FRED M. HARDEN, Petitioner, v.

EMILIO PEÑA from transferring or alienating moneys and other

and ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN, Respondents. properties belonging to the conjugal partnership,
except for valuable consideration with the consent
Vicente J. Francisco, for Petitioner. of the court.

Claro M. Recto, for Respondents. 2. On September 9, 1947, Esperanza filed a motion

SYLLABUS
1. HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP; INJUNCTION DULY ISSUED MUST
BE CONVEYED. — An injunction duly issued must
be obeyed, however erroneous the action of the
court may be, until its decision is overruled by
itself or by a higher court;
2. ID.; ID.; EARNINGS OF THE SPOUSES BEFORE
LIQUIDATION; EXTENT OF INJUNCTION ISSUED.
— So long as the conjugal partnership has not
been properly liquidated, all earnings of the
spouses belong to it prima facie and the injunction
order was broad enough to cover partnership
property then existing as well as profits
subsequently earned.
3. ID.; ID.; PROPRIETY OF ISSUANCE OF
INJUNCTION. — It is not always an abuse of
discretion to issue an injunction to protect the
plaintiff’s rights even if such rights are denied by
the defendant.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
The petitioner prays that, after proper proceedings,
judgment be rendered annulling the orders of the
respondent judge dated October 7, 1947 and
November 13, 1947 in civil case No. 59634 of the
Manila court of first instance. Both required Fred
M. Harden — under pain of contempt — to return
to the Philippines within fifteen days the amount of
P1,000,608.66 which he had remitted abroad, and
to redeposit the same in the account of the Plaza
Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank
of India, Australia and China.
On July 12, 1941, Esperanza P. Harden filed an
action in Manila against Fred M. Harden (whom
she married in December, 1917, in this city) and
one Jose Salumbides concerning administration of
their conjugal partnership, payment of alimony
and accounting (civil case No. 59634). The
following proceedings took place in that
litigation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On the same day, July 12, 1941, the court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction
commanding the defendants to desist and refrain
stating that despite the injunction and without the
consent of the court, Fred M. Harden had on
various dates made remittances totalling
P1,000,608.66 to Hongkong and California.
Wherefore, she requested that Fred M. Harden be
ordered to retrieve that amount for redeposit here.
3. Fred M. Harden opposed the motion, stating
various reasons which were replied to by
Esperanza’s counsel. A rejoinder to her reply was
subsequently answered with a rejoinder to the
rejoinder.
4. After considering the arguments of both parties,
the Hon. Emilio Peña, Judge, issued the order of
October 7, 1947, which upon a lengthy reargument
was reiterated in his order of November 13, 1947.
That order reads in part,
"It is hereby ordered . . . that an order of
preliminary injunction be immediately issued,
addressed to the defendants Fred M. Harden and
José Salumbides, commanding them to desist and
refrain from transferring or alienating monies,
funds, shares of stock, bonds, houses, and all
other properties and assets, real or personal,
belonging to the aforesaid conjugal partnership,
and which may be found in the names of said
defendants, or either of them, except for a valuable
consideration and with the consent of this Court
first had and obtained, upon the filing of a nominal
bond of P500."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner’s contention may be reduced to the
following main propositions:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
(a) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12,
1941, was void ab initio, for lack of jurisdiction or
abuse of discretion;
(b) Even if valid, the writ did not cover monies
acquired by Fred M. Harden after the liberation, or
moneys not existing on July 12, 1941;
(c) Esperanza has no right to complain because she
herself induced her husband to send funds outside
of the Philippines;
(d) Abuse of discretion was committed because the
question whether this amount of P1,000,608.66
belongs to the conjugal partnership is precisely one
of the issues in the main case No. 59634 and in
the incidental case No. L-1499 of this Court;
(e) It is inequitable to require this redeposit,
because anyway the conjugal properties in the
Islands are worth more than three million and a
half pesos, and the rights of Esperanza are
guaranteed by the half-portion of this amount that
will surely be adjudged to Fred M. Harden.
The above propositions will be taken up in their
order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The arguments advanced in support of the
petitioner’s first proposition are those submitted in
G. R. No. L-1499 of this court wherein petitioner
herein questions the authority of the Manila court
of first instance to establish a receivership in Case
No. 59634 and to issue injunction orders pursuant
thereto. Inasmuch as we upheld in that case (G. R.
No. L-1499) the validity of the injunction, the
validity of the orders must also be sustained. The
most that petitioner may claim is that the
injunction was erroneously issued. But authorities
are to the effect that an injunction duly issued
must be obeyed, however erroneous the action of
the court may be, until its decision is overruled by
itself or by a higher court.
(b) The petitioner argues that supposing the
injunction of July 12, 1941, was valid, it did not
and could not affect moneys and other properties
acquired by him after the liberation.
