LISTS OF 2018 CASES OF J.

PERLAS-BERNABE

1. MACTAN ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. AND ANTONIO TOMPAR VS. BENFREI S.

GERMO; G.R. NO. 228799; 01-10-2018

2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEXANDER ALVARO Y DE LEON

AND ROSALIE GERONIMO Y MADERA; G.R. NO. 225596; 01-10-2018

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) VS. LEONOR MACABAGDAL,
REPRESENTED BY EULOGIA MACABAGDAL PASCUAL (FORMERLY JOHN
DOE "DDD"); G.R. NO. 227215; 01-10-2018
4. CECILIA RIVAC VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. NO. 224673; 01-22-
2018

5. ANGEL FUELLAS DIZON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES; G.R. NO. 227577;
01-24-2018

6. MA. VICTORIA M. GALANG VS. PEAKHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION AND

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY; G.R. NO. 233922; 01-24-
2018

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALVIN JUGO Y VILLANUEVA; G.R. No.

231792; 01-29-2018

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIP MAMANGON YESPIRITU; G.R. No.

229102; 01-29-2018

9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO PAZ Y DIONISIO @ "JEFF"; G.R.

NO. 229512; 01-31-2018
10. RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF LEMUEL H. VENDIOLA, SHERIFF IV,
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT (OCC), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BIÑAN CITY, LAGUNA (RTC); A.M. No. 17-11-272-RTC; 01-31-2018

11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs. JOVENCITO MIRANDA Y TIGAS; G.R. No.
229671; 01-31-2018

12. ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME vs. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO; A.C.

No. 10783; 01-31-2018
13. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD,
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 67,
PANIQUI, TARLAC; A.M. No. P-17-3705; 02-06-2018

14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISANTO CIRBETO Y GIRAY; G.R. No.
231359; 02-07-2018
15. RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MS. JANICE C. MILLARE, CLERK III,
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
QUEZON CITY; A.M. No. 17-11-131-MeTC; 02-07-2018

16. RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MS. MARISSA M. NUDO, CLERK III,
BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), MANILA; A.M. No. 17-08-191-
RTC; 02-07-2018

17. JASPER GONZALEZ*Y DOLENDO Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R.

No. 225709; 02-14-2018

18. CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. No. 223477;
02-14-2018

19. . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

AND PETRON CORPORATION; G.R. No. 207843; 02-14-2018

20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTHIAN* KEVIN GUIEB Y BUTAY; G.R.
NO. 233100; 02-14-2018

21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL MANANSALA Y MANINANG; G.R. NO.
229092; 02-21-2018

22. JONATHAN Y. DEE Vs. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY

FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, AND ALBERT HONG HIN KAY,
AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, AS DIRECTOR AND
SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.; G.R.
NO. 224834; 02-28-2018

HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST

PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
 OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-
CHUA, AS A DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Vs. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY
GRACE T. VERA CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, AND
BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS; G.R. NO. 224871; 02-28-2018

23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROY MAGSANO Y SAGAUINIT; G.R. NO.
231050; 02-28-2018

24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILSON RAMOS YCABANATAN; G.R. NO.
233744; 02-28-2018

25. ALEX RAUL B. BLAY vs. CYNTHIA B. BANA; G.R. NO. 232189; 03-07-2018

26. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEY SANCHEZ Y LICUDINE; G.R. NO.
231383; 03-07-2018

27. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA A.K.A.

"IPYANG", AND DEREK JOSEPH LUMAYA; G.R. NO. 231983; 03-07-2018

28. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO CRISPO Y DESCALSO ALIAS

"GOGO" AND ENRICO HERRERA Y MONTES; G.R. NO. 230065; 03-14-2018

29. ANGELITO MAGNO vs. PEOPLE PHILIPPINES, OF THE REPRESENTED BY

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR; G.R. No. 230657; 03-14-2018

30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO ANTIDO y LANTAYAN a.k.a.

ROMEO ANTIGO y LANTAYAN alias "JON-JON"; G.R. No. 20865; 03-14-2018

31. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS; G.R. No.
230070; 03-14-2018
32. RE: REPORT OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE SOLIVER C. PERAS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CEBU CITY (RTC), BRANCH 10, ON THE ACTS OF
INSUBORDINATION OF UTILITY WORKER I CATALINA Z. CAMASO, OFFICE
OF THE CLERK OF COURT, RTC; A.M. No. 15-02-47-RTC; 03-21-2018

33. IRENEO CAHULOGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. NO. 225695;
03-21-2018
34. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PASTORLITO V. DELA VICTORIA; G.R. NO.
233325; 04-16-2018

35. JULIUS E. PADUGA vs. ROBERTO "BOBBY" R. DIMSON, SHERIFF IV,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA CITY, BRANCH 171; A.M. NO. P-
18-3833 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 14-4370-P); 04-16-2018

36. RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. ARNO D. DEL ROSARIO, COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, BRANCH 41, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (METC),
QUEZON CITY; A.M. No. 17-12-135-MeTC; 04-16-2018

37. HERNANIE P. DANDOY vs. ATTY. ROLAND G. EDAYAN; A.C. NO. 12084; 06-
06-2018

38. PHILSYNERGY MARITIME, INC. AND/OR TRIMURTI SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD

vs. COLUMBANO PAGUNSAN GALLANO, JR.; G.R. NO. 228504; 06-06-2018

39. LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. NO.
229380; 06-06-2018

40. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNIE DELOCIEMBRE YANDALES

AND DHATS ADAM Y DANGA; G.R. NO. 226485; 06-06-2018

41. RICKY ANYAYAHAN Y TARONAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. NO.
229787; 06-20-2018

42. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL GAMBOA Y FRANCISCO @

"KUYA,” G.R. NO. 233702; 06-20-2018

43. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELANIE B. MERCADER; G.R. NO. 233480;
06-20-2018
44. RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. FLORANTE B. SUMANGIL, CLERK
III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH 119; A.M. No. 18-04-
79-RTC; 06-20-2018

45. PAULINO LIM vs. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA; A.C. NO. 12156; 06-20-2018
46. SAMUEL N. RODRIGUEZ vs. HON. OSCAR P. NOEL, JR., EXECUTIVE
JUDGE/PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL
SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35; A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-
4435-RTJ); 06-25-2018

47. NICANOR D. TRIOL vs. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR.; A.C. No. 12011; 06-
26-2018

48. GERONIMO J. JIMENO, JR. vs. ATTY. FLORDELIZA M. JIMENO; A.C. NO.
12012; 07-02-2018

49. LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO vs. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY; G.R. NO. 226013; 07-02-2018

50. CATALINA F. ISLA, ELIZABETH ISLA, AND GILBERT F. ISLA vs. GENEVIRA* P.
ESTORGA; G.R. NO. 233974; ; 07-02-2018

51. FELISA AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION

CORPORATION (HAVING BEEN SUBSTITUTED IN LIEU OF THE NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION); G.R. NOS. 231655 AND 231670; 07-02-2018

52. HEIR OF HERMINIGILDO* A. UNITE, REPRESENTED BY HIS SOLE HEIR,

FLORENTINO S. UNITE vs. ATTY. RAYMUND P. GUZMAN; A.C. NO. 12062; 07-
02-2018

53. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO EJERCITO; G.R. NO. 229861;
07-02-2018

54. SPOUSES JOSE MANUEL AND MARIA ESPERANZA RIDRUEJO

STILIANOPOULOS vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LEGAZPI CITY AND
THE NATIONAL TREASURER; G.R. NO. 224678; 07-03-2018

55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. XXX AND YYY; G.R. NO. 235652; 07-09-
2018

56. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERALD TAMAYO CORDOVA AND

MARCIAL DAYON EGUISO; G.R. NO. 231130; 07-09-2018
57. JILDO A. GUBATON vs. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR; A.C. NO.
8962; 07-09-2018

58. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. EFREN BONGAIS, HOUSING AND

HOMESITE REGULATION OFFICER IV, CITY HOUSING AND SETTLEMENTS
OFFICE, CALAMBA CITY; G.R. NO. 226405; 07-23-2018

59. RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN

MASBATE vs. RICKY JAMES RELUCIO; G.R. No. 235498; 07-30-2018

60. JOSE Z. MORENO vs. RENE M. KAHN, CONSUELO MORENO KAHN-HAIRE,

RENE LUIS PIERRE KAHN, PHILIPPE KAHN, MA. CLAUDINE KAHN
MCMAHON, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY; G.R. NO.
217744; 07-30-2018

61. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PATRICIA CABRELLOS Y DELA CRUZ;

G.R. NO. 229826; 07-30-2018

62. RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. ALFONSO O. PINEDA, JR., AND
JOSEPHINE C. PINEDA; G.R. NO. 227147; 07-30-2018

63. ALFREDO A. RAMOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. NO. 233572; 07-
30-2018

64. FENIX (CEZA) INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE
DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, HON. HEAD OF THE LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, AND THE CAGAYAN SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE AUTHORITY; G.R. NO. 235258; 08-06-2018

65. ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN vs. ANTONIO S. CAISIP; G.R. NO. 212987; 08-06-
2018

66. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARICEL PATACSIL Y MORENO; G.R. NO.
234052; 08-06-2018
67. KENNETH SANTOS Y ITALIG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; GR NO.
232950; 08-13-2018
68. BUENAVISTA PROPERTIES, INC. VS. ATTY. AMADO B. DELORIA; A.C. NO.
12160; 08-14-2018

69. OSCAR D. GAMBOA VS. MAUNLAD TRANS, INC. AND/OR RAINBOW

MARITIME CO., LTD. AND CAPT. SILVINO FAJARDO; G.R. No. 232905; 08-20-
2018

70. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN FERIOL Y PEREZ; G.R. No.
232154; 08-20-2018

71. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH PONTIJOS LIBRE; GR No. 235980;
08-20-2018

72. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHRISTOPHER BAPTISTA Y VILLA; G.R.

NO. 225783; 08-20-2018

73. PABLITO L. MIRANDA VS. ATTY. JOSE B. ALVAREZ; AC. No. 12196; 09-03-
2018

74. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILT SAM BANGALAN Y MAMBA; GR No.
232249; 09-03-2018

75. ARIEL P. HORLADOR VS. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC.,

MARINE* SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., AND CAPTAIN MARLON L. MALANAO;
G.R. NO. 236576; 09-05-2018

76. NYMPHA S. ODIAMAR VS. LINDA ODIAMAR VALENCIA; G.R. NO. 213582; 09-
12-2018

77. ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. THE

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA, QUEZON CITY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE, AND QUEZON CITY
TREASURER'S OFFICE; G.R. NO. 230651; 09-18-2018

78. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO DELA ROSA YEMPAMANO @

"BOY," CRISELDA HUERTO Y DOCOT @ "CECIL," AND RONALDO HUERTO Y
DOCOT; G.R. NO. 238338; 10-01-2018

79. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMAN BARADI Y VELASCO; G.R. NO.
238522; 10-01-2018

80. ROSITA TUASON MARAVILLA AND CORAZON TUASON* MIRANDA,

THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO VS.
MARCELINO BUGARIN, ANGELITA CONTRERAS, BENJAMIN LAZATIN,
LOURDES MANIQUIZ, EDELBERTO* PADLAN, REMEDIOS NAVARRO, JOSE
 PANGAN, EDUVEGES* REYES, ALEXANDER CRUZ, PRISCILLA CORTEZ,
MILA LAJA, ANTONIO DAANAY, GENEROSA SISON, PERFECTO DELA VEGA,
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM; G.R. NOS.
226199 AND 227242-54; 10-01-2018

81. MARIA NYMPHA MANDAGAN VS. RUFINO DELA CRUZ OF THE SKILLS AND
LIVELIHOOD TRAINING CENTER AND DING VILLAREAL OF THE GENERAL
SERVICES DIVISION, BOTH OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF SAN
JUAN CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; G.R.
NO. 228267; 10-08-2018
 [G.R. NO. 228799, JANUARY 10, 2018]
MACTAN ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. AND ANTONIO TOMPAR, PETITIONERS,
V.
BENFREI S. GERMO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated August 8, 2016
and the Resolution3 dated October 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 104431, which affirmed the Decision4 dated January 14, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-029, finding petitioners
Mactan Rock Industries, Inc. (MRII) and Antonio Tompar (Tompar) solidarily liable to pay
respondent Benfrei S. Germo (Germo) the amount of P4,499,412.84 plus interest,
damages, and attorney's fees.

The Facts

This case stemmed from a Complaint5 for sum of money and damages filed by Germo
against MRII – a domestic corporation engaged in supplying water, selling industrial
maintenance chemicals, and water treatment and chemical cleaning services 6 – and its
President/Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Tompar. The complaint alleged that on
September 21, 2004, MRII, through Tompar, entered into a Technical Consultancy
Agreement (TCA)7 with Germo, whereby the parties agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Germo
shall stand as MRII's marketing consultant who shall take charge of negotiating,
perfecting sales, orders, contracts, or services of MRII, but there shall be no employer-
employee relationship between them; and (b) Germo shall be paid on a purely
commission basis, including a monthly allowance of P5,000.00.8

On May 2, 2006 and during the effectivity of the TCA, Germo successfully negotiated and
closed with International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) a supply contract of
700 cubic meters of purified water per day. Accordingly, MRII commenced supplying
water to ICTSI on February 22, 2007, and in tum, the latter religiously paid MRII the
corresponding monthly fees.9 Despite the foregoing, MRII allegedly never paid Germo his
rightful commissions amounting to P2,225,969.56 as of December 2009, inclusive of
interest.10 Initially, Germo filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), but the same was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the
absence of employer-employee relationship between him and MRII. He then filed a civil
case before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, but the same was
dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing due to his counsel's failure to mark all his
documentary evidence at the pre-trial conference.11 Hence, Germo filed the instant
complaint praying that MRII and Tompar be made to pay him the amounts of
P2,225,969.56 as unpaid commissions with legal interest from the time they were due
until fully paid, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and the costs of suit.12

In their Answer,13 MRII and Tompar averred, among others, that: (a) there was no
employer-employee relationship between MRII and Germo as the latter was hired as a
mere consultant; (b) Germo failed to prove that the ICTSI account materialized through
his efforts as he did not submit the required periodic reports of his negotiations with
prospective clients; and (c) ICTSI became MRII's client through the efforts of a certain Ed
Fornes.14 Further, MRII and Tompar claimed that Germo should be made to pay them
litigation expenses and attorney's fees as they were compelled to litigate and engage the
services of counsel to protect their interest.15

Due to MRII, Tompar, and their counsel's multiple absences at the various schedules for
pre-trial conference, the RTC considered them as "in default," thereby allowing Germo to
present his evidence ex-parte.16

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision17 dated January 14, 2015, the RTC ruled in Germo's favor, and accordingly,
ordered MRII and Tompar to solidarily pay him the amounts of: (a) P4,499,412.84
representing Germo's unpaid commissions from February 2007 until March 2012 with
legal interest from judicial demand until fully satisfied; (b) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees.18

The RTC found that MRII and Germo validly entered into a TCA whereby the latter shall
act as the former's marketing consultant, to be paid on a commission basis.19 It also found
that MRII's contract with ICTSI was made possible through Germo's negotiation and
marketing skills, and as such, the latter should be paid the commissions due to him. In
this regard, Germo presented various sales invoices spanning the period of February
2007 to March 2012, wherein he should have been paid commissions in the amount of
P4,499,412.84.20 Further, based on the evidence presented and in order to deter those
who intend to negate the fulfillment of an obligation to the prejudice of another, the RTC
found it appropriate to award Germo moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees in the foregoing amounts.21 Finally, the RTC imposed a lien equivalent to the
appropriate legal fees on the monetary awards in Germo's favor, noting that the latter
litigated the instant suit as an indigent.22
Aggrieved, MRII and Tompar appealed23 to the CA, this time claiming, among others,
that: (a) the jurisdiction over the case lies before the NLRC as the same is a monetary
dispute arising from an employer-employee relationship; and (b) Germo had no legal
personality to pursue the instant case since he only signed the TCA as a representative
of another entity.24

The CA Ruling

In a Decision25 dated August 8, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.26 It held that Germo
had sufficiently proven through the required quantum of evidence that: (a) he and MRII,
through Tompar, entered into a TCA and thus, the provisions thereof are binding between
them; (b) MRII's contract with ICTSI was realized through Germo's efforts; and (c) MRII
failed to pay Germo the commissions due to him pursuant to the TCA and the ICTSI
contract.27

Anent MRII and Tompar's additional arguments, the CA held that the same constitutes a
new case theory, which cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal. The CA further
pointed out that such new theory is directly contradictory to the judicial admissions they
made in their Answer,28 which are already binding on them.29

Undaunted, MRII and Tompar moved for reconsideration, 30 but the same was denied in
a Resolution31 dated October 14, 2016; hence, this petition.32

The Issue before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld MRII and
Tompar's solidary liability to Germo.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

In the instant petition, MRII and Tompar insist, among others that: (a) the regular courts
have no jurisdiction over the case as the present dispute involves an employment dispute
cognizable by the NLRC; and (b) Germo had no legal personality to pursue the case as
he signed the TCA not in his personal capacity, but as a representative of another entity. 33
Such insistence is untenable.

As aptly pointed out by the CA, the foregoing constitutes a new theory raised for the first
time on appeal, considering that in their Answer34 before the RTC, MRII and Tompar
admitted, inter alia, the: (a) lack of employer-employee relationship between MRII and
Germo as the latter was hired as a mere consultant; and (b) genuineness, authenticity,
and due execution of the TCA, among other documents proving Germo's claims. 35 "As a
rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower court, will not be permitted to change theory on appeal. Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need
not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who
would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which
it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial
court."36 While this rule admits of an exception,37 such is not applicable in this case.

More importantly, MRII and Tompar's statements in their Answer constitute judicial
admissions,38 which are legally binding on them.39 Case law instructs that even if such
judicial admissions place a party at a disadvantageous position, he may not be allowed
to rescind them unilaterally and that he must assume the consequences of such
disadvantage,40 as in this case.

As to the merits of the case, the courts a quo correctly found that: (a) Germo entered into
a valid and binding TCA with MRII where he was engaged as a marketing
consultant; (b) aside from the P5,000.00 monthly allowance, Germo was going to be paid
on a purely commission basis; (c) during the effectivity of the TCA and in the performance
of his duties as marketing consultant of MRII, Germo successfully brokered MRII's
contract of services with ICTSI, obviously resulting in revenues in MRII's favor; (d) despite
the foregoing and demands from Germo, MRII refused to pay Germo's rightful
commission fees; and (e) MRII's refusal to pay Germo resulted – or at the very least,
contributed to – Germo's financial hardships. In light of the foregoing, the courts a
quo correctly found MRII liable to Germo for the various monetary obligations as stated
in their respective rulings. Time and again, it has been consistently held that the factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that there are facts of weight
and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the
disposition of the case;41 none of which are present insofar as this matter is concerned.

Be that as it may, the Court finds that the courts a quo erred in concluding that Tompar,
in his capacity as then-President/CEO of MRII, should be held solidarily liable with MRII
for the latter's obligations to Germo. It is a basic rule that a corporation is a juridical entity
which is vested with legal and personality separate and distinct from those acting for and
in behalf of, and from the people comprising it. As a general rule, directors, officers, or
employees of a corporation cannot be held personally liable for the obligations incurred
by the corporation, unless it can be shown that such director/officer/employee is guilty of
negligence or bad faith, and that the same was clearly and convincingly proven. Thus,
before a director or officer of a corporation can be held personally liable for corporate
obligations, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complainant must allege in the
complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation,
or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant
must clearly and convincingly prove such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith. 42 In this
case, Tompar's assent to patently unlawful acts of the MRII or that his acts were tainted
by gross negligence or bad faith was not alleged in Germo's complaint, much less proven
in the course of trial. Therefore, the deletion of Tompar's solidary liability with MRII is in
order.

Further, the Court deems it proper to adjust the interests imposed on the monetary awards
in Germo's favor. To recapitulate, he was awarded the amounts of P4,499,412.84
representing his unpaid commissions from February 2007 to March 2012, P100,000.00
as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, his unpaid commissions shall earn legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from judicial demand, i.e., the filing
of the complaint on February 28, 2011 until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of this Decision. Thereafter,
all monetary awards due to him shall then earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this ruling until fully paid.43

Finally, since Germo litigated the instant suit as an indigent party as defined in Section
21, Rule 344 of the Rules of Court, it is only proper that the appropriate filing fees be
considered as a lien on the monetary awards due to him, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 19, Rule 14145 of the same Rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated August 8, 2016
and the Resolution dated October 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
104431 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, DELETING petitioner Antonio
Tompar's solidary liability with petitioner Mactan Rock Industries, Inc. (MRII). Accordingly,
MRII is solely liable to respondent Benfrei S. Germo (Germo) for the following
amounts: (a) P4,499,412.84 representing his unpaid commissions from February 2007 to
March 2012 with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from judicial
demand, i.e., the filing of the complaint on February 28, 2011 until June 30, 2013, and
thereafter, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of
this Decision; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (c)P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. The total monetary awards shall then
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this ruling
until fully paid.

Finally, let the appropriate filing fees be considered as a lien on the monetary awards due
to Germo, who litigated the instant case as an indigent party, in accordance with Section
19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 225596, JANUARY 10, 2018]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
VS.
ALEXANDER ALVARO Y DE LEON AND ROSALIE GERONIMO Y MADERA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Alexander Alvaro y de

Leon (Alvaro) and Rosalie Geronimo y Madera (Geronimo; collectively, accused-
appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated September 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 05279, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated September 7,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
08-1044 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
5,4 Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," and in Criminal Case No. 08-1045 finding Geronimo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11,6 Article II of RA 9165.

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information7 filed before the RTC charging accused-
appellants of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, and another Information8accusing
Geronimo of violating Section 11 of the same law, viz.:

Criminal Case No. 08-1044

That on or about the 5th day of June 2008, in the City of Makati Philippines, and a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Alvaro and
Geronimo], conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport zero point zero three (0.03) gram
of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug, in consideration of five
hundred (₱500.00) pesos.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

Criminal Case No. 08-1045

That on or about the 5th day of [June] 2008, in the City of Makati Philippines and a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Geronimo], not
being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her
possession[,] direct custody and control zero point zero one (0.01) gram of
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

The prosecution alleged that at about 5:30 in the afternoon of June 5, 2008, after receiving
a tip from a confidential informant about the drug peddling activity of an alias "Betchay,"
later identified as Geronimo, a team composed of Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council
(MADAC) and Station Anti Illegal Drugs - Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)
operatives proceeded to the Laperal Compound, Brgy. Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City.
MADAC Operative Juan S. Siborboro, Jr.11 (Siborboro) was designated as the poseur-
buyer, while the rest of the team composed of P03 Rafael J. Castillo (P03 Castillo), P02
Jaime Orante, Jr. (P02 Orante), POI Percival Mendoza, and the other operatives acted
as back-up.12

At the target area, Siborboro was introduced by the informant to Geronimo, who asked
the former how much he intended to buy. Siborboro then handed the marked ₱500.00 bill
to Geronimo, who, in tum, gave the same to her companion, Alvaro, who was about three
(3) meters away. Thereafter, Geronimo took out two (2) plastic sachets of
suspected shabu, and handed one to Siborboro. Upon receipt of the sachet, Siborboro
gave the pre-arranged signal by lighting a cigarette and throwing it, prompting the back-
up officers to rush in and arrest accused-appellants.13

Siborboro confiscated the remaining plastic sachet containing suspected drugs from
Geronimo, while P03 Castillo recovered the buy-bust money from Alvaro. Siborboro
immediately marked the sachet subject of the sale with "JSJR," and the sachet he
recovered from Geronimo with "JSJR-1."14 He also prepared an inventory15of the seized
items, which was signed by P03 Castillo and Barangay Chairman Ernesto Bobier (Brgy.
Chairman Bobier) as witnesses.16 Accused-appellants were brought to the SAID-SOTF
office, where the seized items were turned over to the investigator, PO 1 Randy C. Santos
(POI Santos), who then prepared the request for laboratory examination 17 and submitted
the seized sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic chemist Police Senior
Inspector (S/Insp.) Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip (S/Insp. Mangalip) examined 18the
specimen, which tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.19

In her defense, Geronimo maintained that at around 5 or 6 o'clock in the afternoon of

June 5, 2008, she was resting at her uncle's house at the Laperal Compound, Bernardino
Street, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, when suddenly, several men barged inside. One of
the men told her "manahimik ka diyan kung ayaw mong masaktan," while the others
searched the house. When the men found nothing, they frisked Geronimo and took her
mobile phone, wallet, and a promissory note from a hospital. Afterwards, they ordered
her to bring out her companions and the items she was allegedly hiding, to which she
replied "anong ilalabas ko, anong tinatago ko?." The men then took Geronimo out of the
house where they encountered Alvaro. Together, they were brought inside a van where
they were invited for questioning. At the SAID-SOTF office, accused-appellants were
investigated, and brought to the laboratory for drug testing. However, since the chemist
was not present, they were merely made to sign a document; afterwhich, they were
returned to the MADAC office.20

Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges leveled against
them.21

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision22 dated September 7, 2010, the RTC found: (a)accused-appellants guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine in the amount of ₱500,000.00 each in Criminal Case No. 08-1044;
and (b)Geronimo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, thereby sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine in the amount of ₱400,000.00 in Criminal Case No.
08-1045.23

The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove the presence of the respective
elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It observed that
Siborboro positively identified accused-appellants as the persons from whom he
purchased ₱500.00 worth of shabu,and found that Geronimo had in her possession
another sachet of shabu, which was retrieved from her upon arrest. On the other hand,
the RTC gave no credence to the defense of denial, frame-up, and alibi raised by
accused-appellants for failure to substantiate the same.24

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed25 their case to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision26 dated September 11, 2014, the CA affirmed the R TC ruling in

toto, 27 finding that the prosecution had indeed established the accused-appellants' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged. Moreover, the CA observed that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved and the chain of
custody over them remained unbroken, notwithstanding the fact that some of the
procedural requirements in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 were not faithfully observed,
as well as the typographical error in the marking of one of the seized items. 28

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants' convictions for
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, and Geronimo's conviction for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 29 The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law.30

In this case, accused-appellants were charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, which has the following elements: (a) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.31 In addition, Geronimo was charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the elements of which are: (a) the accused was in possession of an
item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.32 According to
the tribunals a quo, all these elements were proven in these cases.

