MIL HISTORY

SIX DAYS OF WAR – 1967

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ser Chapter Contents Page

No No
1. Chapter I Background 1-2
2. Chapter II Prelude to War 3-5
3. Chapter III Terrain 6-7
4. Chapter IV Israeli Air Campaign 8-10
5. Chapter V Egyptian Front 11-15
6. Chapter VI Jordanian Front 16-20
7. Chapter VII Syrian Front 21-23
8. Chapter VIII Aftermath 24-25
9. Chapter IX Lessons Learnt 26-28
10. Chapter X Chronology of Events 29-31
11. - Questionnaire 32
12. - ORBAT : Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syrian Forces 33-35
 1

CHAPTER – I

BACKGROUND

1. Arab-Israeli conflict remained an immutable fixture of Middle Eastern Life. From a

local dispute in the 1920s and 30s, it had expanded in the 1940s to engulf the region and
then in the 50s, the world. The context of inter-Arab and Great power, rivalry of Israel fears
and bravado and of abiding bitterness in both sides had coalesced. If a new status quo had
been created it was one of inherent instability a situation so combustible that the slightest
spark could ignite it. What begin as a mere idea in the mid-nineteenth century by the
beginning of the twentieth motivated thousand of Europeans and Middle Eastern Jews to
leave their homes and settle in the unthinkably distant Palestine. Ever since the Romans
expelled the Jews from Palestine, the land has been under the successive rule of
Byzantines, Arabs, Crusaders, Turks, and Great Britain. After the fall of Ottoman Empire
and till British occupation in 1918 the number of Jews swelled to 70,000. By the end of
World War I, the British had supplanted the Turks in Palestine and under the Balfour
Declaration, pledged to build a Jewish national home in the country.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA - 1967

2. The resentment between Jew and Arab began to grow. During World War II, the
Arab-Jewish strife remained in abeyance for the most part, however, after the war it flared
up with increased violence. In 1947, frustrated by years of trying to keep the peace between
Arabs and Jews, Britain places the issue before the United Nations (UN). The consequence
came with the passage of UN Gen Assembly Resolution 181. This provided for the creation
of two states, one Arab and the other Jewish in Palestine, and an international regime for
Jerusalem. The Zionists approved of the plan but the Arabs, having already rejected an
earlier, more favorable (for them) partition offer from Britain, stood firm in their demand for
sovereignty over Palestine in full, the Arab response was adamant opposition as evidenced
by the Arab League (a loose confederation of seven Arab states incl Egypt, Jordan, and
 2

Syria) calling for war against the Jews. As the British began to withdraw in the spring of
1948, the clashes between Arab and Jew became more intense approaching org warfare.
3. At midnight on May 14, 1948, when the British mandate over Palestine officially
terminated, it was also that day that the civil strife burning since Nov exploded into a
regional clash between Israel and the five nearest Arab countries. Always the most
truculent of anti-zionists, Syria and Iraq led the invasion, followed by Lebanon and
Transjordan (Jordan) and Egypt. By the fall of 1948 the Israel Def Forces (IDF) had
managed to bypass the blocked of Jerusalem fight Transjordan‟s into a stalemate. Stymied
the Syrian adv in the north, Iraq‟s incursion into the country‟s center and Egyptian tps were
driven out of the entire Negev. The War of Independence had ended. The Jewish captured
30% more territory than the UN had allotted it. The Gen Armistice Agreements (GAA)
signed between Israel and its four adjacent adversaries – Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria, in the first half of 1949 deeply influenced Arab-Israeli relations over the next nineteen
years. Under its ambiguous terms, the Arab claimed the right to renew active hostilities at
will, and denied the other side any form of recognition.
4. Beginning 1954, the Arab states began a campaign of harassment against Israel, it
was subjected to an economic boycott, restd trade through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez
cnl, and frequent attks by Arab infiltrators on border settlements. Tensions increased as the
Israelis refused to allow the Arab refugees to return to their former homes in Israel.
Following an upsurge of cdo raids into Israel from the Sinai, the second Arab-Israeli war,
also known as Sinai Campaign began in the afternoon of Oct 29 when Israeli paratrooper
landed in the Mitla Pass, twenty-four miles east of the cnl. Israeli armored colns broke
through the Egyptian lines in central and southern Sinai and rolled through Egyptian-
occupied Gaza. Israel‟s victory was swift. Op MUSKETEER, the invasion‟s codename, was
a consummate mil success. The Egyptian Army was shattered and three quarters of the cnl
reoccupied. When hostilities ceased in Nov 1956, Israel controlled almost all of the Sinai
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, and the Straits of Tiran, and had captured over 6,000 Egyptian
prisoners. In 1957, a multinational United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF) was to deploy
UN Tps from a consortium of countries along the Egyptian-Israeli border, in the Gaza Strip,
and at Sharm al-Sheikh overlooking the Straits of Tiran with an aim, to disengage the
Egyptian and Israeli tps, serving as a buffer between them and to guarantee Israeli ships
passage through the Gulf of Aqaba.
 3

CHAPTER-II

PRELUDE TO WAR

5. The pd from 1957-67, witnessed Arab-Israeli tensions to grow into a prelude for the
Six Day War. During this pd numerous clashes occurred on Israel-Arab frontiers, Arab trts
attk an Israeli tgt with the predictable Israeli response of even more powerful counter
strikes. This crescendo continued making it difficult to pinpoint any one event which
triggered the ensuing war, but by 1966, the sequence of escalation had begun. On Nov 13,
1966, ten tks, forty Half-Tracks and 400 men the largest Israeli strike force assembled since
the 1956 war crossed the West Bank border before dawn. The op aimed at punishing
Palestinian villages in the Hebron area that had aided and billeted Al-Fatah guerrillas.
Under the cover of IAF fighter, the Israeli coln adv to Rujm al-Madfa, ten miles southwest of
Hebron and demolished its police station. The next target was Samu, a village of 5,000 that
Israel held to be a principal staging grnd for the trts. It was to be a clean attk, in and out,
with little resistance expected, and no encounters with the Jordanian Army. However, what
was intended as a swift and surgical strike ended in a swift battle with no of causalities from
both sides.
6. Starting in early Jan 1967, the area began to simmer again. Syrian tks rained thirty-
one shells on village, Kibbutz Almagor and wounded two members of Kibbutz Shamir with
machine-gun fire. Clashes continued for a week before culminating in the death of one
Israeli and the wounding of two others by an antipersonnel mine planted at Moshav Dishon.
On the morning of 07 April, two tractors entered the DZ (demilitarized zone) near Tel Katzir,
Syrians greeted them with 37mm cannons. Israeli tks shot at the Syrian guns and the
Syrian guns 81mm and 120mm mortars bombed Israeli settlements. What began as a
skirmish rapidly escalated into a mini war. An hr passed, the Syrian bombardment
intensified, IAF Vatour bombers, covered by Mirages, were soon rocketing Syrian bunkers
and villages. Israelis had barely begun their sorties when they were engaged by Syrian
MiG‟s. Two of the MiG‟s were downed over Quneitra, the Golan‟s largest city, in a massive
dog-fight involving as many as 130 planes, another four MiG‟s were destroyed. In a mere
thirty seconds, Israel had est supremacy over Syria‟s skies.
7. In early May false reports began to circulate that Israel was concentrating her forces
on the Syrian border. Egypt and Syria responded to these reports by mob their forces and
announcing their “combat readiness” on 17 May. The next day, Jordan proclaimed her
forces mob for battle against the common en. At the same time Egypt began moving a large
force into the Sinai incl armour, inf, and fwd placement of aircraft. IDF estimates had put the
size of the Egyptian buildup at one Div, the 5th this in addition to the 30,000 tps already
stationed in Sinai and the 10,000 man Palestine Liberation Army div maintained in Gaza.
The 2nd and 7th Inf Div had also crossed the Cnl.
8. Occupying forty-one obsn posts along the international border, in Sharm Al-Sheikh
and in Gaza, the United Nations Emergency Force numbered 4,500 men incl Indians,
Canadians, Yugoslavs, Swedes, Brazilians, Norwegians, and Danes. Following the failure
of other peacekeeping efforts, most notably in the Congo, little faith attended UNEF‟s ability
to prevent Egypt-Israeli hostilities, for indeed the force could only obs them once they broke
out. Yet, for all its handicaps, the mere presence of UNEF had sufficed to deter warfare
during periods of intense Arab-Israeli friction, to keep infiltrators from exiting Gaza and
ensure free passage through the Straits of Tiran. UNEF aircrafts were not allowed to land
at Al-Arish airport. The Egyptians had taken over the OP at Al-Sabha and Kuntilla. Finally
 4