We fail to see any merit in the contention. So long
as the conjugal partnership has not been properly
liquidated, all earnings of the spouses belong to it
and the injunction order was broad enough to
cover partnership property then existing as well as
profits subsequently earned. The respondents were
at some pains to show that such money was actual
earnings of the business of the partnership; but it
is not necessary to delve into the matter because,
as we declare, the order made no distinction.
(c) Petitioner’s objection concerning this point is
that Esperanza Harden had been requesting him to
send money out of the Philippines for her expenses
and those of their daughter Sarah. He argues that
inasmuch as he did nothing more than to comply
with her request, he should not be responsible for
the withdrawals of money he had necessarily to
make.
This objection has practically been eliminated by
our resolution of March 2, 1948, wherein we
indicated to petitioner that he should ask the lower
court to be relieved of the duty of bringing back to
the Philippines the amounts he had delivered or
sent to Mrs. Harden and Sarah Harden.
(d) It is alleged that the respondent abused his
discretion in ordering the redeposit of the amount
of P1,000,608.66 because the question whether
Fred M. Harden was under such obligation
constituted one of the issues in the case, the
nature of the funds being in contest, Mrs. Harden
asserting they were conjugal, and the petitioner
sustaining they were his own personal funds.
There being no question that the parties were and
still are married, the presumption is that
properties or moneys earned during the marriage
are conjugal. 1 And it is not always an abuse of
discretion to issue an injunction to protect the
plaintiff’s rights even if such rights are denied by
the defendant. 2
Now, having issued the injunction, the court had
power and authority to compel obedience thereto.
It does not matter that the propriety of the
injunction was challenged before this Court in G.
R. No. L-1499. Unless we promulgated a
restraining order, His Honor could indulge in the
assumption that there was here no desire to
interfere with proceedings designed to re-establish
the status quo. More than that, on October 29,
1947, we denied the request of herein petitioner in
G. R. No. L-1499 that preliminary injunction issue
to restrain the execution of the order of October 7,
1947.
(e) Finally it is argued that inasmuch as there are
in the Philippines assets of the conjugal
partnership amounting to P3,500,000, it is
unnecessary to require this redeposit inasmuch as
Esperanza’s rights are protected by her moiety of
the assets found in this country.
Respondent’s reply points out that actually the
estate and effects in our territory do not exceed
P2,000,000; that petitioner Harden has already
withdrawn from the Philippines at least about
P3,456,440; and that consequently the properties
in the Philippines will not be sufficient to make up
for Esperanza’s share in the amount of
P1,000,608.66. Under such circumstances we are
not prepared to hold that the trial judge’s
insistence on the re-deposit constituted grave
abuse of discretion.
Consequently the petition must be, and is hereby
denied.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
W. A. Kincaid, for Appellants.
Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEAL; ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. — Where
upon an appeal by both the plaintiff and the
defendant it appears that the plaintiff made no
assignment of errors against the rulings or against
the decision of the lower court. so much of the
judgment as may be adverse to the plaintiff can not
be considered by this court.
2. MARRIAGE; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. — When
a marriage ceremony is duly celebrated between
two persons upon a certain date, in order to show
that the same persons are lawfully married before
that time it is necessary to prove that a marriage
ceremony had theretofore been celebrated between
them. The fact of having had children prior to the
celebration of the latter ceremony does not prove a
former marriage.
3. COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE. — What are known
as common-law marriages in England and the
United States were never recognized by the
Spanish law in force in these Islands. No valid
marriage could exist under the Spanish law unless
some ecclesiastical or civil functionary intervened
in its celebration.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
The plaintiffs brought this action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila on the 2d day of June,
1902, asking that a deed made by Antonio
Enriquez on the 27th of March, 1883, conveying to
the defendant Carmen de la Cavada certain real
estate in the city of Manila, be annulled and set
aside. Judgment was rendered in the court below
to the effect that the plaintiffs were the owners of
an undivided half of the said real estate, and that
the defendant Carmen de la Cavada should pay to
the plaintiffs upward of 1,300 pesos, as rents and
profits thereof. Both parties moved for a new trial
on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence,
by the plaintiffs in this court have neither assigned
as errors the rulings made against them, by the
lower court nor have they discussed any such
rulings in their brief. So much of the decision,
therefore, as is adverse to the plaintiffs we can not
consider, and the questions to be resolved are
those presented by the appeal of the defendants.
The decision of the court below was based upon
the following facts, deemed to be established by the
evidence, namely, that Antonio Enriquez and Doña
Ciriaca Villanueva were legally married prior to the
year 1860; that in 1861 the property in question
was acquired by Antonio Enriquez; that it thereby
became a part of the property belonging to the
conjugal partnership; that Doña Ciriaca Villanueva
died in 1882; that upon her death an undivided
half of the property passed to her heirs, the
plaintiffs; that when, in 1883, Antonio Enriquez
undertook to convey the entire property to the
defendant Doña Carmen de la Cavada he, as
matter of law, conveyed one half thereof, and that
the other half remained and now is the property of
the plaintiffs.