Notably, however, in order to secure a conviction for the foregoing crimes, it remains
essential that the identity of the confiscated drugs be established beyond reasonable
doubt. To obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to
account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti. 33

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve
their integrity and evidentiary value.34 Under the said section, the apprehending team
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same; also, the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within twenty four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 35

Non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the

integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.36 However, for this saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain
the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 37 The justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.38

In this case, accused-appellants point out39 unexplained breaks in the links in the custody
of the confiscated drugs which, to them, constitute flagrant and procedural lapses and
obvious evidentiary gaps that are fatal to the prosecution's case.40 Accordingly, they pray
for their acquittal.41

The appeal is meritorious.

The Court concurs with accused-appellants that indeed, numerous lapses, and even
inconsistencies, taint the prosecution's account of how the arresting officers handled the
subject confiscated drugs, to wit:
First. With respect to the place of marking, Siborboro testified that he immediately marked
and inventoried the seized items at the place of arrest.42 This was, however, contradicted
by P03 Castillo who testified that they did not prepare the inventory at the place of the
arrest since Laperal Compound was teeming with people; instead, they conducted the
inventory along EDSA, at the trunk of the service vehicle.43

Second. The prosecution failed to show that the inventory was made in the presence of
the accused as required by law. The presence of the required witnesses, i.e., the
representatives from the media and the DOJ, and any elected official, was also not
established. While records show that Brgy. Chairman Bobier had signed the inventory
receipt, based on Siborboro's own statement, the former was not present when the same
was prepared and that it was only brought to his office for signature. 44 For his part, PO3
Castillo testified that the apprehending team immediately returned to their office right after
the inventory and preservation marking, without passing by any other place. He also
contradicted his previous statement that the inventory was made along EDSA, when he
later stated that Brgy. Chairman Bobier signed the inventory receipt at the place of
arrest.45

Third. Theprosecution failed to show that the seized items were photographed. While
Siborboro could not recall if photographs of the seized items were taken, 46 PO3 Castillo
testified that the items were photographed by a designated
photographer.47 Unfortunately, the records do not support P03 Castillo's claim as the
prosecution did not offer the photographs of the seized items as evidence. 48

Fourth. The sachet subject of the sale was purportedly marked by Siborboro as "JSJR"
and the other sachet confiscated from Geronimo was marked as "JSJR-l."49However, the
crime laboratory's report shows that S/Insp. Mangalip, the forensic chemist, examined
two (2) sachets, one marked "JSJRND" and the other "JSJR-1."50 Instead of presenting
PO1 Santos - as the receiving investigator - and S/Insp. Mangalip, the prosecution
stipulated upon and dispensed with their testimonies.51 The stipulation was, in fact, limited
to the fact "[t]hat the white crystalline substance contained in a transparent plastic sachet
with markings 'JSJR and JSJR-I' were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office
together with the Request for Laboratory Examination."52 Consequently, no witness could
explain the provenance of the sachet "JSJRND" and the whereabouts of the sachet
"JSJR" after the same were left to the custody of PO1 Santos. Neither did the prosecution
justify if the said discrepancy was a mere typographical error.

Fifth. The records reveal that the request for laboratory examination was not delivered
by PO1 Santos but by a certain Serrano.53 Siborboro and PO3 Castillo both failed to
explain how Serrano came to possess the seized items, while PO2 Orante' s
testimony54 shows that he had no personal knowledge of the arrest and what transpired
thereafter. With PO1 Santos's testimony stipulated upon and dispensed with, no witness
was able to explain how Serrano came to have custody over the seized items.
In view of the unaccounted gap in the chain of custody and the multiple unrecognized and
unjustified departures of the police officers from the established procedure set under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court
therefore concludes that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drugs had been
compromised. Case law states that in cases involving dangerous drugs, the drugs
presented as the corpus delictiof the offense must be established with moral certainty to
be the same illicit substance taken from the accused. Absent such conclusive
identification, there can be no finding of guilt on the part of the accused. The persistence
of reasonable doubt on the identity of the drugs seized from the accused results in the
latter's acquittal,55 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 11, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05279 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, accused-appellants Alexander Alvaro y de Leon and Rosalie
Geronimo y Madera are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is ordered to cause their immediate release, unless they are being lawfully
held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 227215, JANUARY 10, 2018]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), PETITIONER,
VS.
LEONOR MACABAGDAL, REPRESENTED BY EULOGIA MACABAGDAL
PASCUAL (FORMERLY JOHN DOE "DDD"), RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1assailing the Decision2 dated
September 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104473, which
affirmed the Decision3 dated October 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City, Branch 172 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 49-V-08, imposing legal interest on the unpaid
balance of the just compensation for the subject lot at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum (p.a.) computed from the time of the taking of the property until full payment.

The Facts
On January 23, 2008, petitioner the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented
by the Department of Public Works and Highways, filed4 before the RTC a
complaint5 against an unknown owner for the expropriation of a 200-square meter (sq.
m.) lot located in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City, identified as Lot 1343-A-2-A-2-G,
(LRC)Psd-315943 (subject lot),6 for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road
Project, otherwise known as North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) Segment 8.1, traversing
from Mindanao A venue in Quezon City to the NLEX in Valenzuela City. 7
Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted 8 a writ of possession over the subject
lot on May 5, 2008, and was required9 to deposit with the court the amount of
₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.) representing the zonal value thereof (provisional
deposit).10

On August 28, 2012, respondent Leonor Macabagdal (respondent), represented by

Eulogia Macabagdal Pascual, was substituted as partydefendant upon sufficient showing
that the subject lot is registered in her name under Transfer Certificate Title No. (TCT) V-
103067. Respondent did not oppose the expropriation, and received the provisional
deposit.11

The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the
subject lot, which thereafter submitted its Commissioners' Report (Re: Just
Compensation)12 dated May 23, 2014, recommending a fair market value of
₱9,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject lot, taking into consideration its
location, neighborhood and land classification, utilities, amenities, physical
characteristics, occupancy and usage, highest and best usage, current market value
offerings, as well as previously decided expropriation cases of the same RTC involving
properties similarly situated in the same barangay.13

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated October 30, 2014, the RTC found the recommendation of the
commissioners to be reasonable and just, and accordingly: (a) fixed the just
compensation for the subject lot at ₱9,000.00/ sq. m.; (b) directed petitioner to pay the
same, less the provisional deposit of ₱550,000.00; and (c) imposed legal interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the
taking of the subject lot until full payment.15

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed16 before the CA, questioning the just compensation of
₱9,000.00/sq. m. and the award of twelve percent (12%) interest rate p.a., instead of six
percent (6%) p.a.17 as provided under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-
MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.18
The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding
that the commissioners, in their recommendation, observed the parameters 20 set forth
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974,21 and the findings of the RTC was amply
supported by the evidence on record.22

Hence, the instant petition claiming that the CA did not rule on the issue of the applicable
rate of interest which, in this case, should be at twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the filing
of the complaint until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full
payment.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed
reversible error in affirming the RTC's imposition of interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot
until full payment.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken, but
to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as
upheld in a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss
resulted.23 Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for
appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the
landowner, with due consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the property
was taken.24

In addition, the Court also recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but
also its income-generating potential.1âwphi1 Thus, when property is taken, full
compensation of its value must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the
property and the potential income lost.25The value of the landholdings should be
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unRaid balance of this principal sum after
taking has been completed. 26 This shall comprise the real, substantial,
full,and ample value of the expropriated property, and constitutes due compliance with
the constitutional mandate of just compensation in eminent domain.27

In this case, from the date of the taking of the subject lot on May 5, 2008 when the RTC
issued a writ of possession28 in favor of petitioner,29 until the just compensation therefor
was finally fixed at ₱9,000.00/sq. m., petitioner had only paid a provisional deposit in the
amount of ₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an unpaid balance of
the "principal sum of the just compensation," warranting the imposition of interest. It is
settled that the delay in the payment of just compensation amounts to an effective
forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on the difference in the amount
between the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the
government.30

However, as aptly pointed out by petitioner,31 the twelve percent (12%) p.a. rate of legal
interest is only applicable until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at six
percent (6%) p.a. in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. Prevailing
jurisprudence32 has upheld the applicability of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013
to forbearances of money in expropriation cases, contrary to respondent's
contention.33 The cases of Sy v. Local Government of Quezon City34 and Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Wycoco, 35 cited by respondent are both inapplicable because they
were all decided prior to the effectivity of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 on
July 1, 2013.36

Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing
of the complaint but from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5,
2008, since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property can be
established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest should begin from this
date.37 Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be
imposed on the unpaid balance of the just compensation for the subject lot, which shall
be computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the date of the taking on May
5, 2008 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due respondent shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 1044 73 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION imposing legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, as determined by the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, reckoned from the date of the taking
on May 5, 2008 to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full
payment. The rest of the CA Decision stands.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 224673, JANUARY 22, 2018]
CECILIA RIVAC, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated January 11, 2016
and the Resolution3 dated April 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
34247, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Cecilia Rivac (Rivac) for the crime
of Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information4 filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, Branch 14 (RTC), charging Rivac of the crime of Estafa, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on about the 4th day of August 2007, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused received for sale on consignment
from Asuncion C. Fariñas the following pieces of jewelry as follows:

1. One (1) set diamante P 125,000.00

2. One (1) set heart shape with titus 85,000.00
3. One (1) pc. 7 days bangle 80,000.00
4. One (1) pc bracelet w. charm 55,000.00
5. One (1) set rositas w. bagets 45,600.00
6. One (1) pc. charm tauco w. pendant 48,900.00
Total P439,500.00

with a total value of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P439,500.00) under the express obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale or
if not sold, to return the pieces of jewelry to Asuncion C. Fariñas not later than August 11,
2007, but far from complying with her obligation and despite repeated demands, said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit the pieces of jewelry, to the damage and
prejudice of Asuncion C. Fariñas in the aforestated amount.
Contrary to law.5

The prosecution alleged that on August 4, 2007, Rivac went to the jewelry store owned
by private complainant Asuncion C. Fariñas (Fariñas) where she received from the latter
several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate amount of P439,500.00, which were meant for
her to sell on consignment basis,6 as evidenced by a document called jewelry
consignment agreement (consignment document).7 Fariñas and Rivac agreed that after
seven (7) days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or
return the unsold jewelry to Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the
lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform what was incumbent upon her,
causing Fariñas to send her a demand letter.8 This prompted Rivac to go to Fariñas's
store and offer her a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-
9369 as partial payment for the jewelry. However, Fariñas refused the offer as she
discovered that the property was involved in a land dispute, and instead, reiterated her
demand that Rivac return the pieces of jewelry or pay their value in cash. 10

During arraignment, Rivac pleaded "not guilty" and maintained that her liability is only
civil, and not criminal, in nature. She narrated that she asked Fariñas for a loan as she
badly needed money for her husband's dialysis, to which the latter agreed. As such, she
went to Fariñas's store and handed over OCT No. 0-936 and other supporting documents
to the latter as collateral.11 In turn, Fariñas gave her the amount of P150,000.00 and
asked her to sign a blank consignment document.12 She further averred that she was able
to pay interest for several months but was unable to pay the entire loan. According to
Rivac, Fariñas told her that she would foreclose the collateral. Thereafter, she sent her a
letter demanding payment of the principal amount of P280,000.00 plus interest. 13

The RTC Proceedings

In a Judgment14 dated September 30, 2010, the RTC found Rivac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and ordered her to pay Fariñas the amount of P439,500.00 and the costs of
suit.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime
charged, under the following circumstances: (a) Rivac received the pieces of jewelry from
Fariñas, as evidenced by the consignment document which contains her signature;
and (b) she failed to either return said jewelry or remit its proceeds to Fariñas after the
lapse of the seven (7)-day period agreed upon by them, to the latter's prejudice. In this
regard, the RTC did not give credence to Rivac's theory that she was only made to sign
the consignment document as proof of her loan to Fariñas, ratiocinating that absent any
of the allowed exceptions to the parol evidence rule, she is not allowed to present
evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the said document. 16 It further pointed
out that the only reason why Fariñas had possession of OCT No. 0-936 was because
Rivac herself offered the same as partial payment, but the former ultimately decided
against accepting it as such.17

After the promulgation of the aforesaid Judgment and before it lapsed into finality, Rivac
moved to reopen proceedings on the ground that she intends to present the testimonies
of Fariñas and a certain Atty. Ma. Valenie Blando (Atty. Blando) to prove the true nature
of her transaction with Fariñas.18 In an Order19 dated January 6, 2011, the RTC, inter
alia, partly granted the motion insofar as Fariñas's testimony was concerned, as the
apparent revision of her recollection of events could not have been anticipated during the
course of the trial.20 It, however, denied the same as to Atty. Blando's testimony, opining
that there was no showing that Rivac could not present her during the trial
proper.21 Consequently, the Court re-took Fariñas's testimony, where she "clarified" that
she now remembered that the consignment document never became effective or
enforceable as she did not allow Rivac to take the jewelry because she has yet to pay her
outstanding loan obligation plus interest.22

In an Order23 dated April 18, 2011, the RTC affirmed its assailed Judgment.24 It held that
Fariñas's testimony was in the nature of a recantation, which is looked upon with disfavor
by the courts. Moreover, the RTC pointed out that there have been various circumstances
prior to the promulgation of the assailed Judgment where she could have "correctly
recollected" and revised her testimony, such as when she: (a) sent a demand letter to
Rivac; (b) reiterated her demand during barangay conciliation; (c)executed her
complaint-affidavit for the instant case; (d) paid the filing fee for the case; and (e) testified
before the court.25 Further considering that the retraction does not jibe with Rivac's
testimony, the RTC found the same to be unworthy of credence.26

The CA Ruling

In a Decision27 dated January 11, 2016, the CA upheld Rivac's conviction.28Preliminarily,

it held that the RTC erred in allowing the reopening of the case, since it had already
promulgated a ruling therein.29 In this regard, the CA opined that the RTC proceedings
after the promulgation of its ruling can be likened to a new trial, which is likewise improper
as the grounds for its allowance are not extant.30

Anent the merits, the CA held that all the elements of Estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are present, as the prosecution had established that Rivac
misappropriated the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry consigned to her by Fariñas,
considering her failure to either return the jewelry or remit its proceeds at the end of the
agreed period, obviously to the prejudice of Fariñas. 31 Notably, the CA stated that
Fariñas's recantation is not only looked upon with disfavor for being exceedingly
unreliable, but also that the same does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony. 32

Undaunted, Rivac moved for reconsideration,33 but the same was denied in a
Resolution34 dated April 14, 2016; hence, this petition.35

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that it was
improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings; and (b) upheld Rivac's conviction for the
crime of Estafa.

The Court's Ruling

The petition must be denied.

I.

Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the
reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in verbatim: "At any time before
finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion,
with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order
granting it." In Cabaries v. Maceda,36 the Court expounded on the novelty, nature, and
parameters of this rule, to wit:

A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was
nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from
long, established usage. This lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was
remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1,
2000.

x x x Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements
for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
(3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to
prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the
order.

Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed
to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, and in the
furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will
not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. A motion
to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had
formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered,
and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling
guideline covering a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.This
remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 37 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

In this light, the CA clearly erred in holding that: (a) it was improper for the RTC to reopen
its proceedings because the latter court had already promulgated its judgment;
and (b)assuming arguendo that what it did was a new trial, there were no grounds for its
allowance. To reiterate, a motion to reopen may be filed even after the promulgation of a
judgment and before the same lapses into finality, and the only guiding parameter is to
"avoid the miscarriage of justice." As such, the RTC correctly allowed the reopening of
proceedings to receive Fariñas's subsequent testimony in order to shed light on the true
nature of her transaction with Rivac, and potentially, determine whether or not the latter
is indeed criminally liable.

II.

Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 38 The appeal confers
the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.39

Guided by this consideration, the Court affirms Rivac's conviction with modification as to
the penalty, as will be explained hereunder.

Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:

Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any

other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

The elements of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the
offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return
the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property
received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation,
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended party
that the offender return the money or property received.40 In Cheng v. People,41 the Court
further elucidated:

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or

property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be
made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion
to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, the legal
presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account
of their whereabouts.42 (Emphases and underscoring in the original)

In this case, the facts clearly show the existence of all the elements of the crime charged,
considering that: (a) Rivac received various pieces of jewelry from Fariñas on a sale-on-
consignment basis, as evidenced by the consignment document; (b) Rivac was under the
obligation to either remit the proceeds of the sale or return the jewelry after the period of
seven (7) days from receipt of the same; (c) Rivac failed to perform her obligation,
prompting Fariñas to demand compliance therewith; and (d) Rivac failed to heed such
demand, thereby causing prejudice to Fariñas, who lost the pieces of jewelry and/or their
aggregate value of P439,500.00.43

In an attempt to absolve herself from liability, Rivac moved to reopen the proceedings.
Upon the partial grant thereof, Rivac presented the testimony of no less than Fariñas,
who then testified that she now remembers that the consignment document never
became effective nor enforceable, as she did not allow Rivac to take the jewelry because
she has yet to pay her outstanding loan obligation plus interest. 44

However, as correctly ruled by the courts a quo, Fariñas's testimony partakes of a

recantation, which is aimed to renounce her earlier statement and withdraw the same
formally and publicly. Verily, recantations are viewed with suspicion and reservation. The
Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is
settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused
is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious:
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation
or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable as there is
always the probability that it will later be repudiated. Only when there exist special
circumstances in the case which, when coupled with the retraction, raise doubts as to the
truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and
upheld.45 In People v. Lamsen,46 the Court made a thorough discussion on the nature
and probative value of recantations, as follows:

Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken
before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to
discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given
the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery
and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. x x x

This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given
in court. The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the
veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently and
deservedly subject to serious doubt.

x x x Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution

witness after the judgment of conviction has already been rendered, "it is too late
in the day for his recantation without portraying himself as a liar." At most, the
retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is
retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same
witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with
the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court
should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both
the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and
juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly
analyzed. The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a
complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through
the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law
enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused, attending trial and
testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that
all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit
of recantation. And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by
an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are properly
guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is
presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.47 (Emphases and
underscoring in the original)

Here, Fariñas's testimony during the reopened proceedings was supposedly her "correct
recollection" of the events that transpired in connection with the instant criminal case filed
against Rivac. However, after a scrutiny of the same, the Court sees no sufficient reason
to overturn Rivac's conviction for the crime charged. As aptly observed by the RTC,
Fariñas had various opportunities to make a "correct recollection" of her testimony, and
yet she did not do so. Thus, Fariñas's act of making a complete turnaround in her
testimony at the time when a judgment of conviction had already been promulgated is
suspect. Coupled with the RTC's observation that the retraction is highly inconsistent with
Rivac's own testimony, Fariñas's recantation should be seen as nothing but a last-minute
attempt to save the latter from punishment.48 Clearly, Rivac's conviction of the crime
charged must be upheld.

III.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Rivac, it is worthy to point out that pending
resolution of this case before the Court, Republic Act No. (RA) 1095149 was enacted into
law. As may be gleaned from the law's title, it adjusted the values of the property and
damage on which various penalties are based, taking into consideration the present value
of money, as opposed to its archaic values when the Revised Penal Code was enacted
in 1932.50 While it is conceded that Rivac committed the crime way before the enactment
of RA 10951, the newly-enacted law expressly provides for retroactive effect if it is
favorable to the accused, as in this case.

Section 85 of RA 10951 adjusted the graduated values where penalties for Estafa are
based. Portions pertinent to this case read:

Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885,
Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is further amended to
read as follows:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). –Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if such amount is over Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) but does not
exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).

xxxx

Thus, applying the provisions of RA 10951, as well as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and taking into consideration that the aggregate value of the misappropriated jewelry is
P439,500.00, Rivac must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, there being no aggravating
and mitigating circumstances present in this case.

Finally, Rivac must be ordered to pay the value of the misappropriated pieces of jewelry,
plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this ruling
until fully paid.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 11, 2016 and the
Resolution dated April 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34247 finding
petitioner Cecilia Rivac GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, defined
and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and
ordering her to pay private complainant Asuncion C. Fariñas the amount of P439,500.00
plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 227577, JANUARY 24, 2018]

ANGEL FUELLAS DIZON, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions dated June
16, 2016 2 and October 6, 20163 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 37292,
which denied petitioner Angel Fuellas Dizon's (petitioner) Motion to Endorse the Case to
the Sandiganbayan (Motion to Endorse).4

The Facts

This case stemmed from six (6) separate Informations5 filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 42 (RTC), respectively docketed as Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos.
09-272518 to 23, charging petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents. The accusatory portion of the Information in Crim.
Case No. 09-272518 reads as follows:

That on or about July 4, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then an employee of the Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau, City of Manila, holding the
position of Clerk II, hence, a government and/or public employee, entrusted in the
collection of parking fees from various establishments with the corresponding obligation
on the part of the accused to remit the collections made by him and submit the triplicate
copy of the official receipt to the City Treasurer of Manila and therefore, responsible and
accountable for the funds collected and received by him by reason of his duties as such,
with intent to defraud the City Government of Manila, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit the crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public document, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
prepared, forged and falsified and/or caused to be prepared, forged and falsified Official
Receipt (OR) No. 3272946 C which is similar and/or an imitation of the Official Receipt
No. 3272946 C issued by the City Treasurer of the City of Manila and therefore, a public
document, by then and there printing and/or causing to be filled in the blank spaces
thereon, consisting, among others, the date "7/4/06" and the amount of Php200.00,
thereby making it appear as it did appear, the said O.R. No. 3272946 C in the said amount
Php200.00 is genuine as he remitted the sum of Php200.00 to the City Treasurer of
Manila and submitted the triplicate copy of said receipt in the said amount of Php200.00,
when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew, such is not the case in that
said document is an outright forgery because the true and original amount appearing in
the original O.R. No. 3272946 is Php12,000.00 and not Php200.00, thus, having the
difference of Php11,800.00, and once in possession of the said amount of Php11,800.00,
said accused, with intent to defraud and grave abuse of trust and confidence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and take away
from the funds of the City Government of Manila the said amount of Php11,800.00 which
he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of City Government of Manila, represented by Franklin Gacutan,
Jr., in the aforesaid amount of Php11,800.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.6

The Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 09-272519 to 23 are similarly worded with the
foregoing, except that they pertain to different official receipts (O.R.), all issued to Golden
Fortune Seafood Restaurant,7 namely: (a) in Crim. Case No. 09-272519, O.R. No.
04785988 issued on August 7, 2006; (b) in Crim. Case No. 09-272520, O.R. No. 0478666
9 issued on October 10, 2006; (c) in Crim. Case No. 09-272521, O.R. No. 047868210

issued on October 17, 2006; (d) in Crim. Case No. 09-272522, O.R. No. 5069801 issued
on November 7, 2006; and (e) in Crim. Case No. 09-272523, O.R. No 5442301 issued on
February 5, 200711 (collectively, subject receipts).

The prosecution averred that petitioner, being then an employee of the Manila Traffic and
Parking Bureau of the City of Manila with the position of Special Collecting Officer, was
entrusted to collect monthly parking fees from various establishments, and subsequently,
forward such fees, together with the triplicate copies of the corresponding O.R.s, to the
City Treasurer of Manila.12 In the course of petitioner's employment, several
discrepancies were discovered in the parking receipts which he allegedly signed and
issued, whereby the amounts paid, collected, and remitted as parking fees do not match
with each other.13 Thus, the City Legal Office of Manila instructed City Personnel Officer,
Redencion Pitajen Caimbon (Caimbon), to conduct a questioned document examination
for handwriting comparison and analysis. In conducting the same, she was given the
Personnel Data Sheet (PDS) of petitioner as basis for comparison, and thereafter,
compared the handwriting on the PDS against the receipts submitted to her for
examination.14 After her analysis, Caimbon issued Questioned Document Report No.
0907-0115 and thereupon, concluded that the questioned handwritings and the submitted
standard handwriting of petitioner reveal a strong indication that they were written by one
and the same person. 16Caimbon, however, admitted that the questioned documents or
receipts which were allegedly issued to the payors were not the duplicate or triplicate
copies but mere photocopies of the receipts submitted to the City of Manila and to the
Commission on Audit.17

In his defense, petitioner maintained that he was not the one who signed the O.R.s issued
to Golden Fortune Seafood Restaurant.18 He further explained the process of the City's
collection of monthly parking fees; particularly, that upon the execution of the
memorandum of agreement between their office and the private entity pertaining to
parking privileges and payment of fees, a billing statement will be delivered to the
establishment, and thereafter, the latter's representative will pay at their office for which
he will be issued a receipt.19 Petitioner, however, admitted that there were instances when
he collected the fees directly at the offices of the payors, and added that he was the only
collecting officer with respect to the payors covered by the subject O.R.s. 20

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision21 dated December 23, 2014, the RTC found petitioner guilty of six (6) counts
of Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents, and thereby,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and ten (10) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as
maximum, for each count, including the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and
to pay a fine of P70,800.00.22 It held that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the crime charged, given that: (a) petitioner, being Clerk II and then Special
Collecting Officer, was a public officer; (b) the funds involved are public funds for which
he was accountable as they were due to and paid to the City of Manila; (c) he has custody
and control over the said funds by reason of his office, since he was officially designated
to collect the monthly parking fees from various establishments; and (d) he has
appropriated, taken, or misappropriated the said public funds when he failed to discharge
his duty of remitting the same in full.23Moreover, it ruled that he falsified the subject
receipts in order to commit the crime of Malversation.24

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal25 before the RTC, which was acted upon in
an Order26 dated February 2, 2015. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the case to "be
elevated to the Appellate Tribunal for appropriate action."