on 19 May, the UNEF was officially withdrawn from the Egyptian-Israeli border at Egypt‟s
request. Both Israel and Egypt announced the call-up of reservists on 21 May.
9. The pace accelerated as Nasser (Egyptian President) announced the closure of the
Straits of Tiran / Gulf of Aqaba, on 23 May, blockading Israel‟s Port of Eilat and her only
outlet to the Red Sea. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol described the blockade as an
“aggressive act against Israel” and called upon the UN and major powers to restore free
navig through the Straits and in the Gulf. US and UK mooted a plan. An international
convoy of freighters would sail for Eilat under the escort of Sixth Fleet destroyers bolstered
by the British warships. Its code name was “OP RED SEA REGATTA,” or simply,
REGATTA. The plans died its own death as the superpowers were not forthcoming and
were dragging their feet.
10. Tensions were further flared up as Radio Cairo and Nasser speeches called for Arab
unity to destroy Israel, calling for holy war to destroy Israel and liberate Palestine. The next
several days provided increasing evidence of Arab unity against Israel-Sudan, Algeria
and Morocco pledging support to Egypt, Saudi Arabian tps deploying near Aqaba, Kuwaiti
tps landing in Egypt, and most importantly, the signing of an Egyptian-Jordanian mutual def
pact on 30 May placing Jordanian forces under Egyptian Comd. As an Egyptian Gen
arrived in Amman to assume comd of Jordanian forces, the Israeli govt appointed a new
Minister of Def, Moshe Dayan, a popular war hero of 1948 and 1956. After Dayan‟s
appointment on 01 Jun, Israel portrayed external restraint even though the same three
conditions were now present as when the 1956 war started: blockade of the Gulf, Arab trt
raids into Israel, and the threat of a joint Egypt-Syria-Jordan mil attk against Israel.
 5

UNEF DPLY IN SINAI AND GAZA STRIP – MAY 1967

 6

CHAPTER-III
TERRAIN
11. Israel shares its borders with four Arabian countries – Lebanon to the north, Syria to
the north east, Jordan to the east and Egypt to the south west. The Mediterranean Sea is to
its west. The total area of Israel is 22,000 sq kms. The length from north to south is approx
400 kms. Israel has a narrow waistline of only 29 kms from Tel Aviv to the West Bank of the
Jordan River near Hebron.

Sinai Peninsula
12. The triangular Sinai Peninsula is 383 kms long from north to south, and about
200 kms from east to west at its base with a total area of 61,000 sq kms. The northern sect
consists of narrow coastal plains, interspersed with wadis and sand dunes. The going is
difficult and its considered impassable for B vehs. Towards south of the dunes is narrow
coastal plain varying in width from about 10 to 25 kms. The central sect is hilly, rugged and
its ranges run North-South. The going is firm, but it is not easy for digging. The southern
sect is mtns and barren with Mt. Sinai being the highest peak at 2,285 mtrs. Along the
Mediterranean coast, water (brackish) is available 12-18 inches, elsewhere there is no
water.

THE SIANI DESERT

Golan Heights
13. Golan Heights rises above the Sea of Galilee, towards its north, with heights ranging
from 800 to 1,000 mtrs and over the Jordan rift valley to its west. These heights are
characterized by a ridge of volcanic hills, creating a plateau made of layers of hard basalt
rocks which makes cross-country mov extremely difficult. The total area of the Golan
Heights is 1,800 sq kms. It is bounded on the north by Mt. Hermon, on the west by the
Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee, and on the south by the Yarmouk River. Mt Hermon,
provides an excellent obsn of the entire region, up to the Damascus Basin to the east and it
 7

also dominates the entire Israeli Galilee to the west. At the western edge of the Golan
Heights are rock cliffs that drop 500 mtrs to the Jordan River Valley and the Sea of Galilee
below. The eastern portion of the Golan Heights is the watershed line and ctrl of which,
gives topographical advantage to the defender.
West Bank
14. The West Bank of the River Jordan, historically known as Judea and Samaria, is
located in the central densely populated region. It consists of 2,270 square miles of the
Judean and Samarian highlands and 140 square miles of the Gaza Strip. The West Bank
can be divided into three topographic zones The Eastern zone or the Jordan River Rift
Valley and its escarpments, the central zone or the mtns spine, and the Western zone or
the Judean and Samarian foothills.
15. The Eastern Zone. The Eastern Zone is dominated by the Jordan Rift Valley,
which separates Israel and Jordan. The Jordan River forms the de facto Israel-Jordan
border, descending here to more than 1,000 ft below sea level as it apchs the Dead Sea.
The river‟s width ranges from 04 miles in the north to 14 miles at the river‟s influx into the
Dead Sea and it is the only area that permits off-rd travel. Due to lack of natural cover all
movements are exposed to svl from the cliffs nearby. All east or west movements are
difficult. Therefore, before initiating a thrust across the flood plain, the high grnd as well as
the traffic arteries needs to be secured.
16. The Central Zone. Also known as the Judean-Samarian Plateau, it encompasses
ridges and peaks, a few reaching 3,000 ft. The zone‟s only north-south rd joins Beersheba,
Hebron, Jerusalem, Nablus and points in the Galilee Hills adjacent to the rd, also dominates
it for much of its length. A thrust from the Judean and Samarian ridges toward Israel‟s cities
and towns along the coast could be facilitated by the central highway toward the west.
17. The Western Zone. The Western Zone of the “West Bank” is the area between the
2,000-foot altitude contour line and the 1949 armistice line. Most of Israel‟s population and
industrial infrastructure are located here. The Judean and Samarian foothills, towering
above the narrow coastal plain, are known as arty OP‟s dream due to the obs it provides of
the Israel‟s mil bases and instls, most of its population centers, traffic arteries, rail lines, fuel
storage tks and power plants. The mob of Israel‟s army can be interfered with by
concentrating firepower on comn centers and by occupying one or two natural choke pts.
 8

CHAPTER – IV

ISRAELI AIR CAMPAIGN

18. Israeli air campaign started on 05 Jun at 0710hr Israel time, when sixteen Magister
Fouga jets took off from the airfd at Hatzor. Four min later, the real fighters-Ouragan
bombers left Hatzor air fd, followed five mins after that by a sqn of Mirages from Ramat
David and fifteen twin-engine Vatours from Hatzerim. By 0730hr, close to 200 planes were
aloft. They flew low, often no more than fifteen mtrs, to avoid detection by any of Egypt‟s
eighty-two rdr sites. Most of the planes turned west, toward the Mediterranean, before
banking back in the direction of Egypt. Others raced down the Red Sea toward tgts deep in
the Egyptian interior. Radio silence was strictly observed. The Egyptians, for their part, did
little to shield their planes. These were concentrated by type MiG‟s, Ilyushins, Topolovs
each to its own base. Egypt‟s jets were parked in open air aprons. Almost all of Egypt‟s
planes were on the grnd at that moment with their pilots eating breakfast. Assuming that
any Israeli attk would begin at dawn, only four trg flights were in the air, none of them
armed.