The correctness of this decision depends upon the
question as to whether Antonio Enriquez and Doña
Ciriaca Villanueva were legally married in 1861.
The court below found and, the evidence sustains
that finding, that a marriage ceremony was duly
performed between these persons in 1865, but held
that the fact that prior to 1861 they had lived
together as husband and wife, had been recognized
as such, and had children who were baptized as
the legitimate children of their lawful marriage was
sufficient evidence to raise the presumption that
they were at the time legally married.
A marriage ceremony having been duly celebrated
between these persons in 1865, it is necessary, in
order to show that they were legally married before
that time, to prove that the same kind of a
marriage ceremony had theretofore been
celebrated. Although, as held by the Supreme
Court of the United States, by the common law of
England, a valid marriage might be contacted
without the intervention of any ecclesiastical or
civil functionary (Traverse v. Rheinhardt, 27 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 563, decided April 15, 1907), yet such
was never the law in these Islands during the
Spanish domination here. During the entire period
of that domination no valid marriage could exist
unless some ecclesiastical or civil functionary
intervened in its celebration, and the intervention
of civil functionaries was limited to the short time
elapsing between the 8th day of December, 1889,
when the Civil Code took effect here, and the 29th
day of the same month, when the provisions of
Title IV, Book I, of that code were suspended.
During the time covered by the lives of Antonio
Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva no valid
marriage between them could be contracted by
their mere agreement to live together as husband
and wife.
There is no proof in this case that a marriage, valid
in accordance with the laws then in force in these
Islands, was celebrated between these persons in
1865. In order to show that they were before that
time husband and wife, it was necessary to prove
that a marriage ceremony in which an
ecclesiastical functionary intervened was duly
celebrated. No proof of any such marriage was
offered. As has been said, the fact that prior to
1865 they lived together as husband and wife and
had children is not evidence in this case to show
that they were married prior to that time. Nor is
the fact that in the certificates of baptism of these
children it is stated that they were the legitimate
children of the lawful marriage of their parents.
The court below said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Loss of the record of the first marriage, or some
like reason, might have made the second ceremony
seem necessary and for that reason it was
celebrated."cralaw virtua1aw library
This consideration is to our minds entirely
insufficient to explain the celebration of the second
marriage. If the former marriage had taken place, it
must have been celebrated before some priest or
other officer of the Roman Catholic Church. The
law required that a record of such marriages
should be kept in the parish registry, and if such
marriage in fact had been performed, it probably
would have been easy to have obtained a certified
copy of such record. No evidence was offered in
this case of any attempt to obtain such record or
that the records of the church were the ceremony
had been performed had been destroyed. In fact,
no proof whatever was offered in the case to show
the celebration of such prior marriage, except the
facts hereinbefore stated, that the parties lived
together as husband and wife and had children
who were baptized as aforesaid. We hold that this
evidence is insufficient to prove in this case a prior
marriage, where it appears that a marriage
ceremony was duly performed between the parties
at a later date; and we therefore hold that Antonio
Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva were not
legally married prior to 1865, and that, therefore,
when this property was acquired by Antonio in
1861 it did not become a part of the property
belonging to the conjugal partnership, but on the
contrary was a part of the capital which he brought
to the marriage. Being a part of the capital brought
to the marriage by the husband, upon the death of
the wife — the husband surviving her — no
interest whatever therein passed to her heirs.
The judgment of the court below, which rests solely
upon the proposition that at the time of the death
of Doña Ciriaca Villanueva one-half of this property
passed to her heirs, can not, therefore, be
sustained. That judgment is reversed, without
costs to either in this court, judgment is entered
acquitting the defendants of the complaint, with
the costs of the first instance against the plaintiffs.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-55801 August 30, 1982
LEONARDO MAGAT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Aniano A. Albon for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Asst. Solicitor
General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor
Wilfredo D. Reyes for respondents.
&
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 in CA- G.R. No. 23228-CR,
affirming with modification the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch 1,
Olongapo City, in Criminal Case No. 4163 for
Robbery convicting petitioner-accused, Leonardo
Magat, of said crime.
The evidence for the prosecution has been summed
up by the Trial Court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
James Philip Lanigan, American businessman by
profession came to Olongapo City as a tourist and
was billeted at the Admiral Royal Hotel in
Olongapo City. At about 2:00 to 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 19, 1979, Lanigan decided to
take a walk from the hotel to the US Naval Base.
Outside the main gate, he exchanged sixty dollars
($60.00) into pesos and when he got the money
equivalent of his dollars, he started to walk back
towards the Admiral Royal Hotel. He had only
walked four (4) blocks along Magsaysay Drive when
a jeep proceeded to follow alongside Lanigan and
the driver insisted that the said American ride with
him as the driver has a sister who has a bar down
the street. The driver requested favor from the
American to give away some cards which Lanigan
can, perhaps, distribute to some of his friends.