As it turned out; the records were transmitted by the RTC to the CA, which, in turn, sent
petitioner a Notice to File Appellant's Brief dated June 22, 2015.27 Petitioner then filed
motions28 to extend the period within which to file the appellant's brief on account of his
counsel's alleged heavy workload: first, for an extended period of forty-five (45) days from
August 28, 2015 until October 12, 2015, which was granted in a Resolution29 dated
September 7, 2015; second, for another extension of thirty (30) days from October 12,
2015 to November 11, 2015, which was granted in a Resolution30 dated October 21, 2015;
and third, for a final extended period of fourteen (14) days from November 11, 2015 to
November 25, 2015, which was granted in a Resolution31 dated November 23, 2015.32
However, petitioner subsequently noticed that his appeal was erroneously taken to the
CA instead of the Sandiganbayan, which has appellate jurisdiction over his case pursuant
to Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 8249. 33 Thus, to rectify the error, he filed the
Motion to Endorse Case to the Sandiganbayan,34 as well as the appellant's brief,35 before
the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution36 dated June 16, 2016, the CA denied petitioner's Motion to Endorse, and
consequently, dismissed his appeal for having been erroneously filed. 37 It opined that
petitioner should have promptly moved for the endorsement of the case within the original
period of fifteen (15) days instead of requesting for numerous extensions and belatedly
claiming that the appeal has been filed in the wrong court.38

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,39 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution40 dated October 6, 2016; hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing
petitioner's Motion to Endorse.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer having a salary grade below
27, whose appeal from the RTC's ruling convicting him of six (6) counts of Malversation
of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents falls within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 4 (c) of RA 824941 (prior to its
amendment by RA 1066042), which reads:

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Xxxx
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal
circuit trial court as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
xxxx
In Quileste v. People,43 the Court remarked that:

It may be recalled that this case involves malversation of public funds, punishable under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, committed by a low-ranking public officer (with
salary grade below SG 27). Thus the case was correctly filed with, and tried by, the RTC,
the court that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Upon Quileste's conviction
by the RTC, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. (PD) No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7975
and R.A. No. 8249, specifically Section 4 thereof[.] x x x x44

Thus, since petitioner's case properly falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, his appeal was erroneously taken to the CA.

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the foregoing error is not primarily attributable
to petitioner, since the duty to transmit the records to the proper court devolves upon the
RTC.

To recount, petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC on January 6, 2015,
which reads:

Accused, with the assistance of the Public Attorney's Office, through the undersigned
Public Attorney, respectfully serves notice that he is appealing the Decision rendered in
Criminal Cases No. 09-272518-23 which was promulgated on December 23, 2014 for
being contrary to law, established jurisprudence, and evidence adduced during trial. 45
Notably, petitioner did not specify that his appeal be taken to the CA. This was precisely
because it was not even his duty to designate to which court his appeal should be taken.
Case law states that "[i]n the notice of appeal[,] it is not even required that the appellant
indicate the court to which its appeal is being interposed. The requirement is merely
directory and failure to comply with it or error in the court indicated is not fatal to the
appeal", 46 as it should be in this case.
In the case of Ulep v. People,47 (Ulep) the Court held that it was the trial court which was
duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper forum. Thus, inUlep, the Court
granted the plea of the accused therein to remand the case to the RTC for transmission
to the Sandiganbayan:

x x x [P]etitioner's failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was
inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed,
petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be
dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction — which was exactly what happened in the
CA.

The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the
case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge
concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the
great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary
grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected
to know and should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have
known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to
the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully observed this
responsibility specially in cases such as this where a person's liberty was at stake.
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby GRANTED. The August 27, 2008 resolution of this
Court and the September 25, 2007 and June 6, 2008 resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 30227 are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to
remand the records of this case, together with all the oral and documentary evidence, to
the Regional Trial Court for transmission to the Sandiganbayan.

x x x x48 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, the Court finds no reason why the same ruling should not be made in this case.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner duly filed his appeal before the RTC, absent any
indication that his case be appealed to either the CA or the Sandiganbayan. As noted in
Ulep, since cases involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are
fairly common, the RTC was expected to know that petitioner's case should have been
appealed to the Sandiganbayan. Unfortunately, the records were wrongly transmitted by
the RTC to the CA. Petitioner, however, took the liberty to rectify this error by filing the
Motion to Endorse, which the CA nonetheless denied pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court.49 The CA faulted petitioner for belatedly moving for the endorsement
of the case, as the motion was not filed within the original fifteen (15)-day period to appeal.
However, it should be pointed out that the said motion was duly filed within the extended
period to appeal, which period the CA itself granted. In fact, it remains apparent that the
CA, by granting his motions for extension, had already given petitioner the impression
that it had jurisdiction over his appeal. Hence, all things considered, the Court finds that
petitioner's filing of the Motion to Endorse beyond the original fifteen (15)-day period much
more the erroneous transmittal of the case to the CA by the RTC should not be taken
against him, else it result in the injudicious dismissal of his appeal.

At any rate, the Court observes that petitioner had raised substantial arguments in his
appeal, which altogether justify the relaxation of the rules.

In particular, petitioner proffers that the prosecution should have presented the billing
statements issued by the City of Manila during trial, which, by its procedure, would prove
the actual amount to be billed from the private entities, and from said amount, the
difference from what was collected could be ascertained, viz.:

Q: So what will happen after you gave a copy of the billing statement to any person in
that vicinity?

A: They will pay us what is stated in the billing statement, ma'am."50(Emphasis

supplied)

Additionally, petitioner posits that the billing statements are delivered to the private
entities and end up being received by their utility personnel. As such, it opens up the
possibility that someone other than petitioner could have falsified the subject receipts to
make it appear that the employer paid a bigger fee when in fact it did not. 51

Finally, petitioner points out that the testimony of Caimbon, the handwriting expert
witness, should have been considered with more caution, since it appears to be
inconsistent with the Questioned Document Report No. 0907-01, which she herself
issued. In the said Report, it was revealed that "no conclusive opinion can be rendered"
on the questioned handwritings, given that the documents submitted by the prosecution
were mere photocopies of the original. During trial, Caimbon testified that:

ATTY. GUIYAB:
Q: Madam Witness, in this page 3 of the Questioned Document Report No. 0907-01, the
date completed as indicated here is October 2, 2007 on page 3 which I have asked you
a while ago, on No. 1, this Questioned Document No. 1 and No.2 are mere photocopies,
these are the ones pertaining to page 1 Official Receipt, City of Manila dated February 5,
2007 marked as Q-1, is that correct?
A: As I can recall, this Remarks (sic) was in reference to this conclusion, this one,
Questioned Handwriting marked Q-1 to Q-6.
Q: Your Honor, the answer of the witness when I asked her whether this remarks
(sic) pertains to the documents indicated on page 1, the two receipts 5442301 dated
February 5, 2007 and Receipt No. 5069801 dated November 3, 2006, those are the
two receipts which I was asking on cross to the witness but now Your Honor, the
witness is saying that her conclusion indicating that, for emphasis "No conclusive
Opinion can be rendered to Question #1 and #2 due to the fact that the submitted
Questioned Handwritings were mere photo copies.", pertains to the Conclusion
"The Questioned Handwritings marked "Q-1" to "Q-6" inclusive and the submitted
standard Handwritings of ANGEL FUELLAS DIZON marked "S1" to S20" inclusive
reveal strong INDICATION that it was WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME
PERSON.", meaning Madam Witness that the receipts which was (sic) the subject
case against Angel Fuellas from Q1 to Q6 as based on your findings were mere
photocopies, am I correct?
A: Based on my report.
Q: So, these are mere photocopies, the questioned documents, meaning, the
receipts which was (sic) allegedly issued to the payors not the duplicate copy and
the triplicate copy which was submitted to the City of Manila and to the COA, is that
correct?
A: As appearing in my report.
x x x x52 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore finds that a more thorough review and
appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defense, as well as a proper
application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan, would
do well to assuage petitioner that his appeal is decided scrupulously. 53

In fine, the Court holds that petitioner's Motion to Endorse should be granted.
Consequently, the CA Resolutions dated June 16, 2016 and October 6, 2016 are set
aside. The CA is hereby directed to remand the records of this case, together with all the
oral and documentary evidence, to the RTC for transmission to the Sandiganbayan, with
reasonable dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated June 16, 2016 and
October 6, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR No. 37292 are hereby SET
ASIDE. The CA is hereby directed to REMAND the records of this case, together with all
the oral and documentary evidence, to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 for
transmission to the Sandiganbayan, with reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 233922, JANUARY 24, 2018]

MA. VICTORIA M. GALANG, PETITIONER,
V.
PEAKHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated April
21, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated August 29, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 107678, which affirmed the Order4 dated February 22, 2016 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC-Br. 126) in Civil Case No. C-22988,
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner Ma. Victoria M. Galang (Galang) for annulment
of deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings on the ground of forum
shopping.

The Facts

This case stemmed from a complaint for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage and
foreclosure proceedings5 filed by Galang against respondent Peakhold Finance
Corporation (Peakhold) before the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC-Br. 123),
docketed as Civil Case No. C-22988 (Annulment Case).6 Essentially, the complaint
alleged that: (a) Galang is the registered owner of a 150-square meter (sq. m.) lot located
at Deparo, Caloocan City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327548 (subject
lot); (b) the subject lot was mortgaged to Peakhold without her knowledge and
consent; (c) Peakhold foreclosed the subject lot, and eventually, acquired the same via
an auction sale; and (d) as such, the mortgage must be annulled as her signature in the
mortgage document was forged/falsified.7

While the Annulment Case was pending, Peakhold filed an Ex-Parte Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession (Ex-Parte Petition)8 over the subject lot, before the RTC
of Caloocan City, Branch 122 (RTC-Br. 122), docketed as LRC Case No. C-6032, to
which Galang filed her opposition9 on June 11, 2012. In a Decision10 dated November 27,
2012, the RTC-Br. 122 granted Peakhold's Ex-Parte Petition, noted Galang's
opposition,11and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
Peakhold.12 Initially, Galang filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review13 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 128171.14 Further, Galang filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment15 before the RTC-Br. 122 (Petition for Relief Case) on
February 11, 2013, contending that the Ex-Parte Petition is not summary in nature and
should have been threshed out in an adversarial proceeding, as it essentially deals with
the validity of the subject deed.16 After filing the Petition for Relief Case, Galang
manifested that he is withdrawing the filing of the intended petition for review before the
CA, which was granted on April 24, 2013.17

Thus, on May 7, 2013, Peakhold, through a Motion to Dismiss, 18 sought the dismissal of
the Petition for Relief Case on the ground of forum shopping. In a Resolution 19 dated
September 2, 2013, the RTC-Br. 122 granted the said motion, holding that Galang
deliberately failed to mention in her Petition for Relief from Judgment that she likewise
filed a petition for review before the CA, which had not been effectively withdrawn at the
time the Petition for Relief Case was filed.20 With the subsequent denial21 of the motion
for reconsideration,22 Galang elevated the matter to the CA via a petition
for certiorari and mandamus,23 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133782 (Certiorari Case).

During the pendency of the Certiorari Case, the Annulment Case was re-raffled to the
RTC-Br. 126.24 Considering the implementation of the writ of possession, Galang was
prompted to file a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended
Complaint (Amended Complaint)25 on September 23, 2014, incorporating her additional
prayer for reconveyance of the subject lot. In response, Peakhold moved to
dismiss26 the Annulment Case on the ground of, inter alia, forum shopping, since the
Amended Complaint failed to disclose that Galang has a pending Certiorari Case before
the CA, as well as a complaint for qualified theft (Criminal Complaint) 27 against the
President of Peakhold and a certain Jocelyn "Gigi" Cortina-Donasco (Donasco) before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City (OCP Caloocan).28

The RTC-Br. 126 Ruling

Initially, the RTC-Br. 126 issued an Order29 dated October 12, 2015, denying Peakhold's
motion to dismiss. It found that the causes of actions and reliefs prayed for in
the Annulment and Certiorari Cases are different from those in the Criminal
Complaint. It further held that, assuming that the Order dismissing the Petition for Relief
Case is reversed, there is still no violation of the rule against forum shopping, since the
prayers/reliefs in the Annulment Case are different from those in the Petition for Relief
Case.30

On reconsideration,31 however, the RTC-Br. 126 issued an Order32 dated February 22,
2016, finding Galang guilty of forum shopping, considering that the Petition for Relief
Case, together with the Annulment and Certiorari Cases, all have a common cause of
action/relief – that is the reconveyance of the subject lot to Galang.33

Aggrieved, Galang moved for reconsideration,34 but the same was denied in an
Order35dated June 20, 2016; hence, the appeal36 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 107678.37

The CA Ruling
In a Decision38 dated April 21, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC-Br. 126 ruling. It held that
Galang is guilty of forum shopping as she failed to indicate the pendency of
the Certiorari Case before the CA, as well as the Criminal Complaint before the OCP
Caloocan in her Amended Complaint in the Annulment Case. More significantly, it
noticed that there is identity of parties, rights asserted/causes of action, and reliefs prayed
for among the aforesaid cases.39

Dissatisfied, Galang sought reconsideration40 thereof, which was denied in a

Resolution41 dated August 29, 2017; hence, the instant petition.

In the interim, the CA issued a Decision42 dated September 23, 2015, dismissing
the Certiorari Case for lack of merit.43 While it found Galang not to have committed forum
shopping – since the supposed filing of the petition for review, i.e., CA-G.R. SP No.
128171, was simply filed out of oversight – it nevertheless sustained the RTC-Br. 122's
dismissal of the Petition for Relief Case, given that petitioner failed to establish the
existence of extrinsic fraud, as in fact, she was able to file her comment and had her day
in court. In any event, it could not rule upon the existence of forum shopping, as the
petition for review, being the basis of the forum shopping allegation, had already been
expunged by the CA.44 Galang also moved for its reconsideration,45 but the same was
denied in a Resolution46 dated August 23, 2016.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that
Galang committed forum shopping when she failed to declare the
pending CertiorariCase and Criminal Complaint in her Amended Complaint in
the Annulment Case.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues, either pending in or already resolved by some other court, to increase
the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. 47 It can
be committed in three (3) ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where
the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).48

Thus, to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is essential
to ask whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another or
whether the following elements of litis pendentia are present: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two (2) preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.49

In this instance, Galang filed a total of four (4) cases, namely:

(a) the Annulment Case seeking to annul the allegedly fraudulent mortgage document
involving the subject lot;

(b) the Petition for Relief Case seeking to set aside the ex-parte writ of possession
issued in Peakhold's favor;

(c) the Certiorari Case imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 122 in
dismissing the Petition for Relief Case on the ground of forum shopping; and

(d) the Criminal Complaint seeking to indict the President of Peakhold and Donasco for
the crime of Qualified Theft.

A judicious perusal of the records reveals that there is no identity of causes of actions
and reliefs prayed for among the said cases. As already adverted to, the Annulment
Case seeks to nullify the mortgage document executed in Peakhold's favor, as well as
the subsequent foreclosure proceedings, given that the alleged real estate mortgage
covering the subject lot was void for having been executed without Galang's knowledge
and consent. In the Petition for Relief Case, Galang sought to set aside the ex parte writ
of possession, contending that the same should have been threshed out in an adversarial
proceeding, since it involves a fictitious deed of real estate mortgage, where the
mortgagor therein is supposedly an impostor of Galang; while the Certiorari Casesought
to revive the Petition for Relief Case which was dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping. Finally, the Criminal Complaint involves the determination of whether or not
there is probable cause to indict the President of Peakhold and Donasco for Qualified
Theft.

Similarly, the issues raised and determined in these cases likewise differ. In
the Annulment Case, the issue is whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage is
void, thereby entitling Galang to the recovery of the subject lot. In the Petition for Relief
Case,the issue is whether or not extrinsic fraud was actually employed by Peakhold
during the Ex-Parte Petition proceedings. In the Certiorari Case, the issue is whether or
not the RTC-Br. 122 acted with grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the dismissal
of Galang's Petition for Relief. Lastly, in the Criminal Complaint, the issue is whether
or not there is probable cause to believe that the President of Peakhold and Donasco
committed the crime of Qualified Theft and should stand trial therefor.

Given the above, the Court finds that Galang correctly declared in the Amended
Complaint in the Annulment Case that she did not commence any action or proceeding
which involves the same causes of actions, reliefs, and issues in any court, tribunal, or
agency at the time she filed the said Amended Complaint, or anytime thereafter. In this
light, there is no litis pendentia, as the cases essentially involve different causes of
actions, reliefs, and issues. Thus, any judgment rendered in one will not necessarily
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. This holds true even if the
complaint in the Annulment Case was subsequently amended by Galang. Moreover, the
cases also differ in their form and nature, for while a ruling in the Annulment Case may
result in the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject lot, a favorable ruling in
the other cases will not have the same effect, considering that: (a) the granting of
the Certiorari Case will lead to the granting of the Petition for Relief Case; (b) a
favorable result in the Petition for Relief Case would end up in the conduct of adversarial
proceedings before a writ of possession concerning the subject lot may be issued;
and (c) the resolution of the Criminal Complaint is only determinative of whether or not
the President of Peakhold and/or Donasco should be indicted of the crime of Qualified
Theft and stand trial therefor.

Accordingly, the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the Annulment Case on the
ground of forum shopping. Thus, a revival of the Annulment Case and its remand to
RTC-Br. 126 is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 21, 2017 and the
Resolution dated August 29, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 107678 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. C-22988 is
hereby REVIVED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
126 for its resolution on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALVIN JUGO Y VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated September 27, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06927, which affirmed the Decision3 dated June
27, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 2011-0398-D, finding accused Alvin Jugo y Villanueva (Jugo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized
under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information4 filed before the RTC charging Jugo of violation
of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about August 5, 2011 in the afternoon, in Primicias St., corner 4 thBlock, Sagud
Bahley, San Fabian, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously SELL,
TRADE, and DELIVERED (sic) one (1) transparent plastic sachet of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, weighing 0.101 gram to an undercover police
officer of PNP San Fabian during a buy-bust operation, without any permit or license to
do so.

CONTRARY TO Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165.5

The prosecution alleged that sometime in 2011, members of the San Fabian Police
Station conducted surveillance for three (3) months to verify the reports that Jugo was
engaged in illegal drug activities.6 In the morning of August 5, 2011, a team composed of
Police Officer 2 Fernando Romero, Jr. (PO2 Romero) as the poseur-buyer, Senior Police
Officer 1 Ariel Villegas (SPO1 Villegas), Police Officer 3 Edmund Disu7 (PO3 Disu), Police
Officer 3 Cristobal Eslabra, and Police Officer 1 Fernando Berongoy, Jr., prepared for a
buy-bust operation to be conducted at Primicias St., comer 4th Block, Barangay Sagud
Bahley, San Fabian, Pangasinan.8 At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, PO2 Romero
and the civilian informant met with Jugo and his two (2) companions, Amor Lomibao
(Lomibao) and Marvin Zamudio (Zamudio), in front of a carinderia.9 The civilian informant
first approached Jugo, followed by PO2 Romero. Afterwards, Jugo, Lomibao, and
Zamudio executed the transaction with PO2 Romero, who then gave the marked money
to Jugo; in turn, Jugo handed to PO2 Romero one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance.10 After the civilian asset left, PO2 Romero
performed the pre-arranged signal, prompting the rest of the team to approach them and
arrest Jugo and his two (2) companions. SPO1 Villegas conducted a body search on Jugo
and recovered the marked money.11 PO2 Romero retained possession of the subject
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.12

After the buy-bust operation, the team returned to the police station with the confiscated
sachet to avoid any untoward incident as people were approaching the team. 13 Thereat,
PO2 Romero marked the subject plastic sachet with "FMR,"14 took photographs of the
drug and motorcycle, and prepared the request for laboratory examination, Joint Affidavit
of Arrest, and Confiscation Receipt.15 Together with Jugo, PO2 Romero and PO3 Disu
went to the barangay hall and asked Barangay Captain Alvin Fajardo (Brgy. Capt.
Fajardo) to sign the Confiscation Receipt.16 Thereafter, PO2 Romero and PO3 Disu
brought the suspected sachet of drug, with a request for laboratory examination from
Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Domingo Soriano, to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination by PCI Emelda Roderos.17 The laboratory examination yielded positive
results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.18

In his defense, Jugo testified that on August 5, 2011, he went with Lomibao and Zamudio
to Barangay Cayanga to borrow money from his uncle for his wife's delivery. 19While
onboard the motorcycle going back to Barangay Sagud Bahley, they were flagged down
by PO2 Romero and were subsequently brought to the police station for interrogation.
Later on, Lomibao and Zamudio were released, while Jugo remained in detention. 20

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision21 dated June 27, 2014, the RTC found Jugo liable for the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165.22Accordingly, Jugo was sentenced to suffer the penalty of the life imprisonment
and ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00.23

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of illegal sale
of shabu during a valid buy-bust operation.24 In this regard, the RTC ruled that PO2
Romero's testimony positively identified Jugo as the seller of the dangerous drug, which
was presented and duly identified in court. Further, the RTC did not give weight to Jugo's
bare denial that he was merely flagged down by PO2 Romero.25

Aggrieved by his conviction, Jugo appealed26 to the CA, contending, among others, that
there were various deviations from the chain of custody rule.27 Particularly, he pointed out
that: (a) the marking of the drug was not immediately conducted upon arrest and
confiscation; (b) the marking, taking of photographs, and physical inventory were not done
in the presence of a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and an
elected public official; and (c) there were discrepancies between the testimony of PO2
Romero and the Confiscation Receipt and Request for Laboratory Examination, as the
documents state that the one (1) plastic sachet of shabu was seized from all three,
namely, Jugo, Lomibao, and Zamudio, while PO2 Romero testified that the same drug
was only confiscated from Jugo.28

The CA Ruling

In a Decision29 dated September 27, 2016, the CA affirmed Jugo's conviction. 30 It held
that the testimonies of the police officers were sufficient to prove that Jugo committed the
crime of illegal sale of shabu and that PO2 Romero's testimony satisfactorily established
the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, identifying PO2 Romero as the poseur-
buyer and Jugo as the seller of one (1) plastic sachet of shabu for the price of
P300.00.31 Moreover, the CA remarked that the warrantless arrest of Jugo was legal;
hence, the seized items are admissible in evidence.32 Lastly, the CA observed that the
chain of custody was sufficiently established as the handling of the seized items was
substantially compliant with the legal requirements of Section 21, Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165.33

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Jugo's conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 must be upheld.
The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Preliminarily, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review, and thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law.34

Here, Juga was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In order to properly secure the conviction
of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove:
(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment.35 In such a crime, it is essential that the identity
of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in
the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.36

While not specifically defined in RA 9165, Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 200237 defined the term "chain of custody" as the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of the seized drugs at each stage, from the
moment of confiscation to the receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination, until it is
presented in court. In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure
that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their
integrity and evidentiary value are preserved.38 Under the said section, the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory and take photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused or
the person from whom such items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media or the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same;
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination purposes.39Case law stresses
that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the
Department of Justice, [and] any elected public official during the seizure and
marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of
the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs) that were
evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of
such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."40

Nonetheless, it has been clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 41In fact,
the IRR of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA
1064042 - provides that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless
seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165- under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 43 In other
words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out
in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso factorender the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily
proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 44However, prevailing
jurisprudence instructs that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Moreover, the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.45

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody which were unjustified, thereby putting into question the identity,
integrity, and evidentiary value of the seized items from Jugo.