19. The 0745hr time on tgt was shrewdly chosen for several reasons. First, the Egyptian
state of alert was past its peak since the morning dawn ptls were over and most pilots and
grnd crews were breakfasting. Secondly, by making the initial strike at 0745hr Israeli pilots
could sleep until approx 0400hr instead of getting little, if any, sleep which would have been
necessary for a dawn raid. Also, at this time of yr the heavy morning mist over the Nile and
the Delta is lifting by 0730hr and completely clear by 0800hr with excellent definition
because of the sun angle. Finally, striking 15 min prior to the start of normal office hrs would
catch many Egyptian Cdrs, Offrs, and key executive and training pers on their way to wk.
20. In little over half an hr, the Egyptians had lost 204 planes half of their air force all but
nine of them on the grnd. All of Egypt‟s 100 AA btys, its 27 SAM-2 msls sites, had been
issued no-fire orders by Amer, who feared they might mistake his plane for one of Israel‟s.
“We were on high alert, with more than enough amn, but we received no orders to shoot,”
attested Said Ahmad Rabi‟, the maj comdg the guns. The IAF lost eight aircrafts and in the
first wave, and five pilots. One of the planes, damaged but unable to break radio silence,
was destroyed by Israeli Hawk msls after it strayed over Dimona.
21. The second wave of fighters, meanwhile, reached its destinations, fourteen en
bases, nearly half of them west of the Cnl, and all of Egypt‟s rdr sites. Though the Israelis
no longer enjoyed the element of surprise, and no longer obs radio silence, resistance from
these facilities was moderate and largely confined to anti-aircraft fire. The IAF carried out
164 sorties in just over 100 min and destroyed another 107 planes, while suffering only nine
losses. Of the 420 combat aircrafts in Egypt‟s arsenal that morning, 286 were destroyed 30
Tupolev-16‟s, 27 Ilyushin-28 medium bombers, 12 Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers, 90 MiG-21
interceptors, 20 MiG-19‟s, 75 MiG-17‟s, 32 tpt planes and helicopters and almost one third
of their pilots killed. Thirteen bases were rendered inoperable, along with twenty-three rdr
stn and AA sites. At 1035hr, “The Egyptian air force has ceased to exist”.
22. The IAF‟s attn next turned to Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Shortly before 1230h, the IAF
conducted a lightning strike against the airfds of Mafraq and Amman. Before the war,
Weizman had favored eliminating the Jordanian air force even without provocation, as a
preventive measure, but Rabin had vetoed the idea. Now, after the Hawkers were on the
grnd refueling when the Israelis struck, within nine mins, both bases were rendered
inoperable, the runways cratered, and their ctrl towers knocked out. The second Israeli
 9

wave came at 0110h and completed the task by destroying all twenty of Jordan‟s Hawkers.
Eight other aircraft went up in flames, along with Gen Bull‟s private plane. A sole C-130
Hercules managed to take off with fourteen pilots for the H-3 airfd in western Iraq, there to
continue the battle. Israel lost a single Mystere, to grnd fire. Finally, at about 1400h Iraqi
planes raided the Israeli base at Ramat David. Again, the IAF retaliated by striking the Iraqi
airfd at H-3 (500 miles across Jordan) and destroying at least 10 Iraqi aircraft on the grnd.
Having crippled the Iraqi and Syrian air threat and having destroyed Jordan‟s Air Force,
Israel again turned its attn to Egypt. Israeli air raids continued after dusk and into the ni
hitting runways with delayed action bombs and harassing salvage crews. Runway catering
of Arab airfds had been enhanced all day by the IAF‟s use of a radical, lightweight bomb
called the “concrete dibber.” This unique bomb carried retro rockets to kill its fwd speed at
release and a booster to thrust it deep into the runway. This ord permitted accurate delivery
at low level (200 ft) and high speeds.
23. The second day‟s air war went much like the first. By midnight on 06 Jun, Israel had
destroyed 415 Arab aircraft and 393 of them on the grnd, while losing only 26. In just two

days, 05 to 06 Jun, Arab Air Forces‟ losses exceeded 500 million dollars in aircraft with
 10

Egypt losing approx 100 (almost one third) of its most experienced pilots. It would take
years for the Egypt to rebuild its AF.

ISRAELI AIR CAMPAIGN : JUN 1967

ARAB AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON 05 - 06 JUN 1967

Type Quantity
Fighters
MiG-21 95
MiG-19 20
MiG-15/17 82
SU-7 10
Bombers
IL-28 27
Egypt
TU-16 30
Tpts
IL-14 24
AN-12 8
MI 4 Helicopters 1
MI 6 Helicopters 8
Other Helicopters 4
Total 309
Fighters
Hunters 21
Jordan Tpts 5
Helicopters 2
Total 28
Fighters
MiG-21/MiG-15/17 32/23
Bombers
Syria IL-28 2
Tpts
MI 4 Helicopters 3
Total 60
Fighters
Iraq MiG-21 Hunters 97
Bombers
Iraq TU-16 1
Total 17
Fighters
Lebanon
Hunter 1
Arab Total Losses 415
Israel Total Losses 26
 11

CHAPTER – V

EGYPTIAN FRONT : 05 TO 08 JUN

24. In the preceding month of the Arab- Israel conflict, the two Egyptian div stationed in
the desolate Sinai were reinforced with five more, bringing the total strength to 90,000 men
and close to 1,000 tks. The Egyptian forces were dply in a def offn array as per their plan
known as „Conqueror‟. This plan provided for three deeply entrenched lines running on a
north-south axis across Sinai. The first line, from Rafah to Abu „Ageila, was to be lightly
defended and to serve as bait for luring the Israelis into frontal aslt. Adv, en forces would
soon find themselves deep in the desert, cut off from sup and facing the second line the
Curtain (Al-Sitar) – massively fortified, stretching across a triangle inscribed by the bases at
Al-Arish, Jabal Libni and Bir Hassana. Having broken themselves on these def, Israeli
armour and inf would then be prey for a counter strike from the second line together with
forces from the third, in the Mitla and Giddi passes, protecting the apchs to the Cnl. This
“shield and sword” strat culminated in a “comprehensive attk, drawing on tact and strat res
that will shift the battle onto en territory, hitting its vital areas. Against these forces the
Israelis marshalled three div, identified by the names of their cdrs, Tal, Yoffe, and Sharon,
and two Bdes with total strength of 45,000 men and 650 tks. The three div were conc at
three points on a 50 mile front facing the Egyptians. One of the bde was dply near the Gaza
Strip and the other near Kuntilla on the southern axis. Thus, the Egyptians dispersed their
armour while the Israelis conc theirs in a “mailed fist” directed at a narrow sect in a purely
offn strat.
25. The overall strat of the Israelis was devised by Israeli Chief of Staff Gen Rabin. The
offn will be conducted in three phases as under:
(a) Phase I - To break through the Egyptian def at two of their strongest
points.
(b) Phase II - An armoured div to leap fwd to the range of mtn just east of the
Suez Cnl, blocking the Egyptian escape routes.
(c) Phase III - Destr of the trapped Egyptian forces.
26. The task of breaking through Egyptian lines was given to Gen Tal (at Rafa) and Gen
Sharon (at Abu Agheila). After these breakthroughs, Gen Yoffe‟s forces were to make the
dash south westward across the desert to Mitla and other mtn passes, thereby sealing all
escape routes.
27. Secretly adv during the ni, cam and obs radio silence, Israeli forces on the Egyptian
border had watched successive waves of Israeli planes soared overhead. Then at 0750hr
the password for launch of the offn, Red Sheet arrived and the colns moved out. Tal‟s
Ugdah-an IDF div 250 tks, 50 guns, a paratrooper bde crossed the border at two points,
Nahal Oz and south of Khan Yunis. Yet that was precisely the Israeli plan, to hit the en at
selected key points and with a “mailed fist” of concentrated armour. Tal had reminded his
offrs that wars were rarely fought according to plan. They only had to follow one principle:
“Everyone attks, everyone penetrates, without looking sideways or back.” The
armoured corps had broken through the same area in 1956 in just over thirty-six hrs. This
time they had twenty-four. The battle turned into a rout, complete except for Aviram‟s bn
which, having misjudged the en flank, found it pinned between strongholds. Extricating the
force took several hrs, yet by nightfall, the Israelis had finished mopping up. That rd was
now open to the IDF. Already by late afternoon, elements of the IDF‟s 79 th Armoured Bn
 12

