2017 Book Advancing Interdisciplinary Approaches To International Relations

Advancing Interdisciplinary
Approaches to International Relations
Edited by
Steve A. Yetiv and Patrick James
Advancing Interdisciplinary Approaches
to International Relations
Steve A. Yetiv • Patrick James
Editors
Advancing
Interdisciplinary
Approaches to
International
Relations
Editors
Steve A. Yetiv Patrick James
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, School of International Relations,
Virginia, USA University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, CA, USA
ISBN 978-3-319-40822-4 ISBN 978-3-319-40823-1 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40823-1
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016957876
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CONTENTS
1 Pushing Boundaries in the Study of International Relations 1

2 History, International Relations, and Conflict 17

Steve A. Yetiv
3 Hawkish Biases and the Interdisciplinary Study

of Conflict Decision-Making
Jonathan Renshon and Daniel Kahneman 51
4 Trust, Cooperation, and Conflict: Neuropolitics

and International Relations 83
Jacek Kugler and Paul J. Zak
5 Technology, Conflict and International Relations 115

Stefan Fritsch
6 Anthropology, Conflict, and International Relations 153

Raymond Scupin
v
vi CONTENTS
7 Gender in International Relations: Interdisciplinarity

and the Study of Conflict 189
Soumita Basu and Maya Eichler
8 Demography and International Relations:

Economics, Politics, Sociology, and Conflict 229
Tadeusz Kugler
9 International Political Economy

and Political Demography: An Interdisciplinary
Exploration 263
Kyungkook Kang and Tadeusz Kugler
10 Systemism and Foreign Policy Analysis: A New

Approach to the Study of International Conflict 289
Carolyn C. James and Patrick James
11 Conclusion: Interdisciplinary Links

and Future Directions 323
Patrick James and Steve A. Yetiv
Index 339
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 3.1 Hypothetical value function 65

Fig. 4.1 Cross-country trust levels from the world values
survey and others 90
Fig. 9.1 Economic recovery anticipated by the OLG growth model 273
Fig. 9.2 Cohort structure affected by war 276
Fig. 9.3 Effects of the post-war “Baby Boom” on populations 277
Fig. 9.4 Patterns of post-war recovery 279
Fig. 10.1 Functional relations in a social system 297
Fig. 10.2 The initial generation of FPA scholarship 305
Fig. 10.3 The initial generation of FPA scholarship:
A systemist reinterpretation 306
Fig. 10.4 (F)actors at the international and domestic level 310
Fig. 10.5 Models for the individual and group levels 311
Fig. 10.6 Model for the environment and state:
A systemist reinterpretation 313
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Biases examined in this chapter 53

Table 8.1 Common demographic data sources 231
Table 8.2 Traditional research agendas 235
Table 9.1 Summary of post-disaster recovery conditions 275
ix
CHAPTER 1
Pushing Boundaries in the Study

of International Relations
For ages, scholars have contemplated how to view an issue or problem

from multiple angles and in myriad ways—in effect, pushing boundaries.
Plato did not sit around and contemplate justice and governance only
from a political angle, nor did Albert Einstein fail to draw on multiple
disciplines to produce theories that revolutionized how we saw energy,
space, time, and gravity. Nor did their followers, famous and less known,
circumscribe how they thought. Innovative thinking in and beyond aca-
demia has not been the sole province of the modern era.
However, it is only in recent decades that multidisciplinarity and inter-
disciplinarity have become ubiquitous and institutionalized undertakings.
It is now hard to escape the many fascinating efforts aimed at developing
such approaches in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences.
Multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary academic programs have exploded
on college campuses worldwide at both the undergraduate and graduate
S.A. Yetiv ()

Department of Political Science and Geography, Old Dominion University,
Norfolk, VA, USA
e-mail: syetiv@odu.edu
P. James
School of International Relations, USC, Los Angeles, CA, USA
e-mail: patrickj@usc.edu
© The Author(s) 2017 1

P. James, S.A. Yetiv (eds.), Advancing Interdisciplinary Approaches
to International Relations, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40823-1_1
2 S.A. YETIV AND P. JAMES
level. More and more practitioners as well realize that such approaches are
necessary for addressing transnational challenges such as climate change,
energy security, population explosion, and global terrorism—problems
that often elude disciplinary-bound analyses because they cross borders,
regions, and issue areas. Even though policymakers remain far too stove-
piped, they are sometimes encouraged to move beyond disciplines, par-
ticular specialties, and familiar turf in order to more effectively examine
and fix vexing problems.
Yet, while multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches have
gained significant cachet in and outside the halls of academe, we can still
benefit much more from the knowledge, approaches, and theories of dif-
ferent disciplines to enhance our understanding of international relations
(IR). We offer one of the most comprehensive book-length works on
multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity in the field IR, with a focus on
international conflict.
It makes sense to start out with key definitions, although our goal is not
to get bogged down in definitional explorations. We see multidisciplinar-
ity and interdisciplinarity on a conceptual continuum and do not believe
that there is a very clear demarcation between them. But, even if the dif-
ferences are not abundantly clear, several are worth pointing out.
First, while interdisciplinarity can assume many different forms, we
define it as cross-fertilizing empirics, concepts, and approaches from two or
more disciplines, or of sub-fields that overlap disciplines, to enhance explana-
tion.1 By contrast, multidisciplinarity involves far less cross-fertilization of
this kind. Rather, it investigates phenomena from disciplinary perspec-
tives. For example, in one excellent work, scholars provide an introduc-
tory text that applies political science, history, geography, economics,
and anthropology as multidisciplinary angles on various global issues and
world regions, that is, they investigate each issue area through one par-
ticular disciplinary lens. Thus, a multidisciplinary analysis on the subject of
terrorism could offer different chapters on terrorism written by historians,
psychologists, and economists (see Anderson et al. 2014). The disciplinary
angles remain largely intact but are applied to critical subject areas.
As a result, while interdisciplinarity often involves integration or synthe-
sis across disciplinary boundaries, multidisciplinarity does not have such
goals. It may support such goals but is not aimed at them as an enterprise.
Second, interdisciplinarity often challenges the basic elements of dis-
ciplines,2 by interrogating and redrawing their boundaries, theories, and
methods. Multidisciplinarity, as Long (2011: 38) observes, certainly “does
PUSHING BOUNDARIES IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3
not challenge disciplinary paradigms, dominant theories and methods, but

simply adds them to one another.”3
Third, it follows from the first two points that interdisciplinarity poses
far greater challenges. This is because it is hard to achieve syntheses when
definitions, theories, and approaches differ significantly. Multidisciplinarity
helps eschew such problems by using disciplines usually as stand-alone
approaches to subject matter.4
We would like to introduce one more major approach, neodisciplinar-
ity. Aalto et al. (2012: 20) coined this term to refer to institutionalization
of a new field. They describe it as the “radicalization and institutional con-
solidation of some transdisciplinary strategies.” (also, for key definitions,
see Anderson et al. 2014). Neodisciplinarity is an important concept and
suggests that new fields are arising across disciplinary boundaries such as
peace studies where certain social, ethical, economic, and political prob-
lems define the program or the field.
Overall, while we see differences in these analytical approaches, we
believe that it is no simple task to identify where disciplinarity ends and
multidisciplinarity begins or where multidisciplinarity ends and interdisci-
plinarity begins. It is especially challenging with respect to disciplines that
have inherent interdisciplinary dimensions. Ultimately, the labels matter
less than the issue of whether any such approach has value-added.
We now turn attention to international conflict. Since conflict is a key
area of focus in this book, it also is worth defining here. Formal defini-
tions of international conflict are not presented very often.5 The definition
offered here has been selected for its plausibility, range of application,
and consistency with observed practice in IR. An international conflict is
defined as any interaction delimited in time and space, involving two or
more international entities (whether states or transnational actors) that
possess non-identical preference orderings over one or more sets of alter-
native choices. The definition is advantaged by its avoidance of a state-
centered bias and may be seen as plausible because it treats conflict as a
mixed-motive interaction that contains elements of strife along with the
potential for cooperation.
BROAD GOALS OF THE BOOK

This book has four objectives. First, as suggested above, we seek to
advance multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research in IR. While
this book traverses a vast terrain, it aims to contribute to the study of
IR chiefly, as opposed to International Studies writ large.6 IR defies easy

definition and categorization. Postmodernists, for instance, might well
define IR differently than neorealists who focus on the systemic level of
world politics—on anarchy, recurrent phenomena in world politics, and
the balance of power. Meanwhile, scholars of decision-making who draw
on psychology, sociology, and other disciplines would favor a more expan-
sive definition of IR. Some scholars even define IR more narrowly as the
study of both power and conflict at the international level on the logic that
power is critical because it shapes who gains or loses regarding political
issues, while conflict generates disputes in the first place (Anderson et al.
2014). Nonetheless, for present purposes, we adopt the definition from
the Oxford Bibliographies: “International Relations traditionally referred
to the study of foreign affairs and political interaction between states.
Today, the field covers the whole complex of cultural, economic, legal,
military, and political relations of all states and their component popula-
tions, as well as non-state actors and international organizations” (Oxford
Bibliographies 2015). Note immediately the evolving nature of the con-
cept formation. The meaning of IR shifts in relation to new actors and
issues, along with disciplinary dimensions. The choice of this definition,
which is quite inclusive, is appropriate for a project that focuses on inter-
disciplinary contributions to IR. These innovations improve the breadth
and depth; thus, to say IR is a “work in progress,” from the standpoint of
the present volume, is anything but an insult.7
Second, each chapter will provide a guide on how the disciplines it
explores are related to IR. Doing so will help reveal how scholars are
approaching multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity and a basis for how
to build upon them. These guides to research may also help spark dia-
logue within and across disciplines by engaging the literatures, arguments,
debates, and findings of different disciplines and allowing for the interro-
gation of one discipline or sub-field by others.
Third, each chapter will show how and to what extent disciplines and
sub-fields outside of, or overlapping with IR, can help illuminate IR and
especially international conflict. For example, what does cognitive psy-
chology tell us about cognitive biases and how they can yield decisions
that make international conflict more likely? Where is it profitable to draw
on history or anthropology to better inform our understanding of IR in
general, and of conflict in particular?
Fourth, the book will also advance original multidisciplinary and inter-
disciplinary work. Some chapters will focus central attention on doing
so, while others will focus more on the first three goals of the book. But,
overall, the book will present interdisciplinary research which in some
cases aims at redefining fields or ways of thinking.
KEY THEMES OF THE BOOK

We focus primarily though not solely on the causes of international con-
flict which by its nature is suitable for interdisciplinary analysis. While
much good work has been done on this subject (for a survey, see Mitchell
and Vasquez 2013; Ruane and James 2012, chap. 2), we seek to offer new,
overlooked or under-appreciated explanations of conflict.8 This is needed
partly due to the expansion of knowledge and approaches across disci-
plines, and because the world has become more globalized and complex,
even if states remain the dominant actors. Boundaries between the domes-
tic and international; between individual and international; and between
and among regions and issue areas are less defined than in the past.9
A second theme is the importance of sub-systemic variables, especially
in understanding conflict. Innumerable sub-systemic variables have been
studied by scholars in their explanations of IR and of conflict, even if these
variables are largely ignored in mainstream IR theory by both neoliberals
and neorealists. Waltz (1979), for instance, assumed in his path-breaking
formulation of neorealism, as have many other state-centric scholars,
that it is far more profitable theoretically to study state behavior using an
“outside-in” approach that focuses on the structure of the broader system
than an “inside-out” approach that explains state behavior by referring to
domestic factors.10
While we see great value in systemic approaches, a key theme of this
book is the importance of sub-systemic variables, which range widely
across disciplines from those found in neuroscience and psychology to
traits associated with culture and gender. These variables stand in contrast
to international- or system-level variables such as anarchy, the balance of
power, asymmetrical interdependence, and interstate rivalries. We think
greater understanding of these variables would benefit explanation and
theory building about international conflict.
Third, and relatedly, we highlight the role of the individual in the
effort to understand conflict, without ignoring other levels of analysis. We
highlight the individual partly because we have learned much more about
human beings in the past decades, which allows for new understandings
and formulations. For example, in Chap. 3, Nobel Prize winner Daniel
Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, buoyed by the cognitive revolution

which Kahneman helped launch, elucidate upon the role of psychological
biases in foreign policy decision-making. They show how such biases at
the individual level translate into far more hawkish decisions that con-
tribute to conflict at the international level. In this sense, they demon-
strate innovatively how we can draw on one level of analysis (cognitive,
individual) and discipline (psychology) to inform another level of analysis
(conflict, system) and issue area associated with IR.
Moreover, we now understand the mind much better than in the past
and that is creating new opportunities for explaining IR and conflict. For
example, neuroscience represents a cutting edge approach to the study of
foreign policy and IR in illuminating how decisions can be impacted by
how the mind itself works. In Chap. 4, Jacek Kugler and Paul Zak show
how the release of the chemical molecule oxytocin increases trust and how
trust deserves far more consideration in our study of conflict and coop-
eration. The scientific study of trust among actors yields insight into the
potential for actors to defect rather than cooperate, while cognitive biases
such as overconfidence express themselves across areas of world politics
and contribute to conflict processes as well. Numerous potential intersec-
tions could be explored within and between disciplines that can illuminate
human action.
We believe that change in world affairs has also highlighted the individ-
ual. Consider the rise of terrorism, international migration, and the global
demographic boom in population. Of course, individuals have always mat-
tered critically for understanding international conflict and we certainly
account for that, but they can be studied more effectively now, and are
central subjects in fields that are trying to grapple with major change such
as demography, gender studies, and neuroscience.
A final theme of the book is the value of exploring many perspectives
within one volume. Our book is distinguished by the breadth of fields
that it consults and the range of variables that it discusses and researches
at the sub-system level. Current work on international conflict does not
bring such a wide variety of perspectives to bear in one book. In doing so,
we hope to provide a spectrum of thought and research that enhances our
knowledge of each discipline, of each discipline in relation to others, and
of conflict in particular. We bring the old and new, the traditional disci-
plines and the cutting edge fields together in one space to offer different
cuts on understanding IR and in particular conflict.
ADVANCING MULTIDISCIPLINARITY
AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN GENERAL
Myriad thinkers have engaged in interdisciplinary work in IR across lev-

els of analysis in fields ranging from international political economy to
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (see Hudson 2013; Yetiv 2011),11 to a
plethora of areas that each chapter of this book will identify. Long before
“interdisciplinary” even became a “hot” term, scholars such as political
scientist, Robert Jervis (1976), drew on psychology to inform IR, help-
ing in turn to launch a cognitive revolution in the study of IR. And much
valuable work has attempted to apply and/or cross-fertilize ideas and
empirics within and across disciplines in order to shed light on key sub-
jects of IR.12 “Hybrid” fields include social psychology, political economy,
biogeography, historical sociology (Miller 2010: 3905), and behavioral
economics. We can, therefore, ask a basic question: If we already have a
considerable amount of interdisciplinary work, then what does this book
contribute that is new?
One might think that we have plenty of books on interdisciplinarity
in IR. That would be quite mistaken. Interdisciplinarity is one of the
most ubiquitous ideas with the fewest books actually written about it.13
As the discipline of IR has evolved over the last several decades, it has
become dominated by efforts to achieve theoretical parsimony (Ferguson
and Mansbach 2003). That has yielded some explanatory benefits but has
also tended to challenge the interdisciplinary character of IR (Ashworth
2009). Even though a number of journals are now devoted to interdis-
ciplinary IR,14 and myriad journal articles are interdisciplinary in nature,
remarkably few book-length works are devoted to interdisciplinary analysis,
despite common references to it and the proliferation of interdisciplinary
academic programs around the world. We seek to fill that blatant gap in
the literature by bringing different perspectives into one book.
To be sure, there are exceptions to this dearth of work in the litera-
ture as reflected in books by Anderson et al. (2014), Aalto et al. (2012),
Smallman and Brown (2011), and Campbell et al. (2010). However,
some of these works aim more toward multidisciplinary approaches than
toward interdisciplinary IR.15 In addition, some books such as Aalto et al.
(2011) do a good job of discussing the concepts, history, and prospects for
greater interdisciplinarity in IR, and they also are innovative in applying
those concepts to practical policy problems such as climate change (Aalto
et al. 2012). By contrast, we aim to provide the most comprehensive,
interdisciplinary study of the sub-systemic causes of conflict. Our goal is to

show how a wide range of disciplines and sub-fields can contribute to IR
broadly, but also how they, by yielding various new or under-appreciated
insights on individual and domestic-level variables, can provide insight
into international conflict.
A FEW GOOD QUALIFICATIONS

The scope of this book puts a premium on making certain qualifications
up front. Lest it be misconstrued, we are not arguing against disciplinary-
bound approaches. They often offer vital cuts on reality either separately
or in combination and are sometimes the sharpest tool in the kit.
Moreover, interdisciplinarity is not a lodestone or elixir; and there is no
“one-size-fits all” approach for pursuing it. Sometimes, interdisciplinary
approaches do not fit the question at hand and should not be forced into
place inappropriately, even if they are “trendy” or have a surface allure for
greater creativity.16 Doing so can distract us from approaches that could
prove more fruitful. What this suggests is that a key challenge of interdis-
ciplinary work is to identify the most profitable links within and between
disciplines and sub-fields when the permutations are seemingly endless.
That may help us shed light on complex issues and help avert circum-
scribed vision when doing so can engender myopia rather than specialized
insight (see Long 2011; Neumann 2011).
While our book is intended to be broad, it does not cover all of the
salient disciplines and sub-fields that are outside of or overlapping with
IR. Such a task would take several volumes. Rather, we focus on disci-
plines and sub-fields that are tied to our main themes; that are especially
germane to international conflict as a subject area; and that, in some cases,
have not received much attention in the IR field but which are increas-
ingly important such as neuroscience, science and technology studies,
and anthropology. Moreover, this book features, and seeks to advance,
social science approaches mainly. The disciplines and sub-fields chosen
largely fit that goal. Meanwhile, we pay less attention to literature, criti-
cal theory, postmodernism, and so forth, and to such approaches within
each of the areas we cover. While IR is diverse, it does have a modal
point of origin among the scholars who identify with it: political science.
This volume reflects the sociology of IR in that many of its participants
are political scientists. We chose these political scientists because of their
general knowledge and publication record on conflict, level of interest in
the subject, and because their work often lies at the intersection of IR as
well as sub-fields and disciplines outside of IR, including history, demog-
raphy, technology, and gender studies. We have included non-political
scientists as well from anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience, but
the chapters of this volume reflect the reality of interdisciplinary research
on IR today: a sustained interest among political scientists, with growing
attention and involvement from those outside of political science.
SETUP OF THE BOOK
Steve A. Yetiv, in Chap. 2, examines aspects of how IR can benefit more
greatly from history, with some emphasis on the study of international
conflict from a social science angle. He argues that the historical study of
change is especially vital to understanding IR and conflict in both theory
and practice. Building off of this exploration, he sketches a conceptual
framework that bridges foreign policy at the sub-systemic level with IR
in a new way to explain the behavior of states. Yetiv, who has conducted
IR-oriented work as well as historically oriented research based on hun-
dreds of documents that he declassified, argues that drawing on multiple
disciplines and levels of analysis provides added leverage in explaining con-
flict and foreign policy (also, see Yetiv 2011).17
In Chap. 3, Jonathan Renshon and Daniel Kahneman illuminate the
role of psychological biases in foreign policy decision-making. They find
that the biases recently uncovered by psychological research favor hawk-
ish decisions in conflict situations. “Hawkish” refers to a propensity for
suspicion, hostility and aggression in the conduct of conflict, and for less
cooperation and trust when the resolution of a conflict is on the agenda.
While much extant work examines links between cognitive biases and con-
flict, they offer a new and developed formulation based on the excellent
insight of Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman in the field of psychology
and Jonathan Renshon’s knowledge of IR and conflict.
Chapter 4 deals with neuroeconomics or the study of brain activity and
how choices are made. Kugler and Zak show how oxytocin impacts brain
chemistry and levels of trust, with possible implications for decision-
making, and, in turn, conflict and cooperation. They offer a challenge
to realist theory by questioning its assumptions about a fully Hobbesian
world and by incorporating the notion of trust into our thinking and
modeling as well. We are misled by the overemphasis on anarchy at the
systemic level to the neglect of sub-systemic variables such as trust and
the neuroscience aspects that help shape it. Kugler and Zak argue that
willingness to accept international rules that restrict behavior and help
avoid conflict depends critically on the level of trust. While they recog-
nize that numerous variables influence cooperation, and that realists cer-
tainly do hold out the prospect for cooperation even if that is difficult to
achieve, they believe that our understanding of trust is under-developed
as is the role of neuroscience in influencing our decisions. Their chap-
ter combines the path-breaking work of Paul Zak in the laboratory with
Kugler’s enormous record in IR.
Analysis by Stefan Fritsch in Chap. 5 begins by identifying schools of
thought with regard to Science & Technology Studies. Technological
evolution has impacted foreign policy decision-making processes at the
micro-level by facilitating data gathering and speeding up decision-
making processes, thus adding another window on government behavior
and international conflict. A technology-driven skill revolution has also
contributed to the emergence of new actors (NGOs and individuals), and
technological evolution has reshaped armed conflict and related decision-
making processes.
In Chap. 6, Ray Scupin sketches the anthropological perspective and
links to IR and conflict processes through an evolutionary and cross-
cultural comparison. Scupin shows how culture—the central concept
developed within anthropology—challenges rational choice models (a
subject of interest to other scholars in this volume as well such as Renshon
and Kahneman)—and illuminates issues such as religious and secular
global trends, conflict, and terrorism (Cannell 2010; Munson 2008; Atran
2010).
Chapter 7 by Maya Eichler and Soumita Basu seeks to advance our
understanding of a growing area of study: gender and conflict. They show
how an empirical and theoretical focus on gender yields entirely different
explanations of conflict than traditionally understood. Their work empha-
sizes the individual level of analysis which this book highlights, be it in
history, psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, or in this case gender
studies, and also how individuals interact with broader phenomena in
affecting conflict.
Chapter 8, from Tadeusz Kugler, argues that looking at politics and
particularly IR through a demographic prism allows for the analysis of
the fundamental structures of society. Kugler links demographic struc-
tures and changes to key dynamics in IR in ways unaccounted for in stan-
dard IPE and economic models. In particular, he reveals links to national
economic growth and instability, the rise and fall of regions, and civil war.
Demographic dynamics are also directly connected to unrest that gen-
erates democratic movements or conflicts as observable throughout the
Middle East and much of sub-Saharan Africa.
Kyungkook Kang and Tadeusz Kugler seek to further our knowledge of
economic growth, change, and conflict in Chap. 9. They build a general
model that offers a new perspective on politics. It shows that economic
development is a complex socioeconomic process involving multiple fac-
tors within a dynamic, non-linear relationship. Their model synthesizes
diverse ideas from politics, economics, and demography and helps us
understand problems such as income inequality and major conflict.
In Chap. 10, Carolyn C. James and Patrick James expand on the con-
cept of “systemism,” which is a basic framework that can help in thinking
more broadly about world affairs (also see James 2002, 2012). Rather than
theorizing strictly at the level of the system or its components, systemism
(not to be confused with David Easton’s [1953] “systems theory”) allows
for linkages operating at multiple levels of analysis—at the macro- and
micro-levels.
Chapter 11 by Patrick James and Steve A. Yetiv will draw connections
between the different chapters to further highlight the key themes of this
book. We will assess what their separate contributions mean when consid-
ered together for the study of international conflict. In these reflections,
we will also consider where future research could be most profitable.
NOTES
1. On the nuances regarding multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinary work
and related concepts, see Kessel et al. (2008), Stevens (2008), Cantwell
and Brannen (2011), Miller (2010), Lyall et al. (2011), and Holland
(2014).
2. On the evolution of interdisciplinarity over time, see Aalto et al. (2011:
11–26).
3. Multidisciplinarity therefore involves parallel studies (Long 2011: 38).
4. On components of interdisciplinarity work as summarized by Neumann,
see 2011: 258; see also Long 2011: 38, 40, 502. In his conceptualization,
Neumann explains that multidisciplinarity is in play if the subject matter
holds the enterprise together; if concepts, theories, and methods are held
in common, this is transdisciplinarity.
5. The discussion that follows is based on James (1988).
6. IR should be distinguished from international studies as an even wider

designation. As Sarkees and Henehan point out, political science has deep
roots in the United States. International Studies, by contrast, remains rela-
tively young, emerging within the United States only after World War II,
and it is still evolving with competing views of its key goals and how it
should be defined (Sarkees and Henehan 2010). Debate exists on whether
to define international studies as a discipline or as a multidisciplinary field
(Harvey and Brecher 2002: 2), but international studies certainly attempts
to offer an integrative, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to
issues of global importance (Anderson et al. 2014; also, see Denemark
2010).
7. For discussion about the nature of IR, see Grenier et al. (2015). For an
argument that IR is a defined discipline, see Turton (2015).
8. For a basic application of levels of analysis to understanding conflict, see
Nye and Welch (2013) and Cashman (2013). Also, on how multiple levels
of study can illuminate foreign policy, see Hudson (2013).
9. Some traditional (i.e., highly specialized) approaches are hindered in con-
ceptualizing and understanding modern world affairs (Klein 2004).
10. The outside-in approach emphasizes that all states have the potential to
suffer the similar, undesirable fate of extinction because of the difficult
situation in which they must operate. Neorealism explains state behavior
by privileging the international system. Under anarchy, military forces are
crucial to ensuring self-help, because states in world affairs cannot count
on government or a policing force above them for protection. Anarchy
thus socializes them. For Waltz (1979, esp. 93–97), the intentions and
preferences of actors do not matter because outcomes in IR are rarely
explained by them and they are not fodder for useful theory. Rather, out-
comes are generated by the distribution of capabilities under anarchy;
states eventually balance against the strongest state, regardless of what
individual is in power, the type of government, and so forth.
11. For ideas about different kinds of interdisciplinary research and how they
can enhance peace and security studies, see Lebow (1988). On the history
of interdisciplinarity in general and in specific disciplines, and in particular
on its manifestation in cultural studies, see Klein (2005).
12. See Klabbers (2009). On the nature of and manner by which fields such as
international law and IR can be cross-fertilized in an interdisciplinary way,
see Dunoff and Pollack (2013). For a further discussion of interdisciplinar-
ity, see Bommes and Morawska (2005) and Long (2011).
13. For a comprehensive treatment of the meaning and consequences of inter-
disciplinarity as a concept in the context of IR, see Miller (2010).
14. For example, all of the journals of the International Studies Association,
and some outside it such as European Journal of International Relations,
Millennium, Journal of International Business, and Global Society: Journal

of Interdisciplinary International Relationsis>, can be regarded as
interdisciplinary.
15. See Anderson et al. (2014). Also, for instance, see work on the interdisci-
plinary issue of international migration; see Bommes and Morawska
(2005).
16. On such challenges, see Dunoff and Pollack (2013).
17. For excellent reviews of the FPA field, see Breuning (2007) and Hudson
(2013).
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International Relations 29: 255–259.
Aalto, Pami, Vilho Harle, and Sami Moisio (ed). 2011. International Studies:
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——— (ed). 2012. Global and Regional Problems: Towards an Interdisciplinary
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Bommes, Michael, and Ewa Morawska. 2005. International Migration Research:
Constructions, Omissions and the Promises of Interdsciplinarity. London:
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Breuning, Marijke. 2007. Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction.
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Campbell, Patricia, Aran MacKinnon, and Christy R. Stevens. 2010. Introduction
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on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art.
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Easton, David. 1953. The Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political
Science. New York, NY: Knopf.
Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard Mansbach. 2003. The Elusive Quest Continues:
Theory and Global Politics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Grenier, Félix, Helen Louise Turton, and Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard. 2015. The
Struggle over the Identity of IR: What is at Stake in the Disciplinary Debate
Within and Beyond Academia? International Relations 29(June): 242–244.
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———. 2002. Systemism, Social Mechanisms and Scientific Progress: A Case
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———. 2012. Deterrence and Systemism: A Diagrammatic Exposition of
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& the Persian Gulf Wars. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
CHAPTER 2
History, International Relations,

and Conflict
Steve A. Yetiv
The study of history and international relations (IR) is different, but they
also overlap in some important ways that create synergies for understand-
ing and analysis of key questions in IR. This chapter explores how history
can better contribute to the discipline of IR. Within this effort, I focus on
how history can enhance our understanding of the causes of international
conflicts, chiefly from a social science standpoint as opposed to a variety of
other interesting approaches in history and IR.1
In the first two sections of this chapter, I examine what we mean by his-
tory and explore the differences between history and IR. The third section
argues that the extent to which history can benefit IR depends on finding
the right synergies between the two disciplines. “History and International
Conflict” then argues that while history can serve IR in several ways,
history is especially important for understanding the links between change
and international conflict. Many of the major issues, debates, and theories
in IR involve assumptions or assertions about change, but IR scholars do
not do enough to study, or to draw upon studies of, change empirically.
Since history is concerned with change, it can help fill this lacuna.
S.A. Yetiv ()

Norfolk, VA, USA
e-mail: syetiv@odu.edu

18 S.A. YETIV
“Theory Building, Methods, and Testing” shows how history can

aid in theory building, methods, and testing in IR. Meanwhile, in “An
Integrated Approach for Bridging Foreign Policy and IR,” I introduce a
larger question: how can we enhance interdisciplinary work, involving the
IR-history nexus, but extending well beyond it? I sketch what I call an
“integrated approach” that draws on multiple perspectives from various
disciplines. In “Not Pushing a Good Thing Too Far,” I discuss the limits
of history for IR scholarship.
WHAT IS HISTORY?
How can history contribute to IR? This question is long standing and has
been addressed by various scholars (see Williams et al. 2012). In fact, the
question of how to incorporate history has been salient in various fields
including “historical sociology” (see Clemens 2007; Hobson and Lawson
2008; BISA 40th Anniversary Conference 2015), “historical anthropol-
ogy,” “historical geography,” and “historical economics.”2 But all this
interconnection raises an a priori question: what is history?
While we defined IR in Chap. 1, much discussion exists among histori-
ans about how to define history, and the discipline is marked by a diversity
of analyses and schools of thought. Historians are engaged in myriad con-
versations about issues ranging from epistemology through ontology in
deciding upon what subject matter is most important to study. As one his-
torian has put it, historians need to explore, interrogate, and understand
the “very nature of realness itself,” in history (Anderson 2015: 789). That
undertaking is useful and captures the complexities of assessing subjective
realities, but an assumption of this chapter is that history can still inform
important areas of IR.
In this chapter, I use the word “history” to refer to the work of his-
torians and to non-historians conducting work on history. Breisach has
asserted that historians aim to demonstrate “the existence of a necessary
link between history, as reflection on the past, and human life” and that
their task is to “design the great reconciliations between past, present,
and future, always cognizant of both change and continuity” (Breisach
2007: 2–3). Put another way, historians are trained to interpret past reali-
ties and to seek “significance, explanation, and meaning” (Appleby et al.
1994: 275). Berkhofer suggests that historians wrestle with a key question
of how and what we can know of the past given that “so much of it is
gone by definition and experience” (Berkhofer 2008: 2), and they aim to
HISTORY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND CONFLICT 19
understand history even if they know that “no two accounts of the past
are the same” (see Anderson et al. 2008: 3). As E.H. Carr famously noted,
history is much more than digging up facts—facts which in and of them-
selves raise the question of what is a historical fact (Carr 1964: 7; also see
Appleby et al. 1994: 241–270).
In the next section of this chapter, I discuss how IR and history dif-
fer and explicate key aspects of schools of thought related to the nexus
between history and IR.
HISTORY AND IR: DIFFERENCES AND APPROACHES

Exploring how history can contribute to IR requires a sense of how these
fields differ. Varying interpretations exist on this matter (see Williams et al.
2012). Some scholars argue that an ignorance of historiographical contro-
versies presents a much more serious challenge to IR scholars who venture
into history than the lack of engagement of historians with IR debates
(MacDonald 2009). Whatever the case, we should take care, as historian
Schroeder suggests, not to distort and exaggerate the differences between
political scientists and historians (Schroeder 1997: 65–67; also Schroeder
2004). Yet, it is fair to discern several rough differences which should
be viewed as falling on a continuum rather than representing stark polar
opposites.
Historians are more likely to focus on and elaborate upon single
events or more limited time periods than are IR scholars. Of course,
there are many IR scholars, as well as historians of different stripes such
as A.J.P. Taylor (1954), Eric Hobsbawm (1962), Paul Kennedy (1987),
Niall Ferguson (2003), and George Herring (2008), who do not fit this
description at all. But it is fair to describe this as a tendency. Moreover,
historians will be more satisfied with providing a good description of a his-
torical period, while IR scholars will not often be satisfied with providing
a historical account in and of itself.
IR scholars also often seek generalizations, while many historians are
more likely to see events as sui generis, even though neither historians nor
political scientists can really avoid simplification given the great complexity
of what they study. Generalization and specification are different under-
takings, but they are neither necessarily dichotomous nor separate on the
path toward discovery. It may be true, as Isaiah Berlin suggests in his study
of Tolstoy, that some thinkers are like “foxes” in that they seek to explain
and see events through multiple lenses, while others are like “hedgehogs”
20 S.A. YETIV
who see the world through the focus upon a central idea (Berlin 1953).
But we need both types of thinkers for knowledge to be advanced.
If IR scholars are more likely to seek generalizations, they are also more
likely to see events in terms of existing generalizations. In one sympo-
sium chiefly involving diplomatic historians and IR scholars, contributors
tended to find that “unlike international historians, who did not expect
explanations for a particular historical episode to be consistent with argu-
ments for other events, political scientists assumed that particular his-
torical outcomes and processes could be treated as examples of a larger
phenomenon” (Elman and Elman 2008: 358).
While some historians, as historian Pelz observes, do use generaliza-
tions and theories to explain events, “even if they are reluctant to admit
to the practice” (Pelz in Elman 2008: 87), IR scholars are far more
conscious of theory and sometimes even see it as an end point. One
might say that historians reveal pieces of a puzzle. They know that the
pieces have limited meaning in themselves, but they believe that others
will use them to construct the larger picture in longer-range, broader,
or comparative studies. IR, on the other hand, prioritizes generaliza-
tion and often sees it as the culmination of one’s investigation. For IR
scholars, generalization is used for prediction, whereas historians gener-
alize to streamline history so that it can be explained. Otherwise, they
could write a million volumes on any period of history. For example, IR
scholars are also more likely to interpret great powers as pursuing grand
strategies. As with the aforementioned symposium, several contributors
involved in a 2008 symposium agreed that “much of mainstream IR is
fixed on the notion that international relations is repetitive, timeless,
and cyclical” (Elman and Elman 2008: 359). A particular branch of for-
eign policy studies claims that states pursue coherent, consistent strate-
gies over extended periods of time—that their behavior conforms with
grand strategy such as balance of power or hegemonic grand strategy. By
contrast, historians are less likely to see world affairs in terms of a grand
narrative (see Reus-Smit 2008: 400–402).
Another difference is that IR scholars sometimes seek to make pre-
dictions, while historians rarely do.3 This does not diminish the value of
their work for IR scholars, but it creates a separate, disconnected space of
inquiry and analysis. The same can be said of policy. Many IR scholars seek
to make policy recommendations, while this is more rare among histori-
ans, with some notable exceptions (e.g., Neustadt and May 1988).
A HISTORICAL TURN: WHICH HISTORY AND WHICH IR?

Whatever the exact differences between the disciplines, some scholars
have observed an increasing convergence between them. They identify
a so-called historical turn in IR in which history is being brought back
increasingly into IR analysis and qualitative research is gaining ground,
thus putting some IR scholars in a better position to draw on the work
of historians (see Elman and Elman 2008: 361–364). For his part, Keene
goes so far as to argue that the “new history” has moved beyond chrono-
logical description and narrative into greater analysis that resembles politi-
cal science (Keene 2008: 381–389).
Such a historical turn may be in the making for what history can offer
IR, but I argue that understanding what history can offer IR depends on
which history and IR we have in mind. Different schools in both disci-
plines bring varying ontologies, core assumptions, methods, and perspec-
tives to bear in their work. Thus, for neorealists, anarchy socializes states,
and variations in state capabilities are central. In contrast, constructivists
privilege ideas and socially constructed norms in shaping outcomes over
material structures and capabilities (see Wendt 1999; Krotz 2015, chap.
2). These ontological differences fundamentally affect which IR scholars
can learn best from which historians.
At the most basic level, I argue that qualitative IR scholars can benefit
more from the work of historians than can IR scholars who are devoted
to quantitative analyses, although both can certainly benefit from it.
Qualitative scholars can benefit more because the quantitative scholars are
more likely to embrace abstraction and to detach from nuanced historical
analyses. Game theorists can certainly benefit from a better understanding
of the context that they model, as can agent-based modelers and other
types of simulation modelers. Such knowledge can generate more use-
ful assumptions about how actors and systems behave and can also help
calibrate models. However, they can also model without great knowledge
of any event or context. In fact, some modelers would argue strongly in
the area of game theory or for instance simulation modeling that abstrac-
tion is a much better approach toward analysis—even a sine qua non for
efficacy. Partly due to this view of the role of empirics, and partly because
assumptions need not be realistic to be useful if they help illuminate reali-
ties, it is fair to argue that game theorists can benefit less from historians
than can, for instance, neoclassical realists whose approaches invite and
require good historical analysis (for a good example, see Onea 2012).
22 S.A. YETIV
By this I mean that the central thrust of neoclassical realism is that bal-
ance of power dynamics cannot in and of themselves explain key outcomes
such as balancing and bandwagoning; rather it is also vital to incorporate
micro-level variables such as perception, ideology, and domestic-society
relations to explain these outcomes. In turn, it is difficult to understand
micro-level variables, which are not as easily amenable to abstraction as
are balance of power dynamics, with slender historical analysis. In fact, the
main methodological approach of neoclassical realists is to test hypotheses
and theories using the process tracing of case studies (see Schweller 2003;
Onea 2012). And, while the approaches of historians and IR scholars can
be quite different, both groups sometimes use process tracing to identify a
causal chain that links independent and dependent variables (see Bennett
and George 2005: 206–207), in a case study approach.
Within both fields, there are more particular genres to consider for
a sensible rendering of what history can offer IR. Hobson and Lawson
identify several schools of thought among historians, which, while hardly
exhaustive, underscore the diversity of thought in the discipline (also, see
Williams et al. 2012). The school of Radical Historicism, insofar as it can
be discerned, assumes that good history must consider the realities of a
given time and place, which shape events; postcolonial studies provide
an example of such an approach, which brings it closer to constructivist
IR, albeit bereft of the grand scope analysis of Wendt (1999). By con-
trast, traditional historians aim to capture truth through archival work
and primary source documents. Such approaches are averse to the work of
Radical Historicism (Hobson and Lawson 2008: 426). While traditional
historians produce work which differs from that of IR theorists, IR posi-
tivists may well see the work of traditional historians as most useful out
of the different approaches in history. They can draw upon it to test their
theories in a positivist manner.
Meanwhile, in contrast to scholars from the other two schools, big
picture historians are not focused on a “random series of isolated move-
ments,” but rather on the broader sweep of events, employing more
generality.4 They seek to examine large-scale change, but that is also the
central province of historical sociologists who have interacted profitably
with some branches of history and IR (Lawson 2006: esp. 408–409).
Historical sociology can be viewed as composed of efforts by sociologists,
economists, philosophers, and even some political scientists to under-
stand, though the study of history, how the modern world evolved (see
BISA 40th Anniversary Conference 2015). Thus, the study of history is
combined with sociology’s effort to reveal why historical work is signifi-

cant in terms of the social world. Because of its scope and goals, Hobson
and Lawson (2008) suggest that a historical sociological approach offers a
better chance of dialogue with IR theorists than the traditional historical
approach. And these historians are well suited to the task of advancing the
study of change in IR, and to conflicts arising from both systemic and sub-
systemic variables, due to their scope of study and orientation.
Beyond the positivist agenda on which I focus, IR scholars of a differ-
ent type can benefit from history. For instance, some IR constructivists
can use history in their own way. They may draw upon the work of social
and cultural historians in particular. This is because they share certain
ontological claims, allowing for greater inter-operability of thought and
analysis. The historical work of social and cultural historians tends to be
shaped in ways that they can tap.
Scholars identified a so-called cultural turn in the social sciences, and
certainly cultural studies and postmodernism have gained some ground in
IR, notably outside of the United States. These schools of thought con-
sist of numerous approaches that defy easy categorization and can overlap
with constructivism, but they tend to reject causal analysis as a central
goal of social sciences and instead highlight the implications of context
for inter-subjective understandings over perceived causal relations within
them (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: esp. 21–23).
In contrast to social and cultural historians who may be more able to
interface with IR constructivists and postmodernists, traditional historians
will seek to discover what actually occurred in historical events, with far
less regard or even disdain for multiple perspectives or contingent truths.
However, that is not to say that the work of traditional historians cannot
benefit IR constructivists and postmodernists. They can draw on such his-
torical accounts to try to understand better the influences of ideas. This
may help them assemble disparate historical accounts of how culture and
ideas have shaped lenses of actors, and in turn political action, and how
those lenses interacted with the environments in which they sought to
generate outcomes (for a brief example, see Reus-Smit 2008: 411–414).
Yet, I would argue that IR constructivists are far less likely to learn from
traditional historians than from social or cultural historians. Reus-Smit, for
instance, sees constructivist IR as more compatible with social and cultural
history, because the latter tend to reject the notion that historical work can
reveal one truth as opposed to multiple truths. Likewise, in a similar vein,
postmodern historians largely reject the notion of objective histories and
24 S.A. YETIV
instead see history as a function of how we perceive it, making it important

to consider events from different perspectives. Such an approach makes
their work more valuable to postmodern IR scholars than to positivists.
In this case, it is not just a question of ontological congruence but also
of epistemology—about the central question of what we can know and
of how we know what we think we know. If two scholars differ on these
central questions, they will likely find it harder to benefit from each other’s
work.
Meanwhile, on the perennial question of theory, some scholars draw
a distinction among schools of history. Historian Lynn, for example, dis-
tinguishes between traditional and so-called avant-garde historians. The
latter embrace theory, even with “passion,” albeit such theory “is not the
type that international relations specialists would feel comfortable with”;
that being theory imported mainly from “philosophy, literary criticism,
and anthropology.” (Lynn 2001: 360–361). In the past 15 years at least,
we have seen the rise of one prominent exception: alternative schools
anchored by postmodernism and parts of the constructivist literature.
To be sure, much overlap exists within the divisions discussed above.
Thus, cultural/ constructivist approaches are also normally archive-based.
And “traditional history” involving detailed archival work can be comple-
mentary to the broad qualitative, sociological, constructivist, and post-
modern categories sometimes typologized under “Radical Historicism.”
Even so, the question of what historians and what IR scholars are discuss-
ing remains salient. Methodological, theoretical, and empirical differences
certainly exist in both fields.
Of course, historians are not the only ones who study history in a
way that can help IR thinkers; other synergies are worth touching upon.
Beyond the historical work of some IR scholars, four schools of thought
deserve mention here, if only in brief. The first school, historical sociology,
has already been touched upon (see BISA 40th Anniversary Conference
2015).
The second school is comparative historical analysis, which is com-
posed mainly of sociologists or IR scholars. Comparative historical ana-
lysts are concerned with causal analysis in processes over time, such as the
causes of social revolutions or the formation of states; they seek to assess
causality via studying similar and contrasting cases and statistical large-N
analyses. However, the bifurcation between these thinkers is not clear and
they often build upon each other’s work. Thus, as Amenta (2003: 97)
points out, according to “some standard views, comparative and historical
research involves a division of labor in which historians work for social

scientists.” In fact, many historians pursue even larger goals, even though
such a synergy has its proven value.
Historical institutionalism constitutes the third school. It is largely
concerned with revealing why, at a macro-level that can span centuries,
countries evolved along different developmental paths; and how state insti-
tutions emerged from enduring legacies of political struggles (see Fioretos
2011). Such work is important to contemporary comparativists in political
science as well as to IR scholars who are interested in the links between
sub-national and international phenomena. This is in part because, as
Thelen suggests, “knowing how institutions were constructed provides
insights into how they might come apart” (1999: 400). Historical institu-
tionalism is different from but can also inform rational choice institution-
alism which seeks to understand the coordinating functions of institutions.
We could call the fourth school “historical political economy.” Of
course, this is hardly new and some might even include it in historical
institutionalism but its focus on political economy also makes it unique.
Scholars from Karl Marx to Immanuel Wallerstein would fall into this field.
More recently, Thomas Piketty (2014) has undertaken a broad history of
inequality, which economic and other historians should appreciate and, in
turn, inform. Such works could also inform conflict because they highlight
underlying dynamics that historically have contributed to conflict.
HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

The means by which history can be used are broad. They differ not only
on which history and IR we have in mind but also based on various factors
including just how deeply and thoroughly one wishes to delve into his-
tory. For example, game theorists might use history as a heuristic device to
model conditions for conflict over cooperation; qualitative IR scholars of
war might conduct their own historical research or read the work of histo-
rians carefully; and quantitative empiricists may mine history to try to test
theory. All of these efforts can be useful to the purposes of IR, even if they
engage history at varying levels of intensity and run the risk of offending
those who insist that history not be streamlined. We need to remember
that we are exploring how history can contribute to IR—and not how one
should conduct excellent history. They are not the same thing. All that
said, I believe that IR scholars could benefit in particular by using history
to understand change better, which is salient to many of their concerns.
26 S.A. YETIV
To be sure, some IR scholars have explored change in important ways,5

and myriad excellent works have explored the causes of international con-
flict (for a survey, see Mitchell and Vasquez 2013; Ruane and James 2012,
chap. 2). However, I argue that history conducted mainly by historians
but also by others could benefit the work of IR scholars by illuminating
the nexus between political, economic and strategic change and interna-
tional conflict.
There are various areas of IR where more history would help in under-
standing change and its connection to conflict. First, history could do
more to enhance our understanding in IR of various conflicts ranging
from those at the regional level to great power conflict. Of course, we still
have much to learn from diplomatic historians such as Leopold von Ranke
about the deep, antecedent causes of great power conflicts such as World
War I and what this means for a generalized view of how such conflicts
arise from the mix of individual, domestic, and systemic factors. And IR
scholars remain in search of a narrative of how the Cold War came to an
end (see e.g., Snyder 2013), not to mention how to understand key post-
Cold war rivalries. In the twenty-first century, many in IR are fixated on
how China may rival or even challenge a hegemonic America—a notion
captured in hegemonic war theory (Gilpin 1981). The world is concerned
about whether China and America will clash if China continues to rise.
What does history tell us about such rivalries and how can we adjust such
knowledge to current conditions?
We might also ask theory-oriented questions that require some under-
standing of how history is connected across much longer periods of time:
for instance, how did events in one century shape another? Does an imbal-
ance of power lead to war (e.g., did German unification in 1871 contrib-
ute to the eventual outbreak of World War I?) as neorealists might posit; or
does concentrated power plus the behavior of leaders (Kaiser Wilhelm II,
assuming power in Germany in 1890) illuminate the causes of war (World
War I), as neoclassical theorists might posit? Or are these simplifications
privileging parsimony at the expense of fidelity?
IR scholars sometimes make claims about long-range change, but not
infrequently they focus on the near term. This is because some processes
take a very long time to unfold and often fall outside the scope of social
science analysis. As Ferguson and Mansbach put it (2008: 366), “To know
if and how change has taken place, it is necessary to have a baseline—the
past—against which to compare and contrast the present.” History could
help fill this lacuna.
On a smaller scale, work by historians on how minor events can alter

history may be of use to IR scholars such as in the case on how one con-
flict sows the seeds of another or contributes to future conflicts. Historian
Taylor, for instance, is famous for showing how minor events can have
major unintended consequences (1954, 1965), and history is littered with
instances of how such events can generate low-level conflict and tensions,
and may trigger future wars. The Middle East is certainly rife with such
dynamics where the causes of conflict include the effects of previous con-
flicts that manifest themselves in clear and more subtle change over time.
Whether it be between great powers or lesser states, conflicts have com-
plex mid-range and deeper antecedent causes, be they a function of previ-
ous conflicts at the international level or variables ranging down to the
historical evolution of a crucial figure such as Joseph Stalin (see Kotkin
2014). Single, detailed case studies, or a combination of many studies or
books culled from the literature, facilitate efforts to see how one event
leads to another. That makes it easier to ascribe causality in history’s train.
This would be harder to accomplish from more streamlined analyses of
the past which lack the deep context for revealing how seemingly unre-
lated events might well be connected. Historical work reveals the anteced-
ent causes of war in a more specific light than does most IR scholarship
(see Williams et al. 2012, chap. 2). Even if historians treat this informa-
tion as unique, political science can try to determine if it fits into a class
type or theory. For example, without historical understanding, it is harder
to explain why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, an act that was
shaped over a period of two decades or more. That such connections are in
play is not the story, but IR scholars focus less on teasing them out of the
historical process than, for instance, scholars of historical institutionalism
(see Thelen 1999, 2005; Fioretos 2011).
In essence, history can help reveal possible causal links in ways that
can complement IR. Stringing detailed cases together or examining the
broader sweep of time may help us discern causal connections that other-
wise would have been buried in more streamlined and short-term analyses.
Second, history can also help us better appreciate the relative weight
of different causes of war. Does longer-run change alter the key causes of
conflict? Historian Paul Schroeder suggests that “religion ceased in the
latter half of the eighteenth century to be a central cause of war and disor-
der not because it declined in importance and influence or was dethroned
by other concerns or changed its nature, but because it was defused and
de-fanged as a source of interstate conflict through a long, painful quest
28 S.A. YETIV
for order carried out in both domestic and international politics.” (in May
et al. 2010: 87). Regardless of whether one agrees with his argument, it
certainly frames the larger question of the weight of different causes of war
and does so with historical evidence. And such work, alongside the use of
databases on war such as that developed by Richard Ned Lebow (2010b),
could augment our understanding of the motives for war over time.
History can also inform the potential change in the causes of interna-
tional conflict writ large. For instance, are tensions over resources such as
oil and water a more or less common cause of conflict over time? How
about the role of individual leaders in an age of greater communications?
How about refugee crises and environmental problems? Human security
factors of this kind are emphasized in non-traditional definitions of secu-
rity; in what ways have they gained in importance over time? (see Kerr
2009). Comparison over time is crucial for answering such questions,
which history can help execute either through in-depth work such as case
studies or by helping to identify and explore indicators of change over
time.
Third, IR could do far more to explore the effects of the fall of empires.
That would help illuminate many concerns in IR in such failed states and
the conflicts they generate; decolonization and the conflictual struggle
between the strong and weak; and numerous conflicts over borders and
resources, especially in the Middle East.
History is integral to this exploration. Many historians have engaged the
question of empire. Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire comes
to mind as well as the seminal and acclaimed work of Braudel (1972), who
investigated the clash of empires and cultures in the Mediterranean in the
sixteenth century by looking broadly at contexts (agricultural, financial,
economic, demographic, technological, etc.) and back through historical
development over a millennium. In more recent times, other historians of
various stripes have addressed questions of empire (e.g., Kennedy 1987;
Maier 2006; Porter 2006; Burbank and Cooper 2010), and in some cases
this work aids not only in understanding the rise and fall of empires but
also the causes and effects of crucial conflicts like the Thirty Years War
from 1618 to 1648 (Whaley 2013)—a time period that some scholars
believe could inform our understanding of religious and inter-state con-
flicts today (see Owen 2014).
Fourth, scholars have produced useful work on whether the United
States is in decline, but this analysis, which is fundamentally about under-
standing change, could be further developed with a systematic comparison
of indicators of America’s capability over time compared to that of rising

powers. History could supplement this analysis by offering context, with
case studies on the extent to which America achieved its goals in various
issue areas over time. That could help reveal if capability on paper trans-
lated into actual influence over time.
Exploring this issue could benefit from analysis of how we view
America’s station. Some thinkers assert that the United States is an empire
like those of the past (O’Reilly 2008), while others argue that it is not an
empire because, unlike other great powers, it does not aggrandize terri-
tory (Nye 2011). Historiography may reveal the limitations of commonly
cited arguments that the United States is an empire simply because it is
powerful or that it is anti-imperial simply because it disavows conquest
(MacDonald 2009: 65).
The question of American decline is related to conflict not only because
hegemony could potentially contribute to war as suggested by hegemonic
war theory but also because hegemony could help prevent serious conflicts
as reflected in hegemonic stability theory which posits that hegemony
generates stability. Could history help us develop a theory of the condi-
tions under which hegemony globally or regionally leads more toward
one outcome than the other, or sharpen our current theoretical notions?
And at a larger level, history can help reveal if the nation-state itself is in
decline—an issue that greatly interests IR scholars (see Ripsman and Paul
2014). What does it mean for international conflict if the nation-state itself
is in decline? What does it mean for international terrorism and for ideolo-
gies that might want to replace nationalism? Historical analysis can give
us a better sense of the extent to which the nation-state has changed over
time and what this might mean.
Fifth, at the theoretical level, the question of change in world politics
is critical, because the main theories of IR make fundamental assump-
tions about change. Assessing the extent to which these claims or assump-
tions are on target or are useful requires some understanding of history.
Realists/Neorealists assume that world politics is cyclical; that wars and
conflicts recur; that cooperation is perpetually difficult to achieve; and that
not much changes at the heart of world politics (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer
2001). By contrast, their detractors in the liberal/neoliberal school, as
well as constructivists such as Wendt (1999), assume fundamentally that
much changes over time, be it the rise and impact of international institu-
tions; evolutionary learning across history; changes in global culture from
Hobbesian to Lockean to Kantian (Wendt 1999), or of the development
30 S.A. YETIV
and effects of globalization (e.g., Keohane and Nye 2011; Held and
McGrew 2007; Rosenau 2003; Russett and Oneal 2001). Does globaliza-
tion generate “butterfly effects?” Do they, in turn, cause inter-state ten-
sions? Under what conditions?
All of these claims, be they theoretical or empirical, beg questions about
history and change. For example, one major difference between IR theo-
retical schools has to do with conflict in world politics. Is the world just
as war-prone and violent as in past decades and centuries? Realists would
assume that it is, largely; liberals would tend to disagree. Empirically, that
is a giant question which still requires much more attention and engage-
ment with history and multiple disciplines.6 It is hard to judge such ques-
tions without a careful study of change, with accompanying support from
historical work. Even large-N studies, while highly useful, could be sup-
plemented profitably by consulting in-depth historical work.
Sixth, another major difference between IR theoretical schools has to
do with globalization and change. Some scholars believe that it has gen-
erated a radically different global environment, including a diminished
chance for inter-state conflict, in sharp contrast to the assumptions of real-
ism (Russett and Oneal 2001; Pinker 2011). Historical case studies on the
subject are uncommon and it would be useful to see how they might add
to the literature. Dale Copeland offers an interesting exception in which
his historical work informs theory building on how expectations of trade
affect international conflict more than extant levels of trade (Copeland
2014). More historical studies comparing past eras to the present would
also help in understanding to what extent globalization generates instabili-
ties that may lead to conflict as compared to the past (for an exception, see
Buzan and Lawson 2015). Indeed, IR scholars are interested in the notion
that under globalized conditions, small perturbations might “reverber-
ate” or cause “cascading disruptions”—dynamics which researchers have
noticed in other forms of globalization (Rosenau 2003, chap. 9; Maoz
2006). How have such dynamics changed over time?
Seventh, constructivism is not the focus of this chapter, but certainly it is
rich with potential (see Krotz 2015, chap. 2). The study of history informs
myriad notions of constructivist behavior that can influence conflict.
Consider the nexus of time, change, and meaning. As Ty Solomon sug-
gests, the interweaving of temporality, meaning, and subjectivity affects
the social construction process in ways that are subtle and underappreci-
ated. That is true of conflict and of how the meanings attached to various
events and positions in conflicts change over time in the historical process
(Solomon 2014). Such dynamics place further emphasis on understanding

individuals and considering variables related to them that might cross-
fertilize with system-level variables to enhance understanding and possibly
theory.
Eighth, history may also tell us something about change and conflict
that may illuminate the present. For instance, do past religious conflicts
inform us about the nature of current conflicts—a type of work done by
both historians such as Makdisi (2015) and some political scientists like
John Owen (2014) who studied past sectarian conflicts to illuminate mod-
ern conflicts? Is the past telling us about the present or are all circum-
stances sui generis, and even if they are the latter, is there something to
learn from the past? Of course, it would be hard to understand conflicts
in key regions of the world such as the Middle East and Balkans without
understanding the effects of the fall of empires over time.
THEORY BUILDING, METHODS, AND TESTING
History can play an enhanced role in theory, methods, and testing in

IR. First, history could help with inference in the theory-building pro-
cess. As political scientists King, Keohane, and Verba effectively demon-
strate (1994: 42–43), detailed studies can offer some basis for inference to
broader generalization and aid in the most difficult task that social science
faces—simplification. In this sense, and in others, qualitative and quantita-
tive work are similar and can inform each other (King et al. 1994; Box-
Steffensmeier et al. 2008). General theory building or modeling, be it in
the form of statistics, game theory, or various forms of simulation, requires
a sense of how things hang together in reality, of how variables are related.
The parsimony that even purist IR theorists seek need not preclude the
value of historical study. Rather, such study can augment the search for
what the critical variables should be in the first place and how they might
be correlated or causally connected. Neoclassical realism, for instance,
emphasizes variables such as “perception” of the “balance of power” and
history could certainly help illuminate these dynamics.
Consider World War I. Systemic-level empirics or theory in IR can-
not explain the causes of war without an understanding of the complex
interplay among leaders who wanted to avoid war but failed to do so, not
to mention other variables such as the relationship between ethnic factors
and war onset captured in numerous historical works and focused upon by
scholars such as Niall Ferguson (2006).
32 S.A. YETIV
Second, greater attention to the study of history would enhance the-

ory building in relatively neglected areas such as international change. As
Ferguson and Mansbach suggest, “IR theorists who lack historical sensi-
tivity simply assume that the past resembles the present” (Ferguson and
Mansbach 2008: 378). And that can bedevil the ability to generate theory,
especially in terms of theories about change in world politics, of which
there is a relative dearth. Hegemonic war theory, power cycle theory,
power transition theory, and long cycle war theory, for instance, are theo-
ries of change, as is Wendt’s social theory of international politics (1999),
but there are not many of this kind. Neorealism, according to Waltz and
his critics, cannot explain change (Waltz 1979: 323–330), although some
scholars disagree with Waltz’s view of his own theory. Others might say
that neorealism is a theory of change insofar as it indirectly explains why
things do not change; why certain patterns of behavior—balances—recur
in world politics, under the unrelenting, seemingly immutable nature of
anarchy. But non-change is a different dependent variable than change.
Explaining persistence and change are not the same undertakings, albeit
Waltzian theory provides one perspective on prospects for core change in
world politics.
Third, mainstream IR theorists—neorealists and neoliberals—abstract
away from the individual and domestic levels and assume in part that state
preferences are either invariable or not shaped by individual beliefs. As sug-
gested earlier in this essay, history may help bridge these levels of analysis.
For example, a greater understanding of the role of individuals in history
might indicate where it might be profitable to use variables from different
levels of analysis to develop hypotheses, while retaining parsimony. For
instance, a detailed history of the month preceding World War I under-
scores the crucial role of individuals in shaping the war (Tuchman 1976;
Martel 2014). We might also develop theories of conflict derived from
both micro- and macro-level variables across disciplines (see Demmers
2012). But doing so requires that the theorists pay more attention to
theory and vice versa. What, for instance, does history tell us about group
dynamics and how such dynamics related to inter-state conflicts?
Historians who are especially interested in theory—some of it even IR
theory—also should cooperate more with theory-oriented IR scholars. We
see little published work of this kind. Yet, historians, as Gaddis points out,
must strike a balance between particularization and generalization (see
Gaddis 2002: esp. 14–15), as must many IR scholars, and so there is an
area of intersection that can be exploited better.
While history can inform theory building, it can also benefit the related
enterprise of testing. Historical evidence can also help explore hypotheses
and theories, especially in areas where meta-data or artificial evidence are
prominent and quantitative methods are neither possible nor appropriate
for the subject matter. As Larson points out, historical evidence is “essential
to assess the accuracy of psychological explanations of foreign policy deci-
sions,” because experiments generate useful hypotheses about cognitive
and motivational influence, albeit in an artificial environment, in need of
“validation by real-world data” (Larson in Elman and Elman 2001: 327).
Of course, history also can be a laboratory for the study of counter-
factuals, as a means for drawing inferences or testing theory. Such “what
if” questions, which are employed across disciplines, can help identify
the importance of hypothesized variables that are assumed to have been
absent. Often such variables may be tied to broader theories, allowing for
those theories to be tested, if the counterfactual approach is used effec-
tively (see Lebow 2010a; Harvey 2011). Indeed, all counterfactuals are
not created equal. As is well known, they can be misused, especially if the
variable assumed to have been absent is too divorced in time from the
outcome that it is hypothesized to explain (King and Zeng 2007).
Beyond counterfactuals, we rarely use history to calibrate complex
models. For instance, assume that one develops an agent-based simula-
tion model to study the impact of terrorist attacks on the global ship-
ping system. One can populate the model with actors whose behavior is
governed by algorithms which approximate how those actors are likely to
behave, but calibrating the model requires identifying past events that may
approximate terrorist attacks, such as earthquakes or labor strikes and then
assessing their effects. Since we cannot create terrorist attacks, these other
events help assess whether our model captures the essential effects that it
purports to predict and explain. Historians may offer the work that, when
combined with data analysis of such effects, can help in identifying cases
and their key contours for calibrating models of various stripes, or non-
historians can engage in historical analysis for this purpose.
Historical evidence, of course, may be used in quantitative approaches,
even if not conducted by historians. Thus, some comparative historical
analysis uses large-N statistical analysis, such as the analysis of revolu-
tions. While the level of detail in this work which is conducted often by
sociologists falls short of that of traditional historians, it is more involved
than that of most political scientists. It feeds into the study of IR (see
Goldstone 2003).
34 S.A. YETIV
Historical study can also benefit IR in diachronic comparisons aimed at

revealing causality, and, in turn, changes over a relatively shorter period of
time. A sophisticated literature exists regarding debates about the impli-
cations of temporality for social-scientific inquiry.7 The debates touch on
critical areas including how to view historical processes themselves—a
question that could define what the analyst considers to be germane in the
first place (see Abbott 2001: esp. chap. 5). Many salient contributions in
IR and other disciplines hinge on discovering, or theorizing about, corre-
lations between or among variables or, at a higher level, cause-effect links.
It seems, then, that we should be interested in understanding what best
enables this enterprise. There are many paths to discovery and understand-
ing, but the study of history and IR, separately and together, is important
to this enterprise in central ways.
Historical study can be of use to IR in diachronic comparisons by help-
ing illuminate what has changed out of a broader context of interacting
and evolving variables at the sub-systemic and systemic levels. Originally
associated with John Stuart Mill, the diachronic comparative method of
difference can advance the study of IR across a range of critical issue areas
and is seriously underutilized by students and scholars.
The comparative method is used to compare cases that in theory differ
in only one significant respect. This would approximate an experiment in
which one group receives a stimulus while another does not. Any changes
in the experimental group might then be attributed to the stimulus.
Nothing in world politics really resembles such a controlled experiment.
However, the diachronic approach addresses the problem of controlling
variables better than do cross-national studies because fewer variables
change over just time than over both time and area.
While in statistics one variable can be held constant while others fluc-
tuate, that is not possible with history. One cannot change history to
eliminate and then to recreate an event or action, be it a peace treaty,
trade agreement, or change of regime, thus controlling for it and revealing
correlation. Consequently, it is necessary to improvise methodologically.
Such an effort involves many considerations, but at the core, it is vital to
grapple with two basic threats to valid inference. The first refers to specific
events other than the action under study that might account for observed
effects. The second threat is called maturation. It refers to regular changes
correlated with the passage of time and is distinguished from history in
that it refers to processes rather than to discrete events (Campbell 1988:
226–227).
Addressing threats to valid inference helps separate the effects of the

action in question from those of other variables. A before/after compari-
son of the effects of such actions helps assess these effects. Historical study,
be it by historians or others, can be vital to such before/after comparisons,
partly by helping address threats to valid inference. This is true even if the
before/after comparison is based on data analysis. That can be supple-
mented by examining the context in which it has meaning.
The technical methods of IR and sociology may also help in under-
standing history, producing a multi-way street of interaction. For instance,
modelers have tried to represent critical nodes in history in models in
order to understand the historical process better. Exploiting social net-
work analysis, scholars have attempted to answer questions of this kind:
when, if ever, do single events change history? (Bearman et al. 2002).
This question is of obvious cross-disciplinary significance, and answering it
would enrich an understanding of history and also of the conditions under
which events produce major effects—in other words, it would provide key
information for theory building.
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR BRIDGING FOREIGN

