PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

RULE 58, Rules of Court

Abraham Rey Montecillo Acosta

 INJUNCTION

1. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

n is an order issued to restrain the opposite party and to maintain the
status quo until a hearing for determining the propriety of granting a
preliminary injunction.

2. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
n an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final
order.
THE INCORPORATORS OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC.
vs. THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE
PHILIPPINES
668 SCRA 637

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party

may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action.
 NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION VS PNOC-
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
669 SCRA 173

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an

action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or person to refrain from particular act or acts.
 INJUNCTION

WHAT:
A preliminary injunction is an order requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to REFRAIN from a particular act or acts OR it
may also REQUIRE THE PERFORMANCE of a particular act or acts,
in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction.

WHEN :
Granted at ANY STAGE of an action or proceeding PRIOR to the
judgment or final order.

WHOM:
Party or a court, agency or a person
Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio City vs. Jadewell
Parking Systems Corporation
723 SCRA 350

An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this

jurisdiction. It is a suit for the purpose of enjoining the defendant,
perpetually or for a particular time, from committing or continuing to
commit a specific act, or compelling the defendant to continue
performing a particular act. It has an independent existence. The action
for injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding.
 INJUNCTION

FINAL INJUNCTION
One which is included in the judgment as the relief or part of the
relief granted as the result of the case.

PREVENTIVE INJUNCTION
One which requires a person to refrain from doing a particular
act/s.

MANDATORY INJUNCTION
One which requires a person to perform a particular act/s.
 LIMITLESS POTENTIALS, INC. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
CRISOSTOMO YALUNG, and ATTY. ROY MANUEL VILLASOR
G.R. No. 164459. April 24, 2007
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive
writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites:

(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.

Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the

bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite would
make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The dissolution of the injunction,
even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination
that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the
injunction bond immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon
the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of petitioner’s
main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of
recovery upon the bond.
 SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION (now SEMIRARA MINING
CORPORATION), vs.
HGL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and HON. ANTONIO
BANTOLO
G.R. No. 166854, December 6, 2006
FACTS:

Petitioner's representatives approached HGL and requested for

permission to allow petitioner's trucks and other equipment to pass through
the property covered by the FLGLA. HGL granted the request on condition
that petitioner's use would not violate the FLGLA in any way.

However, petitioner erected several buildings for petitioner's

administrative offices and employees' residences without HGL's
permission; also conducted blasting and excavation; constructed an
access road to petitioner's minesite in the Panaan Coal Reserve,
Semirara; and maintained a stockyard for the coal it extracted from its
mines.
SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION (now SEMIRARA MINING
CORPORATION), vs.
HGL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and HON. ANTONIO
BANTOLO
G.R. No. 166854, December 6, 2006
Thus, the land which had been used for cattle grazing was greatly
damaged, causing the decimation of HGL's cattle. HGL wrote petitioner
demanding full disclosure of petitioner's activities on the subject land as
well as prohibiting petitioner from constructing any improvements without
HGL's permission. Petitioner ignored the demand and continued with its
activities. DENR unilaterally cancelled FLGLA No. 184 and ordered HGL to
vacate the premises.

A writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing that (a) the

invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant
is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
 SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION (now SEMIRARA MINING
CORPORATION), vs.
HGL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and HON. ANTONIO
BANTOLO
G.R. No. 166854, December 6, 2006
HELD:
Thus, as holder of a pasture lease agreement under FLGLA No. 184, HGL
has a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject property.
Recall that under the FLGLA, HGL has the right to the lawful possession of the
subject property for a period of 25 years or until 2009. As lawful possessor,
HGL is therefore entitled to protection of its possession of the subject property
and any disturbance of its possession is a valid ground for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in its favor.

The urgency and necessity for the issuance of a writ of mandatory

injunction also cannot be denied, considering that HGL stands to suffer
material and substantial injury as a result of petitioner's continuous intrusion
into the subject property. Petitioner's continued occupation of the property not
only results in the deprivation of HGL of the use and possession of the subject
property but likewise affects HGL's business operations.
 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, SPOUSES JOEY &; MARY
JEANNIE CASTRO AND SPOUSES RICHARD & EDITHA NOGOY
vs BENJAMIN CO, ENGR. DALE OLEA AND THREE KINGS
CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 174569, September 17, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold a lot to petitioner-spouses
Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro. It sold two other lots to petitioner-spouses
Richard and Editha Nogoy.