At the outset, the Court notes SPO1 Villegas's testimony on re-direct examination where
he essentially testified that while he was present at the police station when PO2 Romero
prepared the Confiscation Receipt46 - which the prosecution claims to be the physical
inventory of the seized item - he nevertheless admitted that he never saw PO2 Romero
make such preparation, and also claimed lack of knowledge as to the other details of the
preparation of said receipt despite him and PO2 Romero being in the same office:

Pros. Lopez: By the way, where were you when PO2 Romero was already preparing this
confiscation receipt?
SPO1 Villegas: I am in the office, ma'am.
Q: What about PO2 Romero, do you know where did he prepare this confiscation receipt?
A: In the office also, ma'am.
Q: And did you see him prepared [sic] this confiscation receipt?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: So you did not know what point in time exactly PO2 Romero prepared this Confiscation
Receipt?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: You also do not know who signed this Confiscation Receipt as you say you do not
know when this Confiscation receipt was prepared and who signed the same, correct?
A . Yes, ma’am.47
Verily, the aforesaid testimony raises questions as to whether or not the Confiscation
Receipt was prepared in an orderly manner. More importantly, a plain examination of the
Confiscation Receipt shows that it was not prepared in the presence of any representative
from either the media or the DOJ. Furthermore, the prosecution's claim that an elected
public official attended the preparation of the Confiscation Receipt was belied by no less
than PO2 Romero, who explicitly testified that they merely went to the office of Brgy. Capt.
Fajardo to have the Confiscation Receipt signed after the same was already prepared
and after the photographs were already taken:

Pros. Lopez: What about the signature on top of the name Alvin Fajardo, do you know
whose signature is this?
PO2 Romero: That is the signature of Brgy. Captain Alvin Fajardo, ma'am.
Q: Can you tell us who asked Alvin Fajardo to sign this Confiscation Receipt?
A: It's me, ma'am.
Q: Where did you ask him to sign this Confiscation Receipt?
A: At the barangay hall, ma'am.48
Notably, such testimony was corroborated by that of SPO1 Villegas on cross-
examination, to wit:
Q: Did you contact any barangay official when the confiscation receipt was prepared
because you said you saw the preparation of the same?
A: That's the job of the MAIDSOTG, PNCO, ma'am.
Q: You said you saw the preparation of the confiscation receipt, was there any barangay
official at your office who witnessed the preparation of the confiscation receipt and also
the signing of the same?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: So Punong Barangay Alvin Fajardo was not there?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q: Did he sign this confiscation receipt or not?
A: I don't know because it was the job of the MAIDSOTG to prepare that document.
Q: And there was no picture taken to show the signing of the confiscation receipt?
A: None, ma'am.49 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the preparation of the inventory, i.e., Confiscation
Receipt, and taking of photographs were NOT done in the presence of: (a) the accused
or his representative; (b) an elected public official; and (c) a representative from the DOJ
or the media, contrary to the express provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640. In such instances, the prosecution must provide a credible
explanation justifying the non-compliance with the rule as the presence of these
individuals is not just a matter of procedure. Rather, the rule exists to ensure that
protection is given to the innocent whose life and liberty are put at risk. Unfortunately, no
such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural lapse.

By and large, the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate against
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.50 It is well-settled that the
procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot
be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment
to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.51 Perforce, since the prosecution failed to
provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Jugo's acquittal is in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.52

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As
such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 27, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06927 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Alvin Jugo y Villanueva is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
PHILIP MAMANGON YESPIRITU, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Philip Mamangon y

Espiritu (Mamangon) assailing the Decision2 dated November 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06565, which affirmed the Decision3dated
September 17, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53 (RTC) in Crim. Case
Nos. 09-266829 and 09-266830 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Mamangon
of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the accusatory
portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 09-266829

That on or about February 20, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away any dangerous drug,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell, trade, deliver or give away
ZERO POINT ZERO ZERO NINE (0.009) gm. of white crystalline substance containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, known as "SHABU", a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.6

Criminal Case No. 09-266830

That on or about February 20, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
without being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his control and
custody ZERO POINT ZERO ZERO SEVEN (0.007) gm. white crystalline substance
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, known as "SHABU", a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.7

The prosecution alleged that at around seven (7) o'clock in the evening of February 20,
2009, a tip was received from a confidential informant that a certain "Pepe," who was later
on identified as Mamangon, was selling illegal drugs along the railroad track of Dagupan
Extension and Antipolo Street in Tondo, Manila. 8 Acting on the said tip, a buy-bust
operation was organized in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), and the buy-bust team went to the target area at around 8:40 in the evening. 9
Upon arriving thereat, the informant, together with Police Officer (PO) 3 Erick Guzman
(PO3 Guzman), the designated poseur-buyer, approached Mamangon and ordered
P300.00 worth of shabu from him. Subsequently, Mamangon handed over one (1) piece
of plastic sachet containing shabu to PO3 Guzman, who simultaneously paid the former
using the marked money. Shortly after, PO3 Guzman removed his cap, which was the
pre-arranged signal for the police to come in, and consequently, Mamangon was
apprehended. PO3 Guzman then recovered the marked money from Mamangon and
ordered him to empty his pockets, which purportedly contained another plastic sachet of
shabu. After securing the additional plastic sachet, PO3 Guzman marked it alongside the
other seized item in the presence of Mamangon. Thereafter, the team went to the
barangay hall but immediately left since no one was around. The team then proceeded
to Police Station 7, where PO3 Guzman turned over Mamangon, as well as the seized
items, to PO2 Rolando Dela Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), the investigator on duty. 10 PO2 Dela
Cruz then conducted the requisite inventory, while PO3 Guzman took photographs of the
confiscated items in the presence of Mamangon and the other arresting officers. After
conducting the inventory to which were attached the photographs, PO2 Dela Cruz
prepared the request for laboratory examination, which was submitted together with the
seized items to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.
Accordingly, they were received and examined by Forensic Chemist, Police Senior
Inspector Elisa G. Reyes (FC Reyes), who confirmed that they contained
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.11
In his defense, Mamangon denied the allegations against him. He maintained that at
around four (4) o'clock in the afternoon of February 19, 2009, he was with his cousin,
Moises Mamangon, in Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, when PO2 Jayson Magbitang
(PO2 Magbitang) suddenly approached and asked them if they saw a person running
towards their direction. When Mamangon answered in the negative, another police officer
arrived, asked for his name, and frisked him. Mamangon claimed that PO2 Magbitang
then invited him to the police station for "verification." However, upon their arrival, he was
allegedly placed inside the detention cell and was brought out the following day, only to
have his pictures taken with the seized items. Mamangon clarified that while he knew
PO2 Magbitang to be a police officer, he did not know PO3 Guzman until the latter testified
in court.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated September 17, 2012, the RTC found Mamangon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article II of RA 9165 and respectively
sentenced him as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 09-266829, to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, with costs; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 09-
266830, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with
costs.14 It held that the prosecution proved with moral certainty all the necessary elements
of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On the contrary,
Mamangon's unsubstantiated defense of denial failed to overcome the positive
testimonies of witnesses, who had no ill-motive to testify falsely against him.15

Furthermore, the RTC found that the identity of the corpus delicti was competently
established by the prosecution, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
drugs were shown to have been preserved from the time they were seized from
Mamangon until they were submitted to the forensic chemist for examination up to the
time they were offered in evidence.16

Aggrieved, Mamangon appealed17 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision18 dated November 27, 2015, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC,19holding
that the prosecution adequately proved all the elements of the crimes charged.20 Further,
the CA ruled that the chain of custody rule was complied with: first, PO3 Guzman
immediately marked the confiscated illegal drugs at the place of arrest and delivered them
to PO2 Dela Cruz for further investigation and documentation; second, PO2 Dela Cruz
conducted an inventory of the seized drugs in the presence of Mamangon and the other
police officers; third, after the inventory, PO2 Dela Cruz brought the seized items to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were examined by FC Reyes; and fourth, after
examination, FC Reyes issued Chemistry Report No. D-121-0921 dated February 21,
2009 finding the drugs positive for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.22
Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Mamangon's
conviction for the crimes charged.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 23 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."24

Mamangon was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article
II of RA 9165. In every prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential
that the following elements are proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.25 Meanwhile, in order to convict an accused who is charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements also by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of
an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 26

In both cases, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the
prohibited drug, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the
corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain from the
moment that the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the
crime.27
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.28 Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DQJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same,
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.29 In the case of People v. Mendoza,30
the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.Indeed, the x x x presence of
such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."31

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 32 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064033 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not
render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.34 Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.35 In People v. Almorfe,36the Court explained that for the above-saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless
been preserved.37 Also, in People v. De Guzman,38 it was emphasized that the
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.39

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Mamangon.

First, records reveal that while the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated
drugs were conducted in the presence of Mamangon and the other apprehending officers,
the same were not done in the presence of an elected public official and any
representative from the DOJ and the media, viz.:

[Atty. Winston Aris M. Mendoza (ATTY. MENDOZA)]:

That during the Inventory of the confiscated item there was no other witness present.
[Fiscal Juan Eugenio T. Banico (FISCAL BANICO)]:
The accused as well as the arresting police officers were present. Your Honor.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
But there are no other witness present, Your honor, only the arresting police officers and
when the evidence were photograph [sic] the evidence was not yet marked, Your Honor.
FISCAL BANICO:
It was already marked and the photograph is the best evidence, Your Honor.
x x x x40 (Underscoring supplied)

Additionally, it also appears that when the police officers subsequently arrived at the
barangay hall, they had every opportunity to coordinate with the barangay officials and
secure the presence of the other witnesses, yet they decided to leave and immediately
proceed to the police station. During the Direct Examination of PO3 Guzman, he testified
that:

FISCAL FRANCISCO L. SALOMON:

Q: How about to the barangay officials, did you coordinate with the barangay officials after
the arrest?
[PO3 GUZMAN]:
A: We went at the barangay but no one is around sir.
Q: When you leave the place, where did you proceed Mr. Witness?
A: We proceeded to our office, at Station 7 sir.
x x x x41 (Underscoring supplied)

To make matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible explanation - apart
from their unsubstantiated claim that "no one is around" the barangay hall when they
arrived - in order for the saving clause to apply. Records fail to disclose that the police
officers even attempted to contact and secure the presence of an elected public official,
as well as a representative from the DOJ and the media, when they were already at the
police station. To reiterate, the law requires the presence of these witnesses to ensure
the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting,
or contamination of evidence. Thus, considering the police officers' unjustified non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs are seriously put into question.

Verily, procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were unfortunately
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised.42 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.43 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as well as its IRR, Mamangon's acquittal is
perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [ojrder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.44

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As such,
they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court.
Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact
that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s
below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining
the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely
complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no
such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused
and, perforce, overturn a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 27, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06565 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Philip Mamangon y Espiritu is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 229512, JANUARY 31, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
RONALDO PAZ Y DIONISIO @ "JEFF", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Ronaldo Paz y Dionisio
@ "Jeff'' (Paz) assailing the Decision2 dated February 11, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06886, which affirmed the Joint Decision 3 dated February
17, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
16574-D, and 16575-D, among other cases, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from four (4) separate Informations5 filed before the RTC, charging
Paz with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as well as
illegal possession of dangerous drugs and paraphernalia during parties, meetings, and
gatherings, the accusatory portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 16574-D

On or about February 6, 2009, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Jeffrey Agbunag y Valbuena,
a Police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.08
gram of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the
said law.

Contrary to law.6

Criminal Case No. 16575-D

On or about February 6, 2009, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
custody and control three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.02
gram of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the
said law.

Contrary to law.7

Criminal Case No. 16576-D

On or about February 6, 2009, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, while at a social gathering/meeting, in the proximate company of
three persons and in conspiracy with one another, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in their possession and under their custody and control one (1) unsealed transparent
plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, in the occasion of its use
or sniffing thereof, during a pot session, which substance were found positive to the test
for methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in
violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.8

Criminal Case No. 16577-D

On or about February 6, 2009, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, being in a pot session, and in the proximate company of three (3)
persons and in conspiracy with one another, without having been duly authorized by law
to possess paraphernalia for dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in their possession and under their custody and control one (1) strip
aluminum foil, one (1) rolled aluminium foil tooter and two (2) disposable lighters, said
instruments fit or intended for smoking, consuming or introducing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, the said drug paraphernalias except the disposable
lighters contained traces of white crystalline substance, which were found positive to the
test for methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," in violation of the
said law.

Contrary to law.9

The prosecution alleged that at around 8:30 in the evening of February 6, 2009, a tip was
received from a confidential informant that a certain Paz was selling illegal drugs along
Market Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City (Brgy. Palatiw). Acting on the said tip, a
buy-bust operation was organized in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency. At about 11:35 in the evening, the buy-bust team, together with the informant,
proceeded to the target area, which was a thrift shop (ukay-ukay) located at Brgy. Palatiw.
Upon arriving thereat, the informant saw Paz and introduced him to PO1ice Officer 1
Jeffrey Agbunag (PO1 Agbunag), the designated poseur-buyer. When Paz asked PO1
Agbunag if he was going to buy, the latter replied, "I will score in the amount of P500.00."
Paz then handed over a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO1
Agbunag, who, after inspecting the said item, paid Paz using the marked money. Shortly
after, PO1 Agbunag introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Paz. PO1
Agbunag then signalled Police Officer 3 Arnold Balagasay (PO3 Balagasay) for
assistance, as there were two (2) other persons later on identified as Rolando Condes y
Olivas @ Tangkad (Condes) and Abner Laceda y Ramos @ Abner (Laceda) - who were
purportedly sniffing shabu inside the shop. When PO3 Balagasay entered the thrift shop,
he immediately arrested Condes and Laceda. Thereafter, PO3 Balagasay noticed some
drug paraphernalia placed on top of a sack of clothes, i.e., one (1) unsealed transparent
plastic sachet with traces of white crystalline substance, an aluminium foil with traces of
white crystalline substance, an aluminium foil used as a tooter, and two (2) disposable
lighters, which he subsequently confiscated and marked. Meanwhile, PO1 Agbunag
instructed Paz to empty his pockets, which yielded three (3) more heat-sealed plastic
sachets of white crystalline substance, the marked money, and three (3) 100-peso bills.
Consequently, PO1 Agbunag marked all four (4) plastic sachets. 10 Thereafter, the buy-
bust team took the confiscated plastic sachets and drug paraphernalia to the Pasig City
Police Station, where the requisite inventory was conducted by PO1 Agbunag. After the
inventory, Paz, together with Condes and Laceda, was brought to the Rizal Medical
Center for medical examination, which was followed by a drug testing at the EDP Crime
Laboratory Service. The confiscated plastic sachets and drug paraphernalia were likewise
submitted to the EDP Crime Laboratory Service for qualitative
11
examination. Accordingly, they were received and examined by Forensic Chemist
Police Chief Inspector Lourdeliza Gural Cejes (PSI Cejes), who confirmed that they
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 12

For his part, Paz interposed the defense of denial, claiming that he was not caught in a
buy-bust operation, for there were no buy-bust money and dangerous drugs recovered
from him. He maintained that between seven o'clock to eight o'clock in the evening of
February 6, 2009,13 he was preparing to close the thrift shop with his wife and Condes,
when three (3) unidentified armed men suddenly arrived and handcuffed him and Condes.
When they asked about their violation, they were told to just explain in the office. After
they were brought to the precinct, they were placed inside a detention cell, while Paz's
cellphone and money were taken away from him. The police demanded the amount of
P100,000.00 in exchange for their release, which amount they purportedly failed to
provide. As such, they were brought to Marikina to have their urine samples taken, and
thereafter, to the Rizal Medical Center. On February 9, 2009, they were finally brought to
the Prosecutor's Office.14

As for Condes and Laceda, they corroborated the testimony of Paz, further alleging that
they did not file any administrative charges against the arresting officers out of fear of
reprisal.15 Notably, Condes died during the pendency of the case, and accordingly, a
death certificate was submitted to the RTC.16

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision17 dated February 17, 2014, the RTC ruled as follows: (a) in Crim. Case
No. 16574-D, Paz was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165, and hence, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00; (b) in Crim. Case No. 16575-D, Paz was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and thus, sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00; (c) in Crim. Case
Nos. 16576-D and 16577-D, Paz and Laceda were acquitted of violating Sections 13 and
14, Article II of RA 9165 on the ground of reasonable doubt; and (d) the cases against
Condes were dismissed in view of his death pursuant to Article 89 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code.18

The RTC held that all the elements of the crimes for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs were satisfactorily proven to convict Paz of the said crimes. 19 Further, it
ruled that the absence of an elected public official and a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) did not render the buy-bust operation illegal, as the
chain of custody over the dangerous drugs was competently proven by the prosecution.
More significantly, it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs
had been preserved from the time they were seized, marked, and inventoried by PO1
Agbunag until they were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. 20

Meanwhile, the RTC found that Condes and Laceda could not be convicted of violations
of Sections 13 and 14, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC noted that PO3 Balagasay, as the
officer responsible for the arrest of Condes and Laceda, failed to sign the inventory of the
seized paraphernalia. As such, it was probable that the items seized from them were not
the same items listed in the inventory. Also, the amount or quantity of
suspected shabu found in the unsealed transparent plastic sachet - which was previously
recovered from Condes and Laceda - could barely be determined, as the sachet merely
contained traces or residue of the suspected drug.21

Similarly, the RTC held that Paz could not be charged of Sections 13 and 14, Article II of
RA 9165 as well, considering that he was not caught in the company of Condes and
Laceda when he was selling shabu to PO1 Agbunag. In fact, PO1 Agbunag testified that
Condes and Laceda were caught having a pot session without Paz around them. 22

Aggrieved, Paz appealed23 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision24 dated February 11, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with
modification, adjusting the penalty in Crim. Case No. 16575-D (that is, for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165) to an indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. 25 It held that despite the
arresting officers' failure to both conduct an inventory of the seized drugs immediately
after the arrest and take photographs thereof in the presence of Paz and the required
witnesses, it was nevertheless established that the integrity of the chain of custody of the
seized drugs was preserved.26 On the contrary, it declared that the origin of the buy-bust
money and the non-presentation of the confidential informant in court were
inconsequential to the prosecution of the crimes charged. It likewise added that the
absence of a prior surveillance was neither required for the validity of a buy-bust
operation, nor was it fatal to the prosecution's case.27

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Paz's
conviction for the crimes charged.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 28 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."29

In this case, Paz was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. In every prosecution for an unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is
essential that the following elements are proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment.30 Meanwhile, to convict an accused who is charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements also by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of
an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.31

In both circumstances, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the
prohibited drug, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody
from the moment that the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime.32

In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police
officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value.33 Under the said provision, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs
must be turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.34 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,35 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs) that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 36

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 37 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064038 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance
with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable
grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team.39 Tersely put, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.40 In People v. Almorfe,41the Court explained
that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.42 Also, in People v. De
Guzman,43 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.44

In this case, Paz ultimately prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR, as well as their failure to
proffer a plausible explanation therefor.45 In particular, he claims that there were no
elected public official and a representative from the media and the DOJ to witness the
requisite inventory of the seized items; and that there were no photographs taken during
the conduct of the same.46

Such contentions are meritorious.

An examination of the records reveals that while the marking and inventory of the seized
items were conducted in the presence of Paz and the other apprehending officers, the
same were not done in the presence of an elected public official and a representative
from the media and the DOJ. During his re-direct examination, PO3 Balagasay testified
that:
Q: Who were present when the inventory was made at your office?

A: The operatives, my companions, and the suspects, sir.

Q: Only them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You do not have any elected official there?

A: None, sir.

x x x x47 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, in an attempt to justify such absence, PO3 Balasagay maintained that:

Q: Why?

A: The practice is that it is only when we have search warrant that we invite
barangay official and media, sir.

x x x x48 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Given the above, it appears that PO3 Balagasay clearly misconstrued the law and its
application in buy-bust operations. His justification was likewise grossly insufficient and
without legal basis for the saving-clause to apply. As the Court observed in the case
of People v. Geronimo,49 there is nothing in the law which exempts the apprehending
officers from securing the presence of an elected public official and a representative from
the media and the DOJ, particularly in instances when they are not equipped with a search
warrant.50 Verily, RA 9165 and its IRR provide that non-compliance with the required
procedure can only be allowed under exceptional circumstances, provided that justifiable
grounds are given and proven as a fact by the apprehending officers, 51 which PO3
Balagasay also failed to show.
In addition, records reveal that the prosecution did not present any photographs of the
supposed conduct of inventory during trial. More apparent is the failure of the witnesses
to state or mention whether or not any photographs were indeed taken. When asked
during his cross-examination, PO3 Balagasay merely stated that he "cannot recall already
if there was a photograph of the evidence."52

Observably, the procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were
unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti had been compromised.53 It is well-settled that the procedure in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.54 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as well as
its IRR, Paz's acquittal is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.55

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As
such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 11, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06886 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Renaldo Paz y Dionisio @ "Jeff" is ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED

[A.M. No. 17-11-272-RTC, January 31, 2018]

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF LEMUEL H. VENDIOLA, SHERIFF IV,
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT (OCC), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BIÑAN
CITY, LAGUNA (RTC).

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stems from a request1 to drop Mr. Lemuel H. Vendiola
(Vendiola), Sheriff IV in the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court of
Biñan City, Laguna (RTC), from the rolls due to his absences without official leave.

The Facts

The records of the Employees's Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS),
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), show that Vendiola has not submitted his Daily
Time Record (DTR) since May 2012 up to the present. 2 He neither submitted any
application for leave.3 His service record4 shows that he was appointed Utility Worker I in
the RTC, Branch 24 on November 10, 2004. On April 27, 2009, he was appointed
temporarily as Sheriff IV in the OCC, RTC. He was reappointed to the same position on
a permanent capacity on June 3, 2010.5 Vendiola did not submit the requirements for
initial salary; he did, however, submit his DTR until April 2012.

In a Letter6 dated February 21, 2013, Executive Judge Teodoro N. Solis of the RTC,
Branch 25, requested the OCA to drop Vendiola from the rolls and declare his position
vacant considering his absences without official leave since April 2012. 7
Moreover, Vendiola's salaries and benefits have been withheld since December 2010 due
to his non-submission of requirements for his initial salary in connection with his
reappointment on a permanent capacity as Sheriff IV.8

The OCA informed the Court of its findings based on the records of its different offices,
namely: (a) Vendiola is still in the plantilla of court personnel, and thus, considered to be
in active service; (b) he has no application for retirement; and (c) no administrative case
is pending against him; but (d) he is, however, accountable for STF9 (Sheriff Trust Fund)
and has yet to be audited.10

In its report and recommendation11 dated November 2, 2017, the OCA recommended
that: (a) Vendiola's name be dropped from the rolls effective May 2, 2012 for having been
absent without official leave; (b) his position be declared vacant; and (c) he be informed
about his separation from the service at his last known address on record at Kasilaga
Compound Silangan St., San Francisco, Biñan, Laguna. The OCA added, however, that
Vendiola is still qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws
and may still be reemployed in the government.12

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation.

Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum
Circular No. 13, Series of 2007,13 states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who
is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days
shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated
from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Based on this provision, Vendiola should be separated from service or dropped from the
rolls in view of his continued absence since April 2012.
Vendiola's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as
it disrupted the normal functions of the court.14 It contravened the duty of a public servant
to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. 15 It
should be reiterated and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with
the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's
faith in the judiciary.16 By failing to report for work since April 2012 up to the present,
Vendiola grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed
to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the
government service.17

The dropping from the rolls, however, shall be without prejudice to his liability, if any, upon
completion of the audit.

WHEREFORE, Mr. Lemuel H. Vendiola, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court of Biñan City, Laguna, is hereby DROPPED from the rolls effective May 2,
2012 and his position is declared VACANT. He is, however, still qualified to receive the
benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the
government.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served upon him at his address appearing in his 201 file
pursuant to Rule XVI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as
amended.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
JOVENCITO MIRANDA Y TIGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Jovencito Miranda y

Tigas (Miranda) assailing the Decision2 dated July 29, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07580, which affirmed the Decision3 dated March 10, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 13-906 and 13-
907, finding Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," respectively.
The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Miranda of
the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined
and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portions of
which state:

Criminal Case No. 13-906

On the 18th day of March 2013, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, without the
necessary license or prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and give away Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 13-907

On the 18th day of March 2013, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drugs without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control zero point zero two (0.02)
gram of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu),
which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that on March 18, 2013, an informant tipped the Makati Anti-
Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) that Miranda, alias "Thunder," was selling illegal drugs
along Infanta Street, Barangay Olympia, Makati City. After verifying the said tip, a buy-
bust operation was organized in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), and the team, together with the informant, proceeded to the target area
along Infanta Street at ten (10) o'clock in the evening. Upon arriving, the informant
introduced MADAC operative Delno A. Encarnacion (Encarnacion), the designated
poseur-buyer, to Miranda as the buyer of shabu worth P300.00. Encarnacion then gave
the marked money to Miranda, while the latter simultaneously handed over one (1)
transparent sachet of suspected shabu. After inspecting the item, Encarnacion executed
the pre-arranged signal by wiping his face with a white towel, prompting the buy-bust
team to rush towards the scene and arrest Miranda. Subsequently, a body search was
conducted on Miranda, whose pockets purportedly yielded another plastic sachet of
shabu and the buy-bust money. Since Miranda allegedly resisted and attempted to
escape, the team was constrained to pull out from the site and bring him to the barangay
hall of Barangay Olympia. Thereat, Encarnacion marked (with "THUNDER" and
"THUNDER-1") and inventoried the seized sachets of shabu in the presence of Miranda
and Barangay Kagawad Noe Lyndon Gonzales, among others. Photos of the seized
drugs, together with the witnesses, were likewise taken. Encarnacion turned over the
items to Senior Police Officer 1 Nildo T. Orsua8 (SPO1 Orsua), who prepared a letter-
request for examination. After securing the letter-request, Encarnacion retrieved the items
from SPO1 Orsua and brought them to the Philippine National Police (PNP) crime
laboratory for qualitative examination. At 11:15 in the evening, the same were received
by forensic chemist Police Senior Inspector Rendielyn L. Sahagun (PSI Sahagun) and
confirmed that they indeed contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.9

For his part, Miranda denied the allegations against him, claiming that at around 3:30 in
the afternoon of March 18, 2013, he was in No. 7420 Infanta Street, Makati City installing
a window screen of a house when two (2) unidentified persons suddenly held his back,
handcuffed him, and boarded him inside a van. He averred that he was taken to the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Office, where he was photographed with two (2) plastic sachets
placed on a table. Thereafter, he was brought to the barangay hall and was made to face
a barangay kagawad. Shortly after, he was again photographed together with said official
and the plastic sachets. They proceeded to the Scene of the Crime Operatives Office and
then to the Pasay Hospital. Consequently, Miranda was placed in detention at the
Criminal Investigation Division for two (2) weeks.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision11 dated March 10, 2015, the RTC ruled as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No.
13-906, Miranda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(b) in Crim. Case No. 13-907, Miranda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.12 The RTC found that the prosecution sufficiently established all the
elements of the crimes charged. On the contrary, Miranda failed to overturn the
presumption of regularity afforded to police officers, as he only proffered a denial, to prove
that the evidence obtained against him were tampered or meddled with. 13
Furthermore, the RTC declared that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were properly preserved from the time of their seizure by Encarnacion until their turnover
to PSI Sahagun at the PNP crime laboratory. It was shown that Encarnacion marked and
inventoried the said items and handed them over to SPO1 Orsua for further investigation.
SPO1 Orsua then returned the said items to Encarnacion, who subsequently delivered
them to PSI Sahagun for laboratory testing. After examination, the latter revealed that
they contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.14

Aggrieved, Miranda appealed15 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated July 29, 2016, the CA affirmed Miranda's conviction for the crimes
charged.17 It held that all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were
adequately proven, given that: (a) an illegal sale of shabu, a dangerous drug, actually
took place during a valid buy-bust operation; (b) Miranda was positively identified as the
seller of the said shabu; and (c) both the sachet of shabu and buy-bust money were
presented and duly identified in open court as the same items recovered from Miranda. It
also ruled that Miranda had no right to possess the other sachet of shabu incidentally
recovered from him during his arrest.18

Moreover, the CA declared that the police officers - notwithstanding their failure to
immediately mark, inventory, and photograph the seized items at the place of arrest -
substantially complied with the chain of custody rule, as it was shown that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the said items were preserved. It added that the non-presentation
of PSI Sahagun's testimony, as well as the use of Miranda's alias in marking the seized
items (i.e., "THUNDER" and "THUNDER-1"), neither affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Besides, the marking, inventory, and photography of the items were
witnessed by a barangay kagawad, which thus belied any incidents of tampering or
switching of evidence.19

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Miranda's
conviction for the crimes charged.
The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 20 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."21

In this case, Miranda was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. Case law states that in every prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.22 Meanwhile, in order to convict an accused charged of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements
also by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or
object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.23

In both instances, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established
with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the
crime.24

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.25 Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same,
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 26 In the case of People v. Mendoza,27
the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugsl that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 28

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 29 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064030 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.31 Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not
ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.32 In People v. Almorfe,33the Court stressed that for the above-saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless
been preserved.34 Also, in People v. De Guzman,35 it was emphasized that the
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.36

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from
the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Miranda.