POLICY AND IR
In a necessarily brief foray, I now seek to explore the second question of
the chapter on how to enhance interdisciplinarity in IR—an effort that
is pregnant with opportunities and challenges (see Grenier et al. 2015).
Asking how history can contribute better to IR and the study of conflict is
part of this inquiry, but I now seek to move beyond the study of history,
conflict, and IR.
I will sketch what I call the “integrated approach.” In the discussion
below, I offer a limited version of my own work which developed a more
complex, integrated approach than I sketch here (Yetiv 2011). The inte-
grated approach aims to explain a foreign policy behavior such as the
choice to go to war, to sign a peace treaty, or to make an alliance using
diverse cuts on reality derived from different perspectives and disciplines,
with special attention to engaging sub-systemic variables, without ignor-
ing international factors.
Existing approaches often advance just one perspective or model pre-
ferred by the analyst (Allison and Zelikow 1999: esp. 13, 15–17; Byman
and Pollack 2001: esp. 107–114). The model will often vary with the
36 S.A. YETIV
analyst, but we tend to assume that states try to carefully weigh the costs
and benefits of various options for dealing with the issue at hand, and then
choose, or try to choose, the best option that advances national interests
(Allison and Zelikow 1999: esp. 13, 15–17). We then tend to describe
their behavior as if they acted as a coordinated actor rather than as a com-
bination of competing groups, bureaucracies, committees, and individuals
with their own interests, preferences, and modes of behavior. This concep-
tion of government behavior is captured explicitly in the state-centric ver-
sion of what is called the rational actor model. It is drawn from the study
of IR, with some basis in economics.
Such mono-theoretical explanations based fundamentally on the ratio-
nal actor model can certainly illuminate government behavior. They are
important building blocks to more complex explanations. And in some
cases, they may capture enough of what is vital to be satisfactory. But these
accounts can also be misleading or incomplete,8 notably if they seek to
force reality into pre-fitted boxes. The rational actor model derives chiefly
from political science as applied to states, but could be cross-fertilized bet-
ter with other disciplines to explain foreign policy behavior.
The integrated approach consists of several parts. First, it starts by using
different perspectives to help explain government behavior which includes
how decisions are made (decision-making) and why governments do what
they do. Scholars in different fields have argued the benefits of taking on
different perspectives (e.g., Allison and Zelikow 1999; Tomasello 2014).
The perspectives used in the integrated approach are chosen because they
cover basic aspects of government behavior and offer alternative and some-
times competing explanations.9 Using these five perspectives yields five
different explanations for the same government behavior, in Rashomon
style. The integrated approach is not limited to these five perspectives.
Scholars can add or subtract perspectives to explain the cases that they
examine so long as they cover the basic aspects of government behavior.
The five perspectives are based on different assumptions about what
level of analysis is most crucial (Level of Analysis) in explaining government
behavior; what are the direct or indirect goals or results of the behavior of
the central actor posited in the perspective (Goal or Result); and how that
actor makes decisions consciously or subconsciously (Decision-making).
For each case in question, we would start off by offering a rational actor
model explanation of the behavior we seek to examine, and then move to
offer competing perspectives.
In contrast to the rational actor model, the cognitive approach offers

a different explanation or part of an explanation for government behav-
ior by focusing on the minds of decision-makers at the individual level
of analysis. Drawn from psychology and tied to history, it assumes that
individuals consciously or subconsciously use mental shortcuts, like analo-
gies to historical events, to simplify reality in order to facilitate decision-
making (Khong 1992).
The domestic politics model highlights how government behavior is
shaped by leaders who construct reality to meet their own domestic-level
goals at least as much if not more than national objectives. Unlike the
other models, this model, drawn from political science and from philoso-
phy’s contribution to constructivism, assumes that leaders are concerned
with their position, influence, and reputation in the domestic realm.
By contrast, the social psychology theory of groupthink focuses on the
impact of group dynamics on decision-making, on the pressures for indi-
viduals in groups to conform. It offers its own unique take on government
behavior. For its part, the bureaucratic politics model, drawn from politi-
cal science and business, centers chiefly on individuals within a committee
setting who bargain with others and take positions driven by the inter-
ests and politics of their respective fiefdoms. Seeing government behavior
through the bureaucratic lens highlights other possible explanations for
how decisions were made.
Second, after offering competing explanations of the same behavior
derived from the different perspectives, integrated approach suggests that
we test these perspectives or different model-driven narratives against the
record. I argue that doing so can yield insights that can be integrated into
better explanations of government behavior than we would have in using
just one perspective or model as a guide to explanation. Thus, a rational
actor model explanation could be combined at the system level with an
individual-level explanation to enhance overall explanation.
It is vital to note here that by “integration,” I mean integrating insights
derived from using multiple perspectives and not integrating the per-
spectives themselves. It is a mistake to think that this approach means
combining theories or perspectives. Some of them are contradictory in
their assumptions and cannot be reconciled in that manner.
Third, while the integrated approach does not integrate the perspec-
tives, it does have a theoretical component. Aspects of some of these per-
spectives can be drawn upon in the integrated approach to bridge areas
of theory that tend to be treated as separate and to generate theory. The
38 S.A. YETIV
integrated approach allows for synthesis of insights between two disci-

plines or more.
Integrating insights into one account can yield better explanations
of events, but the approach also allows for more complex integration
across areas that are often treated separately. The different perspectives
carry some irreconcilable assumptions, but when used in combination as
cuts on reality, they allow for integration of domestic and international
theory and variables. This is because the rational actor model is an IR
theory of how states interact, while the other four perspectives are for-
eign policy theories that feature domestic-level variables. Such works fall
in the tradition of cross-fertilization of notions and insights in areas rang-
ing from foreign policy studies to behavioral economics (e.g., see Ariely
2008).10 Such cross-fertilization is also attempted in various other ways
between psychology and political science in areas of political psychology
(e.g., see McDermott 2004; Welch 2005; Renshon and Suedfeld 2007)
or in the more specific field of prospect theory. Efforts in political sci-
ence to integrate cognitive and rational theories in particular overlap these
various fields and sub-fields (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). The integrated
approach seeks to expand on such approaches by drawing systematically
on key disciplines.
Fourth, the integrated approach also allows for integrating the three
key areas of foreign policy: process, choice, and outcome. The rational
actor model is designed to explain just one of the two central dimen-
sions of decision-making—“choice.” In basic terms, it tells us how actors
choose. It tells us that when faced with a choice between alternatives,
actors will take (or try to take) the option that promises the best outcome.
But it ignores process or the nature, content, and origin of the beliefs,
perceptions, preferences, and objectives of actors. Process is what hap-
pens in decision-making prior to choice or to choosing among options.
The rational actor model treats these elements of process as givens and
then tells us how choices will be made. They are assumed rather than
established through research and analysis. But what if, for instance, we
seek to understand how actors form their preferences in the first place, or
in other words, why they prefer certain policies over others, such as free
trade over protectionism, economic sanctions over negotiation, and war
over economic sanctions?
All of the non-rational actor model perspectives offer insight at dif-
ferent levels of analysis into preference formation—a key aspect of pro-
cess. The integrated approach shows how analogies can be a source of
preferences; how certain policies are preferred because they accommodate

the historical lesson or message provided by the analogy. Others are less
preferred because they clash with the lesson or message of the analogy—
something that historical study can help flesh out. The analogy acts as a
prism through which preferences can be formed, downgraded in impor-
tance, and even rejected if the analogy is powerful in its impact.
The domestic politics model assumes that preferences cannot simply
be presumed to be national and largely invariant. They may arise from the
personal interests of leaders or organizations. It also suggests that prefer-
ences can form as a function of the discursive environment created by
decision-makers who seek to construct the adversary, but in the process
alter that environment as well. The constructed environment, then, can
push leaders to prefer certain policies over others.
While the domestic politics model highlights preference formation,
group dynamics can as well. The theory of groupthink assumes that group
preferences will form early in an event. This occurs largely through group
dynamics driven in part by a partial group leader whose preferences can
prevail in part because of groupthink dynamics.
For its part, the bureaucratic politics model illuminates factors that may
shape each player's perceptions, preferences, and likely course of action.
It informs us that preferences will be derived based on the bureaucracies
from which individuals hail and from bargaining among individuals. These
interests, in competition, may ultimately shape the international behavior
of actors more than concern for perceived national interests.
The Integrated Approach, History, and Conflict

The integrated approach can be launched without the careful study of
history. It can be a conceptual work that sketches multiple and competing
perspectives of government behavior to show heuristically how the same
event can be viewed differently. That has its own benefits for empiricists,
theorists, and practitioners who want to understand the behavior of states
from multiple perspectives.
However, a more involved application of the integrated approach would
benefit from history not only in developing realistic perspectives but also
in testing them. This is because the full approach requires an understand-
ing of detailed history. It is not possible to generate different perspectives
and to test them without a good understanding of history. This can come
through archival work, declassified documents, and the secondary litera-
ture of history and IR.
40 S.A. YETIV
Since this book is focused on the causes of conflict, let us consider the
integrated approach as applied to the case of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf
conflict which was triggered by Iraq’s August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait.
How can we explain why the United States went to war on January 16,
1991, to kick Iraq out of Kuwait? Using the integrated approach, I found
that no one approach provided the best explanation of this conflict,
but when all five were used, a fuller and more complete understanding
emerged. Sub-systemic variables really mattered; individuals, and in par-
ticular the President, counted profoundly in the broader scheme of things
because at critical junctures he pushed for conflict in decisive ways.
President George H.W. Bush operated within a context of personal,
domestic, global, and historical constraints. That was revealed in using the
multiple perspectives of the integrated approach. However, testing these
perspectives against the record also showed that he was also a decisive
actor in direct and subtle ways. The individual mattered in history.
Bush’s past personal experiences in the World War II and his use of the
Munich analogy shaped his cognitive map and decisions that led to war.
Indeed, at crucial junctures, he invoked the analogy both publically and
privately and it firmed him against allowing Iraq any type of face-saving
withdrawal from Kuwait; it also pushed him, and in turn, many of his key
advisers, to want to see Saddam cut down to size. I reached this conclu-
sion through a historical understanding of the Persian Gulf crisis, aided by
my declassification of scores of critical documents, but also by studying the
Munich crisis and the use of the Munich analogy by subsequent leaders
(see Yetiv 2011).
While it would be difficult to understand Bush’s critical role in this
crisis without delving into the cognitive level of analogies, we would
be equally hampered if we did not understand group-level dynamics.
Important aspects of groupthink were present among the small group of
presidential advisors, which ironically did not produce a fiasco as group-
think theory would predict for reasons that I demonstrate and theo-
rize about in detail in my work (Yetiv 2003, 2011). These elements of
groupthink further strengthened Bush’s hand in the crisis, because, as
the group leader, he faced little serious opposition within his own group
of advisers. Moreover, an absence of government politics (i.e., posturing
among members of government agencies to push their agency’s interests)
kept different actors, agencies, and departments from pushing their own
agendas and helped keep the President’s aim of dislodging Iraq from
Kuwait on track.
Of course, Washington was driven by a variety of strategic national

interests and also by prisoners’ dilemma dynamics between Iraq and the
United States that I revealed. These are highlighted by the rational actor
model anchored in the IR theory of realism at the systemic level. However,
while such factors were critical, they did not tell the full story of how the
United States decided to enter into conflict with Iraq. Using multiple per-
spectives at multiple levels of analysis builds out a more accurate picture,
aided by historical study.
The integrated approach helps ensure that potentially critical drivers
of decisions, such as cognitive biases (see Renshon and Kahneman, Chap.
3), are not ignored in theory or in practice. And as I show (Yetiv 2011),
it also helps us generate hypotheses that draw on variables from different
disciplines and at different levels of analysis, while maintaining parsimony.
NOT PUSHING A GOOD THING TOO FAR

A cautionary note is in order regarding some limits and misuses of history.
History can only take us so far in the study of IR, partly because pure
deduction is sometimes its own intellectual leap, anchored in the mind’s
ether with only modest empirical moorings. Pure IR theorists could study
a hundred historical cases and still not ferret out insights for generaliza-
tions. Imagination, even if uninformed, can be its own engine of discovery.
Some IR scholars such as those who want to use history to test theory
may question the extent to which historians have achieved an “accurate”
narrative, because most IR scholars will lack the knowledge of the event
or period in question to make a good judgment. While historians can help
IR scholars in understanding change, that presupposes that we under-
stand history well enough to use it as a benchmark and that we also have
a clear grasp of the present to compare with the past. Of course, historians
themselves are concerned with just how accurate a rendering of history is
possible (see Anderson 2015: 789). Among other points, some historians
would argue that it is extremely difficult to know history; that language
itself and what it connotes are subjective; that history is largely or partly
a construction; or that what we consider to be important is gendered and
dependent on a variety of perspectives.
Clearly, my view is that aspects of history are knowable enough that
using history would benefit IR scholars. Otherwise, I would be writing a
treatise on the shaky and dubious grounds that history offers. Yet, consid-
ering such critical views of history is important,
42 S.A. YETIV
Insofar as those engaged in historical study are unaware of IR theory,

they are not concerned with, or possibly able to ferret out, connections
in their work that are salient for IR theory. Thus, it is up to theorists to
discern such connections in material that may not be suited for such pur-
poses. That creates the potential for intellectual dislocation or for seeing in
history the patterns of theory not intended by the historian.
To be sure, some historians are engaged in all sorts of generalizations,
causal analysis, and theoretically informed work; they are not simply athe-
oretical recorders of processes and events whose work IR scholars must
trust for their own purposes. However, in some cases, political scien-
tists can have difficulty drawing on extremely focused historical studies
which do not connect with key questions, debates, or theoretical notions
in IR. The extent of the problem will depend on many factors, includ-
ing the subject matter, the goals of the scholars, the epistemological and
ontological assumptions of their enterprise both within and between the
disciplines, and how their work is presented and located in the literature.
All historians, of course, are not the same. As noted earlier, some his-
torians, such as Kennedy (1987) and Herring (2008) help meet this chal-
lenge by producing works of breadth that tie into the IR literature on
issues such as strategies of containment; the decline of empires; and the
nature of great power behavior and the causes of war. That makes it easier
for them to have a dialogue with political scientists.
Of course, it is true that history can serve the practical goal of inform-
ing decision-makers, on the assumption that if they knew more history,
they would be more likely to make better decisions (Neustadt and May
1986). IR scholar Joseph Nye, who served in high-level policy-making
positions in the administration of President Bill Clinton, illuminates quite
effectively how theory, history, and policy go hand in hand and should
not be regarded as separate efforts (Nye and Welch 2013). But history can
also mislead us if, for instance, we are seduced by historical analogies such
as the Munich analogy which may not fit certain conditions as historians
Fredrik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood (2010) underscore. As they say, a
cat that has sat on a hot stove may not sit on one again, but nor will it sit
on a cold stove. Santayana’s famous warning may be true, but it may also
be true that those who remember history may not understand the present.
As Kammen (2008) rightly explains, history can be misused for parti-
san or policy objectives. Those who invoke it may be pushing their own
agendas. Or, in the view of a constructivist, they are constructing reality
using history for political goals. It may also be that, even if the history is
accurate, its lessons may be too complex to understand, subjected to dif-

ferent interpretations by different actors, or too painful to put in effect.
If we understand the limitations of engaging in interdisciplinarity and we
also try to identify the conditions under which it can be most fruitful, we
can escape the charge that we are engaged in a diffuse undertaking with
greater costs than benefits.
CONCLUSION
IR scholars can do more to benefit from history be it by drawing on exist-
ing studies by historians or others that are history-inclined, or by upgrad-
ing their own work on history. This chapter explored what history can
offer IR at multiple levels of analysis and then introduced the idea of an
integrated approach. The next two chapters focus special attention on the
individual level of analysis and in particular on psychology and neuro-
science as they relate to decision-making and conflict. While history can
provide special insight into the role of individuals in affecting an event
and subsequent dynamics, psychology and neuroscience focus micro-level
attention on factors that affect individual behavior, and, in turn, major
issues such as international conflict.
NOTES
1. Referred to perhaps initially by historian Himmelfarb, is the postmodernist
revolution that involves myriad schools of thought (2004).
2. The last of these is perhaps most prominently on display in recent times by
Ferguson (2003) who, to illustrate the point, is both a professor of history
and business and uses history to inform modern world politics.
3. For an example of forecasting work in IR and beyond, which relies upon
an expected value model, see Bueno de Mesquita (2009).
4. On the nature of this school and on the three waves of historical sociology,
see Hobson and Lawson 2008: 427–435). Also, on history and IR writ
large, see Lawson (2012).
5. For example, see Gilpin (1981), Goldstein (1988), Legro (2007),
MacDonald (2009), Modelski and Thompson (1996), and Nexon (2009).
6. To some extent, Pinker (2011) succeeds in such an approach and finds that
violence has decreased over time.
7. For foundational works, see Abbott (2001), Bearman et al. (2002),
Mahoney and Rueschmeyer (2003), and Tilly (1995).
44 S.A. YETIV
8. Allison offered one of the first challenges to the rational actor model on
the basis of domestic political processes. On the revision of this work, see
Allison and Zelikow (1999).
9. For expanded discussion, see Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy, Chap. 1.
The term “perspective” downplays pretension to theory insofar as it does
not necessarily connote the ability to generate or falsify predictions, while
not precluding the potential for doing so.
10. Thaler is viewed as one of the founders of this field. In recent years, he has
worked with scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Daniel Kahneman to illu-
minate how economic theory can be made more robust if it accounts for
how people actually behave, given cognitive and psychological factors. On
this genre, see their latest work (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
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CHAPTER 3
Hawkish Biases and the Interdisciplinary

Study of Conflict Decision-Making
Jonathan Renshon and Daniel Kahneman
In this chapter, we develop an argument about the relationship between

cognitive biases and conflict that we previously sketched (see Kahneman
and Renshon 2007, 2009). However, in line with the themes of this vol-
ume, we also highlight the benefits of an interdisciplinary approach to
the study of psychology and conflict,1 and focus significant attention on
individuals in the conflict process .
In the last few decades, cognitive and social psychologists have described
many cognitive biases—predictable errors in the ways that individuals
interpret information and make decisions.2 An unexpected and significant
pattern emerges when these biases are viewed as a set: we find, almost
without exception, that the biases recently uncovered by psychological
research favor hawkish decisions in conflict situations. We use the term
“hawkish” to describe a propensity for suspicion, hostility and aggression
in the conduct of conflict, and for less cooperation and trust when the
J. Renshon ()
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
e-mail: renshon@wisc.edu
D. Kahneman
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

52 J. RENSHON AND D. KAHNEMAN
resolution of a conflict is on the agenda. Actors who are susceptible to

hawkish biases are not only more likely to see threats as more dire than an
objective observer would perceive but are also likely to act in a way that
will produce unnecessary conflict. We do not contend, of course, that all
decisions in the international political context will be hostile or aggressive
as a result of biases of cognition and preference, only that more decisions
will be so more often than they would be in the absence of bias. Nor do we
contend that all suspicions are produced by biased thinking and are there-
fore unjustified. Our point is only that the collective effect of the biases
that psychology has identified is to increase the probability that agents will
act more hawkishly than an objective observer would deem appropriate.
For a more concrete image, suppose that a national leader is exposed to
conflicting advice from a hawk and a dove. Our contention is that cogni-
tive biases will tend to make the hawk’s arguments more persuasive than
they deserve to be.
The biases discussed in this chapter pose a difficult methodological
problem for political scientists, since we cannot “prove” the bias to have
been at fault in any given decision. Instead, we define the bias and invite
readers to consider its consequences in conflict situations by invoking a
hypothetical objective observer. We can only hope that this perspective
allows dispassionate analysts to take that role. And we can only hope that
the retrospective judgments are not overly tainted by the familiar hindsight
bias, which makes it all too easy to explain past disasters by finding flaws
in the decisions of actors who cannot defend themselves. The test of our
approach is whether it offers historians and political scientists a useful heu-
ristic. The biases that we list are to be viewed as hypotheses, to be confirmed
by examining evidence of what the decision-makers believed, desired or
feared at the critical time. For example, students of conflict should expect
to find evidence of unreasonably negative interpretations of the opponent’s
intentions, and overly optimistic assessments of the situation by both sides,
because these biases have been established by prior research.
While the approach that we advocate, a focus on cognitive processes
that draws from multiple fields and applies these insights to international
relations, is no longer as controversial as it once was, we remind the reader
that this was not always so. Thus, our chapter begins with a short overview
of the cognitive revolution in the social sciences, its revolutionary effects
on the study of decision-making and psychology, as well as its later impact
for political science and international relations. In our original analysis, we
compiled a list of known biases and proceeded to trace the implications
HAWKISH BIASES AND THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF CONFLICT... 53
Table 3.1 Biases examined in this chapter

Bias Primary effect in conflict situations
Positive Illusions Biased overconfidence raises the probability of violent conflict

occurring and of deadlock in negotiations (when the parties
overestimate their bargaining position or ability)
Fundamental Perceive hostile actions of adversaries as due to unchanging,
attribution error dispositional factors and discount the role of contextual factors;
neglect the effects of one’s own hostility on the behavior of
adversaries
Illusion of Ignore how one’s actions are likely to be perceived by others,
Transparency resulting in behavior that is likely to provoke aggression or hostility
Endowment Effect/ Induces an aversion to making concessions and a reluctance to
Loss Aversion accept objectively “fair” exchanges
Risk Seeking in Reluctance to settle, prolongation of conflict
Losses
Pseudo-certainty Lowers probability of concessions if there is a potential that those
concessions might advantage an opponent in a possible future
conflict and concurrently raises the probability of conflict occurring
by adopting a worst-case scenario of the other’s intentions
Reactive Devaluation Unconscious devaluation of offers, concessions or plans suggested
by rivals or adversaries makes it difficult to reach agreement
of those biases for international conflict. This chapter proceeds in much

the same way. For each bias, we first present empirical evidence illustrating
how and when it is likely to affect judgment and decision-making. Note
that the evidence on which we rely was documented in experimental situa-
tions that did not involve conflict—the biases are considered to be general
features of cognition and preference. We then proceed to examine the
potential behavioral implications of each bias in situations in international
conflict. The biases and their main effects are listed in Table 3.1.
THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION

Before discussing the Hawkish Biases which remain the focus of our chap-
ter, we provide a short overview of how exactly scholars came to study
these decision-making shortcuts in the first place.
The history of psychology is one filled with revolutions and counter-
revolutions. For our purpose, the first notable revolution was that which
defined psychology as the “science of behavior.” In an effort to bring
greater objectivity to the field, these scholars argued that, because mental
events are not directly observable, scientific evidence must necessarily be
based on the observation of actual behavior. This movement is heavily

associated with John B. Watson, and in popular culture with the condi-
tioning experiments of both Ivan Pavlov and B.F. Skinner. The behav-
iorists dominated academic psychology for several decades, though it is
worth mentioning that its preeminence was largely confined to America, as
Europeans such as Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud continued to focus on
internal mental processes that went largely unstudied in the United States.
Of particular relevance here is the manner in which the unobservable
elements of cognition were treated by behaviorists. They were, for the
most part, put in a “black box” of which only the outputs (i.e., the behav-
ior) were of interest or scientific relevance. This is aptly summarized by
Baar (1986: 21), who wrote that “everything of interest would ultimately
reduce to physical movements.” While this may seem wrong-headed or
problematic to us now, this was a reaction to the “mentalism” paradigm
(heavily associated with William James) that had come before, with its
emphasis on introspection as the primary tool for research. In fact, one
significant (and beneficial) contribution of behaviorism was its growing
emphasis on scientific methods, experimental design and statistics.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, and picking up steam in the 1960s and
1970s, a new paradigm emerged: the cognitive revolution. The primary
difference was that where behaviorists had been concerned only with
observable behaviors, cognitive psychologists were only interested in those
behaviors insofar as they allowed them to make inferences about underlying
mental states or information processing. One other significant difference
was the interdisciplinary approach inherent in this new approach (Gardner
1987: 42). Miller (2003) identified psychology, linguistics and computer
science as the central focal points, with additional contributions from phi-
losophy, anthropology and neuroscience. Interdisciplinary conferences
and research centers proliferated, with the Center for Cognitive Studies
at Harvard and the Sloan Foundation creating particularly important net-
works for the nascent field of cognitive science in the early years (that work
has been continued by new research centers, such as the SAGE Center for
the Study of the Mind at the University of California-Santa Barbara).
Though there are many elements that help distinguish the cognitive
revolution from behaviorism and mentalism, one of the most significant
(and most relevant to this chapter) is how that paradigm conceived of
consciousness. For proponents of mentalism in the early twentieth cen-
tury, such as Wundt and Titchener, all cognitive states were necessarily
conscious, while for behaviorists, cognitive states were either secondary or
irrelevant to the observable action. Cognitive scientists relaxed the strict

assumption of conscious mental states and allowed for information pro-
cessing that might occur without awareness on the part of the individual.
As Greenwood (1999: 12) concludes, “one of the achievements by con-
temporary cognitive psychology has been the experimental demonstration
that persons have limited introspective access to their own cognitive states
and processes.” Nisbett and Wilson (1977: 233) add “the accuracy of sub-
ject reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access that might
exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable reports.”
One prominent outgrowth of the cognitive revolution in psychology
came to be known as the “heuristics and biases” approach. This followed
directly from the work of Luce and Raiffa (1957) on uncertainty and
Herbert Simon’s (1957) work on bounded rationality. The psychological
study of decision-making was, critically, based upon a normative model of
rational decision-making that set the bar against which deviations might
be measured. Bounded rationality focused on limitations, both in infor-
mation, cognitive capacity and time available, that prevented humans
from making optimal (or “maximizing”) decisions even under ideal cir-
cumstances. In contrast, Simon saw us as “satisficers.” The “heuristics and
biases” approach built upon this research and was characterized by two
additional features: an emphasis on cognitive processes, which were then
used to explain a diverse set of judgments and choices in different con-
texts, and a research method that favored “simple between-subjects exper-
iments drawing on subjects’ life experience (Kahneman 1991: 142).” The
earliest studies of framing, for example, though consisting of only a series
of trivial manipulations in word choices (e.g., mortality vs. survival rate),
combined with a theoretical explanation to deal a great blow to expected-
utility models.
Decades of research have yielded a long list of mechanisms, effects and
biases.3 In some cases, one heuristic has been used to explain a diverse set
of phenomena. Representativeness, for example, describes the process by
which “subjective probability of an event, or a sample, is determined by
the degree to which it (i) is similar in essential characteristics to its parent
population and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it
is generated (Kahneman and Tversky 1972: 430).” For example, imagine
you were given the following description a man named Mark, who was
“shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful but with little interest in people, or
in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and
structure, and a passion for detail (Tversky and Kahneman 1974: 1124).”
How would you asses the probability that he was a librarian or a farmer?
Airline pilot of physician? Base rates should play a major role here, as farm-
ers are far more common than librarians. However, because Mark is similar
to mental images or stereotypes we tend to hold about librarians, the base
rate is likely to be neglected.
These heuristics have been used to explain a diverse range of findings
related to beliefs about chance, probability and predictions of others’
behavior. In other cases, one particular bias, such as overconfidence (or
“positive illusions”) is likely to be the result of several mechanisms work-
ing in concert.
This approach, developing out of the cognitive revolution, was itself a
revolution in psychology and led the founding of a new field (behavioral
economics, concerned specifically with the impact of psychological fac-
tors on economic decision-making and modeling), new journals and an
explosion of research in related fields such as decision theory, econom-
ics, neuroscience, political science and management studies. Below, we
provide a short overview of the impact of the cognitive revolution and
the heuristics and biases research program on political science and inter-
national relations.
The Decision-Making Approach in International Relations

The history of international relations cannot be neatly divided into domi-
nant paradigms in quite the same way as psychology. It is accurate, how-
ever, to note that the cognitive revolution in psychology had a tremendous
impact on political science. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
explanations that drew upon unobservable mental states, in the form of
belief systems, motivations, perceptions (and misperceptions) and schema,
were used to explain actions of political leaders and states (for notable
early examples, see Snyder and Paige 1958; Holsti 1962; Jervis 1968;
George 1969; Axelrod 1973). However, it is probably fair to say that the
cognitive revolution did not truly come to political science until the 1970s
and 1980s, as developments in related fields took time to work their way
into political science.
This “decision-making approach” to international relations was ener-
gized by two events in the 1970s. The first was the publication of Jervis’
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976). The book
helped to acquaint political scientists with all manner of psychological
theories relevant to international relations, and it is probably not an
exaggeration to say this was the single most influential book in this para-
digm (its 4000+ citations are just one indication of this). The book’s
influence can no doubt be traced not just to its comprehensiveness, but
to the model it set for integrating psychology and international rela-
tions. This was a matter of not just importing a psychological factor (e.g.,
beliefs) into politics, but thinking through in great depth how such a
factor might work in the context of international politics (e.g., in beliefs
about adversaries vs. allies).
A second critical event for the study of decision-making in international
relations was the spread of the “heuristics and biases” approach from psy-
chology to other fields. Prospect Theory alone generated dozens of books
and articles as scholars sought to apply its insights to the study of interna-
tional conflict (notable examples include Farnham 1984 and McDermott
2001). But even aside from Prospect Theory, the heuristics and biases
approach gained popularity as a method of analyzing international conflict
and foreign policy. Notable works in this vein include analyses of attribu-
tion biases and the formation of international reputations (Mercer 1996)
as well as overconfidence and war (Johnson 2004).
The study of decision-making in international relations has, through-
out its history, been both interdisciplinary as well as multi-method in its
approach. The most direct relationship has been with the field of psychol-
ogy, from which political scientists have borrowed and adapted theories
of information processing, emotions, identity and beliefs. For example,
one prominent research program has used Social Identity Theory (SIT)
to explain when, how and why states pursue international status (Larson
and Shevchenko 2010). SIT helps by providing a template of strategies
(e.g., social competition, social mobility or social creativity) states use in
the pursuit of status, as well as explanations for why and when they are
chosen. The importation of psychological theories of identity has also
been used to explain systemic-level phenomena. Wohlforth (2009), for
example, uses the idea of status competition in combination with theories
of system polarity to explain the location and timing of great power con-
flict. Other prominent examples of theories borrowed from psychology
include Appraisal Tendency Framework (for emotions) and the notion of
intuitive versus systematic thinking for work more broadly on the subject
of decision-making.
Other fields have contributed as well, as neuroscience (see Kugler and
Zak, this volume), biology and evolutionary psychology have all pro-
vided fertile grounds for the generation of new hypotheses related to
international relations, and work has been conducted on how to inte-

grate insights from multiple models to explain foreign policy (e.g., Yetiv,
this volume; 2011).
Interdisciplinary research brought the importation of methods, as well
as theories and ideas. In fact, the “decision-making approach” to inter-
national relations has always relied on a wide variety of methodological
tools to test and refine theories of international behavior. This pattern was
evident even at the early stages in which simulations were used to shed
light on international crisis dynamics (e.g., Guetzkow 1959; Guetzkow
et al. 1963; Zinnes 1966; Zechmeister and Druckman 1973) and has not
abated in the years since. The interdisciplinary approach to international
relations relies upon evidence garnered from lab and field experiments,
content analysis (automated or otherwise), qualitative comparative case
studies and observational large-n studies.
Of these, the most notable shift over the last decade has been the
increased prominence of experimental methods. Though these methods
are increasingly common throughout political science, they are especially
visible and relevant for studies of decision-making. In one set of well-
known experiments (Johnson et al. 2006), scholars studied the impact
of overconfidence on decision-making in a realistic “wargame” scenario,
providing valuable data on the role of gender and hormones on both
aggression and overconfidence. They found that overconfidence caused a
preference for aggression over negotiation, and that this relationship was
at least partly explained by levels of testosterone.
While this and many other studies use convenience samples of students
or adults, it has become increasingly common to seek out “elite samples”
of leaders to directly test theories of decision-making. Renshon (2015)
uses a unique sample of political and military leaders to examine the impact
of status loss and power on decision-making, finding that high-powered
individuals were “buffered” from the otherwise deleterious effects of los-
ing status, which caused low-powered subjects to “throw good money
after bad” in an escalation of commitment task. Other recent work (e.g.,
Loewen et al. 2014) has leveraged samples of elected politicians in a host
of countries, including Israel, Belgium and Canada, to examine what
differences (if any) experienced leaders exhibit in their decision-making
patterns.
COGNITIVE BIASES AND CONFLICT DECISION-MAKING
Positive Illusions
One of the most robust findings in cognitive and social psychology is that
individuals often fall victim to “positive illusions.”4 Among these positive
illusions are: unrealistically positive views of one’s abilities and character,
the illusion of control and unrealistic optimism (Taylor and Brown 1988:
195–196).
Unrealistically positive views of the self have been documented in many
domains. Among other things, most people believe themselves to be bet-
ter than average drivers, decision-makers and negotiators (Svenson 1981:
143; Bazerman 1998: 69). A survey of university professors found that 94
% believed themselves to be better teachers than the average at their insti-
tution, which of course is a statistical impossibility (Cross 1977). Because
individuals resist information that conflicts with positive self-assessments,
these unrealistically positive views of oneself are generally robust over time
(Crary 1966: 246; Marks 1984: 203).
The “illusion of control” is an exaggerated perception of the extent
to which outcomes depend on one’s actions. When people were given a
button and instructed to cause a particular color to appear on the screen,
they erroneously believed that they had substantial control over events,
even when the outcomes were actually determined by a computer (Martin
et al. 1984). Experiments have shown that people act as if they can con-
trol the outcome of rolling a die and are more willing to bet when they
do the rolling (Silverman 1964: 114; Langer 1975: 312, 324; Campbell
1986: 290). It has also been demonstrated that stress (common in con-
flict or crisis decision-making) increases the preference for strategies that
engender a feeling of control, even if it is illusory, and even if it leads to
worse outcomes (Friedland et al. 1992: 923). In a competitive situation,
the illusion of control causes each side to believe that the outcome of the
competition depends mostly on its own actions and abilities, even when it
depends equally on the achievements of competitors.
The third positive illusion is “unrealistic optimism.” The evidence for
“illusory,” or biased, optimism comes from the comparisons of individuals’
judgments of themselves and of others. People generally believe that the
probability of positive outcomes (such as having a gifted child, or enjoying
their first job) is higher for themselves than for their peers and judge the
probability of negative events (such as being the victim of a crime or being
in a car accident) as less likely for themselves than for others (Robertson
1977: 136; Weinstein 1980: 806; Perloff and Fetzer 1986: 502). In addi-
tion, experimental evidence suggests that people’s predictions of what
will occur correspond closely to what they would like to happen, rather
than what is objectively likely to occur (Sherman 1980: 211). A study of
entrepreneurs who had started small businesses revealed a striking dis-
crepancy between their expectations of success (typically .80 or more) and
the actual probability of success for a small business, which is about 1/3
(Cooper et al. 1988). One important cause of this bias seems to be “refer-
ence group neglect,” in which individuals discount the abilities or skills of
the peer group against which they are competing (Camerer and Lovallo
1999: 307). Experts are not immune to these positive illusions. One
recent experiment, for example, found that professional financial analysts,
making judgments and predictions about their areas of expertise, were just
as overconfident as the base group of students (Glaser et al. 2005).
Within political science, many scholars have found evidence support-
ive of the notion that leaders’ positive illusions have led to more wars
than would have occurred in the absence of that bias. Stephen Van Evera
argued, for instance, that leaders often have unrealistically positive views
of the balance of military power, overestimate their “will” relative to their
adversary, overestimate the loyalty and abilities of key allies, and underes-
timate the cost of potential wars (Van Evera 1999).
A group of researchers has recently documented the link between over-
confidence and war in a simulated conflict situation (Johnson et al. 2006).
Johnson et al. conducted an experiment in which participants (drawn
from the Cambridge, MA, area, but not exclusively composed of stu-
dents) played an experimental wargame. Subjects gave ranked assessments
of themselves relative to the other players prior to the game, and in each
of the six rounds of the game chose between negotiation, surrender, fight,
threaten or do nothing; they also allocated the fictional wealth of their
“country” to either military, infrastructure or cash reserves. Players were
paid to participate and told to expect bonuses if they “won the game”
(there was no dominant strategy and players could “win” using a variety of
strategies). Players were generally overly optimistic, and those who made
unprovoked attacks were especially likely to be overconfident (Johnson
et al. 2006: 2516).5
The consequences of positive illusions in conflict and international poli-
tics are overwhelmingly harmful. Except for relatively rare instances of
armed conflicts in which one side knows that it will lose but fights anyway
for the sake of honor or ideology, wars generally occur when each side
believes it is likely to win—or at least when rivals’ estimates of their respec-
tive chances of winning a war sum to more than 100 % (Johnson 2004: 4).
Fewer wars would occur if leaders and their advisors held realistic assess-
ments of their probability of success; that is, if they were less optimistically
overconfident.
Positive illusions also have damaging implications for negotiations.
Neale and Bazerman found that overconfident negotiators (those with
biased expectations of their likelihood of success) exhibited less conces-
sionary behavior, and experienced more impasses, than realistically confi-
dent individuals (Neale and Bazerman 1985: 34; Bazerman 2001: 222).
Positive illusions generally favor hawkish, aggressive behavior when
conflict exists or when a side already contemplates hostile actions. The
implications of optimistic biases are less clear for tense situations that may
lead either to conflict or to negotiated settlement. Actors can be overly
optimistic about the prospects of negotiating a peaceful settlement. Of
course, optimism in negotiations does not necessarily yield good outcomes.
Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE)

The Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) is a systematic bias in the
explanation of the behavior of others and is perhaps the most studied bias
in social cognition. Because the mental states of others are not directly
observable, people inevitably rely on inferences to explain the behaviors
they observe as due to personal dispositions or to situational pressures.
The robust finding is that these causal attributions are biased, exaggerat-
ing the role of the other’s dispositions and intentions and discounting the
role of the situation as the other perceives it.6
There is a vast literature on the FAE, but one of the earliest examples
is still among the most evocative. In a famous early experiment, Jones and
Harris asked participants to read short essays about Cuba that were either
pro- or anti-Castro in content. In the “choice” condition participants were
told that the writers had freely chosen the position for which they argued
in their essay. In the “no choice” condition participants were told that the
writers had been assigned the position for which they were to argue.
The participants then estimated the writers’ actual attitude toward
Castro. The surprising result of the experiment was that these estimates
were strongly influenced by the position of the essay, even when the posi-
tion was not chosen by the writer. Indeed, there was only a minor difference
between the judgments made of the same essays in the “Choice” and “No
choice” condition. (Jones and Harris 1967: 6). The authors of this classic
experiment concluded that people are prone to attribute behaviors they
observe to personal dispositions and prone to neglect the influence of situ-
ational pressures—even the overwhelming pressure of a specific instruc-
tion to adopt a particular position in an essay (Jones and Harris 1967: 22).
Some years later, the tendency to underestimate the role of the situation in
explaining the behaviors of others was called the FAE (Ross 1977).
This attribution error is remarkably robust, and people who are
informed about the bias are not immune to it. Students who had learned
about the attribution error continued to overemphasize dispositional fac-
tors and to neglect the importance of situational context or constraints
(Darley and Batson 1973: 100; Pietromonaco and Nisbett 1982: 1). More
recent research suggests that “rumination” (i.e., spending more time
thinking about something) actually increases attribution errors. Subjects
who were asked to take several minutes to imagine the motives, intentions
and strategies of the other players were more likely to be suspicious of
their partners in a computer game (Kramer 1994: 218–219). In line with
previous research on the subject (Wilson and Kraft 1993: 409), rumina-
tion also increased the subjects’ confidence in the accuracy of their errone-
ous judgments.
Explanations of another person’s behavior reflect prior beliefs and atti-
tudes toward that person: actions that are consistent with expectations are
attributed to internal or dispositional factors, while actions that appear
inconsistent with prior beliefs are attributed to situational factors (Regan
et al. 1974). Thus, subjects attributed to stable dispositions the good
actions of people they liked and the bad actions of people they did not
like, and attributed behaviors that violated expectations to fleeting, situ-
ational variables. Thus, the FAE—the tendency to overattribute behavior
to disposition—effectively reverses when disliked or distrusted actors com-
mit positive actions.
Field evidence from the Middle East supports the same conclusion.
Heradstveit conducted interviews with political activists in Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and found strong support for the predictions
of the FAE: actors tended to overattribute the hostile behavior of adver-
saries to dispositions and correspondingly disregarded contextual fac-
tors. However, this effect was reversed for positive behaviors (Heradstveit
1981: 4). Beliefs in the hostile intentions of adversaries tend to be self-
perpetuating—and of course they also tend to be self-fulfilling.
When another country acts in an aggressive, belligerent or deceptive

manner, the explanation of its behavior is of paramount importance. Were
its actions driven by domestic political necessity—or perhaps provoked
by our own actions? Or do their hostile actions reflect the true goals and
character of the other side? The alternative attributions lead to different
policy choices. If, for instance, the behavior is a response to one’s own
aggressive behavior, then attempts to restore trust may be appropriate. If,
however, the same behavior reflects a deeper hostility, friendly gestures are
likely to be futile.
The FAE strongly favors hawkish arguments in conflict situations. When
hostility and suspicion already exist, actors will tend to attribute moderate
behavior of antagonists to situational constraints (“they had to do that”)
while attributing more hostile actions to dispositions. Bad behavior by
adversaries will reinforce prior beliefs, while good behavior will be dis-
regarded as “forced”. The hawkish position is justified both when the
opponents yield and when they do not. Of course, antagonists do often
have hostile dispositions, but that does not disprove our argument, which
is that leaders will make these inferences to an excessive degree—beyond
the level of suspicion that an objective observer would consider appropri-
ate. Furthermore, the same bias will hinder efforts toward conciliation by
causing leaders and their advisors to disregard the positive actions taken
by adversaries.
Of course, the FAE will not cause hawkish arguments to prevail every
time. And in some cases, history might judge an argument that was biased
to have been correct in retrospect. One need only think of Europe in the
1930s to wish that perhaps more politicians had adopted a dispositional
attribution of Hitler’s actions, instead of excusing them as a reaction to
the position of Germany following the Treaty of Versailles.
Illusion of Transparency
We have thus far made the case for hawkish arguments being advantaged
by cognitive biases in how actors explain behavior. But how do people
believe their own behavior will be explained? Individuals realize, of course,
that they are not as transparent to others as they are to themselves.
However, they typically do not make sufficient allowances for this differ-
ence in perspective. As a result, people tend to overestimate the extent
to which their own feelings, thoughts or motivations “leak out” and are
apparent to observers (Gilovich and Savitsky 1999: 167).
In recent demonstrations of this bias, participants in a “truth-telling

game” overestimated the extent to which their lies were readily appar-
ent to others, witnesses to a staged emergency believed their concern was
obvious even when it was not, and negotiators overestimated the degree
to which the other side understood their preferences (even in the condi-
tion in which there were incentives to maintain secrecy) (Gilovich et al.
1998; Van Boven et al. 2003: 117). The common theme is that people
generally exaggerate the degree to which their internal states are apparent
to observers.
The transparency bias has pernicious implications for international poli-
tics. When the actor’s intentions are hostile, the bias favors redoubled
efforts at deception. When the actor’s intentions are not hostile, the bias
increases the risk of dangerous misunderstandings. Because they believe
their benign intentions are readily apparent to others, actors underesti-
mate the need to reassure the other side. Their opponents—even if their
own intentions are equally benign—are correspondingly more likely to
perceive more hostility than exists and to react in kind, in a cycle of esca-
lation. The transparency bias thus favors hawkish outcomes through the
mediating variable of misperception.
The memoirs of US Secretary of State Dean Acheson provide an illus-
tration. Commenting on the American decision to drive to the Yalu River
during the Korean War, he wrote that “no possible shred of evidence could
have existed in the minds of the Chinese Communists about the non-
threatening intentions of the forces of the United Nations (Jervis 1980:
583).” Though the US/UN forces did not have any intention of attempt-
ing to directly invade China, it should have been clear to Acheson and
other US decision-makers that their march toward the Yalu River would
be perceived as threatening by Chinese leaders. Indeed, the People’s
Republic of China had already issued warnings that they would intervene
militarily if any non-South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel separat-
ing North and South Korea. Ignoring those warnings and being unable to
see their actions as China would perceive them cost the U.S. dearly: China
intervened with almost 800,000 troops and at one point pushed US/
South Korean forces to a line well south of Seoul.
Loss Aversion
The assertion that “losses loom larger than gains” was the most important
claim of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 279). It implied
an abrupt change in the slope of the value function at the point that sepa-
rates gains from losses, as seen in Fig. 3.1. The difference in the slopes
of the value function in the positive and negative domains is labeled loss
aversion.
The main evidence for loss aversion in prospect theory was the extreme
reluctance of people to accept gambles with equal probabilities to win and
lose. A majority of respondents will typically refuse to play a gamble in
which they face equal probabilities to lose x or to win 2x (e.g., 50 % chance
to lose $100 and 50 % chance to win $200). Soon after the publication
of prospect theory, Richard Thaler (1980) noted that loss aversion could
explain the observation that he labeled the endowment effect: the fact
that the monetary value that people assign to a good depends on whether
or not it is already part of their endowment. This conceptual advance
extended prospect theory from a theory of choice between gambles to a
more general model of decision-making and provided the foundation of
behavioral economics.
Some years later, Kahneman et al. (1991: 195) reported a demon-
stration of the endowment effect that has become standard. The critical
experiment was conducted in a classroom. Half of the participants were
given an attractive coffee mug. They were told the mug was theirs to
keep, but were given an opportunity to sell it and were asked to record
their cash equivalent (minimal selling price) for the mug. The other par-
ticipants were told that they could choose between receiving a mug and
receiving an amount of money, and were asked to indicate their cash
equivalent for the mug. The options that faced the two groups were
Fig. 3.1 Hypothetical

value function
effectively identical: they could go home with a mug or with a sum of

money. But the cash equivalents were quite different: the participants
who owned a mug valued it at $7.12 while the participants who did not
own a mug valued it at $3.50.7
The point of this demonstration—and by extension, of the endowment
effect—is that people do not put value on the states of “having a mug”
or “not having a mug”. Depending on their endowment, they value the
changes of “getting a mug” and “giving up a mug.” Furthermore, the
psychological aversion to giving up a mug is more intense than the attrac-
tion of receiving one, by loss aversion. Recent work has suggested that one
determinant of the endowment effect is emotional attachment; and that
loss aversion occurs in proportion to the emotion experienced when an
individual considers giving up a good (Ariely et al. 2005: 134; Novemsky
and Kahneman 2005: 139–140).
Loss aversion also contributes to the explanation of an important
phenomenon of choice known as the status quo bias. Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988: 5), who coined that term, illustrated the bias by the
choices that Harvard University employees made when new options were
added to health-care coverage. New employees chose a plan from the set
of options, and continuing employees were free to switch to the new plan.
Because new and continuing employees faced the same options, the dis-
tribution of their choices should have been the same, but it was not. The
continuing employees were very likely to retain their current plan, regard-
less of the advantages of the new options.
It is easy to see that loss aversion contributes to the status quo bias. An
individual who considers switching from her current plan A to an alterna-
tive plan B will naturally evaluate the features of the alternative plan from
the reference point of her current plan. Plan B is viewed as a bundle of
advantages and disadvantages relative to Plan A—and the disadvantages
are given more weight than the advantages, a manifestation of loss aver-
sion. If the individual owned Plan B, of course, she would think of the
same choice in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of Plan A—and
the disadvantages of that plan would loom larger than its advantages.
There are important exceptions to the endowment effect. In particular,
the effect does not apply to “exchange goods”—goods that are specifi-
cally held to be traded, not to be used (Kahneman et al. 1990: 1344).
Furthermore, highly experienced traders exhibit little loss aversion
even for goods they have purchased as personal possessions (List 2003)
Individuals with much experience trading sports memorabilia were less

likely to exhibit an endowment effect for assorted sports collectibles.
Loss aversion has an unfortunate effect on negotiations, because actors
treat their own concessions as “losses,” but evaluate the concessions they
receive as gains. This “concession aversion” can be illustrated by nego-
tiations over mutual disarmament (Kahneman and Tversky 1995: 56)
Because our own losses carry more psychological weight, offers that are
objectively fair or equal will not seem so to either side: a country will feel
the loss of a 10 % reduction of its arsenal more than it will experience the
gain of an equal reduction in the arsenal of its adversary. The asymmetric
evaluation of gains and losses poses a serious obstacle to agreement (Levy
1997: 105).
Concession aversion is exacerbated by two additional factors: antici-
pated regret and the “sucker’s payoff.” Individuals faced with choice
problems anticipate the regret they may experience if they do not achieve
the best outcome. And the outcome of being betrayed by an opponent
one has trusted—known as the “sucker’s payoff”—constitutes an espe-
cially severe form of regret. Actors are reluctant to expose themselves
to this outcome by making concessions that could be exploited by their
opponents. Anticipated regret favors both an aversion to concessions and
the avoidance of risky cooperation.
The second implication of loss aversion for world politics concerns the
relative speed at which people adapt to (or “integrate”) gains and losses.
The endowment effect appears to be largely instantaneous. The mug that
was received a minute ago is immediately absorbed as part of one’s endow-
ment. In contrast, it appears that people are slower to adjust their refer-
ence point following losses (Kahneman et al. 1990: 1342).
Consider a scenario in which Country A has lost a valuable strategic
territory to Country B during the course of a war. Because of the quick
adjustment to its new endowment, B is likely to adopt the new territory
into its “status quo portfolio”, with a corresponding increase in its will-
ingness to expend blood and treasure to defend it.8 However, if actors do
not adapt to losses as quickly as gains, Country A is likely to view the new
situation as a loss relative to the ‘normal’ reference situation in which it
held the territory. In this scenario, both countries will be operating in the
domain of losses: B because of the instant endowment effect and Country
A because of the slow adaptation to losses. As we see in the next section,
actors are likely to take substantial risks in order to avoid accepting a loss—
when both sides face losses, the likelihood of conflict increases.
Risk Seeking in Losses

Formal models of rational choice do not prescribe a particular risk atti-
tude. Rational decision-makers can be as risk-averse or risk-seeking as they
wish—the only requirement is that they must be internally consistent.
Furthermore, models of rational choice do not explicitly specify the nature
of the outcomes to which utilities are attached. However, the relevant out-
comes and the appropriate risk attitude are both specified when the ratio-
nal choice model (aka utility theory) is applied to a particular situation.
In most applications, the outcomes are assumed to be final states—for
instance, a complete description of the state of affairs when uncertainty is
resolved. In the context of financial decisions, for example, rational agents
are said to evaluate the outcomes of decisions as states of wealth, not as
gains and losses. Furthermore, a moderately risk-averse attitude is widely
assumed to be characteristic of reasonable (rational) agents.
Prospect theory questioned both these aspects of rational choice mod-
els. The idea that the carriers of value are gains and losses—not final
states—helps explain robust observations that are difficult to reconcile
with rationality, including the endowment effect, the status quo bias and
the susceptibility to many framing manipulations. A further departure
from the rational model is the observation that risk-seeking preferences
are prevalent when people face difficult choices, especially when one of the
options involves accepting a sure loss.
For an example, consider the following problem:
Problem 1: Choose between:

A. a sure loss of $900
B. a 90 % chance to lose $1000 and 10 % chance to lose nothing
A large majority of people who have been asked this question choose
the gamble over the sure loss—a risk-seeking preference. According to
prospect theory, this preference is explained by two separate factors. The
first is the shape of the value function (see Fig. 3.1). Because of diminish-
ing marginal disutility, the difference between a loss of $900 and a loss
of $1000 is relatively small. The second (and probably more important)
cause of risk seeking in difficult situations is known as the certainty effect.
The certainty effect refers to the overweighting of outcomes that
are certain, relative to outcomes that are merely probable (Tversky and
Kahneman 1981: 455). Kahneman and Tversky illustrated this effect by
the game of Russian roulette. Most people share the strong intuition that
one should be willing to pay more to reduce the number of bullets from 1
to 0 than from 4 to 3 (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 265). The reduction
of the probability of dying is the same in the two cases, but removing the
single bullet achieves the certainty of a good outcome, while reducing the
number of bullets from 4 to 3 does not eliminate the uncertainty. Utility
theory, in contrast, assumes that the rational response to probability is
linear and does not distinguish between the two cases.
In the domain of gains, the certainty effect and the shape of the value
function both favor risk aversion. For example, a large majority of peo-
ple will prefer a sure gain of $850 over a 90 % chance to win $1000.
The certainty effect contributes to this preference because the “decision
weight” that is associated with a probability of .90 is significantly less than
90 % of the decision weight of a sure thing (Kahneman and Tversky 1979:
280–281).9 The overweighting of the sure gain relative to a gain that is
merely probable favors the risk-averse choice in this example. When an
actor faces a choice between a sure loss and a possible loss, however, the
certainty effect contributes to risk-seeking preferences by exactly the same
logic. Certainty enhances the aversion to a sure loss just as it enhances the
attractiveness of a sure gain.
In policy debates, arguments that draw on the certainty effect often
appear more compelling and persuasive than they should be. Experimental
evidence dovetails with the common-sense observation that the invoca-
tion of certainties has a rhetorical power that mere probabilities lack.
Evidence of the special aversiveness of sure losses and the attendant
increase in risk acceptance can be found in a variety of domains. For
instance, Fiegenbaum and Thomas argue that aversion to certain losses
accounts for the negative correlation between risk and return in invest-
ment decisions. Their large-n analysis of companies’ investment portfolios
indicated that most firms are risk-acceptant when they are suffering losses
or are below targeted “aspiration levels” and risk-avoidant when they are
above those levels (1988: 97).
In another domain, Rachlinski examined choices in the context of a
hypothetical litigation case. He showed that decisions concerning whether
to pursue litigation or settle vary with the domain of the individual. He
also showed that respondents who were in the weaker position (low stated
probability of prevailing in court) and were in the domain of losses were
far more likely than their counterparts (weak position but in the domain of
gains) to pursue a costly and risky litigation with a small chance of success
(Rachlinski 1996).
The prototypical risk-seeking behavior occurs in desperate situations:

faced with a choice between a significant loss and the prospect of a bigger
disaster—but with a chance to escape—actors are prone to accept gambles
that appear unreasonable to an objective observer. This analysis applies to
the losing side in a conflict. Faced with a choice between surrendering and
fighting on with a slim chance of escaping the worst, the leaders of the
losing side will be tempted to persevere. If there is one thing that is worse
than a sure loss it is a loss that is both sure and immediate.
The risk-seeking behavior of losers is closely related to the phenom-
enon known as escalation of commitment, which is observed when a proj-
ect that has consumed considerable resources appears to be failing. The
rational prescription is to “ignore sunk costs” and evaluate the costs of
new efforts against the value of their expected outcome, but decision-
makers often persevere even with poor odds of success.10
An agency problem often compounds the psychological difficulties of
giving up a lost cause. The leaders of the losing entity will not personally
do well by giving up now, and the threat they face may not be worse if
they go on fighting. But the slim chance of victory is often enough even
for followers to support a lost cause, although they are likely to suffer
for it. Indeed, the tendency to escalate commitment seems to be exacer-
bated when decisions are considered by groups, and when the actor who
made the original decision is still in charge, circumstances that are often
observed in political decision-making (Staw 1976: 27; Whyte 1993: 430;
Schaubroeck and Davis 1994: 59).
Pseudo-Certainty
The pseudo-certainty effect refers to a decision-making bias in the
response to multi-stage decisions. Specifically, it describes the tendency
for individuals contemplating multiple-stage problems/scenarios to assign
a high decision weight to an outcome that is certain if the second stage is
reached, neglecting its contingent nature. Pseudo-certainty was illustrated
by Kahneman and Tversky using the following two problems11:
Problem 2: Assume a two-stage game. In the first stage, there is a 75 %

chance to end the game with nothing and a 25 % chance to move into
the second stage. If you reach the second stage, your choice is between:
A. a sure win of $30
B. 80 % chance to win $45
Your choice must be made before the game starts.
In this problem, a substantial majority (74%) chose A, which has the

appeal of a seemingly certain gain. Now consider the next problem:
Problem 3: Which of the following options would you prefer?

C. 25 % chance to win $30
D. 20 % chance to win $45
A and C, and B and D, are respectively identical in terms of outcomes

and probabilities. And yet, the single-stage version and the sequential ver-
sion are treated differently.12 In Problem 3, the majority (58%) prefers D,
because the difference between the probabilities appears smaller than in
Problem 2. When contemplating multiple-stage problems in which the
first stage is probabilistic and the second stage contains a certain outcome,
individuals tend to ignore the first stage altogether. The preference for
the option that yields a sure gain in the second stage is an example of the
certainty effect that was discussed in the preceding section. In this case,
however, the certainty that actors find attractive is only illusory: choice A
is no more certain than C, it only seems to be so.
This effect has significant implications for international politics, in
which decision-makers often encounter situations that involve multiple
stages or interactions. In particular, pseudo-certainty is likely to exacerbate
the reluctance to make strategically significant concessions. The dilemma
that confronted Israel in the peace negotiations with Egypt in the 1970s
illustrates the problem. At the conclusion of the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel
had gained control over the Sinai Peninsula, a strategically valuable region
between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. If war broke out, the terri-
tory would be immensely valuable by providing strategic depth to pre-
vent a large massing of Arab troops near Israel’s borders (McPeak 1976:
429–430; Middletown 1991). Yigal Allon, writing when he was Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Israel, declared the
Sinai to be “critical to Israeli defense” (Allon 1976).
Though Israel eventually ceded control over the Sinai in the Camp
David Accords of 1978, Israeli hawks fought stubbornly against such a
concession and came close to carrying the day.13 The intuitive appeal of
their argument is easy to explain as an instance of pseudo-certainty. The
decision whether to give up the Sinai involved a two-stage dilemma. In the
first stage, the question was whether another war would occur between
Israel and Egypt. The second stage was the outcome of a war if one broke
out. There was apparent certainty in the second stage: the Sinai was
definitely an advantage if that stage was reached. In truth, however, the

Sinai was only contingently valuable: holding it was important only if war
broke out, but pseudo-certainty tends to mask such truths. The hypothesis
of pseudo-certainty is that the probabilistic element in the first stage of the
problem—the possibility that war may not break out—will be ignored or
neglected, while the certain element of the second stage is overemphasized.
The actual probability that the war will be lost is the product of P(War
Occurring) × P(Losing War) and is influenced by the possible effect of an
agreement in reducing the probability of war, as well as by the increased risk
in case of war. However, pseudo-certainty leads actors to frame the prob-
lem in their minds as P(Losing War | War Occurring) rather than the more
accurate P(Losing War | War Occurring) × P(War Occurring).
By ignoring the first stage of such games, actors underemphasize the
effect of their own actions. The focus of Israeli hawks on the strategic
advantage conferred by the Sinai if war occurs caused a correspondent
neglect of the effect that giving up the Sinai might have on diminishing
the probability of war in the first place. Decades of peace between Israel
and Egypt strongly suggest that the hawks were wrong.
As this case illustrates, focusing attention on considerations that will
become relevant only if war occurs leads decision-makers to plan for the
worst-case scenario—often a recipe for self-fulfilling prophecies. Dovish
arguments, such as “we should not assume that war will surely occur”
or “doing this now increases the chances of war later” sound feeble. The
rhetorical force of a “sure thing” is a powerful advantage for hawks, even
if the certainty they invoke is illusory.
Reactive Devaluation
As already noted, the “bad behavior” of rivals is likely to be attributed to
long-term hostile intentions, even when these inferences are not logically
or factually supported. Similar distortions are observed in the context of
negotiations, where actors must assess the offers presented by their adver-
saries. Here, the evidence suggests that individuals assign different values
to proposals, ideas and plans of action based on their authorship. This bias,
known as “reactive devaluation,” is likely to be a significant stumbling
block in negotiations between adversaries.
In one recent experiment, Israeli Jews evaluated an actual Israeli-
authored peace plan less favorably when it was attributed to the
Palestinians than when it was attributed to their own government, and
Pro-Israeli Americans saw a hypothetical peace proposal as biased in favor

of Palestinians when authorship was attributed to Palestinians, but as
“evenhanded” when they were told it was authored by Israelis. In fact,
the phenomenon is visible even within groups. In the same experiment,
Jewish “hawks” perceived a proposal attributed to the dovish Rabin gov-
ernment as bad for Israel, and good for the Palestinians, while Israeli Arabs
believe the opposite (Maoz et al. 2002).
The effect of reactive devaluation in international politics is that lead-
ers and their advisors are likely to significantly underestimate the value of
proposals made by adversaries. We recognize, of course, that leaders have
a duty to be wary of seemingly beneficial proposals or plans advanced by
potentially untrustworthy sources. Our point is only that the evidence of
reactive devaluation suggests that politicians are likely to be more wary and
more suspicious than an unbiased observer would consider appropriate.
CONCLUSION
In our view, neither psychology nor decision science can provide a theory
of interstate conflict (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, p. xi). It is simply
unreasonable to expect a theory of choices between gambles with specified
probabilities and monetary outcomes to predict or explain the decisions
of national leaders as they wage war and negotiate peace (Kahneman and
Tversky 2000, p. xi). It is similarly impossible to derive confident pre-
dictions about the future judgments and choices of national actors from
notions such as the FAE or loss aversion. There is too much else going
on. By the same token, post hoc explanations of the judgments and deci-
sions of national leaders in terms of the psychological mechanisms that we
have illustrated are at best tentative and incomplete. A legitimate question
can be asked—and often has been asked: if the psychology of judgment
and decision-making supports neither confident predictions nor complete
explanations of the actions of national leaders, how useful can it be?
A possible answer is that the concepts of psychology—including the
seven biases that we discussed in this chapter—provide templates for pat-
terns that can be recognized in complex situations. The training of histol-
ogists provides a useful analogy. Histologists are not born with an ability
to differentiate different types of cancer cells, and cancer cells of a particu-
lar type do not look exactly alike and are hard to distinguish from other
cells. The trained histologist has seen multiple examples of cells that share
the same label and has learned to identify them in microscope slides. The
slides look different to the trained eye, they make more sense. We offer
the observations discussed in this chapter as templates that may help make
sense of past events and provide expectations about the future. Sense mak-
ing and expectation are much weaker than explanations and predictions,
but still potentially useful. The notion of the endowment effect, for exam-
ple, prepares us to distinguish truly painful concessions that are treated as
losses from other concessions in which bargaining chips are exchanged.
And the FAE prepares us to find that participants in a conflict underes-
timate their role in provoking the opponent’s hostility. We believe these
intellectual tools may be useful but repeat that “No warranty is implied…
The scholars who use the tools to explain complex behaviors do so at their
own risk” (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, p. xi).
The theme of this chapter was a chance observation, made while draw-
ing a list of the biases of judgment and choice uncovered during the last
few decades: it appeared that these biases were themselves biased in a
hawkish direction. We started out by imagining a decision-maker exposed
to competing advisors, a hawk and a dove. If the decision-maker is suscep-
tible to the usual list of biases, she will tend to find the hawk’s arguments
more believable and the hawk’s recommendations more attractive than
they ought to be. We have found no deep reason for this observation, and
we do not present it as a general and exceptionless claim. The most we can
say for it is that it is intriguing.
NOTES
1. Specifically, this chapter expands upon Kahneman and Renshon (2009).
Jonathan Renshon is responsible for changes and additions in the current
version.
2. More specifically, a bias exists when an error in estimating or assessing a
value is more likely in one direction than another. For example, in estimat-
ing our own skills as drivers, a bias exists because we are far more likely to
over-estimate our abilities relative to others than to under-estimate them.
In the absence of an objective criterion, we take the opinions of a knowl-
edgeable but uninvolved observer as our definition of an unbiased judg-
ment. The perspective of history provides another “unbiased” view of the
situation that decision makers faced.
3. For an overview, readers are directed to the following: Kahneman et al.
(1982), Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and Gilovich et al. (2002). For a
less technical treatment, see Kahneman (2011).
4. There is an important caveat to the findings described in this section. The

first is that there may well be cultural variation in unrealistic optimism.
Some studies have found that individuals from societies that do not place
much emphasis on the individual are less likely to evince “self-enhancing”
biases such as unrealistic optimism. As an example, one study found that
Japanese were much less likely than Canadians to demonstrate unrealistic
optimism. See (Heine and Lehman 1995).
5. This effect was statistically significant only for men.
6. While most social psychologists agree on the existence of the FAE, there is
a still ongoing debate about why the attribution error occurs. One theory
states that it is a result of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. In this
theory, a behavior (such as statement by an opposing leader threatening
military action) provides an initial “anchor,” leading the observer to per-
ceive that the speaker has a correspondent attitude (being aggressive/bel-
ligerent). A correction is then made to take into account the amount of
choice that the opposing leader had. However, because such adjustments
are almost always insufficient, there results a pattern of biased attributions
of behavior. Another explanation is that “behavior engulfs the field,”
implying that the behavior of the actor is almost always perceived as the
most salient information, rather than the colorless background of the situ-
ation. Whatever the explanation for why the bias exists, the most relevant
fact for our purpose is that it does exist and biases our judgments of others’
behavior. See (Heider 1958; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1128;
Quattrone 1982, 596).
7. For more recent demonstrations of this effect, see Sen and Johnson 1997,
105; Carmon and Ariely 2000, 360).
8. The exception to this is if the territory is taken and held as a bargaining
chip (or “exchange good”), in which case one would not expect loss aver-
sion to factor in the decision-making. Of course, part of the art of negotia-
tion is to convince your opponent of your aversion to losing things that in
fact you consider to be mere bargaining chips.
9. The certainty effect applies only to moderate or high probabilities. Prospect
theory asserts that low probabilities are overweighted, contributing to the
attractiveness of both gambles and insurance policies.
10. There are alternative explanations for the escalation of commitment, chief
among them self-justification theory. However, a large amount of labora-
tory and field evidence has been amassed which point to prospect theory as
at least a partial cause of the tendency to escalate commitment and take
greater risks in doing so. For reviews, see (Brockner 1992; Bazerman 1998).
11. Results are from Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 453).
12. For further experimental support for this phenomenon, see Quattrone and
Tversky 1988, 731; Kahneman and Tversky 1995, 52–53.
13. For contemporaneous accounts of the Israeli domestic political arguments

for and against the concession, see “Israeli Cabinet Vote Backs Compromises
for Mideast Peace,” The Globe and Mail (March 15, 1979): 1;
H.D.S. Greenway, “Debate Over Concessions Concerns Many Israelis,”
Washington Post (December 9, 1977): A1; “And Now to Meet Those
Deadlines,” The Economist (March 17, 1979): 61.
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CHAPTER 4
Trust, Cooperation, and Conflict:

Neuropolitics and International Relations
Jacek Kugler and Paul J. Zak
In world politics, successful trade negotiations, arms agreements, and

deterrence outcomes depend on trust. It would be difficult to imagine an
aspect of international relations (IR) for which trust does not play at least
some role. Our work questions the realist paradigm in particular, because
it abstracts from the crucial variable of trust. Traditional realism, as per the
findings from Chap. 3 on psychological biases, is disposed toward a belief
in bad intentions, while modern versions of realism such as neorealism
ignore sub-systemic factors such as trust. This zero-sum mind-set leaves a
large lacuna regarding what the study of trust can tell us about IR.
Trust is an essential element of political interactions (Tilly 2005) and
impacts wide-ranging phenomena from decision-making and govern-
ment behavior to conflict and cooperation—key areas of interest in this
book. In a broad cross-national and cross-temporal assessment of political
performance, Tilly argued that different trust networks are generated by
J. Kugler
Department of International Relations, Claremont Graduate University,
Claremont, CA, USA
P.J. Zak ()
Department of Economics, Claremont Graduate University,
Claremont, CA, USA
e-mail: paul.zak@cgu.edu