Lanigan rejected the offer of the stranger to ride in
the jeep, so he went to a bar to avoid him and had
a bottle of beer to drink. After approximately fifteen
(15) minutes, he went out of the bar and again he
noticed that the same driver with his jeep was
waiting for him outside. The driver was insistent
that he take his ride in his jeep so he will bring
him to his destination. So Lanigan agreed and
boarded the jeepney.ït¢@lFº The driver drove away
towards Admiral Hotel but made a right turn at
Rizal Avenue into a side street. Lanigan
complained to the driver why he is going into that
street when that is not the direction of the Admiral
Royal Hotel and the driver answered that he will
get the card first at his house for distribution. The
driver later drove into a parking area in an address
which was pointed as No. 8 Fontaine St. and he got
off the jeep, followed by Lanigan who was told to
come in Lanigan was introduced to the owner of
the house who was later Identified as Leonardo
Magat y Pineda alias 'Dolphy' who told him to sit
down. While they were in the living room Magat
talked to him saying that he should be careful in
the Philippines because there are many pick-
pockets and thereafter Magat then started to frisk
him saying that he is going to make a
demonstration of how a pick-pocket operates.
Lanigan told him to get his hands out of his pocket
and he pushed Magat's hands out of and started
heading towards the door for his exit. The driver
who was later on Identified as Francisco Velasco
Brosas, immediately ran towards the door and
locked it. And thereafter, a guy made a strangled
hold on the American and the accused Magat
together with his cohort emptied the pockets of
Lanigan, consisting of eight hundred sixty
American dollars ($860.00) and the seventy dollars
which was converted into pesos, his passport,
wallet, traveller's checks, airline tickets without his
cash money and he was warned not to say
anything and not to report the matter to the police
authorities as he will be killed. The accused even
made gestures making the American believe that
he has a knife hidden in one of his pockets.
Thereafter, Lanigan was taken into another room,
made to sit down before a table and told him that
they will teach him to play black jack. He was told
that he can learn the game easily in ten minutes
but Lanigan repeatedly refused to play with them
but they kept on insisting but since he did not like
to play, the accused said that they are going to
release him, but he should not make any attempt
to report the matter to the police as they can frame
him up with the charges of rape pushing of
marijuana and other similar crimes. Lanigan
however, went inside the US Naval Base where he
reported the matter to the members of the shore
patrol and told them that he was robbed. The
military police officers from the US Naval Base
accompanied him and pointed out several houses
which are suspected in this kind of modus
operandi in the crimes of robbery committed
against American servicemen and they came up to
No. 8 Fontaine Extension where Lanigan told the
military police that it was the same house where he
was robbed. Considering that they had no
jurisdiction since it was outside the US Naval Base,
the Base police instructed the complainant to
report the matter to the Olongapo City Police
Department and it was at this juncture that a
police officer by the name of 'Danny' drove up.
Later, the complaining witness was brought to the
Olongapo City Police Department where his
statement (Exhibit 'A') was taken by Pfc. Ciriaco
Marcelino, Jr., on July 23, 1979 and the accused
Magat was Identified through his photograph taken
in the gallery. On the following day, the
complainant was again asked to come to the police
headquarters for a supplemental statement
(Exhibit 'B') wherein he Identified Francisco Brosas
y Velasco as the driver of the jeep who brought him
to the place where he was robbed. 2
Petitioner-accused, on the other hand, denied the
commission of robbery and claimed that
complainant lost the money to him in a card game.
His version was synthesized by respondent Court
of Appeals thus: 1äwphï1.ñët
On the other hand, the defense' evidence discloses
that in the afternoon of July 19, 1979, a certain
driver named Brosas arrived with an American who
turned out to be the herein complainant, at
Magat's residence at No. 8 Fontaine Extension,
Olongapo City. Brosas told Magat that the
American was looking for a girl whom he will pay.
Magat then told Brosas to look for a girl so that
they could earn some money. Brosas left Magat's
residence to look for a girl while complainant
Lanigan waited for him in Magat's residence.
While they were waiting, Magat invited Lanigan to
play poker/blackjack, Lanigan agreed. The two of
them sat by the table and they played six games.
Magat won in five games but lost in one. Lanigan's
total loss amounted to a little over P1500.00.
Lanigan then told Magat that he will use his
traveller's check since he had no more money.
Magat did not agree and refused to play further
with Lanigan. Magat's refusal irritated Lanigan.
Lanigan then tried to grab the cash money in the
possession of Magat at the time and the two of
them struggled for possession of the money. In the
meanwhile, Lanigan kept on shouting that he was
cheated and that he wants his money back. Later,
Lanigan told Magat that he is going to cash his
traveller's check at Pag-asa where he has an
American acquaintance. Lanigan, however, did not
come back anymore that day.
