these two kinds of unity, how-
ever, lies in the fact that the unity of the physical thing is not phenom-
enal, that is, it is reducible to laws, e.g., the law of causality.7' Thus, we
can construct the following proportion. The complex of mental lived-
experiences: mental I appearances of the physical thing: physical
thing.72 There is thus no "pure" I "floating above" the empirical con-
tents of consciousness; 73 there is no primitive I as the "center" of the
relationships to all lived-experiences. The empirical I can perceive itself
just as it can external things - there is no need of a pure I (which cannot
perceive itself) to do this.
We may now compare Husserl's views about psychology and its rela-
tionship to natural science with those of Brentano. For Husserl, psycho-
logy studies the contents and lived-experiences of consciousness in order
to determine their origins, laws, causes, etc. It thus studies the empirical
I which is nothing but the unity of the relationships of these lived-
experiences to one another. Opposed to the empirical I are external
physical things which are intended by the I. They are not reducible to
mere presentations, but are given as objects. We may define the physical
world as the intentional correlate of all mental perceptions and judgments.
Thus, to the individual I corresponds the individual world, to the com-
munity of I's the social world and to the community of knowers the world
in itself. The Berkeley-Hume doctrine that bodies (Korper) are ideas
(Ideen) or "bundles" of ideas is false, for bodies are never perceived
"inwardly" (innerlich) and adequately as the former are, but always

70 LAU.II, 1. 354-5.
71 L.U. II, 1. 353-4.
72 L.U. II, 1. 361.
73 L.U. II, 1. 353. (Cf. Note 75.)
 HUSSERL AND BRENTANOON INTENTIONALITY 43

inadequately.Thus, Husserl ultimatelyrejects phenomenalism,which he

defines here as the view that the distinctionbetween the mental and the
physical lies in a correlationof laws, avoiding any referenceto "meta-
physical" entities like souls (Seele) and bodies. A phenomenalistic
psychology,then (one whichBrentanocertainlystrovefor) is a psychology
"without a soul," i.e., a psychology of mental phenomena.74 To this
extent Husserlwould agreewith phenomenalism,though,as we have seen
above, he clearly rejects any attempt to "reduce"physical objects to
phenomena("sense-data"),appearances,or the contents and experience
of consciousness.And since this is a fundamentaltenet of phenomenalism
(and empiricismin general), I think it fair to say that, on this ground
alone he rejects phenomenalism.75
'III.
Let us now conclude and attemptto summarizethe resultsof our dis-
cussion. Husserl warnsthat there are two errorsthat must, above all, be
avoided.The first is the representationaltheory(Bildertheorie),according
to which the physicalthing is "outside"consciousand its representatives
(Bilder, Vertreter)are "in" consciousness.The second error is that the
intentionalobject is immanent,i.e., is a sign (Zeichen)or representation.
These views are both fundamentallyfalse. The intentionalobject is not
an "internal representation" and the external thing is not something
"represented." Rather, the intentional object is the transcendent, external
object.76
I have attemptedto show above that Brentano,probablybecause of a
lack of ultimateclarityabout the intentionalnatureof consciousness,was
led to hold certain views which are ultimatelyinconsistentwith its true
meaning, e.g., he fell at times into a form of representationalism,sub-
jective idealism, and perhapseven solipsism.That is, he committed(or
came very close to committing)both the errors Husserl warns against
above. More specifically,we can summarizeour discussionof Husserl's
74 This material is taken from the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen,
1900-01, Chap. I, par. 7. It does not appear in the second and third editions.
75 Another sense in which Husserl is sympathetic to phenomenalism is his de-
fining the I in terms of empirical contents and his denial of a "pure"I. Of course,
after the Logische Untersuchungen he rejects this view, principally in the Ideen
where the notion of a transcendentalphilosophy and hence of a transcendentalego
is fully developed. Phenomenology and phenomenalism should not be confused.
76 L.U. II, 1. 421-5. This does not imply that all intentional objects are external
physical ones, since "ideal" objects (e.g., essences (Wesen)) are intentional objects.
To say that an object is intentional is to say simply that it is the object (referent)
of an actual or possible act of consciousness. It implies nothing about the objects
"reality"l or "mode of being."
44 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