Records reveal that while the seized items were marked by Encarnacion in the presence
of Miranda and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of any
representative from the DOJ and the media. During the cross-examination of
Encarnacion, he testified that:

ATTY. PUZON:
Who was present at the time of the preparation and signing of the Inventory?
WITNESS:
The witness, Kagawad Lyndon Gonzales; me; the accused and my immediate back-up,
PO2 Renie Aseboque.
ATTY. PUZON:
Was there any representative coming from DOJ?
WITNESS:
None, Ma'am.
ATTY. PUZON:
Likewise, no representative coming from the media?
WITNESS:
None, Ma'am.
ATTY PUZON:
The accused was not likewise represented by his own counsel at that time?
WITNESS:
No, Ma'am.
ATTY. PUZON:
That would be all, Your Honor. x x x x37 (Underscoring supplied)

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as a representative
from the DOJ and the media in order to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody
and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Despite
the non-observance of this requirement, the prosecution did not even proffer a plausible
explanation therefor. No practicable reasons were given by the police officers, such as a
threat to their safety and security or the time and distance which the other witnesses might
need to consider.38 Thus, considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated drugs are clearly put into question.
At this juncture, it is important to clarify that the fact that Miranda raised his objections
against the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs purportedly seized from him only
for the first time before the CA does not preclude it or even this Court from passing upon
the same.

To recount, the CA held that "[any] [l]apses in the safekeeping of the seized illegal drugs[,]
[which affect] their integrity and evidentiary value should be raised at the trial court
level."39 As basis, the CA cited the case of People v. Mendoza (Mendoza),40which in turn,
cited the case of People v. Sta. Maria41 (Sta. Maria) wherein it was opined that:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case
from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers'
alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before
the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did
appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.42

Based on this premise, the Court, in Mendoza, thus ruled that when an accused fails to
raise any issues on the chain of custody before the trial court and yet questioned the
same only upon appeal, whatever justifiable ground which may excuse the police officers
from complying with Section 21 of RA 9165 will remain in obscurity but will not adversely
affect the prosecution's case.43

The Sta. Maria pronouncement may further be traced to People v. Uy44 (Uy), which, for
its part, cited the annotation of "FRANCISCO, VICENTE J., 1 The Revised Rules of Court,
Vol. 1, Part II, 1997 ed., 405," stating the general principle on evidence that:

Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.45

Notably, Mendoza, Sta. Maria, and Uy, are all criminal cases for violation of RA 9165,
particularly involving objections to the chain of custody of seized drugs, which were then
ultimately rejected by the Court since the same were raised only for the first time on
appeal.
After a thorough study of these cases, however, this Court holds that that the aforesaid
declarations espouse misplaced rulings, as the same clearly run counter to the
fundamental rule that "an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for
review."46

It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases confers upon the court full jurisdiction and
renders it competent to examine the record and revise the judgment appealed from. 47
Accordingly, "errors in an appealed judgment [of a criminal case], even if not specifically
assigned, may be corrected motu propio by the court if the consideration of these
errors is necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the case."48 The rationale behind
this rule stems from the recognition that an accused waives the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy once he appeals from the sentence of the trial court. As such, it
is incumbent upon the appellate court to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether it be favorable or unfavorable to the him.49
Thus, in People v. Gatlabayan,50 this Court considered every glaring deficiency in each
link of the custody, even if the same was not raised as an error on appeal, and reversed
the judgment of conviction, given that what was at stake was no less than the liberty
of the accused.51

In Villareal v. People,52 this Court clarified that unlike in civil cases, the assignment of
errors in criminal cases is not essential to invoke the court's appellate review, considering
that it will nevertheless review the record, and accordingly, reverse or modify the
appealed judgment if it finds that errors which are prejudicial to the rights of the accused
have been committed, including those errors "which go to the sufficiency of evidence
to convict":

The rule means that, notwithstanding the absence of an assignment of errors, the
appellate court will review the record and reverse or modify the appealed judgment,
not only on grounds that the court had no jurisdiction or that the acts proved do not
constitute the offense charged, but also on prejudicial errors to the right of accused
which are plain, fundamental, vital, or serious, or on errors which go to the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict.53 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the Court cannot simply turn a blind eye against the unjustified deviations in
the chain of custody on the sole ground that the defense failed to raise such errors in
detail before the trial court. Considering the nature of appeals in criminal cases as above-
discussed, it is then only proper to review the said errors even if not specifically assigned.
Verily, these errors, which go to the sufficiency of the evidence of the corpus delicti itself,
would indeed affect the court's judgment in ultimately ascertaining whether or not the
accused should be convicted and hence, languish in prison for possibly a significant
portion of his life. In the final analysis, a conviction must prudently rest on the moral
certainty that guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, if doubt
surfaces on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, regardless that it does only at the
stage of an appeal, our courts of justice should nonetheless rule in favor of the accused,
lest it betray its duty to protect individual liberties within the bounds of law.

To be sure, this Court is not impervious to the sentiments of the State when it is left to
deal with the seemingly unfair situation of having a drug conviction overturned upon
grounds that it was not able to meet in the proceedings a quo. However, there is no
gainsaying that these sentiments must yield to the higher imperative of protecting the
fundamental liberties of the accused. Besides, the law itself apprises our law enforcement
authorities about the requirements of compliance with the chain of custody rule. Case law
exhorts that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.54Therefore, as the requirements
are clearly set forth in the law, then the State retains the positive duty to account
for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused,
regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo;
otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that
go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised
only for the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further
review.

In this case, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the police officers'
non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as well as its IRR. Thus, even though these
lapses have only surfaced on appeal, reasonable doubt now persists in upholding the
conviction of the accused. As the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised,55 Miranda's acquittal is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.56

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As such,
they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court.
Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact
that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s
below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining
the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely
complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no
such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused
and, perforce, overturn a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 29, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07580 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Jovencito Miranda y Tigas is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 10783, January 31,2018]

ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME, COMPLAINANT
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, RESPONDENT

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For resolution are the Motion to Lift Suspension1 dated July 19, 2017 filed by respondent
Atty. Christopher A. Basilio (Basilio), as well as the Report and Recommendation 2 dated
September 13, 2017 of the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), recommending that: (a)
Basilio be meted with an additional penalty of fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 for his
failure to immediately comply with the Court's order of suspension from the practice of
law, as mandated in the Decision3 dated October 14, 2015 of the Court; and (b) the lifting
of the order of suspension be held in abeyance pending the payment of the fine.

The Facts

In the October 14, 2015 Decision4 (the Decision), the Court suspended Basilio from the
practice of law for one (1) year, revoked his incumbent commission as a notary public,
and prohibited him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective
immediately,after finding him guilty of violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is further warned that
a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.5

The Decision was circulated to all courts for the information and implementation of the
order of suspension.6 Basilio, thru his counsel, Atty. Edward L. Robea (Robea), claimed
to have received a copy of the Decision on December 2, 2015,7 hence, his suspension
from the practice of law, as well as the revocation of his notarial commission and
prohibition from being commissioned as a notary public should have all effectively
commenced on the same date. In a Resolution8 dated April 20, 2016, the Court denied
with finality Basilio's motion for reconsideration9 of the Decision.
However, in a letter10 dated June 9, 2016, Atty. Sotero T. Rambayon (Rambayon) inquired
from the Court about the status of Basilio's suspension, alleging that the latter still
appeared before Judge Venancio M. Ovejera of the Municipal Trial Court of Paniqui,
Tarlac on April 26, 2016. The letter was subsequently referred to the OBC for appropriate
action.11 In a letter-reply12 dated July 25, 2016, the OBC informed Rambayon that the
Decision had already been circulated to all courts for implementation, and that Basilio's
motion for reconsideration had been denied with finality by the Court.

Consequently, in a Report and Recommendation13 dated July 27, 2016, the OBC
recommended that Basilio be required to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court for not immediately complying with the Court's order of suspension
upon receipt of the Decision. He was further required to file a sworn statement, with
certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where he practices his
legal profession and from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' (IBP) Local Chapter where
he is affiliated with, affirming that he has ceased and desisted from the practice of law,
has not appeared in court as counsel, and has not practiced his notarial commission
during the mandated period.

In another letter14 dated August 22, 2016, Rambayon informed the Court that in the
schedule of cases before Judge Bemar D. Fajardo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, there were five (5) cases15where the litigants were
supposedly represented by Basilio.

In a Resolution16 dated October 5, 2016, the Court, among others, noted Rambayon's
letter dated August 22, 2016 and further required Basilio to: (a) show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why he should not be held in contempt of court for not immediately
complying with the order of suspension upon receipt of the Decision; and (b) file a sworn
statement with certifications affirming that he has fully served his penalty of suspension.
Complying17 with the show cause order, Basilio explained that he did not immediately
comply with the suspension order because he believed that his suspension was held in
abeyance pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision, following
the guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios18(Maniago), wherein it was stated that "[u]nless the
Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has [fifteen (15)] days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof.
The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory." 19On this score,
he maintained that what was immediately executory was only the revocation of his notarial
commission and the two (2)-year prohibition of being commissioned as a notary public.20
In a Resolution21 dated March 15, 2017, the Court noted Basilio's compliance, and
referred the case to the OBC for evaluation, report, and recommendation. In a Report and
Recommendation22 dated June 22, 2017, the OBC recommended that the directives in
the Court's October 5, 2016 Resolution be reiterated, i.e., the filing of a sworn statement
with certifications attesting to his compliance with the full service of suspension, and
require Basilio to comply with the same within ten (10) days from notice.

Before the Court could act on the OBC's June 22, 2017 Report and Recommendation,
Basilio filed a Motion to Lift Suspension (Motion)23 on July 25, 2017, attaching an Affidavit
of Cessation/Desistance from Practice of Law or Appearance in Court. 24 In his motion,
Basilio stated that he "has commenced to serve his penalty on July 9, 2016 and continue
to serve his penalty until the present upon his receipt of the Order of the [Court] denying
his Motion for Reconsideration."25 He further mentioned that he "immediately ceased and
desisted from the practice of his notarial commission on December 2, 2015 until the
present."26 Basilio likewise attached to his Motion the following: (a) Certification 27 dated
July 12, 2017 from the IBP-Tarlac Chapter, affirming that Basilio "has not appeared in
court beginning July 9, 2016 to July 9, 2017" and "has not practiced his notarial
commission as notary public from December 2, 2016 [up to] the present"; (b)
Certification28 dated July 14, 2017 from the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, attesting
that Basilio has ceased and desisted from the practice of law and has not practiced his
notarial commission from December 2, 2016 up to the present; and (c) Certifications29
dated July 17, 2017, from the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 and July 20, 2017, from
the RTC of Tarlac City, Branch 64, both affirming that Basilio did not appear as counsel
in said courts from July 9, 2016 up to the present.

The Action and Recommendation of the OBC

In a Report and Recommendation30 dated September 13, 2017, the OBC recommended
that Basilio be meted with an additional penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 for
his failure to immediately comply with the Court's order of suspension from the practice
of law, as mandated in the Decision. Likewise, it recommended that the lifting of the order
of suspension from the practice of law be held in abeyance pending his payment of the
fine.

The OBC maintained that Basilio, through his counsel, Robea, received the Decision on
November 3, 2015. Hence, the one (1)-year suspension order from the practice of law
imposed upon him commenced from the said date should end on November 3, 2016. On
the other hand, the two (2)-year order of revocation of notarial commission and prohibition
from being commissioned as a notary public should end on November 3, 2017. However,
the OBC observed that Basilio served his suspension order from the practice of law
beginning only on July 9, 2016 and desisted from his notarial practice on December 2,
2015, as shown by the attached Certifications; hence, the recommended fine.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a)whether or not Basilio's suspension
should now be lifted, and (b) whether or not he should be fined for his failure to
immediately comply with the order of the Court.

The Court's Ruling

The dispositive portion of the Decision explicitly states that the penalties imposed on
Basilio for violation of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility - namely: (a)suspension from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year; (b) revocation of his incumbent commission as a notary public;
and (c) prohibition from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, were all
"effective immediately", viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and
PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective
immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.31 [Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied]
Accordingly, Basilio's compliance with the order of suspension, as well as all the other
penalties, should have commenced on the day he received the Decision.1âwphi1
According to the OBC, Basilio received the Decision on November 3, 2015. However,
records show that Basilio, through Robea, actually received the Decision on December
2, 2015, as per the Registry Return Receipt, and that the same was merely mailed on
November 13 (not 3), 2015.32 The OBC - albeit still inaccurately - must have thought that
this latter date was to be considered as the date of receipt. In fact, Basilio, in his motion
for reconsideration and compliance to the Court's October 5, 2016 Resolution,33 has
repeatedly maintained that he received the Decision on December 2, 2015. This averment
appears to be consistent with the documents on record and hence, ought to prevail.

This notwithstanding, Basilio himself admitted that he served his suspension only on July
9, 2016, proffering that he believed that what was immediately executory was only the
revocation of his notarial commission and the two (2)-year prohibition against being
commissioned as a notary public. Unfortunately, the Court cannot accept such flimsy
excuse in light of the Decision's unequivocal wording.

Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at the end of the enumerated
series of penalties to indicate that the same pertained to and therefore, qualified all three
(3) penalties, which clearly include his suspension from the practice of law. The
immediate effectivity of the order of suspension - not just of the revocation and prohibition
against his notarial practice - logically proceeds from the fact that all three (3) penalties
were imposed on Basilio as a result of the Court's finding that he failed to comply with his
duties as a notary public, in violation of the provisions of the 2004 Rules of Notarial
Practice, and his sworn duties as a lawyer, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Thus, with the Decision's explicit wording that the same
was "effective immediately", there is no gainsaying that Basilio's compliance therewith
should have commenced immediately from his receipt of the Decision on December 2,
2015. On this score, Basilio cannot rely on the Maniago ruling as above-claimed since it
was, in fact, held therein that a decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof if
the decision so indicates, as in this case.

All told, for his failure to immediately serve the penalties in the Decision against him upon
receipt, Basilio acted contumaciously,34 and thus should be meted with a fine in the
amount of ₱10,000.00,35 as recommended by the OBC. Pending his payment of the fine
and presentation of proof thereof, the lifting of the order of suspension from the practice
of law is perforce held in abeyance.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby FINDS respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY
of indirect contempt.1âwphi1 He is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions
will be dealt with more severely. The lifting of the order of suspension from the practice
of law is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending his payment of the fine and presentation of proof
thereof.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. P-17-3705, February 06, 2018]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT,
V.
PAULINO I. SAGUYOD, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case arose from a Memorandum1 dated May 29, 2017 submitted by
the complainant Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), which adopted the Audit Team's
Report2 dated May 9, 2017 in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-15-2404,3 recommending,
inter alia, that respondent Branch Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod (BCC Saguyod) of
the Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 (RTC) be directed to explain why
he should not be held administratively liable for notarizing several documents submitted
to the court without observing the provisions of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (Re: 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice).4

The Facts

In the Report, the Audit Team examined 1,194 cases decided by former Judge Liberty O.
Castañeda (Judge Castañeda) of the RTC where BCC Saguyod was also stationed.5
After the conduct of investigation, not only did the Audit Team find fault with the way
Judge Castañeda proceeded with the cases she handled, they also discovered that BCC
Saguyod had been notarizing a multitude of documents filed before the RTC in connection
with the various cases before it without properly observing the Court's appropriate
guidelines.6 Particularly, the Audit Team observed that BCC Saguyod violated Section (f)
of the Resolution dated August 15, 2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC as he notarized said
documents without any certification that there are no available notaries public within the
Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac.7 Thus, the Audit Team recommended - with such
recommendation being adopted by the OCA - that BCC Saguyod be made to explain as
to why he should not be held administratively liable for such act. 8

In his Explanation9 dated July 31, 2017, BCC Saguyod claimed that he performed said
act in good faith and without any monetary consideration. 10 Citing Section 41,11 Chapter
10, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 which authorizes clerks of courts to
administer oaths, he thought that he was doing an important function which is vital to the
prompt and sound administration of justice.12 Nonetheless, BCC Saguyod profusely
apologized for notarizing documents without strictly adhering to the provisions of the
Rules on Notarial Practice, and even manifested that after the Audit Team called his
attention on the matter, he had already refrained from subscribing any other document
filed before the RTC out of fear of committing the same mistake.13
The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum14 dated December 14, 2017, the OCA recommended that BCC
Saguyod be found guilty of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, and accordingly, be meted the penalty of suspension from the service for a period
of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall warrant
dismissal from service.15

The OCA found that BCC Saguyod readily admitted to notarizing various documents filed
before the RTC without complying with Section (f) of the Resolution dated August 15,
2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, and even when some of these documents were not
completely accomplished by the concerned parties.16 In this regard, the OCA found that
BCC Saguyod's defenses that he did not charge notarization fees and that there are no
available notaries public in Paniqui, Tarlac do not deserve credence, because: (a) his act
of notarizing without compliance with the Court's aforesaid resolution directly makes him
liable thereunder; and (b) there are other petitions filed before the RTC which are
notarized by notaries public based in Paniqui, Tarlac. 17

Finally, in recommending the proper penalty, the OCA pointed out that a mere fine would
not suffice, considering the number of times BCC Saguyod repeatedly violated A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC, and the fact that he even went out of his way to notarize documents that
were incomplete or sorely lacking in material details. Thus, the OCA recommended that
a suspension from service for one (1) year be meted on him, ursuant to the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.18

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not BCC Saguyod should be held
administratively liable for notarizing various documents submitted to the RTC in
connection with the cases filed before it.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and the recommendation of the OCA that BCC Saguyod
must be held administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance
of official duties.

Inefficiency involves specific acts or omission on the part of the employee which results
in the damage to the employer or to the latter's business. 19 It is akin to neglect of duty,20
which is the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected
of him or her, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. 21

In this case, BCC Saguyod readily admitted to notarizing hundreds, if not thousands, of
various documents which were submitted before the RTC where he is stationed. As a
Clerk of Court, BCC Saguyod's acts of notarization should comply with Section (f) of the
Resolution dated August 15, 2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, which reads:
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (Re: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice). The Court resolved to:

x x x x

(f) AUTHORIZE the Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts to notarize not only
documents relating to the exercise of their official functions but also private documents,
subject to the following conditions: (i) all notarial fees charged in accordance with Section
7(o) of the Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and, with respect to private documents, in
accordance with the notarial fee that the Supreme Court may prescribe in compliance
with Section 1, Rule V of the Rules on Notarial Practice, shall be for the account of the
Judiciary; and (ii) they certify in the notarized documents that there are no notaries public
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court[.]

Under this provision, Clerks of Courts of various Regional Trial Courts are authorized to
notarize not only documents relating to their official functions, but also private documents;
provided, that: (a) the notarial fees received in connection thereto shall be for the account
of the Judiciary; and (b) they certify in said documents that there are no available notaries
public within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court where they are stationed.

Here, aside from maintaining that he did not receive compensation for notarizing
documents, BCC Saguyod claims that he only did so because: (a) there are no notaries
public available within the Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac; and (b) he believed in good faith
that he was authorized to do so. However, and as correctly pointed out by the OCA, such
claim is belied by the fact that there are other documents filed before the RTC which are
duly subscribed by notaries public based in the same municipality. Furthermore, BCC
Saguyod cannot feign good faith in performing the aforesaid acts of notarization, as he
repeatedly did so even on those documents which were not completely accomplished by
the concerned parties. In light of BCC Saguyod's repeated violations of Section (f) of the
Resolution dated August 15, 2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, the OCA correctly
recommended that he be found administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties.

Anent the proper penalty to be meted on BCC Saguyod, Section 46 (B) (4) of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service22 classifies inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties as a grave offense, punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and
dismissal from service for the second offense. Since it appears that this is just BCC
Saguyod's first offense of such nature, the Court deems it appropriate to impose on him
the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year, with a stem warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense shall result in his dismissal from service.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "Public officers must be accountable to the people
at all times and serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility and efficiency. Any
act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of
those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. It is the
imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name
and standing as a true temple of justice,"23 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondent Branch Clerk of Court

Paulino I. Saguyod (BCC Saguyod) of the Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch
67 GUILTY of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from service for a period of one (1) year, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall warrant a more serious penalty, i.e.,
dismissal from service.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to BCC Saguyod's records.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 231359, February 07, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
CRISANTO CIRBETO Y GIRAY,ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Crisanto Cirbeto y

Giray (accused-appellant) assailing the Decision2 dated February 9, 2016 rendered by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06481, which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated October 24, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch
193 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 2011-12719-MK finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

On December 31, 2010, at around 3:15 in the afternoon, while prosecution eyewitness
Roger Dalimoos4 (Dalimoos) was outside a fast food restaurant in front of Marikina Sports
Center at the corner of Sumulong Highway and Toyota Avenue, Marikina City, he saw his
friend Ferdinand Casipit (Casipit) together with accused-appellant walking towards a
nearby mall.5 Dalimoos was on his way home then, so he boarded a jeepney by hanging
on to its end railings.6 Upon reaching the stoplight at the corner of Sumulong Highway
and Tuazon St., from which vantage point he could still see Casipit and accused-appellant
who were already in front of the mall, Dalimoos saw the latter suddenly pull a knife from
the right side of his back, hold Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife
using his right hand.7Accused-appellant was able to stab Casipit once before the latter
managed to run away. However, accused-appellant ran after Casipit and caught up to
him.8Thereafter, the former held the latter's shirt again, pulled him to the ground, and
stabbed him repeatedly, resulting in the latter's death.9
Shortly after the incident, accused-appellant tried to flee, but he was seized by Police
Officer 1 (PO1) Jayson Rael and Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Fabian Ribad of
the Marikina City Police Station, who responded to a radio message relaying the stabbing
incident.10 They were also able to recover the knife used to stab the victim.11

The result12 of the autopsy conducted by Medico-Legal Officer Police Inspector Ma.
Annalissa G. Dela Cruz (P/Insp. Dela Cruz) showed that Casipit sustained five (5) stab
wounds caused by a bladed weapon, the most fatal of which was the one on the posterior
neck or nape region.13 The stab wounds on the trunk portion injured the right lung and
the stab wound on the chest portion caused severe bleeding. 14

Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an

Information15 that reads:

That on or about the 31st day of December 2010, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed
with a knife, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
repeatedly stab one FERDINAND CASIPIT y BASTO on his back and neck, the said
killing having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and abused [sic] of superior strength which changes the nature of the
felony qualifying such killing to the more serious capital crime of MURDER.