84 J. KUGLER AND P.J. ZAK
authoritarian and democratic political regimes. While trust seems essential

to nearly every aspect of international, domestic, and local politics—cer-
tainly in democracies—research to date that scientifically links trust with
political performance has only scratched the surface of this important topic
(Braithwaite and Levi 2003; Ostrom 2005; Hardin 2006; Kramer and
Cook 2007; Kydd 2005).
Micro foundations for trust are all but unknown. To trust is to act,
as if the uncertain future action of others were indeed certain in circum-
stances wherein the violation of these expectations results in negative
outcomes for those involved (Lewis and Weingert 1985). Trust is a cross-
temporal process reflected by the degree of confidence one party has in a
policy pursued by another. When agents agree over time across important
dimensions, trust increases—for example, UK and the USA—but when
they disagree, agree, and then disagree, trust rises and then decreases, for
example USSR and USA prior, during, and after World War II (Tammen
et al. 2000). Consistent trust measures can be extracted from the dynamic
interactions between countries, actors, and agents.
Recent findings in neuroeconomics have identified the neuroactive hor-
mone oxytocin (OT) as a key mechanism that enhances trust. Moreover,
neuroeconomics has identified the physiologic and behavioral effects
of distrust. Based on such new insights, we propose a neurologically
informed model that promises to alter the approach and extend implica-
tions drawn from it for IR. We contend that findings in neuroscience will
deepen social scientists’ understanding of the processes by which foreign
policy decisions are made, and the nature of conflict and cooperation. In
other words, we introduce neuropolitics as a new component of IR. We
now believe that the assumptions of a model matter. Increasing explained
variation is not the best metric of a model. Assumptions depend on mech-
anisms, and getting the mechanisms right increases the odds of making
out-of-sample predictions that fit the data. We advocate that IR scholars
should become informed consumers of neuroeconomics. Neuroscience is,
we believe, the wave of the future because all behavior that drives funda-
mental areas like foreign policy and conflict is ultimately produced by the
brain. Neuroscience can sharpen the assumptions behind political models
and may also increase the predictive power of neuro-informed models to
account for human behavior at the individual level of analysis and how that
intersects with our understanding of central phenomena such as policy
toward civil as well as international conflict.
TRUST, COOPERATION, AND CONFLICT: NEUROPOLITICS... 85
A trust-oriented research agenda for IR is feasible as well as desirable.
TRUST AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In IR, lack of research on the role of trust is accentuated by rather arbi-
trary divisions between domestic and international affairs. Traditionally,
influential realist scholars drew a sharp division between international poli-
tics, where anarchy rules and the unrestricted maximization of self-interest
is the norm—and domestic politics, where trust is essential for governance
to achieve common goals (Hobbes 1651⁄1966; Waltz 1979; Dahl 1961).
This distinction can sometimes mislead. Exaggerating the effects of anar-
chy and under-estimating the potential for trust skews our overall view of
opportunities for cooperation over conflict. Our argument is reinforced
because models based on anarchy fail to explain important phenomena.
Realism is still the dominant paradigm in IR. In anarchy, Mearsheimer
(2001) argues that there is little room for cooperation and trust among
nations that coexist in conditions of perpetual uncertainty and competi-
tion for security. This argument is parsimonious, persuasive, but limited.
Without a notion of trust, realist models cannot explain, for example, inte-
gration, where a nation-state gives up sovereignty voluntarily. All mem-
bers of the European Union (EU) have done so to a certain degree, and
some even lost control over their monetary affairs by adopting a common
EURO currency. Realists also fail to explain why a large country would
not expand its territory when potential defenders otherwise are occupied.
One logically would expect that, in a purely anarchical and zero-sum
world, the USA would have taken advantage of numerous opportunities
(Mearsheimer 2001). For example, in the early stage of World War II the
USA would seek to annex Canada or use that territory as a compensa-
tion for the efforts to defend Europe. Likewise, one would expect that, as
the USSR collapsed, the USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies would further destabilize Russia and China. No such
efforts were made; rather, the contrary became true. Finally, in the nuclear
era, realists argue that Mutual Assured Destruction holds the key to sta-
bility because only unacceptable costs in anarchy prevent severe global
and regional confrontations. The logical implication best articulated by
Kenneth Waltz advocates nuclear proliferation to stabilize the protracted
conflicts in the Middle East (Waltz 2012). Practitioners have rejected such
logical arguments on proliferation but cling to deterrence. We believe—
and will show—those in the international, domestic, and interpersonal
environments humans do not act as in anarchy, but rather interact con-

strained by trust.
Adding trust to policy assessments would produce a better understand-
ing of political dynamics. Let us simply list the most salient evidence in
favor of a general perspective. First, most economic or political interac-
tions among nations—and among individuals—are peaceful. Contrary to
the predictions about anarchy as a dominant force, crisis, civil, and inter-
national wars are the exception not the rule in interpersonal, domestic,
and global interactions.
We are not the first to reject anarchy and re-specify international interac-
tions in a more general format. Most IR efforts on the interaction between
trust and conflict follow the path-breaking work of Organski (1958, 1968).
He and other Power Transition proponents showed that variations in the
status quo produced by different levels of trust across nations directly
affect behavior and the choice between war and peace. The resulting “con-
ditional anarchy” environment shows that trust is directly related to the
outbreak of war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Werner and Kugler 1996;
Tammen et al. 2000). Likewise, Keohane and Nye (1977) showed that
a special case of “complex interdependence” emerged between the USA
and Canada partly because trust was built between nations that fought
serious wars a century earlier. Extending the core argument, Keohane’s
(1984) neoliberalist argument concerned with the emergence of hege-
monic stability anchored by a satisfied, dominant nation willing to carry
the costs of providing global security to “free-riding” allies and insured
through institutionalization economic stability challenged the notion of
anarchy, and this perspective seems to be gaining the upper hand (Lake
2009).
Of direct consequence to conflict, Booth and Wheeler (2008) address
the role of trust in the nuclear era. They argue that a security dilemma
is generated by international uncertainty that prevents the great powers
from establishing effective cooperation. These interactions under uncer-
tainty are directly interconnected, generating vulnerability to conflict. In
a recent work Wheeler (2014) argues that it is possible to achieve partial
cooperation under anarchy, but any significant de-escalation requires mov-
ing from distrust to trust in the security arena of concern to the adversary.
Thus, without trust long-term stability cannot be achieved in the nuclear
era. Finally, literature concerned with the waging of civil wars identi-
fied trust as the critical component that leads to escalation. Benson and
Kugler (1998) show that as trust in the domestic status quo established
by governing elites declined the likelihood of crisis increased both in

severity and frequency. Theoretically and now empirically, trust affects
the evolution of conflict at all levels.
Formal support for the conclusion that trust plays a direct role in con-
flict has also emerged. Among others, Maoz (1984) shows that general
expected utility models proposed by Bueno de Mesquita (1983) account
effectively for the escalation of international and domestic crisis but so
vastly overpredict the likelihood of such events that they are not always
useful as early warning indicators of conflict. Models that assume agents
are greedy, net gain maximizers account as anticipated for crisis escalation
among distrustful antagonists, but fail to account for such behavior in
peace time when other factors—including trust—need to be considered
(Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Further, if international affairs are uncon-
strained and domestic interactions are constrained by trust, one would
expect vast differences in the intensity and severity of international and
domestic conflicts. Lemke and Cunningham show that despite the low
incidence of both international and civil wars, the severity and duration of
such events are equivalent (Lemke and Cunningham 2009). One could
infer that common factors set the pre-conditions for conflict in domestic
and international environments.
We propose that a more general approach can account for conflict and
cooperation in international, domestic, and local politics. This explanation
emerges when a general assessment of variations in trust is added to the
mix.1 Integration among nations becomes a logical and predictable out-
come that follows from cooperation and trust. Conditions for integration
are met when nations share common goals, a dominant nation is willing
to compensate for entry costs, and trust in the new institutions emerges.
Extending insights derived from Power Transition indicates that the gen-
eral process of integration in Europe during the post–World War II period
emerged partly because levels of trust rose as the French–German coali-
tion—supported by the USA—led the way to a supranational arrangement
that is now the EU (Tammen et al. 2000). We might consider, as Kugler
et al. (2015) have established, that Britain has attempted to slow down
EU integration. Survey data suggest that one reason is that Britain does
not trust the EU and is reluctant to give up any additional sovereignty.
Trust, hierarchy, and risk are related to each other. We concur with exist-
ing literature that from the perspective of conflict, nuclear deterrence is
the most important and extreme example of a policy posture that assumes
anarchy and rejects trust. Classical deterrence theory derives directly from
realism, innovatively replacing initiation with retaliation. Proponents of

classical deterrence from Brodie (1946) to Waltz (1981) argue that fear of
credible, unacceptable nuclear retaliation prevents contenders from wag-
ing nuclear war. They rely on evidence gathered during the long Cold War
that shows peace among nuclear powers has been preserved for the last 70
years. However, we can use a different perspective on deterrence. Even
if nuclear states, including the USA, France, and the UK, have deterred
each other as deterrence theory would suggest, it is also possible that these
states have trusted that their partners would not use nuclear weapons to
resolve disputes. Deterrence is only ultra-stable when a smaller nuclear
power exposed to retaliation confronts a much larger one (Kang and
Kugler 2014).2 The size of nuclear arsenals does not necessarily or solely
generate stability. Rather, stability emerges when trust is present among
nuclear powers. Evidence is consistent with this argument and suggests
the dynamics of deterrence are far more complex than implied by previous
models based on anarchy (Kang and Kugler 2012, 2015). The possibility
of nuclear war, given continuing nuclear proliferation that now involves
several large and small nuclear powers, cannot be excluded (Kugler and
Zagare 1987; Zagare and Kilgour 2000).
A related important puzzle that is difficult to solve without bringing in
trust as a factor is the relative absence of nuclear proliferation. Numerous
technically advanced states are capable of developing their own nuclear
arsenals, yet only a handful has done so. While many factors can explain
this outcome, we rarely witness an explanation based on the notion that
technically advanced states trust that existing nuclear powers will not initi-
ate a strike against them and that, if they are a target of a nuclear strike,
other nuclear powers are expected to retaliate against such nuclear aggres-
sion. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty to prevent proliferation implies
a collective nuclear umbrella, but only a few close non-nuclear allies of
nuclear nations have some guarantee of safety.3 Trust is one element that
could account for current stability despite the massive advantage of the
few nuclear states.
Trust is explored in a novel way in the domain of foreign policy by
Rathbun (2012) in a study of the origins of multilateralism on the part
of the USA. Rather than following from involvement in international
organizations, Rathbun’s study of major historical events from the twen-
tieth century reveals that trust precedes institutional formation. Trust is a
variable rather than a constant among leaders (and people in general) and
can help to explain any number of processes and outcomes within IR.
In sum, we argue that willingness to accept international rules that

restrict behavior depends critically on the level of trust. We propose that
increasing trust in the international or domestic arena leads to substantive
cooperation; absence leads to potential confrontation.
Why Trust Is Neglected as a Variable

There are good empirical reasons why trust has not been included in inter-
national models of behavior. Trust is hard to measure objectively. At the
macro level, the most popular technique is to use surveys to approximate
trust. The results are unreliable across time as issues change and cross-
national questionnaires suffer from cultural biases.
Data in Fig. 4.1 report a recent cross-country data set on trust based
on the World Values Survey, compiled by Uslaner (2002). Trust is mea-
sured by the proportion of people answering Yes to the question “Do You
Think Most People Can be Trusted?” These data are stable over time for
most countries, but some data are not believable. A: high-trust countries;
B: lower-trust countries. For example, Fig. 4.1 lists China and Iran as the
sixth and seventh highest trust countries in the world, respectively, ahead
of New Zealand, Switzerland, and Japan. One should be quite skeptical
of these data since they are simply opinions, not behaviors, and may be
affected by who collected the opinions and how they were collected.
This concern is supported by tests using an alternative approach devel-
oped in a laboratory experiment. This approach measures monetary trans-
fers to a stranger to gauge trust, and return transfer to the initial truster
to assess trustworthiness. Active tasks such as this call into question survey
measures of trust. When the World Values Survey question “can most peo-
ple be trusted?” is included in laboratory experiments, there is little cor-
relation with the monetary transfer measure of trust (Glaeser et al. 2000;
Zak et al. 2005a). Thus, survey measures of trust may not consistently
capture actions associated with trust.
A second reason trust is usually excluded from formal models is that
nearly all modelers have assumed that strategic choices are non-cooperative
(Zak and Knack 2001; Zagare and Kilgour 2000). And yet, for a vari-
ety of interactions with high stakes in domestic and international stages,
cooperative solutions are found.4 Finally, a most obvious role for trust
emerges from the analysis of repeated games. Cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemma-type games emerges and can be sustained by repeat play. A find-
ing known as the “folk theorem”, confirmed computationally by Axelrod
Fig. 4.1 Cross-country trust levels from the world values survey and others.
Note: Data are latest available from 1999 to 2001, with occasional data from 1995
if later was unavailable. A: high-trust countries; B: lower-trust countries.
Source: Uslaner (2002)
(1984), shows that cooperation can be achieved under anarchy provided

long-term gains exceed the short-term payoff. Unfortunately, this is not
a general result. Indeed, Realists that rely on game theoretical arguments
recognize that cooperation is not impossible, rather it is hard to get and
precarious to maintain. Most policy-relevant applications are not Prisoner’s
Dilemma situations where the evolution of cooperation can emerge, but
rather, they reflect many variable payoffs. Under anarchy, cooperation is
rare and fragile. Policy analysts that explore players with known attributes
known personally or through a dossier can anticipate the future of conflic-
tual actions with great precision. In non-conflict situations in the absence
of crisis such forecasts are far less reliable (Maoz 1984). In such cases,
understanding the role of trust as an independent element is essential.
We contend that for both a lack of solid data and a straightforward
empirical assessment, trust has not infiltrated into most formal models
or crisis and conflict. At the same time, it is apparent that countries and
individuals often exhibit high degrees of trust in real-world financial deci-
sions and diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, experimental work shows
that individuals presented with trust problems infrequently act as if they
were selfish maximizers interacting in an anarchical world (Smith 1998;
Zak et al. 2005a, b; Vercoe and Zak 2010).
A GENERAL MODEL OF INTERACTIONS WITH TRUST

From an international interactions perspective, there are two primary
takeaways from this overview. First, human beings are far from clas-
sic homo economicus. Behavioral Economics shows that game theoretical
optimization is not followed by subjects in multiple experimental situa-
tions. Neuroeconomics studies have revealed that the prefrontal cortex
integrates information and makes cost-benefit evaluations resulting in
choices. But these decisions are informed by evolutionarily older brain
regions that mediate emotions, motivation, and attention. We are far
from fully rational actors, (as Kahneman and Renshon also underscore
via Chap. 3 on cognitive biases), but neither are we systematically irra-
tional. Rather, we can characterize people as being “rationally rational”
(Zak 2008a). That is, small expected payoff decisions are made quickly
and utilize default pathways in the brain rather than engaging our full
cognitive abilities that typically occur in high payoff opportunities. This
occurs because brain resources are scarce and using defaults saves energy.
This manifests as choice heuristics in which decisions are often similar to
ones previously made. We can deviate from these heuristics, but do so only
when the expected reward is sufficiently high. For a range of decisions, the
energy-related constraints on the brain produce bounded rational choices.
Secondly, strategic decisions require a balancing of resources for self and
other, while taking into account that our brains have evolved to facilitate
repeated social interactions and reputation maintenance.
Trust is the critical variable producing the discrepancy between ratio-
nal and rational, rational decisions. Under stress—consistent with crisis
and conflict initiation—the effects of trust diminish. We propose a middle
ground for how trust affects decision-making, an approach that admits
both trust and defection, and presents a model to illustrate this perspec-
tive. The model in this chapter differs from standard formal models in two
important ways.
First, it is an inductive model whose assumptions are based on years
of experiments under systematically varied conditions in order to reveal
general interaction mechanisms (Vercoe and Zak 2010). This approach
departs from typically deductive models in which the modeler sits down
and imagines mechanisms that may produce a particular behavior. Our
approach is problem-based rather than imagination-based and follows
from the natural sciences. Experiments are used to determine appropriate
assumptions.
The second difference is that the model presented here is based on
accumulated evidence on the neurologic basis for trust, much of it from
Zak’s laboratory. Measuring brain activity while participants in experi-
ments make decisions is a perspective now known as neuroeconomics (Zak
2004; Park and Zak 2007). Neuroeconomics is a recent field that applies
the measurement techniques of neuroscience to decisions that involve
money and other people (Zak 2008a, b, c). This field grew from several
strains of research in the social sciences, including evolutionary economics
and bioeconomics, behavioral economics, and experimental economics.
This approach has added value to traditional neuroscience that has mostly
focused on mechanisms of action rather than objectives and constraints
faced by the organism and brain.
From the perspective of modeling domestic and international inter-
actions, neuroeconomics studies allow the modeler to directly identify
mechanism-producing behavior rather than rely on the typical guess-
and-verify method of building models. Neurologically based model
assumptions are founded on the direct measurement of brain activity.
This approach to modeling takes more time and often results in a more
complicated structure. But we would argue that factor complexity is offset

by the value of getting the mechanisms right.
Neuroscience-informed models maintain the identification of an objec-
tive function and constraints. This has had a salubrious effect on neurosci-
ence by encouraging neuroscientists to do the same (Sugrue et al. 2004).
A discussion of these techniques and findings can be found in the survey
by Zak (2004, 2012).5
Neuroeconomists have studied both individual choices (e.g., choices
between pairs of goods or lotteries) and choices involving other people
(strategic decisions). For the former, a primary finding is that the econo-
mists’ mythical utility function is an actual physiologic entity (Knutson
and Peterson 2005; Kuhnen and Knutson 2005). This is where biology
is particularly useful to understand human behavior. Every animal must
make decisions on how to acquire primary resources like food or a mate.
The brain had to have evolved a circuit that would value outcomes and
balance risk and reward. In the human brain, this involves three funda-
mental and integrated mechanisms. The first is the motivation to acquire
the reward. The second is the cost or risk involved during acquisition. The
third is the value of the reward. The primate (human and non-human)
utility function in the brain integrates these information flows into a uni-
fied evaluation that either motivates the creature to seek the reward or
discourages it from doing so. This research also has revealed a key role for
the emotions during individual choice, both in the motivation to acquire
reward and when outcomes are ill-specified and therefore ambiguous.
The socially influenced choices made by policy makers in international
and domestic politics can be related to brain activity measured while par-
ticipants in experiments make strategic choices. Research has shown that
cooperation is encoded in the brain similar to primary rewards like food
(King-Casas et al. 2005; Sanfey 2007). Far from cooperation being a mys-
tery, as it has been portrayed in realism, relative to the limiting case of a
purely self-interested rational actor, neuroeconomics studies have revealed
that human beings readily cooperate because our social brains motivate
and reinforce it. On the other end of the social choice spectrum, costly
punishment for a lack of cooperation in one-shot games has been seen
as “irrational”. Again, neuroeconomics studies have shown that people,
especially men, experience rewards for punishing sharing-norm violators
(Seymour et al. 2007; Zak et al. 2005a). A recent experiment that infused
testosterone into men showed that a higher level parametrically increased
the likelihood that participants would spend money to punish those who
were non-cooperative (Zak et al. 2009a).
Neuroeconomics studies also have shown that emotions are especially
important when making strategic choices. The role of emotions should be
understood in an evolutionary context as guiding appropriate behaviors
for a species that is highly social. We examine the neurobiology of trust in
this context next.
Neurobiology of Trust
One of the innovative and useful findings from neuroeconomics stud-
ies of decision-making is an understanding of the chemical basis for trust
between strangers. Prior to the dawn of neuroeconomics in the early
twenty-first century (Zak 2004), it was known that in the studies of mon-
etary decision tasks between strangers, participants in experiments readily
could be incentivized to let others take control of some or all of their
resources—a way to measure trust. Of those shown such trust, nearly all
would reciprocate and share money with the person who originally trusted
them rather than defect and keep all the money for themselves (Berg et al.
1995; Smith 1998). The question was, “why?”
Various explanations were offered for the high degree of cooperation
of many types seen in the laboratory, from the stakes being too low, to
confusion, to prosocial framing (Andreoni 1995; McCabe et al. 2002).
After careful experimentation, none of these explanations could account
for much of the variation in the observed behavior (Camerer 2003). This
led to an explosion of model building, seeking to explain this “anomaly”.
A favored explanation seemed to be imbuing individuals with a taste for
fairness (Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Yet these models imposed
a preference for fairness, while experiments had shown that unfair behav-
ior also could be induced easily (Hoffman et al. 1994), revealing this
explanation as either wrong or non-robust. Something interesting was
happening in the laboratory, but participants in these experiments, when
debriefed, had trouble explaining why they decided to trust a stranger.
Analysts were stuck. By the late 1990s, research had found that cross-
country data on trust were highly variable, from around 3 % of Brazilians
to 66 % of Norwegians saying that they thought their countrymen were
trustworthy. This variation was explained through a combination of fac-
tors built into a formal model and tested extensively (Zak and Knack 2001;
Zak and Fakhar 2006). Further, Zak and Knack (2001) showed that trust
was among the strongest predictors that economists had ever found to
account for the growth in living standards across countries.
At the same time, the anarchical realist model of international politics
was being challenged empirically by dynamic models of power transition
that rejected the balance of power structure and replaced it with hierarchy
and trust variations. Tests of structural theories are infrequent, but the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union provided an opportunity to assess behavior. The
USA—the single dominant state after 1991—survived the long Cold War
that should have clarified that dominance opportunities occurred rarely in
a century (the previous one was 1946–1955). Given this temporary pre-
ponderance of power, traditional balance of power models predicted that
the USA should take advantage and impose new and stringent rules on
the international system (Mearsheimer 2001). Instead, despite the obvi-
ous realization that its preponderance would diminish with time, the USA
supported the recovery in Russia, continued to encourage the expansion of
the EU, and sought accommodation with China.
This clear incompatibility between theory and practice added further
urgency to understand the misspecification. The concept of trust was res-
cued from the controlled environment of the laboratory so that it could
be applied effectively to economic and political reality. Other general
problems beyond war and peace faced similar concerns. The importance
of trust in reducing poverty, and the desire to build a well-grounded
model of trust between strangers, led to one of the first neuroeconomics
experiments—and certainly the first involving blood draws, in 2001 (Zak
et al. 2004). These approaches represented a major technological change
that, at the level of individual decisions, created the potential for greatly
enhanced knowledge, as per Fritsch (2011) and Chap. 6.
Neuroscientific techniques might be able to reveal why people quite
regularly trust strangers with their money or their security. These trust-
ers are labeled “irrational” by the standard self-interested, game-theoretic
solution of the trust game because participants do not seek outcomes con-
sistent with the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The Nash solution
predicted no trust and no trustworthiness, based on the assumption that
any money sent to a stranger would be kept by him or her. Thus, a “ratio-
nal” person would not send any money to a stranger. Playing Nash, trust
game participants were expected to leave the laboratory with only their
initial endowment.
Yet in controlled experimental studies, those who initiated trust earned,
on average, 40 % more than their endowment, while nearly all of those
who were trusted with another’s money reciprocated and still walked out
with 70 % higher earnings than predicted by the Nash solution (Zak et al.
2004, 2005a, b). Somehow these participants had found a way to sys-
tematically beat the Nash payouts. Participants certainly were not irratio-
nal—on average they earned more money than in the Nash strategy—so
something must be wrong with the standard model used by economics
and political science to account for their choices.
What these experiments hoped to find was a direct mechanism in the
brain that told people who to trust and not trust. But where to look?
There was little clarity on the reasons why we trust strangers in the eco-
nomics, psychology, political science, sociology, or other literatures. The
Nobel Prize winner Vernon Smith had run the first trust experiments in
his laboratory and found that, when asked, participants could not clearly
articulate why they had decided to trust a stranger with money on the line.
Seeking a solution, Zak turned to the literature in biology and found a
small and evolutionarily old molecule called OT. OT has classically been
associated with peri-reproductive behaviors. OT comes from the Greek for
“fast birth” as it contracts the uterus during parturition and also initiates
milk flow for breastfeeding. In animal studies, this uniquely mammalian
hormone was also shown to facilitate maternal care for offspring. The ani-
mal literature had reported a few studies in rodents suggesting that in
the 3 % of mammals that are socially monogamous, OT sustains attach-
ment between male and female breeding pairs. These animals often live in
“clans”, with several breeding pairs inhabiting the same burrow, and OT
had also been associated with males tolerating other males in their burrow
and even allowing other males access to food. Anthropomorphizing a bit,
this could be called emerging trust and cooperation.
No literature had built up on the study of behavioral effects of OT in
humans. High interspecies variation in OT’s effects meant that extrapola-
tion from rodents to humans was unwise. Human OT studies had not
been undertaken for several reasons. First, the behavioral effects of OT in
animals had only been established in the late 1980s and early 1990s, so
translation to humans had not yet occurred. Second, in humans, OT was
considered a “female hormone”, simply a concern of OB-GYNs. Being
associated with females meant, as one medical doctor related privately,
that it could not be very important. There were no serious disease states
associated with an excess or lack of OT (although those with autism have
recently been shown to have low OT), so the research community largely
avoided studying OT. Unless a woman was giving birth or breastfeeding,
OT could be ignored. Third, OT is difficult to measure. In animals, this

is done by sampling cerebral spinal fluid. This approach could be used in
humans, but is risky and gives people a wicked headache. Animal studies
had shown that OT release to the brain and in the blood targeting periph-
eral organs coordinated, so measuring blood levels of OT in humans might
be possible. Fourth, basal OT in animal studies had been shown to be very
close to zero. Outside of behaviors surrounding reproduction (OT is also
released during sexual climax), animal studies showed that basal levels of
OT were mostly unrelated to behavior. A stimulus was needed to induce
the brain to make OT that could then be related to behaviors. How, or if,
this could be done in humans outside of reproduction was unclear. Lastly,
if a spike in OT could be produced, very precise measurement and han-
dling were needed to capture it because OT has a three minute half-life
and degrades rapidly at room temperature.
Zak (2012) hypothesized that a monetary transfer denoting trust might
be processed in the brain as a positive social signal and cause measurable
OT release. To test this mechanism, Zak’s team borrowed refrigerators,
clinical centrifuges, laboratory space, and brought blood-draw supplies
and 25 pounds of dry ice (described fully in Zak 2012). Through good
fortune, the group included the first doctoral student in neuroeconomics
who was also a medical doctor. The research team designed a protocol
where, immediately after decisions were made in the trust game, it quickly
drew 28 ml of participants’ blood, kept it cold, and processed it to obtain
blood plasma and serum. These samples were put on dry ice until they
could be transported to a -80°C freezer and stored for later analysis.
OT spiked in the experiments when participants were intentionally
trusted with another’s money. The experimenters compared OT levels in
those who were trusted to levels in a control condition in which money
was transferred through a random mechanism and did not signal trust.
Zak and colleagues found that those who were trusted had OT levels that
were 41 % higher than controls (N = 67; F-test p < .049; Zak et al. 2004,
2005a, b). (These articles provide details of the experimental design and
analysis.) In the trust condition, receiving larger transfers caused a surge in
OT, and OT levels predicted how much money participants would return
to the person who had shown them trust (one-tailed t-test, p < .021).
The researchers measured nine other hormones that interact with OT and
found no direct or indirect effects on behavior or OT release.
The trust game was the first non-reproductive stimulus shown to cause
OT release in humans. But as in all such experiments, it was possible that
Zak and colleagues had made a mistake that some other unmeasured phys-
iological factor was responding to a signal of trust. So to prove that OT
caused trust, Zak designed a protocol that exogenously manipulated OT
levels using an OT nasal spray (Kosfeld et al. 2005). In this study, those
who received the OT spray sent 17 % more money denoting trust com-
pared with those who got the placebo (N = 58, Mann–Whitney U-test p
< .029). More compellingly, the number of people who showed maximal
trust—sending their entire endowment to a stranger—increased from 21
% in the placebo group to 45 % in the OT group. There were no differ-
ences in an objective risk-taking task or in mood across conditions, show-
ing that OT narrowly affects positive social behaviors. The bottom line is
this: trust is chemical. Social norms, one’s developmental history, and even
current events affect trust, but these do so by modulating OT release as
we discuss below. Because the amount of OT release directly affects trust-
worthiness, it provides a single pathway through which variations in trust
and trustworthiness can be explored and explained. Zak’s laboratory and
others have replicated these results in a variety of settings, for example,
showing that OT infusion in the zero-sum Ultimatum Game increased
generosity by 80 % (N = 68, Mann–Whitney U-test p < .005; Zak et al.
2007). Zak’s lab has also shown that 15 minutes of touch (from a massage
therapist) primed the brain to release more OT after being trusted by a
stranger (not the therapist) relative to untouched controls and increased
monetary sacrifice toward the person who had initiated trust by a phe-
nomenal 243 % (N = 33, two-tailed t-test p < .006; Morhenn et al. 2008).
Neurobiology of Preferences
Does OT have any effect on political preferences? Zak’s team recently
ran an experiment to test this idea by infusing OT or placebo into 88 US
citizens during the 2008 primary elections. After the OT loaded for 60
minutes, participants were asked questions similar to those used in the
American National Election survey. For example, they were asked “How
much of the time can you trust the government in Washington to do
what is right?” They were also asked general trust questions such as “Do
you think people are generally trustworthy?” They found that, relative to
placebo, OT raised generalized interpersonal trust (the likelihood that two
randomly chosen individuals in a country will trust each other) and that
greater trust in other people predicted greater trust in government and
greater satisfaction with government (Merolla et al. 2013). These results
reveal that OT’s effects scale up from the interpersonal to the government
as a whole.
These findings are important because knowing the brain mechanism-
producing trust permits us to identify when trust is expected to be high
or low. Familiarity and a history of positive interactions will more easily
stimulate OT release resulting in trust, whereas animal studies show that
high stress inhibits OT release and is therefore likely to reduce trust. Zak’s
lab has shown that OT release is associated with the subjective experi-
ence of empathy: when we release OT we can more easily understand and
empathize with others, resulting in greater trust (Barraza and Zak 2009).
OT release activates a brain circuit now called HOME (Human Oxytocin
Mediated Empathy) that makes reciprocation after being trusted “sticky”
(Zak 2011). OT release potentiates the release of other brain chemicals
that are associated with reinforcement learning and positive effects on
mood.
Humans have evolved to socialize. Humans are the hypersocial ape, and
trusting others utilizes the same brain mechanism that evolved to facilitate
care for offspring. At least this is true for most people. Studies of college
student participants have found that 5 % of them have an OT dysregula-
tion so that they appear immune to its promotion of social intercourse
(Zak 2005). These individuals are unconditional non-reciprocators and
have unusual psychological and behavioral traits similar to those found in
psychopaths. These individuals maximize their own monetary returns as
if they were living in the anarchical world described long ago by Hobbes.
Zak’s lab has replicated the finding of dysregulated OT in patients with
social anxiety disorder (Hoge et al. 2008), indicating the crucial role that
OT has in sustaining appropriate social behaviors. There are also sexu-
ally dimorphic effects of OT release: for every non-reproductive stimulus
developed of the past decade, women release OT more than men and are
similarly more prosocial in their behavior (Zak 2008b, 2011, 2012).
The converse of trust is distrust, and this, too, has a physiological sig-
nature. Examining low transfers denoting trust in trust game, men had a
“hot” physiologic response, but not women. Specifically, men had a spike
in the bioactive metabolite of testosterone, dihydrotestosterone (DHT),
indicating an aggressive response that was reflected in their lower levels of
reciprocity as compared with women (Zak et al. 2005a). Women did not
have this response. DHT inhibits OT uptake by its receptor, acting as an
OT antagonist.
This finding was confirmed by administering synthetic testosterone to

men (Zak et al. 2009b). Testosterone-infused men were less generous
toward others but also more likely to punish others for being generous
toward them when compared to themselves on placebo.
Predicting policy outcomes from these experiments is premature, but
they are consistent with findings showing that in some settings women
reciprocate more than men (Eckel 2008). Men and women bring differ-
ent physiologies to interactions that involve trust and distrust, and thus,
gender diversity in negotiations can be quite valuable. One implication is
that as the representation of women in the political and economic envi-
ronments increases, greater cooperation may well follow. Similarly, poli-
cies that support freedom of association can build ties between individuals
who vary in ethnicity, income, education, and geographic location. More
roads and greater access to communication technologies can do the same
(Zak and Knack 2001).
THE MODEL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

If experimental studies are to inform our understanding of IR, two cri-
teria must be met. First, the behavior in the experiment must capture
an essential part of out-of-the-laboratory actions. Second, the mechanism
producing the behavior should be sufficiently consistent and robust that
generalization is reasonable. Knowing the physiology driving behaviors
increases the likelihood that generalizability is supportable.
Presented formally in Appendix 1, the Neurologic Model of Trust
(NMT) shows how neuroscientific findings can be included in a game-
theoretic model that can account for crisis leading to conflict. The speci-
fication is based on 10 years of OT experiments and discoveries about the
brain circuits involved in trust and distrust. The NMT is fairly complicated,
but its value is in its neurologically grounded assumptions. The NMT for-
mulation comes directly from the OT and trust research reviewed above.
The key innovation in the NMT is the reciprocity function α(S, E, V) that
depends on the trust signal received, S, the stress of the environment, E,
and the variance, V, in the trust signal. The reciprocity function α(S, E,
V) determines the degree to which one returns like with like and identi-
fies the factors upon which this decision is conditioned. The neuroscience
indicates that α(S, E, V) is increasing in the signal of trust, S, that one
receives; decreasing in the stress of the environment, E; and decreasing in
the variance, V, of previous interactions between dyadic partners.
The NMT reveals, for example, why on almost all issues France and the
USA agree (variance of interactions, V, low). Both countries understand
that there is value to continuing a cooperative relationship, but that local
exigencies may cause occasional defections. Because trust creates a positive-
sum return possibility for both parties, there is inertia toward trust even
after a breach occurs. The reciprocity function supports a generous tit-for-
tat strategy, but it also rules out a party who is consistently a “sucker”. On
a very basic level, NMT captures the laboratory result showing that most
people are conditional reciprocators and that relationships matter. The
more you trust me, the more likely I am to reciprocate because this creates
values for me (and for the other party). At the same time, having a partner
who I can consistently trust reduces the risk that interactions will result in
a breach and also reduces the search time needed to find other interaction
partners (though this is not part of the NMT model).
These implications are consistent with the two-level games approach
proposed by Putnam (1988). The difference is that NMT does not predict
a return to a state of anarchy and disposition toward conflict after each
round. Rather, it predicts a bias toward trust and reciprocation in most
settings. Applying NMT to deterrence and arms control may also be fruit-
ful in that payoffs are well established and reactions can be monitored over
the last 70 years. In further work we hope to show that such analysis may
provide new insights into how the stability of deterrence during crises is
affected by trust and to what degree arms control increases trust.
NMT also discloses that defectors will seek to demonstrate that their
reciprocity function is positive, even if it is typically not. Note that 5 % of
participants playing the trust game in the laboratory who have deceptive
personalities also have an identifiable dysfunction in the OT system (Zak
2005, 2011). Unconditional non-reciprocators may seek to justify past
defections by claiming that they had been in a high-stress environment
and that the current less stressful environment will produce cooperation.
Understanding defectors neurologically may identify actions that can insti-
tutionalize trust and deter aggression. Can such claims be validated? The
NMT model shows that history matters, as does the current state of the
decision maker. Which state dominates is an empirical question. From the
perspective of international negotiations and agreements, these implica-
tions are potentially important. Recall that the Russian proverb “doveryai,
no proveryai” (trust but verify) was used repeatedly by President Ronald
Reagan when negotiating with the Soviet Union. Starting with a non-
trust posture, the NMT suggests it is possible that compliance will lead to
further reciprocation and stability, replacing the need for threats to ensure
peace.
The NMT may also shed light on ongoing negotiations with Iran and
North Korea regarding their nuclear ambitions. In these interactions trust
is a key element needed for resolution. Recall that realist theorists con-
tend that the central feature that distinguishes international from domes-
tic politics is the state of anarchy. Interactions among international actors
are modeled to reflect participation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, or
related games using Nash equilibria to predict dominant outcomes (Waltz
1981; Mearsheimer 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Only
rarely and tenuously do self-interested participants evolve toward trust
(Axelrod 1984). Generally they discover a way to maintain gains under
very restricted conditions, reverting to anarchy when these conditions
are altered. Following the classic representation of the Hobbesian state of
nature, realist theory portrays the interactions among states as an under-
socialized, brutal struggle for self-preservation. In the absence of a central
authority to punish malefactors, no individual actor can maximize his or
her own welfare by building trust and mutual relationships with others.
NMT challenges the realist perspective that rejects trust and concur-
rently questions the complex interdependence arguments that produce a
collective security based on trust. The result is a middle ground consistent
with power transition where international interactions are resolved in an
environment where self-interest can lead to reciprocation and maintain
an autonomous order based on trust and repeated interactions. However,
when trust is low, international agents will resort to confrontation that
can then escalate to war. Continuous interactive negotiations can create
links that ensure satisfaction and trust allowing rational actors holding
information about the costs of war and the benefits of mutual cooperation
to avert conflict.
NMT provides further credence to propositions that hierarchy and
trust are essential for stability. Scholars from Claude (1962) and Carr
(1964) to Keohane (1984) have argued that to secure a trusting environ-
ment that enhances security, participants may build bilateral and multilat-
eral organizations to increase trust among the parties. The large literature
on democratic peace is a modern testament supporting such arguments
(Russett and Oneal 2000; Ray 2009). Organski and Kugler (1980) and
Kugler and Lemke (1998) empirically show that the most serious wars—
World War I and II—were waged when participants approached parity and
anticipated that changing rules will result in a new, less satisfactory order
(Tammen et al. 2000). Extensions of the NMT model promise to provide

a clear theoretical explanation for rationalist arguments that encompass
both conflict and cooperation.
Paradoxically, despite vast differences in expected outcomes from
competing models, trust is at the core of the prolonged academic ten-
sion between realism and rationalism. Both paradigms share the same
fundamental assumption: nation-states utilize their power to maximize
net gains. Realists contend that actors in anarchy pursue their self-interest
without constraints and assume others do, too. Rationalists argue that
actors base policies on self-interest and trust using reciprocating strategies
to achieve larger gains. This discrepancy implies that for rationalists, simi-
lar situations can produce conflict and cooperation depending on the level
of trust among participants.
Real policy implications follow for the study of foreign policy and inter-
national conflict. Mearsheimer (2001) Offensive Realist theory suggests,
for instance, that the USA should have encouraged further partition of
the USSR in 1989 to reduce future challenges and pre-emptively chal-
lenged China to assure long-term security. Including the variable of trust
creates different interpretations—a win-win space created by having a
(conditionally) trusted dyadic partner. Thus, a clear deterrence policy that
states a no-first use of nuclear weapons assumes trust since it is built on the
expectations that opponents are likely to reciprocate. The trust gamble is
that states that wish to maintain stability will not use pre-emptive strikes
against potential opponents or nations without such weapons. The empiri-
cal record of policy implementation is far more consistent with this view
than one based on anarchy.
The Benefits of Applying Neuroscientific Findings

Is there a payoff to applying neuroscientific findings to questions in poli-
tics? We think there is for several reasons. First, neuroeconomics studies
remove the “middle man” from modeling. That is, rather than guess about
the mechanisms causing behavior that must be later verified, neuroscien-
tific studies allow one to directly measure how decisions are being made.
There is a caveat though—there is not always a one-to-one mapping from
a neurologic mechanism to its behavioral component—the latter being
what is put into a formal model. This is particularly endemic in brain imag-
ing studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or posi-
tron emission tomography. In such studies, typically 10–15 or more brain
regions are statistically more active in the treatment versus the control
task, so papers inevitably focus on a few of these (often those most signifi-
cant statistically), but these are only part of a much more complex net-
work of interactions in the brain. Isolating parts of the network is nearly
uninformative. Further, interpreting what such isolated differential brain
activation means is fraught with post hoc judgments based on findings
from previous studies that may have flaws, compounding misinterpreta-
tions. Finally, the statistical techniques typically used to analyze activity in
50,000 small chunks of brain issue every six seconds for an hour have been
characterized as “voodoo” correlations (Vul et al. 2009). On balance, one
should be quite skeptical of findings from a single study and using a single
technique.
Convergence is the watchword in neuroscience. An additional concern
is that a well-designed study recently produced data that questions whether
fMRI signals correlate with brain activity at all (Sirota and Das 2009). The
work linking OT to trust avoids these post hoc judgments as it shows that
being trusted is directly associated with OT release and manipulating OT
causes participants to trust others in an active, rather than retrospective,
task. This is direct and convergent evidence on mechanism. But the ability
to do such studies in humans is limited for safety reasons and therefore
unusual in human neuroscientific studies. So, political scientists should
borrow from neuroscience, but borrow carefully.
Second, neuroeconomics studies bring human beings back into the cen-
ter of formal and informal models. Social scientists often model “agents”
making decisions. These mythical creatures do not inhabit the real world.
By directly studying humans, one brings real decision-making to bear
when seeking to understand politics—an intense focus on the individual
level of analysis which is all but ignored in IR theory, but as other sev-
eral chapters in this volume show (in particular, Chap. 3 by Renshon and
Kahneman and Chap. 6 by Scupin), is quite important. This certainly can
be done without measuring brain activity. Controlled laboratory studies
and field studies are the place to start and are becoming more common in
political science (Green and Gerber 2003). Even field observation is unde-
rused by most social scientists (Harrison and List 2004). It is interesting
to note how few economists have visited in person the markets they seek
to model and have given up the opportunity to speak to those who are
making decisions before picking up a pencil to describe these decisions.
For such reasons, neuroeconomics is in an especially promising position
to assist in informing decision-making, foreign policy, and international

conflict upon which this book focuses attention.
Scholarship on IR also suffers from an “office bias”. For example, anal-
yses of Russian policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union were often
simplistic. Inclusion of findings from the NMT into standard models in
international politics could have added more nuance to these analyses. At
the same time, many decision makers are unable to clearly articulate the
reasons for some of the most interesting decisions they make. As scientists,
we must devise ways to extract this information from them. Controlled
experiments are the most straightforward way to do this. Combining these
experiments with measurement of brain activity can directly inform mod-
els of political behavior (e.g., Westen et al. 2006; Boudreau et al. 2009).
Models of foreign policy decision-making would seem especially well
suited to injection of findings from neuroeconomics experiments.
Third, the process of building better models of political decisions is
cumulative and iterative. The neurologically informed trust model took
years of experiments before there was sufficient confidence that the
assumptions behind the model were well supported with convergent evi-
dence. Untethered by experiments, one could spin out many rational actor
models and then hope the data would decide which was best. We now
believe this approach is bad science, because the assumptions of a model
matter. Increasing explained variation is not the best metric of a model.
Assumptions depend on mechanisms, and getting the mechanisms right
increases the odds of making out-of-sample predictions that fit the data.
This approach can and should be used in the field of IR. We are not advo-
cating that scholars of IR morph into neuroscientists—it takes an unusual
skill set to run neuroscience experiments. But being an informed con-
sumer of neuroeconomics and neuroscience is, we believe, the wave of
the future. Including neuroscience in IR makes sense because all behavior
that drives fundamental areas like foreign policy and conflict is ultimately
produced by the brain. Neuroscience can sharpen the assumptions behind
political models and may also increase the predictive power of neuro-
informed models.
Such a neuropolitics approach would further highlight the key theme
of this book of bridging levels of analysis and the space between them. It
would offer new perspectives through the novel study of human behav-
ior at the individual level of analysis and how that intersects with our
understanding of central phenomena such as foreign policy as well as
international conflict at the systemic level.
NOTES
1. IR scholars have used a number of words to express concepts related to
trust, including commitment to the status quo, satisfaction with a partner,
or risk reduction. Trust is the act of placing confidence in the promise of
another that may lead to harm. Satisfaction with a relationship or a com-
mon status quo is expressed by policy proximity among actors. Over time
satisfaction evolves into trust. Risk usually is associated with individuals not
states. A general reduction of risk propensity is associated directly with trust
among competitors attempting to resolve differences (Smith 2008).
2. Conditional deterrence is the first general formal deterrence model that
shows weak terrorist groups will use weapons of mass destruction if they
acquire them.
3. A nuclear umbrella is offered to allies only. Most NATO and OECD mem-
bers, Japan, and Oceania have a US nuclear umbrella guarantee. This does
not extend to other regions. A strike by Israel on Iran, or a future strike by
Iran on Israel that consumes much of our attention is outside of this frame-
work. Yet, no institution currently inhibits strikes by these parties, and non-
nuclear nations have no trusted guarantee of retaliation should another
nation initiate a nuclear attack against them. The USA recently provided an
extended nuclear umbrella to South Korea and Japan—states that can be
trusted—but a similar benefit is not extended to North Korea. A stable
arrangement requires trust and coverage on all sides.
4. While some formal models permit both degrees of trust and variations in
trust over time (Binmore 1994; Sobel 2002; Camerer 2003), and include
trust-inducing factors such as reputation and monitoring, most game theo-
retic models consider the baseline case to be non-cooperative. We argue
that such models are not incorrect but underspecified, thus excluding a
large set of options.
5. The techniques used in neuroeconomics studies vary from recording single
neurons while animals execute a task, to, in humans, correlating brain activ-
ity using a electroencephalogram or functional magnet resonance imaging
with a decision outcome. Additional techniques used in neuroeconomics
studies measure neurotransmitters and hormones in blood or other bodily
fluids while experimental participants make decisions, and infuse drugs into
the human brain to “turn on” or “turn off” parts of the brain to demon-
strate the causal effect of these substances on decisions. A focused magnetic
pulse called transcranial magnetic stimulation has also been used to inhibit
or magnify neural activity in cortical (outer) brain regions during decision
making. Finally, individuals with focal brain regions have also been studied
in neuroeconomics to prove the necessity of a particular brain region to
doing an economic task. See Zak (2004) for a review of these techniques.
APPENDIX 1
The game-theoretic NMT proposed here is based on macro studies on
power dynamics and the studies Zak’s laboratory has done on the role
of OT in facilitating trust. The model is presented to show how findings
from neuroeconomics studies can be included in an otherwise standard
optimizing model. The model is a dyadic interaction that captures the
essence of trust—that one party must make a decision first and the other
party subsequently reacts to this. Our hope is that social scientists will use
this model as a foundation to incorporate trust into models of political
decisions particularly in the complex arena of deterrence where formal
models affect policies that impact the safety of millions.
Let us begin with some notation. The players are identified as decision
maker 1 (DM1) and decision maker 2 (DM2). These can be considered
countries or individual political actors. Table A1 lists the variables in the
model and their definitions. The DMs in this model are self-interested but
also value the ongoing relationship between the parties. Both parties have
identical continuous, increasing, and strictly concave utility functions U().
Decisions are made with full information by both DMs, and we abstract
from stochasticity in this version of the model. For simplicity and consis-
tent with the parity conditions previously identified in power transition
dynamics, assume both parties begin with equal resources (M1 = M2 = M
> 0) and have a history of interacting with each other, V(R) > 0 and V(R)
finite. The results of the model do not change if these two assumptions
are relaxed.
We know from Zak’s studies of OT release discussed above that under
conditions of low stress, when DM2 receives a transfer from DM1, OT is
released and this induces a desire to reciprocate. The degree of reciprocity
scales with the size of the transfer. We will call DM2’s reciprocity function
α(S, E, V) : R+x[0, 1]xR+ → [0, 1]
and assume that it is continuous and increasing in S reflecting status
quo level in power dynamics and decreasing in E and V. The shared exter-
nal environment, E, that both DMs experience affects the reciprocity that
DM2 will have toward DM1 by affecting stress levels during the interac-
tion. E is negatively affected by stress that can emanate from an interna-
tional crisis, imminent elections, a shortage of time to make decisions,
or other factors that impact decision-making. As discussed above, high
stress reduces OT release and therefore DM2 reciprocity. The implications
for the understanding of political exchanges, particularly international
exchanges that are currently assumed to be unaffected by reciprocity, are,

clearly, fundamental.
Variance of what DM1 sends to DM2, V, captures how trusting DM1
has been in previous interactions with DM2. This permits DM2 to “right
old wrongs” by reducing returns R if DM1 has been inconsistent in show-
ing trust. This term R captures the notion that trust takes time to build
but is easy to break. The effect of the variance on what is sent causes both
DMs to indirectly place value on a continuing relationship; since the game
is positive sum, win-win solutions exist if α2(S, E, V) is large enough.
The model is solved backwards. DM2’s decision problem is:
MaxK2 , RU(K2) + α2(S, E, V) U(R)
s . t . K2 = M + ηM+
DM2 is self-interested because greater resources K2 are valued, but at
the same time, she/he receives a utility flow U(R) from reciprocating with
DM1. This utility occurs even in a one-shot interaction (V = 0) but is rein-
forced by a continuing relationship.
The necessary and sufficient condition for an optimum is
U′(K2) = α2(S, E, V) U′(R)
This determines DM2’s optimal amount kept, K 2* and amount returned
to DM1, R*. It is straightforward to prove that R* is increasing in α2. In
other words, for a fixed environment E, the more resources DM2 receives,
the greater his/her reciprocity toward DM1, and the larger the amount
returned to DM1. Nevertheless, for E sufficiently high, α2(S, E, V) = 0 and
as a result DM2 uses the self-interested Nash strategy, R* = 0. One can
also show that R* is decreasing in the variance, V.
DM1 is also self-interested, gaining utility from total resources she/
he keeps K1 and from what DM2 returns, R. DM1 understands that for a
given environment E, sending an amount S to DM2 will have a neurologic
effect on him/her. That is, S will induce OT release that will motivate
reciprocity by DM2. DM1 also understands the value of consistency, V, in
the trust shown to DM2 and knows that inconsistency will reduce DM2’s
reciprocity.
DM1’s decision is to solve
MaxK1 , SU(K1 + R)
s . t . K1 + S = M
R = η = Mδεχ2
U′(K2) = α2(S, E, V) U′(R)
The optimum is found from the condition
U′(K1 + R)(ηR)(pt2(S)/dS) = 0,
or
ηr/(dS)2(S)/dS.
This equation reveals that the amount that DM1 sends to DM2, S,
depends on the return, η, as well as on how DM2 responds to being
shown trust by DM1, K2(S). The function K2(S) is positive and decreasing
in S (equivalently, R(S) is increasing) so that DM1 expects a return from
DM2 unless E is high or there is a fractured history of reciprocity (V high).
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CHAPTER 5
Technology, Conflict and International

Relations
Stefan Fritsch
Technology is linked to key phenomena in international relations (IR),

including conflict, but has not been effectively incorporated into the study
of IR and remains under-appreciated, especially given the rise of technol-
ogy in the past 150 years and more particularly in the past several decades.
For millennia, technological evolution has deeply impacted global politics,
security, economics, culture and the environment and vice versa, and such
inter-linkages have only accelerated in the modern era.
Technology’s multifaceted character has motivated different social and
humanities disciplines such as history, sociology, philosophy, economics,
geography and anthropology to investigate its origins, evolution and con-
sequences for humanity. IR also has addressed technology-related issues
in one way or another since its inception in the 1920s. Unfortunately,
a number of early—and mostly policy-oriented—studies of technologi-
cal issues in world politics remained at the discipline’s periphery (Kohler-
Koch 1986; Ogburn 1949; Sanders 1983; Skolnikoff 1993). Recent
macro-trends such as economic and military globalization, transforma-
tions in the relationship between time and space, and the emergence of
S. Fritsch ()
Department of Political Science, Bowling Green State University,
Bowling Green, OH, USA
e-mail: sfritsc@bgsu.edu

116 S. FRITSCH
new actor types (non-state actors) or policy challenges, have highlighted

the discipline’s difficulties in conceptualizing technology’s proper role.
Several primary reasons explain this substantial gap in IR scholarship,
which hinders our understanding of IR and critical subjects such as con-
flict. The first conceptual problem relates to IR’s mainstream understand-
ing of technology as a primarily material artifact and its passive role as
tool or instrument. The second problem is rooted in technology’s defini-
tion as a component exogenous to the international system. Hence, tech-
nology in its role as a highly politicized core feature of the global system
and a main driver of system-level change has taken center stage in recent
efforts to address these conceptual shortcomings of IR. Third, this under-
conceptualization of technology weakens IR’s ability to comprehend the
origins and driving forces of systemic change and of conflict, and to under-
stand a range of newly emerging issues and processes and their intended
and unintended consequences. What this strand of research promotes is
an interdisciplinary approach to the study of technology in the context of
global affairs.
The central argument of this chapter is that IR scholarship must do
far more to incorporate technology into theoretical, empirical and policy
analyses. In particular, this chapter focuses on the role of technology in
conflict. Technology can serve as both a cause of conflict and a deterrent
to it—an outcome that will be highly dependent on context—but it is
certainly an important variable to consider.
With that in mind, this chapter first provides a definitional discussion
of technology. It then explores the relationship between technology and
conflict in general and moves to focus on cyber-conflict as a recent mani-
festation of the effects of technology on conflict. It then examines theories
of IR and conflict, and explores interdisciplinary research in technology
studies and how it can be enhanced.
TECHNOLOGY DEFINED
The drive for theoretical parsimony, criticized by IR scholars of various
theoretical backgrounds, downplayed technology in theoretical accounts
of system change. Technology, often narrowly defined as material arti-
fact, is considered to influence actors and interaction patterns by more
or less being “added” to the structures, actors and processes that make
up the study of global affairs. However, by conceptualizing technology
in the form of more encompassing sociotechnical systems, we can better
TECHNOLOGY, CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 117
understand technology as an endogenous and political factor that is deeply

embedded into the global system.
Technology not only has been ascribed diverse values but also has been
defined in different ways (Hughes 2004: 2), a fact that significantly com-
plicates all discussions about technology and its role in global affairs. For
this analysis, I draw from a broad definition proposed by Brooks, who
defines technology as “knowledge of how to fulfill certain human pur-
poses in a specifiable and reproducible way” (Brooks 1980: 66). While a
narrow definition of technology focuses only on material artifacts, which
would better be termed “tools” or “technique”, as well as technologi-
cal know-how directly related to their construction and usage, the broad
definition of technology also encompasses “soft” aspects like technology-
related norms and ethics, organizational and ritual aspects as well as the
general belief in progress, which together constitute a “technological
practice” (Pacey 1983: 6) or what could also be called a “sociotechnical
system”. By using this broader definition, I try to avoid the reductionist
position that technology consists only of the direct practical application of
hard science in the (material) form of technical tools (Kaplan 2004: XIV).
In this context, anthropological research on sociotechnical systems has
produced interesting insights into the “meaning of sociotechnical activi-
ties, and in particular, the nonproductive roles of technical activities in the
ongoing, pragmatic constitution of human polities and subjective selves”
(Pfaffenberger 1992: 502). This also generates important contributions
for IR and IPE, since it emphasizes the intersubjective interpretation and
application processes associated with any material artifact in a global con-
text. Hence, technology’s meaning and concrete application are shaped
by specific scientific, emotional, cultural, strategic, political, economic and
other factors that also play central roles in global affairs, yet can differ dra-
matically across time and space.
Much scholarly work has been devoted to the focused study of certain
technology-related policy issues in areas of security, welfare and identity,
but far fewer studies have investigated the more fundamental relationship
between technology and global affairs within which an understanding of
conflict also emerges (Ogburn 1949; McNeill 1982; Sanders 1983; van
Creveld 1989; Skolnikoff 1993; Herrera 2006; Hanson 2008). Given
the diverse, yet wide-ranging, consequences of technological evolution
for global affairs, the general omission from mainstream IR is surprising.
Addressing these conceptual shortcomings, Talalay et al. (1997: 2) argue
that standard explanations of systemic changes in global affairs usually
118 S. FRITSCH
focus on political or economic variables, neglecting technology’s core role

as a driving force behind systemic transformation as well as its reciprocal
relations with politics, economics and culture. These conceptual gaps have
contributed in significant ways to IR/IPE’s struggle to explain systemic
change in global affairs.
TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

In line with a key theme of this volume, understanding technology
can inform and enhance our understanding of international conflict.
Technological invention, innovation and diffusion can greatly impact
armed conflict in global affairs. Dependent on both historical and specific
circumstances, some technologies provide states with greatly enhanced
offensive capabilities, which may spur or deter conflict. Diffusion of the
stirrup allowed for development of mounted shock combat in connec-
tion with a medieval feudalistic society revolving around chivalry (White
1962). Introduction of the Swiss pikemen revolutionized medieval warfare
once again, initiating an incremental shift toward standing armies, which
in turn could only be maintained by modern states with vastly improved
administrative and organizational capabilities (McNeill 1982; Spruyt
1994; van Creveld 1999). Rapid evolution of shipping technology and
navigation during the sixteenth century provided European states with
pivotal technological advantages for colonization. Technological superior-
ity over colonized territories was finally achieved with the help of vastly
improved firearms, cannons and new medical discoveries to cope with
tropical diseases (Headrick 2012). Invention, improvement and diffusion
of the steam engine rang in the industrial revolution and subsequently
British hegemony during the nineteenth century (Landes 1969; Headrick
1981). Prussia’s adaptation of railroad technology for military purposes
and subsequent victories against the Habsburg Empire and France dem-
onstrated the advantages of rapid and orderly troop relocations via effi-
cient transportation networks (McNeill 1982).
Technologies such as machine guns vastly improved defensive capabili-
ties by undermining the opponent’s offensive ability to effectively maneu-
ver troops in an attack (Ellis 1975), and may have deterred and invited
conflict depending on the conditions at hand. The military-technological
capability to commit omnicide, that is the total destruction of all human
life on earth, was finally achieved with the invention and eventual lim-
ited diffusion of nuclear scientific knowledge and technology beginning
around the turn of the nineteenth century showcasing the interdependent

relationship between scientific progress, political decision-making and
global sociopolitical conditions (Rhodes 2012).
The invention and eventual diffusion of nuclear weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) became a technological cornerstone of the Cold War
between the USA and the USSR and their respective alliances during the
second half of the twentieth century. The balance of terror ultimately man-
ifested itself in the achievement of mutually assured destruction, defined as
the bedrock of stable bipolarity between the USA and the USSR (Gilpin
1981).
Nuclear strategy and the underlying sociotechnical system of nuclear
WMDs are a good example for the transformative impact of technological
innovation on world politics and on conflict, by decreasing the sensibil-
ity of some types of conflict. Their introduction fundamentally altered
the calculations of modern warfare and geo-strategy after World War II
by igniting a nuclear arms race. According to Schelling, military strategy
could no longer plan to win decisive military victories. Instead nuclear
strategy transformed into the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence
(Schelling 1960). Deterrence is defined as an actor’s ability to use threats
in order to convince an opponent from initiating some course of action
(Huth 1999).
Moreover, traditional means of power accumulation, such as territo-
rial expansion, were increasingly deemed incompatible with the broader
development goals of socioeconomically and technologically interdepen-
dent industrialized countries and rather self-defeating because of prospec-
tive retaliation. Instead, the means-ends relationship that exists for most
conventional weapon systems was fundamentally upended by nuclear tech-
nology’s transnational and sovereignty-devaluing characteristics (Aron
1966; Morgenthau 1961), thereby rendering major war between the
superpowers “obsolete” (Mueller 1988, 1989). The certainty of human
annihilation resulted in a shift from direct military confrontation to socio-
economic competition (van Creveld 1999).
Nuclear WMDs’ inability to discriminate between civilian and military
targets, as well as its tremendous and morally unacceptable (collateral)
damage, required that final authority to engage such weapons had to
always lie with human decision-makers. The nuclear crisis over Berlin in
1961 and Cuba in 1962 demonstrated the dangers of potential escalation
by changing power balances. The superpowers sought out ways to regu-
late the diffusion of civilian nuclear technology combined with intensive
120 S. FRITSCH
monitoring regimes and to limit the number of states with military nuclear
capabilities (Simpson and McGrew 1984). Neoliberal regime theory has
developed strong empirical evidence that arms control and verification
regimes were at least partly successful because both parties realized that
regulation was necessary to control nuclear WMDs’ destructive potential
(Müller 2001; Smith 1987). And yet, regime development was often frus-
trated by qualitative technological evolution in exploitation of regulatory
loopholes as well as politically calculated limited diffusion (Brooks 1975).
From a moral-normative perspective, the real-world use of nuclear WMDs
(as well as chemical and biological) revealed the horrific long-tern conse-
quences (radiation, physical destruction etc.) of nuclear violence and was
pivotal in the incremental development of new technology-related norms
such as the nuclear taboo.
Military technological evolution and globalization are also inextrica-
bly intertwined. Held et al. differentiate between globalized militariza-
tion and military globalization: the former “loosely refers to a generalized
process of global military build-up (measured by increased levels of total
world military expenditures, armaments or armed forces)”, the latter refers
“exclusively to the process (and patterns) of military connectedness that
transcend the world’s major regions as reflected in the spatio-temporal
and organization features of military relations, networks and interactions”
(1999: 88). Military globalization, defined as a process of intensifying and
extensifying military relations between the political units of the interna-
tional system, is seen as the result of technological developments. The
global expansion of European international society was a three-step pro-
cess initiated during the age of discovery (late fifteenth–seventeenth cen-
tury), followed by a period of consolidation (seventeenth–mid-nineteenth
century), which ended in the age of world-empire (1850–1900) (Howard
1984). Each of these periods was marked by a specific combination of
military-technological innovation, socioeconomic and political dynamics,
and interstate competition.
The steamboat, railways, telegraph, radio, nuclear weapons, recon-
naissance satellites or digital networked information and communication
technologies (ICTs) all contributed to the formation of a singular geostra-
tegic space (ibid: 89), marked by increasing time-space compression and
dramatically shortened time spans for deliberation. Military globalization
is also understood as a historical—yet not linear or pre-determined—pro-
cess, which only began to take on a growing global dimension with the
beginning of European colonial expansion toward the end of the fifteenth
century (Black 1998). However, colonial territories could never be fully

controlled and the material and logistical resources associated with their
conquest and defense were enormous (Geyer and Bright 1995; Watson
2003).
Nuclear WMDs ultimately represent what Keohane and Nye termed
“globalism”, defined as “state of the world involving networks of interde-
pendence at multicontinental distances” (Keohane and Nye 2001: 193).
They sparked the Cold War’s arms race, yet at the same time forced the
superpowers to avoid direct outright military confrontation for fear of
escalation and mutual destruction. Overall, they exerted a calming effect
that created a “long peace” (Gaddis 1989). Despite the growing tech-
nological, human and environmental challenges emanating from rapidly
aging nuclear technology (Kraft and Vig 1988), they will continue to be
part of a limited number of state’s military arsenal for personal defense and
protection of allies as well as for civilian energy purposes. Notwithstanding
partly successful post-Cold War efforts to reduce the overall number of
nuclear warheads and delivery systems, nuclear states continue to retain
nuclear capabilities, even if in reduced form and mostly for reasons of
deterrence in the face of a range of new geostrategic and security challenges
(Payne 2015). Interestingly, though, recent years have also seen intensi-
fying academic and public discussions about the effectiveness of nuclear
deterrence against non-rational opponents such as suicide terrorists as well
as growing concerns about nuclear proliferation to terrorist actors. New
focus has also been put on the economic and security consequences of rap-
idly aging nuclear arsenals around the world, forcing countries to decide
on future action. Some former proponents of nuclear deterrence are now
calling for renewed efforts to further curb or even eliminate all remaining
military nuclear capabilities (Taubman 2012).
It makes sense to conclude this section on conflict by stepping back
to examine recent scholarship that is focused on the work of Bertrand
Russell and John Herz (Sylvest 2012: 122). Russell understood that
technologies can be used for reactionary and destructive purposes. He
particularly worried about the consequences of nuclear WMD and the
prospect of worldwide nuclear war. Of great concern to Russell in this
context is the discrepancy between a technologically unified, yet politically
divided planet. Efficient governance of these complex, interconnected and
ultimately global challenges no longer can be achieved within a national
context. All of that established Russell’s scholarly promotion and active
political fight for global governance in the form of world government
122 S. FRITSCH
and nuclear disarmament (Sylvest 2012: 128). Herz put forward a sophis-

ticated and nuanced Realist perspective of the technology-global politics
nexus. He argued that the advance of nuclear weapons had fundamen-
tally challenged the notion of territoriality and states’ interest pursued
via armed conflict. Similar to Russell, Herz identified technology as the
driver of “globality”, time-space compression and a globalization of
threats (Sylvest 2012: 130). Torn between his determinist understanding
of technology and his insistence on the possibility and potential for ratio-
nal action, Herz’ pessimism regarding the prospects of the latter is fueled
by fear and uncertainty, caused by interstate competition between states
that find themselves in an anarchic system. Add to that the dangers posed
by cognitive biases among decision-makers, enumerated by Renshon and
Kahneman in Chap. 3, which tend to aim them toward hawkishness and
conflict. Such biases amplify the risks when combined with the stakes of
destructive technology.
Similar to Russell, Herz concluded that political solutions to technology-
generated problems can be found only at the global level, even if prospects
for world government seem minimal. Together with other marginalized
early scholars of the thermonuclear revolution like Günter Anders or
Lewis Mumford, they promoted a global normative agenda to reform
modern society so as to avoid collective suicide that today is largely absent
from contemporary S&TS research on large sociotechnical systems (van
Munster and Sylvest, forthcoming).
The Rise of Cyber Conflicts

In more recent times, we have had to re-think the sources of strategy and
conflict. Indeed, during the late twentieth and early twenty-first century,
ICTs encouraged transformation of the industrial into the post-indus-
trial information society with new forms of transnational production
and distribution processes, the pervasive application of ICTs in an ever
expanding range of products and services as well as new conflict forms
incorporating and often combining cyber-, drone- or robotic technol-
ogy (Castells 2000; Singer 2009). State as well as non-state actors have
developed new strategies, policies and tools to cope with these technol-
ogy-driven challenges, shape technological evolution itself or capitalize
on new opportunities to realize their specific goals (Dizard 2001; Farrell
and Finnemore 2013; Warkentin 2001).
The evolution of ICTs and their associated sociotechnical systems also

provides a multifaceted example for the technology-conflict nexus, which
often highlights individual and group actors. While there is no generalized
way to conceptualize how ICT relates to conflict, they can both encourage
it by making non-conventional attacks easier and generating instability in
the status quo or deter it by enhancing the ability to detect such challenges
and possibly to retaliate.
Originating in the Allied efforts to decipher the German Enigma code
during World War II, the invention and rapid diffusion of computer
technology was also, at least in part, driven by security concerns during
the Cold War. Large sociotechnical systems such as the semi-automatic
ground environment early warning system became the backbone for the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (O’Reagan 2012).
The Internet, too, is to a considerable extent the result of Cold War
technological research and development. A collaborative effort between
the military and universities such as Harvard and Berkley, ARPA-net
was developed from its inception as a communication system between
the military industrial complex and civilian research institutions such as
universities. The functional necessity of guaranteeing interoperability of
various digital networks, with radio-based and satellite systems in different
countries (allies within NATO), required new approaches to inter-
face design. The resulting Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP or
Internet protocol was a connectionless protocol responsible for addressing
and routing of information packets, which became the standard by 1983
(Abate 1999; O’Reagan 2012).
The invention of the World Wide Web by Tim Berners Lee at the inter-
national nuclear research center CERN was driven by the need to better
organize the exchange of information among scientists inside and outside
of CERN. The outcome was the URL address system and the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol, which enabled the linking of information distributed
over many computers and networks. In combination with continuously
advancing computing power according to Moore’s Law (Moore 1965),
as well as the invention and ultimately global diffusion of ever cheaper
mobile communication technologies ushered in what became known as
the era of “The Global Village” (McLuhan 1992), “post-capitalist society”
(Drucker 1994) or the service- and information-based “post-industrial
society” (Bell 1976; Piore and Sabel 1984).
The origins and evolution of these new global sociotechnical systems
represented a major challenge to many existing ontological and epistemo-
logical axioms in IR and other social science and humanities disciplines.
124 S. FRITSCH
Slowly, IR scholars grappling with the issue of change in world politics

began to acknowledge that ICTs—among many technologies—did con-
tribute to “global turbulences” by challenging the foundations of main-
stream IR in the form of the Westphalian state system (Rosenau 1990),
and in this sense, contributed to a context for conflict.
ICTs allow a greater number of actors to initiate conflicts both within
and between states. According to some scholars, digital ICTs with their
drive toward interconnection, network expansion and affordability have
had a tremendous “leveling” effect on contemporary global military rela-
tions, enabling a range of state and non-state actors to develop significant
digital war-fighting capabilities (Rosenau and Fagan 1997; Halpin et al.
2006). This has also been observed with regard to surveillance technology
(satellites, sensors etc.), which is now widely available to civilian customers
(Litfin 2002). However, this technological evolution of actor capabilities
also creates new challenges related to the processing and representation of
information in a non-biased way (Parks 2009).
Although ICTs have been recognized broadly as pivotal drivers of
change in global conflict patterns triggering new security strategies
(Arquilla and Ronfeld 1997, 2001) the field of security studies has only
recently witnessed a more substantial debate about the potential implica-
tions of ICT-based conflict forms for national defense and global security
politics (Halpin et al. 2006). This rather late engagement may be attrib-
uted to several factors.
First, as proponents considering cyberwar a new reality argue, the tech-
nical complexity of ICT-related security issues has resulted in their general
avoidance by scholars. This neglect impedes a full analysis of the political
and strategic implications of ICTs. Cyberwar skeptics proclaim that the
other side is overestimating cyberwar’s real impact on the fundamental
power constellations of the interstate system. Rather, skeptics see cyber-
war as an addition to a range of other conventional/non-conventional
weapons systems without fundamentally altering military strategies or
the distribution of capabilities (Gartzke 2013; Walt 2010; see also Kello
2013: 8). However, the danger of reserving ICTs and cyberspace for the
engineers is a potential neglect of the politico-economically and cultur-
ally constituted institutions and processes in which these technical systems
are embedded (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010). These social processes do
shape technology on different levels of analysis. Political-economic analy-
sis strengthens our ability to understand cyberspace as a multi-level socio-
technical system that is shaped by various actors with differing levels of