The lots of the Castro spouses and the Nogoy spouses are commonly
bound on their southeastern side which is in the name of respondent
Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings. Co and his siblings entered into a joint
venture with respondent Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation
for the development of the Northwoods Estates. For this purpose, they
contracted the services of respondent, Engineer Dale Olea.
 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, SPOUSES JOEY &; MARY
JEANNIE CASTRO AND SPOUSES RICHARD & EDITHA NOGOY
vs BENJAMIN CO, ENGR. DALE OLEA AND THREE KINGS
CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 174569, September 17, 2008

In 2003, respondents started constructing a perimeter wall. Petitioners wrote

respondents asking them to stop constructing the wall, and remove all installed
construction materials and restore the former condition of the Lot which they
(petitioners) claimed to be a road lot. They also claimed that the construction
obstructed and closed the only means of ingress and egress of the Nogoy spouses
and their family, and at the same time, caved in and impeded the ventilation and
clearance due the Castro spouses' residential house.

Petitioners' demand remained unheeded, prompting them to file before the RTC
a complaint for injunction, restoration of road lot/right of way and damages with prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Before respondents filed their Answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint,

alleging that the construction of the perimeter wall was almost finished and thus
modifying their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, SPOUSES JOEY &; MARY
JEANNIE CASTRO AND SPOUSES RICHARD & EDITHA NOGOY vs
BENJAMIN CO, ENGR. DALE OLEA AND THREE KINGS
CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 174569, September 17, 2008
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are entitled to the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.

RULING:
No, they are not entitled.

To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the petitioners

must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.

Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of

an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously
regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction.
 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, SPOUSES JOEY &; MARY
JEANNIE CASTRO AND SPOUSES RICHARD & EDITHA NOGOY vs
BENJAMIN CO, ENGR. DALE OLEA AND THREE KINGS
CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 174569, September 17, 2008
Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is
justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the
complainant's right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal
right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

x x x The ocular inspection showed that [petitioners] will not lose access to
their residences. As a matter of fact, lot 3783-E is not being used as an access
road to their residences and there is an existing secondary road within St.
Benedict Subdivision that serves as the main access road to the highway. With
respect to the blocking of ventilation and light of the residence of the Sps.
Castro, suffice it to state that they are not deprived of light and ventilation. The
perimeter wall of the defendants is situated on the left side of the garage and
its front entrance is still open and freely accessible, and the absence of a
showing that petitioners have an urgent and paramount need for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent irreparable damage, they are not
entitled to such writ.
 CLASSES OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(Section 1)

PURPOSE:

To maintain the status

Requiring a party
quo between the parties
PRELIMINARY or court, agency
in relation to the subject
PROHIBITORY or person to
INJUNCTION refrain from a matter.
An order granted particular act/s
at any stage of an
action or
proceeding prior
to judgment or
final order To re-establish and
maintain a pre- existing
Requiring the
PRELIMINARY right rather than to
performance of a
MANDATORY create a new relationship
INJUNCTION particular act/s
between
them.
 VINUYA VS. ROMULO
732 SCRA 595

Preliminary injunction is provisional because it constitute s a

temporary measure available of during the pendency of the action;
and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent
upon the result of the main action.

A mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular

act.
 PREYSLER vs. CA
G.R. No. 158141, July 11, 2006

FACTS:
Private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc., owns Tali Beach Subdivision.
Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots therein and also two parcels of
land adjacent to the subdivision. These two parcels were bounded on the North and
West by the China Sea and on the East and South by the subdivision.

To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass through private
respondent's subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way
but private respondent refused it for being grossly inadequate. Private respondent then
barricaded the front gate of petitioner's property to prevent petitioner and his family
from using the subdivision roads to access said parcels.

The petitioner filed, with the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, a
Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary prohibitive injunction against
private respondent. After due hearing, RTC issued the preliminary injunction allowing
entrance of plaintiff free passage.
 PREYSLER vs. CA
G.R. No. 158141, July 11, 2006

Subsequently, petitioners used the subdivision road to transport heavy

equipment and construction materials to develop his property.

Respondent moved to dissolve the writ for violation of its right to peaceful
possession and occupation.