The following day he appeared at the residence of
Magat with a CIS agent named Rene who told
Magat that a certain Captain Santos, Chief of the
CIS, wanted to see him in connection with
Lanigans complaint. In the meantime, Patrolman
Marcelino also arrived at the house of Magat who
allegedly told the latter that if he will return the
P500.00 of the complaining American, then the
complaint against him will be settled. 3
On July 26, 1979, at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
an Information for Robbery was filed against
Leonardo Magat, Francisco Brosas and four others
in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch
1, at Olongapo City. The case was immediately
raffled and set for arraignment and trial. Only
petitioner-accused was arraigned at 4:35 that
same afternoon, as the others had not been
apprehended. Petitions-accused entered a plea of
"Not Guilty."
The post-arraignment proceedings were as
follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
COURT
Enter a plea of not guilty in favor of the accused.
This is for immediate trial because according to the
motion of the First Assistant City Fiscal, the
complainant is a tourist.
Are you now ready for trial?
ATTY. BALINGIT
If your Honor please, I was hired about a few
minutes ago and I was indeed surprised to be
contracted. Although I understand the extent of
the law which requires the speedy trial of this case,
however, if I may be given at least one (1) hour to
confer with my witness, I will proceed with the
trial.
FISCAL ANONAS
How many witnesses do you intend to present?
COURT
How about you, Fiscal?
FISCAL ANONAS
Two (2).
COURT
How about you Atty. Balingit?
ATTY. BALINGIT
Two (2).
FISCAL ANONAS
I have no objection to the conference between
counsel and his witness but after we have already
submitted our case.
And besides, we have only twenty-four (24) hours.
ATTY. BALINGIT
But just only one (1) hour to confer to give me the
chance to defend my client.
COURT
You can do that after the prosecution presented its
witness.
ATTY. BALINGIT
Provided . . .
COURT Before you could cross examine. For cross
examination. You can consult your client from time
to time. 4
Trial proceeded and lasted up to 7:30 in the
evening. The following day, trial was resumed at
8:30 o'clock in the morning when petitioner-
accused and his witness, testified on direct, cross,
and re-direct examination. At 11:35 that same
morning, a judgment of conviction was
promulgated, sentencing the accused to six (6)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P6,996.00, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner-accused appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Instead of filing a Brief for the People, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion and
Manifestation joining the accused's cause, and
recommending the reversal of the Trial Court's
judgment on the ground that complainant is not a
transient visitor; that said Court acted with
unusual haste in the arraignment, trial, and
rendition of the judgment of conviction; and that
the evidence adduced failed to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In its Decision promulgated on August 21, 1981,
the Court of Appeals refuted the contentions of the
Office of the Solicitor General, affirmed conviction,
but modified the penalty. 1äwphï1.ñët
WHEREFORE, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime
of ROBBERY as charged in the information,
defined by Art. 293 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized under Art. 294, par. 5 thereof; and there
being no aggravating nor any mitigating
circumstance affecting his criminal liability, thus
entitling him to the imposition of the penalty in its
medium period, he is therefore hereby sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and
1 day of prision correccional as the minimum to 8
years of prision mayor as the maximum and to pay
costs.
Except with the aforesaid modification, the
judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respects.
Petitioner-accused appealed by certiorari to this
Court assigning the following errors to the Court of
Appeals: 1äwphï1.ñët
1. The Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals
erred in brushing aside the mute but clear import
of lack of adherence to the basic fundamental
formulation of due process whereby counsel and
client must be accorded the right to be heard i.e.,
before proceedings to commence trial ample
opportunity must be given for them to confer and
prepare for the defense.
2. The Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals
erred in not sustaining the submission for
acquittal made by the state counsel, the Honorable
Solicitor General in its Motion and Manifestation in
lieu of appellee's brief anchored upon grave and
conclusive circumstantial facts negativing
petitioner's guilt.
3. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals
erred in merely modifying the judgment of
conviction of the petitioner based upon mere
assumptions and suspicion of guilt.
Required to comment by this Court, the Office of
the Solicitor General adopted its Motion and
Manifestation filed before the Court of Appeals and
recommended the grant of the petition for
certiorari averring that the findings and
conclusions of respondent Court of Appeals are not
supported by substantial evidence.
In his first assigned error, petitioner-accused
claims lack of due process because of the unusual
speed with which the Trial Court disposed of his
case. The record does show that the accused was
arraigned at 4:35 P.M. on July 26, 1979. The
request of defense counsel for one hour within
which to confer with his client was deferred by the
Trial Court till after the prosecution had presented
its evidence but the Court clarified that it would
allow counsel to consult his client from time to
time during cross-examination. Trial commenced
thereafter and continued until 7:30 in the evening,
with the prosecution resting its case. The following
day, trial was resumed, for the presentation of
evidence for the defense, at 8:30 A. M, and
judgment was promulgated at 11:35 that same
morning.