CONTRARY TO LAW.16

When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of "not guilty"17 with the assistance of
counsel de oficio and raised the defenses of denial and alibi, disclaiming liability for the
killing of Casipit and even denying that he knew the latter or the witness, Dalimoos. 18 He
claimed that he was assisting a car parked in front of a fastfood restaurant in the area
when the police officers arrested him for allegedly killing Casipit.19

During the trial, the victim's brother, Isidro Casipit, testified that he incurred expenses for
his brother's wake amounting to P5,000.00 "more or less," and P8,000.00 for the burial. 20
He presented receipts21 to support his allegation.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision22 dated October 24, 2013, the RTC convicted accused-appellant as charged
and sentenced him to suffer the straight penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of Casipit the amounts of P13,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.23

In finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, the RTC found
that he failed to prove his innocence even with his denial that he knew Casipit, as during
his testimony, he referred to the victim by his nickname, "Ferdie".24 Moreover, the RTC
found the attendance of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the mode of assault
having been deliberately and consciously adopted to insure the execution of the crime
without risk to accused-appellant.25Likewise, the RTC appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation, which it inferred from the act of accused-appellant
in bringing with him a knife and waiting for the perfect moment to consummate the plan
to kill Casipit.26

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed27 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision28 dated February 9, 2016, the CA affirmed accused-appellant's conviction

with modifications, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00 and moral
damages to P75,000.00.29 Additionally, it awarded the amount of P30,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages. Likewise, all monetary awards shall earn an interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid. 30

The CA found that the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) Casipit was
stabbed and killed; (2) accused-appellant was the one who killed him; (3) the victim's
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation; and (4) the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide.31Moreover,
accused-appellant was positively identified by Dalimoos, the eyewitness, whose
testimony was straightforward and direct. Contrary to accused-appellant's contention,
Dalimoos's testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency sufficient
to destroy his credibility.32

As regards the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA found that Casipit
was caught off-guard when he was stabbed by accused-appellant, which act reeks of
treachery.33 It further observed that the victim had no way of defending himself, and thus,
the mode of attack was deliberately and consciously adopted by accused-appellant to
insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself.34

The CA likewise sustained the RTC's finding that evident premeditation was attendant in
this case, as the same may be inferred from the outward act of accused-appellant in
bringing a knife with him and thereafter, patiently waiting for the right moment to
consummate his plan. The CA found that from the time accused-appellant and Casipit
began walking towards the mall until the time they stopped to wait for a jeepney, the
former had time to ponder whether to pursue his plan to kill Casipit or not. 35

Finally, the CA rejected accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi, as he failed to

show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
of the incident.36

Dissatisfied, accused-appellant lodged this appeal37 before the Court.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed accused-
appellant's conviction for the crime of Murder.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Murder is defined and punished under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, to wit:

Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death
if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity;

xxxx

5. With evident premeditation[.]

xxxx

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be

established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.38

In this case, and as correctly found by the courts a quo, the prosecution was able to
establish a confluence of the foregoing elements, considering the following: (1) the victim
Casipit was killed; (2) accused-appellant was positively identified as the one who killed
him; (3) Casipit's killing was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance; and (4) the
killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.

Accused-appellant's defense is focused on the possible uncertainty over his identification

by Dalimoos, the eyewitness, as the victim's assailant. He insists that Dalimoos was
mistaken in identifying him and may even have been coached to lie in his testimony. The
Court is not convinced.

It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible,
as in the case of Dalimoos, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of
murder.39 On the witness stand, Dalimoos testified thus:

Assistant City Prosecutor Conos - Do you know a person by the name [of] Ferdinand
Casipit?

Dalimoos - Yes, ma'am, he is my childhood friend.

Q - In the afternoon of December 31, 2010, where were you then?
A - I was at the parking lot of Mc. Do, ma'am.
Q - Do you know where Ferdinand Casipit was?
A - He was with Crisanto [Cirbeto] at Marquinton, ma'am.
Q - What particular place in Marquinton?
A - In front of Robinsons, ma'am.
Q - How did you know that Ferdinand Casipit and Crisanto [Cirbeto] were in front of
Robinsons Marikina?
A - I was in front of Mc. Do, ma'am.
Q - In going to the front of Robinsons, what mode of transportation did they ([Cirbeto] and
Casipit) take?
A - They were just walking, ma'am.
Q - By the way, where is Ferdinand Casipit now[?]
A - He is already dead, ma'am.
Q - When did he died [sic]?
A-December 31, 2010, ma'am.
Q - How did he died, if you know?
A - I was on my way home and I boarded a jeepney going home, ma'am.
Q - Where were you going home?
A - Sapa, ma'am.
Q - Where were you seated on that passenger jeepney?
A - "Nakasabit lang po"
Q - What about [Cirbeto] and Casipit, where were they?
A - They were already in front of Robinsons, ma'am.
Q - What happened next while you were on board the passenger jeepney and accused
and the deceased were in front of Robinsons?
A - Crisanto suddenly pulled a knife, ma'am.
Q - How far were you when you saw Crisanto suddenly pulled [sic] a knife?
A - At the stop light in front of Jollibee, ma'am.
Q - When Crisanto suddenly pulled a knife, where was Casipit?
A - He was beside Crisanto, ma'am.
Q - What happened after Crisanto pulled a knife?
A - "tyumempo po siya habang nag aabang sila ng jeep at bigla na lang tinraydor nya
bigla na lang pinagsasaksak"
Q - Who was stabbed?
A - Ferdinand Casipit, ma'am.
Q - What do you mean by "tyumempo po sya habang nag aabang sila ng jeep at bigla
nyang sinaksak si Ferdie?"
A - "tinraydor po"
Q - What do you mean by "bigla na lang nyang sinaksak"?
A - They were waiting then for a jeepney, ma'am.
Q - How far where you from the jeepney that you were riding was on stop position from
where you saw Crisanto suddenly pulled a knife and stabbed the deceased, what is the
distance?
A - About 25 meters, ma'am.
Q - Will you please stand up and demonstrate how the two, the accused and the deceased
standing, where was the accused in relation to where the deceased was standing at the
time you saw them?
A - (the witness is demonstrating his distance from the deceased about a meter while the
accused was behind the deceased towards the right, the accused looking towards the
deceased and the deceased was looking on the left side towards the stop light)
xxxx
Q - How many times did you see the accused stabbed [sic] the victim?
A - Only once and then he suddenly run, ma'am.
Q - Who run [sic]?
A - Ferdie, ma'am.
Q - Where did Ferdinand, the victim run?
A - Going to Sapa, ma'am.
Q - What about the accused where did he go?
A - He run after Ferdie, ma'am.
Q - What about you what did you do?
A -I can't cross the street because the traffic light was on green light, ma'am.
Q - What did you do next?
A - "bumaba po ako sa jeep hinintay ko pong mag-stop tsaka ako humabol"
Q - What did you see when you run after the accused?
A - The accused reached Ferdinand again and he hold Ferdinand's shirt and repeatedly
stabbed him, ma'am. x x x x40
Based on the foregoing testimony, Dalimoos had consistently, straightforwardly, and
positively identified accused-appellant as the person who was walking with the victim
Casipit and who later on stabbed the latter. Dalimoos's testimony did not waver; neither
did it suffer from any grave or material inconsistency as would strip away his credibility as
an eyewitness to the crime.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial
court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best
position to discern whether or not they are telling the truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that
appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a
showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would affect the result of the case. The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent
application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA. 41 As such, the Court
finds no reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, with
respect to the probative value of Dalimoos's testimony in this case.

As regards the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court likewise
concurs with the courts a quo in finding its presence in the commission of the crime.

Treachery is the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the
crime against persons which tends directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance
to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must
be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself;
and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods,
or forms of attack employed by him.42

The evidence in this case clearly show that the attack against Casipit was sudden,
deliberate, and unexpected. He was completely unaware of any threat to his life as he
was merely walking with accused-appellant on the date and time in question. Moreover,
deliberate intent to kill Casipit can be inferred from the location and number of stab
wounds he sustained, and even though he was able to run after the first stab wound,
accused-appellant was able to subdue and stab him further, rendering him defenseless
and incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance in this case.
However, the Court is of a different view with respect to the purported presence of evident
premeditation.

For evident premeditation to be considered as a qualifying or an aggravating

circumstance, the prosecution must prove: (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution,
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.43

In this case, there is dearth of evidence to prove that accused-appellant had previously
planned the killing of Casipit. Nothing has been offered to establish whenand how he
planned and prepared for the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had
lapsed between his determination and execution. The Court stresses the importance of
the requirement in evident premeditation with respect to the sufficiency of time between
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent and the criminal act, affording such
opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the
consequences of what accused-appellant had planned to do, where the interval should
be long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and
scheme.44 In the stabbing of Casipit, this requirement is clearly wanting.

With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi proffered by accused-appellant, the Court
- as with the courts a quo - rejects the same. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that
further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive identification and
straightforward narration of the prosecution witness, Dalimoos. Between an affirmative
assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general denial, the former generally
prevails.45 On the other hand, for the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must prove
through clear and convincing evidence that not only was he in another place at the time
of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime.46

Accused-appellant himself testified that on the date and time material to this case, he was
outside a fastfood restaurant standing beside a parked car within the vicinity of the
stabbing incident.47 As such, he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime when the incident occurred. Therefore, his denial and alibi
do not deserve credence.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court affirms the conclusion of the courtsa quo
that accused-appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
for which he is accordingly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, and
conformably with prevailing jurisprudence,48 the amount of exemplary damages is
increased from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00. All other monetary awards are affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 9, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06481 finding accused-appellant Crisanto
Cirbeto y Giray guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
the amount of exemplary damages, which is increased to P75,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. The rest of the assailed Decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 17-11-131-MeTC, February 07, 2018]

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MS. JANICE C. MILLARE, CLERK III,
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, QUEZON
CITY.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stems from a letter1 dated August 3, 2017 informing the Court
that Ms. Janice C. Millare (Millare), Clerk III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, did not submit her Daily Time Records (DTRs) for
July 20172 and up to the present.

The Facts

The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), show that Millare has not submitted her DTRs since
July 2017 up to the present. She neither submitted any application for leave. Thus, she
has been on absence without official leave (AWOL) since July 17, 2017. 3

On May 30, 2017, Millare applied for and was granted authority to travel to Saipan 4from
June 5 to July 14, 2017. To date, she has still not reported for work. 5 Her salaries and
benefits were withheld based on Memorandum WSB No. 8a_2017 dated August 2, 2017.6
The OCA informed the Court of the following findings based on the records of its different
offices: (a) Millare is still in the plantilla of court personnel and, thus, considered to be in
active service; (b) she has no application for retirement; (c) no administrative case is
pending against her; and (d) she is not an accountable officer.7

In its report and recommendation8 dated November 22, 2017, the OCA recommended
that: (a) Millare's name be dropped from the rolls effective July 17, 2017 for having been
absent without official leave for more than thirty (30) working days; (b) her position be
declared vacant; and (c) she be informed about her separation from the service or
dropping from the rolls at 1312 Taurus Street, Carmel IV Subdivision, Tandang Sora,
Quezon City, her last known address on record.9 The OCA added, however, that Millare
is still qualified to receive the benefits she may be entitled to under existing laws and may
still be reemployed in the government.10

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation.

Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2007,11 states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days
shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated
from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Based on this provision, Millare should be separated from the service or dropped from
the rolls in view of her continued absence since July 17, 2017.

Millare's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it

disrupted the normal functions of the court.12 It contravened the duty of a public servant
to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. 13 It
should be reiterated and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with
the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's
faith in the judiciary.14

By failing to report for work since July 17, 2017 up to the present, Millare grossly
disregarded and neglected the duties of her office. Undeniably, she failed to adhere to
the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government
service.15
WHEREFORE, Ms. Janice C. Millare, Clerk III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, is hereby DROPPED from the rolls effective July 17, 2017 and
her position is declared VACANT. She is, however, still qualified to receive the benefits
she may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served upon her at her address appearing in her 201 file
pursuant to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as
amended.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 17-08-191-RTC, February 07, 2018]

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MS. MARISSA M. NUDO, CLERK III,
BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), MANILA.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stems from a letter1 dated April 3, 2017 informing the Court that
Ms. Marissa M. Nudo (Nudo), Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
6, has been on absence without official leave (AWOL) since March 2017.

The Fact

The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS),
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), show that Nudo has not submitted her Daily Time
Record (DTR) since March 2017 up to the present. She neither submitted any application
for leave. Thus, she has been on AWOL since March 1, 2017.2

Moreover, Atty. Rosette H. Abrenica (Atty. Abrenica), Clerk of Court V of the RTC, Branch
6, informed the OCA that Nudo, among others, failed to submit her DTR for the month of
March 2017 because she has been absent since March 14, 2017 up to the present. 3

To date, Nudo has still not reported for work. Her salaries and benefits were withheld
based on Memorandum WSB No. 5a_2017 dated May 2, 2017.4
The OCA informed the Court of the following findings based on the records of its different
offices: (a) Nudo is still in the plantilla of court personnel, and thus, considered to be in
active service; (b) she has no application for retirement; (c) no administrative case is
pending against her; and (d) she is not an accountable officer.5

In its report and recommendation6 dated July 11, 2017, the OCA recommended that: (a)
Nudo's name be dropped from the rolls effective March 1, 2017 for having been absent
without official leave for more than thirty (30) working days; (b) her position be declared
vacant; and (c) she be informed about her separation from the service at 738 Magsaysay
Road, San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, her last known address on record. 7 The OCA
added, however, that Nudo is still qualified to receive the benefits she may be entitled to
under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.8

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation.

Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum
Circular No. 13, Series of 2007,9 states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days
shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated
from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Based on this provision, Nudo should be separated from the service or dropped from the
rolls in view of her continued absence since March 2017.

Nudo's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it

disrupted the normal functions of the court.10 It contravened the duty of a public servant
to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. 11 It
should be reiterated and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with
the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's
faith in the judiciary.12

By failing to report for work since March 2017 up to the present, Nudo grossly disregarded
and neglected the duties of her office. Undeniably, she failed to adhere to the high
standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government service. 13
WHEREFORE, Ms. Marissa M. Nudo, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 6, is hereby DROPPED from the rolls effective March 1, 2017 and her position is
declared VACANT. She is, however, still qualified to receive the benefits she may be
entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served upon her at her address appearing in her 201 file
pursuant to Rule XVI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as
amended.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 225709, February 14, 2018]

JASPER GONZALEZ*Y DOLENDO, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August
7, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated June 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 36523, affirming the conviction of petitioner Jasper Gonzalez yDolendo
(Gonzalez) for violation of Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by
Section 32 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7166.

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations4 filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 269 (RTC) accusing Gonzalez of violating: (1) Section
261(p) (q)5 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),6 as amended by Section 327 of RA
7166;8 and (2) Section 11, Article II9 of RA 9165 or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002,"10 to wit:

Criminal Case No. 173-V-12

That on or about February 23, 2012 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and control one (1) Kitchen Knife, without securing an
exemption from the COMELEC pursuant to Sec. 261 (p)(q) OEC as amended by Sec. 32,
of R.A. 7166.

Contrary to Law.11

Criminal Case No. 174-V-12

That on or about February 23, 2012, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point eight (0.80) gram, found to
be methylamphetamine hydrochloride [sic] (shabu), knowing the same to be dangerous
drugs.

Contrary to Law.12

The prosecution alleged13 that in the early morning of February 23, 2012, an operative of
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID), Special Operation Task Group (SOTG), Valenzuela
City, was informed of the rampant selling of illegal drugs at a wake in Tamaraw Hills,
Barangay Marulas, Valenzuela City, which thus led to the conduct of an anti-illegal drug
operation. At about 3:30 a.m., certain Police Officer (PO) 2 Lim, PO2 Recto, and PO1
Raya, together with PO1 Julius R. Congson (PO1 Congson), proceeded to surveil the
area near No. 75 Tamaraw Hills Street. While in the area, PO2 Recto and PO1 Congson
saw a person coming out of an alley about four (4) meters away, with a fan knife in his
right hand. Since there was a ban issued by the Commission on Elections 14 (COMELEC)
on the carrying of deadly weapons at that time, PO2 Recto and PO1 Congson approached
the person and introduced themselves as police officers. The person, who they later
identified as Gonzalez, immediately ran away, prompting the police officers to chase and
eventually, arrest him. PO1 Congson recovered the knife from Gonzalez, frisked the
latter, and ordered him to bring out the contents of his pocket, which revealed one heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing what PO1 Congson believed to be shabu.
PO1 Congson further recovered another heat-sealed transparent plastic pack, labeled
"Calypso", containing several plastic sachets. Thereafter, Gonzalez started shouting,
causing several persons from the wake (including Gonzalez' mother) to approach him.
The police officers then decided to bring Gonzalez to the nearby barangay hall, where the
seized items were inventoried15 and turned over.16 After duly receiving the submitted
specimen, the forensic chemist examined17 the same which tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.18

In his defense,19 Gonzalez denied the charges against him and instead, claimed that on
February 23, 2012, at around 3:00 a.m., he was just at their house in No. 75 Tamaraw
Hills Street. He was about to go to sleep when four (4) male persons arrived and arrested
him. The men then tied his hands with his wife's brassiere, and thereafter, showed him a
sachet of shabu and took the knife that was on top of the table. They then dragged him
down from their house, bringing with them his child, while he shouted for someone to call
his mother. Many of his neighbors who heard or were awakened by his shouts and the
crying of his child came out of their houses and saw his arrest. At the ground floor, he
was photographed with the knife placed on the top of a small table. Thereafter, the
arresting persons boarded him on a vehicle. They drove around Ugong for thirty (30)
minutes, fetched Senior Police Officer 3 Ronald C. Sanchez (SPO3 Sanchez) at his office
at the third floor of the city hall, and then proceeded to the Manilas Barangay Hall to wait
for the barangay kagawad. When the kagawad arrived, he just signed a paper about the
seized evidence. Gonzalez was then brought to Camp Crame for drug testing, and
afterwards to the detention cell at the new city hall.20

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision21 dated January 6, 2014, the RTC found Gonzalez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 261 (q) of the OEC,22 holding that all the necessary elements
thereof have been proven, namely: (1) Gonzalez was found holding the fan knife with his
right hand; (2) such possession occurred during the prohibited period; and (3) he was
carrying the knife while casually walking towards Tamaraw Hills Street from an alley - a
public place.23 The RTC gave no credence to Gonzalez' version of his arrest in light of his
positive identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of regularity accorded to
the police officers in the performance of their duties. 24 It also brushed aside the
testimonies of Gonzalez' three (3) witnesses for their failure to actually see what had
transpired immediately preceding his arrest.25

As regard the charge of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, the RTC found Gonzalez not
guilty due to insufficiency of evidence.26

Aggrieved, Gonzalez elevated his conviction to the CA. 27 Pending his appeal, Gonzalez
renewed his Surety Bond28 posted in this case, and thereafter, applied for bail, 29 which
the RTC granted in an Order30 dated January 24, 2014.

The CA Ruling
In a Decision31 dated August 7, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, 32 finding that
the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Gonzalez was "found in
possession of a fan knife at the time he was apprehended by the police officers during
[the ban] enforced by the COMELEC."33 It held that Gonzalez failed to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence his defense that "he uses [the fan knife] as a utensil in
cooking."34

Undaunted, Gonzalez moved for reconsideration,35 which was denied in a

Resolution36dated June 22, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Gonzalez' conviction for violation of
Section 261 (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32 of RA 7166, should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that "[t]he constitutional right to be presumed

innocent until proven guilty can only be overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
that is, that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Hence,
where the court entertains a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, it is not only
the right of the accused to be freed; it is the court's constitutional duty to acquit them." 37
In this light, the Court is convinced that Gonzalez' conviction must be set aside.38
Gonzalez was charged under Section 261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as amended by Section 32
of RA 7166. Section 261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as originally worded, provides:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxxx

(p) Deadly weapons. - Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place
and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by law
for the registration of voters in the polling place, voting, counting of votes, or preparation
of the election returns. However, in cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer
or public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise the election is entitled to carry
firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving order and enforcing the law.

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. -Any person who, although
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place
of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the
Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a
residence or place of business or extension hereof.

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the
performance of their duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession,
business or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or valuables.
while Section 32 of RA 7166, pertinently reads:

Section 32. Who May Bear Firearms. - During the election period, no person shall
bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including
any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to
possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance
of firearms licenses shall be suspended during the election period.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

COMELEC Resolution No. 9357, implementing Section 32 of RA 7166 for the conduct of
a plebiscite in Valenzuela City on March 3, 2012, defines "deadly weapon" as:

Section 2. Firearm; Deadly weapon. - x x x.

Deadly weapon includes bladed instrument, hand grenades or other explosives, except
pyrotechnics.
A bladed instrument is not covered by the prohibition when possession of the bladed
instrument is necessary to the occupation of the possessor or when it is used as a tool
for legitimate activity.
In order to secure a conviction of an accused based on these provisions, the prosecution
must prove that: (a) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other
deadly weapons; (b) such possession occurs during the election period; and (c) the
weapon is carried in a public place. Notably, it is essential that possession of the deadly
weapon in a public place be established beyond reasonable doubt. In his petition,
Gonzalez prayed for his acquittal in view of the serious doubts on the prosecution's
evidence. Particularly, he claims that PO1 Congson's narration of events was
uncorroborated and in fact contradicted by the physical evidence submitted in court, as
well as by the testimonies of his witnesses, corroborating his version of the events, which
thereby puts into question PO1 Congson's credibility.39
The Court agrees, as the prosecution failed to dispel all reasonable doubts surrounding
Gonzalez' arrest.
In particular, the prosecution failed to establish its allegation that, immediately before and
at the time of his arrest, Gonzalez was holding a knife in a public place - the critical
elements of the crime of violation of Section 261 (p) (q) of the OEC, as amended by
Section 32 of RA 7166. Records show that aside from the testimony of PO1 Congson,
the prosecution did not present any other evidence that would corroborate his version
leading to Gonzalez' arrest. PO1 Congson claimed that at around 4:00 a.m., he and the
other police officers saw Gonzalez holding a fan knife in his right hand as he was walking
out of an alley where they eventually arrested him after a chase.40 Gonzalez, on the other
hand, presented three (3) witnesses41 - neighbors who lived below and across his house
where he was arrested and who were there at the time of his arrest. All these witnesses
corroborated Gonzalez' version, particularly on five (5) critical points, namely: (a)
Gonzalez and his child were brought downstairs from his house located at the second
floor by the arresting persons; (b) his hands were tied behind his back as he was being
dragged downstairs; (c) his photograph was taken soon after the arrest took place at
around 3:00 a.m.; and (d) there were a total of four (4) male persons who conducted the
arrest.42 One of the witnesses even confirmed that Gonzalez' hands were tied by a
brassiere.43 In other words, all three (3) witnesses rendered more credible the defense's
claim that Gonzalez was arrested at his home; at the very least, their testimonies rendered
doubtful the prosecution's claim that police officers arrested Gonzalez on the street in the
regular performance of their duties. Unfortunately, the RTC simply brushed these aside,
thus leading to the erroneous conclusion that "[n]o one actually saw the factual
circumstances immediately preceding his arrest."44
Moreover, while the information and the physical evidence 45 presented before the lower
court both revealed a kitchen knife, PO1 Congson categorically testified that he saw a fan
knife.46 A fan knife, locally known as "balisong"47 or "Batangas",48 is a folding pocket knife
with two handles counter-rotating around the tang so that, when the knife is closed, the
blade resides concealed inside the grooved handles.49 In contrast, a kitchen knife has
one handle that does not fold, with its blade clearly visible. Obviously, a fan knife is far
from being the same as a kitchen knife. To the Court's mind, there is doubt as to whether
PO1 Congson had actually seen Gonzalez come out of an alley holding a fan knife.
Given the difference in the prosecution and defense's versions of Gonzalez' arrest,
including the variance regarding the physical evidence presented in court, it behooved
the lower court to examine and calibrate more carefully the evidence presented by both
sides. As it was, the defense's evidence weighed more than the prosecution's evidence.
At the very least, their evidence were evenly balanced such that the appreciation of such
evidence called for the tilting of the scales in favor of Gonzalez. 50 After all, the burden is
on the prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. 51
In fine, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Gonzalez committed the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 7, 2015 and the
Resolution dated June 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36523 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Jasper Gonzalez y Dolendo
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018]

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, PETITIONER,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August
28, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated September 10, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-87386
finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262, 5otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004."

The Facts

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA
9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having
the means and capacity to give financial support, with deliberate intent, did then and there
commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA,6] and her minor son, [BBB] (12 years
old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and
AAA entered into a compromise agreement8 on the civil aspect of the case. After the
RTC's approval of the compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of
the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year
later, or on June 24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement
and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which was
supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001
to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the
criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence. 9

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which
resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity
of BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous
photographs showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned
sour as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1)
year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which
was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her
and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar. 10

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of
P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a Toyota
Avanza and his children are enrolled in. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at
and she spends the amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked
Melgar for P8,000.00 as support.11

For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence due to his
repeated failure to appear during trial.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment13 dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and, accordingly, sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum.14

The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son,
BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was
supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010.15

Melgar moved for reconsideration,16 which was, however, denied in an Order17dated May
9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed18 to the CA.
The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction. It held that
Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB.20 As such, when he deliberately and with evident
bad faith deprived BBB of support, he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262. In this regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case was
prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment based on compromise
agreement, particularly, in providing support to his son; and worse, in conveying to
another person the parcel of land which was supposed to, among others, answer for the
support-in-arrears of his son from 2001 to 2010.21 Lastly, the CA ruled that Melgar's acts
"has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA]
and her child[, BBB]."22

Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution24 dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's
conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in, inter alia, economic abuse.25 The said law defines economic abuse as follows:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.

xxxx

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.

xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation
of support of a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such
common child is legitimate or not.26 This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA
9262, pertinent portions of which read:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in

conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other hann, or intimidation directed against the woman
or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial

support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support;
 (3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

xxxx

Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.27 Notably, case law instructs
that the act of denying support to a child is a continuing offense. 28

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section
5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a
romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his
paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was
just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when
he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his
support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact,
the trial court was in the best position to assess and detennine the credibility of the
witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should be accorded to
the same.29

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that he
was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that the
acts complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
[AAA] and her son[, BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation
of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.30

Melgar's contention is untenable.