“cyberpower” (Nye 2011).
Second, political analysis is necessary to understand actor motivations.
As Kello points out, while engineers might have the technical expertise
to develop and apply powerful cyber-weapons, defense strategies without
a social scientific perspective will fail to effectively assess why and how
certain actors choose to rely on cyber-related offensive or defensive weap-
ons systems and strategies (Kello 2013). In order to tackle basic ICT-
related conceptual issues, the emerging field of cyber-security studies has
developed taxonomies to differentiate between different types of “cyber
phenomena” (Kello 2013: 7). Cyber phenomena that serve offensive and
defensive military purposes often imply the intent to cause widespread
harm to critical national infrastructure, sometimes also in combination
with conventional military operations. Cybersecurity “consists of measures
to protect the operations of a computer system or the integrity of its data
from hostile action. Cybersecurity can also be conceived of as a state of
affairs: the absence of unauthorized intrusion into computer systems and
their proper functioning” (ibid: 18). Malware is designed as mischievous
software that tries to interfere with a computer system’s functionality or
to undermine data integrity, including Trojans, spyware, viruses, worms,
adware and so on. It is designed to open avenues for access to opponents’
computer systems or/and to attack it.
Cybercrime consists of the use of computers for illicit purposes under
national penal codes. Cyber attacks intend to interfere with an adversary’s
computer systems’ functionality for strategic purposes. Such attacks can,
but need not, be limited to the digital realms of cyberspace. The ultimate
objective of cyber attacks may be to “incapacitate the computer system
itself or to degrade social, economic, or government functions depen-
dent on its proper operation (Kello 2013: 19)”. Cyber attacks can also
fall into the categories of “hacktivism”, cyber attacks conducted by private
perpetrators for political or ideological reasons (Paget 2010), or outright
cyberwar, if the intent of an attack is to cause severe physical damage and
loss of life. Cyber exploitation refers to cyber-activities that penetrate an
opponent’s computer systems in order to extract information while trying
to avoid detection, which would defeat the purpose of maintaining privi-
leged access (Kello 2013: 20).
New policy areas such as cyber-related terrorism and anti-terrorism
measures, cyber attacks, malware, transborder access to data and data flows
are currently discussed broadly within United Nations bodies such as the
126 S. FRITSCH
General Assembly. The complexities of new technologies, and their co-evo-

lutionary relationship with society, require an interdisciplinary approach
that combines social sciences, technology studies and the humanities to
explore the technical, political, socioeconomic and cultural transforma-
tions they co-shape. However, the 2001 Council of Europe Convention
on Cyber Crime (Council of Europe 2001) remains the only cyber-related
international treaty. The convention stresses the “need for co-operation
between States and private industry in combating cybercrime and the need
to protect legitimate interests in the use and development of information
technologies” (Council of Europe 2001: 2).
Third, the newness of cyber-related conflict needs to be explored with
modified theoretical lenses that accept the mutual embeddedness of tech-
nology in cultural underpinnings, sociopolitical institutions and economic
forces. Traditional understandings of interstate war require adaptation to
the fact that cyber-weapons are not overtly violent. Cyberweapons’ ambiv-
alent characteristics and new capabilities transform the traditional axioms
of interstate war potentially blurring the boundaries of the war-peace
dichotomy. While the cyber revolution has not fundamentally altered the
nature of war, it has contributed in important ways to the emergence of
new non-military foreign threats as well as a range of non-state actors
who have the ability to inflict social and economic harm. The debate over
cyberwar technologies’ impact on offensive and defensive military strategy
is an illustrative case for the difficulty of projecting future development
paths based on a limited number of empirical cases.
Many observers argue that cyberwar is no longer an abstract possibil-
ity, but that it has been in the making for at least 20 years. For example,
in April 2007 Estonia experienced a massive distributed denial-of-service
(DDoD) attack via 80,000 hijacked computers, most likely in retaliation
for the removal of the Soviet war memorial. In 2008, Georgia’s military
command, control and communication capabilities were neutralized via
a Russian DDoD preceding Russia’s conventional military intervention.
Stuxnet, a computer worm which disrupted Iranian uranium enrichment
centrifuges in 2010, is the first instance of a computer network attack
known to cause physical damage across international boundaries (Foltz
2012). Critical voices question if these recent cases fulfill the definition
of an act of war as violent, purposeful and political. So far, no human
being has been killed as result of a cyber attack (Rid 2012). Critics of
the “cyber-hype” also point out that constantly improved cyber-defenses
make successful cyber attacks harder, especially since many cyber-weapons
can potentially only be used once, before defensive systems are updated,
therefore favoring defensive approaches. Furthermore, the development
of sophisticated cyber-weapons like Stuxnet requires formidable human
and technological resources and time and is therefore unlikely to be eas-
ily replicated by other states or non-state actors. New international arms
agreements to regulate a variety of cyber-activities have little prospect for
success due to issues such as how to distinguish cyber crime from political
activity in cyberspace, verifying the origins and/or perpetrators of cyber
attacks and cyber-aggressors’ preference for non-attribution.
Proponents of cyberspace as a de-facto fifth conflict dimension, cut-
ting across land, sea, air and space, argue that cyber-conflict has simply
become a reality of global security politics (Arquilla 2012). Many countries
are now engaged in a new cyber-arms race and collaborative exercises, for
example that between NATO states have become regular (Ventre 2011).
The leveling effect of digital ICTs in terms of technological capabilities
between countries and non-state actors and the growing complex (tech-
nological) interdependence characterizing contemporary global society
make the invisible continent a relevant battlefield. While critics question
if cyber-conflict actually can be categorized as war, proponents argue that
the shifting boundaries between what counts as aggression and other forms
of interaction such as information gathering (espionage) require a more
nuanced categorization of various forms of cyber-interaction. The anonym-
ity of cyber-attackers is actually potentially the strongest argument in favor
of offensive behavior. Moreover, the extensive cyber-prying campaigns
against US military systems as well as private companies since the late 1990s
represent a new kind of permanent low-intensity form of cyberwar further
blurring the offensive-defensive dichotomy (Arquilla 2012). The interna-
tional legal frameworks will remain rudimentary at best, since states still
seem to assess the potential strategic, political and legal implications of new
cyber-technologies. Iran, the victim of the prominent Stuxnet worm, has
remained silent about this incident. Several explanations have been offered:
(1) public acknowledgement would have created pressure to release further
information; (2) Iran, like many other states, does not want to set a prec-
edent for what constitutes cyber-aggression; and (3) we are actually wit-
nessing the emergence of an implicit consensus regarding new thresholds
as to what constitutes cyberwar (Fidler 2011). By raising the threshold,
countries like the USA, Russia and China remain able to enhance their
capabilities for covert defensive and offensive cyber-operations while simul-
taneously pushing for international legal frameworks that actually allow sig-
128 S. FRITSCH
nificant freedom of cyber-action. Taken together, it seems plausible that we

will observe more cyber-propaganda, espionage and conflict in the future.
Digital cyberwar also demonstrates the complex interrelationship
between material and non-material components of technology. Because
the production, dissemination and storage of information remain at the
core of the information revolution, “secret keeping becomes a matter of
cryptology, algorithms, software, firewalls, passwords and other devices
which are both sophisticated and dematerialized” (Ventre 2011: 50).
Therefore, material and increasingly non-material aspects of technology
have to be investigated with regard to their impact on norms, actors, inter-
ests and policies.
To further deepen interdisciplinarity, security studies can draw from
neighboring disciplines such as sociology (Turk 2004), terrorism studies
(Combs 2006; Homer-Dixon 2002), religious (Sandal and James 2010;
Sheik 2012), ethnic (Soeters 2005) and communication studies (Archetti
2013), geography, as well as cultural studies to better conceptualize their
interplay between society and technology on local, national, global, vir-
tual and physical world. Only modified theoretical frameworks will result
in analytical concepts that address technology-induced changes in global
security politics, military strategies and conflict resolution. With regard to
the technology-conflict relationship—and similar to conflict and security
studies— IR at large has not yet understood technology’s impact on new
conflict forms. This impedes IR from successfully deconstructing the tech-
nological development process into its interdependent scientific, social,
cultural, economic, political and geostrategic factors.
THEORIES OF IR AND CONFLICT
Realist and Neorealist Conceptions of Technology, Change

and Conflict
The potential but neglected link between technology and theory can
also inform conflict studies. According to realism/neorealism, inter-
state relations are defined by fierce competition over power and influ-
ence (Morgenthau 1948). The hierarchy among states is the result of the
system-wide distribution of power, which reflects the distribution of mate-
rial capabilities. The emphasis lies on states’ relative endowment in various
power categories, which implicitly include technology (Waltz 1979: 131).
Rarely is technology mentioned explicitly, as with Gilpin, who postulates
that “[…] power refers simply to the military, economic, and techno-
logical capabilities of states” (Gilpin 1981:13). In most realist accounts,
technology seems to occupy the role of a passive, neutral and exogenous
instrument. It represents one among many power factors that states try to
maximize. States are primarily driven by ideological/political, not techno-
logical factors (Waltz 1959, 1981).
System-level change is the result of a modified power distribution
among states. Technology, however, does not qualify as a core component
of the system (Herrera 2006). Authors mainly associated with classical
realism have more self-consciously acknowledged that technological prog-
ress has changed international politics considerably, especially in the field
of high politics (security). The reason is that the invention of WMDs has
made total war a very irrational option for the realization of political goals
(Aron 1966; see also Morgenthau 1961: 280; Gilpin 1981: 173).
However, for most realist/neorealist scholars, the basic conditions of
international politics have not changed, since the system is solely defined
by the distribution of power (capabilities). In the wake of economic glo-
balization, many have simply extended the great power game from secu-
rity politics to economic competition. Here, too, technology plays an
important role, since it is a basic requirement for economic power (Gilpin
1987; Brzezinski 1997; Rosecrance 1986, 1999).
Since realism/neorealism mostly works with political concepts (national
interest, power accumulation, anarchy etc.), little room exists for critical
technology-related concepts. The state of nature and forces of politics are
more influential than any technology (Waltz 1979: 173). Furthermore,
most realists/neorealists reject the assumption that technological progress
either has favored the emergence of new actors on the international stage
or radically altered the structure of the system itself (2002; Hirst and
Thompson 1999; Rugman 2001; Held and McGrew 2007).
Liberalism, Technology and Interdependence

The global change that realists downplay is affected fundamentally by tech-
nology, in areas related to and apart from international conflict. For liber-
als, transformations of the international system often are perceived as the
result of technological developments. Emergence of new technologies—
among other things—can represent what Holsti described as “markers”.
After such historical turning points “[…] things appear to be done dif-
ferently than they were previously” (Holsti 2002: 25). Interdependence,
130 S. FRITSCH
globalization and transnationalization are largely understood as result-

ing from “[…] a long accumulation of technological advance which has
given human beings the ability to conduct their affairs across the world
without reference to nationality, government authority, daytime or physi-
cal environment” (Langhorne 2001: 2). Technological progress in ICTs,
transportation or weapons technology has caused intensified and more
complex economic, social and cultural interactions and structures, which
have resulted in a partial decoupling from physical surroundings like state
territory and borders (Kobrin 2001; Rosenau 1990; Wriston 1989).
A large body of scholarship also focuses on the relationship between
interdependence and conflict. Thus, if technology plays a major role in
interdependence, it also is linked to international conflict. Yet, the tech-
nology dimension is all but ignored in this large literature.
Technological progress in the military sphere has resulted in military
globalization, defined as strikingly increased levels of potential destruc-
tion as well as capacities to deliver force to any point on earth (Kaldor
1981; Held et al. 1999). Therefore, the Westphalian core principles of
political sovereignty, territoriality and state autonomy have been modified
significantly (Strange 1994, 1995, 1996) or eroded (Ohmae 1995). Some
scholars even go so far as to ascribe technology, in combination with a
global capitalist ideology, a remarkable homogenizing power across cul-
tures and national political economies (Albrow 1996; Fukuyama 1992).
However, this bold claim has been thoroughly refuted by comparative
political-economic research on capitalist diversity (Clift 2014; Hall and
Soskice 2001; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Whitley 1999).
Liberal institutionalists also maintain that states and international orga-
nizations still provide the institutional backbone for the effective man-
agement of interdependence-related challenges via rules, norms, and
international laws, although cooperation is no forgone conclusion. For
more critical scholars, commercial liberal arguments about the peace-
furthering impact of closer economic integration remain problematic (Carr
1946). States are able to maintain their sovereignty because sovereignty is
able to tolerate alternatives (Krasner 2001). A number of scholars associ-
ated with global governance approaches, liberal internationalism, post-
internationalism and so on argue that in order to cope with the effects of
growing interdependence, state and non-state actors increasingly cooper-
ate on the international level, which often takes place within international
governmental organizations, regimes and private non-governmental forms
of cooperation like strategic alliances between MNCs (Cutler et al. 1999;

Kahler and Lake 2003).
Such processes further the establishment of new as well as re-
strengthening of older spheres of authority or polities, which causes
increasingly complex structures on the global level (Rosenau 1990, 1997,
2003). The state-centric world of “Westphalian” states is enriched by
multi-centrism, consisting of technologically empowered actors (Litfin
2002; Rosenau 2003) who are less bound by sovereignty or territory, but
rather organized along the logic of global networks in which concepts of
time and space are radically modified (Castells 2000). The resulting pat-
terns of global politics often resemble earlier forms of political organization
during medieval times, with complex and overlapping patterns of politico-
economic governance (Friedrichs 2001; Slaughter 2004). Therefore, lib-
erals make a strong case that globalization to a considerable degree is
caused by technology. Although these assumptions could be described as
leaning toward deterministic explanations, most liberals explicitly reject
technological determinism (Singh 2002: 11). Political and social aspects
like liberalization policies, infrastructure programs and decisions concern-
ing application of certain technologies in relation to specific social and/
or cultural conditions play an equally important role (Jones 2000). How
state and non-state actors utilize specific technologies depends on their
ideologies and interests. Interdependent globalists admit that technology-
induced globalization processes influence nearly every aspect of human
life (Ferguson and Mansbach 1999, 2004). Nevertheless, they tend to see
technology as an exogenous factor that projects its influence from outside
into the international system (Rosenau 1990).
Social Constructivism, Materiality and the Normative Dimension

of Conflict
Constructivists, especially those of the so-called middle ground, do rec-
ognize technology as an occasionally influential factor in IR (Adler 1997).
Brute material resources frame the general conditions in which social,
political and economic interactions take place. Thereby these forces play
an important but not a determining role (Onuf 1998). For Wendt, the
debate between materialists (realism and neoliberalism) and social con-
structivists does not revolve around the relative explanatory contribu-
tions of ideas, power and interests to the understanding of social reality.
Rather it is concerned with explaining power and interests through the
132 S. FRITSCH
relative contribution of material resources (Wendt 1995). In this con-

text, Shaw supportively postulates that it “is simply implausible that there
could have been significant technical, commercial or cultural change with-
out important political antecedents and concomitants, as well as effects”
(Shaw 2000: 13).
Contrary to so-called rational-materialist approaches such as realism or
liberalism, constructivists focus on the normative, discursive and institu-
tional foundations of global affairs. Palan et al. interpret globalization as
“(…) a created social order and as such a product of human agency. This,
of course, is in marked contrast to the ‘politics of reaction’, which rep-
resents globalization as an externally generated social order, a product
of technological determinism and other changes” (Palan et al. 1996: 27;
emphasis by the author). Ruggie admits that technological progress has
increased the demand for more international organizations in order to
effectively manage interdependence between states. However, “(…) when
it comes to the international management of technology there is a hole
in the technological whole, one which can be filled only by introducing
political purpose” (Ruggie 1975: 558). Choosing between options ulti-
mately is “not a question of physical and technological determinants; it is
a question of social choice” (Ruggie 1975: 558; emphasis by the author).
According to constructivists, technology can only acquire meaning by
being embedded within social norms (Der Derian 1992, 2001; Wendt
1995).
Wendt calls on radical constructivists to avoid the presumption that
nature is irrelevant for explaining social action. Effects caused by mate-
rial artifacts interact with interests (based on ideas) and culture, which
shape social actions and systems in certain directions. Change, therefore,
is rather the result of evolving norms and identities, not new technologies:
“The term ‘interaction’ is significant here, since it means that at some level
material forces are constituted independent of society, and affect society in
a causal way. Material forces are not constituted solely by social meanings
and social meanings are not immune to material effects” (Wendt 1999:
111). Doubtlessly, the existence of technology transforms social reality.
Its concrete meaning, though, remains dependent on the social context
(Checkel 1998). Material limitations are often successfully overcome by
human intervention indicating, that “the effects of material forces are
internal to society rather than external given by nature” (Wendt 1999:
112; see also Adler 1986, 2001).
Social constructivism has successfully established norms, rules, identity

and culture as variables in security studies to overcome the predominant
“[…] focus on material capabilities and the use and control of military
force by states” (Katzenstein 1996: 9). In this context, social construc-
tivism has made important contributions by highlighting the importance
of norms for understanding the evolution of (military) technology in a
global context. For example, after the horrific experiences with chemical
weapons during World War I and nuclear weapons in World War II, inter-
national efforts to limit or ban their use in armed conflicts have resulted
in strong norms of non-use or “taboos” that have persisted for decades
(Tannenwald 1999). Chemical and nuclear weapons taboos consist of a
normative humanitarian core, which established ethical-moral barriers for
the usage of WMDs (Price and Tannenwald 1996). Only those countries
considered “civilized” are permitted to keep military nuclear capabilities,
while poorer and less capable states sometimes have to resort to chemical
or biological weapons systems, the “poor man’s atom bomb” (ibid: 132).
Remarkably, however, both taboos’ normative effectiveness and their
stigmatizing impact have severally limited states’ ability to legitimately
use nuclear WMDs offensively or defensively and therefore triggered the
search for alternative powerful conventional weapons systems that could
reach destruction levels similar to smaller nuclear weapons systems, yet
are not limited by similar normative-ethical limitations.
Often, moderate constructivists acknowledge that the diffusion of
technology has increased the density of the international system. This
is an important prerequisite for interaction between social actors, which
in turn establishes social structures. Without (technological) interaction
capacities, interaction between different actors of the global system would
hardly take place, an observation rarely raised in constructivist accounts.
Perspectives on Technology Writ Large

Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) comprise a highly interdisci-
plinary research field that has experienced remarkable growth in recent
decades and has widespread implications for understanding the modern
world (Sismondo 2004: VI). Broadly speaking, one can distinguish two
major perspectives on technology and society that have influenced S&TS
for the last few decades: technological determinism and social construc-
tivism. Both perspectives highlight different aspects of the technology-
society nexus and come to different conclusions regarding technology’s
134 S. FRITSCH
impact on society and our ability to govern technological evolution. By

synthesizing findings from both sides, a newly emerging middle ground
has provided more balanced explanations that offer a pragmatic avenue for
incorporating technology into IR/IPE explanations for change in global
affairs.
During the late 1950s and 1960s, the growing dominance of technol-
ogy fostered fears of losing control over technology and technological
evolution in general (Winner 1977: 202). Observers expressed fears of
machine domination in the sense that the “imperatives of technology and
organization, not the images of ideology, are what determine the shape
of economic society” (Galbraith 1967: 7). The growing impact of large
sociotechnical systems on industrialized society triggered inquiries into the
political aspects of technology (Winner 1986; Smith 1994: 28). A modi-
fied perception of technology that emphasized its potential for domination
and oppression drove the exploration of interrelations between society and
technology (Vig 1988: 8). Technology was seen not as a solution to socio-
economic problems, but rather as a generator of new problems. According
to Mumford’s influential thesis on technology, man “[…] will become a
passive, purposeless, machine-conditioned animal whose proper functions,
as technicians now interpret man’s role, will either be fed into the machine
or strictly limited and controlled for the benefit of de-personalized, collec-
tive organizations” (1966: 3). Technology’s homogenizing force emerges
from its inherent scientific rationality that pushes technology to continu-
ously increased efficiency (Mumford 1934; Heidegger 1954/1977; Ellul
1964).
Moreover, scholars such as Mumford assumed that these cumu-
lative developments would result in a mega-machine, defined as an
all-encompassing yet invisible unified whole, which not only contains tech-
nical and scientific artifacts but also organizational and control systems of
bureaucratic hierarchy (Mumford 1966). This ultimately global techno-
structure also would limit the range of available (alternative) technologi-
cal options and thereby exert converging pressures on people and states
(Feenberg 2002: 136).
One facet of technology’s partial uncontrollability is unintended side
effects (Winner 1986). Social actors, no matter how aware they are or how
carefully they plan, cannot anticipate every effect from practical applica-
tion of technology. Technology, at least in the sense of its unintended side
effects, acts in part autonomously (Winner 1977). Every society hoping to
steer its structural development effectively should consider all technologi-

cal options with a good portion of skepticism (Winner 1977: 77).
It is a widespread impression that technological determinists see
technology as an autonomous, all-encompassing structural force, which
strictly follows its inherent “natural laws” of constant progress and higher
efficiency (“the one best way”) and leaves almost no room for human
agency unless within the tightly defined boundaries set by technology’s
requirements (Heilbroner 1967; Vincenti 1995). However, a closer read-
ing reveals that most determinists do not argue on the basis of strict deter-
minism. They are well aware of the social, cultural, political and economic
aspects of technological society (Heilbroner 1994).
Given its inherent political qualities, stemming from development by
human beings, technology can never be value-neutral. It always promotes
the interests of certain social groups, while neglecting the interests or
rights of others (Winner 1986: 22). No representative of technological
determinism mentioned earlier neglects the broader social settings into
which technology is nested (Cohen 1980; Bimber 1994). What unites
them in their diverse work is the general observation that technology has
become a globally dominating force of sustained, even constant, change
as well as the concern about real or perceived loss of sociopolitical control
over transformative processes set off by technology. The greatest weak-
ness of this scholarship, though, is an inability to open the black box of
technology and explain what drives its evolution: Is technology’s inherent
push toward the one best way of ever-higher efficiency based on scientific
progress? Or is technological evolution rather driven by capitalist profit
interests, sociopolitical power considerations of various interest groups or
governmental policies?
From the late 1970s on, social constructivist conceptions of technol-
ogy developed in reaction to technological determinism. In contrast to
deterministic positions, exponents of this approach tried to formulate
more practical and contextual interpretations of technological evolution
and its interactions with politics, economics and society. Constructivism
“treats technology as a social construction that interacts with other social
forces rather than as an autonomous entity with its own unique ratio-
nality” (Kaplan 2004: 89). Technology is not different or distinct from
any other social phenomena. It is part of our social reality and only gains
meaning when described and interpreted in social terms. “It is the human
beings who create and use technology that make it a force for good or evil:
technology itself is considered morally neutral” (Vig 1988: 12).
136 S. FRITSCH
Most constructivists dismiss the existence of an overarching techno-

logical complex. They reject any separation of technology and society. For
them, technology represents a materialized result of cultural, political, eco-
nomic and social structures and power (Weingart 1989: 9). Constructivists
emphasize social determinants in processes of invention or innovation as
well as in the way technology is actually used (Weingart 1976). The black-
box of technological evolution is opened for political and social guidance,
design and societal control (Teusch 2000: 413). Technological evolution
no longer is seen as autonomous, but rather as a result of interconnected
political, social or economic interests, norms or identities (Ropohl 1998).
According to Bijker et al. (1989), social construction of technology can
be seen most clearly during development of new technologies. Their
phrase of the “seamless web” denotes the assumption that technology
represents “socially constructed natural phenomena, socially constructed
social interests, socially constructed artifacts, and so on” (Bijker and Pinch
1989: 109). In Bijker and Pinch’s opinion, there “is no grand plan to his-
tory—no economic, technical, psychological or social ‘last instance’ that
drives history” and “technology, the social world, and the course of his-
tory should all be treated as rather messy contingencies” (Bijker and Law
1992: 8). This means that any deterministic assumptions about an inde-
pendent technology that somehow has emancipated itself from human
control are broadly rejected (Ropohl 1979; Misa 1994). Instead, issues
such as intersubjective meaning, politico-economic interests, ideologies
and agency take center stage (Ropohl 1985; Noble 1999; Pacey 1999).
Technological determinism’s general critique of technological evolution
has to be replaced by a critical evaluation of the contexts within which
specific technologies are developed and applied (Scranton 1994).
Social constructivists have been criticized for being unable to deliver
convincing answers to the question of how technology then could be dis-
tinguished meaningfully from other social phenomena. This perception
rather represents an underestimation of technology’s social significance
and complexity, because it portrays technology as a medium through
which social relationships can easily be established and sustained (Böhme
1986). However, diffusion and application of technology not only result
in more efficiency but rather in completely new social structures as well as
forms of social action (Böhme 1986).
TOWARD SYNTHESIS
Social constructivists tend to focus on the early stages of technological
evolution (invention, establishment, stabilization and distribution) in
which social agents’ decisions decisively impact design and characteristics
of a technology but neglect their long-term consequences (Winner 1993)
or issues such as path dependency, that is, the availability of a limited range
of known technological options based on previous decisions. Meanwhile,
by avoiding a detailed analysis of invention and innovation processes,
technological determinists underestimate sociopolitical influences in the
early stages of new technological developments as well as society’s ability
to address challenges posed by the increasing proliferation of technology
(Noble 1984).
Offered by Hughes (1969), a synthesizing approach represents a “mid-
dle ground” in S&TS by combining deterministic and constructivist argu-
ments while adding a time-sensitive perspective. He is well aware of the
strengths of each approach, which he tries to combine in a concept of
the “technological system” (Hughes 1969). For Hughes, a “technologi-
cal system can be both a cause and an effect; it can shape or be shaped
by society. As they grow larger and more complex, systems tend to be
more shaping of society and less shaped by it. […] The social constructiv-
ists have a key to understanding the behavior of young systems; technical
determinists come into their own with the mature ones” (Hughes 1994:
112). Technological systems are based on networks in which technological
artifacts, individuals, organizations and so on “become interacting enti-
ties” (Hughes 1986: 282). With regard to global affairs, certain weapons
systems (nuclear weapons), as well as communication, transportation and
energy systems, might qualify as particularly relevant. Their distinct quali-
ties, such as their network character, their tendency to diffuse globally
over time, a vital backbone function in global economics, security and
culture, and particularly impact on time-space compression in global social
relations make these technologies relevant for any in-depth exploration of
the mutual relationship between technology and global affairs.
Hughes’ middle perspective offers a viable avenue to the integration
of technology studies and IR as well as conflict studies in particular. The
middle ground provides IR with an avenue to integrate technology and
global affairs that neglects neither social agency nor technological path
dependencies. As historians of technology emphasize, technological sys-
tems have life cycles (Hughes 1983). Their historical development paths
138 S. FRITSCH
have to be retraced to assess their societal impact at various points in time

throughout their life cycle and vice versa.
First, one has to deconstruct the process of invention and innovation,
that is, the development of new technologies and their improvement. This
requires us to look at institutions such as scientific and technical organiza-
tions, educational systems, state involvement via national innovation and
defense policies, markets and individuals or companies. Disciplines such as
S&TS, economics, economic geography or comparative political economy
have produced a steadily growing body of research that investigates these
processes at the individual, firm, state and global levels (Clift 2014; Dosi
et al. 1988; Rosenberg 1994; Polenske 2007).
Second, diffusion can be defined as the mechanism or transfer of tech-
nologies or technological knowledge domestically or across borders by
sharing (e.g. strategic alliances between states and corporations), emula-
tion, theft, mobility of ideas or physical transfer and the actors that enable
those transfers. Archibugi and Michie therefore conclude that, “the
process which nurtures and disseminates technological change involves
a complex web of interactions among a range of different subjects and
institutions (1997: 1)”.
Development of new technological systems rarely is confined to the
domestic sphere. National technology policies emphasizing domestically
oriented research and development incentives for individuals and firms
often are accompanied by policies that try to attract foreign research poten-
tial, thereby potentially transnationalizing the technological innovation
processes (Metcalfe 1997). Moreover, economic or military competition
as well as cooperation between countries and firms always has contributed
significantly to the diffusion of technological knowledge (McNeill 1982;
Casson et al. 1992; Fransman 1997). Innovation and diffusion are the
basis for changes in systemic “interaction capacity”, the dependent vari-
able that describes the ability of various actors in the system to interact
with each other (Durkheim 1933/1984: 25). The driving forces behind
growing domestic and global societal interactions are means of communi-
cation and transmission, which sharply reduce time and space constraints.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
S&TS has focused primarily on the interconnections between and among
technology, politics, economics, society and culture within the domestic
context (Teusch 2000) but could do much more to evaluate multiple inter-
actions (as articulated by James and James in Chap. 10). Development of

a truly interdisciplinary approach would profoundly impact both IR/IPE
and S&TS. The latter would have to qualify several of its core postulates
from both the social constructivist as well as the deterministic perspective.
Once social constructivist S&TS scholars acknowledge that the efficient
governance of technology in the long term might only be realized at the
global level, they also have to face limited prospects for such a global
governance endeavor to be successful.1 The main reason can be found
in the anarchic character of the international system, which makes col-
laboration between actors with often divergent interests at least very dif-
ficult to achieve. Potential obstacles toward an efficient cooperation-based
management of technology-related problems might actually contribute to
technology’s transnationalization and further uncontrolled global diffu-
sion. Unintended negative consequences, as well as necessary regulations,
though, often require global solutions. Given the fundamental character-
istics of the global system, this remains a big challenge. Focusing on the
mastering of such processes within domestic political frameworks appears
increasingly difficult in light of the growing global and transnational char-
acter of many technology-based challenges. But when approached from
an IR perspective, core assumptions of technological determinism also
require a re-evaluation.
Assuming that processes of technological proliferation will be charac-
terized by tensions, inconsistencies and distributional conflicts, the inter-
national system seems even less likely to acquire technologically driven
homogeneous structures. Instead, one might reasonably assume a grow-
ing number of crisis phenomena. Collectively, these might be the conse-
quence of an extremely uneven distribution of technological capabilities
and related welfare and power asymmetries among the actors of the inter-
national system (Buzan and Little 2000; Buzan and Lawson 2015). Or,
crises and conflicts might be the result of adaptation struggles or resistance
to techno-globalism.
Sanders (1983: 5) formulates three reasons why IR should pay more
attention to technology: First, an increasing number of humanity’s prob-
lems ranging from the environmental to conflict are created by existing
or evolving technologies and many of them can only be solved by new
technology. Second, despite intensifying inter-exchange between practitio-
ners, engineers and political scientists, they mostly remain within their
respective discipline, while continuing to work with its core variables, cat-
egories and concepts. Third, increasingly complex technological evolution
140 S. FRITSCH
constantly creates new societal challenges, which increase the demand for
the development of new interdisciplinary approaches for the investigation
of interdependent and complex problems, including policy advice.
IR could further profit from exchanges with other new interdisciplin-
ary fields such as environmental, sustainability, energy, consumer food and
agro-studies, as well as cultural and media studies, which also investigate the
impact of technological innovations on their respective fields of analyses.
For example, within the technology-global affairs context, demographic
studies as presented in Chaps. 8 and 9 provide further opportunity for
ample cross-fertilization with IR with regard to questions concerning
diverse issues such as the impact of new technological solutions to envi-
ronmental or demographic problems. Do those solutions solve existing
problems or rather create new ones? What and who drives the technologi-
cal selection process, how are dominant technologies established and how
are counter-reactions to technological domination refracted through the
subjective usage of technological devices in a “polity-building process”
representing a “technological drama” (Pfaffenberger 1992: 505)?
The potential overlap between S&TS and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)
could also provide opportunities for fruitful interdisciplinary research. For
example, how are foreign policy goals produced and reproduced through
and within certain sociotechnical systems, their technological stan-
dards, control and command structures, predominant and “redressive”
(Pfaffenberger 1992) interaction forms and patterns as well as knowledge
and content-related issues? As discussed below, very little scholarship in
IR bridges the existing conceptual gaps to explore the deeper connections
between technology and global affairs. Technological evolution’s constant
challenges for humanity seem to justify a permanent pursuit of this topic.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH VENUES

IR/IPE scholarship must begin to engage systematically with S&TS to
better understand the driving forces behind technological evolution,
global social change and related phenomena such as international conflict.
Due to this research field’s young history, a complete list of possible future
research avenues seems impossible. Instead, a few examples shall demon-
strate the continuing need to explore technology-related topics in IR.
For example, China’s rise as a naval power has resulted in new interest
in power shifts between countries and the role of naval technology therein.
Strategic and conflict studies have begun to formulate more nuanced
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of naval power shifts in the era

of global trade well beyond the classical core issues of strategy, threat per-
ception and possible conflict scenarios. This includes “systemic problems
involved in warship production and the associated material, financial,
technological, and political requirements” (Kirchberger 2015: 8). Ethical,
legal and other issues of governance in relation to the increasing use of
robots and potentially autonomous weapon systems on the postmodern
battlefield raise normative and ethical questions about human control of
human-made technology (Singer 2009). Will such advances prove a cause
of conflict or a deterrent?
More recent developments aiming to “upgrade” soldiers through
“drugs, implants and exoskeletons” represent additional challenges the
ethical and legal norms of traditional warfare (Lin 2012). As pointed out
previously, such normative questions are an important—yet still periph-
eral—issue from both an IR as well as an S&TS perspective, especially since
technological development paths are still open (Anderson and Waxman
2012). This seems also to characterize other emerging policy areas such
as the large-scale and systematic collection and exchange of citizens’ com-
munication data by national security agencies as well as the constantly
evolving political and regulatory relationship between government agen-
cies and private sector players over issues of access to data, the shaping
of critical national infrastructure and related security architectures as well
as media, speech, privacy and human rights. The legal standoff between
the FBI and Apple over access to the iPhone of one of the two 2015 San
Bernardino attackers is a case in point.
Technology-based challenges include the growing social, political, eco-
nomic and cultural interconnections between individuals and societies
around the planet, as well as the technological and environmental risks
and opportunities often associated with “progress”. What do they mean
for key areas of world affairs such as conflict? How do they affect our
understanding of the link between interdependence and conflict? How
can they inform new and open-ended approaches to investigation of inter-
dependent and complex problems, which must be addressed and solved
increasingly also on the global level? Besides practical pressures, the grow-
ing demand for application-oriented knowledge also has contributed to
demands for new modes of inquiry. As this chapter demonstrates, IR and
more specifically security studies can gain tremendously from interdisci-
plinary exchange and collaboration with S&TS. S&TS-based concepts and
142 S. FRITSCH
empirical insights will likely play a more prominent role in other issue areas
that are covered in this book.
In recent years, the academic community ultimately has reacted. The
attentive observer can discover a trend to include an ever-growing number
of technology-related papers and panels in conferences as well as publica-
tion outlets (Simmons 2011). A final step toward firm establishment of
S&TS within the field of IR is marked by the very recent creation of a new
section within the International Studies Association, entitled “Science,
Technology, Art and International Relations”.
NOTE
1. See, for example, Ropohl’s sparse comments from a moderate social con-
structivist S&TS point of view (Ropohl 1979, 1985).
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CHAPTER 6
Anthropology, Conflict, and International

Relations
Raymond Scupin
Anthropology, like International Relations (IR), has strong multidisci-

plinary and interdisciplinary links to many of the other social sciences,
but it is grossly underutilized in IR, perhaps because not enough has been
done to link sub-systemic variables inherent in the study of anthropology
to central questions in IR. This chapter will introduce research develop-
ments within the discipline of anthropology that have contributed and can
benefit IR, with an emphasis on conflict. I focus attention on the dominant
theoretical paradigm within cultural anthropology based on culture and
will argue that a better understanding of culture will illuminate the causes
of conflict for IR scholars. Relatedly, ethnicity and long-term research pro-
grams in the anthropological study of warfare will also be discussed.
R. Scupin ()
Anthropology and International Studies, Lindenwood University,
St. Charles, MO, USA
e-mail: cigs@lindenwood.edu

154 R. SCUPIN
ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERDISCIPLINARY, ENCOMPASSING,

AND GLOBAL
By its very nature anthropology is an interdisciplinary, encompassing

discipline with a global perspective, even if it is committed to studying
particulars as well. Anthropology offers relevant data and insights for
IR. Most anthropologists within the USA receive some training in what
is referred to as the four subfields of the discipline: physical or biological
anthropology, archaeology, linguistic anthropology, and cultural anthro-
pology.1 Physical or biological anthropology is devoted to the study of
human evolution, genetic variation in the past and present, and prima-
tology. This subfield provides a scientific understanding of the biologi-
cal traits that have emerged through the evolutionary process influencing
humans around the globe. Archaeology is the subfield that focuses on the
study of artifacts, material remnants of the human past, which illuminates
the comprehension of prehistoric and historic societies and civilizations.
Linguistic anthropology helps discern the different patterns of languages
that have developed through time and their influence on cognition, social
interaction, and culture. Cultural anthropology is concerned with acquir-
ing knowledge of contemporary societal values, norms, behaviors, and
conditions through long-term residence, participation observation, and
research strategies used to develop ethnographic studies about various
world regions. There are two major goals of anthropology within these
four fields: to understand and explain the biological and cultural evolution
of humanity in the past and present; and to discover the differences and
similarities of humans throughout the world.
This four-field character of anthropology serves to commit practitioners
to an approach that involves a broad comprehensive analysis of biological,
psychological, economic, social, political, religious, and other cultural fac-
tors that influence humans in all the regions of the world. Anthropologists
recognize that the rigid boundaries among different disciplines have
become very blurred (Geertz 1980). For instance, cultural anthropol-
ogy is closely related to its sister discipline, sociology. In the past, cultural
anthropologists examined the traditional or indigenous preindustrialized
societies of the world, whereas sociologists focused on modern industrial
societies. Currently cultural anthropologists and sociologists explore many
of the same societies using similar research approaches. For example, both
rely on statistical and nonstatistical or qualitative data whenever appropri-
ate in their studies of different types of societies. Cultural anthropology
ANTHROPOLOGY, CONFLICT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 155
also overlaps with the fields of psychology, relying on recent research in

cognitive and social psychology, economics (in particular behavioral eco-
nomics), political science, IR, and religious studies. In addition, anthro-
pology dovetails considerably with the field of history, which, like IR,
encompasses a broad range of events. Historians describe and explain
human events that have occurred throughout the world; anthropologists
place their biological, archaeological, linguistic, and ethnographic data in
the context of these historical developments. Through this interdisciplin-
ary and holistic approach anthropologists can ask broadly framed ques-
tions about humanity.
Additionally, through this interdisciplinary and encompassing research
agenda, anthropologists have developed a global perspective that enhances
the investigation of a wide range of phenomena beyond specific or local
conditions to demonstrate the interconnections among societies around
the world. This global perspective is extremely useful in generating insights
especially in respect to comprehending the diverse aspects of the related
issues of conflict, nationalism, secular and religious developments, and
globalization and its consequences.
CULTURE: A KEY CONCEPT

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the founders of
the modern discipline of anthropology such as E.B. Tylor (1871, 1881)
and Franz Boas (1912, 1916, 1940) elaborated the concept of culture2
in order to explain the material products, beliefs, norms, and values of
different societies. Nineteenth-century anthropologists assumed a linkage
between biological or racial traits and their concept of culture, suggest-
ing that there was a hereditary transmission of gross behavioral or mental
characteristics from generation to generation. With an increased knowl-
edge of genetics, anthropologists of the early twentieth century such as
Boas demonstrated through systematic scientific research that there was
no causal link between biological ancestry and a particular culture (Boas
1912, 1916, 1940; Degler 1991). In addition, Boas argued against the
‘armchair,’ library-based views of the early anthropologists and advocated
that cultural anthropologists must immerse themselves in the language
and culture of different societies through long-term fieldwork and par-
ticipant observation. One of the legacies of Boas is that contemporary
anthropologists advocate a ‘close-up’ view of humans based on fieldwork
or ethnographic research. Students of Boas such as Ruth Benedict (1934,
156 R. SCUPIN
1946), Margaret Mead (1928, 1935), and others relied on this concept of
culture and fieldwork for understanding differing personalities, values, and
norms in various societies. Most of these early ethnographic studies were
completed in small-scale non-Western societies where cultural boundaries
were assumed to be fixed. This formulation of culture tended to produce
essentialist or stereotypical portraits of different societies that were viewed
as isolated and bounded communities with only a small degree of internal
differentiation, therefore appearing homogeneous and static.
Inspired by Max Weber, later anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz
developed a phenomenological and interpretive-based humanistic under-
standing of culture. In his volume, The Interpretation of Culture (1973),
Geertz advocated a method of ethnographic inquiry that he referred to
as ‘thick description.’ Drawing on a famous statement of Weber, Geertz
described the most important aspect of culture as the ‘webs of signifi-
cance,’ that is, symbols that have meaning that humans have spun. Thick
description focuses on the collection of data on social structure, the econ-
omy, ritual, myth, symbols, and cultural values. From these data interpre-
tations of symbolic meanings—webs of significance—are drawn. In the
phenomenological mode, Geertz advanced the view that culture is shared
intersubjectively by people (Geertz 1985). Later, Geertz criticized the
‘cookie-cutter’ notion of cultures or societies as bounded isolated com-
munities, especially in this global age (2000: 250). This Geertzian ‘culture
as text’ semiotic approach became the major paradigm in cultural anthro-
pology and was widely employed in the social constructivist, postpositivist,
and postmodernist theories in IR (Burchill et al. 2009; Chabal and Daloz
2006).3
Influenced by these semiotic approaches, some mainstream political
scientists and IR specialists viewed ‘culture’ as the major factor influ-
encing the international arena, notably conflict. Two major books that
emphasized the role of culture in IR were published in 1996 by politi-
cal scientists Benjamin Barber and Samuel Huntington. Barber’s Jihad vs.
McWorld: Terrorism’s Challenge to Democracy argued that globalization
represented by the spread of McWorld (McDonald’s, Macintosh comput-
ers, and Mickey Mouse) through many societies has resulted in jihad by
those who resist these global trends and, therefore, react in antagonistic
ways, including supporting terrorism of the sort that led to 9/11. Barber
gives many other examples of jihad that represent a defense of an indig-
enous culture from the McWorld global tendency, some of which have
become extremely violent and dangerous.
In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order,

Samuel Huntington posited that a critical dynamic would drive global
conflict and that this dynamic would revolve around ‘culture,’—a concept
that anthropology can help illuminate. Huntington argued that a uni-
tary ‘Western civilization and culture’ is at odds with ‘Islamic,’ ‘Hindu,’
and ‘Confucian civilizations and cultures.’ Huntington argued that these
Islamic and Asian cultures do not have the institutions for developing
civil democratic societies, individualism, free markets, secularism, or other
elements that will enable them to coexist peacefully with Western soci-
eties. He envisioned these cultural and regional blocs along fault lines
that fragmented the world order resulting in more conflict and instability
throughout the world. Huntington’s perspective gained some followers
in both the West and the Islamic world, especially after the tragedy of
9/11/2001 and the aftermath of the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq.4 Huntington proposed that the West would have to confront the
whole of Islam along a number of bloody borders in North Africa, Central
Asia, the Balkans, and Southeast Asia. In some senses the clash thesis of
Huntington became a myth designed to substitute Islam (and Asia) for
the threat of the old Soviet enemy.
Like some political scientists and historians, many anthropologists
are critical of the sweeping generalizations perpetuated by Barber and
Huntington. However, in contrast to political scientists, ethnographers
live among these people on a day-to-day basis for years and observe
and interview them,5 such was the case prior to the Iranian revolution
(Eickelman 1986: 35). Ethnographers find tremendous diversity in terms
of religions, ethnic and sectarian groups, and politics, including dissenting
beliefs and values from the mainstream elite groups. Cultural anthropolo-
gists find that there is no uniform ‘Islamic’ or ‘Confucian’ or ‘Asian’ or a
monolithic ‘Western culture or civilization,’ despite the rhetoric that polit-
ical and religious leaders espouse in these respective regions (Eickelman
and Piscatori 2004; Scupin 2003, 2008). The views of Huntington and
Barber on international conflict are also based on basic understandings
of ‘culture’ as forms of fixed beliefs and values shared within a coherent
‘homogeneous civilization.’ This stereotypical image of Islam and Asian
cultures and religions as monolithic faiths at odds with the Western liberal-
secular way of life is simplistic. This understanding of a fixed and widely
shared ‘culture’ is not found in non-Western societies (or any society) by
cultural anthropologists. People in both non-Western Islamic and Asian
(and Western) societies are constantly reinterpreting and transforming
158 R. SCUPIN
their cultural conceptions as they are exposed to rapid changes through

the Internet, the media, consumption patterns, and other results of glo-
balization processes. Cultural anthropologists find that there is no uni-
form ‘Islamic culture or civilization,’ ‘Confucian culture or civilization,’
‘Asian culture or civilization,’ or ‘Western culture or civilization,’ despite
the rhetoric that political and religious leaders espouse in these respective
regions (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004). All of that urges caution against
over-aggregation in analysis of conflict between and among groups. While
we understand that there are considerable variations in culture among
the peoples in all these regions of the world, anthropology helps us in
understanding complexities such as how these so-called civilizations and
cultures have been cross-fertilizing one another for generations, and why
simplistic stereotypes cannot summarize the enormous diversity in culture
that exists in these societies (Breidenbach and Nyíri 2009).
Anthropologists find that intracultural variation is pervasive within any
society.
Yet, as anthropologist Akbar Ahmed indicates many Muslims through-
out the world do feel themselves as under a state of ‘siege’ (2003).
Although Ahmed is a critic of the ‘clash thesis,’ he believes many Muslims
perceive a threat from globalization and associated it with the clash thesis
(Brasted and Khan 2012). The universal currency of this cognitive model
and catchy metaphor has in itself engendered ethnoreligious conflict seen
presently in the Middle East and elsewhere. Conflict within a given civili-
zation can be more intense than what occurs between these highly aggre-
gated groupings.
CULTURE, COGNITION, RATIONALITY, AND CONFLICT
Some anthropologists have questioned the notion that culture can be con-
sidered a deus ex machina, or prime determinant of behavior or thought
within populations (Fox and King 2002). A less muscular approach to
culture is conceptualized by contemporary anthropologists such as Dan
Sperber and Lawrence Hirschfeld (2004), (Sperber 1996), Rita Astuti
and Maurice Bloch (Astuti and Bloch 2012; Bloch 2012), Scott Atran
(1990, 2010, 2012), Pascal Boyer (2001), and Norbert Ross (2004).
These anthropologists draw on the most current research in cognitive
psychology, evolution, neurology and the brain sciences, social psychol-
ogy, behavioral economics, and related fields to examine the connections
among human thinking, emotions, culture, and behavior. They merge the
semiotic-hermeneutic investigation of symbols with the most current find-

ings emanating from various cognitive and social psychology experimental
laboratories or neuroscience laboratories. Some of them employ psycho-
logical experiments and tests within their fieldwork. We will survey some
of this research that averts the problems of essentializing cultures or civi-
lizations as discrete, fixed, and bounded wholes, while adding fruitful and
productive insights for both scientific explanations and humanistic under-
standings for IR. Collectively speaking, the work in question provides an
exemplar of interdisciplinarity.
The link between culture and other micro-level factors on the one hand
and conflict on the other is of interest to anthropologists. For example,
many of them have interests that overlap with behavioral economics, cog-
nitive psychology, and social psychology, allowing for convergence on
issues germane to foreign policy and conflict as well, such as rationality.
Generally, these anthropologists question the views of mainstream rational
choice theory, which assumes that actors logically weigh the risks, costs,
and benefits of their economic decisions in allocating scarce resources and
proceeding with their actions. Current findings in cognitive psychology
and behavioral economics have demonstrated that decision-making is
often muddled, confused, biased, suboptimal, and uncertain about risks,
costs, and benefits (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Kahneman 2011).
In line with Chap. 3 by Renshon and Kahneman, this research demon-
strated that the human brain had trouble calculating the costs and benefits
of every possible course of action and that, separately, it was not very
good at applying rules of logical inference to abstract situations. Homo
economicus has been replaced by a quirkier, more idiosyncratic decision-
maker. Supplementing this cognitive and behavioral economics research
done mostly in laboratory settings, detailed ethnographies by anthropolo-
gists include data that specify the heuristics regarding how people make
economic decisions (Dames 2012).
Kahneman and Tversky’s findings bear on how anthropologists have
engaged in discussions and debates regarding reason, rationality, and
culture. During the Western Enlightenment of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, anthropologists argued that humans were progressing
from early forms of primitive societies to more civilized states based on
increasing rationality. In the twentieth century, this view was challenged by
anthropologists doing field work in the underdeveloped world. For exam-
ple, in 1937 the British anthropologist, Edward Evans-Pritchard, pub-
lished a classic book, Oracles, Witchcraft, and Magic Among the Azande
160 R. SCUPIN
(1937). He was doing field work among the Azande tribe in the Sudan.
Evans-Pritchard studied the consultation of oracles, beliefs in witchcraft,
and magical practices and argued that these notions were based on ratio-
nality within the context of Azande culture. He tried to demonstrate that
the Azande’s belief in witches helped them make moral and psychological
sense of the misfortunes that befell them. Thus, he advocated the view
that different societies have different criteria for rational belief and action.6
In the study of economics by anthropologists doing research in pre-
capitalist small-scale societies, a similar discussion of rationality and culture
emerged. Anthropological research in small-scale precapitalist societies
emphasized that the neoclassical model of utility maximization and ratio-
nality was not suitable for comprehending economic decision-making.
Anthropologists such as Paul and Laura Bohannan who did field research
on the Tiv tribe in Nigeria suggested that the neoclassical models of ratio-
nality and utility maximization did not take into account the social institu-
tions, cultural norms, and values of the society (1968). This perspective
became known as the ‘substantivist’ economic model that viewed decision-
making and rationality as embedded within the culture and institutions
of a society. Of course, in this globalization era there are few precapital-
ist, small-scale societies that are isolated from the larger global economy.
Yet, anthropologists continue to discover how kinship institutions and
traditional practices influence rationality and economic decision-making
(Henrich et al. 2005). It appears that individual agency and rationality
cannot be understood in an isolated manner without the analysis of the
sociocultural and institutional contexts.
Cognitive anthropologist Dan Sperber has developed a perspective
that overlaps somewhat with Kahneman’s research findings when address-
ing decision-making and reasoning. Sperber discusses two different types
of beliefs that are represented in the human cognitive system; ‘intui-
tive beliefs’ and ‘reflective beliefs’ that involve psychological reasoning
(1996). Intuitive beliefs are based on spontaneous and unconscious opera-
tions that are usually beyond one’s conscious awareness. These intuitive
beliefs involve perceptual and inferential processes that are innate, uni-
versal, and do not vary much cross-culturally. Reflective beliefs are more
conscious and involve deliberate interpretations of representations that
are not self-evident or tacit. Although these reflective beliefs based on
human interaction and communication involve mental effort they may
be ‘half-understood,’ mysterious, or ‘semi-propositional representations’
such as the Christian ‘Trinity’ or they may be ‘rational’ scientific ideas.
These reflective beliefs can vary dramatically across cultures and can often
seem ‘irrational’ from the standpoint of those outside of a particular soci-
ety. Sperber’s cognitive anthropology project that draws on our evolu-
tionary heritage has implications for behavioral economics, reasoning, and
decision-making, as does that of some other anthropologists.
The insights of anthropology are rarely mined in the cognitive-rational
debate in IR. Pure theorists assume rationality but for those who want to
study it empirically, this broad anthropological literature could be useful.
Such work may provide insights into the nature and manifestation of cog-
nitive biases, and into how they relate to conflict as well. Relatedly, they
also provide insight into the question of rationality and conflict. In what
measure are irrational actions connected to conflict? And how should we
interpret what is irrational in the first place?
GLOBALIZATION, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALISM
Sometimes by cross-cutting the study of culture, but often by depart-

ing from it, some anthropologists have contributed to an understand-
ing of ethnic identity, ethnic conflict, and nationalism in ways relevant to
IR. Their studies underscore the potential perils in developing essentialist
‘us’ and ‘them’ views, which can fuel conflict or make cooperation more
difficult.
One of the central issues that confronted anthropologists is whether
ethnic identities are immutable and ‘primordial’ or are social constructions
shaped by dynamic historical, political, and economic conditions. Similar
issues apply to understanding national identities and nationalism, which
are important for understanding IR’s focus on conflict and cooperation.
Are national identities ‘primordial’ or socially constructed through histori-
cal, political, and symbolic processes? In 1963, Geertz summarized these
issues in a classic essay entitled ‘The Integrative Revolution: Primordial
Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States.’7 Following decades of
research on ethnicity, most anthropologists have agreed that ethnic identi-
ties are best understood as a combination of primordialist and constructiv-
ist approaches. Ethnic identities are incessantly constructed out of available
historical and symbolic-cultural resources under ever-emerging global
circumstances. These identities are assembled out of local languages,
economic policies, political and legal structures, and imagined forms of
community or politically consequential fictions that evolve with unfold-
ing historical conditions. As anthropologist Stanley Tambiah suggested,
162 R. SCUPIN
ethnic identity is a combination of the ‘semantics of primordial claims’ and

‘the pragmatics of calculated choices’ in the contexts of political-economic
competition among differing interest groups (1989: 336).
Like ethnic identities, any essentialist description of nationalism does
not seem plausible. Most anthropologists agree that nationalism, which
some political scientists tie to conflict, is a set of symbols and beliefs con-
structed to provide the sense of belonging to a single political commu-
nity, with a strong sense of loyalty, ideological commitment, and feelings
of identification with a distinctive sovereign nation-state or country. The
anthropologist Ernest Gellner argued that with the industrial revolution,
with increases in literacy and mass education, nationalism became a unify-
ing force of political expression (1983). As a literate populace began to
read about their history and culture in their own language, they embarked
on a new self-identification. In most cases a particular language had to
be legitimized by the government to serve as the basis of nationality.
Eventually people began to express a source of patriotic pride and loyalty
to these newly defined nations (Eriksen 2010).
Dru Gladney’s research on the Muslim minority known as the Hui in
the People’s Republic of China (Gladney 1998a, b, 2004) has contrib-
uted to an understanding ethnicity and nationalism in China. Through
his ethnographic research, Gladney demonstrates how ethnic expression
varies within the group classified as ‘Hui minzui’ in China. Gladney ques-
tions the homogeneity of the majority Han/Chinese ethnic category and
how it has been constructed and promoted by state authorities (2004).
In most state publications and public representations, the Han majority is
depicted as the most modern and educated peoples in China in contrast
to various backward minorities. Gladney notes that in southern China
as economic globalization has increased, various groups within the Han
majority category have begun to reassert, reinvent, and rediscover their
own ethnic and cultural differences. It would be interesting to assess how
this phenomenon may affect decision-making in Beijing. Do changes in
ethnicity nationally alter who makes key decisions and would such changes
alter foreign policy? Scupin’s (1986, 1987, 1998) ethnographic research
on ethnicity and nationalism among the Muslim minority in Thailand has
some parallels with Gladney’s findings.8 Since the early twentieth century
Thai nationalist leaders and state bureaucrats have constructed an image
of Thailand as a culturally homogeneous nation. But doing so tended
to institutionalize and racialize one form of ethnoreligious identity and
limit other forms. Scupin’s ethnographic research examined how the
multiethnic Muslim minority in Central Thailand and Bangkok experi-

ence, encounter, confront, and contest the ethno-nationalist project of
the Thai state. Such challenges may be more endemic in other nationalist
settings and may alienate ethnic groups such as Muslims.
Despite the enormous number of ethnographic studies that describe
how ethnic and national identities have been socially and politically con-
structed, currently essentialist ethnic and national identities have grown
ever more powerful and seductive. Some anthropologists have begun to
explore the causal dimension of these pervasive and potent essentialist eth-
nic and national identities. Lawrence Hirschfeld published a groundbreak-
ing study of how American and French children categorize and essentialize
ethnic or racial identities (1996). He found that these children were psy-
chologically predisposed to conceptualize, perceive, and reason about
human groups, which include what he calls ‘ethnoraces’ (1996: 20–21).
By ethnoraces, Hirschfeld refers to a ‘primordial group’ as a group that a
person recognizes as being like him or her in some fundamental enduring
manner (1996: 20–21). He suggests that ethnic and racial thinking is the
product of a special cognitive ability, or an evolved domain-specific com-
petence for understanding differences among ethnoraces.
Anthropologists have been doing similar research in India (Mahalingam
2003), Mongolia (Gil-White 1999, 2001), Madagascar (Astuti et al. 2004),
Brazil (Jones 2009), Ukraine (Kanovsky 2007), and the USA (Glasgow
et al. 2009) that confirm that essentialist notions of identities are easy to
think as a result of our innate cognitive architecture. The conclusions of
these studies indicate that ethnoraces become part of a naïve folk sociol-
ogy and provide the foundations of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dynamics result-
ing in universal patterns of ingroup/outgroup formation, ethnic conflict,
and ethnocentrism (Brown 2012).
Foreign policy experts have noted this dynamic in examining ethnicity
and nationalism (Muller 2008), but these anthropological studies provide
provocative suggestions as to why these essentialist ‘us’ and ‘them’ con-
ceptions of ethnic and nationalist identities are so pervasive and endur-
ing. From an interdisciplinary standpoint, anthropological studies can
contribute to the understanding of causal mechanisms regarding a wide
range of causal mechanisms. This contribution stands as multidisciplinary
in character; IR and anthropology converge on common subject matter
regarding the roles of ethnicity and nationalism in producing and sustain-
ing intense strife.
164 R. SCUPIN
The link between globalization, culture, and conflict must also be con-
sidered in less overt manifestations. Cultural anthropologists focus on
the people in local areas being affected not only by large multinational
corporations and their capital, technology, and governments (globaliza-
tion from above), but also by the transnational flow of people and goods
with relatively small amounts of capitals and illegal and semi-legal forms of
transactions outside of banks, bureaucracies, and lawyers (Mathews et al.
2012). Globalization in this sense invades the political and social space of
individuals, which can in turn make them agents or supporters of conflic-
tual approaches be they terrorism or inter-state conflicts. Cultural anthro-
pologists are expanding methodological approaches to international and
global studies by employing a ‘globalization-from-below’ strategy. This
has resulted in empirical data that advance interdisciplinary approaches in
IR.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES OF WARFARE

Cross-cultural and evolutionary research in anthropology promises to illu-
minate some traditional queries regarding the origins of warfare and its
relation to human nature. Anthropologists define warfare as armed combat
among territorial, sovereign, or autonomous political communities. They
distinguish between feuds and warfare. A feud is a type of armed combat
occurring within a political community, primarily revenge seeking among
kinship groups (Otterbein 1974; Kelly 2003). In their cross-cultural and
evolutionary perspectives, anthropologists examine the different biologi-
cal, environmental, demographic, economic, social, political, and other
cultural variables that influence warfare and feuds.
Anthropological studies compare the incidence and persistence of war-
fare in many different types of hunting-gathering, tribal, chiefdom, agricul-
tural, industrial, and postindustrial societies. Some archaeological evidence
suggests that early hunter-gatherers may have been involved in extensive
warfare far back into prehistory (Keeley 1996; LeBlanc and Register 2003;
Walker 2001). However, since most of these hunter-gatherer societies
were limited in population size, the archaeological evidence for violence
and warfare is fragmentary and sketchy (Fry 2006, 2013; Ferguson 2013).
Yet, what can our knowledge tell us about the nature of conflict and the
role of the individual in it? Are human beings inherently violent, suggest-
ing a level one cause of conflict?
In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars saw warfare among hunter-gatherers

as less prominent and intense. However, more recently anthropologists
who have done archaeological and historical research on hunter-gatherers
find that warfare was very prevalent in hunter-gatherer societies.
In earlier decades, key anthropologists wrote books that endorsed a
Rousseauan perspective emphasizing a ‘Noble Savage’ approach to under-
standing warfare. Books with titles such as The Harmless People (1959)
about the Ju’/hoansi San or the !Kung San Bushmen of the Kalahari des-
ert were written by Elizabeth Marshall Thomas. Yet, in the 1970s Richard
Lee described extensive conflict and violence among the Ju/hoansi in his
thorough ethnographic studies (1979). He found that prior to the impo-
sition of state authority in the Kalahari, the Ju/hoansi had four times the
1990 homicide rate of the USA, and thus Eric Wolf (1987: 130) com-
mented: ‘Clearly the !Kung are not the ‘Harmless People’ that some have
thought them to be.’
Most of the evidence from ethnographic research on contemporary
hunting-gathering societies suggests that warfare takes the form of spo-
radic violence, rather than continual fighting. Raymond Kelly’s in-depth
survey of warfare and violence concluded that although violence did occur,
it did not involve sustained vengeance and enduring warfare between fam-
ily band groupings; rather, it involved cases of individuals seeking revenge
that were brief (2003). Generally, these societies seek to minimize ani-
mosities, status rivalry, and competition among males, which can become
a primary motivation for feuds and warfare (Knauft 1988; Boehm 1993,
1999). In addition, because of the emphasis on reciprocity and sharing
food and other resources in these societies, rights to property are not
restricted. All these factors serve to reduce the amount of violence in these
societies. Most importantly, the absence of centralized political institu-
tions to implement large-scale military mobilization inhibits the develop-
ment of intense or frequent warfare; no standing armies with specialized
warriors can be organized for continual warfare (Roscoe 2013).
In a recent essay Israeli political scientist Azar Gat, a specialist on war-
fare (Gat 2006), draws on anthropological research to discuss warfare in
hunter-gatherer societies (2015). Gat summarizes the various Rousseauan
anthropological arguments and evidence regarding the lack of warfare
among hunter-gatherers. He indicates that the Rousseauans neglected
some of the most significant data from archaeological and ethnographic
studies from Australia. The Australian aborigines were hunter-gatherers
throughout the entire continent from about 50,000 years ago until the
166 R. SCUPIN
British arrived in 1788. The evidence from archaeological data, nineteenth

century Western observations, and early ethnographic studies demon-
strates that though the Australian aborigines were primarily egalitarian,
they suffered from large-scale and pervasive intercommunal warfare. Gat
cites the extensive archaeological and forensic evidence of skeletal trauma
in Australia that indicates the enormous amount of warfare prior to the
British arrival (Allen 2014). Although it appears that Australian aborigine
warfare was not directed by conquest or the imposition of political con-
trol of one group over another, large-scale armed conflicts accounted for
much, if not the majority of violent deaths (Gat 2015: 120).
The anthropological studies of hunter-gatherer warfare have implica-
tions for the study of international conflict. In a 2014 book entitled War,
what is it good for? archaeologist Ian Morris agrees with Steven Pinker
(2011) that warfare was ubiquitous and deadly among hunter-gatherers
in prehistory with mortality rates very high. Continuing archaeological
research has gathered more precise forensic evidence for substantial pre-
historic violence on a per-capita basis, which is shedding more light on this
question regarding prehistoric warfare (Allen and Jones 2014; Walker and
Bailey 2013; Kohler et al. 2014). Anthropologists Christopher Boehm
and Carol Ember did worldwide cross-cultural studies that demonstrated
that hunter-gatherer warfare was extensive (Boehm 2013; Ember 1978).
Rousseauan anthropologists such as Douglas Fry have tried to challenge
these findings by arguing that hunter-gatherers developed mechanisms
and institutions that emphasized the ‘potential for peace’ (2006, 2013).
This is undoubtedly true. However, cooperation, competition, avoidance,
and violent conflict have always been options and adaptations for humans
to choose from in different social interactions (Gat 2015: 123). Violent
conflict is only one of the tools or behavioral strategies for humans during
prehistory in hunter-gatherer societies.
Both internal and external warfare is far more common among tribes
than among contemporary hunter-gatherers. Generally, anthropologists
distinguish between two different types of tribes based on self-sufficient
subsistence and economic activities. Horticulturalist tribes usually prac-
tice slash and burn or limited swidden (i.e., slash and burn) agriculture
in various areas of the world such as the Amazon or highland Southeast
Asia. Pastoralist tribes depend on animals such as sheep, goats, cattle, don-
keys, or camels and a nomadic lifestyle in the Middle East and Central
and South Asia. In general, political leadership is not centralized in tribal
societies and is based on kinship and descent—within segmented clans
or lineages. Among both horticulturalist and pastoralist tribal societies,

members of different groups raid one another for territory, women, ani-
mals, or other resources. Anthropologists have offered a variety of mate-
rialist explanations based on ecological factors, population pressure, or
protein or resource shortages to explain the development of tribal warfare
(Harris 1985).
William Durham and Napoleon Chagnon put forth sociobiological or
evolutionary psychological hypotheses for tribal warfare in the Amazon
(Durham 1976; Chagnon 2000). Durham argued that warfare among
the tribal Mundurucu, who had a reputation for continual warfare and
head-hunting against other tribes, was an adaptive reproductive strategy.
That is, as the Mundurucu effectiveness in warfare reduced the number
and survival of offspring of their rival tribes, their own reproductive suc-
cess was enhanced. Chagnon hypothesized that Yanomamö tribal war-
fare enhanced the ability of individual warriors to have more children. He
recorded how individual warriors among the Yanomamö tended to have
more wives and children than other males. Neither Chagnon nor Durham
proposes the existence of a Freudian or Lorenzian aggressive instinct for
humans, nor do they contend that these reproductive strategies are based
on conscious policies. They argue that this violent behavior in tribal peo-
ples can be triggered by a number of factors that affect the human capac-
ity to survive and reproduce, including scarcities of resources, excessive
population densities, and significant ecological developments. They also
acknowledge that the norms and values of a particular tribe can either
inhibit or enhance aggressive tendencies.
Other anthropologists maintain that although population pressure,
competition for land and livestock, and reproductive success may help
explain tribal warfare, these variables need to be combined with cultural
factors such as honor, prestige, and the enhancement of male status.
Walter Goldschmidt, who did ethnographic research among tribal pasto-
ralists in East Africa, noted that males in these societies are induced to go
to war against other groups through institutionalized religious and cul-
tural indoctrination (1989). Although in some tribal societies warriors are
given material rewards such as women or land, in most cases nonmaterial
rewards such as prestige, honor, and spiritual incentives are just as impor-
tant. Studies of conflict in IR rarely take into consideration such variables.
Akbar Ahmed has been studying tribal peoples of South Asia and the
Middle East for many years (1980, 2013). Prior to formal graduate study
in anthropology, he was a political agent in a number of tribal zones in
168 R. SCUPIN
Pakistan, including South Waziristan in Northwest Pakistan, known as

the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the area where the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda sought sanctuary following the US war in Afghanistan. Ahmed’s
major focus in his recent book is on the four core Muslim tribal groups
known as the Pukhtun, (also known as Pashtun, Afghan, or Pathan, all
referring to the same ethnic group), Yemenis, Somalis, and Kurds who
he classifies as ‘nang,’ (honor-code based societies) (2013). Ahmed dis-
cusses how the members of these tribal groups define themselves with
respect to their Islamic faith, as well as their blood, clan, and loyalty to
their honor codes. They maintain that the Prophet of Islam is ‘a kind of
tribal chief par excellence’ and trace genealogical linkages and descent to
Muhammad, which instills religious fervor and inspiration for defending
the faith against outsiders.
During the age of European colonialism, these tribal peoples that had
resided with one another for centuries often were cut off and dispersed
as modern nation-states were formed. For example, the nearly 50 mil-
lion Pukhtuns were split between Afghanistan and Pakistan, while the 30
million Kurds have been divided and live in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
Ahmed argues that as increasing globalization and nation-building have
disrupted the traditional lifestyle of these peripheral tribal Muslim groups,
they have been increasingly drawn into networks and coalitions caught up
in terrorism, warfare, and violence. As central governments have margin-
alized and repressed these peripheral tribal Muslim populations, globally
based Islamic fundamentalist movements stemming from the Middle East
have nourished insurgent tendencies.
Warfare among chiefdom and agricultural state societies was more orga-
nized than among bands or tribes, primarily because the political and eco-
nomic institutions were more centralized and formalized. Anthropologist
Robert Carneiro views warfare as one of the decisive factors in the evolu-
tion of centralized chiefdoms and agricultural states (1970). Both chief-
doms and agricultural states have centralized political organizations that
can mobilize military operations. According to Carneiro, tribal societies
developed more centralized forms of political leadership (chiefdoms) based
on kinship as various ‘chiefly’ leaders extended their territories through
competitive warfare in order to dominate the populations of surrounding
communities and, thereby, controlled those communities’ surplus produc-
tion and peoples.
Warfare, especially defensive warfare, appears to be an integral aspect of
agricultural state development. The state emerged, in most cases, as a result
of conflict and competition among groups that eventually led to domina-

tion by a ruling group (Carneiro 1970; Cohen and Service 1978; Roscoe
2013). Thus, with the emergence of state societies, warfare increased in
scale and became much more organized. As governing elites accumu-
lated more wealth and power, warfare became one of the major means
of increasing their surpluses. A cross-cultural study of external warfare by
Keith Otterbein found that the capacity for organized warfare is much
greater in agricultural state societies than in hunting-gathering, tribal, or
chiefdom societies. State societies usually have a centralized political and
military leadership, as well as professional armies and military training.
In addition, surpluses of foodstuffs and luxury items frequently attract
outside invaders, particularly nomadic pastoralists (1994). Such findings
need to be incorporated into the study of conflict in IR much better, as
important sub-state variables.
Recently, a number of cognitive anthropologists have explored how
religious beliefs and rituals are related to warfare in the development of
large-scale agricultural states (Atran and Henrich 2010; Atran and Ginges
2012; Whitehouse and Martin 2004). These cognitive anthropologists
note that patterns of reciprocity and redistribution and exchange through
economics, kinship, and marriage maintain ‘prosocial norms’ for broad-
based altruistic cooperation in small-scale hunting-gathering, tribal, and
chiefdom societies. They then ask this question: ‘how are “prosocial
norms” for cooperation among people maintained in large-scale agricul-
tural societies and interrelationships that are no longer based directly on
reciprocity and kinship relations?’
These anthropologists suggest that, as large-scale agricultural civiliza-
tions develop, major religious traditions and shared sacred values, beliefs,
and rituals become the stabilizing ‘prosocial norms’ for cooperation
among people who no longer share kinship connections. Building large-
scale monuments (e.g., temples and pyramids) involved increasing com-
mitments of labor to sustain particular religious beliefs and sacred values.
These activities were costly to these individuals. However, the ones who
did not participate in these costly projects tended to be punished by other
members of their societies. Thus, most people tended to cooperate and
participate, regardless of cost. These shared initiatives produced coopera-
tion and collective action among people of different family and socioeco-
nomic backgrounds.
Yet, as these complex religious traditions and sacred values reinforced
group solidarity and cooperation, the resulting economic and demographic
170 R. SCUPIN
expansion frequently led to conflict and warfare between different agricul-

tural state civilizations. This competition and conflict among large-scale
agricultural state civilizations led people to become more deeply commit-
ted to particular religious beliefs and practices within their own groups—
dynamics that we see as germane to explaining conflict in modern world
politics as well, especially with the rise of jihadi radicalism. Cooperation and
coordination of military organization to defend one’s own civilization and
religious tradition became essential. Humans will kill and die not only to
protect their kin and kith, but for religious and moral convictions that bind
their groups together. According to these cognitive anthropologists this
competition among agricultural state civilizations and their religious tradi-
tions expanded the sphere of cooperation and solidarity within states, but
often created the potential for enmity and conflict between different states.
With the evolution of industrial and postindustrial states, military tech-
nologies were developed that enabled them to carry on fierce nationalistic
wars in distant regions, fueled in part by cultural and religious dynamics
and impacted by their particularized formation of identity and preferences.
This suggests a possible cross-fertilization between technology on which
Fritsch focuses (this volume) and nationalism. The industrial nation-states
became much more involved in economic rivalry over profits, markets,
and natural resources in other territories. World War I marked a watershed
in the evolution of military warfare. It was a global war in which nation-
states mobilized a high proportion of their male populations and reori-
ented their economic systems toward military production and support.
The numbers of combatants and noncombatants killed far outnumbered
those of most previous wars in any type of society. Under what conditions
could nationalism and technology produce major war?
The combination of technological advances and centralized military
organizations dramatically changed the nature of warfare in industrial
nations. Tanks, airplanes, and other modern weapons enabled industrial
states to wage tremendously destructive global warfare, as witnessed by
World War II. This expanding military technology was inextricably linked
to industrial technology. And, of course, the atomic era began in 1945
when the USA dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Since that period, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to
many countries of the world has of course become a worldwide concern.
With the emergence of mass communications including the Internet in
postindustrial societies, new forms of political and religious coalitions arise
that advance asymmetrical terrorism and warfare in different regions of
the world. This type of warfare has sometimes been referred to as ‘Fourth
Generation Warfare’ that involves insurgent groups or other violent non-
state actors that often develop in failed states or civil wars. Following
the 9/11 tragedy, some anthropologists began following the develop-
ment of this new media and its links with political and religious coalitions
(Eickelman and Anderson 2003).
JIHADISM, TERROR, AND CONFLICT