criticismof Brentanoby referringto our list of the latter'seight defining

characteristicsof mental phenomena.
Husserl denies (1) - all mental phenomena are acts - since sensations
and certain feelings are clearly "mental"yet do not refer to an object
other than themselves.He accepts (2) with the importantreservationthat
presentationbe taken in the sense of act only (in which case (2) is
triviallytrue). He accepts (3) - all act-mentalphenomenahave Inten-
tional Inexistence- only in its bare form, i.e., all consciousnessis con-
sciousness=of. But he goes on to develop his own highly originalnotion
of Intentionality,denying many of the basic aspects of Brentano'sown
analysiS,.77Husserlrejects (4) and (5) by substitutingfor the term inner
perceptionthat of adequateperception and by distinguishingadequate
perceptionfrom evidence. (8) is accepted (with certain clarifications)to
the extent that consciousnesscan be conceived of as identical with the
unity of "mentalphenomena"and that the latter are always experienced
as a unity persistingthroughtime. Husserlaccepts (7) in that he defines
the physicalworld as the correlateof intentionalacts of consciousness.78
Thus, the physicalworld is not "actual"in the sense that it must be con-
ceived as the object of a possible consciousness,whereas consciousness
itself is actual in the sense that its object need not be real or existent
and its acts, qua acts, are not intentionalobjects.79Characteristic(6) -
that of the "privacy"of all mental phenomena- was not explicitly dis-
cussed, though I think we may supposethat Husserl would not reject it
altogether,since i one sense it is triviallytrue. For instance,.you cannot
have my pain since if you did it would be your pain and not mine. And
the converseis true in regardto my having your pains.
In my discussion I have concentratedon Husserl'sdetailed criticism
of Brentanoin the Logische Untersuchungen.I would now like to con-
clude with a short statement of what I think his most fundamental
objectionis, based on the later developmentsof phenomenologyfrom a
"descriptivepsychology"'in the Logische Untersuchungento the mature
statementof phenomenologyas a transcendentalphilosophyin the Ideen
(1913). One must be clear about the fundamentallydifferentmotivesand
aims of each thinker.Brentanowas concernedto groundpsychologyon
77 It should be onted that Brentano never uses the term "Intentionality" and
Husserl never uses that of "Intentional Inexistence" except when referring to
Brentano or Scholasticism. This fact by itself should give pause to critics and
interpretersof Husseri who think his views to be the same as Brentano's and hence
can refute him by refuting Brentano.
78 To this extent Husserl rejects traditional "realism," which for him is com-
mitted ultimately to the existence of a thing-in-itself.
79 Of course, an intentional act can become the "object of anotheract; e.g., one
can htink about thinking.
 HUSSERLAND BRENTANOON INTENTIONALITY 45

principlesand to delineate its own peculiar subject

empiricist-naturalist
matter as opposed to that of the natural physical sciences. Thus, for
him, the notion of IntentionalInexistencewas significantas a defining
characteristicof mental phenomena. For Husserl, on the other hand,
not psychology but philosophy was his central concern. More specifi-
cally, the significanceof Intentionalitylay in its implicationsfor the
establishingof philosophyas a "rigorousscience."Such a science is pos-
sible only on the basis of a radical critique of knowledge, which critique
would strive to trace all our knowledgeback to its original sources in
immediateexperience,to the evident self-givennessof all beings. This is
the basic meaningof: To the things themselves(Zu den Sachen selbst)!
And since the things themselvesare first "given"- constituted- in sub-
jectivity,the intentionalityof consciousnessbecomes the guiding "clue"
for the project of a phenomenologicalphilosophy. All this, of course,
lies very far from Brentano.
In the view of the later developmentsin the Ideen it becomes clear
that Huserl regardsBrentano'spsychologyand philosophy,and hence his
notion of IntentionalInexistence,as a naive and dogmaticNaturalism.80
That is, Brentano conceived consciousness - mental phenomena - as
inner-worldlyand mundane.They are thus part of naturejust as physical
phenomenaare. To this extent, the laws of psychologyare naturallaws,
whetheror not they are ultimatelyreducibleto the laws of physics. In
other words, for Husserl, Brentano's fundamentalmistake lay in not
seeing that the intentionalstructureof consciousnessultimatelyimplies
that all beings in the world are relative to consciousnessin so far as
they must be conceivedas a possible correlateor object of consciousness,
and that thereforethe latter itself cannotbe part of the world or nature,
but must be transcendental.8'The final justificationand clarificationof
the meaningof this transcendentalidealismmust be left to Husserlhim-
self and his writings.Suffice it to say here that Brentano'sbasic error
consistsin not understandingthe transcendentalimplicationsof his notion
of IntentionalInexistenceand hence the inadequacyof any "naturaliza-
tion of consciousness." On the other hand, perhaps his greatest contri-
bution was in seeing the formal structureof consciousnessas conscious-
ness-of and the inadequacyof the traditionalconceptionof consciousness
and the mind as "thinkingsubstance"(Cartesianrationalism)and/or a
"bundleof ideas" (empiricism).Closely allied with this insightis that of
the differencebetween a descriptiveand genetic psychology,which dis-

80 Cf. Husserl's Ideen III, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1952, p. 156.

81 This, for Husserl, is the utlimate meaning of Descartes' Cogito.
46 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

inction opened the path for Husserl'sown radicallyoriginalconception

of a transcendentalphenomenologicalpsychology.

"... However much I see in the [Brentano's]transformation of the Scholastic

concept of Intentionality a great discovery, through which alone phenomenology
has become possible, one must still essentially distinguish the pure psychology,
in my sense, implicitly contained in phenomenology and the psychology of
Brentano."82

And, of course, such an "essentialdistinction"is even more necessaryin

regardto Husserl'stranscendentalphenomenologyas a whole.

JAMES C. MORRISON.
UNIVERSITYOF TORONTO.

82 Ideen HI. p. 155.