Petitioner also moved to clarify the writ issued on whether it allows contractors,
visitors and other representatives to pass through. RTC thereafter amended the
writ allowing contractors, guests and visitors to pass.
 PREYSLER vs. CA
G.R. No. 158141, July 11, 2006
RULING:

Prefatorily, we note that what was granted by the trial court was the preliminary
injunction, and that the main case for right of way has not yet been settled. We have in
previous cases said that the objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be fully heard. Status quo is the last actual,
peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.

The Court of Appeals was correct in its findings that the last actual, peaceful and
uncontested situation that preceded the controversy was solely the access of petitioner
and his household to his property outside the subdivision for visits and inspections. At
the time the writ was applied for in 1995, there was still no construction going on in the
property. It was merely raw land.

The use of the subdivision roads for ingress and egress of construction workers,
heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation of power lines, are
clearly not part of the status quo in the original writ. Along this line, the Court of Appeals
properly set aside the amended writ and reinstated the original writ.
 MANTILE vs. CAJUCOM
G.R. No. L-5734, August 17, 1911

Defendants contend that the writ issued by the court contained no order
instructing the defendants to raise or remove the obstructions that prevented
the water from flowing through the said canal or ditch.

The canal was obstructed and closed on June 1st, and when the persons
who closed it were notified on July 3 that they should abstain from performing
any act whatever tending to obstruct and prevent the flow of water, the canal or
ditch still remained closed, and the record shows no proof that it was
afterwards opened to the passage of water, nor that, after the defendants had
been notified of the injunction, they again closed it.

The fact that the latter failed to remove the obstruction they had placed in
the said canal or estero for the purpose of preventing the passage of the water,
since they were not ordered so to do by the judicial writ, is not sufficient to
make them liable for contempt of court.
 DISTINGUISH INJUNCTION, MANDAMUS, and
INJUNCTION
Generally directed against a
party to the action but may be
against any person
Does not involve the
jurisdiction of the court
May be the main action itself
or just a provision remedy in
the main action
PROHIBITION
MANDAMUS
Directed against judicial and
non-judicial entities
Extends only to ministerial
functions
Original and independent
action
PROHIBITION
Directed against a court,
tribunal,or a person
exercising judicial, quasi
judicial, or ministerial
functions
May be on the ground that the
court against whom the writ is
issue sought acted w/o or in
excess of jurisdiction
Always a main action
 GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY and
MANDATORY INJUNCTION
(Section 3)

(a) Applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the
act or acts complained of( PRELIMINARY), or in requiring the performance
of an act or acts(MANDATORY);

(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or

(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is

attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
 1. AGOO RICE MILL CORPORATION vs. LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES
682 SCRA 36

For an Injunction to issue, the following essential

requisites must be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or
the existence of a right to be protected, and (2) the act against
which the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of such
right.

2. RBC CAPITAL CORPORATION VS BANCO DE ORO

UNIBANK, INC.
687 SCRA 583
 LUKANG vs. PAGBILAO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
718 SCRA 297

With regard to the issue of the injunctive bond, the Court has time and
again ruled that the posting of the bond is a condition sine qua non before a
writ of preliminary injunction may issue. Its purpose is to secure the person
enjoined against any damage that he may sustain in case the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

The rule, does not mean, however, that the injunction maybe
disregarded since it becomes effective only after the bond is actually filed in
court. In fact, in the case of Consolidated Workers Union v. Court of
Industrial Relations, the Court declared that it was erroneous for the labor
court not to require the party to file a bond. Yet, the Court did not annul the writ
of injunction but instead ordered the said court to determine the appropriate
amount of bond to be posted by the party.
When is a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issued?
(Section 5)

If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified

application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application
for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided.

Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party
or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not
the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.
 EX-PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Matter of extreme urgency, and applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury;

Executive judge of multiple-sala court or presiding judge of single sala court may
issue ex-parte TRO effective for 72 hours from issuance.