After the Enlightenment in Western society, thinkers such as Auguste
Comte and Karl Marx, as well as early anthropologists, predicted that as
societies became increasingly industrialized and modernized, seculariza-
tion would eradicate religious institutions and beliefs. They believed that
this was an inevitable development, where religion would become at most
a very private affair of individuals. However, contemporary anthropolo-
gists doing research on this phenomenon find that the terms ‘secular’ and
‘religious’ do not do justice to the variety of possible positions and the sur-
prising combinations and configurations evident in different national set-
tings (Cannell 2010; Asad 2003, 2011; Munson 2008; Mahmood 2010).
Though secular/religious trends can result in polarizing tendencies in the
Arab Spring or elsewhere, at times ethnographers find that the secular
can become sacralized and the religious secularized. Although since 9/11
more IR scholars have been engaged in research on religion and secular-
ism (James 2011; Shah et al. 2012), anthropologists continue fieldwork
research that can aid IR scholars in understanding such things as how
religion can be exploited in ways that make conflict more likely.
Scott Atran is an anthropologist who combines his ethnographic stud-
ies with cognitive and social psychology, and has provided insights into
religion, secularism, and the phenomenon of terrorism. Early in his career,
Atran conducted ethnographic research on kinship and social ties, land
tenure, and political economy among the Druze, a religious group in
Israel and Lebanon. Later Atran teamed up with psychologists to experi-
ment extensively on the ways scientists and ordinary people categorize and
reason about nature (1990), on the cognitive and evolutionary psychol-
ogy of religion (2002), and on the role of sacred values in political conflict
and terrorism (2003). His most recent work focuses on the characteristics
associated with political and religious terrorism in different areas of the
world.
172 R. SCUPIN
For a number of years following 9/11, the Department of Defense

(DOD) was not talking to terrorists. Atran convinced the DOD that this
was a mistake. Atran undertook fieldwork and survey research among
Palestinians and Israelis, and interviews with Hamas and imprisoned jihad-
ists and their supporters in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and
Central and Southeast Asia (Atran 2010). Atran draws on extensive inter-
views to detail the organization, norms, and practices of Al-Qaeda and
other terrorist networks to determine how religion and secularist notions
influence terrorist activities. He describes how Al-Qaeda has charismatic
leaders such as the late Osama bin Laden and tightly knit networks based
on kinship, clan, nepotism, and the Islamic concepts of brotherhood,
which invoke the ideals of martyrhood for their ingroup. As Atran indi-
cates, there are millions of people who may express sympathy for Al-Qaeda
and its terrorism; however, there are only thousands who actually commit
to violence. The individuals that do commit to violence begin as small
groups of volunteers consisting of friends and kin within specific neigh-
borhoods, schools, workplaces, leisure activities such as soccer, café, and
online chat rooms to become ‘bands of brothers’. Drawing on the cogni-
tive and social psychological experiments on altruism and ingroup forma-
tion and how groups are essentialized as indicated by Hirschfeld et al. (see
above), Atran discusses how emotional and moral commitments are nur-
tured within these small jihadist terrorist networks. Additionally, most of
these Muslim terrorists suffer from feelings of relative deprivation, viewing
their own Islamic brethren as losing honor and respect in comparison with
other groups in society.
Through his research Atran questions the rational choice models of
realpolitik and the marketplace to investigate how sacred values trump
instrumental reasoning in decision-making. In surveys and interviews of
various peoples, he found that sacred values emerge that divide communi-
ties and nations. This moral absolutism runs counter to rational choice
theories in politics or economics (2010: 377, 2016). Although this might
result in a pessimistic perspective on conflict resolution, Atran’s interviews
among the Palestinian and Israelis suggest that groups can reframe their
sacred values and achieve pathways toward more peaceful solutions.
Yet, humans are comforted by religious narratives that provide explana-
tions regarding the causes of suffering and the purpose of life. Religion
contains ritual practices that heighten the emotions and can demonstrate
how individuals practice cooperation, altruism, and trust within ingroups,
which plays a role in terrorist networks. As globalization tends to promote
secular beliefs extending from the West that threaten communities and
morality, new reformulations of fundamentalist and puritan-based reli-
gions result in the creation of jihadist movements. In his overview of
global trends Atran does not see a ‘clash of civilization,’ but rather a
‘crash’ of religion with secular trends. In an essay in Foreign Policy (2012),
Atran advocates a scientific approach to explain why religion is increasingly
significant in international affairs. As people recognize that globalization
is not incidental to their lives but rather is a recognizable transforma-
tion in their everyday circumstances, they draw on religious substance as a
means of restoring power over their lives. Atran has utilized his knowledge
and research as a cultural anthropologist to help understand the issues of
religion and secularism and also to contribute to solving some of our cur-
rent problems with globally sponsored political and religious terrorism.9
Atran’s research is bound to have implications for understanding recent
developments in the Middle East. Beginning in January 2015, Scott Atran
and his team of researchers were based in Iraq continuing his ethnographic
research on jihadism and violent sectarian and ethnic movements.
The recent declaration of a caliphate by the militant group the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) means that violent jihadism is now an
entrenched feature of the political landscape in the Middle East. Neither
the late Osama bin Laden nor Mullah Omar (the Taliban leader in
Afghanistan) could declare the development of a caliphate because they
could not fulfill the conditions of a caliph, a proof of descent from the
Prophet Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraysh. However, the leader of ISIS,
Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, can provide proof of his descent from the Prophet
(Haykel and Bunzel 2015; Bunzel 2016). Al Baghdadi is a charismatic
orator and scholar of Islamic studies and Islamic law who uses sophisti-
cated social media with injunctions from the Qur’an and hadith to help
recruit many young Muslims to this newly declared caliphate. Unlike a
conventional nation-state, this declared caliphate is not subject to fixed
borders and Al Baghdadi has announced plans to defend and expand this
caliphate to incorporate Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and areas of the Levant
such as Lebanon, and perhaps Israel (Atran 2016).
Al Baghdadi advocates that all Muslims, including all jihadist factions,
must acknowledge the caliphate as a collective religious obligation. He
has been able to manage deals with the Sunni tribes of Iraq and conquer
territories in Iraq and Syria. This perhaps temporary jihadist success has
depended on the various divisions within Arab countries and the weak-
ness of governments such as Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Yet,
174 R. SCUPIN
the various jihadist movements are fragmenting with Al-Qaeda’s current

leader Ayman Al Zawahiri declaring that Al Baghdadi is an extremist and
the caliphate is not legitimate. But many jihadi groups and individuals,
particularly young Muslims, have signaled their support for the caliphate.
ISIS statements have been viewed more than 18,700 times on YouTube
and has been posted numerous times on Twitter and Facebook (Haykel
and Bunzel 2015; Bunzel 2016).
Atran’s investigations of how the jihadist networks emphasize kinship,
fictive kinship, and ingroup altruism that provide emotional and moral
commitments as well as sacred values for disenfranchised and frustrated
young Muslims will provide a comprehensive framework for explaining
and understanding ISIS. As he suggests sacred values will trump instru-
mental reasoning and realpolitik among these thousands of young Muslims
who are recruited by Al Baghdadi and they find new symbolic meanings,
emotional comfort, and a new revitalization of their Islam identity in this
newly declared caliphate. Atran describes ISIS as a revolutionary counter-
cultural movement of world-historic proportions (2015, 2016).
His research team has been conducting dozens of structured interviews
with captured ISIS fighters in Iraq, as well as among young Muslims in
distressed neighborhoods in Paris and Morocco who have been attracted
to the caliphate movement. In his address to the UN Security Council
in April, 2015, Atran indicated that the ISIS fighters they interviewed
in Iraq had more than a primary school education and lacked a knowl-
edge of the Qur’an or Hadith or the early Caliphs Omar and Othman,
but had learned their Islam from Al-Qaeda and ISIS propaganda. These
young Muslims sought a life of significance through struggle and sacrifice
in comradeship. ISIS appeared to offer a dream with a concrete chance
of realization. Atran describes how the sacred values associated with the
Caliphate provide these young Muslims a purpose and freedom from what
they perceive as the vice of a meaningless material world in the West or in
other illegitimate governments of the Islamic world.
In addition, as Atran has found that as a consequence of the ‘crash’
of religion with secular trends rather than a ‘clash of civilizations,’ many
of these young Muslims who have joined with ISIS—especially those
recruited from Europe—are dissatisfied and frustrated with their current
conditions. Violent and depraved though they are, these jihadist and ter-
rorist networks established by Al Baghdadi serve as a meaningful substi-
tute for kinship and familistic emotional bonds that result in sacrificial
ingroup altruism. Drawing on social psychology Atran discusses how these
emotional bonds are a case of ‘identity fusion’ or ‘total fusion’ where an

individual loses his personal identity to a unique collective identity (Atran
et al. 2014; Atran 2016).
Al Baghdadi and his allies cultivate and manipulate these emotional
bonds to foment violent jihadism throughout the Middle East. Atran’s
ethnographic research and experiments in the Middle East on terrorist
networks will undoubtedly continue to elucidate the ISIS and other vio-
lent jihadist organizations that are currently developing.
ANTHROPOLOGY AND IR: MICRO- AND MACRO-LEVELS

There are a number of other research areas in anthropology that produce
knowledge and empirical data that can help illuminate IR, foreign policy,
and conflict. These research areas can be found at both the micro- and
macro-levels. At the micro-level, a number of anthropologists have been
engaged in research that overlaps with the new developments in neuro-
economics. A neodiscipline, neuroanthropology, has emerged with its first
major book published by MIT press (Lende and Downey 2012). These
anthropologists are working with neuroscientists to explore the connec-
tions among neurology, culture, cognition, emotions, and behavior, and
certainly could have productive interactions with scholars such as Kugler
and Zak (Chap. 4), as well as Renshon and Kahneman (Chap. 3). A num-
ber of anthropologists have been coordinating their research with neu-
roeconomists that will have a definitive impact on IR. Neuroeconomics
originated in the early twenty-first century, growing out of a critique of
the rational choice theory in economics by behavioral economics.
As indicated above, anthropologists such as Scott Atran have had simi-
lar research interests in debunking the rational choice models in classical
economics, which raises questions about the role of individuals in conflict,
especially if one assumes that less rationality equals more conflict or that
understanding the extent of rationality can help explain decision-making
in conflict situations. Atran has teamed with Gregory C. Berns, a neuro-
economist, in a research project employing functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). With the use of fMRI this research team has been investi-
gating brain activation and how sacred values trigger emotional responses
consistent with sentiments that coincide with absolute moral imperatives
and outrage (Berns and Atran 2012; Berns et al. 2012). Specifically, when
individuals are confronted with statements that are contrary to their sacred
values, the amygdala, the region of the brain associated with physiological
176 R. SCUPIN
arousal, produces heightened affective emotional responses resulting in

experiences of moral outrage and potential violence (Berns et al. 2012).
This research team is also investigating how ingroup altruism, concepts
of honor, and norms may be associated with various brain activations that
are connected with violence and warfare. Although neuroanthropology
is in its infancy, with future improvements in fMRI technology and more
refined techniques, it may be possible to develop more comprehensive
explanations of why violence, terrorism, and perhaps even warfare emerge
in different international arenas.
One of the most active micro-level fields of research in history and
anthropology is collective memory. This research investigates how nations,
ethnic communities, and individuals remember, manipulate, invent, and
construct their pasts. Recent anthropologists have been coordinating
research with cognitive psychologists and historians on collective memory
and its relationship to individual memory and brain activity (Boyer and
Wertsch 2009; Anastasio et al. 2012). These anthropologists, cognitive
psychologists, neurologists, and historians describe linkages between indi-
vidual and collective memories and why they are so significant for humans
and affect decision-making in areas ranging from domestic issues to for-
eign policy and IR. Both individual and collective memories are by nature
elusive, selective, and difficult to quantify, but these researchers attempt
to demonstrate how individual and collective memories become consoli-
dated and retained. While most of the memory research in the past by
anthropologists and historians was anti-psychological, these new research
efforts are collaborative and include the findings in cognitive psychol-
ogy and neurology (Boyer and Wertsch 2009; Anastasio et al. 2012). For
example this research details what is known at both the neurological and
psychological level regarding ‘flashbulb memories,’ such as memories of
traumatic events such as 9/11, and how they are connected with collective
shared memories. The research in this area includes the use of neuroimag-
ing as a means of enhancing what is known from brain states for identify-
ing individual and collective memories. These interdisciplinary research
endeavors can become profitable for understanding the distribution of
beliefs and ideologies for individuals, groups, and nations in the interna-
tional arena.
Other anthropological research at a macro-level can inform our under-
standing of IR. Alvin W. Wolfe has been engaged in research on the evolu-
tion of supranational organizations, both states and corporations for over
30 years. Wolfe has continued to promote research on the supranational
social networks created by both states and multinational corporations for

the anthropology of the future (2006, 2011). He argues that the interac-
tion of corporations and states (as well as cities and families) has gener-
ated a new system of integration or supranational organization (2006: 6).
In Wolfe’s view, when studying contemporary cultural evolution from a
long-term perspective, both multinational corporations and nation-states,
as fairly recent developments, need to be viewed as a single complex net-
work. Wolfe believes that the most effective research strategy for the study
of these supranational systems is a network model that begins with defin-
ing the interacting units in relationship with one another and applying
various mathematical algorithms to discover clusters and equivalence sets
representing the different levels of organization. He notes that there is a
lot of attention paid to network analysis for social media, personal, and
community relationships established by Facebook or LinkedIn; however,
Wolfe suggests that anthropologists need to investigate the networks
established by the supranational organizations. In doing so, he thinks that
anthropologists can engage in data mining and contribute to the broader
field of complexity theory, which involves the study of systems of evolu-
tion at various levels from material, biological, and sociocultural (2011).
This type of research can contribute to the system-oriented approaches in
IR, such as systemism (James and James, Chap. 10).
Another line of research at the macro-level developed by archaeologist
Ian Morris promises potential insights for IR. He develops big-picture
themes about sociocultural evolution from the past to the present, and
projections about the future (2010, 2012). In these books, Morris tracks
sociocultural evolution by quantifying the specific variables regarding
energy capture, social organization, war-making capacities, and informa-
tion technology to measure social developments of nations throughout
the world. By social development, he means ‘the bundle of technologi-
cal, subsistence, organizational, and cultural accomplishments through
which people feed, clothe, house, and reproduce themselves, explain the
world around them, resolve disputes within their communities, extend
their power at the expense of other communities, and defend themselves
against others’ attempts to extend power’ (2012: 3). Morris considers
the critiques of social or cultural evolution and develops a sophisticated
quantitative index to measure the four factors of social development that
result in the rise or decline of various empires and states. From this plat-
form many anthropologists as well as historians, political scientists, and
178 R. SCUPIN
IR specialists can launch extensive research projects that will contribute

toward an interdisciplinary perspective.
CONCLUSION
Anthropology has an important role to play in furthering multidisciplinary
and interdisciplinary research in IR. Anthropologists can help produce
more enriched, comprehensive, and enlarged explanations and under-
standings of IR and conflict. Anthropologists offer a useful micro-level
look at culture drawing from cognitive and social psychology and other
related fields to analyze human behavior. This interdisciplinary strategy
underscores the enormous intracultural variation rather than the essen-
tialist generalizations regarding homogeneous cultures or monolithic
civilizations.
The combination of primordialist and instrumental or constructivist
approaches has debunked the notion that ethnicity or nationalist concep-
tions can be viewed as fixed or immutable. Yet, despite these findings,
essentialist and stereotypical fixed conceptions of ethnicity and national-
ism appear to have very broad appeal. They offer challenging explanations
of why essentialist ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ingroup/outgroup dynamics are so
pervasive universally. These explanations and research findings can assist
researchers in IR who focus on conflict in the international arena, because
such conflicts are not divorced from sub-systemic variables like culture and
ethnicity which shape how actors see each other in the first place.
Aside from ethnic and nationalist conflicts, anthropologists have been
engaged in long-term research on the incidence and frequency of war-
fare in different types of societies. Employing an evolutionary and cross-
cultural perspective, anthropologists and archaeologists have studied the
origins of warfare in prehistory among hunting gatherers. This research
may illuminate questions about human nature that were based on specula-
tive social contract philosophical theorists of the Western Enlightenment.
Ethnographic research demonstrates that warfare has existed within most
hunting-gathering, tribal, chiefdom, agricultural and industrial, and
postindustrial societies. The anthropological research on warfare will assist
those interested in interdisciplinary research on war, conflict, and terror-
ism in IR.
Since the tragedy of 9/11, more IR specialists have focused their atten-
tion on religious trends in the Islamic world and elsewhere. Ethnographic
investigations have demonstrated how in many circumstances the secular

can become sacralized and the religious can become secularized and other
permutations. Multiple variations and configurations of the religious and
secular have led to a reframing of how one understands these trends both
among anthropologists and IR scholars. In some areas, anthropologists
such as Scott Atran have been combining cognitive and social psycho-
logical studies to provide more insight into the phenomena of religion
and terrorism, a subject of study within IR. Further cooperation among
anthropologists and IR scholars on religious and secular tendencies is
extremely important in this global age.
Finally, this chapter has described some of the recent micro- and macro-
approaches used by anthropologists to enhance explanations of interna-
tional trends. New micro-level approaches in neuroanthropology that
coordinate research efforts with neuroeconomists with the use of fMRI
technologies have led to insights into the dynamics of neurology, cogni-
tion, culture, emotions, and behavior. These new micro-level investiga-
tions should improve in the future as fMRI technologies become more
refined and useful in interdisciplinary perspectives in IR. Other micro-
level anthropological studies of collective memory that combine cogni-
tive psychology and history offer fruitful insights into ethnic and national
identity, and conflict processes. By focusing on what is known at the neu-
rological and psychological aspects of individual memory, anthropologists
study how shared and collective memories are formed and constructed.
Moreover, steadily accumulating research from anthropologists on IR and
foreign policy is approaching a volume that would encourage a review of
the kind conducted by James and James in Chap. 10—a diagrammatic
exposition of causal mechanisms based on systemism.
NOTES
1. Historically, the four-field approach in anthropology developed most fully
within the USA. However, other traditions of anthropology developed in a
different manner in regions such as continental Europe and the UK. For an
overview of British, German, French, and American anthropology and their
distinctive trajectories see Barth et al. (2005).
2. There were different nineteenth century understandings of the term culture
in various European societies. Both E.B. Tylor and Franz Boas were influ-
enced by Herder’s concept of Kultur (Ballinger 2012; Kuper 2000; Denby
2005; Zammito 2002; Lewis 1999, 2001; Adams 1998). Like the French
180 R. SCUPIN
usage of culture, the British in the nineteenth century used culture to refer
to civilization and usually to indicate a superior form of European ‘British’
civilization (Arnold 1873).
3. Geertz was not the only social scientist to influence theories in IR. Others
such as the French sociologist/ethnographer Pierre Bourdieu were also
influential; see Adler-Nissen (2013).
4. In part, Huntington was responding to Fukuyama, who had argued in his
1992 book The End of History and the Last Man that the end of the Cold
War presaged the ultimate triumph of the American political and economic
world order and the expansion of the democratic institutions, free markets,
and secularism.
5. In some cases, political scientists have engaged in in-depth ethnographic
studies. For example, political scientist Scott (1987) did a classic ethno-
graphic study in rural Malaysia that drew on many different and dissident
voices.
6. Evans-Pritchard had been a student of Bronislaw Malinowski at the London
School of Economics who had carried out extensive research in the
Trobriand islands near New Guinea during World War I. Malinowski had
advocated a new understanding of reason and rationality among these tribal
peoples in many of his works (1922).
7. The primordialist tradition of ethnicity is an outgrowth of earlier sociologi-
cal theories such as the distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
developed by German theorists such as Ferdinand Tönnies (1963). Geertz’s
perspective on ethnicity drew on the ideas of sociologist Edward Shils
(1957).
8. See Scupin (2013) and political scientist Duncan McCargo (2007, 2008,
2009) for a review of the insurgency and recent political trends in South
Thailand.
9. Atran has made it very clear that he does not support the development of
the ‘Human Terrain teams’ that employ some anthropologists and other
social scientists in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
other ‘hotspots.’
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CHAPTER 7
Gender in International Relations:

Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Conflict
Soumita Basu and Maya Eichler
Since the 1980s, feminist scholarship in international relations (IR) has

challenged the boundaries of the discipline. Feminist scholars use the con-
cept of gender to bring to light a diverse set of actors (especially women
but also men as men) and social relations that constitute the international.
In keeping with the aims of the volume, this chapter highlights the contri-
butions of feminist IR in enriching interdisciplinarity within IR, focusing
specifically on the ways in which gender can enhance our understanding
of conflict and its resolution.
As a concept, gender “first emerged as an idea in sex-change medicine and
psychology in the 1950s (in the work of pre-feminists like John Money)”
(John 2015: 73); in popular parlance, it is often used synonymously with
women. In IR, the intellectual building blocks for the initial employment of
gender came from feminist philosophers and political theorists such as Donna
Haraway, Sandra Harding, and Joan Scott. IR scholarship that uses gender as
S. Basu
Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India
M. Eichler ()
Political Studies and Women’s Studies, Mount St. Vincent University,
Halifax, Canada
e-mail: maya.eichler@msvu.ca

190 S. BASU AND M. EICHLER
a central category of analysis has come to be identified as feminist. The first

significant feminist intervention in Anglo-American IR was with the publica-
tion of the Special Edition of Millennium: Journal of International Studies
on “Women and International Relations” in 1988.1 Since then a substantial
feminist literature critiquing and reformulating the field of IR has emerged.
The relative marginalization of women in international politics has been
a matter of concern for the “curious feminist” (Enloe 2004a); beyond this,
feminists have also pointed to the masculinist biases of the discipline.2 They
note that masculine characteristics such as power/strength, autonomy,
and rationality have dictated the basis on which states and societies have
been historically and ideologically organized (Peterson and Runyan 1993;
Steans 1998; Tickner 1992; True 2013). In practice, neither femininities
nor masculinities exist independently of the other but this dependence is
systematically hidden. As a result, power is attributed to masculine values
to such an extent that feminine values lose their significance in the political
sphere (Peterson and True 1998: 15; also see, Enloe 1989, Enloe 2004a).
Not only does this enable hierarchical gender relations between men and
women, traditionally associated with the structural notion of patriarchy,
but such biases permeate all structures and relations in the international
realm. Thus, while men may also appear to be absent as referents in IR
and security studies, the masculine values associated with them appear
to define the scope and limits of political practice and discourse. Such a
worldview challenges the very foundations of IR.
Feminist IR also has strong normative underpinnings: the aim of
knowledge creation is to problematize the claims that existing structures
and relations are natural, and to seek ways to reconstitute these—challeng-
ing oppressive hierarchies—thereby initiating change. In this chapter we
show how the three moves just described manifest in feminist scholarship
on conflict and security: by making women visible in war and conflict,
gendering and rethinking the study of war and conflict, and considering
how gender equality is linked to the prevention of conflict. We believe
that failure to do so leaves us with blind spots about the causes of conflict,
conflict prevention, and conflict resolution.
While there have been proposals to use gender as a neutral descriptive
category of analysis, and from a “non-feminist standpoint” (Carpenter
2002), this chapter maintains its focus on feminist IR. The rationale for
doing so is that feminist perspectives elicit interdisciplinarity at the con-
fluence of gender and international relations. Feminist scholarship in
IR employs concepts drawn from a range of disciplines, including some
GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARITY... 191
traversed in this volume, such as history, sociology, demography studies,

anthropology, peace and conflict studies, women’s and gender studies,
and critical masculinities studies. When gender is simply added as a vari-
able without feminist theory, that interdisciplinarity is lost.
Three caveats need to be introduced at this stage. First, there is tremen-
dous diversity within feminist IR, including tensions and disagreements
on the specific employment of gender, which this chapter can cover only in
passing. Second, we do not intend to reify a monolithic “mainstream” ver-
sion of IR, even as we highlight the assumptions that dominate the field.
Finally, this chapter does not pretend to “bring” feminism or gender into
the study of IR: feminists have been conducting interdisciplinary work in
IR for close to four decades.
The remaining part of the chapter is divided into four sections. Section
one outlines the emergence and evolution of feminist work on conflict and
war. Section two presents key feminist insights on conflict and security vis-
à-vis actors, relations, as well as normative change. It highlights the ways
in which attention to women and men and gender relations challenges
given categories in IR, such as levels of analysis, and re-constitutes secu-
rity with concepts such as “continuum of violence”. Section three criti-
cally examines the commonsense but essentializing association of women
with peace and argues for a focus on feminist foreign policy rather than
allegedly more peaceful female leaders. Sections four and five use finer
brushstrokes to discuss how both the waging of war and international
policymaking on “maintenance of peace and security” are gendered pro-
cesses.3 The concluding section ties the reflections on security, conflict,
and its resolution to larger debates in feminist IR. In the end, our argu-
ment is not only about recognizing the value of gender in empirical con-
texts that have been traditionally of interest in IR (conflict and security,
elite-level politics, or the international system), but to show that taking
gender seriously changes what constitutes IR. Interdisciplinarity is central
to this transformation.
FEMINIST IR SCHOLARSHIP ON WAR AND CONFLICT

The roots of feminist scholarship on war and conflict in IR have been
interdisciplinary and activist. Early feminist analyses of war and conflict
took place outside the discipline of IR, often within women’s peace
movements. As scholars made feminist interventions within the field
of IR, they brought insights and concepts from other disciplines with
them—primarily from history, peace studies, sociology, women’s studies,

critical masculinities studies, and anthropology. The feminist study of
war and conflict has developed into its own sub-field within IR, Feminist
Security Studies. This contemporary work is informed by its historic
antecedents and the scholars’ normative interest in peace and gender
equality as well as interdisciplinarity.
Since the inception of feminist activism and scholarship war has been
of central concern (Pierson 1988). Early twentieth-century suffragists
were deeply involved in debates on war (MacDonald 2010), and Virginia
Woolf wrote The Three Guineas (1977) in response to the rise of mili-
tarism in the 1930s. The Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom (founded in 1915) were early advocates of, and lent tremen-
dous support to, the early twentieth-century institutions of collective
security—the League of the Nations as well as the United Nations (UN)
(see Galey 1995). Throughout the Cold War period, feminists delved
into the gendered politics of war and peace through activism and scholar-
ship (Feminism and Nonviolent Study Group 1983; Brookfield 2012).
Feminists were particularly active in the nuclear disarmament movement,
vividly exemplified by the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp set
up next to a British air base—with cruise missiles—from 1981 until 2000.
Beginning in the late 1980s, the publication of three interdisciplin-
ary feminist texts spurred the emergence of the sub-field of feminist IR:
Women and War by Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987); Bananas, Beaches, and
Bases by Cynthia Enloe (1989); and Gender in International Relations by
J. Ann Tickner (1992). Each of these texts challenged the masculinist bias
in war and conflict studies which assumes that conflict and war can be stud-
ied without taking women and gender into account. Together, these texts
made visible women’s exclusion from official stories of war and security
while highlighting women’s many roles in support of militaries and state
security agendas. Elshtain’s book showed how the waging of war relies
on gendered stories of protection. The gendered narrative of “just war-
riors” protecting “beautiful souls” is a key justification for the waging of
war. Enloe’s book asked “where are the women?” in international politics
and in the politics of war and militarization more specifically. She brought
to light the experiences of women working in prostitution outside mili-
tary bases, of diplomatic wives greasing the wheels of international diplo-
macy, and of women as marginalized soldiers within militaries—showing
how these diverse women and ideas about their feminized roles are cru-
cial to war, diplomacy, and militarism. Tickner’s book uncovered the
masculine bias in IR theory which makes women invisible while claiming

to be gender-neutral. As she argued, concepts such as rationality, power,
and security are all gendered—they rely on characteristics stereotypically
associated with masculinity and are defined in opposition to femininity.
Mainstream conceptions of security are militarized and do not take into
account women’s many insecurities that result from states’ security poli-
cies. Instead, Tickner proposed a multidimensional conception of security
rooted in women’s experiences.
Over the next two decades feminist scholars applied these insights
to empirical case studies of war.4 This feminist scholarship on war, con-
flict, and security led to the emergence of the new sub-field of Feminist
Security Studies (Blanchard 2003; Sjoberg 2010; Shepherd 2010; Sjoberg
and Martins 2010; Wibben 2011). This sub-field is diverse and includes
feminist scholars working from a variety of theoretical perspectives and
with interest in a range of empirical security issues from contemporary
war (Sjoberg 2013), peacekeeping (Duncanson 2013; Whitworth 2004),
sexual violence in war (Pankhurst 2010), private security (Eichler 2015),
terrorism (Parashar 2009), to embodied security (Wilcox 2014), human
security (Hudson 2005), emancipatory security (Basu 2011), post-
colonial security (Agathangelou and Ling 2004), and security narratives
(Wibben 2011).
Feminist Security Studies is informed by earlier feminist work, both
within and outside of IR but insists on a place for feminist research within
IR. Feminist Security Studies scholars inhabit a space from which they
engage in ongoing conversations with feminist scholars of war and conflict
working outside IR while pushing IR scholars to take gender seriously
in the study of war and conflict. Their research is strongly positioned to
further interdisciplinarity within IR because it continuously contests IR’s
boundaries while helping to remake its boundaries in more interdisci-
plinary ways (see Sjoberg 2010). Feminist scholarship in IR contests the
boundaries of the discipline, for example, by redefining the meaning and
referents of security, and by revisiting the question about whose interests
should be served by security policies.
Feminist Security Studies scholars agree that gender should not be
included just as a variable without asking deeper feminist questions
about the gendering of war and conflict. Drawing on feminist and anti-
militarist normative roots, feminist security studies scholars tend also to
argue that transforming gender relations is key to the reduction and pre-
vention of violence in IR. Debates among feminist scholars have been
productive in formulating the agenda of Feminist Security Studies. Some

recent conversations in journals have featured reflections and debates
on the normative agenda of this scholarship, its relationship with (non-
feminist) positivist and post-positivist security studies, the positionality
of a majority of these scholars in the global north and its impact on the
development of the field, and the relationship between feminist secu-
rity studies and feminist political economy (see Elias 2015; Lobasz and
Sjoberg 2011; Shepherd 2013). In all of this, gender is deemed concep-
tually important to understanding security (Sjoberg and Martin 2010).
FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY

The feminist gendering of the study of conflict and security entails three
key moves that we outline in this section. First, feminist analysis begins
by asking where the women are and by making visible diverse women’s
experiences in and on the margins of conflict and war. Second, feminist
analysis entails a critique of the concepts used by mainstream scholars in
their explanations of war and conflict, thus offering a different perspec-
tive. And finally, feminist analysis leads to examining how gender relations
need to be transformed toward preventing or reducing incidents of war
and conflict. These three moves lead feminists to not just add women but
also redefine the subject matter and purpose of IR scholarship on war and
conflict.
Making Gender Visible

Importantly, in bringing women (and men) into focus, feminist IR schol-
ars employ a non-essentialist understanding of gender roles in war. They
begin from the assumption that men are not innately militaristic nor are
women naturally peaceful. While feminist scholars have a strong interest
in women’s peace activism, they also examine how women are encouraged
to support war and militarism as “patriotic mothers”, sex workers, or in
military support roles (Enloe 1989). Feminist scholarship also investi-
gates how women directly participate in non-state armed groups as recent
work on female terrorists and paramilitaries (McEvoy 2010; Parashar
2010; Gentry and Sjoberg 2007) and on women’s increasing incorpora-
tion into combat (Chapman and Eichler 2014; Eager 2014; Eichler 2013;
MacKenzie 2012) illustrate. At the same time, women’s peace movements
across national and historic contexts have strategically used notions of
traditional femininity—such as motherhood—to gain public legitimacy for

their opposition to war (Eichler 2006, 2012; Confortini 2010). Feminist
scholarship not only documents women’s myriad roles in war and conflict
but also shows that femininities are used to legitimize, carry out, and pro-
duce military violence, and in some instances, to oppose war.
Feminist work on conflict, war, and security begins by asking where
the women are but more broadly enquires into the significance of gender,
including of men and masculinity and gendered relations of power, to the
making and waging of war. It shows that the link between masculinity and
the military is constructed and maintained for the purposes of waging war
and men are encouraged to identify with militarism. Feminist scholars use
the term “militarized masculinity” to refer to the idea—prevalent in many
though importantly not all contexts—that traits stereotypically associated
with masculinity can be acquired and proven through military service or
action, and combat in particular (Enloe 2000; Whitworth 2004). State
and military leaders rely on and reproduce militarized masculinity when
they attempt to display strength through military force or aim to recruit
male citizens through appeals to manliness. There is nothing inherently
militaristic about men, but rather notions of militarized masculinity are
central to the production of violence globally (Eichler 2014).
Feminist scholars argue that war and conflict are gendered, they shape
and are shaped by gendered relations of power and notions of masculin-
ity and femininity. Cynthia Cockburn (2010) puts it succinctly when she
argues that gender is productive of war, and war is productive of gen-
der relations. Thus gender and war are mutually constitutive (Goldstein
2001).
Rethinking IR
Feminist scholars argue that taking women and gender seriously allows us
to see aspects of conflict (and conflict resolution) that would otherwise
remain invisible. This can make the study of war and conflict in IR richer
and more empirically accurate, more “realistic” as Enloe (1989) has
argued. The analogies that she employs to discuss “underestimation of
power” in the study of international politics, more broadly, help to high-
light the costs of ignoring concepts such as gender in IR; she suggests that
analyses that tend to focus on select variables and centers of power make IR
look like a Superman comic strip or the American detective show Dragnet
(with its “Just the facts, Ma’am” approach to crime-solving) whereas
the complexities of practices studied in IR are closer approximations of

a Jackson Pollock painting or the Japanese film Rashomon that presents
the same event from different perspectives (Enloe 1996). Paying attention
to gender as an analytical category—never absent, even if invisible—in
research projects opens up new avenues for analysis and knowledge cre-
ation in the discipline of IR. In the same essay, for instance, Enloe notes
that the 1994 Chiapas peasant rebellion in Mexico—led by the Zapatista
National Liberation Army—“surprised everyone—almost” (1996: 197).
It may have surprised the IR scholar whose focus was on the Mexican elites
negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) around
the same time; however, it did not surprise individuals, organizations, and
indeed scholars whose eyes were open to the “relationships between patri-
archal male practices, the Priista [associated with the Mexican ruling party
at the time] state formula, Chiapas political economy and NAFTA” that
marked the unstable domestic situation in Mexico—papered over at the
NAFTA negotiations (Enloe 1996: 195–198).
Building on work from a variety of disciplines, feminist scholarship on
conflict and security in IR has made two key innovations that challenge
mainstream IR approaches to conflict and security. The first is what feminist
scholars call rethinking war as part of a gendered continuum of violence.
If one takes seriously the question “where are the women?” it becomes
impossible to limit our analysis of war to the official place and time of bat-
tle, in which historically men have predominated (Cuomo 1996). Instead,
we need to examine women’s roles in the preparation of war, in support-
ing the waging of war, and in its aftermath along a temporal gendered
continuum. Similarly, we need to see a spatial continuum of violence from
the battlefield to the homefront, connecting public and private forms of
violence (Cockburn 2004). Times of peace entails plenty of instances of
gendered violence, from domestic violence, work-place sexual harassment,
to societal rape cultures. These forms of gendered violence exist along a
continuum of gendered violence that includes systematic war-time rape,
military sexual trauma, and war-time sexual trafficking. War and conflict
are not simply gendered, but part of a gendered continuum of violence
across times of “war” and “peace” and across public and private spaces.
Second, feminist scholarship challenges the privileging of system-level
factors in IR analyses of war and conflict—a theme that other chapters in
this volume also suggest. An interdisciplinary lens, especially one drawing
on historical, sociological, and anthropological disciplines, allows feminist
scholars to study war and conflict from the “bottom-up”, paying attention
to the lives of individual women and men (Enloe 1989; D’Costa 2006;
Stern 2006; Hamber et al. 2006). Relatedly, feminists investigate war as an
embodied gendered experience (Wilcox 2014) and in relation to conjugal
and family dynamics (MacKenzie 2010; Enloe 1989). In addition to the
individual level, feminist scholarship is interested in gendered societal and
state-level factors, examining for example gendered war discourses (Hunt
and Rygiel 2006) and the gendered organization of violence. Feminist
scholars show that gender is fundamental to the organization of violence,
to the use of force, and to understanding the aftermath of war for states
and societies (Cockburn 2010; Sjoberg 2013).
While much feminist scholarship focuses on individual, familial, soci-
etal, and state levels, feminist scholars of war and conflict place their
analysis within the context of global gender inequalities. Many see the
international system as patriarchal (Reardon 1985; Enloe 1989) or
gender-hierarchical (Sjoberg 2013), and gender as a key component of
the international system. Indeed, the forces of patriarchy and militarism
intersect with other socializing forces such as class, nationality, race, and
ethnicity. As Cockburn has pointed out, “It is not coincidental that the
institution of war, along with state-building, first occurs in human history
in the same period as the emergence of class hierarchy and a patriarchal
sex/gender system” (2007: 254). In the contemporary gendered system,
states try to behave in ways that adhere to characteristics stereotypically
associated with masculinity and military strength.
Behavior associated with femininity such as cooperation, negotiation,
and compromise is less valued in the international system, which is one
factor leading to conflict. As a Saferworld report suggests, “ideas about
masculinities and femininities which are used to justify these inequalities
[manifest in, for example, debates on women’s participation in combat as
well as formal peace processes] might also contribute to conflict and vio-
lence” (2014: 5). The report presents a case study of young men’s involve-
ment in the practice of cattle raiding in South Sudan that instigates “cycles
of violence” between communities, and has become more dangerous in
recent years due to the proliferation of small arms; “owning a gun and par-
ticipating in a cattle raid are rites of passage for adolescent boys”, and cattle
raids are also linked to “bride price” that men need to pay—in cattle—in
order to get married (see Saferworld 2014: 7). As is noted about this
particular case, “masculinity, weapons, cattle and marriage are therefore
closely linked, combining to create powerful incentives for young men to
participate in violence” (Saferworld 2014: 7). More broadly, as evident in
men’s socialization into militaries and in masculinized, militarized notions

of defense, discussed in more detail later in this chapter, gender is a key
component in the militarization of the international system and is woven
into the causes of conflict and war (Tickner 2001; Sjoberg 2013).
Recognition of gender dynamics in international politics not only draws
attention to the importance of multilevel analysis of conflict and its reso-
lution but also offers a re-constituted understanding of the international
system. This latter point echoes the notion of gendered continuum of
violence discussed above. In the introduction to her edited volume on
Gender, Violent Conflict and Development, for instance, Zarkov illustrates
the analytical employment of gender in IR: “in what ways do specific global
political and economic realities become an element of the local process of
gendered social exclusions; and in what ways do specific local economic
and political dynamics become an element in the gendering of the global
redistribution of power” (2008: 4). As such, feminist inquiry pushes the
boundaries of the kinds of investigations that are deemed legitimate in
mainstream IR.
Transforming Gendered War

Empirical research has established the value of understanding war and
conflict using a feminist perspective (for some recent contributions, see
Zarkov 2008; Sjoberg 2010; Kronsell and Svedberg 2011). Evidence sug-
gests that “[p]eace processes that include women as witnesses, signatories,
mediators, and/or negotiators demonstrated a 20 % increase in the prob-
ability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years. This increases over
time, with a 35 % increase in the probability of a peace agreement last-
ing 15 years” (Stone 2015 cited in UN Women 2015: 49). Practitioners
tend to use the women-as-peacebuilders image to advocate for women’s
inclusion in peace processes because this appears to be non-threatening
in policy negotiations (Naraghi Anderlini 2007: 197); the significance of
biology has been explored in research on gender and conflict (see, e.g.,
Goldstein 2001). However, the more dominant viewpoint within femi-
nist scholarship is that greater involvement of women in conflict resolu-
tion is beneficial not because women are by nature more peaceful but
because their specific placement within the gender hierarchy means that
their gender-specific experiences and interests offer an alternative perspec-
tive to that of masculinized militarism. Conversely, it is the persistence of
unequal gender norms that may well explain why numbers of women, in
spite of growing evidence about their positive roles in peace processes and
negotiations, continue to be minimal—2–4 % (see UN Women 2015: 45).
The marginalization of women, including ex-combatants, also plays out in
post-conflict processes. Based on her extensive research in Sierra Leone,
Megan MacKenzie notes that “the reintegration process for men has been
emphasized as vital to transition from war from peace while the reintegra-
tion process for females has been deemed a ‘social concern’ and has been
moralized as a ‘return to normal’” (2010: 163; see also Wilson 2005: 232,
Luciak and Olmos 2005: 208). This “normalcy” often entails physical,
economic, and social insecurities for women, marking the gendered con-
tinuum of violence for them. Scaling up, Cockburn and Zarkov describe
the “postwar moment” as “part of a continuum of conflict, expressed
now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political force” (2002:
10). What is notable is that the thresholds between peace, conflict, and
peace again are gendered; understanding and addressing causes and con-
sequences of violent conflicts will remain incomplete without adequate
attention to related gender dynamics (UN Women 2015: 207).
The study of war and conflict is crucial for feminist scholars for analyti-
cal as well as for political reasons. As J. Ann Tickner has noted, “a key goal
for feminist theory is to understand how the existing social order, one
many feminists believe is marked by discrimination and oppression, came
into being and how this knowledge can be used to work towards its trans-
formation” (2002: 276). Feminist scholars of war and conflict empha-
size the significance of gender for ending or preventing war and conflict,
and for redefining security in ways that benefit ordinary men and women.
The transformation of existing power relations, including gender rela-
tions that enable violence, is a key normative concern of feminist scholar-
ship. Feminist scholars are particularly interested in instances in which
women and men reject militarized gender roles (Cockburn 2013; Connell
2002). Focusing on such transformative aspects of gender allows for going
beyond considering responses to symptoms of armed conflict such as
forced displacement, valuable as these may be, to identifying resources for
transforming the very context within which women’s and men’s security
and well-being are examined.
The transformative project of feminist IR is often cognizant of the
“where are the women?” question, and the evidence of women’s mar-
ginalization in the formal peace and security arena highlighted here is
illustrative of the same. However, as pointed out here as well, feminists
have also been critical of essentialist notions of women and men. The next
section examines the issue of women leaders to discuss the limitations of

essentialization in greater detail. It contrasts discussions about women’s
leadership with more recent debates on the need to develop feminist for-
eign policies. Through this example we illustrate the need to move from
essentialized notions of “women” to feminist gender analysis in the study
of IR, and conflict and security more specifically.
FROM FEMALE LEADERS TO FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY

For those unfamiliar with the complexities of feminist IR, the inclusion of
gender in the study of IR and in policies on war and conflict is usually asso-
ciated with women’s participation in the public sphere, and with the pro-
tection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence. This
approach draws on, and reproduces, essentialized images of women as
peacemakers and victims. Conversely, there is a commonsense association
of men with war (examined in the next section). It is within these popular
frames of gender that women elites in IR have been considered. As one of
the chapter’s authors was once asked at a formal meeting, “would there
be world peace if all the diplomats of the leading powers were female?”
This is a difficult question to answer not least because the numbers of
women in state parliaments and diplomatic corps continue to be generally
low, making accurate empirical analysis impossible (see Caprioli and Boyer
2001); even the UN, which has been at the forefront of calls for gen-
der equality, continues to have relatively fewer women in senior positions
in the peace and security arena, despite some serious albeit inconsistent
efforts (see Landgren 2015).
At a more fundamental level, however, the question itself is problematic
because it is based on gender essentialism: the assumption that women’s
biology leads to particular policy preferences. Critical feminist IR schol-
ars argue that peaceful womanhood is just one of the many femininities
embodied by women in peace and conflict. Laura Sjoberg explains: “That
some women play roles of advocating for or helping build peace means just
that—that peace-making and peace-building are among women’s many
diverse roles in war” (2014: 45). Recent feminist IR work has strongly
challenged the stereotypical association of women with peace, show-
ing the various ways in which women have participated and increasingly
participate as combatants in militaries and paramilitaries (Alison 2009;
Parashar 2010; McEvoy 2010; MacKenzie 2010) and even in genocidal
rape (Sjoberg 2014: 93). That being said, there are feminist scholars in
political science who engage with the question of gender differences in

attitudes toward foreign policy and the use of force, including in relation
to female policy leaders. This area of study at the intersection of political
science and IR seeks to determine whether there is a “gender gap” when it
comes to support for the use of force and how such a potential gap can be
explained. The findings of this research are inconclusive, and gender gaps
themselves are specific to historic and cultural settings and linked to social
constructions of gender rather than sex (Gallagher 1993; Togeby 1994).
Feminist scholars in political science and in IR have shown that gender
stereotypes, in particular masculine norms of leadership, put pressure on
female (and male) leaders in the executive to prove their willingness to use
force (Koch and Fulton 2011; Enloe 2014; Tickner 2001). On the other
hand, Bashevkin’s study shows that countries with female foreign policy
leaders spend more on programs for women in the Global South and bring
more “rhetorical attention to issues associated with transnational feminism
than the men who preceded or succeeded them” (2014: 425).
Another reason feminist IR scholarship largely rejects the question of
allegedly more pacific female leaders is because it perpetuates gendered
assumptions about what kind of politics count. Elite politics is privileged
to the exclusion of examining war and conflict through the eyes of regu-
lar women and men. As Enloe argues, the focus on the centers of power
is problematic because it underestimates “the amounts and varieties of
power it takes to form and sustain any given set of relationships” in global
politics (Enloe 1996: 186). Moreover, mainstream IR scholarship and
practice has viewed “that which is feminine, and the areas in which women
predominate, … as outside the areas of ‘real’ foreign policy” (Stienstra
1994–1995: 105). Paying attention to those deemed marginal and silent
is an important step in challenging the gendered assumptions of IR. A
focus on female foreign policy leaders to the exclusion of a consideration
of all women, including those on the “bottom-rung”, reinforces the mas-
culinist bias of the discipline (Enloe 1996). Instead, as Enloe explains,
“making useful sense—feminist sense—of international politics requires
us to follow diverse women to places that are usually dismissed by con-
ventional foreign affairs experts as merely ‘private’, ‘domestic’, ‘local’, or
‘trivial’” (Enloe 2014: 3).
In light of these concerns, revisiting the question on female policy elites
in international politics and world peace leads us to related but different
questions about both quantity and quality. First, why is it that the num-
bers of senior-ranking women in the peace and security sphere continue
to be disproportionately low, including in the bureaucracies of countries

and international organizations that have been vocal supporters of gen-
der equality for decades? Second, can there be alternative associations
between gender and the “high politics” of foreign policy and diplomacy?
Depending on the context and disciplinary interests, it is possible to iden-
tify multiple responses to the first question, such as: sexist biases that dis-
tance women from the high-stakes issues of peace and security; related to
this, lack of access to combat roles in most national militaries appears to
negatively affect perceptions about women’s credibility on such matters;
and, at a more individual level, the professional costs—in terms of missed
promotion opportunities or posts at non-family duty stations—that may
well be higher for women who are expected to take on reproductive care
in most societies. There may be a number of responses to the second
question as well, one of which is the discourse of “feminist foreign policy”
that has gained significant traction in recent years. While the concept has
been primarily cultivated by female leaders, especially Hilary Clinton and
Margot Wallström, the emphasis has been on ideals that resonate with
feminist values. The concept of a “feminist foreign policy” may incorpo-
rate questions about women’s participation in decision-making as well as
the popular association of women with pacifism but is certainly not limited
to these issues (on development, e.g., see Richey 2001).
In early 2015, Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström
announced that her government would adopt a feminist foreign policy. In
her definition, “a feminist foreign policy seeks the same goals as any vision-
ary foreign policy: peace, justice, human rights and human development”
(United States Institute of Peace 2015; also see Basu 2016: 262–263).
This interpretation may not go as far as how feminist IR scholars would
define a feminist foreign policy, but her comments open up debate on
“what can or should a feminist-informed foreign policy look like?” From
a critical feminist IR perspective, a feminist perspective on foreign policy
needs to recognize the continuum of violence that shapes diverse women’s
lives and needs to confront global structures of inequality. It needs to chal-
lenge the militarist and masculinist norms of international relations.
The debate on feminist foreign policy furthermore highlights the impor-
tant differentiation between gender balancing and gender mainstreaming.
To ask simply about women’s presence in foreign policy leadership and
thus about the gender balance does little to incorporate a gender perspec-
tive into a country’s foreign policy. With the adoption of UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000 and its implementation
through National Action Plans (NAPs) (which will be discussed in more

detail later in the chapter), this differentiation between gender balanc-
ing and gender mainstreaming becomes particularly significant. A feminist
foreign policy requires more than introducing gender balancing, namely
the tackling of unequal gendered power relations within states and beyond
(True 2010: 191–192). The opposite is equally true: even countries who
have adopted gender mainstreaming into the foreign policy, such as the
USA under the Obama administration, still have an underrepresentation
of women at the senior levels of foreign policy making. These consider-
ations put into critical perspective the question of female leaders’ alleged
pacifism. Substantive policy changes will need to include but also go
beyond a better representation of women in leadership.
Recent discussions in regard to feminist foreign policy open up space
to consider what IR might look like if we took gender equality and diverse
women’s lives seriously. A feminist-informed analysis of IR can certainly
not be limited to women and/or elite-level politics. The next two sec-
tions offer specific examples of feminist analyses of war and conflict in
IR. The first example is that of an intra-state war, a more common phe-
nomenon today than inter-state conflict. The second example illustrates
the emergence of the women, peace, and security agenda in IR through
UNSCR 1325. The two examples, drawing on our own research, illustrate
the breadth of feminist research on war, conflict, and conflict management
and resolution in IR.
GENDER AND THE WAGING OF WAR: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS

OF THE RUSSIAN-CHECHEN WARS
In this section, I outline some of the research conducted for my book

Militarizing Men: Gender, Conscription, and War in Post-Soviet Russia
(Eichler 2012) to illustrate what a feminist analysis of war looks like
through the example of the Russian-Chechen wars. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the Russian military engaged separatist Chechen forces
in two wars lasting from 1994 to 1996 and from 1999 to 2009. Observers
have emphasized different factors in explaining the outbreak of these
wars, from Russian imperialism, the legacy of Soviet nationality policies,
Russia’s economic and geostrategic interests in the Caucasus region, to
the global rise of terrorism. These factors are important to consider, but
a gender lens offers additional insights. As feminist scholars argue, gender
represents a missing piece in the “war puzzle”—a gender lens is necessary

to understand the “meanings, causes, and consequences of war” (Sjoberg
2013: 3). A gender lens is crucial to help explain why conflict broke out
between the Russian state and Chechen separatists, why the Russian state
faced difficulties in waging war in Chechnya, and how the aftermath of
war played out in Russian society broadly and for Russian-Chechen war
veterans specifically.
In researching the Russian-Chechen wars, I drew on feminist IR schol-
arship on war and conflict to inform my questions. I began with the ques-
tion, Where are the women in the Russian-Chechen wars? During the first
Chechen war, the main image of femininity that gained public attention
was that of Russian mothers of conscripts and conscript-age men who pub-
licly protested the war and spoke out against conscription. This was where
my initial interest in the Chechen wars lay: Who were these women, and
why were they taking on the military, this central and powerful institution
of Soviet and now Russian society? What made their challenge to the mili-
tary and state so potent? My feminist inquiry into the Russian-Chechen
wars began by asking about the women, but I ended up with questions
about gender more broadly. As I began to realize, soldiers’ mothers were
challenging not only notions of patriotic motherhood—the idea that a
mother should support her son’s military service—but something even
more fundamental to the state’s ability to wage war. They were challeng-
ing the idea that serving in the military is a citizenship duty of men and is
important to the socialization of boys into men. While I had begun with
an interest in motherhood, militarized masculinity soon became the cen-
tral focus of my investigation.
During the Soviet period, militarized masculinity had been firmly
linked to male conscription. Thus, male conscription was justified by the
idea that serving in the military helps boys become men and equips them
with the traits stereotypically associated with masculinity. Military service
was also seen as key obligation of male citizenship and patriotism. This
notion of militarized masculinity was supported by the idea of patriotic
motherhood that defined “good” mothers to be those willing to sacrifice
their sons for the state’s defense (Enloe 1993: 12). Militarized masculinity
and patriotic motherhood began to be challenged during the Soviet war in
Afghanistan, when conscripts went missing and their mothers began to ask
questions about their whereabouts (Eichler 2012: chap. 1). By the time
the first Chechen war broke out in December 1994, notions of militarized
masculinity and patriotic motherhood were in full-fledged crisis.
In developing my analysis of the Russian-Chechen wars through the lens

of militarized masculinity, I drew on a variety of disciplinary approaches.
Feminist IR scholarship on war and militarization featured prominently
(Enloe 2000; Whitworth 2004), but I also drew on feminist sociological
and anthropological work on militaries (Gill 1997; Sasson-Levy 2003) and
on critical masculinities studies (Connell 1987; Connell 2000; Morgan
1994). Methodologically my research was based on fieldwork interviews
with Russian soldiers’ mothers activists, draft evaders, conscripts, and war
veterans, supplemented by analysis of government materials and public
statements, media coverage, opinion polls, and secondary sources. Such
an approach allowed me to pay attention in my analysis to the continuum
of violence and to different levels of analysis to show the complex gen-
dered processes involved in the waging of war.
By widening my analytical lens to broader processes of gendered milita-
rization that enable and help legitimize war, I could place the war within
a broader continuum of violence which includes mobilization for war
through male conscription, violent military socialization practices, vio-
lence against civilians in war, everyday violence in the aftermath of war,
and the post-combat experiences of veterans and their families. My analy-
sis showed how this continuum of violence was disrupted when soldiers’
mothers activists challenged the state’s conscription policy and supported
draft evaders and deserters. It was also disrupted by the experiences and
portrayals of Russian veterans who returned from Chechnya. Dominant
representations of the Russian men who fought in the Chechen wars often
departed from the ideal image of the heroic warrior, instead being seen as
unwilling warriors, fragile warriors, excessive warriors, and unrecognized
warriors. These competing representations of Russian-Chechen war veter-
ans contributed to the state’s difficulties in waging war and mobilizing the
population for these wars (Eichler 2011, 2012, chap. 5).
I was interested not only in militarized masculinity across a continuum
of violence but also in how militarized masculinity operated and functioned
at various levels, including the individual, societal, and state levels. As for
the state, the Russian-Chechen wars, I argued, are best understood in
the context of the deep ideological crisis of post-communist transforma-
tion and attempts to re-establish the legitimacy of the state and its leader-
ship. Lack of legitimacy can become associated with a crisis in masculinity,
while the ability of state leaders to mobilize the nation on the basis of
militarized patriotism can confer masculinized legitimacy onto those wag-
ing war. Domestic and foreign policy leaders often seek to buttress their
leadership through a show of manliness, and that appearance of manliness

is often achieved through association with the military or war (Kreisky
1997; Enloe 2004b; Nagel 2004). A militarized notion of masculinity
was central to the Russian state’s justifications for both wars and part of
broader attempts to re-legitimize the post-Soviet regime.
The 1990s were characterized by a deepening crisis in the legitimacy
of the post-Soviet regime under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin.
When Yeltsin intervened in Chechnya in December 1994, he relied on an
official discourse that was very much gendered. The official justification
of the war portrayed the Russian leadership as the masculine protector of
state and nation: Yeltsin was depicted as the one who could provide order,
ensure the integrity of the state, and the safety of its citizens. A notion
of ordered, patriotic Russian masculinity was juxtaposed to a notion of
aggressive, criminal, and corrupt masculinity apparently embodied by (at
least some) Chechen men. War against Chechnya resumed in the fall of
1999 in response to terrorist attacks and was officially justified by the need
to secure the state’s territorial integrity and to protect Russia’s citizens
from terrorism. The Russian government promised tough and decisive
action to re-establish law and order throughout the Chechen republic.
The government linked Chechen terrorism to international terrorism and
extremism, and vowed to rid Chechnya of terrorists. The second Chechen
war helped launch then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin into the presidency.
His execution of the war helped him embody an image of strong, patriotic
Russian masculinity juxtaposed to an image of unruly Chechen masculin-
ity represented by terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists (Eichler 2012:
chap. 2).
The war in Chechnya was used by both post-Soviet leaders, Yeltsin and
Putin, in an attempt to strengthen their leadership position. As others
have argued, the domestic crisis and in particular the deep socio-economic
crisis and rising popularity of nationalists in post-Soviet Russia led Yeltsin
to take a strong stance on Chechnya (Lentini 1996: 166). Yeltsin and his
advisers apparently believed that military intervention in Chechnya could
serve to boost the president’s waning popularity. The Secretary of the
Russian Security Council is claimed to have said: “It is not only a ques-
tion of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the
President’s ratings” (quoted in Gall and de Wa1l 1997: 161). The politi-
cal leadership hoped that the war in Chechnya would help establish an
image of Yeltsin as a patriotic warrior (Soldner 1999: 162–163). While
Yeltsin faced difficulties in mobilizing the citizenry behind the first war,
opinion polls in the early phase of the second war revealed that supporters
of then Prime Minister Putin saw him as “decisive, strong-willed and strict
in his demands to re-establish order” (quoted in Alexseev 2006: 101).
As a result of his response to the terrorist attacks, Putin quickly saw his
approval rating rise from 5 % in September 1999 to 45 % in November
of the same year (Alexseev 2006: 108). Putin who at the time had only
recently entered politics and been little known became the most popular
politician of 1999 and even earned the designation of “Man of the Year”
(Fond “Obshchestvennoe mnenie” 2000). Putin became acting president
at the end of 1999 and won a majority of the votes in the first round of
the March 2000 presidential election. The rise in Putin’s popularity was
closely tied to his tough execution of the Chechen war and his successful
appeal to militarized masculinity and patriotism (Eichler 2012: chap. 2).
At the level of state leadership and state discourse, both Chechen
wars relied on militarized masculinity for their justification and appeal.
However, at the societal level the two wars exhibited a markedly differ-
ent politics of militarized masculinity. During the first Chechen war, pro-
tests by soldiers’ mothers against conscription and the war challenged the
state’s waging of war, as did large-scale draft evasion and desertion. Young
men and their families questioned the value of military service as a result of
violent hazing practices, poor service conditions, and the dangers of being
involved in an ongoing war. Also, the introduction of a market economy
in post-Soviet Russia had produced new notions of masculinity rooted
in economic success rather than militarized patriotic duty which under-
mined draft compliance among Russia’s young men (Eichler 2012: chap.
3). Moreover, soldiers’ mothers activists openly questioned the military’s
actions and supported conscripts, draft evaders, and deserters. The moth-
ers blamed the Russian government for the breakout of war and were
critical of the government’s scapegoating of Chechens (Eichler 2012:
chap. 4). The first Chechen war was characterized by a deep question-
ing of militarized masculinity among the Russian population and among
conscript-age men and their families in particular.
During the second Chechen war, soldiers’ mothers groups continued
to challenge notions of patriotic motherhood and militarized masculinity,
but found it increasingly difficult to gain public attention for their cause.
In an attempt to strengthen militarized patriotism and improve draft com-
pliance, the Russian government introduced a patriotic education pro-
gram. In the context of President Putin’s attempts to revive militarized
patriotism and the ongoing war against terrorism, motherhood lost some
of its legitimacy as a platform for dissent. Moreover, the appearance of

Chechen female suicide bombers during the second war fed into the war
on terror rhetoric and its construction of “civilized” Russians versus “bar-
baric” Chechens. New soldiers’ mothers groups emerged that received
government support and encouraged men to follow the draft call, while
Afghan and Chechen war veterans were recruited to participate in patri-
otic education programs for the youth. Despite these attempts to revive
militarized masculinity from above, official notions of militarized mascu-
linity remained contested during the second Chechen war and draft eva-
sion remained a major concern for the government (Eichler 2011, 2012,
chaps. 3–4). As this discussion shows, a gender lens allows us to see the
connections and contradictions between developments at state, societal,
and individual levels that are important to a deeper understanding of these
wars.
My study of the Russian–Chechen wars was also informed by normative
concerns with demilitarization and gender equality. I was interested in the
challenges to militarism that present themselves when men and women
refuse to adhere to state-prescribed militarized gender roles: when men
refuse to serve in the military and fight in war and when women support
and even encourage men’s draft evasion. The first Chechen war exempli-
fied how potent mothers’ anti-conscription and anti-war activism can be
in undermining a state’s ability to wage war. The insight that men are
not born militaristic but become militarized opens up space to recon-
sider gender roles and the militarist policies that they help sustain. On
the other hand, militarized masculinity is central to the perpetuation of
gender inequality. Men’s obligatory military service genders the institu-
tion of citizenship in ways that elevate men’s citizenship status over that
of women. Militarized masculinity also shapes political power, as gender
signifies relations of power more broadly. The ability to associate with
hegemonic notions of masculinity, such as those connected to the military
and war, can benefit a political candidate. Thus, an examination of how
notions of militarized masculinity achieve or lose hegemony is important
for understanding not just the waging of war but also gender equality
and the gendering of social and political power. The first Chechen war
was highly unpopular among the Russian public, and President Yeltsin felt
compelled to declare a cease-fire in the lead-up to the 1996 presidential
election, while the second war illustrated state efforts to revive militarized
masculinity in support of the waging of war.
Russia’s post-communist transformation entailed a profound socio-

economic, political, and ideological crisis, in the context of which its
leadership came to see war as an important political tool for regime legiti-
mation (Eichler 2012; Sperling 2014). Both Russian-Chechen wars exhib-
ited challenges to militarized masculinity at the societal level—even while
the second war resulted in a partial restoration of militarized masculinity
and patriotism. A focus on gender, and more specifically on militarized
masculinity, gives us a deeper understanding of the reasons and justifi-
cations behind these wars and the difficulties the Russian state faced in
mobilizing its population for war. The Russian-Chechen wars illustrate
that gender and the waging of war (as well as its contestations) are deeply
connected. Employing an interdisciplinary gender lens allows us to take
into account women and men, femininities and masculinities, and gen-
dered power relations, at a variety of levels and along a gendered con-
tinuum of violence. A feminist analysis helps paint a more comprehensive
and complex picture of the Russian-Chechen wars compared to analyses
that do not take gender into account.
“MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE

AND SECURITY”: GENDER IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
As noted above, the Chechen wars reflect well the kind of armed conflicts
that have characterized the international security arena in recent decades.
While the status of Russia, not least its identity as one of the permanent
five members of the UN Security Council, has prevented any major inter-
vention by external actors into the Chechen wars, the international com-
munity has had to grapple with these “new wars” in other regions of the
world since the 1980s. It was apparent that the causes and consequence of
these armed conflicts were being increasingly shaped by what is referred to
in this volume as “sub-systemic factors”. On the one hand, scholarly and
policy literatures began to recognize, for instance, that national security
does not necessarily imply the security of its citizens, and that security and
development are connected (Cronin 2002; Duffield 2001; Thomas 2001;
Boutros-Ghali 1992; UNDP 1994). On the other hand, the battlefield for
these wars was no longer demarcated—civilians were deliberately targeted
(ICISS 2001); further, sexual violence—against women and men—was
used systematically—increasingly—as a “weapon of war” (Meger 2011;
Sivakumaran 2007).
In this section, we build on our earlier discussions on causes of conflict

to examine the related aspect of how these conflicts may be addressed
and, more specifically, the gender dimension of international conflict
management and resolution. Moving the spotlight to the UN, this sec-
tion focuses on the first UNSCR on “women and peace and security”—
UNSCR 1325—that recognizes the gendered nature of armed conflicts
and peace processes. The section begins with an examination of the case
that was built for the passage of UNSCR 1325 by its advocates, and the
extent to which the provisions of the resolution re-envisioned the man-
date of the Council—“maintenance of international peace and security”.
Notwithstanding the passage of seven follow-up WPS resolutions—
UNSCRs 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2242—their imple-
mentation, that is the use of the concept of gender in the work of the
Security Council, has been uneven. Drawing on existing feminist critique
on the subject, the final part of this section evaluates the implementation
of the resolutions. It focuses especially on the difference that the resolu-
tions make to the work of the UN Security Council. The discussion is
placed within the broader context of feminist perspectives in IR and other
relevant fields such as international law and women’s studies that have
pointed out that it is not just the waging of war that is gendered but that
its resolution is gendered as well (see, e.g., Cockburn and Zarkov 2002;
Chinkin 2002–2003).
As the understanding of conflict and security was re-conceptualized in
international policy documents such as the 1992 Agenda for Peace and
the 1994 Human Development Report (wherein the concept of human
security was presented), the concept of gender slowly gained traction at
the UN (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UNDP 1994). While the links between
women and peace had been made since the First World Conference on
Women held in Mexico City in 1975, it is in the 1990s that the hitherto
separate trajectories of the low politics of “women’s issues” and high poli-
tics of “peace and security” intersected in a substantive manner (Cockburn
2007). The 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing
identified armed conflicts as a “critical area of concern” in its Platform
for Action; women and armed conflicts was the theme of the 1998
Commission on the Status of Women meeting; and in the same year, rape
was identified as a war crime in the Rome Statute for the establishment of
the International Criminal Court (see Basu 2010). These developments
were strongly influenced by the empirical evidence from ongoing con-
flicts that demonstrated that women and men experienced armed conflicts
differently; sexual violence against women was increasingly used as a tactic

in war; and women were not only “victims” of armed conflicts but also
demonstrated agency as peacemakers and indeed combatants (as soldiers
and peacekeepers) (Moser and Clark 2001; Lorentzen and Turpin 1998;
Copelon 2000).
The concept of “gender mainstreaming” also gained credence at the
UN in the 1990s. As per a widely cited definition, “mainstreaming a
gender perspective is the process of assessing the implication for women
and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or pro-
grammes, in any areas and at all levels” (UN ECOSOC 1997). The UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations was the first among the orga-
nization’s security-related entities that introduced gender mainstreaming
into its work in the late nineties (see Mackay 2005; Olsson and Tryggestad
2001). In May 2000, the Security Council and the General Assembly
endorsed the Windhoek Declaration that called for gender mainstream-
ing in peacekeeping operations (UNGA UNSC 2000). A review of this
policy literature suggests a growing awareness of gender issues outlined
above (see Basu 2010). Importantly, together these documents also
created an international framework on gender and security, which sub-
stantively expanded earlier—limited—references to women as victims
in international humanitarian law (Gardam and Charlesworth 2000). A
number of civil society events such as the “Women building peace” cam-
paign of International Alert and the hundredth anniversary conference
of the Hague Conference held in 1999 also consolidated these links in
what has come to be known as the “women, peace and security” (WPS)
agenda. Indeed, the role of civil society actors is widely considered to be
crucial for the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent advocacy for
the implementation of the resolution (Cockburn 2007; Cohn 2004; Hill
et al. 2003; Naraghi Anderlini 2007). By October 2000 when the resolu-
tion was adopted, women’s role in conflict resolution and prevention and
the need to protect women and girls from violence in armed conflicts had
been established. The recognition of these linkages was cemented with the
passage of UNSCR 1325 in 2000.
The resolution is considered to be a landmark policy document because
it is for the first time that the Security Council recognized the gendered
nature of conflict and peace processes, and called for recognition as well
as increasing participation of women in conflict resolution, and for the
protection of women and girls during conflicts (UNSC 2000). It brings a
gender perspective to the humanitarian aspect of armed conflicts and the
formal and informal processes associated with conflict resolution. Felicity

Hill writes that “Resolution 1325 is typical of the Council’s first resolu-
tion on a theme … sketch[ing] out the scope of the Council’s concern in
a broad normative scene” (2004–2005: 2–3). It includes provisions on a
wide range of UN operations including peacekeeping, peace negotiations,
de-mining operations, repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, rein-
tegration and post-conflict reconstruction (including nation-building),
and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (UNSC 2000). With
no reference to gender in its formal title, UNSCR 1325 on “women and
peace and security” focuses on women and girls. So, the resolution pri-
marily focuses on gender as a variable in the contexts identified above.
There are references to gender perspective and gender mainstreaming, but
the policy implications are left ambiguous.
Thus, on the one hand, the resolution does not seriously challenge the
institutional conceptualization of security (Shepherd 2007)—gender, spe-
cifically women and girls, are brought into the mandate to the extent that
it is relevant to the work of the Council, that is issues identified as “threats
to international peace and security”. On the other hand, in linking wom-
en’s participation and protection with international peace and security and
by calling for gender perspective on “domestic factors” such as nation-
building and post-conflict reconstruction, the separation between levels
of analyses traditionally used to conceptualize security in IR are blurred.
The seven follow-up resolutions have strengthened the mandate of
resolution 1325 even as the focus has primarily been on provisions to
address the use of sexual violence against women in armed conflicts; four
of the resolutions have focused on the “protection” mandate of SCR 1325
(UNSC 2008, 2009a, b, 2010, 2013a, b, 2015). Critics have pointed out
that this aspect of women’s experience fits well into the discourse of seeing
women as victims and does not address more fundamental links between
gender and militarism (discussed in the previous sections of this chapter)
that undergird the systematic use of sexual violence during armed conflicts
and indeed peacetime. There is also paucity of attention to economic and
social security of women, which in turn provides a limited understanding
of the continuum of violence within which women’s experiences of war
are located. However, over the course of 15 years since the passage of
UNSCR 1325, there have been new developments in the discourse of the
WPS agenda at the Security Council and beyond (UN Women 2015: 31).
For instance, the attention given to violence against women has brought
to light that sexual violence is also targeted toward men and boys during
armed conflicts (Basu 2013). This was recognized in SCR 2106 (UNSC
2013a; Kirby 2015: 470) and certainly gives a more holistic sense of the
social relations that factor into contemporary wars. Thus, while it is possi-
ble to argue—as noted above—that resolutions on “women and peace and
security” work within the traditional framework of the Security Council,
bringing in women, men, and their different experiences of war poten-
tially re-constitutes the meaning of international peace and security at the
Council.
The third “move” of feminist analysis discussed in this chapter relates
to normative change. It is expected that implementation of UNSCR
1325 would lead to protection of women and girls in conflict-affected
and post-conflict societies. Further, increasing the role of women—as
peacemakers and peacekeepers—would lead to gender equality in the
international security arena. UN entities and member states have adopted
specific mechanisms to operationalize the provisions of the resolutions
that, importantly, include allocation of funds and personnel. For instance,
as per UNSCR 1888 (2009a), the Office of the Special Representative of
the Secretary General (SRSG) for Sexual Violence in Conflict was estab-
lished in 2010, with Margot Wallström serving as the first SRSG, fol-
lowed by Zainab Hawa Bangura of Sierra Leone taking over in 2012;
and, as of 2015, more than 50 countries have adopted NAPs for the
implementation of the WPS resolutions. At the same time, conversely,
the UN continues to grapple with the involvement of its peacekeepers
in sexual exploitation and abuse in conflict zones (Ndulo 2009)5; and,
the impact of the NAPs on the foreign policy of donor or troop con-
tributing member states as well as reconstruction efforts of post-con-
flict states is debatable (for a recent assessment, see Miller et al. 2014).
Even as advocates call for more political will and financial resources as
well as a more thorough understanding of specific conflicts—including
local-national-regional-global dynamics—toward better implementation
of the WPS resolutions, the broader normative framework within which
UNSCR 1325 was adopted needs to be highlighted: as Cora Weiss has
famously noted, the aim of resolution 1325 was not to “make war safe for
women” (Weiss 2011). She, among others, has called for more emphasis
on the conflict prevention aspect of the resolution whereby gender is
not only used instrumentally—to talk about protection and participation
of women—after war begins but is also used to prevent conflict before
it turns violent. In this regard, gender-related early warning indicators
have been proposed by the UN and civil society organizations such as

Saferworld (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Saferworld 2014; Shoemaker 2002).6
Based on this discussion on resolution 1325, it may be possible to sug-
gest that the UN Security Council, which to a large extent reflects the
power dynamics of 1945 in terms of its permanent members and voting
structure, has nevertheless identified gender as an integral part of its man-
date (Basu 2016). As such, it is ahead of many “schools” in the discipline
of IR. In practice, however, conceptual limitations in the provisions and
uneven implementation of the “women and peace and security” resolu-
tions resonate with gender’s treatment in IR whereby, for instance, gen-
der tends to be added as an afterthought to already formulated policies/
research questions. Instead, IR scholars as much as policymakers need to
pay attention to the ways in which using gender provides deeper insights
into the causes and impact of conflict, and offers possibilities for gender
equality and transformation of armed conflicts.
CONCLUSION
Key concepts in IR such as the state, sovereignty, citizenship, power, and
anarchy are based on a particular kind of experience, one that gives pri-
macy to masculine traits, the stereotyped experience of being a man. As
the discussion on the Russian-Chechen wars in this chapter suggest, ste-
reotypical masculine values that celebrate militarism draw upon a partial
understanding of male behavior. Robert Connell’s (1995) influential work
on masculinities points out that such partial understanding does not cor-
respond to any generalizable behavior of men; it is a construct of an ideal
dominant force that seeks to subordinate the mixed archetypes of mascu-
linities and femininities that operate in society, including in IR practices.
The dominant voices in IR, however, have used limited and selected read-
ings of political theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau, and adapted, for
instance, elements of competitiveness and struggle for autonomy in poli-
tics, without acknowledging that the only gender role under discussion
is the male one (Grant 1991: 10). Instead, as Rebecca Grant points out,
“separating women from the public realm has led to suspicions … [that]
social relations on which the state is based are not pure types; they are
products of gender bias” (1991: 14). As such, while feminist IR scholars
tend to be associated with bringing attention to women’s marginalization
in the study and practice of IR, they have also used gender as a category of
analysis to call for inclusion of social relations and multiplicity of human

experiences, including those of women, in re-constituting IR.
In its review of feminist contributions to the study of conflict, secu-
rity, and peace in IR, the chapter provided a brief overview of the evolu-
tion of the sub-field of feminist IR and the more recent emergence of
Feminist Security Studies. Highlighting that insights from multiple dis-
ciplines constitute feminist IR, it argues that feminist scholarship is well
suited to deepen interdisciplinarity within IR. Three particular aspects—
“moves”—of feminist analysis were identified in section two: first, there
is an interest in investigating the relative marginalization of women in the
study of IR and making gender visible; second, using gender as an analyti-
cal category, the fundamental assumptions and concepts of IR, war and
its boundaries and causes are challenged; third, while there are diverse
feminist responses to what counts as transformation, all feminist research
is normatively oriented. All three “moves” are valuable and may well be
used together. Specifically, feminist scholarship on conflict—the focus of
section two—challenges the idea that the practice or study of war can be
“gender-neutral”. Feminist scholars ask questions such as “where are the
women?” and “how is war and conflict gendered?”; they re-think war as
part of a gendered continuum of violence and are as interested in how
individual women and men experience war as they are interested in famil-
ial, societal, state, and system-level factors in the study of war.
While a tremendous volume of feminist research on the study of
conflict is available, this chapter focused on two specific ways in which
employment of gender challenges the traditional boundaries of IR. First,
it put a question mark to the distinction made between levels of analy-
sis by highlighting how wars span international, domestic, and individual
spheres. Second, it introduced the concept of “continuum of violence”
that highlights gendered forms of violence across time and space. Before
illustrating the relevance of these feminist innovations through two empir-
ical examples, this chapter critically considered commonsense understand-
ings of female leaders’ alleged pacifism. We discussed problems inherent
in this very question, in particular its essentialist assumptions and limited
focus on elite-level politics. We suggested instead that recent debates on
feminist foreign policy offer a more useful avenue to consider how gender
matters in IR and what substantive change would entail.
Next, the discussion on the Russian-Chechen wars illustrated the ways
in which gender is central to how wars are justified, waged, contested, and
experienced. It demonstrated how militarized masculinity and associated
constructions of femininity are fundamental to a state’s ability to wage war,

and how challenges to militarized gender roles can undermine a state’s
ability to wage war. The second case of the UNSCR 1325 on Women
and Peace and Security moved the discussion to the international policy-
making arena. It focused on the dynamics of the engagement of the UN
Security Council with gender, within the broader context of the changing
nature of contemporary armed conflicts. Critique of the resolutions and
their implementation notwithstanding, it was argued that UNSCR 1325
and the follow-up thematic resolutions have made a difference to how
conflict and its resolution are understood in the Council and the larger
international policy framework on security.
Lest the relatively straightforward narrative of this chapter suggest that
feminist engagement with IR, including on matters of conflict, peace, and
security, has evolved in a benign way, it is necessary to recognize in this
concluding note that feminist (inter)disciplinary interventions have not
always been welcomed into the IR disciplinary fold. Generally associated
with the post-positivist turn in IR, feminist scholarship shared the brunt
of being evaluated by traditional benchmarks (such as the need to isolate
the “object” of study) in spite of having different epistemological and
ontological assumptions. The responses to Robert Keohane’s 1989 essay
“International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint”
and Adam Jones’ 1996 article “Does ‘Gender Make the World Go Round?’
Feminist critiques of International Relations” are particularly good early
examples of the often-times fraught engagement. Further, owing to the
differences within feminist IR, there is diversity in how scholars have
adapted feminist insights into IR (for a range, see Hudson and den Boer
2004; Tickner 1997; Stern and Zalewski 2009).
The chapter has not examined these debates but recognizes the politi-
cal nature (and normative aspect) of feminist research within IR. As has
been discussed here, feminist IR enhances our understanding of areas tra-
ditionally of interest to IR and brings in new areas of research. Feminist
IR scholars also share an interest in changing the frames of the discipline
itself. This is—by definition—a contentious process, but one that is bound
to advance interdisciplinarity within IR. The chapters in this volume aim
to change how we think about IR and we believe that feminist IR scholar-
ship is crucial to that endeavor.
NOTES
1. Craig N. Murphy (1998) traces this “first” in the US IR literature to a 1972
article by Bernice Carroll in the Journal of Conflict Resolution although the
article was not self-identified as a feminist piece. He notes, however, that the
Millennium Special Edition had the most visible impact in the study of
IR. Annick T.R. Wibben notes three conferences, and the publications of
their proceedings, as having “completed the launch of feminist thought
onto the IR scene” (2004: 98). The conferences were held at the London
School of Economics (1988), the University of Southern California (1990),
and Wellesley College (1990); and the publications were the Millennium
Special Edition, noted above, Gender and International Relations (1991)
edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, and Gendered States
(1992) edited by V. Spike Peterson (Wibben 2004: 98–99).
2. Masculinism refers to “not questioning the elevation of ways of being and
knowing associated with men and masculinity over those associated with
women and femininity” (Hooper 1998: 31).
3. The sections draw on the authors’ respective areas of research: Eichler has
published on militarized masculinities (2011, 2012, 2014) and Basu focuses
on UN Security Council resolutions on Women and Peace and Security
(2010, 2016).
4. See Enloe (1993) on the Cold war and its aftermath; Niva (1998) on the
first Gulf war; Zalewski (1995) on the war in Bosnia; Cockburn (1999) on
women’s peace activism across ethnic/national boundaries.
5. Notably, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2272 in March 2016
that considers the specific issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN
peacekeepers and makes recommendations to address the same.
6. The suggestion in UNSCR 2242 (2015) to involve more women in coun-
tering terrorism and violent extremism has received a somewhat mixed
response (see Ní Aoláin 2016: 285).
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CHAPTER 8
Demography and International Relations:

Economics, Politics, Sociology, and Conflict
Tadeusz Kugler
Demography is an intrinsically dynamic field of study that shapes the very

characteristics of a society, which in turn has implications for the causation
of conflict and dynamics of international relations in general. Intelligent
observers might well argue that world affairs at the core is about the peo-
ple that populate the planet, but the field of IR has largely ignored this
dimension of world politics, compared to other concerns, possibly because
it falls at a sub-systemic level of analysis—an area of analysis that this book
seeks to elevate with regard to the interdisciplinary study of IR.
Yet, demographic studies allow for the analysis of fundamental structures
of society and can significantly enhance our understanding of international
relations and the causes of conflict. Structural patterns that produce the
demographic transition,1 youth bulges,2 migrations,3 gender imbalances,4
and population size,5 and density6 result in large part from choices made by
policy-makers. These patterns then have the potential to affect profoundly
the stability of nations and other key issues of the international system.
Economic pressures, political destabilization, and even the potential for
conflict can be influenced by these dynamics and decisions.
T. Kugler ()
Politics and International Relations, Roger Williams University,
Bristol, RI, USA
e-mail: tkugler@rwu.edu

230 T. KUGLER
This chapter strongly suggests the pressing need for further development
of the field of political demography with a special emphasis on its influence
in the field of conflict studies. As such, it aims to sketch a truly interdisci-
plinary approach to the study of IR, with some focus on conflict dynamics.
Consider first the discipline of demography. Broadly defined, demog-
raphy is “the study of the size, territorial distribution, and composition
of population, changes therein, and the components of such changes”
(Hauser and Duncan 1959: 31). Births, deaths, and mobility are its pri-
mary research questions. The ubiquity of these topics and their impor-
tance to all aspects of human life link the study of demography to a variety
of disciplines, including IR.
Despite its relevance to multiple fields, it is important to remember that
demography comprises its own distinct discipline, not simply a method. It
deals mainly with creation of census, development of data collection, and
specification of sub-components of population. The study of this field,
though, is not always treated institutionally as a separate discipline. Within
academia, only a handful of specialized centers—often under the aspects of
quantitatively minded sociologists—have made a concerted effort to link
demographic variations with economic and social changes.
Creation of fields within an academic framework allows for the blos-
soming of research agendas. Parallel development and isolation decrease
the overall effectiveness and efficiency of development as each group
moves without a shared framework of past study. This limitation reduces
the advantage of knowing what works and what should be improved
upon. Creation of a standardized canon of literature, and most impor-
tantly methods, provides the knowledge necessary for expanded opportu-
nities to broaden our understanding about the effects of demography on
politics and reverberation of those influences on history.
As this chapter will show, politics and demographics are synergistic. In
political demography, a particular focus of this chapter, the interdisciplinary
drive originates from the belief that knowledge of demography can shape
institutional and non-institutional change and outcomes in world affairs
ranging from inequality to domestic and international conflict. Weiner
(1971) points out that this area of study “is concerned with the political
consequences of population change, especially the effects of population
change on the demands made upon governments, on the performance
of governments, on the distribution of political power within states, and
on the distribution of national power among states” (1971: 597). The
importance of political demography, he notes, goes beyond governmental
DEMOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ECONOMICS, POLITICS... 231
concerns and statistical data: “in the study of political demography it is not
enough to know the facts and figures of population—that is fertility, mor-
tality, and migration rates; it is also necessary to consider the knowledge
and attitudes that people and their governments have toward population
issues.”
Currently a variety of detailed breakdowns and multiple data sources
are available both nationally and most importantly cross-nationally.
Table 8.1 helps to illustrate only a few of the possible sources of national
and cross-national, complex demographic information. Data collec-
tion is both by the states themselves and then often compiled by inter-
national organizations but can also be collected directly at the local
level. Combination of the three methods means that it is common for
the primary variables, births and deaths, to be reasonably supported
or supported at a higher level than other traditional cross-national
measurements.
Births and deaths, moreover, are a cornerstone of interdisciplinary
health public policy. Early cross-national results are associated, unexpect-
edly, with a higher likelihood of birth-related deaths with choices and
length of garments,7 creating some of the first connections between and
among sociality, politics, and the study of public health (Graunt 1665).
In many ways, the central concerns of birth, death, and lifespan have per-
sisted in demographic studies from the early analysis of the seventeenth-
century English statistician, John Graunt, to today. The state of one sex
significantly outnumbering the other, for example, remains a concern for
demographers and the policy-makers who rely on their work. This was
a concern for Graunt’s early demographic studies, which, among other
things, attempted to track the number of European males taking monastic
Table 8.1 Common demographic data sources

Source Title
Eurostat Population—Eurostat Yearbook

UN Population Division World Population Prospects: The 2012
Revision
US Census Bureau Decennial Census
US Census Bureau & Bureau of Labor Current Population Survey (CPS)
Statistics
The World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)
World Health Organization Global Health Observatory (GHO)
232 T. KUGLER
vows of celibacy, serving as one of the key origin moments in research

on the interactions between a social norm and population reduction.
Although different political implications follow from an analysis of long-
term problems emerging from gender imbalance (i.e., depending upon
the situation at hand), this continues as a concern today.
Clearly, demography offers academics, government policy-makers,
health officials, and many other groups a useful set of concepts and
methods for addressing crucial issues of their professions. What the field
frequently lacks, though, is a clear, concise, generalizable, and accepted
theoretical structure linking political and socioeconomy to demographic
changes. Instead, research often is isolated from other demographically
related projects. Rather than viewing demography as a wider field within
which multiple methodologies and approaches may apply to many proj-
ects, demographically driven research often focuses on a single issue.
Demographic tools are beneficial, but thinking of it as a field in its own
right allows the environmental economist to learn from a study of school
districting policy or the World Health Organization’s tracking of a disease.
A major step in the development of political demography is training
interdisciplinary students and scholars in the use and understanding of
demographical concepts and methods. Only as scholars in a variety of disci-
plines become familiar with concepts developed by demographers will new
inquiries offer fruitful insights and therefore increase the depth of study.
Political demography should attempt to create a unified interdisciplinary
field with participation from a variety of disciplines, one of which is IR.
Demography is dynamic and has serious political consequences, which
include international change and conflict—key areas explored in this book.
Demography could combine with work from historical studies, political
science, and other disciplines to illuminate key dynamics in world affairs.
This chapter will start with an overview of the history and breadth, cross-
nationally, of demographical studies. The latter half of the chapter provides
a synopsis of current research agendas. Complexities of both increased life
expectancies and lower infant mortalities will be linked to demographi-
cal transitions (an aging population) and youth bulges (a disproportionate
young population). Migrations and population flows, within nations and at
the international level, have been (and continue to be) a key topic of con-
cern. Lastly, dramatic changes in demographical structure after severe wars,
and possibly in the degree of the future economic strain, is a sustained mat-
ter and one of increased possible concern. All of this matters significantly
to IR in general and the study of conflict in particular.
OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL STUDY

Basic studies of population have a long history. Even before the Han
dynasty census in second century CE, what is now the People’s Republic
of China already had begun to recognize the importance of demography.
Wang (1995, 1999) points to examples such as the fourth-century BCE
reformer Shang Yang as a key figure in the development of the field in
China. Concerned with encouraging population growth in order to create
a balanced—though not necessarily large—populace, Shang Yang sought
incentives to attract immigrants, such as land offers and tax exemptions.
Shang Yang was not alone in his views. His work fits into a long his-
tory of demographic study that continues to this day. Research on current
demographic trends within China’s population, such as Wang (1995),
contextualizes within it 2500 years of demographic study and policies. By
linking historicism to political demography, this framework suggests that
the modern Chinese policy is simply the continuation of traditional ideas
of population organization and control from deep historical origins. This
approach points to an interdisciplinary example of demographic study,
but it also highlights the rich record of scholarship that is missed when
demography is thought of merely as a tool rather than as a field in its own
right. This point reminds us of the universality of such research.
Much of the scholarship on demography in North America and Europe
does not address the field’s long global history. One of the earliest figures
usually cited for European demographic study, John Graunt, is best known
for his Natural and Political Observations … upon the Bills of Mortality.
First published in 1662, this work listed the number and manner of deaths
per week in London. Initially intending to track the spread of bubonic
plague that culminated into the Great London Plague of 1665–1666,
Graunt collected some of the first longitudinal mortality tables. His tables
became very popular, running into multiple updated editions over the next
decade. He, however, saw his data as holding greater analytical potential
than his readers seemed to find in them. Graunt observed that most of
his fellow Londoners took these “Bills of Mortality” as short-term infor-
mation: it provided a news source for conversation that week, it helped
wealthy Londoners determine whether or not to leave for the country, and
gave tradesmen a sense of how their business might fare in the immediate
future.
Graunt believed that more could be done with this information beyond
tracking the progress of the plague. By placing his data into tables, he
234 T. KUGLER
could compare: “one Year, Season, Parish, or other Division of the City,
with another, in respect of all the Burials, and Christenings, and of all the
Diseases, and Casualties, happening in each of them respectively.” The
study of demographic data allowed him to “begin not only to examine the
conceits, opinions, and conjectures which upon view of a few scattered
Bills I had taken up; but did also admit new ones, as I found reason, and
occasion from my Tables” (Graunt 1665: 3, capitalization and spelling
original). More than information on the spread and fatality of one dis-
ease could be gleaned from Graunt’s tables. Graunt also used his tables
to raise questions about overall fertility and health in the British Isles. He
grouped individuals by sex and age, as well as whether they lived in the
country or city and, and thus allowed for differences to be measured and
then studied.
By accurately assessing population sizes, their growth and decline, and
importantly, the demographic attributes of sex, age, and occupation (celi-
bate orders, for example, could affect population grown), Graunt asserted
that governments could allocate needed resources for recovery better,
tradesmen would make better business decisions, and individuals perhaps
could prevent losses of life. Even this first crude attempt at analysis shows
the interconnections between and among politics, policy, and economics.
In short, demographic information becomes relevant.
Though the methods of gathering data and analyzing have grown in
their sophistication, demography still is concerned most directly with
measuring births, deaths, and the quality of life in between those events.
Insights from the data allow for the first attempts to modify the behav-
ior of populations as a means to decrease mortality. Accumulated power
of multiple individual and governmental decisions possesses the ability
to alter future demographic dynamics that, in turn, affect the wealth of
nations and well-being of societies. The trend toward gathering policy-
relevant data becomes clearly visible over a century after Graunt’s first
study. Starting with the USA in 1790 and England in 1801, nations began
regularly and systematically running national censuses. These first steps
created the need for more advanced methods of analysis (Spiegelman
1973).
Table 8.2 helps to illustrate the traditional research agendas of the most
common disciplines interacting with demography.
Many of these core topics have been studied by three major social sci-
ences: sociology, economics, and political science. However, such efforts
frequently are carried out semi-independently from each other. With
Table 8.2 Traditional research agendas
Economics Political science

i. Labor i. Democracy and voting
ii. Productivity ii. Citizenship and nationalism
iii. Gravity models of migration iii. Migration, borders, legality
iv. Economic development iv. Recovery after war
v. Demographic transition
vi. Youth bulge and conflict
Sociology Public health
i. Assimilation i. Morality
ii. Causes of migration ii. Birth control
iii. Social restructuring iii. Nutrition
iv. Discrimination
increasing interdisciplinary work, pairings emerge that can accumulate

insights: development links to policy, policy links to public health, and
public health links to economics.
A good example of such interaction comes from economics. From Marx
(1906), Marx and Engels (1939) to Solow (1956), economics has used
labor as a key part of growth theorems. Labor itself is simply the outcome
of the demographic realities of societies. These, in turn, are expanded
upon, with human capital becoming important to the study, productiv-
ity, and later discussion on the creation of economic development. This
worry over where labor is, not simply what it does (i.e., productivity), is
an increasingly important aspect of economic analysis, with the modeling
of immigration being based upon similar trade and foreign direct flow
studies. Total economic size is a combination of both productivity and
total labor force, with this concept increasingly becoming important to
questions of economic development. Gains to the individual as well as
cultural connections between societies are two key drivers of international
immigration (Mayda 2007). Such connections within and across levels of
aggregation bring back to mind expectations based on systemism as iden-
tified by James and James in Chap. 10.
Demographic and economic indicators long ago suggested that a cre-
ator of economic development, at least in the short term, could focus on
fertility reduction to facilitate a decline in births. Early models suggested
that reducing births rates would result in a greater amount of resources
for education and care of remaining youth, which would create a more
educated workforce. In turn, that workforce would be more productive.
236 T. KUGLER
In addition, resources that otherwise would be used for child rearing

could be diverted to investments, thereby creating the possibility of faster
growth.
Stretching back to the early political economist T.R. Malthus, research-
ers have worried that humanity would not have had an incentive to
decrease births. An early insight of evolutionary theory is that no bio-
logical reason exists to reduce fertility. Faced with constrained natural
resources, rising infant mortality, and falling productivity per capita, soci-
etal collapse therefore could be expected. These arguments about demo-
graphic pressures were grounded in biological, environmental, economic,
and political considerations. An interdisciplinary conclusion reached from
these underspecified and untested assessments contended that birth rates
would increase faster than economic growth. Each generation thus would
be poorer than the one before, which creates an ever-expanding poverty
trap.8 Global long-term implications from the poverty trap are dismal.
This type of apocalyptic forecast, associated with a population bomb, had
clear policy implications (Ehrlich and Brower 1968).
The one child per family policy of China is an example of policy cre-
ated due to this incorrect evaluation of underlying demographical fore-
casts. It was not a unique act. Similar attempts can be seen in India and
in other developing nations often supported by international develop-
ment organizations. The creation of sometimes highly aggressive and
government-forced fertility restrictions caused a preselection of male
infants and resulting gender imbalances. This came to be called femicide.
The consequences are that the large male population is unable to find a
sufficient number of female partners (White 2006; Greenhalgh 2008).
Hudson and Den Boer (2004) link these policies, resulting in imbalances,
with economic and political instability. Importantly they consider the mul-
tigenerational aspects as these problems cannot be alleviated within one
lifetime. The resulting social system from possibly hundreds of millions
of men without partners is a fruitful study in domestic conflict literature
but one that is still undergoing development. Again, a policy decision
had an unintended and unexpected impact on population decline (Ding
and Hesketh 2006). Gender imbalances remain a major concern in demo-
graphic studies.
Societal preferences are also of great importance. With the increased
availability of ultrasounds and continued preference of male children, very
high gender imbalances can be found outside countries with fertility poli-
cies. These imbalanced societies also can be created from the outcomes of
highly intense conflicts. Unlike the previous cases based upon femicide,
these instances are most likely due to concentrated casualties in male pop-
ulations during wars.
Revised theory supported by new empirical assessments indicates that
such forecasts were well off the mark (Lam 2011). Generally, birth rates
fell as politically capable societies reduced infant mortality, increased
education, and incorporated females into the workforce. Such politi-
cal decisions, in turn, prompted income increases without the need for
authoritarian measures. Fertility declined. Basic connections established
by Malthus as preconditions for a population bomb proved incorrect.
Women, with limited regard to class, choose to produce fewer chil-
dren when given a reason and an assurance of longevity. Declining birth
rates started in the early nineteenth century, but tended to be ignored
due to fixation on the Malthusian thesis. Subsequent research, however,
tends to show the near universality of fertility decline. This profoundly
important issue has led to decades of research about causal structure, with
women’s rights being a key consideration. For example, Jejeebhoy (1995)
creates a framework for the empirical study of the complex relationship
between fertility and development and shows that this most important,
and nuanced, development comes from choice as opposed to policy. This
is further evaluated at the international policy level by Halfon (2007) who
considers the ramifications of changing doctrine within the Cairo con-
sensus, which is a set of best practices and an attempt to move away from
more aggressive policies like the one child per family policy.
National implications of demographic change, particularly fertility
change, became quickly understood as a relative evaluative variable in an
age of national competition. Tilly (1978) linked changes in fertility to
economic success, with Wrigley (2004) attempting to link all aspects of
demography to overall evaluation of ‘by whom and why?’ the industri-
alization of cities was accomplished and how the modern world was cre-
ated. Security concerns caused by changing economic success and then
demographical dynamics is a common topic of discussion. In his seminal
work World Population Carr-Saunders helped propel the discipline for-
ward by investigating the population pressures within great power states,
resulting movements to colonies, and the possibility of war caused by
those pressures. In effect, he claimed that much of global conflict was
between high or low fertility states with migration pressures helping to
incentivize countries toward warfare. Even in this early work many of the
same foundational research agendas of our day are evaluated.
238 T. KUGLER
Fertility, longevity, and the quality of life combine to form central issues
within demographic study. Life expectancies are increasing. Consistent
with the Demographic Transition proposed by Thompson (1919),
Omran (1981) identifies three epidemiologic stages that later researchers,
such as Lee (2003), have linked to economic and political development.
The first stage, found in the least developed societies, is associated with
both pestilence and famine; this creates lower life expectancies (30–40
years) and high infant mortality. The second stage, associated with more-
developed societies, is characterized by continued decline of infant mortal-
ity and increase in life expectancy primarily due to increased organization
and civic infrastructure, causing population growth. The third stage is
the transition itself, in which the largest cohort of the total population
is the oldest, having undergone declines in fertility but also increases in
life expectancy; the population is thereby proportionally weighted to the
elderly. The demographic transition is the outcome of success: increased
life expectancy, declines in mortality of all types, and also likely decreased
fertility rates. This is the common set of characteristics for the developed
world and soon the future of most of the developing.
In terms of political demography, policies to increase life expectancy
can be seen in global efforts. Practical realities of disease control within
one nation, for instance, often are tied to larger efforts through interna-
tional aid policies. Attempts to eradicate diseases—HIV/AIDS, malaria,
tuberculosis, or venereal diseases—are designed to reduce mortality as well
as improve the quality of these extended lives. Numerous international
attempts—led by the UN or bilaterally supplied by large national donors
including the USA, Europe, Russia, Japan, and recently China—provide
populations in developing societies with drugs and care available in the
more-developed societies. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
of the UN range from halving extreme poverty rates to halting the spread
of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education. These goals,
set for 2015, provide the motivation for one of the largest multinational
efforts in history that aims to extend the quality of life.
Political policy, a sub-field of political demography, re-emerged in
the past ten years as a key area of study. In the early twentieth century,
demographic research maintained the underlying belief in eugenics—ideas
hijacked by the Nazis in their unspeakable atrocities in the Holocaust
(Galton 1883; Barrett and Kurzman 2004). The popularity of that perspec-
tive provided the foundational drive for research and did much to distort
the policy agenda of demography. Whole disciplines of anthropology and

sociology provided policy prescriptions that shadowed much of the early
research that connected ethnicity to human potential and led to seriously
misguided policy recommendations (Kevles 1995). The policy of steriliza-
tion became common throughout much of Europe and the USA, ending
mostly in the 1960s (Hansen and King 2013; Lombardo 2008). Major
birth control organizations, however, continued to target groups they
considered to be less evolved.
Although arguments based on the eugenicist perspective persist in
many policy circles, few scholars explicitly present Social Darwinism or
similar arguments as either a motivation or result of their work. Many
take pains to distance themselves from this legacy of scientific demogra-
phy, which, problematically, is sometimes called political demography. The
evolution of genetics within biology conclusively demonstrates that cross-
ethnic differences are minimal and cannot be used to assess the potential
of individuals. Minor differences in phenotype previously used to support
policies of racial discrimination or even extermination are false. Yet, the
idea of eugenics could be revived in a different form as suggested perhaps
by new research on genetic differences and manipulation.
AGENDAS IN POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY

The potential for dynamic research agendas is vast. Most of the possi-
bilities for unified interdisciplinary study remain untapped. Teitelbaum
(2006), Goldstone (2012), and Kugler and Kugler (2013) all marvel
at the limited amount of current research bridging the disciplines that
would explain complex causal structures that remain unresolved and
controversial (i.e., optimal age of retirement altered by longevity). The
agenda identified here, moreover, would seem natural for work in com-
bination with scholars from science and technology studies identified by
Fritsch in Chap. 6.
The future of research is bright and the following sections will focus on
five major agendas. The first is birth as a driver of youth bulges resulting
possibly in conflict, second is death and the implications of longevity, third
is migrations and refugee flows, fourth is the consequences of one con-
flict can become the causes of another, and lastly is future environmental
stresses. Future work in demography and in particular, political demogra-
phy will focus on five major issues:
240 T. KUGLER
• A general shift toward an interdisciplinary approach to the field,

emphasizing political demography and forming a common core of
methodological training.
• Demographic transitions due to fertility and youth bulges (with their
interrelated effects of economic development and gender equality)
as well as the unprecedented effects of increased life expectancy and
quality of life
• Effects of domestic and international migration
• War and its aftermath
• Environmental Shocks
Births and the Youth Bulge

Birth rates fall with increases in political performance and economic pro-
ductivity. Income is associated with increased women’s rights and partici-
pation in the economy.9 In countries that permit some limited degree of
women’s rights, political performance and economic development allow
birth rates to fall; what remains to be explained is whether this process
can be sustained without increasing the participation of women in the
economy.
Standard International Political Economy and economic models of
economic growth make limited use of cohort distortions and changes.
Such models tend to assume demography as a constant. These critical but
underrepresented assessments disclose the potential advantages nations
achieve due to the aftereffects of post-war baby booms, the demographic
dividend,10 or the alternative negative effects of youth bulges that reduce
economic growth (Bloom et al. 2003). Bifurcation in economic perfor-
mance resulting from these two demographic processes profoundly affects
economic and political performance.
Note that both a demographic dividend and a youth bulge seemingly
are very similar phenomena—the consequences of youth. It is an exciting
research agenda to differentiate where and why countries undergo insta-
bility due to youth or when they are able to enjoy the economic gains.
Notice that these are not mutually exclusive. The first, the demographic
dividend, seemingly underlies the rise of the developing world that will
soon overtake the more-developed societies in total output; the second
accounts for the delayed recovery of Africa, the Middle East, and large
portions of Latin America, with youth bulges being connected to rising
political instability.
Demographic changes not only affect economic development but also

provide a link to civil war, which can also trigger interstate conflicts as the
case of the Islamic State shows in the Middle East. This region is especially
fragile due in part to highly concentrated wealth, high rates of unemploy-
ment, and also additional demographical pressures (Winckler 2002).
A major side effect is increased national instability but with the possibil-
ity of democratic change (Bloom et al. 2003; Urdal 2006, 2012; Cincotta
and Doces 2012). This is of particular importance as the number of states
undergoing the temporary surge is highly correlated with difficulties of
intrastate war and unrest. Youthful populations throughout the Middle
East, central Africa, and Iran all are linked to the combination of limited
economic advantages, higher rates of risk acceptance, and neither status as
full democracies or full autocracies among those states. The demographic
transition is also a reality to many of these states, with the period of
extreme youthfulness being brief but dramatic. Extensive future research
on causal structures linking the reasons for the young demanding change,
of all types, would help expand from cross-national studies to the realm of
policy recommendations.
Extending these arguments, differential demographic changes are
related directly to the resurgence of Western Europe after World War II
and the failure of less advanced societies—Afghanistan, North Korea, or
Pakistan—to escape the poverty trap following major regional conflicts
(Kugler et al. 2013). Demographic dynamics are also connected directly
to unrest that generates democratic movements or conflicts as observable
throughout the Middle East and much of sub-Saharan Africa (Urdal and
Hoelscher 2009).
Lastly, more-developed societies tend to have low infant mortality and
high to very high life expectancy (70 years of age and up), with mor-
tality primarily being caused by degenerative and environmental dis-
ease. Development is linked to longevity but political performance is a
main driver. Recent work shows that, combined with improvements in
mobilization, increases in political extraction produced large reductions
in infant mortality and increases in life expectancy in the early stages.
The expectation based on Japan’s patterns is that longevity will rise to
approximately 100 years in the near future and may expand beyond that
for another two decades in the foreseeable future. Changes in public
health are the major causes of reduced cancer rates; improved survival
of heart attack patients, and reduction of infectious diseases. In the com-
ing new stage of reduced mortality, extension of active participation in
242 T. KUGLER
the economy is a major priority to reconcile the costs of health with the
productivity of aging populations.
Investment incentives change with increased life expectancy. The sec-
ond driver is gender equality, as demands for increased women’s equality
in the workplace and social environment change the size of active popula-
tions. Thus, the very popular policy to decrease mortality has implications
that fundamentally alter the basis of states and the international system.
Aftereffects often are not considered when the policy is originally imple-
mented, but the underlying and frequently unexpected process driven by
such decisions generates much of the basic challenge from modernization.
Research should expand upon the dynamics that follow from expansion
of life expectancy and integration of all members into the socioeconomic
fabric that generates economic opportunities but also inequalities. Such
patterns seemingly underlie what could be the cause for a rise of civil war
in developing societies (Urdal 2006, 2012). Massive migrations within
and across societies are associated with instability as a cause and effect.
Death and Longevity
Life expectancy is increasing rapidly. Even limited amounts of pub-
lic health expenditure correlate with economic growth and sharp drops
in infant mortality. Birth rates are not a constant and do decrease pre-
dominantly after economic growth and possibly due to declines in infant
moralities. Fertility rates may have been historically high due to the under-
standing that many of those children would perish due to the complexities
of human health, something that modern policy can elevate. The conse-
quences are a lagged decrease in birth rates and that delay of onset creates
a baby boom and a youth surge. Simply, an unexpectedly large number
of children survive, grow, and reduce the average age of the country. The
unexpected bounty is the outcome of public health successes.
Closely related to the issue of extended longevity patterns are temporal
distortions in the relative size of age cohorts. In the developing world, the
youth bulge can be turned into an economic dividend when a dispropor-
tionate percentage of the population enters the workforce simultaneously,
which reduces total dependency ratios and increases the possibility of eco-
nomic growth. Concurrently, if this large bulge is unemployed or under-
employed, the possibility of civil war rises as frustrated youth challenge the
established rights of the aging working sectors—a phenomenon that we
have witnessed with the Arab Spring and the rise of both democratic and
radical Islamic uprisings.
An example of longer-scaled issues resulting from unexpected reality is
the demographic transition from declining births and deaths. Simply put,
most countries in the world are aging. Each generation is smaller than the
one that came before and this causes a bulge often aggravated by conflict
and creation of baby booms. Equally important is rapidly rising life expec-
tancy and resulting years of retirement that require support from family,
society, and states.
All Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and most non-OECD states have created social programs in
which elderly populations obtain access to continued social welfare. These
programs, however, operate under the assumption of life expectancies
beyond retirement that are close to 20 years in error. People are living
longer and becoming more expensive each year with the most expensive
year of life likely to be the last. This stresses the smaller labor force to pro-
vide for both them but also the resulting generation. Research questions
raised by this problem are vast. Politically speaking, the older you are, the
more you vote, causing possible stagnation in the system. Additionally, a
smaller labor force creates the need to be more efficient on a per person
basis. With human capital and innovation being profoundly important,
the need for labor causes additional incentives for women to enter the
labor force. The resulting sociological implications are still under evalua-
tion. A country whose average age is 40 has never been seen in the mod-
ern era but is something that soon will emerge as a common cross-national
characteristic.
The unexpected nature of demographic reality is profoundly important
as both factors, declining death and reduced birth rates, were and are the
goals of decades of policy. Declines in births mean more money per child,
or more disposable income, with more life being self-explanatory. The
unexpected outcome is what happens when success is achieved.
Considering that much of European and North American demographic
roots come from late seventeenth-century statistics about the plague, much
of the field until recently has focused primarily on the need to extend lives
and improve living standards. The focus on infant mortality, for instance,
remains an area of public concern, but also points to what has been the
central problem policy-makers have used demographic studies to combat:
the need to keep people alive. Now, at the transnational level, there is the
244 T. KUGLER
unprecedented question of how to support a growing population of adults

living beyond conventional concepts of life expectancy.
Toward the beginning of demographic studies in the Atlantic World,
such a situation was the stuff of satiric fantasy. The third volume of
Jonathan Swift’s fictional travelogue, Gulliver’s Travels (1726), for exam-
ple, satirizes the attempts of governments to improve the quality of life
and most of all control the populations they rule through a variety of
emerging scientific schools of thought: abstract mathematics, mechani-
cal computations, empiricism gone awry, and so on. As the titular hero
journeys to Laputa, Balnibarbi, Luggnagg, Glubbdubdrib, and Japan, he
encounters (with the exception of Japan) faulty solutions to the problems
of poverty, mortality, and social inequality. In Luggnagg, Gulliver encoun-
ters a group of people he finds as fantastic if not more so than the giants,
flying islands, and other sights he has seen thus far: an immortal group
born randomly within the population.
The reaction of the naive narrator, Gulliver, to this group mirrors com-
mon apprehension of death in the eighteenth century. He fantasizes about
the advantages of a long life: greater time for education, as well as more
time to accrue wealth, not marrying young (or at all), and so on. Yet, he
learns that the immortals serve as a reminder to the rest of the population
to value their short lives: the Strulburghs are prone to depression from
about age 30 to 80 years old, at which point they became “opinionative,
peevish, covetous, morose, vain, talkative; but incapable of Friendship,
and dead to all natural Affection, which never descended below their
grandchildren” (III.10.197). At age 80, the state declares them dead,
redistributes their estates, gives them a small pension on which to live,
and they become legally ineligible for employment or property ownership.
They live forever in relative poverty, poor mental and physical health, as
well as on the pittance of the society. A short life of health and economic
stability is held as worth more than immortality in an inevitably decay-
ing body. Although this fictional world of one of the great writers in the
English language may have been written assuming that the future cannot
be made up of nations populated by the old, depending on a seemingly
ever shrinking youthful labor force, Swift’s albeit dramatic vision is now
widely held as the future of the developed world.
Policy consequences associated with the demographic transition also
fundamentally affect the more advanced societies. Increasingly aged popu-
lations in the developed world—and in a not too distant future, China
and other developing societies—underlie serious political problems related
to education, social security, and health maintenance. Rapidly aging and

falling populations distort national budgets unless dynamic solutions
reflect anticipated demographic trends. They seldom do. Demographic
dynamics will affect every nation—the only question is when and to what
degree.
Attempts to decrease fertility have succeeded. In contrast, efforts to
increase birth rates by redistribution have failed or shown limited suc-
cess. Paying people to produce more children misses the sheer cost of
child rearing. Immigration is a possible answer but one that has limitations
(Balter 2006; Preston 1984, 1986). Immigration as a means of maintain-
ing the economic status quo and stability of the nation will be discussed
later in this chapter.
International implications are profound. This phenomenon is starting
first in the most developed countries who are also subsequently the most
influential internationally. Policy-oriented work such as Jackson and Howe
(2012) and Yoshihara and Sylva (2012) both consider the more practical
side of kinetic policy. The availability of population to be components of
military force come to mind. With rapidly decreasing youth populations,
limited birth rates, and the resulting likelihood for increased demand for
evermore limited labor, militaries may have additional pressures through-
out the developed world, principally in members of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Is there even the possibility of a “geriatric peace”?
Basic questions of how to redistribute enough resources to sustain an
elderly population of the scale projected first in the most developed and
the later in the rest of the world are simply unanswered. Research on this
issue will continue in the twenty-first century and the multitude of pos-
sible paths cannot be understated. They include the possibility of retracted
urbanization due to increasingly isolated elders who retreat from cities, as
well as problems occurring within a democracy when attempts are made
to reduce entitlements to the elderly, as this is the population most likely
to vote. Research into the demographic transition will be illuminating;
this issue more than any other is a key interest of demographically minded
researchers.
Migrations and Refugees
First off, it is important to distinguish between a refugee and a migrant. A
refugee has similar characteristics as a migrant but importantly has specific
international laws pertaining to expectations of host countries’ political
246 T. KUGLER
protection. In its most simplistic definition, a migrant is someone who

likely for economic reasons has chosen to move locations with the expec-
tations that their new country will have steps or immigration restrictions
that then need to be dealt with. A refugee is someone who did not want
to move but due to direct threats against their lives had the choice to
move or likely deal with significant danger. Hence should the individual in
question be turned down by the host country for residence or more to the
point asylum, they would then be sent back to their home country to face
a likely dangerous future. The distinction is important as one classification
can be deported under international law normally and the other has at
least some level of expectations to protect (UNHCR 2007). Between the
two the first, migrations, is the overwhelming largest category in the flows
of population globally even with the current movements seen in Europe.
As an example of the nearly one million immigrates who move to the USA
in a given year less than 60,000 are classified as refugees.
Migration, which can be linked to conflict, comes in two forms: inter-
national and domestic. International migrations are restricted by policy,
society, and interest. The combination of legal allowance as well as social
acceptance is important to forecast future interstate flows. It is currently
unknown if global migrations will increase or decrease and this issue is likely
to generate considerable debate. More is understood about the impor-
tance of past migrations and effects of economic disparity. Population
flow to locations where co-ethnic or national groups already have created
enclaves can help to reduce both the costs and risks of immigration. This
finding has also been supported in the refugee literature with Rüegger and
Bohnet (2015) helping to establish that kinship groups and legal allow-
ances are two key components in evaluating refugees flows. There is likely
a difference between the two types of movement (refugees vs. economic
migrants) in terms of the distance traveled. The first, migration, particu-
larly economic migration, can often be characterized by sometimes vast
distances; the second, refugees, is often primarily consisting of shorter
distances, moving toward the closest safe location to the most developed.
Economic disparity may also be a driver, as people flow to locations of
increased opportunity but also simply the move itself can increase both life
expectancy and earnings.
Domestic migration is a very strong force for change, particularly in
developing societies. Urbanization, because of domestic migration, is
increasing rapidly. Due to increased mechanization in agricultural popula-
tion, people have a reason to move to cities in search of opportunity. This
type of intrastate migration is expected to boom, with a great deal of stress

being put upon civil planning as the scale and speed of the transfers seem
to be outpacing the planning process. This, in turn, creates disorganized
cities and inevitable long-term costs associated with urban reconstruction.
Climate stress due to this process and population growth in general is still
under significant debate.
Migration itself is the study of flows that have been limited by choice
and policy. The simple need to move—be it for safety, employment, or
interest—is not a right but a privilege. The locations of these flows cre-
ate the need to establish the existence and structure of assimilation, or
from a more traditional nationalism standpoint, what the future of the
nation-state will be as the bounds of ethnicity are undercut or reorga-
nized. The idea of the nation-state itself comes from both the need to
differentiate control but also as an attempt to increase the trust between
government and group. Ties of ethnicity reinforce authority. Migration
disrupts these accumulated social structures and puts to question their
origin or even existence. Migration then becomes difficult, controversial,
and all-important. More than any other dynamic of demography, it has the
potential to rejuvenate nations and create true dynamic change (Massey
et al. 2000).
Migrations and consequent urbanization that redistributes popula-
tions also generate systemic problems. Still, 70 percent of China’s popula-
tion remains rural—while in most developed societies this sector seldom
exceeds 20 percent. Less-developed societies seeking to alter their internal
standing likely will attempt to implement such changes in a fraction of the
time it took for the more established developed world. Partial integration
of economies, leading to creation of free trade zones, frequently occurs
but common labor markets such as those within the EU are seldom found.
Understanding the political elements that generate social stress—includ-
ing national, religious, and ethnic identity—all are enhanced when ana-
lysts use the political demography perspective to such problems.
The level of flows is of concern, with two vastly different possibilities
being identified. The first is that economic development will decrease
future flows due to decline in difference between rich and poor. The sec-
ond, more likely, is that flows will increase as economic development at
the lowest levels creates a difference between wanting to leave and hav-
ing the funds to leave. That development will increase migration (Hatton
and Williamson 2002). The fall of authoritarian governments created
and allowed large amounts of migration, as these governments had been
248 T. KUGLER
effective in keeping people contained. Rising anti-immigration policy from

non-authoritarian governments and the effect of increased border controls
remain a work in progress.
Governments have attempted to utilize immigration without dealing
with the resulting dynamic change caused by citizenship. UAE, Bahrain,
and some European nations have extensive amounts of contractual labor
force without any real attempt or legal method to permit citizenship.
Immigrants simply are regarded as temporary visitors. A short-term solu-
tion to the long-term problem is through temporary work visas. This
approach is becoming a common alternative to immigration (Gratton
2012).
Where we live and why remain key questions of humanity. Domestic
politics, racial discrimination, citizenship, and dynamics of ethnic nation-
alism all are helpful avenues of research. All are interconnected and,
although we are all migrants (as long as you increase the scale of time),
we also are part of populations that have had a tendency to ignore this
shared history and the resulting issues associated with it for a multitude
of research agendas. Rising militant nationalism in Europe, and in many
other countries, may be due to economic issues and increased difficulties
related to employment or to the reasonably new migration caused by the
post-1990s population waves.
These problems have been highlighted by concerns that many Islamic
State terrorists in the Middle East are citizens of western countries and
may have been radicalized in that context and may wish to attack western
targets in the future. Due again to the differences in birth rates, often
immigrants prior to assimilation have expanded growth in numbers rela-
tive to the native population. This can be exacerbated by the possibility
of religion differentiation and even new sources of domestic conflict (Toft
et al. 2011). Problematically, the direct influence of refugees on conflict
has not been studied as extensively as it should. Choi and Salehyan (2013)
building from work seen in Salehyan (2009) and in Salehyan and Gleditsch
(2006) show that this last aspect is of increasing importance. The possi-
bility of refugees moving to sites where they share kinship relations with
large groups of the host population and as a result exporting the conflict
to that new site is only one of many concerns particular to refugee popula-
tions that remain in close proximity to their origins and the conflict itself.
Equally interesting is that humanitarian aid in locations with limited over-
sight can be redirected toward rebel groups, and hence increase conflict.
This suggests that refugees must be protected not simply for humanitarian
reasons in order to perpetuate the policies of peace.
Assimilation itself would seem to be nothing more than a question of
trust, but the causal relationship has not yet been studied. Starting with
limits on religious attire and a process of both self-isolation and state iso-
lation, the story of assimilation does not need to end in a multiethnic
melting pot. Assimilation may not be a universally feasible policy due to
the degree of social isolation, yet homogenization is popular. Recently the
likelihood of increased social pressure and even the possibility of more
aggressive policies toward already existing immigrants could be increasing
in Europe. The popularity of anti-immigration policy even after successful
assimilation is a complex but interesting topic (Dancygier 2010).
States with future generations limited in size can be expected to allow
immigration as a means of stabilizing the labor force. It has been sug-
gested that creation of the unified labor market in the EU is due to this
very reason. Older developed states have allowed immigrants that they
assumed would be easiest to assimilate (fellow Europeans) into their labor
markets. Issues relating to the “brain drain,” shifting definitions of multi-
culturalism, along with the rise of right-wing parties and anti-immigration
groups, provide fruitful avenues for future research. Increasing xenopho-
bia would seem to be a real problem in the EU and some of this is due to
increased immigration without thought to assimilation.
Consequences of One Conflict Can Become the Causes of Another

I have suggested the link between demography and conflict previously in
this chapter, but the connection deserves much more attention and con-
nects directly to a key theme of this book. Remarkably little attention is
given to demographics in our explanations of the causes and effects of war
compared to myriad other considerations. Insofar as it is studied, the lit-
erature focuses far more attention on recovery than on the link between
one conflict and possible future conflicts, yet such links certainly do exist,
as the most dramatic case of World War I being linked to World War II
would suggest. Even in less dramatic cases, it is during the period of peace
following conflict when the demographic makeup and structure of a society
are most influenced, and that can then affect prospects for future conflicts.
Indeed, the recovery process involves a complex interaction between
social norms, economic incentives, and political choice with each a key
250 T. KUGLER
determinant leading to recovery or even the possibility of sustained

damage (Hill 2004). The aftereffects of war include the disruption of the
expected demographic structure, which alter the future of the nation. For
example, a country on the trajectory of a developed nation may revert to
one with a traditional pyramid shape in which a unique outcome of sus-
tained violence is more possible.
Conflict itself, with all the resulting population losses from causalities
and forced migration, impacts population more than any other event. The
effects of this demographic disruption may destabilize society in a way that,
when combined with even small grievances, can lead to new hostilities.
This section will deal with two interlocked issues:
• Expected Recovery After War—The possibilities of peace and allow-

ing for rapid economic growth and societal change. Current research
suggests that a stable governmental system is a necessity.
• Demographic Disruption—The resulting imbalances of age (and
gender) being a possible cause of the political structure to become
unstable undermining recovery and resulting in new conflict.
Wars, although they are temporary, entail a recovery process that

can last generations and fundamentally alter the destiny of nations. This
becomes a critical political issue with the ability of a government to placate
the grievances from the war itself and to implement policies of economic
development. Both are increasingly important but also difficult given the
new patterns of demographic structure. Violence (or more specifically its
aftereffects) can disrupt the basic demographic fabric of a human society
and needs to be studied as an independent event. Casualties themselves
are important as are resulting gender imbalances, forced migrations of
refugees, and likely disequilibrated age distributions. The previous sec-
tion illustrated the connection between forced migrations of ethnic kin
groups across sub-Saharan Africa, which could possibly generate conflict
in those regions. Gender imbalances may not create new violent conflict
directly but could put additional pressure on the central government that
then could cause a lack of a government capacity which spurs grievances
and violence. The age distributions primarily refer to rapid increases in a
commonly seen rapid increase in birth rates and then a youth surge phe-
nomena with the expectations of stresses on the labor market and most
problematically the likelihood of a young population being more risk
acceptant. This young population looking for work is a potential engine of

growth and similarly an engine for rebellion.
Direct casualties (i.e., casualties primarily due to combat itself), per-
haps the most dramatic outcome of war and the most heavily studied,
are not the only damage to a population, and these secondary losses can
often heavily outweigh combat casualties (creating a great deal of range
in measurements of war population losses). The effects of disrupted pub-
lic health programs, access to both shelter and food, as well as increased
physical exertion due to displacement can cause rapidly increased child/
infant mortality rates and pressures on other vulnerable populations such
as the elderly (Tabeau and Zwierzchowski 2013). Population losses due
to war are not simply those lost to militarized violence but those lost who
would have survived birth to reach adulthood, if not for the war-induced
famine, increased disease, and disruption (Seybolt et al. 2013).
It is not only a matter of children not reaching adulthood, but of the
potential population lost to a decrease in birth due to gender imbalances.
Concentrated losses of young males in combat—and, in some extreme
cases, civilian atrocities associated with genocides—often result in large-
scale gender imbalances. Most outcomes of even small conflicts are bal-
ances between 85–95 Male to Female (meaning 95 males for each 100
females) ratio. The more common ratio is 101 males to 100 females in a
stable state society without sex selection, migration, or war (UN 1955). In
Cambodia, males categorized as young adults during the conflict experi-
ence disproportionate losses large enough to create a gender balance of
59 to 100 females in certain age cohorts and is likely the largest imbalance
on record (Kugler 2016; UN 2011). Other major genocides of the twen-
tieth century (e.g., Rwanda and Bosnia) saw similar numbers but none
had as high a concentration as in male casualties. This imbalance is not a
temporary phenomenon, as it continues to influence birth rates, gender
relations, as well as the societal organization and cultural transformations
of a country for generations. The simple question of marriage becomes
remarkably complex and puts pressure on the expectations of what family
means or could be in a society of such limited amount of male partners.
The primary focus of studies on gender ratio has been female imbalance
not from conflict but from sex selected births throughout much of Asia—
primarily in China, some Indian Provinces, and in the Caucasus region
(Das Gupta et al. 2003; Zhu et al. 2009; Hudson and Den Boer 2004).
This is an important subject itself and one that should be used as a basis
for generalization to imbalances caused by conflict. These studies have
252 T. KUGLER
suggested that governments come under greater pressure primarily from

large amounts of males without female partners (notice the gendered dif-
ferences between this cause of imbalance and the one created by conflict).
The fundamental gender balance of a war generation is disrupted by a
range of effects: from societal restructuring of families (in this case missing
future husbands) to a reconsideration of the potential of the labor force.
The gender imbalance, in turn, also disrupts future population growth
patterns with the specific causal structure still to be determined. In terms
of abstract practicality, reproductive biology suggests that male losses
should have less of an effect on birth rates than female, but this depends
heavily on a culture’s attitudes toward marriage, birth, and other associ-
ated social pressures. It is important to remember that, when discussing
demographical statistics, they in turn represent choices of individuals and
pressure of societies. The age of marriage or lack thereof, amount of chil-
dren, and the types or complexity of relationships are all key components
to the choices necessary in birth itself. This complexity is sociological and
one that should not be ignored in larger macro analysis.
Recovery itself may have a dramatic effect on the future but one that
necessitates the efficiency of politics and the policy of peace to implement.
Recovery, particularly economic, needs returning refugees. Refugees bring
expanded skill sets, investment capacity, and they themselves represent a
needed labor force. Nearly all major conflicts create more outflows of pop-
ulation than actual casualties. Some of this is likely to be caused by ethnic
cleansing or the use of these forced migrants as policy pressure on outside
actors (Greenhill 2010). Most migration simply reflects the need to move
from areas of violence. Importantly, returning home necessitates the victo-
rious government’s agreement. The policy choice to allow refugee returns
is a necessity when facilitating economic and demographic recovery.
A temporary but rapid rise in birth rates is often seen after wars, par-
ticularly in cases of significant casualties (Hill 2004)—originally called the
‘phoenix factor’ in Organski and Kugler (1980) or ‘phoenix population’
by Heuveline and Poch (2007). These ‘baby boom’ events dramatically
increase the future labor force and help facilitate a sustained economic
growth far in advance of probable estimations prior to the conflict
(Koubi 2005). The baby booms themselves are not a single event as the
disproportionate age distribution now creates unexpectedly larger amounts
of children in subsequent generations (Urlanis 1971). Importantly in
nearly all conflict cases, even the most bloody countries demographically
recover (Fisunoglu 2014).
Kugler et al. (2013), supported by Fisunoglu (2014), empirically show

how this complex interaction between economic growth, increased fertil-
ity, and demography is linked to sustained changes in society. They reveal
two diverging non-linear patterns, based upon productivity and develop-
ment, which follow war. Demographic recovery through the acceleration
of population growth (i.e., baby booms) increases the size of populations
following conflict, but does not result from or create correlating increases
in productivity, financial stability, or any other area of recovery. The
effects of baby booms on a population depend on the preexisting condi-
tions of their societies, particularly in terms of development prior to and
post-conflict. In the case of more-developed societies, these baby booms
may augment overall productivity, due to the limited need to create new
human capital. If the products of well-trained generations now possess a
disproportionately young population (labor force) with high productivity
along with newer equipment (enhanced infrastructure), it follows that the
baby boom will foster economic growth (the “phoenix factor”) that allows
the recovering nation to outpace their competitors who escaped—or expe-
rienced less of—the population loss and other devastating effects of war.
In less-developed societies, however, baby booms only add younger but
equally low-trained workers to an already underprepared laboring popula-
tion. The resulting demographic disruption of the seemingly beneficial
population recovery, in this case, only serves to re-inscribe wartime eco-
nomic losses. In the less-developed societies, recovery will likely continue
and augment inequalities between them and their competitors. Preexisting
issues of education and infrastructure will be exacerbated likely increasing
income inequality. Rather than increasing human capital by better educat-
ing these new generations, standards tend to fall even below those prior
to the war. Without the population loss due to conflict, they may have
experienced incremental growth, but unlike the more-developed societ-
ies, these will endure the highest costs and are also least able to recover.
Worse, this effect is exacerbated by the now expanded youth population,
who have the potential to undermine the current political establishment.
The young may end up causing societal unrest, but also increasing the pos-
sibility of losing the potential of this newly expanded labor force (Urdal
2006, 2012). As their populations explode, many become “failed states,”
unable to maintain the institutions necessary for producing high levels of
economic performance. The result is a return to conflict and continued
disruption as the expected development path becomes untenable. The
basic demography of populations is surprisingly resilient to losses due to
254 T. KUGLER
conflict throughout the twentieth century. That resiliency is based upon

politics, economics, and societal choice. Each is an important factor in the
investigation of recovery or the return to war.
In this new century, the possibility of aging populations and rapid
declines in birth rates, along with changing attitudes, have the possibility
of decreasing or even stopping recovery in future major wars. Recovery is
highly dependent on both return migrations but also on limited increases
in the birth rates. In Bosnia for example (a country well into the demo-
graphic transition) this was not seen after the genocide. This in turn means
that Bosnia, uniquely of major conflicts in the twentieth century, will not
recover to the point of total population due to the genocide. The birth
rates are not high enough without returning refugees—a problem that
may well face states such as Syria and Iraq as well. Even with significant
return migration (and a quick peace process) Syria with a fertility rate of
roughly three and expected causalities in the hundreds of thousands may
not be able to recover that scale of population or (unlike our earlier exam-
ples) sustain a baby boom necessary to meet what it needed and expected
prior to war. Conflict having the potential to create a total population
loss due to the demographic transition is a remarkably interesting future
research project.
Environmental Influences
Changes in water access, desertification, natural disasters, and other aspects
of climate change are increasingly popular topics, but they are not yet
clearly linked to conflict. They may have an influence on demographical
characteristics of the underlying populations or perpetuate the influences
leading to migration, and those characteristics then could have an influ-
ence on migration flows. Part of this could be in the common movement
of agriculture population to cities due primarily to technological improve-
ments in agriculture (urbanization effects in general) but that same flow
can likely be exasperated by aspects of climate change. This may increase
or otherwise influence already existing demographical changes in urban-
ization (as in this example) or even migration. The agendas linking vari-
ous different versions of an environmental shock are wide from changes
in rainfall, to desertification, and possibly increased variation within sea-
sons. Consensus on the effects themselves, or which aspects are the most
important, has not yet been agreed upon in terms of how they influence
conflict or at what level (Salehyan 2008).
Bhavnani and Lacina (2015) provide a good example of this new type
of investigation using India as the basis for investigation. In it they study
first the effects of short-term environmental disasters causing temporary
migrations and then the possibly of riots. Importantly they further the
study by evaluating the preexisting political issues between the regions
within India and support for the central government. Allow a discus-
sion of the importance of the environmental issue and more importantly
leading to the possibly that if future climate crises increase so too will
its positive effect on internal violence and domestic migrations. Hendrix
and Salehyan (2012) working within Africa investigate the complex rela-
tionship between rain fall (or lack) and increased domestic conflicts.
Although not directly discussing the likelihood of a demographic causal
structure (principally using population growth as a control variable) and
having difficulty generalizing the curvilinear outside of Africa itself, the
possibly of less reliable rainfall suggests the likelihood of increased social
unrest that could be exasperated by demography. This subject is of great
interest to many and one that will be developed to a greater extent in the
coming years.
CONCLUSION
Demography is the foundation of humanity and a veritable fountain
of research agendas, all of which illuminate the key questions regard-
ing human existence. The importance of population movements and the
structures of population itself, be it gender or age, are remarkably impor-
tant for the understanding of both the futures of nations themselves and
the potential possibilities of conflict. Why are we alive, how can we stay
alive, what do we do to each other, and where we can live are basic ques-
tions for shaping the agenda of demographic studies. Each of these ques-
tions needs to be answered within an international and interdisciplinary
agenda. The research potential of direct demographic studies is growing
and should be at the core of IR. The study of population is the study of
us all, what we do, can do, have done, and will do—in short, the study
of humanity.
256 T. KUGLER
NOTES
1. Demographic Transition: Declines in death rates and later in birth rates. This
causes first rapid growth and then later aging as following generations are
smaller than the previous ones. See Kirk (1996) and Dyson (2010) for a more
detailed explanation of this phenomenon.
2. Youth Bulges: The lag between declines in death rates to birth rates can
cause disproportionate population structures. These can radically decrease
the overall age of the society.
3. Migrations: Movement of population from geographic location to loca-
tion. This increasingly also refers to refugees.
4. Gender Imbalance: With no selection bias, human births are slightly higher
in males at 1.06 to 1, with increased mortality rates in males decreasing this
ratio by year. Imbalance is when either gender is radically higher or lower
than the natural state.
5. Population Size: Total population of the location in question.
6. Density: Population location by area. Often associated with urbanization.
7. The query was simply “why did both mothers and infants have a higher
level of mortality in childbirth in a select few wealthier nations?” The likely
cause is the complexity of the maternal garments, with highly restricted
mobility being the consequence of social norms on isolation and the physi-
cal complexity of the clothing itself. Poor, non-isolated, and mobile moth-
ers had higher survival rates.
8. A poverty trap occurs when population growth is greater than economic
growth. As a result, each subsequent generation is, per capita, poorer than
the previous generation.
9. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010) is a practically good example of the intrica-
cies between and among women’s rights, labor, and fertility.
10. Increased economic potential is due to a temporarily disproportionately
young labor force. Simply put, after major wars the elderly and the very
young have a tendency to have higher mortality rates. At the end of a war
the labor force is a higher percentage of the total population and can be an
economic engine. Additionally, the resulting baby boom can further this
economic potential to the resulting generations.
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CHAPTER 9
International Political Economy

and Political Demography:
An Interdisciplinary Exploration
Kyungkook Kang and Tadeusz Kugler
In this chapter, we develop and evaluate an interdisciplinary approach to

the study of economic and population recovery after disaster. To do so
we rely on merging approaches from (a) political economy that focus on
how policy actions affect market decisions; and (b) political demography
(PD) that explores dynamic interactions among politics, fertility, mortality
and migration. We will borrow freely from both fields to account for the
contribution each makes to our understanding of economic and demo-
graphic recovery following natural and man-made calamities.
All of this is in line with a key focus of this book on conflict. Indeed,
exploring these effects offers some confirmation of our model, developed
in this chapter, for understanding recovery after disasters. While most
of the chapters in this book helped illuminate the causes of conflict, our
chapter helps balance that out by focusing on post-conflict realities.
K. Kang (*)
Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida,
Orlando, FL, USA
e-mail: kyungkook.kang@ucf.edu
T. Kugler
Politics and International Relations, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI, USA
e-mail: tkugler@rwu.edu