had charged through the seven-mile-long Jiradi defile, a narrow pass through shifting
dunes. The pass changed hands several times before the Israelis finally cleared it and
emerged at its western end, having adv over twenty miles in a single afternoon. In all, the
Israelis lost twenty-eight tks, ninety-three men were wounded and sixty-six killed. However
costly, Israel‟s offn was proceeding well ahead of schedule-so much so that a combined
sea and airborne aslt on Al-Arish planned for the next day was cancelled, and the
paratroopers preparing for it were diverted to Jerusalem. Sharon‟s plan was to cross the
sand wastes deemed impassable by the Egyptians and to deliver an armoured thrust from
the north. Simultaneously, from the west, his tks would engage the Egyptian bastions on
the Umm Qatef ridge and block any rfts they might receive from Jabal Libni or al-„Arish.
Israeli inf men would clear the three 3,000-yard trenches while, a mile behind them,
heliborne paratroopers would silence the Egyptians‟ arty park. Lastly, an armoured
diversion would be made at al-Qusayma, preoccupying and isolating its grn.
28. In Sinai, at 2200hr, six bns of 105-mm and 155-mm guns fired the largest barrage in
Israeli mil history, levelling 6,000 shells in less than twenty mins on Umm Qatef. “Let
everything tremble,” Sharon purportedly announced. While Israeli tks continued to pound
the northernmost Egyptian defs, IDF inf men poured into the triple line of trenches in the
east, and paratroopers neutralized Egypt‟s arty to the west. This was the implementation of
what Sharon called “a continuous unfolding of surprises” striking the en from multiple and
unexpected directions, simultaneously, at ni. One Egyptian officer, taken prisoner, agreed:
“It was like watching a snake of fire uncoiling.” At a cost of 40 killed and 140 wounded, the
Israelis had broken through the Egyptian def and were poised to attk Umm Qatef. In the
north, Tal‟s div consolidated its hold on Rafah and Khan Yunis, and reached the outskirts of
Al-Arish.
29. Between Tal and Sharon‟s forces, close to midnight and with lights blazing passed
the third of Israel‟s southern Div Gen Yoffe‟s en-route to Bir Lahfan and Jabal Libni. Farther
to the north, in the sandy wastes of Wadi Haridin, inched the 200 th Bde of Col Yissachar
“Yiska” Shadmi, who in turn managed to cut off all the major rd jn to Jabal Libni, Abu Ageila,
and Al-Arish and to stop two Egyptian armoured bde attempting to encircle Sharon. Yoffe‟s
initial obj, taking the vital rd jn of Abu Ageila, Bir Lahfan, and Al-Arish, had already been
accomplished before midnight. The thrust to Egypt‟s center enabled Tal and Sharon to
complete the unfinished business of the previous day conquering the Jiradi Defile, Khan
Yunis and the bastions at Umm Qatef. Each of these battles was savage. Having pressed a
frontal attk through Abu Ageila, Sharon‟s Centurions launched their main thrust against
Umm Qatef.
30. Gavish‟s strat was to prevent the Egyptians from stabilizing their second def line and
mtng a possible counterattk on Al-Arish. He wanted to hit them hard and then beat them to
the passes, destroying what remained of their tks. Accordingly, Tal‟s forces were to
overwhelm the Egyptian posns to the west of Jabal Libni, to attk Egypt‟s 3 rd Div east of Bir
al-Thamada and the 4th Div at Bir Gafgafa. Yoffe, striking south through Bir Hasana and the
remnants of the 3rd Div, would divide his force into two colns, one each to the Giddi and
Mitla passes. Farther south, Sharon would block Shazli‟s retreat at Nakhl before driving the
rest of Egypt‟s army into Tal and Yoffe‟s ambushes. Col Granit‟s coln, meanwhile, would
continue to adv along the Mediterranean coast, through Romani en route to Qantara. But
there would be no conquest of the Cnl itself.
31. Op LIGHTS, the conquest of Sharm al-Sheikh was scheduled for the evening of
07 Jun. The op began, as planned, with a naval probe of the Egyptian def. A formation of
three Israeli msls boats opened fire on the en‟s shore bty. Paratroopers and cdos
meanwhile prepared to board Nortatlas cargo planes and helicopters for Al-Tur, on the Gulf
 13

of Suez and the overland aslt on Tiran. Reports from both the AF and the navy finally
convinced Rabin that most of the Egyptians had fled. Instead of landing at Al-Tur, the
paratroopers were ferried directly to Sharm al-Sheikh. The Straits of Tiran constituted an
international waterway open to all ships without restn. Forces under Gen Tal continued to
adv in two directions south to Bir Lahfan with Gonen‟s 7th Armoured Bde and along the
coast with Granit‟s mech unit. Gonen broke out of the Jabal Libni redoubt to hit the densely
fortified rear of the Egyptian 3rd Div at Bir Hamma, and then struck forty miles west to Bir
Gafgafa. His obj was to cut off the 4th Div main escape route, via the Firdan Birdge, Yoffe‟s
Ugdah, swinging south through Bir Hasana and Bir al-Thamada. Yoffe‟s goal, however, was
not Firdan but the entrance to the Passes and the retreating Second Div. Farthest south,
Ariel Sharon crossed the desert to Nakhl in the hope of trapping Shazli Force before it, too,
could reach the passes. The second line of Egypt‟s def the much touted „Curtain‟ had
collapsed.
32. The task force under Col Yisrael Granit, proceeding virtually unopposed from
Al-„Arish, reached Romani, the Egyptian village closest to the Cnl. Other elements of Tal‟s
Ugdah meanwhile raced for the passes. Yet, even as the Egyptians made a bold stand
against Tal, Yoffe‟s tks were approaching the entrance to the Mitla Pass. A det of nine
Centurions, perilously low on fuel four had to be towed by the others and their crews
exhausted, reached the entrance to the pass before sunset. There they arranged wrecks of
Egyptian vehs in such a way as to channel the retreating army directly into their guns.
Though vastly outnumbered, this tiny force ctrl the single escape route through which three
Egyptian Divs 300 tks and over 30,000 men were soon to stumble.
33. Nakhl and al-Thamad, where Col Mendler‟s coln drove elements of the Shazli Force
and the Egyptian 6th Div straight into an ambush laid by Arik Sharon. Egypt had lost as
much as 70 percent of its armoured force. Yoffe‟s tks, having effectively blocked the
passes, were now chasing those Egyptian forces that had managed to slip through. To the
north, Col Gronen and 7th Bde over whelmed Al-Ghul‟s adv guard of T-55 tks, destroying
forty of them. Having lost over 50 percent of its equipment, the Egyptian 4 th Div was again
retreating toward the Firdan Bridge, with Gonen‟s men in close pursuit. Also racing for the
bridge was Col Granit‟s coln, which had turned inland from the coast on the rd to Qantara.
Yoffe now divided his Ugdah into three colns. Two were to proceed south of the Great Bitter
Lake, the third coln would strike for Ras al-Sudr on the Gulf of Suez coast, there to link up
with the paratroopers heading north from Sharm al-Sheikh. Tal was to continue his two
pronged thrust from Bir Gafgafa and Qantara towards the Firdan Bridge. By the time cease
fire came into effect, IDF was astride the Suez Cnl.
 14

34. In four days the Israelis had decisively defeated Egypt‟s proud army of 90,000 men.
For three of those four days (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday), the IAF, with total air
supremacy, roved the desert skies at will, cooperating in the land battle where necessary,
but always seeking out and destroying en forces wherever they found them. Thousands of
vehs, incl over 700 tks, were lost in the desert. President Nasser later confirmed that
80 percent of Egypt‟s mil equipment committed in the Sinai had been lost. Their losses in
personnel were equally high nearly 12,000 men. The Israeli victory was much less
expensive-less than 300 men killed and only 61 tks destroyed.

THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN

 15

LOSSES OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES

Ser Country Loses

No
1. Offrs killed 1,500
Tps killed 10,000
Soldiers wounded 20,000
Taken prisoner by Israelis 6,000
Tks destroyed 600
Egypt Tks abandoned and captured intact 100
by Israel
Trucks and other vehs destroyed 10,000
Guns destroyed or abandoned 400
Self-propelled guns 50
155mm guns 30
2. Soldiers killed 300
Israel Soldiers wounded 1,000
Tks destroyed 61
 16

CHAPTER – VI

JORDANIAN FRONT: 05 TO 07 JUN

35. By the time the war on the West Bank front started, the Jordanians had concentrated
at least 09 of its 11 bde (approx 45,000 men) on the West Bank. These forces were dply in
two def sects:

(a) Northern Def region in Samaria, based on the cities of Jenin and Nablus.

(b) The Judean region, extending south from Ramallah along the Judean hills
through Jerusalem to Hebron.