Judge shall immediately cause upon adverse party service of summons, complaint,
affidavit, and bond;

Within 72 hours, the judge shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether
the TRO shall be extended until application for preliminary injunction can be heard
(total period is 20 days including the 72 hours;

If application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within said period,
TRO deemed automatically vacated (except, if it is issued by CA or member-
effective for 60 days from service of copy; if issued by SC or member-effective until
further orders).
 IRREPARABLE INJURY

Injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and

frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had
therefor in in a court of law, or where ther is no standard by which
their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it
is not susceptible of mathematical computation.
 JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC. VS FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.
667 SCRA 440

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent

a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.
 DELOS SANTOS VS METROPOLITAN BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY
684 SCRA 410

Injunction will not protect contingent, abstract or

future rights whose existence is doubtful or disputed; An
application for injunctive relief is strictly construed against
the pleader.
 MEDINA vs. CANOY
666 SCRA 424

An injunction cannot be issued to transfer

possession or control of a property to another when the
legal title is in dispute between the parties and the legal title
has not been clearly established.
 STATUS QUO

Is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested status

of the parties which preceded the pending case from
the controversy.
OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION
vs. ATTY. CESAR L. CHAVEZ, et al
G.R. No. 169802, June 8, 2007

A writ of preliminary injunction being an

extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of
equity or a transcendent remedy, it must be granted
only in the face of actual and existing substantial
rights.In the absence of the same, and where facts are
shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the
conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be
struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of
discretion.
 WHO MAY GRANT INJUNCTION
(Section 2)

The court where the action or proceeding is pending;

If the action or proceeding is pending in the Court of Appeals or in

the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any member
thereof.
 LAHM III VS MAYOR, JR.
666 SCRA 1

Under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC), the labor arbiters no longer has the
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining orders.
1. AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC. vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE
668 SCRA 253

The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a

pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court
for its conclusive determination.

2. MAGTIBAY vs. INDAR

681 SCRA 510
 AGAINST WHOM IS INJUNCTION ISSUED

Executive Secretary v. CA

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify
an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of
bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for
equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"
and is generally disfavored.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law

assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to
succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.
Executive Secretary v. CA

The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward "legislation or

regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic
processes." Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the
status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought
and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on
the merits. Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and
authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts
must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation, including the public
interest.

In litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go

much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are
involved. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.
 MABAYO FARMS vs. CA AND ANTONIO SANTOS
G.R. No. 140058, August 1, 2002

We have minutely scrutinized the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction and are
unable to say that the writ applied to private respondent. The order merely stated "[L]et a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining and restraining the defendants or any person or
persons acting in their place or stead from further entering and cultivating the said land of the
plaintiff subject matter of this case until further order from the Court.” The persons specifically
enjoined in the order were the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695 or persons acting in their
stead. Petitioner itself admitted that private respondent was not a defendant in Civil Case No.
6695 since "at the institution of the case in 1997, he (private respondent) did not have a right
over any portion of petitioner’s lot.” Neither was he a trespasser then. Also, nothing in the
records indicate that private respondent was acting on behalf of any of the defendants. Taking
all these into consideration, we must hold that the writ of preliminary injunction thus cannot be
made to apply to private respondent.

A person who is not a party in the main suit, like private respondent in the instant case,
cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against
the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he
is a stranger.
SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE vs. JUDGE MAJADUCON
G.R. No. 136760. July 29, 2003

The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to

Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the
Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify
before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement
of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, thus:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had
no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and testify
before it.
 SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION vs. THE
PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURER'S CORP., et al.,
G.R. No. 158540, 8 July 2004
Before the merits of the Petition, a brief comment on Southern Cross's application for
provisional relief. It sought to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing the definitive safeguard
measure he imposed in his 25 June 2003 Decision.

The Court did not grant the provisional relief for it would be tantamount to enjoining the
collection of taxes, a peremptory judicial act which is traditionally frowned upon,unless there
is a clear statutory basis for it. In that regard, Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997
prohibits any court from granting an injunction to restrain the collection of any national
internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the internal revenue code.

A similar philosophy is expressed by Section 29 of the SMA, which states that the filing
of a petition for review before the CTA does not stop, suspend, or otherwise toll the
imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate
safeguard measures.

This evinces a clear legislative intent that the imposition of safeguard measures, despite
the availability of judicial review, should not be enjoined notwithstanding any timely appeal of
the imposition.
 DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC. vs. CABATO
G.R. No. 118216, 9 March 2000

Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of
possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the
legality or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of execution, including the
acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the
writ. The complainant was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a
decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter,
to wit: Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice. Considering the factual
setting, it is then logical to conclude that the subject matter of the third party
claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of
regional trial courts.

A Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor

Relations Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.
 BSP vs. VALENZUELA
G.R. No. 184778, 2 October 2009

The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an

unwarranted interference with the powers of the MB. Secs. 29 and 30 of RA
7653[ refer to the appointment of a conservator or a receiver for a bank, which
is a power of the MB for which they need the ROEs done by the supervising or
examining department.