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,31 punishes the act of "causing
mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children."
Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or
the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an
element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish,
it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to
this party."32 Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's denial
thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or
emotional anguish to the woman-victim and/or to their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and
BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either
AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of
violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration
the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which
is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged33 - the courts a quo correctly
convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of
support, by itself and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is
already specifically penalized therein.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that

violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably,
while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is
taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v.
People,34 the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties
found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,35 otherwise known as the
Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:

Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum
and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the
special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark mling of
People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)] that the situation is
different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is
taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal
effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to
the speciallaw.36

Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under
the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules
applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.37

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the
penalty of imprisonment for an indetenninate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
In addition, Melgar is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, to undergo
a mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric treatment, and report compliance to
the court.38
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 28, 2015
and the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR
No. 02211 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) to pay a fine
in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a mandatory psychological counselling
or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 6.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 207843, February 14, 2018]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER,
v.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND PETRON CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a motion for reconsideration 1 filed by respondent Petron
Corporation (Petron) on the Court's Decision2 dated July 15, 2015 which set aside the
Resolutions dated February 13, 20133 and May 8, 20134 issued by the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 8544 and thereby, dismissed the petition for review5
before the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity.

The Facts

On June 29, 2012, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued a Letter 6
interpreting Section 148(e) of the National Internal Revenue Code 7 (NIRC) and thereby,
opining that "alkylate, which is a product of distillation similar to naphtha, is subject to
tax."8 In implementation thereof, the Commissioner of Customs (COC) issued Customs
Memorandum Circular (CMC) No. 164-2012. Not long after, and in compliance with CMC
No. 164-2012, the Collector of Customs assessed excise tax on Petron's importation of
alkylate.9

Petron filed a petition for review10 before the CTA, contesting the allegedly erroneous
classification of alkylate and the resultant imposition of excise tax arising from the CIR's
interpretation of Section 148(e) of the NIRC.

On February 13, 2013, the CTA issued the first assailed Resolution,11 reversing its initial
dismissal of Petron's petition for review and giving due course thereto.12 It explained that
the controversy was not essentially about the constitutionality or legality of CMC No. 164-
2012 but a question on the propriety of the interpretation of Section 148(e) of the NIRC in
reference to the tax treatment of Petron's alkylateimportation, which is within the CTA's
jurisdiction to review.13 The CTA also held that the substantial and grave damage and
injury that would be suffered from the threatened collection of excise tax warranted the
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and justified Petron's immediate resort to
judicial action.14

The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration,15 which the CTA denied in the second assailed
Resolution16 dated May 8, 2013. Subsequently, the CIR elevated the matter to the Court
through a petition for certiorari,17 alleging that the CTA had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a case involving the CIR's exercise of interpretative or quasi-legislative
functions and that there was yet no final decision by the COC that was properly
appealable to the CTA.

In the July 15, 2015 Decision, the Court upheld the CIR's position that the CTA could not
take cognizance of the case because the latter's jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes
excluded the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of a law, rule or regulation
and that, in any case, it was premature to elevate a customs collector's assessment
without a prior protest and an appeal to the COC.18 Accordingly, the Court ordered the
dismissal of Petron's petition for review filed before the CTA.19

Dissatisfied, Petron filed a motion for reconsideration20 dated October 5, 2015.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Court's July 15, 2015 Decision, which
ordered the dismissal of Petron's petition for review before the CTA on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, should be reconsidered.

The Court's Ruling

At the onset, Petron insists that the CTA has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
CIR's interpretative ruling on alkylate, arguing that the CTA may rule on the validity of a
revenue regulation, ruling, issuance or other matters arising under the NIRC and other
tax laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). As basis, Petron cites for
the first time in its motion for reconsideration the Court's ruling in The Philippine American
Life and General Insurance Company v. The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue21 (Philamlife).

Philamlife is a 2014 case decided by a Division of the Court, which controversy arose
from an unfavorable ruling by the Secretary of Finance that affirmed, through its power of
review under Section 4 of the NIRC, the CIR's denial of a request to be cleared of liability
for donor's tax. Noting the absence of an express provision in the law concerning further
appeals from the Secretary of Finance, the issue framed for resolution was — "where
does one seek immediate recourse from the adverse ruling of the Secretary of Finance
in its exercise of its power of review under Sec. 4?"22Resolving this issue, the Court in
Philamlife held that:

Admittedly, there is no provision of law that expressly provides where exactly the ruling
of the Secretary of Finance under the adverted NIRC provision is appealable to. However,
We find that Sec. 7(a)(l) of RA 1125, as amended, addresses the seeming gap in the law
as it vests the CTA, albeit impliedly, with jurisdiction over the CA petition as "other
matters" arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR. As stated:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Xxx

Even though the provision suggests that it only covers rulings of the Commissioner, We
hold that it is, nonetheless, sufficient enough to include appeals from the Secretary's
review under Sec. 4 of the NIRC.23

Corollary to this disposition, however, the Court's Third Division extended its discussion
on the issue regarding the CTA's jurisdiction over the rulings of the CIR, viz.:

Evidently, City of Manila can be considered as a departure from Ursal in that in spite of
there being no express grant in law, the CTA is deemed granted with powers of certiorari
by implication. Moreover, City of Manila diametrically opposes British American Tobacco
to the effect that it is now within the power of the CTA, through its power of certiorari, to
rule on the validity of a particular administrative rule or regulation so long as it is within its
appellate jurisdiction. Hence, it can now rule not only on the propriety of an assessment
or tax treatment of a certain transaction, but also on the validity of the revenue regulation
or revenue memorandum circular on which the said assessment is based. 24

The foregoing remarks appear to be in direct opposition to the ruling in British American
Tobacco v. Camacho, et al.25(British American Tobacco), which is a 2008 case decided
by the Court En Banc, cited as basis by the Court in its July 15, 2015 Decision in this case
regarding the issue of jurisdiction.

The apparent conflicting jurisprudence on the matter involving the Court's 2008 En Banc
ruling in British American Tobacco and the Court's Third Division Ruling in Philamlife has
been seemingly settled in the 2016 En Banc case of Banco De Oro v. Republic of the
Philippines26(Banco De Oro) wherein it was opined that:

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes,
appeals from the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related problems must be brought exclusively to
the Court of Tax Appeals.

In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals
to have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of
certiorari against the acts and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should thus
be filed before the Court of Tax Appeals.

Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa Blg.129 provides
an exception to the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over actions
questioning the constitutionality or validity of tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax
cases, actions directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation
or administrative issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax Appeals.

Furthermore, with respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue

memorandum circulars, or rulings), these are issued by the Commissioner under its
power to make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions
of internal revenue laws. Tax rulings, on the other hand, are official positions of the Bureau
on inquiries of taxpayers who request clarification on certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, other tax laws, or their implementing regulations. Hence, the
determination of the validity of these issuances clearly falls within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals under Section 7(l) of Republic
Act No. 1125, as amended, subject to prior review by the Secretary of Finance, as
required under Republic Act No. 8424.27 (Emphases supplied)

The En Banc ruling in Banco De Oro has since not been overturned and thus, stands as
the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. Accordingly, the Court is prompted to
reconsider its ruling in this case with respect to the issue of jurisdiction.

However, the Court had also dismissed Petron's petition for review before the CTA on the
ground of prematurity. Unlike in Philamlife where the petition for review was filed before
the Secretary of Finance, Petron in this case directly elevated for review to the CTA the
customs collector's computation or assessment, which is not a proper subject of appeal.
To reiterate the Court's decision in the main:

xxx The [Tariff and Customs Code] prescribes that a party adversely affected by a ruling
or decision of the customs collector may protest such ruling or decision upon payment of
the amount due and, if aggrieved by the action of the customs collector on the matter
under protest, may have the same reviewed by the COC. It is only after the COC shall
have made an adverse ruling on the matter may the aggrieved parly file an appeal to the
CTA.

xxx There being no protest ruling by the customs collector that was appealed to the COC,
the filing of the petition before the CTA was premature as there was nothing yet to
review.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Nevertheless, Petron has presently manifested that it had already complied with the
protest procedure prescribed under the N1RC, and later on, filed an administrative claim 29
for refund and/or tax credit with the BIR on November 21, 2013. 30 Records are bereft of
any showing that the CIR had already acted on its claim and hence, Petron filed before
the CTA a Supplemental Petition for Review31 to include a claim for refund and/or tax
credit of the excise tax that was levied on its alkylateimportation. The CTA then gave due
course to the petition and, as per Petron's manifestation, the parties have already been
undergoing trial.32 Consequently, considering that the CTA had taken cognizance of
Petron's claim for judicial refund of tax which, under Section 7(a)(l)33 of RA 1125, is within
its jurisdiction, the Court finds that these supervening circumstances have already mooted
the issue of prematurity. Thus, in conjunction with the Banco De Oro ruling that the CTA
has jurisdiction to resolve all tax matters (which includes the validity of the CIR's
interpretation and consequent imposition of excise tax on alkylate), the Court finds it
proper to reconsider its decision.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Respondent Petron

Corporation's petition for review docketed as CTA Case No. 8544 is hereby DECLARED
to be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, which is DIRECTED to resolve
the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 233100, FEBRUARY 14, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
*
CRISTHIAN KEVIN GUIEB Y BUTAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Cristhian Kevin Guieb
y Butay (Guieb) assailing the Decision2 dated January 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07770, which affirmed the Decision3 dated August 28, 2015
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, Branch 13 (RTC) in Crim. Case
Nos. 15685-13 and 15686-13 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC charging Guieb of the
crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portions
of which state:

CRIM. CASE NO. 15685-135

That on or about 12:30 o'clock in the afternoon of September 28, 2013, at Brgy. 5 San
Silvestre, municipality of San Nicolas, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.10336 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug, in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) to police
poseur-buyer, without any authority or license from the appropriate government agency
to do so.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7
CRIM. CASE NO. 15686-138

That on or about September 28, 2013 at Brgy. 5 San Silvestre, Municipality of San
Nicolas, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.0635 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug, without any authority or license from the appropriate
government agency to do so.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

The prosecution alleged that at around 11:30 in the morning of September 28, 2013 and
upon the report of an informant, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task
Group (PAIDSOTG) of the Provincial Police Office of Ilocos Norte organized a buy-bust
team operation with the objective of apprehending Guieb, who was verified to be number
four (4) in PAIDSOTG, as well as in the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency's lists of
drug personalities. Upon arrival at the carinderiawhere the buy-bust was to be held, the
poseur-buyer, Police Officer 2 Richard Rarangol (PO2 Rarangol), and the informant were
approached by Guieb. After some preliminaries, PO2 Rarangol gave the marked money
to Guieb, who in turn, gave the former a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. When the transaction was consummated, PO2 Rarangol performed the pre-
arranged signal, prompting backups Police Officer 2 Jay Arr Agtang and Police Officer 1
Hayden Waga (PO1 Waga) to rush to the scene and arrest Guieb. Upon frisking Guieb,
PO1 Waga recovered another sachet containing white crystalline substance, which he
gave to PO2 Rarangol. The buy-bust team then brought Guieb and the seized items to
the Municipal Police Station of San Nicolas.10

Thereat, PO2 Rarangol conducted the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized
items in the presence of Guieb and Barangay Captain Francisco Bagay, Sr. (Brgy. Capt.
Bagay). Thereafter, PO2 Rarangol brought the seized sachets to the crime laboratory
where a qualitative examination ofthe contents revealed 11 that the same were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.12

In his defense, Guieb denied the allegations against him. He maintained that at around
noon of the day when he was arrested, he and his daughter went to a neighbor's house
to invite the latter to his child's baptism. After talking to said neighbor, Guieb sought out
his daughter who was then playing in front of thecarinderia where he was arrested.13 He
further maintained that he and his daughter were about to go home when two (2)
policemen arrested him and took him to the police station for allegedly running away with
the money of another policeman. At the police station, he was made to sit in front of the
table where PO2 Rarangol brought out two (2) sachets appearing to contain shabu, and
placed it on top of the table. PO2 Rarangol also took out a piece of paper with the word
"inventory" therein and started filling out the same. Thereafter, PO2 Rarangol asked Brgy.
Capt. Bagay to sign the paper, but the latter refused as he did not see how Guieb was
arrested.14

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision15 dated August 28, 2015, the RTC found Guieb guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced him as follows: (a) in Crim. Case
No. 15685-13, Guieb was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine in the amount of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim Case No. 15686-13, Guieb was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00.16

The RTC found that the prosecution had established the presence of all the elements of
the crime charged, as it was shown that: (a) Guieb was caught in the act of selling shabu
through the buy-bust operation conducted against him; and (b) after his apprehension,
the arresting officers frisked Guieb and discovered another plastic sachet containing
shabu in his possession.17 Further, the RTC observed that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the shabu seized from Guieb were preserved as the police officers complied with
the chain of custody rule under the law.18

Aggrieved, Guieb appealed19 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision20 dated January 17, 2017, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling, holding
that the prosecution had shown the presence of all the elements of the crimes charged. 21
It further held that the arresting officers complied with the chain of custody rule,
considering that: (a) on September 28, 2013, PO2 Rarangol seized the shabu from Guieb;
(b) he conducted the marking and inventory of the same in the presence of Brgy. Capt.
Bagay, and thereafter, prepared a request for laboratory examination; (c) on even date,
PO2 Rarangol himself transmitted the seized items and the necessary-paperwork to the
crime laboratory, which were received by Senior Police Officer 4 Arnulfo Burbano (SPO4
Burbano); and (d) SPO4 Burbano brought the seized items to Forensic Chemist Amiely
Ann Luis Navarro, who, after conducting a qualitative examination, confirmed that the
seized items were indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.22

Hence, this appeal.23

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Guieb's
conviction for the crimes charged.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.24 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."25

Guieb was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article II of RA
9165. In every prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential that
the following elements are proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment.26 Meanwhile, in order to convict an accused who is charged with Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements
also by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or
object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.27

In both cases, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the
prohibited drug, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the
corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 28
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.29 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,30the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 31 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,32 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."33

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 34 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064035 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not
render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.36 Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.37 In People v. Almorfe,38the Court explained that for the above-saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.39 Also, in People v. De Guzman,40 it was emphasized that
the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.41

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Guieb.

First, records reveal that while the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated
drugs were indeed conducted, a reading of the Certificate of Inventory42 shows that only
an elected official, i. e., Brgy. Capt. Bagay, was present and that there were no
representatives from the DOJ and the media. This mishap was made more apparent by
PO2 Rarangol's testimony in direct and cross-examinations, to wit:

DIRECT EXAMINATION:

[Prosecutor Garcia]: Were you able to reach the San Nicolas Police Station?
[PO2 Rarangol]: Yes, sir.
Q: While you were there as you said it will be there where you will wait for the barangay
officials, were you able to wait for the barangay officials?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And who were/was the barangay official who come [sic]?
A: The Brgy. Captain of Brgy. 5, sir.
Q: What did you do when the Barangay Captain of Brgy. 5 arrived?
A: I marked the confiscated items, sir.
xxxx
Q: How about the Barangay Captain, where was he?
A: He was also there, sir.
xxxx
Q: I am showing you Mr. Witness, a document entitled Certificate of Inventory where there
are There is a list of two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
P500.00 bill bearing serial number BP103932, one (1) Nokia cellphone, one (1) pack
transparent plastic sachet containing plastic, one (1) wallet containing driver's license and
one (1) blue lighter previously marked as Exhibit "F" found on page 36 of the record, will
you please go over the same and tell to us what is the relation of these to the one you
mentioned earlier where you place the listing of the items?
A: This is the one, sir.
Q: There is a signature above the printed name PO1 Richard Rarangol, whose signature
is that?
A: Me, sir.
Q: And who wrote this name Barangay Captain Francisco Bagay, Sr., (refuse to sign)?
A: I, sir.
Q: Did you ask him why he refused to sign?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his answer?
A: He said "I was not present when you arrested him"
Q: What was your reply, if any?
A: I told him, sir, only for the marking of the evidence you will witness, I told him, sir.
Q: So, you did not ask him to witness the inventory?
A: I did, sir.
Q: When you asked him to witness the inventory, what did he do?
A: He still did not like to sign, sir.
Q: What else did you do at your police station after the marking and inventory of the items
seized?
A: I placed them in a sealed pack, sir.
x x x x43

CROSS-EXAMINATION

[Arty. Asencion]: This Certificate of Inventory, Mr. Witness, you were the one who
accomplished and entered all the entries?
[PO2 Rarangol]: Yes ma'am.
Q: Barangay Captain Francisco Bagay, Sr., he was also present before you left Gudo
Carinderia in going to San Nicolas Police Station?
A: He was not there then, ma'am.
Q: He only arrived when you were already at the Investigation Section of PNP San
Nicolas?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: When you arrived, Mr. Witness, and made to sign this Certificate of Inventory, you
were already able to finish the details indicated in the Certificate of Inventory?
A: Not yet, ma'am.
Q: When Barangay Captain Francisco Bagay, Sr. arrived also, that was only the time you
marked the said items, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Nevertheless, he still refused to sign the Certificate of Inventory because his reason
was he did not actually see from whom the items came from other than your allegation
that it came from the subject person?
A: Yes, ma'am.
x x x x 44

To make matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible explanation as to why
there was a complete absence of an elected official and a representative from the DOJ
and the media in order for the saving clause to apply. To reiterate, the law requires the
presence of the enumerated witnesses — namely, an elected official, as well as a
representative from the DOJ and the media - to ensure the establishment of the chain of
custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
Thus, considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs are seriously put into question.

Verily, the procedural lapse committed by the police officers, which was unfortunately
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militates against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised.45 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165, is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal
drug suspects.46 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for
non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as well as its IRR, Guieb's acquittal
is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.47

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 17, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07770 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Cristhian Kevin Guieb y Butay is ACQUITTEDof the
crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 229092, FEBRUARY 21, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
RAUL MANANSALA Y MANINANG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Raul Manansala y
Maninang (Manansala) assailing the Decision2 dated November 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07080, which affirmed the Judgment3dated
September 5, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 37 (RTC) in Crim.
Case Nos. 16329-2009-C and 16330-2009-C finding Manansala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Manansala
of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory
portions of which state:

Crim. Case No. 16329-2009-C

(For violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165)

That on or about 11:30 a.m. of 07 March 2009 at Brgy. Parian, Calamba City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur
buyer a one (1) plastic sachets (sic) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise
known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, having a total weighing (sic) 0.02 grams.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Crim. Case No. 16330-2009-C

(For violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165)

That on or about 11:30 a.m. of 07 March 2009 at Brgy. Parian, Calamba City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess one (1) plastic
sachets (sic) of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu", a
dangerous drug, having a total weigh of 0.01 grams, in violation of the aforementioned
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that on March 7, 2009, a buy-bust team composed of Police
Senior Inspector Jaime V. Pederio, Police Inspector Jose Mari Pena, Police Officer (PO)
2 Dela Rosa (PO2 Dela Rosa) and PO2 Renato Magadia, Jr.8 (PO2 Magadia) was
formed, in response to an information given by a confidential agent that Manansala was
selling shabu at Barangay Parian, Calamba City. After conducting a pre-operation
procedure and coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), as
well as the barangay officials of Parian, the buy-bust team together with the confidential
agent, proceeded to the target area. As soon as Manansala was identified, PO2 Magadia,
the designated poseur-buyer, approached Manansala and asked if he could purchase
shabu. Manansala asked how much money PO2 Magadia had and in turn, the latter gave
the marked P500.00 bill, while Manansala simultaneously handed over one (1) plastic
sachet of suspected shabu. After inspecting the same, PO2 Magadia introduced himself
as a police officer and arrested Manansala. Subsequently, a preventive search was
conducted on Manansala to ensure that he had no firearms. Not finding any, Manansala
was ordered to empty his pockets which yielded another plastic sachet of suspected
shabu. Upon confiscation and marking of the items at the place of arrest, PO2 Magadia
brought Manansala to the Parian Barangay Hall where a blotter of the incident was made.
Thereafter, Manansala was taken to J.P. Hospital for medical examination, and then to
the police station where PO2 Magadia prepared a request for laboratory examination of
the seized items. After securing the letter-request, PO2 Magadia delivered the said items
to the crime laboratory where it was received by forensic chemist Lalaine Ong Rodrigo
who confirmed that they tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9

For his part, Manansala denied the charges against him, claiming that at around eleven
(11) o'clock in the morning of March 7, 2009, he was at home doing the laundry with his
daughter, when two (2) persons entered, pointed a gun at him, and made him board a
black car. He averred that he was later transferred to a police mobile and interrogated
about a certain "Iko." When he replied in the negative, he was returned to the black car
and brought to the Parian Barangay Hall where two (2) officers told the barangay officials
that they recovered from his possession the P500.00 bill and a tawas-like substance.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment11 dated September 5, 2014, the RTC ruled as follows: (a) in Crim. Case
No. 16329-2009-C, Manansala was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 16330-2009-
C, Manansala was likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.12

The RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of Illegal Sale
of Dangerous Drugs as it was able to prove that: (a) one (1) sachet of shabuwas sold
during the buy-bust operation; (b) Manansala was positively identified by PO2 Magadia
as the seller of the said dangerous drug; and (c) the said dangerous drug was presented
and duly identified in court as the subject of the sale. Also, the RTC observed that the
essential elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were established since
another plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from Manansala during the preventive
search.13 On the contrary, Manansala's denial and defense of frame-up were given scant
consideration for lack of substance.14

Furthermore, the RTC declared that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were properly preserved from the time of their seizure by PO2 Magadia until their turnover
to the crime laboratory.15

Aggrieved, Manansala appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated November 27, 2015, the CA affirmed Manansala's conviction for the
crimes charged.18 It ruled that all the elements of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Possession
of Dangerous Drugs were duly proven by the prosecution through PO2 Magadia's detailed
narration of the incident. It further held that the confidential informant need not be
presented in order to successfully hold Manansala liable. 19More importantly, the CA
admitted that while the requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165 were not perfectly
adhered to by the police officers, considering the absence of representatives from the
media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official during the
inventory and photography of the seized drugs, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
same were shown to have been duly preserved as PO2 Magadia was its custodian from
the time of their confiscation until presentation in court as evidence.20

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Manansala's
conviction for Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 21 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."22

In this case, Manansala was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.23 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.24

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on its identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment
the drugs are seized up to its presentation in court as evidence of the crime.25

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.26 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,27the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 28 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,29 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared
their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain
of custody."30
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 31 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.32 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not
ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.33 In People v. Almorfe,34the Court explained that for the above-saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.35 Also, in People v. De Guzman,36 it was emphasized that
the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.37

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from
the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Manansala.

An examination of the records reveals that while the prosecution was able to show that
the seized items were marked by PO2 Magadia immediately upon confiscation at the
place of arrest and in the presence of Manansala, the same was not done in the presence
of any elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ and the media.
Despite the failure to observe these requirements, no justifiable ground was given to
explain such lapse. Additionally, records are bereft of evidence showing that a physical
inventory of the seized items was made or that photographs of the same were taken.
The prosecution itself admitted these lapses when PO2 Magadia testified that:

[Prosecutor Joyce M. Barut]: Are you aware Police Officer Magadia of the provisions of
Section 21, RA 9165 particularly the preparations of inventory and the taking of
photographs of the accused and the items?
[PO2 Magadia]: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Were you able to comply with the provisions?
A: No ma'am.
Q: Why not?
A: Because commotion already happened that is why we just made a blotter on the
barangay, ma'am.
Q: Did you take photographs of the accused and the items confiscated?
A: No ma'am.
Q: Why not?
A: Because we do not have any camera at that time, ma'am.
x x x x38 (Underscoring supplied)

The mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of
photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities under the law, fails to
approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165. 39
Needless to state, the barangay blotter, which is merely a recording of the incident, is not
equivalent to or a substitute for a physical inventory that accounts and lists down in detail
the items confiscated from the accused. Besides, "[e]ntries in official records, as in the
case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated" and are
"[n]ot necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries."40
Neither can the Court excuse the alleged absence of a camera as a justifiable reason for
non-compliance with the photography rule, since the cause of such absence was never
explained. Nor does the plain allegation that the "commotion had already happened" -
without explaining its compelling nature - dispense with the necessity for the seized items
to be properly inventoried. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality.41 Therefore, it must be shown that earnest efforts were exerted
by the police officers involved to comply with the mandated procedure so as to convince
the Court that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. Since
this was not the case here, the Court is impelled to conclude that there has been an
unjustified breach of procedure and hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently, Manansala's acquittal is in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 42
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As such,
they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but alsojustify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court.
Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact
that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s
below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining
the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely
complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no
such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused,
and perforce, overturn a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 27, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07080 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Raul Manansala y Maninang is ACQUITTEDof the
crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 224834, FEBRUARY 28, 2018]

JONATHAN Y. DEE, PETITIONER,
V.
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, AND ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, AS MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND
HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, AS DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE
SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 224871, FEBRUARY 28, 2018]

HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA,
AS A DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,PETITIONERS,
V.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP,
JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA CRUZ,
ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, AND BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS,
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are various motions for reconsideration filed by Barbara Anne C.
Migallos,1 George E. SyCip,2Erwin M. Elechicon,3 Alliance Select Foods International,
Inc.,4 Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz and Antonio C. Pacis,5Jonathan Y. Dee,6 and Raymund
K.H. See,7 assailing the Decision8 dated March 15, 2017 of the Court which affirmed the
Decision9 dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution10 dated May 25, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, with modification, remanding COMM'L CASE NO.
15-234 to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) for further
proceedings.11

In the said motions, the movants similarly claim, inter alia, that supervening events have
rendered COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 moot and academic. In particular, they point out
that: (a) in COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 pending before the RTC, Harvest All Investment
Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy
S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) prayed that the 2015 Annual Stockholders' Meeting
(ASM) of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc. be held on the date set in the
corporation's by-laws, i.e., before the completion of the Stock Rights Offering (SRO); and
(b) the SRO, the 2015 ASM, and the 2016 ASM were all conducted and finished on
October 28, 2015, March 1, 2016, and June 28, 2016, respectively, absent any injunction
or restraining order issued by any court for the same. Hence, it would be futile and a
waste of court resources to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. 12

On the other hand, Harvest All, et al. maintain,13 among others, that the supervening
events mentioned by the movants did not render the instant case moot and academic, as
they cannot be permitted to render the same by their own positive actions. 14

At the outset, it must be reiterated that the only issues raised for the Court's resolution in
its Decision dated March 15, 2017 are: (a) whether or not Harvest All, et al.paid insufficient
filing fees for their complaint, as the same should have been based on the P1 Billion value
of the SRO; and (b) if Harvest All, et al. indeed paid insufficient filing fees, whether or not
such act was made in good faith and without any intent to defraud the government. 15
Notably, such issues are only determinative of whether or not the RTC had acquired
jurisdiction over COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 through Harvest All, et al.'s payment of
correct docket fees. Since the resolution of these issues is only a preliminary matter - and
does not affect the merits of this case - the Court deems it appropriate to let the RTC
make the proper determination as to whether or not the aforesaid supervening events
had indeed rendered COMM'L CASE NO. 15-234 moot and academic. Besides, such
determination will entail an examination and verification of the movants' various claims
and allegations, all of which are factual matters which are better threshed out before the
trial court.