36. This distr of forces as of 05 Jun indicated a def dply, but the outlines of an offn dply
were devp. The emphasis was to hold firm the nodal sects around Jerusalem and Jenin,
defending the rest of the front more lightly. Jordan‟s actual entry into the war drew an Israeli
paratrooper Bde destined for EI Arish on the Egyptian front and caused three other Bdes,
two of them armoured, to be diverted from the Syrian front to the north. Thus, the total
number of forces on the Israeli Jordanian front was relatively evenly matched approx
45,000 soldiers on each side. By 0900h, 05 Jun, King Hussein had been informed of
Israel‟s attk on Egypt, and Gen Riadh, the new Egyptian Cdr of all Jordanian forces, had
been ordered by Cairo to open a second front against Israel on the Jordanian frontier.
Riyad ordered the destruction of Israeli airfds by a combination of arty fire, jet bombing and
cdo attks. Tk Bdes 60th descended to the Jerusalem-Jericho rd and the 40th to Hebron. The
shelling of Israel from Jordan had already begun an hr earlier, at 1000h. One result of
Jordan‟s offn was to draw both the Syrian and Iraqi air forces into the war. Syria activated
OP RASHID for the bombing of northern Israel, and by noon, twelve of its MiG‟s were
striking Galilee settlements, incl Kibbutz Degania. Iraqi Hunters strafed settlements in the
Jezreel Valley, incl Dayan‟s village of Nahalal. A Tupolev-16 bomber, also from Iraq, attk
the Lower Galilee town of Afula. At about the same time, sporadic firing broke out along the
Jerusalem perimeter from the Jordanian side, and soon afterwards shells began falling on
the Israeli side of the city. By 1130h there was firing all along the border with shells from the
Jordanian 155mm Long Tom guns falling on Tel Aviv and the area around the Israeli airfd at
Ramat David to the north.

37. Shortly before noon, Gen Narkiss was ordered to open an offn in the Jerusalem area
by launching OP WHIP. Gen Narkiss, Comdg Israel‟s Central Comd, had mob five reserve
Bdes for a completely def msn protection of Israel‟s territory, two in the north to guard the
Jezreel Valley and one each to protect Jerusalem, Lod airport and the apchs to Tel Aviv.
The Israeli offn against Jordan had two planned phases:-

(a) Secure three initial objs before fighting ceased.

(b) In the second phase, time permitting, take advantage of those objs.

38. The three objs of phase one were:-

(a) To push the border south in the Jenin region so as to protect the airfd and
Jezreel Valley settlements from Jordan's arty.

(b) To secure and widen the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv corridor by cutting off the Latrun
salient.
 17

(c) To secure a link with the Mt Scopus enclave separated from Israel since
1948. Successfully achieving this phase would enhance Israeli chances of
completing the second phase-capturing the entire West Bank and destroying or
routing the Jordanian army.
39. The Israeli offn in Jenin, involved a pincer of the armoured bdes swinging south and
southwest, while the inf descended from the north. The two axes to these destinations the
Megiddo Jenin and Afula Jenin rds. The Jordanians‟ 12th Armoured Bn held off repeated
attempts by Bar Kokhva‟s coln a far larger force to break through Burqin woods, close by
the Kabatiya cross-rds. Two armoured bdes to begin the aslt on Jenin. Harel Bde‟s tks were
to adv along the Jordanian-held ridge that dominated the Jerusalem Tel Aviv highway,
block any en armour descending from the north, and relieve the grn at Mt Scopus.
Simultaneously, inf would breach the fortified Jordanian posns at the enclave‟s southern
foot.
40. In the Jerusalem sect two Israeli bdes began from Latrun and fought uphill in a north-
easterly sweep between Ramallah and Jerusalem to cut the northern and eastern apchs to
the city. Concurrently, a third bde, starting from the southern outskirts, attk eastward,
seizing the hills to the south and cutting off Jordanian forces in the Bethlehem-Hebron area.
Here Israel responded to the Jordanian bombardment by unleashing a secret weapon,
code-named L after its inventor, Col David Laskov of the IDF engg br. Hidden in all the fwd
bunkers and pre-sighted on en posns. L was a coffin shaped grnd to grnd msl that hit with
devastating impact. One Jordanian soldier, surrendering, was convinced that Israel had
dropped an atomic bomb. The IDF‟s breakthrough in the northern West Bank was mirrored
in the Jerusalem area. Another bde, the 4th under Col Moshe Yotvat had been thrown
together from sundry inf units and sent to open the Latrun Corridor.

41. Then the sun rose, and the Jordanians were again exposed to the sky. Israeli jets
and arty dropped a two-hr barrage on Al-Ghazi‟s men, killing 10 and wounding 250, many
of whom had to be left on the field. Only seven tks two without gas and sixteen APC‟s
remained to limp eastward to the Tubas rd and then south, toward Nablus. Bar Kokhva‟s
armoured forces, together with Avnon‟s inf, meanwhile blasted their way into Jenin.
Resistance proved obstinate, especially around the city‟s police fort, where Bar Kokhva
himself was wounded. Not until noon could the Israelis claim functional ctrl over the city, the
key to the northern West Bank.
42. The Jordanians were losing grnd in the Jerusalem theatre as well, in the hills west of
the city. After a fifteen min battle, the rd was now open to Beit Hanina, a suburb of East
Jerusalem situated only 500 mtr from the Ramallah-Jerusalem highway. 60th Bde still posed
an imminent threat to Jewish Jerusalem. Blocking that effort were the strongest fortifications
in Jerusalem, a ganglia of trenches, bunkers, minefds, and concrete obstacles known since
World War I, when Gen Allenby stored his ord there, as Amn Hill. The Israelis perceived the
bastion as a direct threat to Mt Scopus and the western half of the city. The soldiers on both
sides of that line, Israelis and Jordanians, had been under continuous shellfire for many hrs.
The scene was set for a gruelling battle when, at 0125hr, Col Motta Gur‟s paratroopers
moved quietly into posn. Gur‟s men were to divide into three forces. The first would cross
the no man‟s land near the Mandelbaum Gate, the UN checkpoint between the two sects of
the city and aslt the Police Academy that guarded the southern apchs to Amn Hill. The
second group would move towards east through the neighbourhoods of Sheikh Jarrah and
the American Colony to reach the Rockefeller Museum, while the third followed the ravine
of Wadi Joz up to the Augusta Victoria Hospital, on the ridge midway between Mt Scopus
and the Mt of Olives. However, robust, Jordanian resistance gradually gave way to Israeli
 18

fire power and momentum. 71st Bn, succeeded in breaching the wire and minefds and
emerged near Wadi Joz at the base of Mt Scopus. From Wadi Joz, the Israelis could cut off
the Old City from Jericho and East Jerusalem from Ramallah. The one remaining route to
the West Bank eastward through the suburb of Al-„Azariya. This, Col Gur believed, was the
ideal jumping off site for the final aslt on the Old City. By midday on Jun 06, Jordanian Army
dispatch reported that “the en has conquered all of Jerusalem except for the Old City.
43. Just outside Jerusalem, the 10th and 4th Bdes occupied Ramallah with its 50,000
inhabitants. In Jerusalem itself, the 163rd Inf Bn under Lt Col Michael Peikas attk Abu Tor, a
heavily fortified Arab neighbourhood overlooking the Old City‟s southern wall. IDF secured
the area, thus severing the Old City from Bethlehem and Hebron to the south, while Israeli
forces descending from Ramallah would soon cut the last open rd to Jericho. On 07 Jun the
momentum of the Israeli adv indeed appeared unstoppable. At the same moment that
Motta Gur‟s paratroopers claimed the Western Wall, Ben-Ari‟s tks reached the outskirts of
Jericho. The first of several heavy battles had broken out west of Nablus while, south of
Jerusalem, Israeli inf over ran the defs around the Mar Elias monastery, beyond that lay
Bethlehem and Hebron. These attks, supported by armour, arty, and the IAF, were
successful. A paratrooper bde performed the most difficult msn of aslt the Jordanian posns
north of the old walled city and breaking through them to link up with the forces which had
encircled the city.
44. By 0930hr on 07 Jun, Israeli forces had reached the Damia Bridge on the Jordan
River. That afternoon org resistance dwindled as Arab mayors collaborated with Israeli cdrs
and the Kebron region fell with hardly a vestige of a struggle. Jordanian forces were in total
disarray, abandoning vehs in their rush to reach the East Bank for safety. Fighting halted as
Israeli and Jordanian cdrs accepted a UN call for a cease-fire at 2000hr on 07 Jun. In less
than three days the Israelis had captured Jerusalem, the city of David, Hebron, the city of
Abraham, all of the Holy Land and the entire West Bank.

LOSSES OF JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES

Ser Country Loses
No
1. Jordan Killed in action 696
Wounded in action 421
Missing in action 2,000
2. Israel Killed in action 550
Wounded in action 2,400
 19

THE BATTLE FOR JERUSALEM

 20

THE BATTLE FOR THE WEST BANK

 21

CHAPTER - VII

SYRIAN FRONT: 09 TO 10 JUN

45. Since the war of Independence of Israel in 1948, the Syrians had converted the
Golan Heights into a large, fortified camp complimented with gun emplacements, bunkers,
dug-in tks, connecting trenches, etc. These fortifications were concentrated along the
western edge of the heights overlooking the Huleh Valley and the Sea of Galilee 1,500 ft
below. Along this 70 km Golan Plateau, Syrians had dply about eight bdes (40,000 soldiers)
by early Jun concentrating the north sect, centred on Quneitra. From their well-protected
posns, the Syrians could launch more than 10 tons of shells per min from the 265 guns
placed along and just behind the ridge line.