The writs of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court hinder the MB
from fulfilling its function under the law. The actions of the MB under Secs. 29
and 30 of RA 7653 may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on
petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

The writs of preliminary injunction order are precisely what cannot be done
under the law by preventing the MB from taking action under either Sec. 29 or
Sec. 30 of RA 7653.
 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA YADNO AND
PUGSONG MAT.AN VS THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES
MAURO AND ELISA ANCHALES
684 SCRA 106

The Long standing doctrine is that no court

has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction.
 TRADERS ROYAL BANK vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-66321, October 31 1984

Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with
the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal
power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases where
no third-party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the
judgment or process of another court of the same rank or category, a power which
devolves upon the proper appellate court .

Intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimant's right in an

attachment proceeding is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right
to bring an independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a third-party claim to
property levied upon cannot operate to bar a subsequent independent action by
the claimant to establish his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from
the order denying his original third-party claim.
 RCBC Capital Corporation vs. BDO
G.R. No. 196171, 10 December 2012

n Rule 19.22 of the Special ADR Rules states:

n Rule 19.22. Effect of appeal.—The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment,
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals directs
otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

We find no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s denial of the
application for stay order or TRO upon its finding that BDO failed to establish the
existence of a clear legal right to enjoin execution of the Final Award confirmed by
the Makati City RTC, Branch 148, pending resolution of its appeal.It would be
premature to address on the merits the issues raised by BDO in the present petition
considering that the CA still has to decide on the validity of said court's orders
confirming the Final Award. But more important, since BOO had already paid
P637,941,185.55 m manager's check, albeit under protest, and which payment was
accepted by RCBC as full and complete satisfaction of the writ of execution, there is
no more act to be enjoined.
 RCBC Capital Corporation vs. BDO
G.R. No. 196171, 10 December 2012

n xxx Thus, the Court ruled in Gov. Looyuko that when the events
sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition have already
happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. Indeed, it is a
universal principle of law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the
performance of an act already done. This is so for the simple reason
that nothing more can be done in reference thereto. A writ of injunction
becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined has
already been consummated.

Injuctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of

substantive rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in
itself, but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.
AREVALO vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
670 SCRA 252

A writ of preliminary injunction is auxiliary to, an

adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main case,
thus, a writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted
upon dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.
INJUNCTION ON GOVERNMENT PROJECTS OR
CONTRACTS

R.A. 8975 provides, No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue
any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under
the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the acts stated
therein which would adversely affect the expeditious implementation and
completion of government infrastructure projects.
 REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005

However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily
warrant the outright dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts
seeking permanent injunctive relief from the implementation of national
government infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is
the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the lower
courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as
ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a national government
infrastructure project.

A statute such as Republic Act No. 8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally
mandated judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Section 3 of the law in fact mandates,
thus:
 REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null
and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the
contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the
same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under
existing laws.

Thus, when a court is called upon to rule on an initiatory pleading

assailing any material aspect pertinent to a national government
infrastructure project, the court ordinarily may not dismiss the action based
solely on Republic Act No. 8975 but is merely enjoined from granting
provisional reliefs. If no other ground obtains to dismiss the action, the
court should decide the case on the merits.
 Hernandez vs. NPC
G.R. No. 145328, 23 March 2006

Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting

judges from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure
projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the importance of this decree, this
Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement this particular law.

Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends
only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative
acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law,
this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
 DFA vs. FALCON
G.R. No. 176657, 1 September 2010

There are three types of national government projects enumerated in Section

2(a), to wit:

(a) current and future national government infrastructure projects,

engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken
by government-owned and controlled corporations;

(b) all projects covered by R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 7718,
or the Build-Operate-and-Transfer ( BOT) Law; and

(c) other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply
and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation,
construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement repair
and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
 DFA vs. FALCON
G.R. No. 176657, 1 September 2010

Under the BOT Law, wherein the projects are to be privately funded, the
entire information technology project, including the civil works component and
the technological aspect thereof, is considered an infrastructure or
development project and treated similarly as traditional infrastructure projects.

In contrast, under Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement

Reform Act, which contemplates projects to be funded by public funds, the
term infrastructure project was limited to only the civil works component of
information technology projects. The non-civil works component of information
technology projects would be treated as an acquisition of goods or consulting
services as the case may be.