264 K. KANG AND T. KUGLER
Disasters include civil and international wars, earthquakes, tsunamis or

volcanic eruptions that produce massive human and material losses. Such
events not only leave long-lasting scars in the demographic cohort struc-
ture but also devastate the economies of affected nations. In some cases
nations recover from immense losses but in many cases they cannot over-
come major disasters and fall into a poverty trap, which can contribute to
the cause of the next conflict as the previous chapter examined. The ques-
tion posed here is simple but profound: why do some nations recover after
major disasters, while others do not? Is there a predictable path to antici-
pate rebounds to sustainable growth? How do societies recover popula-
tion losses and stabilize fertility in the aftermath of disasters? Can foreign
aid efforts help people rebuild their economies with effective post-disaster
interventions?
Disasters usually are classified into natural and man-made. War is the
most destructive man-made event. Brutal consequences of severe civil or
international war linger for generations. Despite the lasting effects of war
and waves of post-war aid, relatively few studies center on the factors that
lead to successful economic and population recovery. Unlike prepara-
tions and the waging of war that are publicly debated and extensively ana-
lyzed, post-war recovery is hidden from view. Today a major issue facing
Washington’s agenda consists of post-war actions to be taken in Iraq and
Afghanistan as these wars wind down. However, as US strategic concerns
shift from war to recovery in these states, the effectiveness of reconstruc-
tion operations already has been largely overtaken by events in Syria—
where active conflict continues. Of course, the manner by which wars end
can make it either more or less likely that societies and politics will stabilize
and, in turn, more or less likely that states will succeed or fail and conflict
will re-emerge.
Similar patterns emerge in the aftermath of natural disasters. An earth-
quake or tsunami gains immediate coverage and reaction. However, such
attention is short-lived, compared to the recovery period that frequently
extends one or two generations. Assessment and evaluation of effects of
war and likelihood of recovery need to focus both on the intensity of the
disaster, likely period of recovery, and on the impact of domestic and for-
eign attempts to enhance recovery.
Many perspectives can be brought to bear on the study of recovery from
disasters.1 The approach that gained much traction and still dominates this
field is based on the traditional development economics perspective. This
work explores alternate means to restore economic livelihoods following
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY:... 265
disasters. The focus is on foreign aid. Keynes (1920) gave a major impe-
tus to the generalized provision of foreign aid, arguing that without such
action recovery was unlikely and depression rather than recovery would
follow. His cogent argument prompted the Marshall Plan, subsequently
reinforced by the successful recovery record of advanced economies fol-
lowing World War II. However, the recovery miracles of Germany, Italy
or Japan have not been reproduced consistently elsewhere. Following
natural or war-related disasters, many developing societies had only mixed
successes in spite of massive foreign aid. Indeed, failed states such as
Mozambique, Haiti or Somalia—despite long-term foreign assistance that
far exceeded the per capita aid provided to Japan after World War II—con-
tinue to linger in the poverty trap (Organski and Kugler 1980).
We propose that economic and demographic recovery from disaster can
be examined best from an interdisciplinary perspective. A useful approach
is to apply the tools of international political economy (IPE). They com-
bine economic and political considerations and PD in the analysis of
disasters. Even though IPE today mainly focuses on interactions among
states—such as trade, monetary exchange and globalization—recovery
from disasters is now gaining traction. From a demographic perspective,
PD is generally concerned with consequences of the ongoing demo-
graphic transition and migration. Assessments of disaster loss are common
but understanding how to enhance the effectiveness of fertility recovery
following disasters is again not central in that agenda.
Refocusing on theory and assessment about recovery from disaster is
important because understanding that process would help desperate and
frustrated victims of disasters restore their lives and that of the following
generations. Here we explore how domestic and foreign actors can alter
recovery dynamics and propose ways to advance this important theoretical
and policy field with an interdisciplinary perspective. Doing so can give us
a different perspective on change in world affairs, which is central to the
type of broader understandings that IR theory wishes to achieve—a subject
that is addressed in Chap. 10—as well as virtually all disciplines c onnected
with IR. Effective recovery from events such as conflict, in turn, impacts
the historical process thereafter and causes the type of changes that are not
understood well enough, even at the intersection of history and IR as laid
out by Yetiv (Chap. 2). Such changes influence subsequent events includ-
ing future conflict, as suggested for example by the interwar period after
the Treaty of Versailles.
To understand the process of post-disaster recovery, we first over-

view the field and then introduce a formal macro-approach motivated
by micro-considerations. This model represents the intertwined interac-
tions among individual decision-makers, firms and the government. Given
its range of connections, the model is in line with theoretical compre-
hensiveness as entailed by systemism as articulated by James and James
in Chap. 10. Specifically, we model how strategic interactions among
agents are affected during the recovery period by multiple constraints
including pre-disaster economic trend, technology, investment, political
uncertainty, political performance and population growth. With this as a
foundation, we then suggest how to assess the effects of foreign aid on the
post-disaster period. This positive political economy approach suggests
how to monitor the cumulative effects of recursive decisions and enables
us to analyze the process and speed of economic recovery. Unlike static
approaches frequently applied, the dynamic assessment we favor evaluates
the time-dependent growth patterns that vary in the process of recovery.
Particularly, after reviewing alternate perspectives we introduce a general
equilibrium overlapping generation (OLG) model to assess recovery and
failure. This perspective provides a most versatile approach to analyzing
nonlinear dynamic interactions between and among politics, economics
and demography.
Before addressing the dynamic framework we favor, it is useful to
first discuss alternate attempts to study post-disaster economic recovery.
We then focus on the theoretical reason why it is important to build an
interdisciplinary dynamic structure that handles multiple social processes
simultaneously. Finally, we investigate empirically how the OLG model
answers the key questions raised at the outset.
International Political Economy and Demography

Assessment of Post-Disaster Recovery
A clear consensus emerged regarding the urgent need to provide realistic
solutions to help recovery from disasters. Beyond the calculable economic
and demographic considerations, many scholars recognized that to fight
poverty resulting from disasters, including wars, one must focus on the
ability of governments to plan and provide aid to enhance growth and, to
manage successful reconstruction (Easterly 2007; Riddell 2008; Kugler
et al. 2013; Fisunoglu 2014). From a population perspective, demogra-
phers point out that populations increase despite massive initial losses after
severe disasters but effects linger in the age cohort structures (Frumkin
1951; United Nations 1971).
Systemic understanding of the underlying mechanism of economic
and demographic recovery from disasters is in its infancy. Scholars and
policy-makers still propose and pursue diverse and frequently contradic-
tory doctrines (Keynes 1920; Angell 1933; Kuznets 1973). There is little
agreement over how nations can escape from the poverty trap, recover
population and pursue sustained egalitarian development on their own
(Sachs 2006; Bowles et al. 2006; Boussalis 2011).
Due to the multifaceted characteristics of recovery, the task of integrat-
ing comprehensive mechanisms within a single framework is challenging.
Most observers acknowledge that political, economic and demographic
factors are intertwined throughout the entire recovery path. Yet, few agree
on what these interactions are and even fewer attempt to test the propo-
sitions that they advance. The difficulty is compounded because of the
sharp separation of disciplines within the social sciences. Lack of a com-
mon paradigm and language is one of the most serious obstacles to estab-
lishing a unified explanation of how recovery can be optimized. Once the
parameters of post-disaster actions are established, one can provide effec-
tive policy prescriptions based on theoretical regularities. The objective is
to account for economic processes in post-disaster periods and achieve a
reduction of inequality in the affected societies.
Mainstream economic development studies generally explore the eco-
nomic growth using the neoclassical growth model (NCGM) (Barro 1996;
Jones 1995, 2002; Weil 2008). The reason for this choice is that theoreti-
cal implications of NCGM are consistent with the empirical record of eco-
nomic recovery in the western advanced economies. Indeed, after both
World War I and II, recovery in developed economies followed the paths
predicted by NCGM. The succession of recovery miracles supports the
fundamental implication of NCGM. Specifically, “convergence” among
post-war economies took place and the belligerents involved in war did
rapidly catch up to their pre-war productivity. Above all, levels of destruc-
tion from war, as theoretically anticipated, are associated with accelerating
economic growth.
This implication was first systematically reported and explored by
Organski and Kugler (1980). The empirical “Phoenix Factor” path pre-
sented a very optimistic assessment of post-war recovery. According to
their findings, the consequence of severe war is only temporary. In a bit
more than one generation, the enormous losses incurred by belligerents
are erased as they converge back to pre-war economic productivity levels

and growth trends. While useful in minimizing suffering, aid is not the
factor determining recovery levels or rates.
Phoenix Factor results are not fully general, however. Kuznets (1973)
and Arbetman and Kugler (1989) observe that many developing econo-
mies are trapped in chronic poverty, and their growth is further restricted
by exploding post-war population growth. Effects of aid in these con-
texts have turned out to be limited. Despite good intentions, and different
donor countries and numerous forms of foreign aid provided, most of the
least developed belligerents followed a path of divergence from their pre-
war performance. Unlike the developed nations, the least developed did
not recover levels achieved previously and frequently added in the post-
war period to losses incurred during the conflict. In sum, NCGM results
seemingly account only for the path that developed economies follow after
disasters and have not anticipated the disappointing performance of the
least developed societies.
The source of this empirical inadequacy may be rooted in the strong
assumptions of the NCGM approach. This NCGM model is based on the
assumption of a fully informed and efficient market system. This logic dis-
misses any possibility of breakdown in the marketplace. Thus, the NCGM
explanation proposes that all economic behaviors are made in a perfect
market environment, where the process of exchange among subgroups is
costless (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975). This simplification leads to the
conclusion that every economy operates efficiently at the aggregate level
with frictionless exchange. For this reason, the theory anticipates that suc-
cessful recovery is associated with a larger growth opportunity that pro-
duces fairly rapid convergence toward pre-disaster patterns.
Most political economists argue that a perfect market economy is fre-
quently not present (Olson 1984; de Soto 2003). Markets always need a
certain level of state regulatory enforcement to secure uninterrupted eco-
nomic exchanges. Without effective cohesiveness, governance is impeded
as competing parties increase uncertainty of market transactions. In the
absence of effective governance, frictionless exchange behavior will not
take place in an economy (North 1984; Organski et al. 1984; Clague
1997; Yeager 1999). Kugler and Tammen (2012) are the latest political
economists to argue that only within well-functioning governance that
assures property rights and contract enforcement are individuals willing to
engage in efficient economic exchanges that minimize costs for all trans-
actions. In the absence of effective governance, all exchanges are inher-
ently risky and inefficient. Thus, if economic growth can be sustained only
through secure exchanges within polities that can reduce overall socio-
economic uncertainty, then politics plays a critical role in the process of
post-disaster recovery. The connection between politics and economics
has been made theoretically but not effectively implemented. Ordeshook
(1990) correctly points out “it is impossible to predict market outcomes
without also predicting the political responses that alternative outcomes
engender (1990: 9).”
Except for a few systematic but still partial attempts at theory (Organski
and Kugler 1980; Koubi 2005; Kugler et al. 2013; Fisunoglu 2014), polit-
ical scientists have described serious disasters as unique events. Normative
and historical approaches point in the right direction of inquiry. Traditional
approaches suggest that to understand recovery, enriched information is
required regarding value judgments about human rights, and income dis-
tribution along with detailed assessments of real cases. They also detect
that, based on case studies and reports of experienced practitioners, societ-
ies differ; these differences frequently affect the optimal design of strate-
gies and prevent implementation of common policies (Lancaster 2006;
Riddell 2008). Their work identifies the limitations of existing theoretical
approaches. To obtain a more powerful and persuasive framework, how-
ever, it is crucial to integrate the fragmented elements derived from case
studies and empirical observations into a unified research agenda.
To take a first step, we first should distinguish fundamental elements
that need to be included in the research. Once identified, those elements
can construct a more general and malleable theoretical structure that treats
different issues of politics, economics and demography simultaneously (Alt
and Shepsle 1990). This interdisciplinary theoretical perspective perhaps
can motivate scholars in other disciplines to be aware and advance other
aspects of the complex social phenomena that affect economic recovery
and growth patterns in general.
The next section puts forward an analytical framework that provides
alternate interdisciplinary answers to central questions of economic recov-
ery. Specifically and comparatively, we examine theoretical and empirical
advantages of the OLG model over the traditional neoclassical macroeco-
nomic approach.
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Post-Disaster

Economic Recovery
To investigate key mechanisms of the economic recovery process, it is use-
ful to contrast the Samuelson-Diamond’s overlapping generations (OLG)
framework with the Solow-Swan’s NCGM in terms of their theoretical
implications.2 These two alternative approaches frequently are utilized in
research from modern macroeconomics because they incorporate demo-
graphic factors into the dynamic process of aggregate economic activity.
The main implication of the Solow-Swan NCGM is strikingly simple
but profound. It proposes that the economic growth rate is determined
by two important factors: current level of income and long-run equilib-
rium level of future income—also called a balanced growth path or steady-
state position (Barro 1996). A major prediction of recovery derived from
the Solow-Swan perspective is that the catch-up phenomenon, also called
“Phoenix Factor,” is associated under some conditions with the oppor-
tunity for accelerated growth after a severe economic loss. From this
perspective, economic backwardness engendered by a disaster is only a
temporal condition because economies with the lower starting level of
income will grow faster when their output per capita is reduced. This pro-
cess allows economies affected by a disaster to catch up their long-run
equilibrium within one generation. In other words, the temporary man-
made or nature-induced disasters that negatively affect economies have
no lasting effects because the long-run equilibrium is not fundamentally
altered by temporal shocks. The catch-up phenomenon has been explored
systemically by empirical economists, including Gerschenkron (1962),
Abramovitz (1986), Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992), and political
scientists such as Organski and Kugler (1980) and Koubi (2005).
Once we are aware that empirical studies of recovery contradict the pre-
diction of the catch-up process (Kuznets 1973; Wheeler 1975; Arbetman
and Kugler 1989), it becomes important to identify the conditions when
that cannot take place. Kugler et al. (2013) recently reported that devel-
oped societies recover economically within a generation from severe
conflicts, but developing societies frequently do not. In other words, eco-
nomic recovery is a conditional, rather than universal, phenomenon.
Based on the interaction between theory and evidence, we shift our
theoretical focus from elaborating the deterministic path of “equilibrium
and catch-up” to understanding the possibility of “disequilibrium and
persistent loss” in post-disaster economies. The study of recovery is not
simply about fixing an economy derailed from the normal growth track
after external shocks, but rather identifying the conditions that can lead to
success or failure in the post-disaster enterprise.
The most promising theoretical approach that provides both outcomes
is Samuelson-Diamond’s OLG model. This perspective specifically iden-
tifies several kinds of pathologies caused by market failure, contrary to
the Solow-Swan NCGM. This workhorse model of “disequilibrium”
captures clear linkages between distorted sociopolitical environments
and the malfunctioning of a market system. From a recovery perspective,
the OLG model makes three fundamental assumptions that differ from
Solow-Swan’s treatment. First, it assumes that demographic evolution is
generated by a continuous turnover in younger and older generations,
which eventually constrains aggregate economic activity. Second, OLG
postulates intertemporal decision-making of individuals under uncertainty
where every forward-looking agent makes economic decisions—such as
saving for future consumption or hiring workers for more production—as
part of plans for all conceivable events under uncertainty. Consequently,
economic growth is conditioned by such decisions that are in turn affected
by the levels of security and stability in a society.
Third, and finally, the OLG model incorporates political constraints
imposed by institutional arrangement for transactions between multiple
markets. It assumes that the labor, goods and capital markets are connected
to each other via intermediary political institutions that either secure or
distort economic exchanges via contract enforcement or the credit market.
These assumptions produce complex nonlinear dynamics that differen-
tially affect recovery patterns. Add technology into the mix—a priority for
the study of change identified by Fritsch in Chap. 6—and the situation
becomes even more complex to consider.
The variant of the OLG growth model introduced here, in the spirit
of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965), adds political factors to this
theoretical framework. We further add insights from economists including
Galor and Ryder (1989), Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Galor and Weil
(1996), who elaborate more general specifications of the OLG model by
permitting the existence of multiple equilibrium points. The main political
elements incorporated have been added more recently into the framework
by Feng et al. (2000) and World Bank (2009). Our proposed approach is
based on and extends these works.
Let us now outline the core argument accounting for recovery alterna-
tives formally constructed (for complete derivations see Appendix 1). By
solving for the optima from the equations of (A1) and (A2) in Appendix
and plugging the solutions to the market clearing condition, we derive a
nonlinear difference equation3:
AH χγβ  kt 
kt +1 =  ln (1 + kt ) − 
1+ n  1 + kt 

where each parameter denotes:

k: Physical capital per capita
A: Technology
H: Human capital
χ: Economic effectiveness of political performance
γ: Efficiency of financial institution
n: Population growth rate
β: Saving propensity related to socioeconomic uncertainty
Capturing elements identified in previous studies, this equation shows
that an economic recovery of each period is a product of a complex pro-
cess in which political, economic and demography factors are intertwined
in a dynamic way (i.e., the level of future capital kt + 1 is a function of the
level of current capital kt).
Theoretical propositions that emerge from such assessments are pre-
sented in Fig. 9.1. The figure provides an analytical representation of
the anticipated recovery paths resulting from variations in key factors
described above. Figure 9.1 shows that expectations for recovery vary dra-
matically depending on the level of economic development achieved prior
to the disaster, and its severity of destruction. Indeed, economic recovery
is a typical path-dependent process. Specifically, following a disaster, the
economy will either grow or contract depending on where it falls on the
S-curve at the end of disaster. Recovery follows when the post-disaster
loss still places the economy above the threshold on the 45 degree line
(kt > k∗). This induces either accelerated or fast recovery (kt + 1 > kt). For
this reason, relatively developed societies are able to regain their status in
international politics.
A different outcome is expected for the least developed societies.
Contraction of the economy will persist when a devastating loss places
the economy below the threshold on the 45 degree line (kt < k∗). This
induces a protracted decline (kt + 1 < kt). Thus, the least and some less
developed nations devastated by natural or man-made events, which were
Fig. 9.1 Economic recovery anticipated by the OLG growth model
relatively close to the threshold on the 45 degree line (k**) prior to war, are
expected to enter a protracted period of decline and fall into the poverty
trap denoted by the shaded gray area. Note that even nations that perform
very well prior to a disaster may fall into this trap in the aftermath if the
massive and devastating event places them below the threshold (e.g., as
one would anticipate following a nuclear exchange).
Let us clarify these implications a bit more by analytically exploring
the two alternate recovery trajectories. Analytical solutions in Fig. 9.1
indicate that the speed of recovery (defined by the slope of trajectory)
is determined by political performance. High-performance societies will
recover faster (reflected by a steeper slope of S-curve) and will have a lower
likelihood of falling into the poverty trap (reflected by a smaller sized
gray colored region) than low-performance societies. Developed societ-
ies devastated by disaster will recover regardless of low or high political
performance because their initial post-disaster points usually fall above

the threshold of the gray area. While rates of recovery will vary, positive
growth takes place anyway.
Developing societies with higher political performance may recover fol-
lowing the path of developed nations by shifting the trajectory of economy
upward (from undashed to dashed trajectory) and shrinking the gray area
of poverty trap (from kt** to kt* ). Yet, for the least developed societies at
or below the threshold, economic recovery is unlikely to occur. Note that
economies “exactly” located at the threshold point will preserve disaster
losses. Catch-up rates will remain zero. At the worst, economies that fall
below the threshold will decline and continue to accumulate losses after
the disaster. Losses are exacerbated as economies captured by such dynam-
ics fall into a poverty trap.
The effects of politics are notable. Figure 9.1 also shows that high-
performance societies have a much lower likelihood of falling into a pov-
erty trap than low-performance societies. The implication is that, alongside
external inputs of foreign aid or education subsidies, internal politics mat-
ters a lot. Governments can boost their capital accumulation by improving
their governance performance, attracting foreign aid, subsidizing human
capital and technology, controlling population growth, stabilizing socio-
economic fluctuation, enforcing legal institutions to reduce transaction
costs, and building a more efficient business environment. Indeed, societ-
ies with high political performance are more likely to avoid the poverty
trap area and are more likely to move toward convergence with pre-war
performance and eventually catch up with their past trajectory (i.e., this
is achieved by reducing the threshold value to kt* from kt** ). By contrast,
low-performance societies affected by high population growth and low
economic effectiveness are far more likely to fall into the poverty trap
(defined by kt** ) than other societies that balance population growth with
investment and production.
From the perspective of war studies, developed post-war economies
such as those of the World War II belligerents are expected to recover as
the Solow-Swan NCGM predicts. This recovery pattern is consistent with
the idea of “Phoenix Factor” that discloses much more powerful growth
acceleration by losers during recovery and eventual convergence of win-
ners and losers (Kugler 1973; Organski and Kugler 1980). This, however,
is only half of the story. Developing belligerents have mixed prospects.
Those that fall above the threshold can recover like the developed societ-
ies. Developing belligerents close to the threshold are expected to maintain
losses but will not suffer additional costs, supporting Keynes’ (1920) argu-
ment that war losses are sustained without foreign aid. However, develop-
ing belligerents with low political performance, which endure devastation
severe enough to fall below the critical threshold, will descend into a pro-
tracted poverty trap, as Angell (1933) suggests. Thus, application of OLG
perspective provides a more general assessment of how and why nations
differentially recover from equivalent devastating events.
In sum, the perspective proposed implies that multiple sociopolitical
factors can either drive or inhibit the process of economic recovery. A
number of testable hypotheses about recovery flow from this interdisci-
plinary model; the most direct is that states recover differently from disas-
ters depending on the level of economic pre-disaster success and political
performance.
Table 9.1 summarizes the main argument. Above the threshold, the
rate of recovery increases with devastation, and foreign aid further accel-
erates recovery because a technically advanced productive population is
employed at low wages. Fertility rates temporarily increase but then reduce
to pre-disaster levels. Below the threshold, however, the rate of recovery
becomes increasingly negative with distance to the threshold. Foreign
aid alleviates suffering momentarily but does not sustain the long-term
recovery because such economies are constrained by chronic sociopolitical
obstacles that hinder continuous employment based on high productivity.
Indeed, the proposed interdisciplinary model based on the OLG frame-
work shows that the relationship between economic recovery and political
performance is nonlinear, dynamic and multifaceted. If these mechanics
find support from empirical assessments, this research can provide policy-
makers with a rough road map to successful post-disaster recovery.
Table 9.1 Summary of post-disaster recovery conditions

High political performance Low political performance
Developed Rapid recovery with full Less rapid recovery with limited
economy convergence convergence
Developing Rapid or tenuous recovery No recovery or decline into a
economy (political choices important) poverty trap
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Post-Disaster

Demographic Recovery
Let us now turn to demographic consequences of disasters. Kugler and
Kugler (2013) summarize the work of demographers to demonstrate that
usually population losses are recovered after war within a generation, even
though cohort effects of such disasters linger in the long run.
Consider first the cohort distribution of populations. Figure 9.2 illus-
trates how war disproportionately affects gender and age cohorts. Casualties
from battle deaths affect male far more than female population between
the ages of 18 and 40. The very young and the very old suffer much more
from war than adults because of food and medicine scarcity. Even though
total populations can be replaced within a generation, cohort losses can
only be compensated by immigration and will linger for half a century.
The post-war generations continue to experience the demographic
effects of war far longer than its economic effects. The longer-term effects
are not trivial. Substantial proportions of men of fighting age who die
prematurely produce a scarcity in the male labor force. Thus, women and
Fig. 9.2 Cohort structure affected by war

Source: Adapted from Urlanis (1971) based on Russia’s population losses.
minority groups frequently denied opportunities are now drafted to par-

ticipate in the post-war effort having received opportunities for employ-
ment and training during the war itself. A major disaster is therefore also a
major catalyst of social change in the post-war period.
A very different story emerges from analysis of population losses.
Surprisingly, given the severe war carnage, Frumkin (1951) and the
United Nations (1971) show with careful general assessment that across
time the aggregate overall effect of all conflicts on national and global
population is nil or slightly positive. Figure 9.3 shows that the peace gen-
eration engenders a substantial “baby boom” immediately after war ends,
replacing absolute casualties in less than a generation, or even surpassing
the population losses incurred during the war
Frumkin and the United Nations study also surmised that the overall
effect of conflicts on national populations is erased in one generation, and
the effects on the global population are nil or even slightly positive. The
main driver of post-war population recovery is the “baby boom” that fol-
lows substantial losses. A large increase in fertility emerges immediately
after the disaster. Such a boom obliterates casualties of war and its “echoes”
affect several generations. Figure 9.3 illustrates general effects empirically
reported in the aftermath of disasters (Kugler and Kugler 2013). A large
baby boom occurs within nine months of the event and is then sustained
for another year, repeating across several generations. Nations devastated
by disasters not only endure immediate losses but are also affected by
cyclical large fertility fluctuation rates as the misshaped cohorts achieve
maturity. Thus, many generations experience the aftereffects of war. The
underlying mechanism driving this pattern is still poorly understood.
Fig. 9.3 Effects of the post-war “Baby Boom” on populations

An Interdisciplinary Test of Post-Disaster

Economic and Demographic Recovery
The preliminary theoretical validity of the model proposed in this section
is supported by assessment of post-war economic and demographic recov-
ery. We estimate the net economic and demographic losses from war by
assuming that nations would have continued along pre-war growth trends.
The output and population trajectories estimated for each nation assume
each would sustain the logarithmic (output) or linear (population) trends
of the pre-war period during conflict and for the next 20 years. This simple
structure shows the difference between what could have been if the war
had not happened and what did happen. Accordingly, comparability across
states for economic and demographic losses and demographic recovery is
attained by measuring costs in foregone years (Organski and Kugler 1980;
Kugler et al. 2013).4 These estimates allow direct comparison of large and
small societies that suffer severe economic or demographic losses caused
by disasters.
Figure 9.4 shows three typical exemplars of post-war recovery: Japan
(successful developed belligerent), Vietnam (delayed developing belliger-
ent) and Mozambique (failed developing belligerent).
Pattern 1 shows a developed society that rapidly rebuilds. In this case,
Japan (a) experienced a population boom after the conflict; (b) effectively
controlled fertility decline; and (c) benefited from foreign aid and invest-
ment during the recovery period. Consistent with our predictions, Japan
maintained very rapid economic recovery rates based on high political
performance, while its short baby boom immediately eliminated the war-
time population losses. Indeed, Japan took advantage of existing human
capital and utilized foreign aid efficiently, enjoying the stable socioeco-
nomic environments supported by strong political performance. Such
dynamics in turn increased the marginal product of physical capital, which
is a main driver of economic growth. In sum, Japan’s accelerated recovery
matches theoretical expectations.
Pattern 2 shows that developing societies can recover with high politi-
cal performance in the pre- and post-war period. Vietnam’s war losses are
erased after a significant delay. Our model suggests that the Vietnamese
government exerted its high political performance to maintain human
capital but its ability to recover is constrained by limited access to foreign
aid. Economic recovery relied heavily on domestic capital accumulation
and only later was assisted by foreign direct investment. Once more, such
delayed but positive growth patterns are consistent with expectations.
10
War Period
5
Population Loss
-5
War Loss Time
-10
-15
Total GDP Loss

-20
-25
GDP per capita Loss

-30
-35
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Fig. 9.4 Patterns of post-war recovery
Pattern 3 shows a developing society engaged in a brutal civil war that

subsequently falls into the poverty trap. Mozambique’s political perfor-
mance is very low, and the persistent baby boom not only erases war losses
but expands the population faster than economic productivity. No eco-
nomic recovery takes place. Total domestic product recovers slightly right
after the war but the per capita income declines precipitously because the
government fails to maintain human capital and misappropriates substan-
tial foreign aid. The detrimental effect of socioeconomic uncertainty is
aggravated by the lack of effective legal enforcement arrangement and
chronically hinders most beneficial economic transactions that increase
marginal product of physical capital. Consequently, economic recovery is
stifled. The protracted negative growth patterns caught in the poverty trap
are consistent with our expectations again.
According to these preliminary assessments, our proposed model cor-
rectly explains selected cases of conditional recovery. Plausibility is not
sufficient, however. With more adequate and enriched data, we still need
further verification of our explanation with more systemic scrutiny across
time and across disaster types.
Conclusion and Implications
The interplay between political economy and demography allows us to
understand the mechanism behind economic and population recovery
in the aftermath of disasters such as wars. Consistent with IPE insights,
political performance is a critical element in the economic and population
recovery process, suggesting that individuals are fundamentally germane
not only to the onset of conflict as suggested by Renshon and Kahneman
in Chap. 3, as well as Kugler and Zak in Chap. 4, but also to how states
recover from it. These intertwined interdisciplinary factors are connected
to sustained post-disaster recovery. The formal model proposed and its
empirical implications can perhaps help scholars build a more effective
approach within IR as a whole.
Further research may in time allow decision-makers to choose policy alter-
natives that most effectively can combat the effects of disasters, which not
only will benefit the post-recovery period but may well place states on a
more peaceful path. Indeed, it is well understood that the way by which a
war ends and recovery is conducted can be linked to future conflicts. One
war can become a partial cause of another.
We show that policy outcomes will differ across levels of development
and political performance. Moreover, arrays of sociopolitical factors are
needed to understand the process of recovery. Foreign aid is important,
but its effectiveness in advancing recovery will depend on the constellation
of socioeconomic factors that differ fundamentally with each situation.
Put simply, allocation of aid to support recovery of advanced nations is
relatively straightforward; allocation of aid supporting recovery in less and
least developed societies is far more complex, and less likely to succeed.
Empirical interdisciplinary research on recovery from disasters has focused
mainly on wars, yielding some insight into the question of the effects of
conflict which is tied to one of the broad themes of this book—the dynamics
of conflict and cooperation. Future research, however, following Boussalis
(2011), should expand to natural disasters. Human losses from tsunamis in
Asia and Japan, for example, far exceed casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Historical records suggest that plagues devastated European, American
and Asian populations. While in the short term natural disasters may still
fall short of the costs of World War II—estimated at 50 million casual-
ties—recovery from such disasters is not well understood.5 As conflict is
reduced, other disasters may take prominence but the process of recovery
should be similar. We are confident that viable estimates of recovery pat-
terns can be obtained with interdisciplinary efforts in IR and beyond. We
are convinced that successful recovery strategies will vary but systematic
analysis can identify optimal paths to recovery for each type of disaster in
each level of socioeconomic development. Among all, government actions
will be critical to success. Clarifying what is politically feasible could mini-
mize human suffering and make human security choices more rational.
Finally, a closely related issue is the problem of inequality exacerbated by
disasters (Boussalis et al. 2012). The goal of this research is to formu-
late and develop mechanics of recovery that can provide effective policy
prescriptions to reduce vast differences in standard of living within and
across nations. The UN Millennium Declaration led to an unprecedented
commitment to build a more equal world society. The record shows, how-
ever, very slow progress or even growing disparities across sub-national
populations (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development
Agenda 2012). The next interdisciplinary exploration of recovery in our
view should perhaps focus not only on absolute recovery but also on ways
to minimize inequality and overcome the devastating effects of various
man-made or natural disasters.
Appendix 1: Formal Description of Economic

Recovery Model with the OLG Framework
In an OLG economy that incorporates a demographic structure, popula-
tion grows Nt + 1 = (1 + n)Nt for n ≥ − 1. If n > 0 then population grows.
If 0 > n ≥ − 1 then the population shrinks. If n = 0 then the population
is stable. Agents are assumed to live two periods. In each period there are
two types of agents—young and old. Young agents are endowed with one
unit of labor that they supply to firms. As compensation for labor, they
receive the real wage, wt. Old agents are retired. Their income is assumed
to derive only from return on the savings Rt + 1 made when they are young.
Receiving a wage and anticipating a return for savings, young agent allo-
cates income between current consumption c1t and saving at*+1 . We then
set up the lifetime utility maximization problem for an agent born at time
t with additive logarithmic utility:
max
c1t , ct2+1
( ) ( )
E (1 − β ) ln ct1 + β ln ct2+1  s.t.c1t = wt − at +1 c t2+1 = Rt +1 at +1 (A1)

where 0 < β < 1 is the rate of time discount factor relevant to an agent’s
saving propensity.
Under uncertain socioeconomic situations, this time discount factor

has a fundamental implication in the process of economic growth as Fisher
(1930) correctly emphasizes: “future income is always subject to some
uncertainty, and this uncertainty must naturally have an influence on the
rate of time preference, or degree of impatience, or its possessor (p. 42).”
If individuals are assumed to be risk-averse (as represented in logarithmic
utility), more macro-political uncertainty about the future adverse envi-
ronment (such as political upheavals that involve any reversal of property
rights) increases impatience because people prefer “sure” consumption to
the delayed “unsure” rewards. Because economic growth can be sustained
through continuous savings investment, an unstable political regime is
not likely to induce consumers to increase savings for future rewards and
decrease immediate consumptions as savings may become worthless (Feng
2003). As a result, more macro-political uncertainty leads to the lower
value of β parameter.
We model a representative firm choosing physical capital per effective
worker kt to maximize profits based on its production function AHχ ⋅ f(kt):
max AH χ ⋅ f ( kt ) − Rt +1 kt − wt (A2)
kt

Notice a total factor productivity term of production function consists

of Aas technology, H as human capital and χ as the effectiveness of politi-
cal performance. This means economic productivity can be improved by
well-functioning government. The effectiveness of political performance
can be evaluated by the government’s ability to raise revenues as budget
adjustment, the prudence to purchase goods and provide services, and
the quality of political infrastructure that reduces the transaction costs
between society and government (Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Kugler
and Tammen 2012). In other words, “sufficiently” extracted resources
spent in “optimal proportions” thorough an “effective” channel can boost
the productivity of an economy.
Consistent with previous insights by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943),
Kuznets (1973), Alesina (1997), Acemoglu (2005) and Knack and Keefer
(1995), this treatment can provide a clear linkage between political perfor-
mance and economic growth.
Connecting the equilibrium saving decisions of at*+1 through the
demand for investment by firms, we further derive the equilibrium dynam-
ics of the physical capital stock, kt + 1. In the entire marketplace of OLG
economy, every sub-market of labor, capital and goods is connected to

each other via financial institutions such as a credit market that facilitates
go-between transactions. This connection, also called “market clearing,”
defines the fundamental relationship between current period’s and next
period’s physical capital stock, kt and kt + 1.
According to our demographical setup, by parameterizing population
growth as Nt + 1 = (1 + n)Nt, the aggregate savings from time t to t + 1 is
defined as N t at*+1 . Firms then borrow the savings of workers (and consum-
ers, simultaneously) to produce the new level of physical capital stock kt + 1
at the next time period, t + 1.
Such dynamic processes of supply and demand of money, however, do
not operate within a vacuum. Most of these interactions occur within the
formal institutional sector governed by political actors including the state.
Indeed, linking ultimate borrowers to ultimate lenders with a single mon-
etary system, which is legally guaranteed, is one of the most crucial roles
that financial institutions play in igniting the engine of economic growth.
By equating the supply of loanable funds (saving) to the demand for loans
(investment), we have the capital market clearing condition K t +1 = γ N t at*+1
for 1 ≥ γ ≥ 0, where Kt + 1 is the aggregate stock of physical capital at
the next time period, Nt is the number of population at the current time
period and at*+1 is the optimal saving rate decided by consumers solving
the lifetime utility maximization problem described in equation (A1). If
the institutional efficiency parameter γ is equal to 1 (equivalently, there
exists no transaction cost in financial environment), we can consider this
financial institution to be working completely without any friction.
Finally, the dynamics of economic recovery, or the physical capi-
tal accumulation, is defined by the capital market clearing condition of
K t +1 = γ N t at*+1 . By solving for the optima from the equations of (A1) and
(A2) and plugging the solutions to the market clearing condition, we
derive a law of motion for capital accumulation as follows.
AH χγβ  kt 
kt +1 =  ln (1 + kt ) −  (A3)
1+ n  1 + kt 

Notes
1. One academic response emerging from human security and normative new
humanitarianism analysis tackles recovery problems with the aim to protect
and promote human dignity (Fox 2001; Bellamy and McDonald 2002;
Wibben 2008). Many insights emerge from such studies but a systematic
paradigm has not been agreed upon.
2. The overlapping generation model was originally introduced by Samuelson
(1958) and elaborated by Diamond (1965). The Solow-Swan model was
introduced by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) independently.
3. The first order condition shows the optimal level of the yield on capital Rt +
1 = f (kt) and wage wt = AHχ ⋅ [f(kt) − ktf (kt)]. To simplify the derivation
′ ′
without loss of generality, we employ a family of neoclassical production

functions with the intensive form of f(k) = a ln (1 + k)is (1993: 94). This
function reduces the cost of notational complexity and satisfies all the stan-
dard properties: it is increasing, concave, twice continuously differentiable
and goes through the origin.
4. First, the predicted time is estimated as Time = b0 + b1 ln(GDP) and Time
= b1(Population). Then to obtain consistent estimates of costs, we calcu-
late: Time Loss during the Post-War Period = Predicted Time − Time.
5. In the Japan 2012 tsunami, direct losses exceeding 20,000 people and 360
billion USD in property making it the most expensive natural disaster
recorded thus far (Ferris and Solis, 2013). The Indian Ocean 2004 tsunami
produced about 250,000 deaths and approximately 14 billion USD in
property loss (Economist 2013).
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CHAPTER 10
Systemism and Foreign Policy Analysis:

A New Approach to the Study
of International Conflict
Carolyn C. James and Patrick James
SYSTEMISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Systemism, an intellectual approach with great potential for application
to International Relations (IR), is introduced in this chapter. The essence
of systemism, which should not be confused with “systems theory,” is
conveyed by its most longstanding exponent, Bunge (1996, 1998): a
commitment to building comprehensive theories. Systemism includes but
also transcends individualism and holism as the other available “coherent
views” with respect to operation of a social system (Bunge 1996: 241;
see also Choi 2011: 29–30). Rather than theorizing strictly at the level
of the system or its components, systemism allows for linkages operat-
ing at macro- and micro-levels, back and forth between them, as well
any discipline that borrows nothing from, and gives nothing in return to, other
disciplines is worthless (Bunge 1996: 267).
C.C. James
International Studies, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA, USA
P. James ()

290 C.C. JAMES AND P. JAMES
as facilitating comparison. The properties of systemism facilitate a more

complete approach toward the study of foreign policy, with the potential
to derive greater insights about international conflict.
Systemism is an approach rather than a broad theory (Bunge 1996: 265).
As will become apparent, systemism is a well-suited tool for applica-
tion to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), given the evolution of the latter
toward middle range as opposed to epic theory (Kesgin 2011: 337). As
Hermann (1995: 251) asked regarding FPA two decades ago: “How are
variables, hypotheses, or even theories from different analytical levels to
be integrated into more complete explanations?” The question deserves
an answer and what follows is an attempt, through application of system-
ism, to assess FPA’s development in a way that facilitates the quest for
synthesis. With that goal achieved, more can be learned, in turn, about
international conflict.
“Systemism,” as assessed in a recent and favorable review from Choi
(2011: 29), “has emerged as an important worldview and methodological
approach in social science.” While systemism is introduced in more detail
a bit later, we stress here its potential as a comprehensive frame of refer-
ence for assessments of theorizing in IR. Put differently, the apparatus of
systemism—a commitment to fully specified theoretical linkages within
and across macro- and micro-levels of analysis, along with diagrammatic
exposition—can be of great value in charting the direction of a field such
as FPA within IR as a whole. For example, modeling according to the
rules of systemism can help to present more clearly the standard Waltzian
(1959) levels of analysis and other frameworks applied to the causes, pro-
cesses, and consequences of international conflict. Injection of system-
ism into IR and FPA creates the potential for greater insight into foreign
policy via a new integrated approach in line with the priorities set by Yetiv
in Chap. 2.
FPA is a major component of IR, with a history dating back approxi-
mately 60 years (Snyder et al. 1954).1 More than anything else, FPA is asso-
ciated primarily with the individual or micro-level of analysis. “The central
focus of foreign policy analysis,” observed Gerner (1995: 18), “is on the
intentions, statements, and actions of an actor—often, but not always, a
state—directed toward the external world and the response of other actors
to these intentions, statements, and actions.” FPA “privileges the human
decision maker” (Breuning 2007: 169; see also Hudson and Vore 1995:
210; Hudson 2005: 1; and Hudson 2007: 31) and focuses primarily on
states (Alden and Aran 2012: 1). Furthermore, it seeks to unpack the
SYSTEMISM AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A NEW APPROACH... 291
“black box” of decision-making (Hudson and Vore 1995: 211). For such
reasons, FPA tends toward interdisciplinary and multicausal explanations
as its theory and research accumulate over time (Breuning 2007: 6, 15;
Hudson 2007: 6; Neack 2008: 6, 19–25; Hill 2010: 2576). FPA is a vital
source of insights with regard to cooperation and conflict among states.
FPA’s agent-centered approach explains why, in a post–Cold War world
with an increasingly diverse set of actors and conflicts, it is gaining atten-
tion once again. Within IR, FPA is “becoming more theoretically impor-
tant” (Hudson 2007: 185; see also Kaarbo 2015) after a phase in which
large-scale paradigm wars primarily involving realism and liberalism had
taken center stage. FPA can be traced back to the mid-1950s, with the
exegesis of decision-making put forward by Snyder et al. (1954) often
cited as the foundational text (Kesgin 2011: 336, 338).2 Thus FPA’s ori-
gins, which shaped its trajectory, go back to the era of systems theory
and behaviorism. The initial decades of FPA therefore tended toward the
assembling of variables into increasingly intricate frameworks.
Like other sectors in IR, however, FPA moved away from grand the-
orizing emphasized in that era and toward “finding theories that work
under certain conditions” (Kesgin 2011: 336). The result is a long-term
trend toward “midrange theories that are empirically grounded, culturally
sensitive, and often issue- or domain-specific” (Gerner 1995: 30; see also
Hermann 1995: 248; Breuning 2007: 170; Hill 2010: 2573; Alden and
Aran 2012; 119). As a result of the emphasis on middle-range theorizing,
any number of interesting propositions have emerged and gained favor—
see, for instance, the vast inventory and comparative analysis from Mintz
and DeRouen (2010)—but “there is not much work yet on integrating
different factors influencing foreign policy into a comprehensive frame-
work” (Kesgin 2011: 341). Thus, the whole of insights about cooperation
and conflict from FPA may be at risk of becoming less than the sum of its
parts.
This chapter unfolds in five additional sections. The second section
provides the intellectual foundation for systemism, which is descended
from systems analysis. Section three presents systemism. Section four
focuses on systemism and IR in terms of the record of accomplishment
so far. The fifth section applies systemism to assess progress in the field of
FPA at two points in time approximately a decade apart. Sixth and final
among the sections is a summary of findings that also includes ideas for
further application of systemism within FPA in particular and IR’s study
of conflict in general.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS AN INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION

Given its centrality in the discipline of political science at one time, it
is appropriate to begin the review with Easton’s systems analysis (1953,
1965a, b).3 In a comprehensive assessment, Leslie (1972: 155) confirmed
Easton’s systems analysis as occupying a leading place in the study of poli-
tics during the 1950s and 1960s.4 The approach Easton introduced, with
the look and feel of the behavioral revolution strongly imprinted upon
it, generated considerable reaction for over a decade. Thus systemism,
which relies upon a diagrammatic exposition to convey cause and effect,
is therefore by no means the first conceptual framework of its kind in the
study of politics.
This is neither the time nor place to review the works concerned in
detail, but system-level theorizing in political science to this day tends to
favor interdisciplinary borrowing rather than ideas drawn more directly
from the discipline itself.5 Systemism’s similarities with, and differences
from, Easton’s conceptual apparatus will demonstrate the progress that
has been made in thinking about sociopolitical systems since the 1960s.
Since systems analysis fell out of favor in the 1970s, there is no need to
focus in any detail on alternative strands of research within IR.6
Easton’s (1965a: x, 23) point of departure is to view politics as a system
of behavior. He designates systems analysis as part of political behavior as
an intellectual movement in academe (Easton 1965a: 4). The behavioral
turn in IR included, during the 1960s and 1970s, an implicitly Easton-
inspired emphasis on flowchart-style diagrams in conveying cause and
effect. Four components are identified in systems analysis (Easton 1965a:
24–25; see also Fisher 2011: 71, 73): a system made up of political behav-
ior; an environment that can be distinguished from the system at issue;
the members’ response to stress within the system’s operation; and feed-
back to actors and decision makers that is (or is not) sufficient for the
system’s persistence. The overall focus of Easton’s (1965a: 84) analysis is
on the ability of a system to continue in the face of stress and return to a
state of equilibrium. Stress can include change through adaptation to new
circumstances.
Easton (1990: 4) revisited his theorizing and pointed out that, decades
after its heyday, the emphasis of the system-oriented approach in the 1950s
and 1960s on political behavior had caused neglect of the “broad context”
of activity. He argued that more attention therefore needed to be paid to
the “overarching structure of the whole political system in shaping all its
major parts” (Easton 1990: 6). This would not mean “throwing the baby
out with the bathwater,” in that a focus on individual action would need
to be sustained. Theorizing would continue to be individualistic in terms
of social behavior being “reducible to the activities of persons and their
empirically traceable connections with each other” (Easton 1990: 257).
However, Easton (1990: 257) added soon after that emergent properties
“may be accessible only if dealt with at the collective level.” Individual
actions matter but constraints imposed by overarching structures “are very
real, even though they are invisible and seldom identified and recognized
for what they do” (Easton 1990: 280). His exposition, from the stand-
point of a systems approach as it might be applied today, anticipates the
need to combine levels of action into a single frame of reference.
Offered three decades ago, Green’s assessment of systems analysis as
Easton had put it forward rings true today: systems theory is “nearly
friendless among political scientists” (1985: 127). Declining and even
vanishing interest in systems analysis can be traced to characteristics that
systemism, as will become apparent, seeks to avoid. Quite recently, Fisher
(2011: 74) produced a valuable review that sums up the multifaceted criti-
cism of systems analysis that caused it to go out of favor: methodologi-
cal weakness (i.e., how to incorporate all events); difficulty in specifying
boundaries and variables in a system; and problems with the operational
meaning of equilibrium.
So, in light of those shortcomings, who needs systems theory? Perhaps
it should go into a pile with other obsolete things from the twentieth
century. Put systems theory next to the VCR and forget about it, right?
While on the surface that might seem justified, it is not the right deci-
sion. Consider the assessment from Pickel (2007: 392): “abandoning
conceptions of systems has imposed a high price on the social sciences: a
lack of ontologies and methodologies that are both philosophically pro-
found and scientifically defensible.” The key concern becomes success-
fully identifying and explaining mechanismic causation. Without a system
orientation, a mechanismic account cannot be achieved; instead, research
becomes an exercise in increasingly sophisticated empirical research that
cannot depict cause and effect directly.7 In particular, the nexus of foreign
policy and international conflict must be studied in a way that identifies
causal mechanisms and thereby obtains practical value.
Correlation does not equate with causation and that is the point of
departure for systemism as it seeks to incorporate mechanisms. Consider
the adage about storks and birth rates as a simple illustration of what is
at issue here. The correlation is there, but not because storks, as parents
might tell their young children, are bringing the babies. Instead, a causal
mechanism involving rural areas is at work. The degree to which an area
is rural will explain both the frequency of storks being observed and the
birth rate. Something more FPA-related to consider might be a fanciful
(or perhaps even observed) connection involving the number of letters in
a state’s name and the frequency of its involvement in Cold War conflict.
This might be a simple artifact of the USA and USSR when fully spelled
out. The underlying causal mechanism is that the superpowers became that
way through federation—voluntary or otherwise—and thus also had very
long names as a by-product of their history. In sum, systemism does not
focus on obtaining ever-larger coefficients from regression-style research
or accumulation of case studies that show association between variables.
Instead, systemism goes beyond debates over qualitative or quantitative
methods to focus explicitly on explanation.
The quest for causal mechanisms demands a return to system-oriented
thinking. The ontology and method of systems analysis open up new vis-
tas to research. With respect to existence, a system orientation reminds
us that causal effects often may be nonlinear or disproportionate; regard-
ing method, such thinking reminds us that causal relationships “cannot
be inferred from linear correlations” (Pickel 2007: 394). Furthermore,
systems analysis offers a way beyond the increasingly tedious debate over
material versus ideational analysis. As Pickel (2007: 404) asserts, “social
systems cannot be directly observed” and therefore any exposition that is
thorough must include composition, structure, environment, and causal
mechanisms. For such reasons, any ensuing argument about whether idea-
based or material explanations are paramount is rendered irrelevant.8
Easton’s vision of system-oriented theorizing from the era of the
behavioral revolution, nearly lost in the mists of academic time, creates a
context within which to introduce and evaluate systemism. To what extent
is systemism similar to Easton’s formulation? How is it different? Does sys-
temism represent an improvement over what Easton proposed long ago?
And most germane of all, does this improvement result in theoretical and
explanatory power that can enhance the ability to explain IR phenomena?
SYSTEMISM
Systems analysis from the high behavioral era focused on regulative
responses to stress in the quest for system persistence (Easton 1965a:
124). In that sense it can be interpreted as exhibiting a status quo-oriented
or homeostatic bias that overlooked the “personal goals and values of

decision-makers” (Leslie 1972: 158; see also Young 1968: 44–48).9
Systemism, by contrast, does not exhibit that bias. Its agenda is more
expansive and does not entail a homeostatic element, that is, a focus on
whether a system returns to its initial state. From the standpoint of sys-
temism, social systems are in constant motion—they do not stand still
(Bunge 1996: 272). In addition, systemism gives agency a more central
role because it explicitly models micro-level as well as macro-level interac-
tions. The objectives and values of leaders and even ordinary citizens are
incorporated within systemism—a clear point of difference from Easton’s
frame of reference.
Systemism, however, does resemble systems analysis in a few signifi-
cant ways. But the characteristics are not those that stimulated criticism
and produced a decline in systems analysis among political scientists.
Systemism is based on the assumption that a discrete system exists and can
be distinguished from its environment. In addition, systems analysis and
systemism both favor diagrammatic expositions to show cause and effect.10
Feedback is present in systemism in the sense that individual linkages can
feature such loops; however, that is not the same as Easton’s application
of feedback as a concept connected to the quest for system persistence.
Systemism, it would be fair to say, is at least an indirect descendent of
Easton’s systems analysis. The contemporary approach attempts to move
beyond that legacy by avoiding the holistic and homeostatic biases that
accompanied earlier efforts to develop theories about political systems,
valuable as they may be in other ways. Systemism, moreover, is compatible
with FPA’s evolution (described below) in the direction of building mid-
level theory from the “ground up” (Kesgin 2011: 337). Systems analysis,
by contrast, is associated with the quest for general theory (Easton 1990:
ix).
Systemism’s creator, Bunge (1996: 264; see also 1998), puts it forward
as a way to think about the world; in principle, it can be applied to any
aspect of social life: “The alternative to both individualism and holism
is systemism, since it accounts for both individual and system, and, in
particular, for individual agency and social structure. Indeed, systemism
postulates that everything is a system or a component of one. And it mod-
els every system as a triplet (composition, environment, structure), or CES
for short, so it encompasses the valid features of its rivals [individualism
and holism.]” To the CES apparatus Pickel (2007) adds causal mecha-
nisms to convey explicitly the contribution made by the diagrams entailed
by systemism, resulting in what this study will refer to as composition,

environment, structure and causal mechanisms (CESCM).
Composition refers to participants—who may be individuals, social
groups, or those speaking for government institutions—and interactions
between and among them that take place because of certain issues. This
book highlights the role of the individual but it does not ignore other
levels of analysis. The environment is everything beyond the boundaries
of the system itself. It may have an influence on the system and vice versa.
Structure refers to the rules that govern interactions among participants.
Finally, a causal mechanism is a link through either communication or
material action involving variables within the system.11
From the standpoint of systemism (Bunge 1998: 65), the choice
between unit and system is a flawed dichotomy and that point is well
recognized already in IR (Brecher 1999; James 2002a, b) among other
fields. This book focuses more on the individual than the environment for
various reasons laid out in Chap. 1, but it recognizes the complex interplay
between the two.
Indeed, all theories must be expected to deal with both systems and
units—that is, the macro- and micro-levels—in some way. This point
comes out clearly in the brief discussion of ideas about FPA that opened
this chapter and is reinforced by the preceding review and critique of
Easton’s classic work. Macro- and micro-levels influence each other; they
do not operate in isolation (Archer 1996, xxi).12 The question, of course,
is how best to put together a theory that takes this reality regarding causal
mechanisms into account while avoiding a dichotomy of macro- versus
micro-explanations, each too often seeking to discredit the other.
Systemism conceives of systems as entities nested within one another
as subsystems, systems, and supersystems (Bunge 1996: 270). Thus, work
begins with identification of boundaries. Within IR, for example, the usual
focus is upon levels of analysis, with international, state, and individual as
near universal in usage after the highly influential treatment from Waltz
(1959). However, as will be demonstrated through later application of
systemism to FPA, the Waltzian language can produce confusion when
efforts are made toward the all-important objective of integration vis-à-vis
explanations. Put differently, the terminology developed below provides
more rigorous boundaries for classifying variables as being in one category
or another and thereby creates a better platform for articulating com-
prehensive explanations in FPA and elsewhere. The exposition also is in
line with Yetiv’s recommended integrated approach from Chap. 2 because
terminology from one field (IR) is engaged directly by that of another

(systems analysis) to the benefit of both.
Systemism goes beyond holism and reductionism through its inclusion
of all basic connections that can make up a theory.13 Recall that holism
and reductionism, respectively, focus exclusively on aggregates and units.
In the context of IR, for example, this would mean theorizing about the
international system as a whole (holism) versus foreign policy decision-
making for a given state (reductionism).
Systemism, in contrast to reductionism or holism, entails a commit-
ment to “understanding a system in terms of a comprehensive set of func-
tional relationships” (James 2002a: 131). Figure 10.1 depicts functional
relations in a social system from a systemist point of view. Variables oper-
ate at macro- (system—X, Y) and micro- (subsystem or unit—x, y) levels.
Outside the system is the environment (supersystem—E). The environ-
ment can be expected to provide inputs into, and experience outputs
from, the system at both macro- and micro-levels.
Fig. 10.1 Functional relations in a social system.

Sources: Adapted from Bunge (1996, 149; see also James 2012)
For example, Africa might be regarded as one such system, with the
environment corresponding to the world beyond its boundaries.14 Inputs
from the environment might include actions by international organiza-
tions or states from outside, along with human immigration into Africa.
A particularly intense example is the injection of European conflicts into
Africa as a by-product of nineteenth century colonialism. Outputs might
include the foreign policies of states in Africa and their actions within
regional or global organizations, along with emigration to the rest of the
world. Turbulence that began in Tunisia, for purposes of simplification
labeled as the Arab Spring, eventually set in motion huge and contro-
versial movements of people out of the African system and contributed
to various regional conflicts. The preceding examples deliberately include
both macro- and micro-oriented variables, referring to international orga-
nization and state activity on one hand and human migration on the other.
Within a system as depicted by Fig. 10.1, four basic types of linkages
are possible: macro-macro (X → Y), macro-micro (X → x), micro-macro
(y → Y) and micro-micro (x → y). In addition, the effects may go back
and forth with the environment, such as E → X or y → E. Note that in
this figure, and in the subsequent diagrams that focus on FPA, upper-
and lower-case characters correspond to macro- and micro-level variables,
respectively.
Of interest as well is functional form for the relationship X → Y, where
X is put forward as a cause of Y; what, for example, is the nature of
Y = F(X) (i.e., read as “Y is a function of X”)? Is the function incremental
or something else? This question must be answered for all connections
identified between variables in the system. Assessment of Y as a function
of X, by intuition, begins with an incremental or linear relationship, with
complexity added as necessary. For example, some linkages may be incre-
mental, such as water cooling down or heating up, and then step level,
with temperatures of 0 and 100 Celcius resulting in freezing and boiling,
respectively. Functional form is also important in strengthening the falsifi-
ability of a theory by increasing the specificity of its causal mechanisms.
Figure 10.1 is generic and may apply to any social system. Its basic con-
tents will be elaborated through illustrations from FPA. The linkages con-
veyed by Fig. 10.1—(a) between the environment and the system and (b)
within the system itself—will be covered in turn. This process will reveal
how, in principle, the contents of any theoretical exposition can be trans-
lated into the language of systemism, which in turn facilitates comparison.
What about systemism’s emphasis on CESCM at a general level and

in relation to FPA? Consider Africa, once again, as an example of a social
system. Analysis begins by identifying a system relative to a supersystem
and subsystems, in other words, the system’s boundaries. In this context,
the continent of Africa is the system (macro-level), within the world as
a supersystem (environment). Subsystems (micro-level) inside of Africa
might take the form of regions (e.g., the Horn), states (e.g., Mali), or
some other designation. Hence, when applying systemism, this part of the
process is empirical and problem-driven.
Africa’s composition in terms of actors at the macro-level includes
over 50 states and an even greater number of international organizations.
These organizations include those of a system-wide character, such as the
African Union, along with the Economic Community of West African
States and other regional entities. At the micro-level are actions within
societies for each respective state. A good illustrative case for macro- ver-
sus micro-action is provided by the career of the late Nelson Mandela. As
president of South Africa from 1994 to 1999, he acted at the macro-level
as the official voice of his state on policy matters. Mandela acted at the
micro-level—as a leading figure in the struggle against apartheid and as a
philanthropist—before and after his time in office, respectively. He mat-
tered significantly as an individual changing history’s course.
Africa’s environment consists of everything beyond its boundaries.15
Thus, inputs to Africa from its environment would include actions of
states and international organizations, with the USA and former colonial
powers such as France and Britain on one hand and the UN on the other
as most relevant. An unfortunate conflict-related example of an output
from Africa to its environment in recent years is piracy, notably around the
Horn of Africa.
Structure in Africa consists of a combination of anarchy, as with the
rest of the international system, tempered to some degree by cooperation
facilitated by norms. Consider two examples of causal mechanisms, micro-
macro and macro-micro, respectively. Interstate war is rare in Africa, prob-
ably because of a micro-macro effect. Most regimes on the continent,
even if democratic, are corrupt and led by quasi-dictators who are more
concerned with safeguarding their rule than engaging in potentially dan-
gerous acts of conquest. Thus, interstate strife ends up rather scarce in
comparison to conflict at the intrastate level, which reflects a macro-micro
effect, namely, the postcolonial borders of African states that do not match
up with ethnic boundaries.
Causal mechanisms, such as communication between states, are con-

veyed through the preceding sample of connections. This completes
the use of Africa to illustrate CESCM for a social system. The tentative
conclusion of this section is that systemism represents an advancement
over systems analysis at the level of theory. Further attention to system-
ism’s record of accomplishment and its potential for application to a
domain such as FPA therefore is warranted.
SYSTEMISM, CONFLICT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

THE RECORD SO FAR16
Efforts to apply systemism to IR began with reflection on the time-
honored realist paradigm—central to the field but embattled and in need
of an overhaul in response to sustained criticism. James (2002a) reassessed
realism in an effort to address one of the main criticisms of the paradigm,
namely, contradictions within it. In particular, when and why would the
key concept of power balancing be expected to operate?.17 Through a dia-
grammatic exposition based on systemism, James (2002a) demonstrated
that balancing might ensue at a global level, with partnership at a regional
level occurring out of perceived necessity in response to a threat from
beyond. Cooperation in a subsystem at the dyadic level therefore accumu-
lates in order to make its actors collectively viable in intersystemic terms;
balance of power politics, anarchy, and dyadic conflict then follow at a
higher level of aggregation (James 2002a: 138–139). This formulation
places conflict and cooperation on a continuum and helps highlight their
dynamics.
Consider in that context the movement toward integration witnessed
in Western Europe after World War II. Formation of various economic and
security-related institutions can be traced directly to a perceived existential
threat from the very powerful Soviet Union. The USSR had extended
its sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe after the collapse of
the Third Reich and the leadership of Western Europe had every reason
to eschew international conflict in favor of cooperation for that reason.
Cooperation spread throughout Western Europe, with institutions such
as the European Community and NATO firmly in place as the Cold War
and associated Soviet menace drew to a close.
Apparent contradiction turns into logical consistency, at least for the
preceding components of the conceptual apparatus from realism, with
cooperation in a system (Western Europe) facilitating competition in

a supersystem (Eurasia). In other words, forms of cooperation in one
context can sustain or stimulate conflict in another. Thus, systemism’s
diagrammatic approach adds order and helps to manage complexity as
causal mechanisms are assembled into a more coherent whole.
James (2002b) also reevaluates realism, but in a much more encom-
passing way. The focus of this application is on structural realist theorizing
as a whole, as opposed to specific linkages in need of more coherence with
each other. When applied to structural realism, systemism reveals that the
theory lacks a unified approach toward assembling elements of capability
into a more encompassing and logically consistent treatment of structure
and how it impacts on process. Elements of structure are defined and
assembled into a more unified treatment that goes substantially beyond
counting the number of great powers (i.e., polarity) of the system. The
result is a new, elaborated variant of structural realism with the potential
to expand upon the relatively limited hypotheses about power balancing
and recurrent conflict at the macro-level (James 2002b). Through this
approach, it becomes possible to generate propositions about, for exam-
ple, the conflict propensity of individual states as well as the system as a
whole.
With a unified model of crises in world politics, Brecher (2008) demon-
strates the value of a systemist approach in the context of conflict processes.
The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project defines an international
crisis as a macro-level phenomenon: a change in the intensity of disruptive
interactions and greater probability of military hostilities that destabilizes
relationships of states and challenges the structure of the international
system (Brecher 2008: 7; see also Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).
At the micro-level, ICB defines a foreign policy crisis in terms of lead-
ership perceptions: a threat to basic values, finite time for response, and
higher probability of military hostilities (Brecher 2008: 9; see also Brecher
and Wilkenfeld 1997). The ICB Project rigorously connects these micro-
and macro-levels of crisis into a research program that includes aggregate
data analysis and depth through case studies. In sum, by taking seriously
the priorities set by systemism regarding theoretical completeness and
logical consistency, the ICB Project is able to obtain greater insight into
issues such as crisis onset, escalation, management, resolution, and legacy.
The individual level of analysis is not ignored for theoretical parsimony,
but elevated, alongside other variables, for explanatory fidelity. Systemism,
thus, accounts for various individual-level factors, highlighted throughout
this book, but within a broader mechanism for assessing the gravity of
competing variables that can explain crucial phenomena such as interna-
tional conflict.
Systemism has been used to create a model that facilitates compara-
tive foreign policy studies (James and Özdamar 2009). Based upon an
expanded version of McGowan and Shapiro’s original foreign policy
model (1973), Turkey’s foreign policy toward Syria takes into account the
often-troubled micro-level influence of Turkey’s internal Kurdish popula-
tion. Macro-macro level links, in this case relations between Turkey and
Syria, are expanded to include macro-micro links (e.g. Syrian support for
the PKK, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party within Turkey), micro-micro links
(rising Turkish nationalism in response to PKK terrorism), and micro-
macro links (domestic demands from ethnic Turks for a more hawkish
foreign policy toward Syria). Such systematic analyses underscore the role
of domestic and individual factors as causes of conflict.
Rather than attempting to discern patterns of cooperation and conflict
between states based primarily on domestic actors and structures, other
internal variables, including ethnic minorities as well as the behavior and
intentions of individual leaders, yield a more complete understanding of
Turkey’s relationship with Syria. This implementation of systemism also
allows for incorporation of a broad variety of methodological approaches
to form a more coherent and comprehensive set of studies amenable to
further criticism and development individually and as a whole.
Systemism has been applied most recently to conflict processes in IR
through a study of how deterrence and compellence operate, with par-
ticular attention to the case of Iraq (James 2012). A study from Harvey
and James (2009), which tracked six deterrence exchanges involving the
US–Iraqi conflict from 1991 through the outbreak of war in 2003, is
used in James (2012) to reveal the value added from systemism. First, the
diagrammatic exposition reveals a difference in degree rather than kind in
the practice of deterrence and compellence under conditions of post–Cold
War complexity. The six exchanges over Iraq show that basic traits of tradi-
tional deterrence—rationality, state-centrism, and rivalry conditions—are
maintained in the era of complex deterrence. Second, the series of figures
reveals the importance of domestic sources for security policy; numer-
ous and significant micro-macro linkages appear. Third, the one exchange
leading to deterrence failure and subsequent war in 2003 contains sig-
nificantly more linkages than the other five exchanges, which may help
thinking about what to watch for in the future. We stress that the failure
of deterrence is a dynamic that constitutes a complex cause of conflict.