46. During the initial four days (05 to 08 Jun) of war, the Syrian front was the least
active. Other than three Syrian coy-size recce ptls conducted inside Israel on 06 Jun, the
primary activity restricted to heavy arty shelling of Israeli forces in the valley there. During
this time the Israelis remained in a def dply, under intense arty fire, awaiting the outcome on
the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts. On Thursday, 08 Jun, the IAF turned its attn to the
Syrian gun emplacements-antiaircraft first, arty next. On the Syrian Front, Gen Elazar‟s obj
was to capture the Golan Heights. His plan was to break through Syrian def in the northern
sect onto the Banias-Quneitra rd. Once that opening was obtained, Israeli armour could
pour through it on the diagonal rd, smash into the en‟s rear, and facilitate new openings by
threatening rft and retreat lines. The primary thrust was undertaken near Tel Fahar with
several secondary penetrations to occur further south.

47. Campaign at the Syrian front started at 0940hr when Israeli jets carried out dozens
of sorties and dropped hundreds of tons of bombs on Syrian posns from Mt Hermon to
Tawafiq. Arty btys and storehouses were knocked out, and tpt colns driven from the rds.
But the bombs could scarcely scratch the bunkers and trench systems overlooking Israeli
territory and covering every route up the face of the Golan. Total of 163 sorties in just over
three hrs were carried out. The HAMMER and PINCER plan, for capture of Golan Heights,
called for a swift smashing of the en‟s frontline def where the en least expected it in the
north, near Kfar Szold, and south of the Sea of Galilee. Israel‟s secondary thrust would be
made in the central sect between the fortresses of Darbashiya and Jalabina.

48. Climbing extremely steep (2,000 ft), rocky trn, in the daylight the original attk was
supposed to have been staged at ni the first wave would be totally exposed to Syrian fire. It
would have to move swiftly, reaching the ptl rds that linked all of Syria‟s fortifications and
then capturing the fortifications as well, which were strat positioned to provide covering fire
for one another. Bulldozers ran in front, clearing the wire and mines. Five of the eight
bulldozers were struck immediately, their burning hulls battered aside by other, still-adv
vehs. The Shermans, their manoeuvrability sharply reduced by the trn, moved slowly
towards the fortified village of Sir al-Dib, aiming for the major fortress at Qala. The fighting
was intense and confused as Israeli and Syrian tks struggled around obstacles, firing at
extremely short range. The first three Shermans to enter Qala were halted by a Syrian
bazooka team. By 0600hr, both Qala and Za‟ura had fallen, along with a third fort, Ein Fit.
The most accessible rd to Quneitra lay open to the Israelis. Similar carnage occurred
throughout the central sect in the battles for the strongholds of Dardara and Tel Hilal.
Desperate fighting also broke out along Hammer‟s northern axis, where the 12 th Barak
(“Lightning”) Bn of the Golani Inf Bde was assigned to clear some thirteen posns, incl Tel
 22

Fakhr an imposing, horseshoe shaped bastion three miles inside Syrian territory. All of
them had been subjected to prolonged air attk in the hope of reducing their defs or inducing
their grn to flee.

49. The southern appch was densely braced with bunkers, trenches and a double row of
wire. Behind them, a coy of the 187th Inf Bn under Capt Ahmad Ibrahim Khalili waited with
an arsenal of anti tk guns, machine-guns and 82-mm mor. “It was one of our most fortified
posns,” he remembered. “It placed them (the Israelis) directly in our crosshairs.” In the
seven-hr struggle, Tel Fakhr fell as did Tel „Azzaziat taken by the Golani Bde‟s 51st Bn and
Darbashiya. Though Israeli forces had achieved most of their objs and well ahead of
schedule, they had penetrated no deeper than eight miles into Syrian territory. A five-mile
wide bridgehead between Za‟ura and Qala had been est and armed probes effected at five
other points on the Syrian front. These were the minimal goals of Hammer but Elazar and
the gen staff aspires, to much more than that, to „Op PINCERS‟, the conquest of the entire
Golan.

50. Beyond its shattered first line, Syria‟s def were largely intact. Mt Hermon and the
Banias in the north and the entire southern sect between Tawafiq and the Customs House
rd remained in Syrian hands. Operating against this inexorable clock, expecting the Syrians
to counterattack, Israeli forces fought obstinately throughout the ni. And the Syrians just as
resolutely fought back. Mendler‟s tks meanwhile rolled south from Qala, adv six miles under
heavy arty and tk bombardment to Wasit. The Israeli attk continued, when Mendler reached
Mansura he was surprised to find negligible opposition. In hopes of triggering Soviet
intervention, the Syrians made a false announcement at 0845hr on 10 Jun over Radio
Damascus that the Israeli tps had captured Quneitra. The Syrian soldiers interpreted this
announcement to mean that the Israelis would soon close their escape routes. As a result,
the Arabs began to abandon their posns and flee eastward. Following full-tilt on the Syrians‟
heels, the Israelis descended on Wuneitra from three directions from Mas‟ade and Beq‟ata
in the north, east from Qala, and northeast from Tel Abu Nida. Quneitra was taken at
1230hr followed by Mt Hermon. Offn Israeli activity stopped at approx 1430hr and when the
cease-fire became effective at 1830hr on 10 Jun, the Israelis had captured the entire south-
western corner of Syria incl all of the strat important Golan Heights. In less than two days,
the Syrian army had suffered a costly defeat.
LOSSES OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES

Ser Country Loses

No
1. Syria Killed in action 1,000
Wounded in action 2,000
Prisoners captured/missing 560
Tks destroyed 33
Tks captured intact 40
Other arty destroyed/captured 130
2. Israel Killed in action 127
Wounded in action 625
Tks destroyed 160
 23

THE SYRIAN CAMPIAN

 24

CHAPTER – VIII

AFTERMATH

51. One hundred and thirty-two hrs, the duration of the war, one of the shortest in
recorded history. In that brief period, the Egyptians lost between 10,000 to 15,000 men,
among them 1,500 officers and 40 pilots were wounded. An additional 5,000 Egyptians
were listed as missing. 700 Jordanian soldiers had died and over 6,000 were wounded or
missing. Syria‟s losses were estimated at 450 dead and roughly four times that number
wounded. Israel admitted to 679 dead and 2,563 wounded. Israel held at least 5,000
Egyptians, incl 21 gen, 365 Syrians (of whom only 30 were officers), and 550 Jordanians.
15% of Egypt‟s mil hardware, worth $2 billion was destroyed and vast stores to include 320
tks, 480 guns, 2 SAM msl bty and 10,000 vehs became Israeli booty. The Jordanian list
was also painfully long 179 tks, 53 APC‟s, 1,062 guns, 3,166 vehs, and nearly 20,000
assorted arms. Of the Arab forces, the Syrians emerged from the war the least impaired,
losing 470 guns, 118 tks, and 1,200 vehs, another forty tks were abandoned to the Israelis.
In all, the IAF destroyed 469 en planes, fifty of them in dogfights, in 3,279 sorties. The
figures included 85 percent Egypt‟s combat aircrafts and all of its bombers. Never in the
history of mil has aviation had the exercise of air power played so speedy and decisive part
in modern warfare,” but that part came at a price. Thirty-six planes and eighteen pilots,
roughly 20 percent of Israel‟s air power, had been lost. Though mil casualty rates were
high, those among civilians were remarkably low. Between 175,000 (Israeli estimates) and
250,000 (Jordanian estimates) Palestinians fled the West Bank for Jordan, many of them
second-time refugees were once again billeted in wretched camps. While Israel did little to
precipitate this flight, neither did it do anything to stop it encouraged the refugees to return.
Similarly, on the Golan, the exodus of the civilian population was neither impelled nor
inhibited by Israel.
52. Israel had conquered 42,000 sq miles and was now three and a half times its original
size. Exceedingly vulnerable before the war, its major cities all within range of Arab guns,
the Jewish state now threatened Damascus, Cairo, and Amman. Its own capital, Jerusalem,
was united. Israel‟s war objs were attained, the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf were open to
navig, the trts' raids were silenced and the homeland had been preserved against the
Egypt-Jordan-Syria threat. Nonetheless, the unforgettable victory began to create as many
problems for Israel as it had temporarily solved. In just over six years, Israel would once
again be locked in combat with the Arabs in the War of Yom Kippur.
 25

TERROTRIES CAPTURED BY ISRAEL AT THE END OF WAR

 26

CHAPTER - IX

LESSONS LEARNT

53. „To forget the knowledge of past war would be foolish and to try to fight the next war
as last is also foolish‟. There are various lessons that can be driven home from the six days
of war. The major one being, the application of principle of war will help future op cdr to
achieve success no matter how hi-tech or network centric the armed forces become and a
nation should never plan for their next war by looking back at their last war. The various
lessons learnt from the Six Days War will be discussed in this chapter.