Applicable to this case is General Order No. 39
amending General Order No. 12, dated September
30, 1972, which gave Civil Courts concurrent
jurisdiction with Military Tribunals over crimes
committed against tourists and transients, and
mandates that cases involving tourists be disposed
of within 24 hours from the filing of the
complaint. 1äwphï1.ñët
23. Crimes where the offended party is a tourist or
a transient.
The civil court shall have concurrent jurisdiction
with the military tribunals over the said crimes,
provided that civil courts shall dispose of such
cases within 24 hours after the filing thereof by the
arresting officer.ït¢@lFº The court or tribunal that
first assumes jurisdiction shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others.
Considering that explicit requirement, the Trial
Court had no other alternative but to speed up
trial. That defense counsel was aware of the
prescribed time element is shown by the fact that
he had asked for only one hour within which to
confer with his client although normally he would
have been entitled to at least 2 days to prepare for
trial. 5In point of fact, the Trial Court did not deny
defense counsel's request for conference with
petitioner-accused. The Trial Court merely deferred
such conference till after the prosecution had
presented its witnesses. It is to be noted further
that defense counsel was not totally unprepared
for trial for he was ready with two witnesses when
asked by the Court. Moreover, after the
prosecution had rested its case, trial was resumed
the next day, thereby giving the defense enough
time to prepare for the presentation of its direct
evidence. Besides, notwithstanding the brief span
of trial time, rebuttal and surrebuttal were
presented by the prosecution and the defense,
respectively.
The rendition of the judgment not long after the
trial was terminated is not necessarily indicative of
inordinate haste. On the contrary, Judge Regino T.
Veridiano I I, the Trial Fiscal, and the defense
counsel are to be commended for their punctilious
compliance with the explicit mandate of the law. A
reading of the transcript and of the judgment
rendered will also reveal that petitioner-accused
was duly and amply heard in his defense. He was
not denied procedural due process.
The submission of the State that complainant is
"not a transient visitor" for his testimony shows
clearly that he has been in Olongapo City many
times for the past fifteen years" 6 is not well taken,
the exact declaration of complainant having been
"a number of times" and not "many times". And
even if complainant has been in Olongapo City a
number of times, that does not make him any less
a transient, or one whose stay is "of uncertain
duration" or for a "short time", or for a "brief
period" only each time. 7 There is no question
either that notwithstanding the number of times
that he has been to this country, complainant is a
"tourist" or one who travels from place to place for
pleasure or culture. 8 As a "tourist" or a
"transient", complainant falls within the coverage
of General Order No. 12, as amended, supra.
We likewise find it difficult to agree with the
Solicitor General's position that the guilt of
petitioner-accused has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt. Complainant was
categorical in his Identification of petitioner-
accused and emphatic as to the latter's direct and
active involvement in the robbery. Petitioner-
accused's version of the occurrence does not ring
with truth. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals: 1äwphï1.ñët
Appellant advances the argument that if robbery
was his intention, then he would not have done it
in the very premises of his home. This explanation
appeared lame and weak. He did so, because he
never expected that their victim being a tourist will
have the insistence and temerity of lodging and
pushing through a complaint against him and his
cohorts for forcibly divesting him of his money. No
doubt, appellant and his confederates must have
been emboldened by the fact that even if their
victim complained but considering his
unfamiliarity with the place, it will be almost next
to impossible for him (the American victim) to trace
his way back to appellant's place and pinpoint
their Identities. In fact, the American MP's were
able to tract down his (Magat's) place only because
of its notoriety for assaults and acts as that
perpetrated against the complainant. Then too
appellant and Brosas were Identified only by their
photos in the files of the police. Both happened to
be notorious police characters having been
previously involved in a series of robbery and theft
cases.ït¢@lFº They were readily pointed to and
Identified by complainant upon seeing their photos
as among the persons who divested him of his
money on the day of the incident in question. 9
Moreover, if as petitioner-accused testified,
Lanigan was shouting at petitioner-accused "you
cheated me, give my money back" 10 it is incredible
that "after that the American suggested that he
was going to leave the place because he will cash
the traveller's check ...". 11 One who has been
allegedly cheated would refuse to return to play
some more.
Again, complainant had been to Olongapo City a
number of times in the past, and, therefore was
not a complete stranger to the place. He would
have had more or less, an Idea where to go for
entertainment, so that petitioner-accused's
allegation that complainant was looking for a girl
when brought to his place hardly deserves
credence.
In the last analysis, the issue simmers down to one
of credibility. The well established rule is that the
conclusions of a Trial Court on the question of
credibility are entitled to utmost respect and will
remain undisturbed on appeal unless substantial
facts, which might affect the result of the case,,
have been overlooked, which is not the case herein.