Deterrence failure may even reinforce more aggressive impulses.
Additional directions identified in the study for systemism and complex
deterrence include extending the case of Iraq forward in time, exploring
connections with contemporary events, focusing on more than two lev-
els of interaction and pursuing the study of rising powers (James 2012:
158–159). Of course, individuals matter in this context and their pro-
pensities and behavior, as reflected in the earlier chapters of this book, are
crucial to understanding deterrence in conflict situations. One example
of a new project would be to seek understanding, via systemism, of the
relatively limited actions taken by the USA in response to the rise of the
Islamic State.
Systemism is an approach with relatively few conflict-oriented appli-
cations so far within IR; the domains include realist theory, crisis, for-
eign policy and ethnic conflict, and deterrence and compellence. Yet the
studies that exist already are sufficient to reveal the value of systemism
with respect to probing the logical consistency of theories, making causal
mechanisms explicit, facilitating comparison, and identifying priorities for
future research. Thus, application of systemism to FPA, a rising sector of
research in IR with great relevance to explanation of conflict, becomes a
priority.
SYSTEMISM AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Systemism and FPA, as will become increasingly apparent, are made for
each other. Consider in that context the challenging question posed by
Hermann (1995: 256):
How does one create an interactive theory that takes the perspective of an
actor in the system, rather than that of the system itself, while at the same
time taking into account that the actor is constantly responding to per-
ceived external feedback to its prior actions, new initiatives of others, dif-
fering situations, and shifts in the international structure? We must address
the question.
This multifaceted question is an important one and implicit within the

query is a systemist point of view in deriving an answer. Note the empha-
sis on macro (system) and micro (unit) levels in tandem. To assess FPA’s
progress in line with systemist priorities identified by Hermann (1995),
both diachronic and synchronic analysis will be carried out. Studies from
1995 and 2007 will be assembled into diagrammatic expositions based
on systemism to assess the state of FPA. The first set of studies includes
Gerner (1995), Hermann (1995), and Hudson and Vore (1995), while
the second consists of Breuning (2007) and Hudson (2007). While other
valuable studies exist, the preceding sets are selected for comparison
because (a) each attempts to assess FPA in an overall sense in the same
year of publication, with attention to causal linkages at varying levels of
analysis; and (b) two time intervals, separated by more than a decade, are
sufficient for the purpose of this chapter.18
What is the state of FPA in 1995, about four decades after its inception?
A first generation of research, up to approximately the mid- to late 1970s,
is identified by Hudson and Vore (1995) and Gerner (1995). Figure 10.2
shows four sets of variables combined from the preceding studies in a
simple visual presentation: national and societal characteristics; organiza-
tional process and bureaucratic politics; small group dynamics; and indi-
vidual characteristics.19 Note the relatively sizeable number of variables
grouped together under the first category as compared to the others. One
arrow leads from each set of factors over to foreign policy, which reflects
the narrative available in Gerner (1995) and Hudson and Vore (1995).
Put differently, the vision is of assembling a wide range of factors with
an interdisciplinary flavor (e.g., demographics, culture, geography, opera-
tional code, etc.) into a unidirectional model of foreign policy.
Pause now to consider a problem for integration of theory that comes
out when looking more closely at the contents of the preceding figure.
Small group dynamics and individual characteristics in Fig. 10.2 really
mean government or macro-level as designated by systemism. Put differ-
ently, language from the first level of Waltz (1959) is used to label these
categories, but they really pertain to how individuals and small groups
operate in a government context. This needs more clarity as work moves
forward on how foreign policy leads to cooperation or conflict. In addi-
tion, note that items in the same category change at vastly different rates;
an obvious comparison would be political issues at time ‘t’ versus national
character under the heading of national and societal characteristics.
This kind of diagrammatic presentation also readily points out the omis-
sion of a feedback loop. Unpacking the categories from Fig. 10.2 in this
way draws attention to the need for dynamic modeling that moves beyond
comparative statics. Take, for example, World War I as an outcome that
Fig. 10.2 The initial generation of FPA scholarship
feeds back into the system in a wide range of ways that contribute to the
outbreak of World War II. Revanchism took hold in Germany as an ideol-
ogy, eventually manifested in its most virulent form as National Socialism.
Transforming demographic changes occurred; for instance, huge losses in
World War I left France in a greatly weakened state in both material and
psychological terms during what became the interwar years. These and
various other factors included in Fig. 10.2 could be put together into a
comprehensive account for World War II as a product of the experience in
World War I—that is, an explanation based on the dynamics of conflict. Of
course, an a priori question is whether Adolph Hitler could have arisen to
play a crucial role in the absence of these developments.
Consider Fig. 10.3, which provides a systemist reinterpretation of the
first generation of scholarship conveyed by Fig. 10.2. Several properties of
the systemist-inspired figure stand out.
First, note that causal mechanisms are identified within as well as across
the prior groupings of variables. For example, geography now stands as
the first “domino” in a much more intricate sequence than before. This
shift increases the framework’s degree of falsifiability through a more pre-
cise statement of presumed causal mechanisms.
Second, some items are reclassified in terms of placement at the
macro- versus micro-levels within the system. (Recall that macro- and
micro-variables are distinguished in the figure through use of upper- and
lower-case characters, respectively.) Elite perception of national role, elite
and mass public opinion, and particular political issues at time ‘t’ are moved
to the micro-level in Fig. 10.3; in Fig. 10.2, these items had appeared
as national and societal characteristics. As per the example of President
Mandela above, which focused on his classification as a macro-level actor
during time in office and a micro-level actor otherwise, formal processes in
government such as a leader(s)’ degree of dominance in decision-making
are subsumed within official state policy and therefore are presented at the
macro-level. Thus systemism’s macro-level placement of what primarily had
been labeled “individual characteristics” in a Waltzian frame of reference
facilitates a more transparent process of integration for causal mechanisms.
Fig. 10.3 The initial generation of FPA scholarship: A systemist reinterpretation

Third, these preceding changes, manifested in Fig. 10.3, effectively

bifurcate what had been a mixed list of items, from the standpoint of level
of analysis, in Fig. 10.2. Moreover, the three micro-level items in Fig. 10.3
are also linked to each other and the ultimate foreign policy outcome in
more specific, inherently falsifiable ways.
Fourth, and in line with requirements from systemism regarding com-
prehensive theorizing, all four types of linkage within a system—macro-
macro, macro-micro, micro-macro and micro-micro—appear explicitly
in Fig. 10.3. Examples are the impact of HISTORY on a wide range
of factors such as WEALTH (M → M), STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES on elite perception of national role (M → m), particular
political issues on STRESS AND UNCERTAINTY (m → M), and elite
perception of national role on elite and mass public opinion (m → m).
This range of connections confirms the field’s intuition about multi-level
explanation while also creating the foundation for (a) quantitative analysis
that includes multi-equation models (i.e., sequences of dependent vari-
ables); and (b) qualitative analysis that investigates causal mechanisms in
greater depth.
Fifth, note the imbalance between the macro- and micro-levels depicted
in the figure. Only three of the variables in the vision of FPA scholarship
from Fig. 10.3 are micro-level, while macro-level factors are quite detailed
by comparison. (They fill two rows of the figure). This diagram obviously
represents FPA long before what Kaarbo (2015) labeled the “domestic
politics” turn in IR. In that sense the figure shows some degree of continu-
ity with realism; the first generation of FPA unpacked decision-making in a
quest to go beyond the “billiard ball” metaphor but focused on states and
formal state processes rather than societies as it grappled with explanation.
Sixth, input and output concerning the environment do not appear in
the figure. Perhaps this is because the global system, rather than a sub-
system, is implied in the summary discussions from Gerner (1995) and
Hudson and Vore (1995). Of course, the absence of an environment in
the model also could reflect FPA’s essential rejection of what had been
seen at the time as realism’s homogenizing (and therefore pernicious)
sense of actors in world politics. In other words, the lack of explicit theo-
rizing about the environment reflects a desire among FPA scholars in the
initial generation to move far away from power-based determinism associ-
ated with the billiard ball model, a formative characteristic made visible
through a diagrammatic depiction based on systemism.
Manifested again in a seventh point is the value added from systemism’s

diagrammatic presentation. All of the linkages in the figure and the nar-
rative upon which it is based are linear. Functional form is not explored
as an issue, generally speaking, in the first generation of scholarship that
investigated cause and effect regarding foreign policy. Thus, the figures
generated by systemism draw explicit attention to the incrementalism
inherent in how the first generation depicted causal mechanisms. This
parallels the modal quantitative methodology from that time and beyond:
linear regression.
Eighth, and perhaps sounding a bit paradoxical as a positive trait derived
from systemism, is the inherently contested nature of Fig. 10.3. On the
one hand, it is true that another scholar could read the same works and
produce something different from the version conveyed by the current
figure. On the other hand, that point reiterates a key strength of system-
ism—the fact that competing visions of a narrative can be compared to
each other explicitly in terms of presumed causal mechanisms through a
diagrammatic exposition. As it turns out in the present context, the nar-
ratives from Gerner (1995) and Hudson and Vore (1995) complement
rather than contradict each other vis-à-vis the potential causal factors
identified in the initial generation of FPA scholarship. This approximates
“inter-coder reliability” in a quantitative research design but, of course,
another scholar could follow up and claim a lower level of correspondence
between the two reviews. And what if Hudson and Vore versus Gerner had
produced narratives that seemed to contradict each other when rendered
into a visual form? This result also would have value because systemism
then would have identified points of controversy in recounting the trajec-
tory of FPA research that otherwise might not have been discovered.
What about the second generation of FPA scholarship? Following on
the initial generation of scholarship from FPA, according to Hudson and
Vore (1995) and Hermann (1995), is a period of consolidation that went
through, approximately, the 1980s. This period of self-reflection among
scholars of the second generation focused on theory and method (Hudson
and Vore 1995: 220) and expanded the range of explanatory variables
across levels of analysis. Newly investigated factors included individual
techniques of comparison (e.g., analogies and metaphors) for interpreting
situations, cognitive processes, cultural and societal norms, women and
roles specified in nationalist movements, democratic and dependent states,
the role of the state (e.g., fragmentation of regime, along with military
and party opposition), democratic peace, and drastic international system

change (Hermann 1995: 251; Hudson and Vore 1995: 227).
Second generation FPA scholarship moved forward in an incremental
way. A wider range of factors are explored on the right-hand or indepen-
dent variable side of the equation. Hudson and Vore (1995: 226) see a
more inclusive “psychosocial context of foreign policy” as the focus of
substantive research: individual characteristics, perceptions, society and
culture, the polity, and the international system (Hudson and Vore 1995:
226). Thus, some movement away from primarily macro-oriented work
is observed. On the left-hand or dependent variable side of the equation,
greater interest builds in cooperative behavior and economic activity as
subjects for explanation (Hermann 1995: 248). Overall, FPA continued in
its second generation to be characterized by comparative statics. Hudson
and Vore (1995: 229) use the visual metaphor of photo (realized) ver-
sus motion picture (desired) in calling for more “dynamic theory” in the
domain of FPA.
To summarize, FPA, as of 1995, had gone through two generations
of research when Gerner (1995) and Hudson and Vore (1995) evaluated
its progress. Its models corresponded to those represented in an era of
research inspired by systems analysis. FPA had pursued a research program
of comparative statics, with an emphasis on linear relationships investi-
gated through either case studies or single equation models.
What, then, is the story a decade or so later? Reviews from Breuning
(2007) and Hudson (2007) reveal continuity in approach but with sig-
nificant evolution as well. Figure 10.4 reveals an expanded list of fac-
tors investigated by FPA scholarship, divided between international and
domestic categories (Breuning 2007; Hudson 2007).20
Notable in comparison to a decade earlier is a greatly expanded record
of accomplishment at the domestic level. Elements of civil society, ranging
from unions to epistemic communities, now appear on the domestic list in
Fig. 10.4. Yet, in another way, the figure shows continuity; factors such as
terrorist forces that appear in both the international and domestic subsets
are treated as exogenous. Even a quick glance at the table is enough to
reveal temporal precedence for some factors, such as geographic location,
over others. This endogeneity is not addressed. The material in this figure
will be discussed in further detail when it is converted into the format
favored by systemism.
Fig. 10.4 (F)actors at the international and domestic level
Tentative movement toward systemism is revealed by models isolat-

ing individual and group levels—referring here to macro-level processes
unfolding in a national government—that appear in Fig. 10.5. Models for
the formal processes in government (individual) and group levels appear
on the left and right side of the page, respectively. (Ignore for now the
arrows and boxes with broken lines. These will be discussed at a later
point.) The models correspond approximately to those drawn by Hudson
(2007), with (a) insertion of additional factors emphasized by Breuning
(2007) where appropriate and (b) reformatting to reflect systemism.21 To
SYSTEMISM AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A NEW APPROACH...
Fig. 10.5 Models for the individual and group levels.

311
Sources: Adapted from Hudson (2007) and Breuning (2007)

prevent confusion, it should be noted that the variables all appear in upper
case, that is, operating at the macro-level. This is because individual and
group-level linkages are functioning at the level of formal processes in
national government as opposed to within society. This point returns to
the observation about Waltzian terminology and the difficulties it can pose
for efforts to integrate theorizing; the language of systemism, by contrast,
promotes clarity.
Figure 10.5’s model of individual decision-making provides a sense of
accomplishment through its elaboration of linkages that begin from mul-
tiple locations—motivation/emotion/state of the body, character, per-
ceptions, and the situation—and continue through all the way to behavior
and speech acts. Note in particular the double-headed arrow connecting
cognitions with mental models and problem representation. Collectively
speaking, the full set of linkages on the left-hand side of the page repre-
sents the value of constructive borrowing from the discipline of psychol-
ogy that had accumulated over decades. (The potential to continue such
borrowing is established in Chap. 3 from Renshon and Kahneman, which
reveals important effects from cognitive biases on decision-making in gen-
eral.) Group-level linkages on the right-hand side of Fig. 10.5 also reveal
progress as manifested through a multifaceted range of factors identified
through the study of individual and social psychology, organizational
behavior, and so on. Routine and nonroutine pathways, for instance, are
identified. Crisis emerges as a special instance of the latter type of situation
and is associated with a specific kind of small group dynamics.
Figure 10.6 displays a full-fledged systemist reinterpretation of the two
lists of factors, international and domestic, from Fig. 10.4. These factors
are re-aggregated into the categories of environment and state and then
depicted according to the rules conveyed by systemism. Assembled from
Breuning (2007) and Hudson (2007), the diversity of these factors reveals
the progress made in FPA. (Once again disregard, for now, the boxes and
arrows with broken lines.) Note the presence of the environment and, as
mentioned earlier, the more elaborate treatment of the micro-level in Fig.
10.6. Beyond the national system (which is contained within the larger
box), effects reverberate between and among macro-variables in the envi-
ronment such as treaty alliances, foreign media, and micro-factors like
epistemic communities. All of this combines as an input into the national
system. At the micro-level inside the national system, a parallel process
occurs involving the many actors who comprise civil society (e.g., unions),
media, and local government. At the macro-level, a familiar sequence from
Fig. 10.6 Model for the environment and state: A systemist reinterpretation
geographic location, through history and into national traits including

capabilities, size, culture, and national government, takes place.
Now is the time to solve the mystery regarding arrows and boxes with
broken lines. Figures 10.5 and 10.6 can be combined in order to offer a
full set of linkages, in line with systemism—macro-macro, macro-micro,
micro-macro, and micro-micro—along with input and output regarding
the environment and system with each other. The box with broken lines
that contains an interrogation point, at the right edge of the system in Fig.
10.6, enters into Fig. 10.5 at the top left through perceptions, character,
motivations/emotion/state of the body, and the situation. The causal
pathway in Fig. 10.5 continues from the individual level to the group
level through the broken arrow at the bottom center. In other words, the
individual and group levels within the government process now are con-
nected to each other, whereas they had been depicted separately.
Moving further across the page, given the two possible routes for group
decision-making—routine and nonroutine—foreign policy is achieved at
either the bottom (far) right or top (center) right of Fig. 10.5. Foreign
policy exits the national system, into the environment, and then re-enters
the system after being filtered through the environment. In the case of
foreign policy, for example, the environment often includes the reactions,
or inaction, of international actors such as states or international organiza-
tions. This is the connection depicted by the box with broken lines and
an interrogation point at the upper left of Fig. 10.6. History accumulates
in this manner.
When summing up progress in FPA, the vision from 2007 is quite
encouraging relative to 1995. A wider range of variables, recognition of
feedback mechanisms, and growing sense of consciousness about the need
for theoretical integration characterize the later reviews. Still lacking, how-
ever, is movement forward in terms of identifying functional form; FPA
continues to be incremental and linear in putting forward causal mecha-
nisms. But even there it is possible to see some degree of progress in think-
ing about a new generation of theory; Hudson (2007: 32), for instance,
calls for attention to “nonarithmetic ways to relate variables.” While indi-
vidual scholars often become experts in small corners or specific paths
within the larger domain of FPA, systemism revisits how all these pieces fit
together and to what it all adds up. All things considered, the two stages of
analysis are sufficient to reveal consensus on FPA’s standing at each time,
along with strengths upon which to build and weaknesses to counteract.
THE WAY FORWARD

Consider now the epigraph to this chapter. Systemism reveals value in
terms of bridging and borrowing across intellectual domains. This is a
worthwhile objective in the eyes of exponents of FPA (Hermann 1995:
254; see also Alden and Aran 2012: 2) as well as those beyond its bound-
aries. Application of systemism to assess FPA at two points in time, 1995
and 2007, is sufficient to identify (a) consensus of opinion at each stage
in major review essays (Gerner 1995; Hermann 1995; Hudson and Vore;
Breuning 2007; Hudson 2007); (b) unobserved properties that come out
through a diagrammatic exposition; and (c) priorities for further research.
Given these accomplishments, systemism shows its value as an approach
that can facilitate comparison, identify omissions and errors, and promote
integration when it comes to theorizing about FPA, most notably in rela-

tion to international conflict.
Note in particular that the figures drive the narrative, rather than the
reverse. Thus, systemism is essential to the process of discovery regard-
ing development of FPA. The case of FPA, moreover, demonstrates that
systemism represents a major step beyond earlier systems analysis from
political science, which had not demonstrated the capabilities summarized
above.
One natural query after all is said and done concerns parsimony. Is sys-
temism worth all of the extra work? Why not simply write a narrative and
learn the same things? The point is that the latter option will not work.
The exercise of producing a visual representation of a theory brings hid-
den gaps and contradictions into bold relief. Proof of the pudding is “in
the eating,” of course, so it is up to the community of scholars to assess
whether systemism’s ratio of payoff to effort is high enough to warrant
further implementation.
Further application of systemism to IR in general and FPA in particular
is encouraged by the results obtained here. One path worth exploring is
the connection of systemism to other approaches. Consider, for example,
Yetiv’s (2011: 2–3) “integrated approach,” which (a) presents different
perspectives on government behavior; (b) tests them against evidence; (c)
combines resulting insights into better explanations; and (d) bridges areas
of theory that had tended to be apart from each other. The integrated
approach entails “layered thinking,” that is, treating decisions in a case of
foreign policy action as linked to each other (Yetiv 2011: 209–210).
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the connec-
tion more fully, the integrated approach is one example of a framework
that might exhibit synergy when implemented in tandem with systemism.
Opportunities for integration of insights revealed by later contributions
to this volume abound; examples include science and technology-related
factors (Fritsch, Chap. 5) and neuropolitics (Kugler and Zak, Chap. 4)
that could entail important causal mechanisms regarding formulation and
implementation of foreign policy.
On a methodological note, it would be worthwhile to bring system-
ism into the twenty-first century by developing user-friendly software to
generate potentially interactive diagrams—even in three dimensions—to
facilitate the creative process. This would further facilitate an ability to
pinpoint both commonalities and differences of working assumptions and
variables between and among a variety of analyses.
Further substantive work could focus on democratic peace and other

heavily traveled areas related to international conflict processes in order
to facilitate comparison and synthesis of insights from across reviews.
Moreover, FPA has not been standing still since the assessment reported
here for 2007; new works create the opportunity to update evaluation
(Neack 2013; Hudson 2014). In such ways systemism can expand its
accomplishments in IR and help to facilitate overall progress in an inter-
disciplinary manner.
NOTES
1. For reviews of FPA, see Gerner (1995), Hermann (1995), Hudson and
Vore (1995), Breuning (2007), Hudson (2007), Hill (2010), Kesgin
(2011), Alden and Aran (2012) and Kaarbo (2015).
2. Hudson and Vore (1995: 212), among others, add the works of Sprout
and Sprout (1956) and Rosenau (1966) as milestones that shaped FPA for
decades to come. Sprout and Sprout (1956) are credited with initiating a
sustained emphasis on the psychological environment of decision-makers,
while Rosenau (1966) is recognized for emphasizing the intellectual value
of a comparative approach.
3. Although the description and analysis that follow rely on Easton (1965a),
it just as easily could proceed on the basis of his other two works noted,
which also convey basic concept formation and arguments from systems
analysis. For an excellent summary of Easton’s exposition on systems anal-
ysis, see Green (1985: 131–132).
4. For what may be the most prominent exposition in the social sciences from
that era on systems, complexity and related concepts, see Simon (1969).
5. In a prominent review of system-level theorizing, Young (1968: 37)
observes that Easton created “one of the few systemic frameworks origi-
nally developed by a political scientist rather than adapted for political
analysis from some other discipline.”
6. Jervis (1998) makes an impressive case for a system orientation by showing
how unintended consequences from actions are an important part of what
is observed at the international level. His work takes the form of a critique
of holistic approaches such as structural realism and the point of view con-
veyed about social theory is quite consistent with systemism.
7. For a recent effort to integrate individualism and holism from a perspective
built upon studies in philosophy, see List and Spiekermann (2013).
8. This conclusion is anticipated in the philosophical exposition from
Collingwood (1946).
9. A review of the literature reveals no significant attempt to reformulate

Easton’s systems analysis after the early 1970s, although it would be fair to
say that many frameworks from that decade and beyond owe at least an
indirect intellectual debt to Easton’s call for rigor and diagrammatic
emphasis. Leslie’s (1972: 169–170) attempt to reformulate the approach
based on an expansive set of variables, which fall under four headings (sys-
tem attributes, regime characteristics, characteristics of political commu-
nity, and characteristics of the authorities), stands as an isolated attempt to
continue to work under the rubric of systems analysis as envisioned by
Easton.
10. Some of the conceptual apparatus added to systemism in James (2010)
likewise parallels Easton’s approach. The concepts of stability and equilib-
rium form part of that book’s framework for application in the domain of
constitutional politics, but without the holistic tendencies noted above.
11. Pickel (2007: 397) provides a valuable treatment of systems and mecha-
nisms. The causal mechanisms vary with system ontology, that is, ideational
or material.
12. Systemism is agnostic on the longstanding debate over rational choice.
Analysis based on systemism is consistent with agents acting out of self-
interest but also accepts that “political action is influenced by ideological
and emotional factors, too” (Bunge 1998: 156). An excellent review of
ideas from rational choice and political psychology, in the FPA context,
appears in Neack (2008: 29–64).
13. The diagrammatic exposition that follows is based primarily upon James
(2012; see also Bunge 1996).
14. Alternatively, a state within Africa might be the system, with the continent
itself as the environment. The exact delineation of the system would
depend upon the nature of a given study but does not preclude the dia-
grammatic presentation used by systemism to compare, contrast, and build
a body of knowledge in FPA.
15. An obvious question concerns the boundaries of the system; for example,
is Egypt a part of Africa or the Middle East? The question of identifying
system boundaries is beyond the scope of this introductory exposition, but
in most instances it can be resolved in a practical way by relying upon
geography. Thus, Egypt and other potentially challenging cases, such as
Turkey, might be designated as being in one system or another (i.e., Asia,
Europe, or Middle East) on the basis of pragmatic considerations.
16. A more extensive literature, beyond the scope of the present review, exists
on systemism and the study of politics. James (2010) applies systemism to
evolution of constitutional politics in Canada. Choi (2011) summarizes
systemism’s contributions to the study of urban politics and system analy-
sis. Urban politics, for instance, is described as featuring “a continuous
stream of feedback to the environment that may result in the alteration and
creation of inputs that keep cycling into the system” (Choi 2011: 30–32).
17. A realist-based answer to this question is worked out through the example
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), specifically, in which German
self-sacrifice within the region facilitated competition with an actor, Japan,
outside of its boundaries (Grieco 1995). This instance regarding German
conduct related to creation of the EMU underlies the following, more
encompassing analysis based on systemism.
18. Other studies, such as Hill (2010), Kesgin (2011), Alden and Aran (2012),
and Kaarbo (2015) are referenced in this chapter but not included in the
diagrammatic exposition that follows because their mandates do not cor-
respond fully with assessment of causal mechanisms within FPA. Alden and
Aran (2012: 3), for example, eschew the focus of “classical FPA” and
instead explore engagement with globalization and articulation of a theory
of the state.
Neack (2008) reviews causal factors comprehensively, but does so in the
context of foreign policy in substantive terms, with coverage of subjects
ranging from public opinion and media to great powers.
19. The single arrow that appears leading to foreign policy has been inserted
because it is implied fully within these studies.
20. As with Fig. 10.2, the arrow leading over to foreign policy has been added
because it is implied fully by the studies under review.
21. The original diagrams in Hudson (2007), of course, do not have the same
appearance as Fig. 10.5. The contents of Fig. 10.5 are adapted from arrow-
style diagrams in Hudson (2007) that had not been constructed under the
rules imposed by systemism.
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CHAPTER 11
Conclusion: Interdisciplinary Links

and Future Directions
Patrick James and Steve A. Yetiv
In Vienna around the beginning of the twentieth century, leaders in art,

science, and medicine began to intermingle not only in salons but via syner-
gistic ideas; artists such as Gustav Klimt, scientists such as Sigmund Freud,
and novelists like Arthur Schnitzler began a revolution that emphasized
the importance of unconscious thoughts and emotions across human and
natural phenomena—as a path to understanding truths. Such exchanges of
ideas created a common base of thinking that spearheaded breakthroughs
in psychology, brain science, and literature that shape key contours of how
we think today (Kandel 2012). Meanwhile, in Paris of the same era, the
bustling cafe culture allowed for interaction among artists such as Cézanne
and Picasso; writers such as Ernest Hemingway, Scott Fitzgerald, and
Gertrude Stein; and a range of philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre. Their
interactions impacted how they saw their own disciplines and those of oth-
ers. Indeed, Cézanne was viewed as shaping the views of other thinkers
who were in fields viewed as afar from his own (Danchev 2012).
P. James ()
S.A. Yetiv
Norfolk, VA, USA

324 P. JAMES AND S.A. YETIV
It has been long recognized that sharing ideas across disciplinary fields
can be very fruitful. While our effort here is obviously more humble, we
hope that we have brought new ideas to bear in understanding complex
realities. Multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity can enhance empiri-
cal and theoretical explanations; they are increasingly possible given the
expansion of outlooks, techniques, and knowledge across disciplines, and
they are more vital given the increasing complexity of world affairs.
Each chapter of this book has provided insight and approaches into
how to advance multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity in IR from dif-
ferent fields and sub-fields: history, political science, psychology, neuro-
science, anthropology, gender studies, technology studies, demography,
and systems analysis. This chapter draws on these different insights to
illuminate further for students and scholars the types of links among and
between disciplines and sub-fields that may enhance understanding; to
inform further the study of conflict; and to point to some fruitful areas for
future research.
CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE STUDY OF CONFLICT

We sought to develop the theme that IR could benefit from greater mul-
tidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity and from input at the sub-systemic
level by various disciplines and sub-fields, especially in the study of conflict.
However, we do not claim that sub-systemic variables are more impor-
tant than systemic variables. In fact, we included systemic variables in this
book such as in the integrated approach, analyses of technology, and the
approach of systemism in various chapters. No good understanding of
conflict can focus on just one level of analysis. That said, we do believe
that sub-systemic variables deserve more consideration as we explained in
Chap. 1 and we have focused attention on them. This can help us under-
stand conflict and can also serve as a basis for comparison to other causes
of conflict.
What conclusions can we draw about conflict studies? Let us start with
neuroscience and cognitive psychology at the individual level of analysis
and build from there. Neuroscience is still in the early stages of trying to
illuminate how decisions are impacted by the physical aspect of how the
mind works. As Kugler and Zak show in Chap. 4, IR can benefit from
this burgeoning discipline. One aspect that they highlight has to do with
chemical release. As they suggest, the release of oxytocin (OT) itself may
CONCLUSION: INTERDISCIPLINARY LINKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 325
well have a greater impact on how human beings interact than we could
imagine.
Future work on this subject looks promising in the effort to see how
chemical factors impact conflict outcomes in IR. We could, for example,
hypothesize that the greater the level of OT released, the greater the like-
lihood of cooperation among actors and that the less released, the more
likely is conflict. Further, if high stress or other mental dynamics inhibit
OT release and trust, we could hypothesize that to be harder in crises for
leaders to trust each other and reach compromise. In any case, accounting
for the role of OT could provide a different angle of insight. Doing so
might also illuminate high-stress situations.
For example, take the case of September 11 in which Al-Qaeda ter-
rorists murdered nearly 3000 people in New York City. We do know that
9/11 must have created serious stress in the US government because
it raised the prospect that terrorists could also deliver weapons of mass
destruction to the American homeland. The attack initially even forced
the President to leave Washington. What role did stress play in decision-
making during and after the crisis? We will not find an answer in this case,
but further work on stress and conflict may yield insights that can be used
to understand real-world cases better.
At a broader level, the approach from Kugler and Zak provides insight
into trust and cooperation, which, as they note, lies at the heart of realist
versus liberal views. Vehicles that can enhance trust, based on such find-
ings, may be a pathway to joint-sum approaches in world politics, while
diminishing prisoners’ dilemma dynamics.
For their part in Chap. 3, Renshon and Kahneman approach conflict
from a different angle but one that still emphasizes the individual and in
particular, mental processes. They point to the cognitive dimensions that
can shape hawkish attitudes, push decisions toward conflict, and thereby
make cooperative outcomes harder to achieve. Renshon and Kahneman
argue that cognitive biases make it more likely that “agents will act more
hawkishly than an objective observer would deem appropriate.” Thus,
cognitive biases will tend to make a decision-maker more likely to follow
the advice of a hawk than a dove; they will make the hawk’s arguments
more persuasive than they deserve to be.
At an interdisciplinary level, we also can ask how such cognitive work
relates to that of neuroscience. Might it be, for instance, that cognitive
biases also generate greater hawkishness in part because they induce stress
or other chemical dynamics, thus allowing for neuroscience as a source of

other intervening variables?
If cognitive biases, as Renshon and Kahneman argue, are likely to make
hawkish arguments and policies far more appealing than otherwise, what
conditions can mitigate such an effect? Could debiasing efforts, which
attempt to decrease the prevalence of cognitive biases, have some positive
effect, as challenging as they are to execute successfully?
Psychological explanations for conflict have gained traction and their
contribution underscores how important it is for IR scholars to consider
the individual level of analysis. For instance, we can hypothesize that lead-
ers subject to certain neurological conditions will be more conflict-prone
than others—a tendency likely to be reinforced if they are autocrats. This
hypothesis combines input from neuroscience with the democratic peace
theory from IR to produce a hybrid statement about the likelihood of
conflict. We could imagine many more hypotheses of this kind, once we
break down more barriers between disciplines.
What, for instance, does this book have to say about gender, conflict,
and cooperation? An enormous amount of work exists on this subject,
but we offer a few insights. The more one believes that the individual
matters in world politics (Rosenau 2008), the more critical any differ-
ences between genders would become. By contrast, the more one believes
that system-level factors matter, the less such findings can be viewed as
salient. What do cognitive psychology and neuroscience suggest about
differences in how men and women make decisions? Are such differences
real? Is it possible that the hawkish dynamic laid out by Renshon and
Kahneman would be less prevalent with women as decision-makers? If
women are found to be fundamentally different decision-makers, what
does that mean for the realist assumption that anarchy shapes all actors to
be functionally similar—that characteristics such as gender do not matter
for the behavior of states?
We can now turn attention to a key cognitive bias that is related to con-
flict, but understudied in IR: overconfidence. The study of overconfidence
is a promising area for gaining a greater understanding of conflict not only
because it is understudied in IR but also because the evidence that humans
tend to be overconfident is relatively strong in psychological studies. Does
overconfidence make leaders less cooperative? Or more likely to engage in
diversionary war? Are democracies more likely to check excessively confi-
dent leaders?
At the group level, will an overconfident leader be more likely to

contribute to groupthink, which is associated with conflict and foreign
policy failures? What characteristics, including psychological and neuro-
logical, can help check groupthink? Research on groupthink has started to
explore more seriously how the characteristics of the group leader impact
the likelihood of groupthink and associated outcomes, but this remains a
neglected aspect of research in this area, despite the critical importance of
the leader’s impartial, dominant role in the theory. Cognitive dynamics
and neuroscience could prove quite useful in illuminating this question.
Neuroscience and the study of overconfidence are not unrelated. One
key work has discovered that success produces testosterone, which in turn
can generate overconfidence, making decision-makers more likely to trade
beyond an optimal amount in the stock market (Coates 2012). Such exces-
sive trading can then result in significant losses and contribute to boom-
bust cycles in the market. Can success in foreign policy sometimes push
leaders into overconfidence and then conflict? For example, it may be that
the administration of George W. Bush saw America’s previous successes
in kicking Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991 as reason to think that it should
invade Iraq in 2003. It would be interesting for scholars to see if success
has cognitive or neuroscientific effects that affect foreign policy behavior.
Of course, the cognitive field offers myriad possible combinations
with other fields. For example, while there are many potential synergies
between history and IR—some obvious and others less so—we can also
see how history can inform conflict studies and foreign policy analysis.
Indeed, the cross-section of history and cognitive psychology yields ana-
logical reasoning, which can inform decision-making, especially if we
understand the history to which it is connected. Analogies can serve as
heuristics or biases—effects that cognitive psychology can highlight, but
which stress may impact as well. Does stress make it harder to retrieve
and remember the correct lessons, which undermines rationality, whereas
lower stress might make such analogical reasoning more effective, thus
complementing rationality? And what can history tell us about the charac-
teristics of group leaders? Can that provide insight into when groups will
function more or less effectively? These questions are relevant to IR across
the board.
Cognitive and neuroscience studies, when combined, can also yield
insights into various decision-making tasks such as planning in both con-
flict and non-conflict situations. For example, “reference class forecasting”
predicts the future not by projecting from one case, but by looking at
similar past situations and their outcomes (Coates 2012). Scholars have
found that inaccurate projections of costs, demand, and other impacts of
plans, collectively speaking, are a major problem. Errors stem from opti-
mism bias and strategic misrepresentation; reference class forecasting helps
to achieve accuracy in projections by basing them on actual performance
in a reference class of comparable actions and thereby bypassing both opti-
mism bias and strategic misrepresentation (Flyvberg 2008). In 2005, the
American Planning Association endorsed reference class forecasting and
asserted that planners should use it in addition to traditional methods as
a way to improve accuracy. Furthermore, in his book, Thinking, Fast and
Slow, Kahneman (2011: 251) called Flyvberg’s counsel to use reference
class forecasting where possible “the single most important piece of advice
regarding how to increase accuracy in forecasting.” At the same time, we
can also draw from history to understand when planning failed in various
cases and how we might induce broader ideas from this exploration.
Cognitive and neuroscience studies, and various other fields, can also
yield insights into rationality—critical to any potential understanding of
conflict. Rational actors are usually presumed to weigh options in terms
of costs and benefits. While it is sometimes useful in developing models to
assume that actors are rational, it is also important to evaluate how human
beings actually think. Interdisciplinary analysis may offer some value
added. It provides a more complete idea of rationality than we can achieve
with non-disciplinary analysis. For example, as suggested by Renshon and
Kahneman in Chap. 3, cognitive biases often challenge individual rational-
ity, as do dynamics such as groupthink which prevent a clear assessment of
options, as Yetiv underscores in Chap. 2 in exploring foreign policy from
multiple perspectives (also, see Yetiv 2011). And neuroscience suggests
that chemical factors in our brain may sometimes hamper an accounting
of options. Do lower levels of OT produce greater mistrust that precludes
a systematic evaluation of options and makes conflict seem to be a bet-
ter alternative than it is? Will a particularly strong historical analogy, if
misused, undermine planning, especially when combined with overconfi-
dence? Such questions are anchored in interdisciplinary thought and are
intended to spur it.
Meanwhile, even fields that are not regularly associated with concern
about rationality such as anthropology can inform it. As Scupin discussed in
Chap. 6, anthropologists who do research on “globalization from below”
have interests that overlap with behavioral economics, cognitive psychol-
ogy, and social psychology. Generally, these anthropologists, like many
behavioral economists who have followed in Kahneman and Tversky’s

(1979) footsteps, question the views of mainstream rational choice theory,
which assumes that well-informed actors logically weigh the risks, costs,
and benefits of their economic decisions in allocating scarce resources and
proceeding with their actions. Detailed ethnographies by anthropologists
gather data that specify the heuristics and other dimensions of how peo-
ple make economic decisions, and that can supplement the cognitive and
behavioral economics research done mostly in laboratory settings. Scupin
reviews such anthropological contributions to IR effectively in Chap. 7.
High risk-taking is related to conflict initiation. Possible synergies in
explaining risk-taking are endless as we expand our vision across disciplines
and incorporate such relatively new sub-disciplines. For example, genetics
is revealing links to risk-taking (Cesarini et al. 2009; Frydman et al. 2011).
Imagine grafting the insights from the field of genetics onto those of cog-
nitive psychology and neuroscience to explain decision-making. What if
we moved to develop a theory of risk-taking that incorporates proposi-
tions from all these fields, and then also cycled various potential variables
about conditions for risk-taking derived from political science and his-
tory, and from group dynamics examined in sociology? In fact, scholars
increasingly recognize how different mental processes are linked to each
other; to decision-making; and to political outcomes. For example, one
study shows that stress accentuates the focus on others’ faults and failures
as opposed to circumstances—that is also known as attribution bias—a
prominent cognitive bias.1
Multiple disciplines offer independently a better picture of how human
beings actually make decisions, and much potential exists for collaboration
between them as well. For example, a new field of neuroanthropology
has emerged in which anthropologists are working with neuroscientists to
explore the connections among neurology, culture, cognition, emotions,
and behavior. Can an enhanced interdisciplinary dialogue yield different
interpretations of rationality or enhance current explorations of it? Will it
yield better explanations of the conditions under which non-rationality
is more probable? What does anthropology tell us about how different
cultures may mediate the cognitive variables that may generate less ratio-
nal behavior? Or are such dynamics not culture-bound?
Reaching into the toolkit and knowledge of multiple disciplines also
suggests that we need to do more at the individual level of analysis in
order to understand how the preferences of states are shaped in the first
place. That is important for understanding conflict and decisions leading
to other outcomes in IR. Why, for instance, do actors have a preference for

conflict over compromise under some conditions?
Most modern realist-based schools of thought, including neorealism,
assume that the preferences of states are largely invariant. States seek secu-
rity. Individuals in power do not matter much. They are all going to be
shaped by the anarchic context of world politics, subject to the dictates
of dwelling in a self-help, Hobbesian world. Women or men, ideological
or not, autocrats or democrats, cognitively adaptive or rigid, impacted by
testosterone or oxytocin and so forth—none of that ultimately matters
because all actors are socialized to behave in functionally similar ways.
An exception is provided by the state of the art in neoclassical realism,
which urges incorporation of domestic variables into more comprehensive
power-based models (Lobell et al. 2009).
Modern liberal schools, even if they assume diversity, also do little to
explore that variation because they abstract away from the variables at
the individual and domestic level that would help us understand causal
mechanisms. Abstraction is a useful theoretical vehicle, but what happens
when we open up that black box within states? In exploring how various
disciplines can help enhance interdisciplinary IR, we gain a better sense of
our ability to understand how preferences vary.
Cognitive psychology provides input into seeing how preferences are
developed and changed. Renshon and Kahneman in Chap. 3, for instance,
provide insight into how attitudes toward war develop and why some indi-
viduals will prefer that option over others. Renshon and Kahneman link
these preferences to cognitive biases. In that sense, they help fill out the pic-
ture that the dominant theoretical schools take as assumptions. Individuals
and communities on the local, national, or global level, as Scupin dem-
onstrates in Chap. 6, are constantly engaged in the social construction of
norms, rules, identity, as well as the interpretation of world events broadly
defined. That is another pathway toward how states generate preferences.
Anthropology sheds light on these struggles between individuals, groups,
and larger communities to define, implement, and reproduce socially con-
structed claims over time as well as their interrelations on the different
levels of analysis at and between which such struggles take place. One can
imagine the possible combinations within and across disciplines of explain-
ing how preferences arise. Such opportunities expand when we train our
eye on how each discipline treats the issue and then on how combinations
can arise when viewing multiple disciplines in one eyeshot.
Meanwhile, the approach of Kugler and Zak in Chap. 4, while quite

different from that of Renshon and Kahneman in Chap. 3, also provides
an added window on preferences that is missing from IR. It is not that
such approaches undermine IR as a discipline. That would be like saying
that interesting approaches to microeconomics undermine macroeconom-
ics. Rather, when used together with IR theory or apart from it, they offer
another angle on the causes of a variety of phenomena that we consider
important. We can still maintain the parsimony of IR theory, while includ-
ing other explanations in the mix—explanations that can be derived from
integrated approaches such as the broad-based one from systems analysis
offered by James and James in Chap. 10.
At a conceptual level, Yetiv’s scaled-down version of his integrated
approach (Chap. 2, this volume) is a Rashomon-style exposition that
reveals how the preferences of states are shaped at multiple levels of
analysis—individual, group, state, and international—each yielding dif-
ferent insights on preferences. While Yetiv used this approach to explain
American foreign policy in the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf conflict, it can
help reveal preferences in any case by applying either (a) the rational actor,
cognitive, bureaucratic politics, groupthink, and domestic politics models
in a systematic manner or (b) other models deemed appropriate to any
case in question.
Now, let us layer insights from other analyses in this book, working on
their own and in an interdisciplinary manner to illuminate conflict. What
can they add? Of course, science and technology studies (Fritsch, Chap. 5)
and demographic studies (Kugler, Chap. 8, and Kang and Kugler, Chap.
9) are centrally interested in gender since women are impacted by technol-
ogy and are at the heart of demography—both of which can contribute to
economic inequalities that have become a frontline issue and concern both
within the USA (Stiglitz 2012; Picketty 2014) and at the global level.2 In
turn, such inequalities may trigger conflict under conditions highlighted
by various disciplines, creating the potential for many fruitful hypotheses.
Such fields certainly intersect with feminist IR and the more recent
emergence of Feminist Security Studies. Basu and Eichler (Chap. 7,
this volume) show how feminist scholarship is well suited to deepen
interdisciplinarity within IR by investigating the relative marginalization
of women and making gender visible, chiefly at the individual level of
analysis, and by interrogating the concepts and assumptions that predomi-
nate in our thinking of IR. Shifts in demography may be studied at the
macro level, but feminist IR can offer both macro and micro-level insights
into how they are linked to conflict.
For its part, anthropological research can help to develop a more con-
textualized and evolutionary understanding of many core concepts in
IR. Examples are national identity, culture, religion, and secularization;
anthropology also can help to account for broader sources of conflict.
Anthropology has already established strong interdisciplinary links with
neuroeconomics and could develop further connections with political sci-
ence, history, demography, and psychology. Research on individual and
collective memory has already resulted in some ties with psychology.
Anthropological work can also contribute to a better understanding of
the distribution of beliefs and ideologies among individuals, groups, and
states that animate conflict. For instance, conflict studies can gain better
insights into the social construction of “us versus them” dichotomies and
how these differences impact issues such as terrorism or ethnic or religious
conflicts. Certainly, the social construction of identity is not a subject area
suited for disciplinary-bound analyses. Feminist studies, among others, can
intersect with anthropology more profitably to elucidate how such social
constructed identities can become causes of conflict under certain con-
ditions. If demographic shifts analyzed in demographic studies alter the
gender balance, and in turn that influences the balance of ideas and nature
or intensity of social construction of identities, we can find one intellectual
intersection of demographic studies, feminist IR, and anthropology.
Studies on nationalism, state building, or minority issues gain a more
nuanced understanding of how identities are formed, reproduced, or
changed and how cognitive processes on the individual and group level
influence the interpretation of “reality” as a result of engagement with
anthropology. Anthropological research and feminist IR also counter the
still prevalent state-centrism in IR by pointing to the strategies developed
and adopted by individuals to cope with a wide range of political, socio-
economic, environmental and cultural challenges in an increasingly inter-
dependent world.
Increasingly, domestic conflicts have gained attention in global studies.
As Chap. 8 from Kugler explains, demographic changes not only affect
economic development, with implications for international conflict, but
also connect to civil war, national instability, and the related development
of democratic change—which, in turn, feeds into the global system. Such
unrest is observable throughout the Middle East where youthful popu-
lations face myriad problems including limited economic opportunities.
Differential demographic changes are also related to broad power shifts

such as the resurgence of Western Europe after World War II and the
failure of less advanced societies such as Afghanistan, North Korea, and
Pakistan to escape the poverty trap following major regional conflicts.
Drawing on this foregoing discussion, we can ask more complex ques-
tions driven by looking through interdisciplinary lenses: what happens to
conflict when uneven economic development coincides with significant
demographic change? What if those factors contribute to a shift in the bal-
ance of power between two countries? What if we add the condition that
one or more leaders is overconfident or we consider chemical factors that
may pertain under certain conditions or we layer onto our analyses greater
appreciation for dynamics such as groupthink that are inevitably linked to
cognitive factors? This series of questions offers just one example of how
to look at the broader spatial picture offered by integrated approaches.
Science and technology studies, as Fritsch observes in Chap. 5, also
cross-cut other disciplinary interests such as demographic studies and his-
tory. What can both technology studies and history tell us about conflict
when considered together? It is interesting to examine how technology
has changed over time as a cause of international conflict. Cyber-war is an
especially interesting dimension of international conflict that has implica-
tions for how we understand credibility, deterrence, coercion, and retal-
iation. It may be that these concepts apply well in cyber-war, must be
adjusted, or that new concepts need to be developed. It is also interesting
to ask if cognitive biases and non-rational behavior, when combined with
cyber-war, create new dangerous realities. That may depend on such fac-
tors as the extent to which cyber-war may be conducted by individuals
that can then trigger inter-state conflicts. In this sense, technology and
cognitive psychology which are viewed as different enterprises may be fit
for interdisciplinary work.
As elaborated upon by Yetiv in Chap. 2, historical study provides a
sense of how things hang together in reality, of how variables are related,
which in turn can inform our understanding of IR conflict and, in par-
ticular, of how dynamics of change are related to conflict. Even high-level
theorists can benefit from a solid and nuanced understanding of historical
work, especially if they make assumptions about conflict across time or are
fit to be tested by historical case studies or even large-N approaches that
are historically based.
What, for instance, does historical work tell us about globalization,
which some liberal scholars believe has generated a radically different
global environment and helped check conflict and enhance cooperation?

If we compare technological growth and impact across time, combining
the insights of technology studies with the work of historians, what would
we find about conflict? For example, is it possible that the greater the level
of technological change, the more likely a hegemon will be challenged,
offering a new angle on hegemonic stability theory and the causes of war?
Or do certain technologies and their specific characteristics, for example
information and communication technologies and their core features
such as network-based interconnectivity, global diffusion, zero marginal
costs, or cross-cutting application, increase interdependence and enhance
cooperation? Or do they rather enable the continuation and deepening of
already existing asymmetries between various actors in the global system
(Fritsch, Chap. 5)? And what about demography? If differential demo-
graphic changes are directly related to major change, such as the resur-
gence of Western Europe after World War II, does not incorporation of
insights from demography enhance our ability to explain the rise and fall
of powers and attendant implications for conflict?
As Kugler lays out in Chap. 8, demographic processes matter funda-
mentally for understanding change and conflict. These processes impact
economic and political performance and play a role in gigantic global shifts
at the international level, including the rise of the developing world and
failed recoveries of countries in regions such as Africa and Latin America.
Following this line of thought, Kang and Kugler in Chap. 9 identify a
critical problem in world affairs: the need to alleviate the misdistribution
of resources globally. Through an interdisciplinary approach that takes
the best insights and structures from multiple disciplines, they illuminate
a critical factor of change historically across regions and time periods:
the course of development. Because economic development is a complex
socioeconomic process involving multiple factors, it is crucial to pursue
modeling by synthesizing diverse ideas from the interdisciplinary perspec-
tive of politics, economics, and demography.
PROFITABLY MOVING FORWARD

Multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinary studies remain in their infancy
compared to what they could achieve with more concentrated effort. We
have tried to show and illustrate how such approaches can help us see
how reality hangs together on so many linked threads and dynamics. Such
links are endless in their potential, as the approach of systemism helps us
contemplate. We must also be careful about what type of work to pursue.

Not all interdisciplinary pursuits are created equal. A plethora of uninte-
grated factors complicate efforts to step outside one’s disciplinary bounds.
The challenges include questions about what most benefits promotion
in academia and government; how to conduct interdisciplinary research
when methods, concepts, and concerns can differ widely; and, as argues,
managing the dominance of disciplinary specialization. However, there is
also much to gain from interdisciplinary research, so all other things being
equal, the quest should continue along such lines.
We can think of myriad possible combinations that would create greater
interdisciplinarity. But which assembled fields are likely to yield the most
benefits? And to what degree should they be combined with each other?
Answers to those questions are really about trying to find a typology for
expanding interdisciplinarity in the first place—a sort of map or guidebook
for integrated approaches in what is still a burgeoning area.
We offer a few ideas here which are derived in part from the preceding
chapters about what types of interdisciplinary approaches are most useful
to develop. These suggestions are not cast in cement but, in our view, are
helpful because, while disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches often
overlap, they are also different from each other. Thus, the best approach
to each field also can be expected to differ.
First, as this book has shown, it is useful to produce ideas, approaches,
and perspectives that draw upon two or more disciplines and take us in
new directions that none of the disciplines would facilitate or perhaps even
allow on its own. Progress is about finding synergies that offer greater
leverage and explanation than existing approaches. It is not very helpful to
push interdisciplinary approaches unless they yield greater understanding
than our current theories, hypotheses derived from them, and resulting
empirical findings. While all of that might seem obvious, it is not a matter
that has been addressed formally in much detail. The question of inter-
disciplinarity therefore involves numerous considerations. Circumstances
alter cases and there is no uniform answer when it comes to building upon
what has been achieved already in IR.
Second, it is useful to exploit areas of disciplines that are most devel-
oped and that have led to the most robust or interesting findings. These
areas then can be used as bases from which to launch greater multidiscipli-
narity and interdisciplinarity and explore new spaces or help reshape and
enrich older ones. For example, what research on cognitive biases fits the
preceding description of priorities and can inform foreign policy analysis
best? Research on overconfidence is certainly one of these areas for which

we have much evidence from works in psychology, political science, and
other disciplines. That offers a more solid basis for further work than sec-
tors that are less supported.
Third, we can search for commonly treaded areas across disciplines
where an overlap of subject areas facilitates cross-fertilization. For exam-
ple, at the broadest level, virtually all disciplines have something to say
about individuals and they play a role across respective areas of disciplin-
ary subject matter. Within the study of individuals, we can identify more
specific areas of common interest and possible convergence across two or
more disciplines, as we discuss later in this chapter.
Beyond analyses at the individual level, we can also explore other sub-
schools across disciplines. For example, which components of a given dis-
cipline offer the best overlap of concerns and ideas to help understand
change? Within history, the school of radical historicism assumes that
good history must consider the realities of a given time and place that
shape events, while traditional historians aim to capture truth through
archival work and primary documents. Could traditional historians and
IR positivists, as well as positivists in other disciplines, have more useful
interdisciplinary collaborations than constructivists across different sub-
schools? We believe so, albeit one type of sub-school can still learn from
another even if its ontology and epistemology differs.
Fourth, even if we come up with interesting new hypotheses and
approaches, we should assess whether they are amenable to study or if, for
other reasons, they are useful even if we cannot really explore them in a
traditionally empirical way. This is about value added and interdisciplinar-
ity needs to consider that concept more broadly. Some synergies can be
fascinating but hard to actually research or effectuate. If so, their value
added must be based on other factors. For example, deterrence theory is
hard to test and study, but it remains very influential because of its great
salience across many issue areas and heuristic appeal.
CONCLUSION
Opportunities for multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity research are
equal to the challenges. Done well, such approaches can launch new “cot-
tage industries” and research programs with exciting results and in some
fields, have already done so. Disciplinary-based approaches often yield
useful specialized knowledge and cuts on reality, and sometimes they are
the best approach to take. However, unlike multidisciplinary and inter-
disciplinary approaches, they usually cannot capture the comprehensive

nature and causes of most phenomena such as international conflict. Nor
can they yield panoramic solutions to some of the world’s biggest transna-
tional problems, including energy security, climate change, sustainability,
terrorism, proliferation, poverty, and population. For such reasons, multi-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches deserve continuing attention
in a world that is ever more complex and challenging.
NOTES
1. Cited in Discover, July/August 2014: 33.
2. It the most expensive natural disaster recorded thus far. The Indian Ocean
2004 tsunami produced about 250,000 deaths and approximately $14 bil-
lion in property loss.
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Picketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the 21st Century. Boston, MA: Belknap.
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Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2012. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society
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Yetiv, Steve A. 2004; 2nd ed. 2011. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making
& the Persian Gulf War. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
INDEX1
A behavioral economics, 7, 38, 56, 65,

alliance, 35, 119, 130, 138, 312 91, 92, 155, 158, 159, 161, 175,
Al Qaeda, 168, 172, 174, 325 328, 329
American decline, 29 behaviorism, 54, 291
anarchy, 4, 5, 9, 12n10, 21, 32, 85–8, Boas, Franz, 155, 179n2
91, 101–3, 129, 214, 299, 300, 326 bounded rationality, 55
anthropology, 2, 4, 8–10, 18, 24, 54, Braudel, Fernand, 28
115, 153–80, 191, 192, 239, Brecher, Michael, 12n6, 296, 301
324, 328–30, 332 Breisach, Ernst., 18
Apple, 141 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 43n3, 87,
Appraisal Tendency Framework, 57 102
arms race, 119, 121, 127 bureaucratic politics model, 37, 39
Atran, Scott, 10, 158, 169, 171–5, Buzan, Barry, 30, 139
179, 180n9
attribution, 57, 61, 63, 75n6, 127
authority, 102, 119, 130, 131, 165, 247 C
Axelrod, Robert, 56, 89, 102 Carr, E.H., 19, 102, 130
certainty effect, 68–71, 75n9
cognitive biases, 4, 6, 9, 41, 51, 52,
B 59–73, 91, 122, 161, 312, 325,
Baby booms, 240, 242, 243, 252–4, 326, 328, 330, 333, 335
256n10, 277–9 cognitive revolution, 6, 7, 52–8
1
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to foot notes.

to International Relations, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40823-1
340 INDEX
Cold War, 26, 88, 95, 119, 121, 123, D

180n4, 192, 217n4, 291, 294, decision-Making Approach, 56–8
300, 302 demographic disruption, 250, 253
compellence, 302, 303 demographic transition, 229, 235,
competition, 39, 57, 59, 85, 119, 120, 238, 240, 241, 243–5, 254,
122, 128, 129, 138, 162, 165–7, 256n1, 265
169, 170, 237, 301, 318n17 deterrence, 83, 85, 87, 88, 101, 103,
complexity, 19, 93, 124, 136, 177, 106n2, 107, 119, 121, 302, 303,
252, 256n7, 284n3, 298, 301, 333, 336
302, 316n4, 324 diachronic comparisons, 34
computer, 54, 59, 62, 123, 125, 126, diffusion, 118–20, 123, 133, 136,
156 138, 139, 334
concession aversion, 67 domestic politics mode, 37, 39, 331
conflict, 2–6, 8–11, 12n8, 17–44, drones, 122
51–76, 83–109, 115–42, 153–80,
189–217, 229–56, 263–5, 268,
270, 277, 278, 280, 289–318, E
324–34, 337 Elman, Colin, 20, 21, 33
conflict and gender, 10, 198 Elman, Miriam, 20, 21, 33
constructivists, 21–4, 29, 30, 42, Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 192
131–3, 135–8, 142n1, 156, 161, empire, 28, 29, 31, 42, 118, 120, 177
178, 336 endowment effect, 53, 65–8, 74
continuum of violence, 191, 196, 198, Enloe, Cynthia, 190, 192, 194–7,
199, 202, 205, 209, 212, 215 201, 204–6, 217n4
cooperation, 3, 6, 9, 10, 25, 29, 51, environmental shocks, 240, 254
67, 83–109, 130, 138, 139, 161, essentialist ethnic and nationalist
166, 169, 170, 172, 179, 197, identities, 163
280, 291, 299–302, 304, 325,
326, 334
Council of Europe, 126 F
counterfactual, 33 female leaders, 191, 200–3, 215
crisis, 40, 58, 59, 86, 87, 91, 92, 100, femicide, 236, 237
107, 119, 139, 204–6, 209, 301, femininities, 190, 195, 197, 200, 209,
303, 312, 325 214
crisis resolution, 301 feminist foreign policy, 191, 200–3, 215
cultural historians, 23 Feminist International Relations, 218,
culture, 5, 10, 23, 28, 29, 54, 115, 220, 224, 227
118, 130, 132, 137, 138, Feminist Security Studies, 193, 194,
153–62, 164, 175, 178, 179, 215, 331
179n2, 196, 252, 254, 304, 309, Ferguson, Yale H., 14, 45, 144, 145
313, 323, 329, 332 fertility, 231, 234–8, 240, 242, 245,
cybercrime, 125, 126 253, 254, 256n9, 263–5, 275,
cyberwar, 124–8 277, 278
INDEX 341
Foreign Policy Analysis, 7, 140, I

289–318, 327, 336 ideas, 7, 11, 12n11, 20, 21, 23, 43,
Fourth Generation Warfare, 171 55, 57, 58, 68, 72, 98, 131, 132,
framing, 55, 68, 94, 179 138, 160, 172, 180n7, 189, 192,
Fundamental Attribution Error, 53, 195, 197, 202, 204, 205, 214,
61–3, 74, 75n6 215, 233, 238, 239, 247, 274,
291, 292, 294, 323, 324, 328,
332, 334–6, 296317n12
G ideology, 22, 61, 130, 134, 305
Gaddis, John Lewis, 32, 121 illusion of control, 59
game theorist, 21, 25 Illusion of Transparency, 53, 63–4
game theory, 21, 31 integrated approach, 18, 35–41, 43,
Geertz, Clifford, 154, 156, 161, 290, 296, 315, 324, 331, 333,
180n3, 180n7 335
gender, 5, 6, 8–10, 41, 58, 59, 100, interdependence, 5, 86, 102, 121,
158, 189–217, 229, 232, 236, 127, 129–32, 141, 334
240, 242, 250–2, 255, 256n4, interdisciplinarity, 1–4, 7–8, 11n2,
269, 270, 276, 277, 324, 326, 11n4, 12n11–13, 35, 43, 128,
331, 332 159, 189–217, 324, 331, 335,
gender imbalance, 229, 232, 236–7, 336
250–2 international change, 32, 232
gender ratio, 251 international conflict, 2–6, 8–11, 17,
globalization, 30, 115, 120, 122, 25–31, 43, 53, 57, 84, 103, 105,
129–32, 155, 156, 158, 160–4, 118–22, 129, 130, 140, 157,
168, 172, 173, 265, 318n18, 166, 210, 230, 289–318, 332,
328, 333 333, 337
governance, 1, 85, 121, 130, 131, International Crisis Behavior, 301
138–40, 268, 269, 274 international organizations, 4, 88, 130,
groupthink, 37, 39, 40, 327, 328, 132, 202, 219, 231, 298, 314
331, 333 International Political Economy, 7, 10,
24, 117, 134, 138, 140, 263–84
International Studies, 4, 12n6, 12n14,
H 190
Himmelfarb,Gertrude, 43n1 intersectionality, 6, 9, 32, 201, 265, 332
historical institutionalism, 25, 27 Islam, 157, 158, 168, 172–4, 178,
historical sociology, 7, 18, 22, 24, 43n4 206, 241, 243, 248, 303
historiography, 29
Hudson, Valerie, 7, 12n8, 13n17, 193,
216, 236, 251, 290, 291, 304, J
307–12, 314, 316, 316n1, 318n21 James, Patrick, 5, 11
hunter-gatherer, 164–6 Jervis, Robert, 7, 56, 64, 316n6
Huntington, S., 156, 157, 180n4 jihad, 156, 170–5
342 INDEX
K neuroanthropology, 175, 176, 179,

Keohane, Robert, 30, 31, 86, 102, 329
121, 216 neurobiology, 94–100
neuroeconomics, 9, 84, 91–5, 97,
103–5, 106n5, 107, 175, 332
L neuropolitics, 83–109, 315
Lake, David, 86, 130 neuroscience, 5, 6, 8–10, 43, 54, 56,
Lawson, George, 18, 22, 23, 30, 57, 84, 92, 93, 100, 104, 105,
43n4, 139 159, 324–9
Lebow, Richard Ned, 12n11, 28, 33 njeorealists, 4, 5, 21, 26, 29, 32,
liberalism, 129–32, 291 128–9
life expectancies, 232, 238, 243 non-state actors, 4, 116, 122, 124,
longevity, 237–9, 241–5 126, 127, 130, 131, 171
loss aversion, 53, 64–7, 73, 75n8 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 85, 106n3, 123, 127,
245, 300
M Nye, Joseph S., 12n8, 29, 30, 42, 86,
macro-level research, 175–8 121, 124
Mansbach, Richard W., 7, 26, 32, 131
masculinities, 190–2, 197, 205, 209,
214, 217n3 O
Mearsheimer, John, 29, 85, 95, 102, Oneal, John R., 30, 102
103 one child per family policy, 236, 237
micro-level research, 175–9, 301 optimism, 59, 61, 75n4, 328
Mintz, Alex, 38, 291 overconfidence, 6, 53, 56–8, 60,
multidisciplinarity, 1–4, 7–8, 11n1, 326–8, 336
11n3, 11n4, 324, 334–6 Owen, John, 28, 31
multinational Corporation, 164, 177 Oxytocin, 6, 9
Munich analogy, 40, 42
Muslims, 158, 162, 163, 168, 172–4
mutually assured destruction, 119 P
path dependency, 137
Paul, T.V., 49
N peace, 3, 12n11, 34, 35, 61, 71–3,
nationalism, 29, 130, 155, 161–4, 86–8, 95, 102, 121, 126, 130,
170, 178, 235, 247, 248, 302, 157, 166, 172, 191–4, 196–203,
332 209–16, 217n3, 217n4, 245,
neodisciplinarity, 3 249, 250, 252, 254, 277, 280,
neoliberals, 5, 29, 32, 86, 120 309, 316, 326
network, 35, 54, 83, 104, 118, 120, Persian Gulf conflict, 40, 331
121, 123, 124, 126, 131, 137, population bomb, 236, 237
168, 172, 174, 175, 177, 334 positive Illusions,53,56,59–61
INDEX 343
positivists, 22–4, 156, 194, 216, 336 reputation, 37, 57, 92, 106n4, 167
postmodernists, 4, 23, 43n1, 156 Ripsman, Norrin, 29
poverty trap, 236, 241, 256n8, 264, risk-taking, 98, 329
265, 267, 273–5, 279, 333 robot, 122, 141
power, 4, 5, 12n10, 20, 22, 26, 27, Russett, Bruce, 30, 102
29, 31, 32, 39, 42, 57, 58, 60, Russia, 85, 95, 127, 203, 206, 207,
69, 72, 84, 86–8, 95, 102, 103, 209, 238
105, 107, 119, 123–5, 128–31, Russian-Chechen wars, 203–9, 214, 215
133, 135, 139, 140, 163, 169,
173, 177, 190, 193, 195,
197–201, 203, 204, 208, 209, S
214, 230, 234, 237, 269, 274, Schroeder, Paul W., 19, 27
294, 299–301, 303, 307, Schweller, Randall, 22
318n18, 330, 333, 334 Sjoberg, Laura, 193, 194, 197, 198,
power transition, 32, 86, 87, 95, 102, 200, 204
107 social constructivism, 131–3
Primordialism, 161, 178, 180n7 Social Identity Theory, 57
process tracing, 22 Solomon, Ty, 30, 31
prosocial norms, 169 sovereignty, 85, 87, 119, 130, 131,
prospect theory, 38, 57, 64, 65, 68, 214
75n9, 75n10 status quo, 66–8, 86, 106n1, 107,
pseudo-certainty, 53, 70–2 123, 245, 294
systemism, 11, 177, 179, 235, 266,
289–318, 324, 334
Q systems theory, 11, 289, 291, 293
qualitative IR, 21, 25
T
R Taylor, A. J. P , 19, 27, 59
Radical Historicism, 22, 24, 336 technological determinism, 131–3,
rational actor model, 36–9, 41, 44n8, 135, 136, 139
105 technology, 8–10, 115–42, 164, 170,
rational choice theory, 159, 175, 329 176, 177, 239, 266, 271, 272,
rationality, 55, 68, 134, 135, 158–61, 274, 282, 315, 324, 331, 333, 334
175, 180n6, 190, 193, 302, telegraph, 120
327–9 telephone,
reactive devaluation53, 72–3 territory, 29, 67, 71, 75n8, 85, 130,
reference class forecasting, 327, 328 131, 167
reference points, 66, 67 terrorism, 2, 6, 10, 29, 125, 128, 156,
refugees, 28, 239, 245–9, 250, 252, 164, 168, 170–3, 176, 178, 179,
254, 256n3 193, 203, 206, 207, 217n6, 302,
representativeness, 55 332, 337
344 INDEX
Thelen, Kathleen, 25, 27 W

theory-building process, 31 Waltz, Kenneth, 5, 12n10, 29, 32, 85,
Tickner, J. Ann, 190, 192, 193, 198, 88, 102, 128, 129, 296, 304
199, 201, 216 war and gender, 190, 192, 194–201,
time-space compression, 120, 203, 208, 215, 216
122, 137 warfare, 118, 119, 141, 163–71, 176,
traditional historians, 22, 23, 33, 336 178, 237
transdisciplinary, 3 weapons of mass destruction, 106n2,
transformation, 115, 118, 122, 126, 119, 325
129, 173, 191, 199 Wendt, Alexander, 21, 22, 29, 32,
transnationalization, 129, 139 131, 132
transportation, 118, 130, 137 women, peace and security, 202, 203,
tribes, 160, 166–8, 173 210–14, 216, 217n3
trust, 6, 9, 10, 42, 51, 63, 67, World War I, 26, 31, 32, 102, 133,
83–109, 172, 247, 249, 170, 180n6, 249, 267, 304, 305
325, 328
Y
U Yetiv, Steve, 7, 9, 11, 35, 40, 41,
United Nations, 64, 125, 174, 44n9, 58, 265, 290, 296, 315,
192, 198–200, 202, 203, 328, 331, 333
209–14, 216, 217n3, 217n5, youth bulges, 229, 232, 235, 239–42,
231, 238, 251, 267, 277, 256n2
281, 299
UNSCR 1325, 202, 210–13, 216
UN Security Council, 174, 202, 203, Z
209–14, 216, 217n3, 217n5 Zelikow, Philip, 35, 36, 44n8

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Advancing Interdisciplinary

Approaches to International Relations

ISBN 978-3-319-40822-4 ISBN 978-3-319-40823-1 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016957876

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

Cover image © Cosi Bella Photography

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

1 Pushing Boundaries in the Study of International Relations 1

2 History, International Relations, and Conflict 17

3 Hawkish Biases and the Interdisciplinary Study

4 Trust, Cooperation, and Conflict: Neuropolitics

5 Technology, Conflict and International Relations 115

6 Anthropology, Conflict, and International Relations 153

7 Gender in International Relations: Interdisciplinarity

8 Demography and International Relations:

9 International Political Economy

10 Systemism and Foreign Policy Analysis: A New

11 Conclusion: Interdisciplinary Links

Fig. 3.1 Hypothetical value function 65

Table 3.1 Biases examined in this chapter 53

Pushing Boundaries in the Study

For ages, scholars have contemplated how to view an issue or problem

S.A. Yetiv ()

© The Author(s) 2017 1

not challenge disciplinary paradigms, dominant theories and methods, but

BROAD GOALS OF THE BOOK

IR chiefly, as opposed to International Studies writ large.6 IR defies easy

KEY THEMES OF THE BOOK

Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, buoyed by the cognitive revolution

Myriad thinkers have engaged in interdisciplinary work in IR across lev-

interdisciplinary study of the sub-systemic causes of conflict. Our goal is to

A FEW GOOD QUALIFICATIONS

6. IR should be distinguished from international studies as an even wider

Millennium, Journal of International Business, and Global Society: Journal

Miller, Raymond C. 2010. Interdisciplinarity: Its Meaning and Consequences. In

History, International Relations,

S.A. Yetiv ()

© The Author(s) 2017 17

“Theory Building, Methods, and Testing” shows how history can

HISTORY AND IR: DIFFERENCES AND APPROACHES

A HISTORICAL TURN: WHICH HISTORY AND WHICH IR?

combined with sociology’s effort to reveal why historical work is signifi-

instead see history as a function of how we perceive it, making it important

research involves a division of labor in which historians work for social

HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

To be sure, some IR scholars have explored change in important ways,5

On a smaller scale, work by historians on how minor events can alter

of indicators of America’s capability over time compared to that of rising

(Solomon 2014). Such dynamics place further emphasis on understanding

THEORY BUILDING, METHODS, AND TESTING

History can play an enhanced role in theory, methods, and testing in

Second, greater attention to the study of history would enhance the-

Historical study can also benefit IR in diachronic comparisons aimed at

Addressing threats to valid inference helps separate the effects of the

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR BRIDGING FOREIGN

In contrast to the rational actor model, the cognitive approach offers

integrated approach allows for synthesis of insights between two disci-

preferences; how certain policies are preferred because they accommodate

The Integrated Approach, History, and Conflict

Of course, Washington was driven by a variety of strategic national

NOT PUSHING A GOOD THING TOO FAR

Insofar as those engaged in historical study are unaware of IR theory,