54. Obj. Obj, defines what the mil action intends to accomplish and normally
describes the nature and scope of an op. An obj may vary from the overall obj of a broad
mil op to the detailed obj of a specific attk. The key to Israel‟s victory was recognition that its
survival was at stake. Israel‟s overall obj in this war was to ensure the survival of the nation
itself. The Israelis realised “that while defeat of the Arabs would mean the loss of an army,
for Israel it would mean the end of her existence as a state and the annihilation of her
people.” This “survival” obj was further refined into two primary national mil objs and a third
implied political obj. The opening of the Straits of Tiran and defeating or driving off the large
Arab armies recently concentrated along her borders were the two main mil objs. The
implied political obj, assuming victory, was for Israel to be recognized by the Arabs as a
legitimate nation forever.

55. Offn Actions. Unless offn action is initiated, mil victory is seldom possible. The
principle of offn is to act rather than react. The offn enables cdrs to select priorities of attk,
as well as time, place, and weaponry necessary to achieve objs. Israel‟s methodology for
fighting the entire war could probably best be described by the word “offn.” The opening
move in the war, a pre-emptive air strike on the major Egyptian airfds, is a classic example
of offn use of air power. Similarly, the Israelis also successfully applied the principle of “offn”
in the land war. The Sinai Campaign began with two offn thrusts to break through Egyptian
defs at Rafa and Abu Agheila. After achieving breakthrough, the action remained offn
continuing the momentum-not to take the en‟s posns, but to throw him off balance and
make his posns untenable

56. Maint of Surprise. In order to maint surprise it is required to attk on an en at a

time, place, and manner for which the en is neither prepared nor expecting an attk. Surprise
is achieved when an en is unable to react effectively to an attk. Surprise is achieved
through security, deception, audacity, originality, and timely execution. Surprise can
decisively shift the balance of power. Surprise gives attk forces the advantage of seizing the
initiative while forcing the en to react. The surprise surrounding the Israeli air raid which
opened the war was enviable as evidenced by the fact that Jewish citizens residing
adjacent to the main base at Tel Aviv were unaware that many of the combat aircraft had
launched in the shadow of their homes to attk Egypt.

57. Manoeuvre. War is a complex interaction of moves and countermoves.

Manoeuvre is the movement of friendly forces in relation to en forces. Cdrs seek to
manoeuvre their str selectively against en‟s weakness while avoiding engagements with
forces of superior str. Effective use of manoeuvre can maint initiative, dictate the terms of
engag, and retain security and posn forces at the right time and place to execute surprise
attks. Manoeuvre permits rapid massing of combat power and effective disengagement of
forces. The Israelis demonstrated application of manoeuvre on several occasions. First, in
the Sinai desert, Gen Yoffe‟s forces crossed sand dunes which the Egyptians thought were
 27

impassable (therefore they met little resistance) and raced across the desert to block Mitla
Pass and seal the Egyptians in a trap.
58. Timing and Tempo. Timing and tempo requires executing mil ops at a point in
time and at a rate which optimises the use of friendly forces and which inhibits or denies the
effectiveness of en forces. The purpose is to dominate the action, to remain unpredictable
and to create uncertainty in the mind of the en. Ctrl the action may require a mix of surprise,
security and mass and manoeuvre to take advantage of emerging and fleeting
opportunities. Consequently, attks against an en must be executed at a time, frequency,
and intensity that will do the most to achieve objs. The opening Israeli air strikes on Egypt
provide one of the war's best examples of excellent timing and tempo.
59. Unity of Comd. Another lesson learnt was Unity of Comd. It means vesting
appropriate auth and responsibility in a single cdr to effect unity of effort in carrying out an
assigned task. Unity of Comd provides for the effective ex of leadership and power of
decision over assigned forces the purpose of achieving a common obj. Unity of Comd
obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal.

60. Lgs. Lgs is the principle of sustaining both man and machine in combat. It
includes obtaining, moving, and maint war fighting potential. Success in warfare depends
on getting sufficient men and machines in the right posn at the right time. This requires a
simple, secure, and flexible lgs system to be an integral part of an op. The Israelis applied
lgs system to their advantage, one of the most striking examples of outstanding results from
Israeli lgs is the seven and half min grnd turn-around time (refuelling and rearming) during
the air offn. The IAF's lgs success was demonstrated by starting the war with a 99 percent
aircraft serviceability level, maintaining a serviceability level above 90 percent throughout
the war (even while flying over 1,000 sorties the first two days). On the other hand Egypt
had an acute shortage of pilots (approx one per aircraft) because force expansion had
outpaced trg. Also, the Egyptian grnd crews, using Soviet techniques, were averaging grnd
turn-around times of two hrs (16 times slower than the Israelis) Egyptians had acquired only
an 80 percent aircraft serviceability level by the beginning of the war.

61. Cohesion. Cohesion entails establishing and maintaining the war fighting spirit
and capability of a force to win. Cohesion is the adhesive that holds a unit together through
the trials of combat and is critical for fighting effectively by a force. Throughout mil
experience, cohesive forces have generally achieved victory, while disjointed efforts have
usually met defeat. Cdrs build cohesion through effective leadership and generating a
sense of common identity and shared purpose. Ldrs maintain cohesion by communicating
objs clearly, demonstrating genuine concern for the morale and welfare of their people, and
employing men and machines according to the dictates of sound mil doctrine. Even before
the war began, Israeli forces demonstrated cohesion and a sense of common purpose.
During mob for the war, some units found themselves with a 20 percent surplus in
manpower because many over-age or otherwise slightly unqualified men reported for duty
anyway and were accepted without much question. The regional org pattern for Israeli units
built in cohesion and provided additional incentive in battle. Such incentive was exemplified
in the Northern Comd when Israelis fighting the Syrians were avenging their own frequently
shelled villages. One of the best examples of Israeli cohesion was displayed immediately
following the bitterly contested battle for Jerusalem. One of the most important contributions
to Israel‟s victory was that each soldier clearly understood that, he was fighting for the
future existence of Israel. This shared, common understanding was undoubtedly an
important and inseparable facet of cohesion throughout Israeli units. Although, the Arabs
demonstrated a degree of cohesion, however, it was short-lived. President Nasser‟s
 28

attempt to unite the Arabs against their common en (Israel) in a holy war began to
disintegrate as the fighting grew more intense.
 29

CHAPTER - X
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Oct 1966
1 Oct 1966 Syrian Prime Minister encourages guerrilla ops against
Israel.
Nov 1966
2. 04 Nov 1966 Egypt signs def pact with Syria. Russian technicians
speed up installation of SA-2 guided msl sites in Syria.
3. 13 Nov 1966 Israel attk on Jordanian village of Samu.
Apr 1967
4. 07 Apr 1967 Clash between Syria and Israel six Syrian MiGs shot
down. USSR warns Israel of the possible consequences
of her „armed provocation‟.
May 1967
5. 02 May 1967 „Russians provided tip to Egyptian parliamentary
delegation to Moscow that Israel is planning to attk Syria.
6. 12 May 1967 Eshkol indicates that Israel will not tolerate Syrian
sabotage raids any longer.
7. 13 May 1967 Syrian Foreign Minister states that Israel is planning
aggression.
8. 15 May 1967 Israel Independence Day Parade held in Jerusalem.
Egyptian Army begins to concentrate in Sinai Peninsula.
9. 16 May 1967 Egypt proclaims a state of emergency for the armed
forces.
10. 18 May 1967 (a) Egypt requests the withdrawal of the UNEF from
Egypt.
(b) Brazilian Govt signifies willingness to withdraw its
432 men with UNEF, if U Thant agrees the Egyptian
withdrawal request.
(c) Egyptian tps re-occupy Sharm-el-Sheikh.
11. 19 May 1967 (a) U Thant announces the withdrawal of UNEF.
(b) Israeli Navy begins mob.
12. 22 May 1967 Nasser announces the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to
Israeli shipping and bans the passage of strat materials to
Israel.
13. 23 May 1967 Statement by USSR gives verbal support to the Arabs.
14. 30 May 1967 Meeting between King Hussein of Jordan and President
Nasser of Egypt.
Jun 1967
 30