Suffice it to quote some notable observations of the
Court of Appeals on the matter of credibility even
as it refuted some of the contentions advanced by
the Office of the Solicitor General in support of the
latter's bid for acquittal of the
accused. 1äwphï1.ñët
The second point raised by the state counsel is
that allegedly complainant admitted having been
strangled by his neck and yet he did not sustain
any physical injury or bodily harm as could be
gleaned from his testimony of July 26, 1979 (p. 12
of the motion and manifestation). That
complainant did not suffer any injury whatsoever
did not make his version of the incident incredible
because as the accused together with his
confederates tried to divest the complainant of his
money, the latter struggled and it was at that
juncture when complainant was choked. What
possible injury must he necessarily sustain in a
situation of that sort? Maybe only the reddening of
the portion choked which however, was no longer
visible to the naked eye after a couple of hours or
so.
The third circumstance advanced by the Honorable
State Counsel is that it was rather incredible and
absurd for one who had robbed another to still
endeavor to teach his victim how to play a game of
cards. The argument appears plausible but not
conclusive. Complainant was brought to another
room and taught the rudiments of poker blackjack
preparatory to the theory to be set up by the
defense that if the American victim has lost his
money ... it was in gambling where cards were
utilized during the game. And secondly, to properly
appease the victim and condition his mind making
him cool in the process so that whatever he may
have in mind by way of retaliation may no longer
be pursued by him. But the victim-complainant
happened to be a person not of the type the
accused thought of him to be. In short, he was
underestimated by the culprits.
Lastly, it is likewise claimed that when the
complainant first appeared before the police officer
on July 19, 1979, the day when the robbery was
committed, he allegedly told the police that 'a
jeepney driver picked him up and with the use of
flowery words was able to take his money.' On the
fourth day, however, following the incident or on
July 23, complainant in his sworn statement
stated that he was choked and strangled by two or
three persons and the accused took his money
from his pocket while they were in a house at No. 8
Fontaine Extension, Olongapo City.
The statement referred to appeared embodied in
Exhibit 'A' which was allegedly prepared by a
certain Pfc. Alberto dela Isla, the contents of which
reads as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
This is in connection with Police Blotter Entry No.
2387, (p. 453 dated 15 July, 1979.) Complainant
alleged that on or about 2:00 P.M. to 3:00 P.M.
July 1975, at the above mentioned located, suspect
with intent to gain and with intimidation took and
carted away his cash money amounting to $940.00
more or less. Complainant further alleged that
while he was walking along Magsaysay Drive, Q.C.,
when a jeepney driver picked him up and with the
use of flowery words was able to take his
money. Furthermore, suspect/s choked him while
others were holding his hand and at the same time
threatened him that if he did not stop strangling he
will be killed. Complainant pointed the person of
LEONARDO MAGAT as one of the suspects when a
picture of the said suspect was showed to him.
(Emphasis supplied).
Pfc. Isla was never placed on the witness stand to
testify on the alleged report. The contents therein
appearing therefore is decidedly hearsay . . . the
prosecution being denied of the right to cross-
examine him on the truth thereof. But what
appears confusing is the fact that when
complainant-victim made a follow-up of his
complaint with the police, since nothing appeared
to have been done in connection therewith, no
records whatsoever pertaining to his complaint
could be found. And yet here comes this alleged
police report.
But let it be assumed that complainant when
interviewed made the statement that now appears
in this Exhibit 'A'. Analyzing the said statement in
its entirety, the conclusion arrived at appeared not
warranted for if complainant was divested of his
money merely through the use of flowers words
then why was there a necessity for choking him
and holding his hands and threatening him and,
further, that if he did not stop then he will be
killed. Interpreted in the light of the testimony of
the complainant, it would appear that the first step
that led into complainant's being divested of his
money were the flowery words made by Brosas to
him that ultimately brought him to Magat's place
whereby, through force and intimidation the
offenders took his money from his pocket. 12
All told, we find the second and third assigned
errors also without merit, and like the Trial Court
and the Appellate Court, we find petitioner-
accused's guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Review is denied
and the judgment of the Court of Appeals hereby
affirmed.
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO
GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo
were married in 1910 and have lived together as
man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife
went away from their common home with the
intention of living separate from her husband.
Mariano’s efforts to induce her to resume marital
relations were all in vain. Thereafter, Mariano
initiated an action to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful
wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and cross-
complaint that she had been compelled to leave
because of the cruel treatment of her husband.
She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be
declared and the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership as well as permanent separate
maintenance.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence
before him, reached the conclusion that the
husband was more to blame than his wife and that
his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the
conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one
of the spouses to cohabit with each other
HELD: NO.
It is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of
the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered
to compel the restitution of the purely personal
rights of consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the
spouses to live under the same roof; and the
experience of these countries where the court of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B.
Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory
part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt,
entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient cause and that
it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from,
in respect both to the original complaint and the
cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de
Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home
without sufficient cause; and she is admonished
that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is
absolved from the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance.