Courts can therefore issue an injunction

THE BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT INC. vs. MASWENG
G.R. No. 180882, 27 February 2013

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the

prohibition covers only judges, and does not apply to the
NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect, Republic Act No.
8975 conforms to the coverage of Presidential Decree No.
60515 and Presidential Decree No. 1818,16 both of which
enjoin only the courts. Accordingly, we cannot nullify the
assailed Orders on the ground of violation of said laws.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU vs. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY
742 SCRA 524

Injunction “is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a

party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act.” “It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as incident in the
main action.” The essential requisites of a writ of injunction are: “(1)
there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
and (2) the act against which the injunction is directed to constitute a
violation of such right.”
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU vs. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY
742 SCRA 524

In case the local government unit has issued a notice of delinquency, the
taxpayer may file a complaint for injunction to enjoin the impending sale of the
real property at public auction. In case the local government unit has already sold
the property at public auction, the taxpayer must first deposit with the court the
amount for which the real property was sold, together with interest of 2% per
month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of action.

The taxpayer may then file a complaint to assail the validity of the public
auction. The decisions of the Regional Trial Court in these cases shall be
appealable before the Court of Tax Appeals, and the latter’s decisions appealable
before this court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Id.
 REPUBLIC vs. EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 156015, 11 August 2005

Only mere prima facie evidence is needed to establish the rights

or interests in a preliminary injunction case.

It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction, mere prima facie evidence is needed to establish
the applicants rights or interests in the subject matter of the main action. It
is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a
violation of his rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main
case. Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
 REPUBLIC vs. EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 156015, 11 August 2005

n In the case at bar, we find that respondent judge had sufficient basis to issue
the writ of preliminary injunction. It was established, prima facie, that Legaspi
has a right to peaceful possession of his land, pendente lite. Legaspi had title to
the subject land. It was likewise established that the diggings were conducted
by petitioners in the enclosed area of Legaspis land. Whether the land fenced
by Gutierrez and claimed to be included in the land of Legaspi covered an area
beyond that which is included in the title of Legaspi is a factual issue still
subject to litigation and proof by the parties in the main case for damages.

n It was necessary for the trial court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
during the pendency of the main case in order to preserve the rights and
interests of private respondents Legaspi and Gutierrez.
 LANDBANK vs. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN
G.R. No. 136114, 22 January 2004
The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or complete
for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.

Based on the evidence presented by private respondent, the trial court found that all the
requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ were present. Although petitioner presented evidence
to rebut private respondent's assertions, those will be better assessed and considered in the trial
proper. The assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits of the case, contrary to the
submission of petitioner, for a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and
incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or
complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact
and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and
made before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated. Furthermore, it does not
necessarily proceed that when a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, a final injunction will follow,
as erroneously argued by petitioner. There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the
trial which may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive
writ. Clearly, petitioner's contention that the trial court and the Court of Appeals had already
disposed of the main case lacks merit.
 LANDBANK vs. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN
G.R. No. 136114, 22 January 2004

Also, the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard. Here, after evaluating the evidence
presented by both contending parties, the trial court held that justice would be
better served if the status quo is preserved until the final determination of the
merits of the case. We find nothing whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious in such
ruling.

The question is: Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the
trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the
rulings of the Court of Appeals and by this Court that its issuance was not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
 LANDBANK vs. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN
G.R. No. 136114, 22 January 2004

We hold that the trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary
injunction it previously issued. We do not agree with petitioners argument that the
trial court may no longer dissolve the preliminary injunction because this Court
previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its

issuance is governed by Section 3,[38] Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure while the grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution
of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the grounds for its
dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court previously
ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
 LANDBANK vs. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN
G.R. No. 136114, 22 January 2004

A preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing

that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order,
the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause
irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can
be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former
files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of
the injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur: first, the
court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the
injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff
can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the
defendant files a counter-bond.[39] The Order of the trial court dated 29
April 2006 is based on this ground.
WHEN IS FINAL INJUNCTION ISSUED?
(Section 9)

If after the trial of the action it appears that the

applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained
of permanently enjoined.
 Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate
Controversies

A party may apply for any of the provisional remedies

provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for the
purpose of the action. However, no TRO or status quo order
shall be issued save in exceptional cases and only after
hearing the parties and posting of a bond. (sec1, Rule10)