15. 02 Jun 1967 Egyptians carried out mor firing on Israeli kibbuizim and
set wheat fields on fire.
16. 04 Jun 1967 Two Egyptian „cdo‟ bns and an Iraqi Div arrive in Jordan.
17. 05 Jun 1967 (a) The war begins.
(b) Israeli air-strike on Egyptian airfds, Egyptian Air
Force virtually destroyed.
(c) Syrian raid on oil refinery at Haifa.
(d) Levi Eshkol says that Israel will „not initiate any
action against Jordan‟.
(e) Jerusalem-sporadic shelling. Jordanians attk Kfar
Sirkin.
(f) Ineffective Jordanian air strikes on Netanya and
near Tel Aviv.
(g) Israelis attk Damascus air base, Amman and
Mafraq airfds, and Ajlun rdr stn.
(h) Israel attks 23 Egyptian rdr stns, Gen Narkiss
ordered counter-attk on Jerusalem.
(j) Govt House taken by the Israelis.
(k) Syrian air strike against Haifa.
(l) Iraqi Air Force attks Netanya.
(m) Israeli adv begins, Kuntilla taken.
(n) Israeli attks on Port Said and Alexandria.
(o) Egyptian Navy withdrawn from Port Said.
(p) Three Egyptian submarines attk off Haifa and
Ashdod.
(q) U.S.S. Liberty attk off El Arish.
(r) Capture of Jenin.
18. 06 Jun 1967 (a) Capture of El Arish, Abu Agheila stormed Gaza,
and Ras en Naqb taken.
(b) Israeli paratroop Bde attks Jerusalem.
(c) Minor Syrian attks repulsed.
(d) Heavy shelling of Israeli settlements.
19. 07 Jun 1967 (a) Adv to Romani.
(b) Action at Bir Gifgafa.
(c) Occupation of Sharm-el-Sheikh.
(d) Israelis take the old City of Jerusalem.
(e) Fall of Nablus, Tulkarm, Jericho and Hebron.
 31

20. 08 Jun 1967 (a) Action near Nakhl.

(b) Israelis reach the Suez Cnl.
(c) Fall of El Qantara.
(d) Air attks on Syrian anti-aircraft btys and arty.
21. 09 Jun 1967 (a) Egypt agrees to a ceasefire.
(b) Syrian def posns pounded from the air.
(c) Final aslt on Syrian Golan posns.
(d) President Nasser broadcasts his resignation.
22. 10 Jun 1967 (a) Fall of Qunaitra.
(b) Syria accepts the ceasefire.
(c) President Nasser withdraws his resignation
 32

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE
Long Questions

Q1. Briefly explain the reasons that led to the Six Day War? What objs did IDF set for
themselves before the war and were IDF able to achieve those objs?

Q2. Explain the Battle of Sinai front with principles of war employed by both IDF and
Arabian Forces?
Short Questions

Q1. The fight for ctrl over the Golan Heights did not begin until the fifth day of this six day
war. Explain the reasons for the same and the overall plan for capture of Golan Heights?

Q2. Six Day War witnessed the complete air supremacy by IAF. Explain the conduct of
air campaign and total losses suffered by IAF?

Q3. Explain the concept of Regatta as mooted by the USA and the reasons for its
failure?

Q4. Briefly explain the reasons for the defeat of combine Arabian forces in just over six
days?

Very Short Questions

Q1. Explain the concept of Conqueror?

Q2. What does the code word Red Sheet implied for and what were the main aspects of
the Op Plan in Sinai?
Q3. What were the diplomatic steps initiated by Israel during and after the Six Day War?

Q4. What were the total losses the Arabian forces suffered after the Israeli Air
Campaign?
 33

ORBAT : ISRAEL, EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIAN AND IRAQI FORCES

Israel

1. The Israeli Army, when fully mob, numbered about 2, 64,000. It consisted of:

(a) Inf Bde (Motorised) - 22.

(b) Armoured Bde - 8 (250 Centurion, 200
Super-Sherman, 200 M-48 Patton
and 150 AMX-13 tks).
(c) Parachute Bde - 01.

2. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) had around 300 combat aircraft. It consisted of:-

(a) Light bombers - 25 Vantour, 48 Skyhawk.

(b) Interceptors - 72 Mirage III- C, 20 Super Mystere.
(c) Fighter-bombers - 45 Mystere-IV, 50 Ouragan.
(d) Trainers - 60 Magister.
(e) Tpts - 20 Noratlas / Stratocruiser.
(f) Helicopters - S-58, Alouette.
(g) Light aircraft - Piper Cubs.
(h) Surface-to-air msls - 02 Hawk bns.

3. The Israeli Navy (Strength 3,000) only played a part in the reoccupation of Sharm
el-Sheikh, It had:-

(a) Destroyers - 03.

(b) Anti-aircraft frigate - 01.
(c) Submarines - 01.
(d) MTBs - 01.
(e) Landing craft (with a „frogman - 03.
cdo‟ unit)

Egypt

4. The Egyptian Army had 1, 80,000 personnel (incl mob reservists). It consisted of:-

(a) Armoured div - 02 (350 medium/heavy tks each).

(b) Inf Div motorised - 04 (150 medium tks each).
(c) Parachute bde - 01.
(d) Arty Regt - 12.
(e) Surface-to-Air msls - 100.

5. The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) had around 450 combat aircraft, entirely equipped by
the USSR. It consisted of:-

(a) Medium bombers - 36 TU-16.

(b) Light bombers - 40 IL-28.
(c) Interceptors - 100-120 MiG-21 C/D.
 34

(d) Fighter-bombers - 80 MiG-19 200 MiG-15/MiG-17/Su-7.

(e) Tpts - 60 II-14/An-12.
(f) Helicopters - 8 Mi-6 Hook.
(g) Surface-to-air msls - 100 SA-2.

6. The Egyptian Navy (strength 11,000) had:-

(a) Destroyers - 08.

(b) Submarines - 11.
(c) Escort vessels - 06.
(d) Coastal escorts - 06.
(e) Msl ptl boats - 18.
(f) Minesweepers - 10.
(g) Ptl vessels - 50.

7. In addition to that there were about 30,000 irregular PLO tps also, trained by the
Egyptian Army and were stationed in the Gaza Strip.

Jordan

8. The Jordanian Army had 55,000 personnel. It consisted of:-

(a) Armoured Bde - 03(250 Centurion/Patton tks).

(b) Inf Bde - 06.

9. The Jordanian Air Force consisted of 12 Hunter Mk-6 and 16 Vampire fighter-
bombers.
Syria

10. The Syrian Army had 50,000 personnel (incl mob reservists). It consisted of:-

(a) Armoured Bde - 02 (400 Soviet T-54 tks).

(b) Inf Bde - 07.
(c) Arty Regt - Soviet guns up to 155mm.
(d) Surface-to-air msls - 10(SA-2 Guideline sites).

11. The Syrian Air Force had 106 combat aircraft, entirely equipped by the USSR. It
consisted of –

(a) Light bombers - 06 IL-28.

(b) Interceptors - 40 MiG-19/MiG-21 C/D.
(c) Fighter-bombers - 60 MiG-17.

12. The Syrian Navy (strength 1,500) did not participate in the war, however It had:-
 35

(a) Coastal escorts - 06.

(b) Msl ptl boats - 04.
(c) Minesweepers - 02.

Iraq

13. Iraq made one Inf div available in support of Jordan.

APPROX FORCES STR – SIX DAY WAR - 1967

Ser Available Israel Egypt Jordan Syria Iraq

No
1. Mob Manpower 2,10,000 200,000 46,000 63,000 –
2. Tks 1,000 1,300 287 750 –
3. APC 1,500 1,050 210 585 –
4. Arty Pieces 203 575 72 315 –
5. SAMs 50 160 0 0 –
6. AA Guns 550 950 - 1,100 –
7. Combat Aircraft 286 431 28 127 106