LY GIOK HA ET AL. V. GALANG
G.R. No. L-10760 (5/17/57)
Doctrine: Any foreigner who posted a bond to make
his/her entry feasible in the country and thereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines will be
entitled to the return of the said bond.
FACTS: Petitioner Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy Giok Ha,
entered the Philippines as a citizen of the
Nationalist Republic of China and a temporary
visitor, extended up to March 14, 1956. In order to
make said entry feasible, her sister and co-
petitioner Wy Hong Eng, had, on March 28, 1955,
made with the Bureau of Immigration, a cash
deposit of P10,000. Ly Giok Ha, alias Wy Giok Ha,
married Restituto Lacasta, a Filipino. This
notwithstanding, on March 16, 1956, respondent
Emilio L. Galang, as Commissioner of Immigration
declared said cash deposit forfeited. Ly Giok Ha,
her husband Restituto Lacasta, the former's sister,
Wy Hong Eng, and the latter's husband, Ngo In,
instituted the present action against Emilio L.
Galang.
Lower Court Ruling: The Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment for the petitioners.
Appellate Court Ruling: N/A
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not her marriage to a Filipino
justified or excused the failure of Ly Giok
Ha to depart from the Philippines and thus
the forfeiture of the cash bond posted was a
violation of her right. – Yes
RATIO: On this issue of violating her bond which
states, “the undersigned, with full knowledge that
Ly Giok Ha, a temporary visitor whose authorized
stay in this country is limited only up to and
including August 14, 1955, do hereby undertake
that said Ly Giok Ha will actually depart from the
Philippines on or before said date so specified, or
within such period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of immigration or his authorized
representative may properly allow,” asking for an
extension did not violate the bond on four reasons:
(a) Competent authorities granted said requests; (b)
the bond clearly indicates that the Commissioner
of Immigration, or his authorized representative,
may properly allow an extension; (c) The requests
for extension involved in the case at bar do not, in
any manner whatever, run counter to any of the
purposes sought to be served by the bond in
question; (d) Respondent Galang did not regard
said requests for extension as a breach of said
undertaking.
On the issue of whether her marriage to a
Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid
failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines
on or before March 14, 1956, The pertinent part of
section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon
which petitioners rely, reads, “Any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.” By reason of such naturalization
through marriage, section 40 (c) of Commonwealth
Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen . . . of the
alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given,
the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited
shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative.”
Considering, however, that neither in the
administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court,
had the parties seemingly felt that there was an
issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully
naturalized," and this being a case of first
impression in our courts, The SC is of the opinion
that, in the interest of equity and justice, the
parties should be given an opportunity to
introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue.
The decision appealed from is hereby set aside and
let the records of this case be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher
GR. No. L-11622
January 28, 1961
DOCTRINE:
“Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states
collects or imposes or does not exempt any transfer,
death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the
reciprocity does not work.”
FACTS:
Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of
British parents, married in Manila to another
British subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in
California where he and his wife moved to.
In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole
heiress to certain real and personal properties,
among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines).
Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary
administrator of his estate filed an estate and
inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary
return to secure the waiver of the CIR on the
inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.
In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and
interests in the estate to the spouses Fisher.
Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax
return claiming ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of
which is the estate and inheritance tax on the
Mines’ shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity
proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund
from what he initially paid. The collector denied the
claim. He then filed in the CFI of Manila for the
said amount.
CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should
be deducted from the net estate of Walter, (b) the
intangible personal property belonging to the estate
of Walter is exempt from inheritance tax pursuant
to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the
reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting exemption
from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of
stock.
RULING:
NO.
Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states
collects or imposes or does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any
character, the reciprocity does not work.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any
citizen or resident, or non-resident with
properties, there are imposed upon his estate,
both an estate and an inheritance tax.
But, under the laws of California, only
inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although the
Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate
tax, it does not grant exemption on the basis of
reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be
at a disadvantage. This is not what the legislators
intended.
SPECIFICALLY:
Section122 of the NIRC provides that “No tax shall
be collected under this Title in respect of intangible
personal property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of
his death did not impose a transfer of tax or
death tax of any character in respect of
intangible personal property of citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign
country, or

(b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the

decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal property owned by citizens of
the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country."

On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California

Inheritance Tax Law provides that intangible
personal property is exempt from tax if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of
a territory or another State of the United States or
of a foreign state or country which then imposed a
legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to
intangible personal property of its own residents,
but either:.

Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax

of any character in respect to intangible personal
property of residents of this State, or

Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which

intangible personal property of a non-resident was
exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of
every character if the Territory or other State of the
United States or foreign state or country in which
the nonresident resided allowed a similar
exemption in respect to intangible personal
property of residents of the Territory or State of the
United States or foreign state or country of
residence of the decedent."