Finally, suffice it to say that the other issues raised in the aforesaid motions for
reconsideration are but mere reiterations of the grounds already evaluated and passed
upon in the Assailed Decision. In view of the foregoing, there is no cogent reason to
warrant a modification or reversal of the same.

WHEREFORE, the aforesaid motions are DENIED with FINALITY. Let entry of judgment
be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 231050, FEBRUARY 28, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
ROY MAGSANO Y SAGAUINIT,ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Roy Magsano y

Sagauinit (Magsano) assailing the Decision2 dated November 4, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08001, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
December 1, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 (RTC) in Criminal
Case Nos. 15-1652 to 15-1653, finding Magsano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4otherwise known as
"The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," respectively.

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC, charging Magsano
with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the accusatory
portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 15-1652

On the 19th day of May 2015, in the [C]ity of Makati, the Philippines, accused, without the
necessary license of prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and distribute a total of zero point ten (0.10)
gram of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in consideration of Php500.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 15-1653

On the 19th day of May 2015, in the [C]ity of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license
or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his
possession, direct custody, [sic] and control a total of zero point zero nine (0.09) gram of
white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged8 that an informant tipped the operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG) that a certain "Taroy," who was later
on identified as Magsano, was engaged in illegal drug activities at Barangay South
Cembo, Makati City (Brgy. South Cembo). After verifying the said tip, or at around five
o'clock in the afternoon of May 19, 2015, the SAID-SOTG team, together with the
informant and in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 9 organized
a buy-bust operation and thereafter, proceeded to the target area. Upon arriving thereat,
the informant introduced Police Officer (PO) 3 Luisito Leif F. Marcelo (PO3 Marcelo), the
designated poseur-buyer, to Magsano, who then asked PO3 Marcelo how much shabu
he intended to buy. When PO3 Marcelo informed Magsano that he wanted to buy P500.00
worth of shabu, the former immediately handed over the marked money to the latter.
Afterwards, Magsano took out three (3) small plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance and instructed PO3 Marcelo to choose one. Accordingly, PO3 Marcelo took
one sachet and after examining the same, executed the pre-arranged signal by scratching
his forehead. Consequently, PO1 Mauro A. Pagulayan (PO1 Pagulayan) rushed towards
the scene and performed a body search on Magsano, which search yielded two (2) more
sachets of suspected shabu and the buy-bust money. Moments later, Magsano was taken
to the barangay hall of Brgy. South Cembo, where the confiscated drugs were marked
and inventoried in the presence of Barangay Kagawad George Achacoso.10 After the
inventory, PO3 Marcelo turned over the confiscated items to PO3 Voltaire A. Esguerra
(PO3 Esguerra), who then prepared the requests for laboratory examination 11 and drug
testing.12 Subsequently, PO3 Esguerra returned the items to PO3 Marcelo and provided
him with the investigation report13 and requests for examination. Shortly after, PO3
Marcelo delivered the seized items to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, where they were received by Police Chief Inspector May Andrea A. Bonifacio
(PCI Bonifacio) at 10:10 in the evening.14 In Chemistry Report No. D-551-15,15 PCI
Bonifacio revealed that the specimen drugs contained the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

In his defense,16 Magsano simply denied the charges against him, claiming that at around
eight o'clock in the evening of May 19, 2015, some men suddenly barged into his house,
handcuffed him, and conducted a search therein. When the search proved futile, the men
took Magsano to the office of the SAID-SOTG. Subsequently, he was brought to the
barangay hall of Brgy. South Cembo, where he allegedly saw for the first time the sachets
of shabu that were supposedly recovered from him.17

During trial, Shabina Agas testified18 in behalf of Magsano to corroborate his claims. She
maintained that she was outside their house when some men arrived and asked for
Magsano's whereabouts. She added that after learning where Magsano was, they forcibly
entered his house and arrested him.19

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision20 dated December 1, 2015, the RTC found Magsano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 and respectively
sentenced him as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 15-1652, to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 15-1653, to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00.21

The RTC ruled that the prosecution proved all the essential elements of the crimes
charged.22 Further, it found an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the dangerous
drugs, as it was established that: (a) after seizing the drugs at the place of arrest, PO3
Marcelo marked and inventoried them at the barangay hall of Brgy. South Cembo; (b)
subsequently, PO3 Marcelo turned them over to PO3 Esguerra, who prepared and signed
the request for laboratory examination; (c) thereafter, PO3 Esguerra returned the seized
items to PO3 Marcelo for delivery to the PNP Crime Laboratory; (d) the said items were
then received by PCI Bonifacio, who confirmed the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride therein; and (e) finally, PCI Bonifacio brought the items to the court for
presentation as evidence. In this relation, it held that the absence of representatives from
the media and the DOJ during the inventory did not render the buy-bust operation illegal,
since it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs was
nevertheless preserved.23

Aggrieved, Magsano appealed to the CA.24

The CA Ruling

In a Decision25 dated November 4, 2016, the CA affirmed in toto the conviction of

Magsano. It rejected Magsano's claim that the seized drugs were not the same items
presented in court as the police officers allegedly failed to put them in a separate sealed
plastic container before delivery to the PNP Crime Laboratory, considering that RA 9165
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require the observance of such
procedure. It ruled that the facts of this case do not fall squarely with the case of People
v. Martinez,26 as it was established that the seized drugs were properly identified from the
time of their marking and inventory until their presentation in court.27

Moreover, the CA observed that the seized drugs were adequately handled before,
during, and after the conduct of the laboratory examination. 28 Further, it declared that
Magsano could no longer raise the issue with respect to the police officers' purported non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 on appeal, since he failed to question
the same during trial. In fact, he had every opportunity to object to the exhibits and
testimonies of the prosecution, yet he did not.29 He instead relied on his defense of denial,
which was, however, insufficient to overcome the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.30

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Magsano's conviction should be
upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 31 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 32

In this case, Magsano was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of RA 9165. Case law states that in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the following elements must be proven with moral certainty: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.33 Meanwhile, to convict an accused for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the necessary elements thereof, to wit:
(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b)
such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.34

In both instances, it is equally essential that the identity of the prohibited drugs be
established beyond reasonable doubt, considering that the prohibited drug itself forms an
integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken
chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on
the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination
of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the
chain of custody from the moment the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the crime.35

In this regard, Section 21,36 Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640,37outlines the

procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order
to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.38 Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
with an elected public official AND a representative from the National Prosecution Service
(NPS) (which falls under the Department of Justice [[DO])39OR the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the
seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from confiscation for examination.40 In the case of People v. Mendoza,41 the Court
stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or
the [NPS/DOJ], [and] any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the
[seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidencethat had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure
and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed,
the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of
custody."42

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 43 In fact,
the IRR of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA
10640 - provides that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless
seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA
9165, — under justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 44 Tersely put, the
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section
21, Article II of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.45 In People v. Almorfe,46the Court stressed that for
the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.47 Also, in People v. De Guzman,48 it was emphasized that
the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.49

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed an unjustified deviation from
the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Magsano.50

An examination of the records reveals that while the inventory of the seized drugs was
conducted in the presence of Magsano and an elected public official, the same was not
done in the presence of a representative from the media or the DOJ. By their own account,
both PO3 Marcelo and PO1 Pagulayan explicitly admitted that there were no witnesses
from either the media or the DOJ during the inventory of the seized drugs:

PO3 Marcelo on Cross Examination

Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?
A: At the barangay hall of Brgy. South Cembo, sir.
Q: When you arrived at the barangay hall, was the barangay official already there?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: How long did you have to wait?
A: More or less ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q: And then when the barangay official arrived, you conducted the inventory?
Q: Yes, sir. We conducted the markings and inventory.
Q. Was there a representative from the DOJ?
A: None, sir.
Q. How about a representative from the media?
A: None, sir.
x x x x51
PO1 Pagulayan on Cross Examination
Q: You did not conduct the inventory at the place of operation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You conducted it at the barangay, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: And when you arrived at the barangay, was the barangay official already there?
A: No, sir.
Q: How long did you have to wait before the barangay official arrived?
A: Ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q. Was there any representative from the DOJ?
A: None, sir.
Q. How about any media personnel?
A: None also, sir.
x x x x52

Despite such admissions, the police officers did not provide any plausible explanation as
to why the presence of these required witnesses was not procured. Thus, their unjustified
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
puts into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs purportedly seized from
the accused.

Notably, as held in People v. Miranda53 (Miranda), "the fact that [an accused such as
Magsano in this case] raised his objections against the integrity and evidentiary value of
the [dangerous] drugs seized from him only for the first time [on appeal] x x x does not
preclude [the CA], or even this Court[,] from passing upon the same." 54This is because
"[a]n appeal in criminal cases confers upon the court full jurisdiction and renders it
competent to examine the record and revise the judgment appealed from." 55 Accordingly,
"errors in an appealed judgment [of a criminal case], even if not specifically assigned,
may [therefore] be corrected motu propio by the court if the consideration of these errors
is necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the case." 56 In Miranda, the Court explained:
In this case, the Court cannot simply turn a blind eye against the unjustified deviations in
the chain of custody on the sole ground that the defense failed to raise such errors in
detail before the trial court. Considering the nature of appeals in criminal cases as above-
discussed, it is then only proper to review the said errors even if not specifically assigned.
Verily, these errors, which go to the sufficiency of the evidence of the corpus delicti itself,
would indeed affect the court's judgment in ultimately ascertaining whether or not the
accused should be convicted and hence, languish in prison for possibly a significant
portion of his life. In the final analysis, a conviction must prudently rest on the moral
certainty that guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, if doubt
surfaces on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, regardless that it does only at the
stage of an appeal, our courts of justice should nonetheless rule in favor of the accused,
lest it betray its duty to protect individual liberties within the bounds of law. 57(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

All told, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the police officers' non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as
its IRR. Thus, even if the same only surfaced on appeal, reasonable doubt now persists
in upholding the conviction of the accused. As the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised,58 Magsano's acquittal is in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty, x x x.59

"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial
court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."60

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 4, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Roy Magsano y Sagauinit is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 233744, FEBRUARY 28, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
 WILSON RAMOS YCABANATAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Wilson Ramos y

Cabanatan (Ramos) assailing the Decision2 dated March 21, 2017 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07864, which affirmed the Judgment3 dated October 23,
2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
Q-10-167524 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the RTC charging Ramos of the
crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about the 12th day of November 2010, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, without lawful authority, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell,
trade[,] administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport, or act as broker in the said transaction, dangerous drugs, to wit:

one (1) heat[-] sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero eight ten
(0.0810) gram of white crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero four five nine
(0.0459) gram of white crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero six one six
(0.0616) gram of white crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero five one nine
(0.0519) gram of white crystalline subs[tance]
one (1) heat[-] sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero five thirty
(0.0530) gram of white crystalline subs[tance]
with a total of ZERO POINT TWENTY NINE THIRTY FOUR (0.2934) grams, all positive
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 12, 2010,
the operatives of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) went to Pingkian,
Pasong Tamo, Quezon City, in order to implement a pre-organized buy-bust operation
targeting a certain "Wilson" (later identified as Ramos) who was known to be a notorious
drug pusher in the area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer, Intelligence Officer 1 Cesar
Dealagdon, Jr. (IO1 Dealagdon) and the confidential informant met with Ramos, who
immediately demanded the money. Since IO1 Dealagdon requested that the "item" be
shown first, Ramos took out a black coin purse from his pocket and pulled out five (5)
sachets containing the suspected shabu therefrom. After giving the marked money to
Ramos and receiving the sachets from him, IO1 Dealagdon performed the pre-arranged
signal, prompting his back-ups to swoop in and arrest Ramos. Ramos was then frisked,
resulting in the recovery of the marked money, and thereafter, was brought to the police
station. Thereat, the PDEA operatives conducted the inventory and photography of the
seized items in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Jose Ruiz (Kgd. Ruiz). IO1
Dealagdon then brought the seized items to the PDEA Crime Laboratory where the
contents were confirmed7 to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8

For his part, Ramos pleaded not guilty to the charge against him and interposed the
defenses of denial and frame-up.9 He maintained that at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon
of the day he was arrested, he was driving his tricycle towards home when he decided to
park at a jeepney terminal. After a while, a motor vehicle stopped near him, from which
armed men came out. He was asked where the "items" were but after answering that he
did not know, the armed men mauled him and forcefully boarded him inside their vehicle.
He was then taken to Camp Crame where he saw the man arrested before him released
from custody. Finally, Ramos claimed that he only saw the black coin purse and the five
(5) small plastic sachets for the first time after they came from Barangay Pinyahan en
route to the PDEA Office.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment11 dated October 23, 2015, the RTC found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. 12

The RTC found that all the essential elements in the Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
have been proven, to wit: (a) the transaction or sale took place; (b) the corpus delictior
the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (c) the buyer and seller were identified. It
found that the prosecution was able to establish that a sale actually took place between
IO1 Dealagdon, the poseur-buyer, and Ramos, who was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu, during the conduct of a buy-bust operation. Moreover, the RTC held that the
prosecution has sufficiently shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items were duly preserved in this case, pointing out that the chain of custody
of the said items was shown to be continuous and unbroken, from the time IO1 Dealagdon
recovered the same from Ramos until they were turned over to the PDEA Crime
Laboratory and examined. Accordingly, the RTC upheld the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duty of the arresting officers in the absence of showing that they were
motivated by ill will against Ramos. Finally, the RTC rejected Ramos's defenses of denial
and frame-up, being inherently weak defenses against the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.13

Aggrieved, Ramos appealed14 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision15 dated March 21, 2017, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling, holding that
the prosecution had shown the presence of all the elements of the crime charged. 16 It
further refused to give credence to Ramos's insistence that the arresting officers failed to
observe the chain of custody rule regarding the disposition of the seized items, i.e., failure
to make an inventory at the place of his arrest in the presence of a media man or a
government official, as the PDEA operatives offered a justifiable explanation for the same.
In view thereof, as well as the fact that the arresting officers sufficiently complied with the
proper procedure in the handling of the seized items, the CA concluded that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved. 17

Hence, this appeal.18

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Ramos's
conviction for the crime charged.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review, and thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 19 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."20

Ramos was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In every prosecution of unauthorized
sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential that the following elements be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.21
Moreover, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited
drug, as the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
It has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate
any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link of the chain from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.22

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.23 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,24the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 25 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,26 the Court stressed that "[without the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs], that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 27

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 28 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.29 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not
ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.30 InPeople v. Almorfe,31the Court explained that for the above-saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.32 Also, in People v. De Guzman,33 it was emphasized that
the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.34

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Ramos.

First, although it is true that the seized plastic sachets were marked in the presence of
Ramos himself and an elected public official, i.e., Kgd. Ruiz, the same was not done in
the presence of any representative from the DOJ and the media. IO1 Dealagdon admitted
this when he testified on direct and cross-examinations, thus:

DIRECT EXAMINATION:

[ACP Bartolome]: Mr. witness, who were present during the inventory?
[IO1 Dealagdon]: The accused alias Wilson, Barangay elected official, Kagawad Ruiz,
me, Agent Oliver dela Rosa, and other members of team, sir.
Q: How about DOJ representative?
A: None, sir.35
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
[Atty. Manzano]: After the arrest of alias Wilson, you immediately proceeded to Barangay
Pinyahan, correct?
[IO1 Dealagdon]: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And according to you, you conducted the marking, inventory and photograph?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: The marking and inventory was not done in the presence of representative from the
Media and DOJ, correct?
A: Yes, ma'am.36
When asked to explain the absence of any representatives from the DOJ and the media
during the conduct of inventory and photography, Intelligence Officer 1 Oliver Dela Rosa
(IO1 Dela Rosa), another member of the buy-bust team, testified:
[ACP Bartolome]: Who were present during the preparation of this Inventory?
[IO1 Dela Rosa]: Kagawad Ruiz, sir.
Q: Of what barangay?
A: Brgy. Pinyahan, sir.
Q: Why is it that there [is] no signatures in this space provided for the representative of
the DOJ and media?
A: There was no media available, sir.
Q: Why?
A: It was past office hours and we cannot find a media, sir.37

The Court finds the aforesaid explanation inadequate for the saving clause to apply. As
may be gleaned from the records, as early as 2:30 in the afternoon of November 12,
2010, the PDEA operatives already conducted a briefing where they organized the buy-
bust operation against Ramos; and such operation was implemented at 8 o'clock in the
evening of even date.38 Verily, the PDEA operatives had hours to spare before the buy-
bust team was deployed in Pingkian, Pasong Tamo, Quezon City to implement the
entrapment operation against Ramos. They could have used that time to secure the
presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media who would have accompanied
them in the conduct of the inventory and photography of the items to be seized from
Ramos on account of the buy-bust; but unfortunately, they did not.

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.39 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced.40 In People v. Umipang,41the Court held that
the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives
were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as
a flimsy excuse."42 Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance.43 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily
given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full
well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section
21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their
non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts
to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their
actions were reasonable.44

Second, the combined weight of the seized specimens, which initially weighed0.2934
gram during the first qualitative examination,45 decreased to 0.2406 during the re-
examination46 by the second forensic chemist. These were the same items that IO1
Dealagdon identified in court as those that he had previously marked. Although the
discrepancy of 0.0528 in the amounts may be considered negligible, the prosecution,
nonetheless, did not even venture to explain how the discrepancy came about. As already
adverted to, the saving clause "applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the
procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when
the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption
of regularity and bears the burden of proving — with moral certainty — that the illegal
drug presented in court is the same drug that was confiscated from the accused during
his arrest."47

Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the PDEA operatives, which were
unfortunately left unjustified by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against Ramos, as the integrity and evidentiary value of thecorpus
delicti had been compromised.48 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA
9165, as amended by RA 10640, is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.49 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA
10640, as well as its IRR, Ramos's acquittal is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.50

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07864 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Wilson Ramos y Cabanatan is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 232189, MARCH 7, 2018]

ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, PETITIONER
VS.
CYNTHIA B. BANA, RESPONDENT

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated February 23,
2017 and the Resolution3dated June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 146138, which affirmed the Orders dated May 29, 2015 4 and March 3, 20165 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 (RTC) in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-
CV that: (a) granted petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay’s (petitioner) Motion to Withdraw;
and (b) declared respondent Cynthia B. Baña’s (respondent) Counterclaim for
independent adjudication.

The Facts

On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage,6 seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on
account of his psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.7 Subsequently, respondent filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim 8 dated
December 5, 2014.

However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to
Withdraw9 his petition. In her comment/opposition10 thereto, respondent invoked Section
2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court (alternatively, Section 2, Rule 1 7), and prayed that her
counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent adjudication. 11 In
turn, petitioner filed his reply,12 averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from
being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which - according to
petitioner - was required under the same Rules of Court provision. In particular, petitioner
alleged that respondent filed the required manifestation only on March 30, 2015.
However, respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's Motion to Withdraw on
March 11, 2015; hence, respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest before the
trial court her desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action. 13

The RTC Ruling

In an Order14 dated May 29, 2015, the RTC granted petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw
petition.15 Further, it declared respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for independent
adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto.16
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 17which was denied in an
Order18 dated March 3, 2016. Thus, he elevated the matter to the CA via a petition
for certiorari, 19 praying that the RTC Orders be set aside to the extent that they allowed
the counterclaim to remain for independent adjudication before the same trial court.20

The CA Ruling

In a Decision21 dated February 23, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.22 It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been filed by the defendant
before the service upon him of the petitioner’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint.23

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,24 which was denied in a

Resolution25 dated June 6, 2017; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC
Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for independent adjudication before the
same trial court.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure relative to
counterclaims in the event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiffs
instance, viz. :

Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the preceding

section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The
dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same
action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be
without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court.

As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in
this case - the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that "[i]nstead of an ‘action’ shall not
be dismissed, the present rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action is
different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint
and not the action is dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute
his counterclaim in the same acton."26

However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be
prosecuted in a separate action. As explained by renowned remedial law expert, former
Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the matter:

Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to
which a counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute
his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same
action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the
corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a
separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the
same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within
15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss. x x x27
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its
second sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint."
Evidently, the CA ignored the same provision's third sentence, which provides for the
alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom,
should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manifest his
preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.

The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day
period triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the
conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the
same action. Thus, in order to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the
required manifestation within the aforesaid period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be
prosecuted only in a separate action.

It is hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that "[t]he whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to
all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its
meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter."28

By narrowly reading Section 2, Rule 1 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA clearly violated the
foregoing principle and in so doing, erroneously sustained the assailed RTC Orders
declaring respondent’s counterclaim "as remaining for independent adjudication" despite
the latter's failure to file the required manifestation within the prescribed fifteen (15)-day
period. As petitioner aptly points out:

[I]f the intention of the framers of the Rules of Court is a blanket dismissal of the complaint
ALONE if a counterclaim has been pleaded prior to the service of the notice of dismissal
then there is NO EVIDENT PURPOSE for the third (3rd) sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 17.
x x x x29

[I]t is clearly an ABSURD conclusion if the said provision will direct the defendant to
manifest within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice of dismissal his preference to
prosecute his counterclaim in the SAME ACTION when the same AUTOMATICALLY
REMAINS. If the automatic survival of the counterclaim and the death of the complaint as
being ruled by the Court of Appeals in its questioned Decision is indeed true, then the
third sentence should have required defendant to manifest that he will prosecute his
counterclaim in a SEPARATE [and not - as the provision reads - in the
same] ACTION.30 (Emphases and underscoring in the original)

Petitioner's observations are logically on point. Consequently, the CA rulings, which

affirmed the patently erroneous R TC Orders, must be reversed. As it should be, the RTC
should have only granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw and hence, dismissed his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, without prejudice to, among others, the
prosecution of respondent's counterclaim in a separate action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 23, 2017 and the
Resolution dated June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146138 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED solely granting petitioner
Alex Raul B. Blay’s Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others, without
prejudice to the prosecution of respondent Cynthia B. Baña's counterclaim in a separate
action.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 231383, MARCH 07, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
JOEY SANCHEZ Y LICUDINE, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Joey Sanchez y

Licudine (Sanchez) assailing the Decision2 dated February 19, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06911, which affirmed the Decision3 dated May
21, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27 (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 8842 and 8843, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," respectively, with modification
imposing fines therefor.

The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Sanchez
with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the accusatory
portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 8842

That on or about the 29th day of July, 2010 in the Municipality of Bacnotan, Province of
La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for and in
consideration of in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos, sell and deliver one (1) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known
as SHABU, a dangerous drug, with a weight of 0.0352 gram to IO1 RAYMUND TABUYO,
who posed as buyer thereof using marked money, a Five Hundred Pesos bill bearing
Serial Number VX925142, without first securing the necessary permit, license or
prescription from the proper government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 8843

That on or about the 29th day of July, 2010 in the Municipality of Bacnotan, Province of
La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody two (2) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.0430 gram
and 0.0352 gram, without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from
the proper government agency to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that on July 29, 2010, with the help of a confidential informant,
the members of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Regional Public Safety Mobile Battalion organized a buy-bust
operation against a certain alias "Totoy" (later on identified as Sanchez), who was
allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade at the Bacnotan Public Market, Bacnotan, La
Union. After a briefing where, inter alia, PDEA Investigation Officer (IO) 1 Raymund
Tabuyo (IO1 Tabuyo) was designated as the poseur-buyer, the buy-bust team proceeded
to the target area. Thereat, IO1 Tabuyo was able to meet Sanchez, who, after receiving
the marked money, handed over a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance to the former. After IO1 Tabuyo examined the contents of the plastic
sachet, he executed the pre-arranged signal, thus prompting the other members of the
buy-bust team to rush to the scene and arrest Sanchez. The buy-bust team searched
Sanchez and found two (2) other plastic sachets also containing a white crystalline
substance.8

The buy-bust team then conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site
before proceeding to their office for documentation purposes.9 Thereat, the team was met
with representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media,10 both of whom
signed the Certificate of Inventory.11 The seized plastic sachets were then taken to the
PNP Crime Laboratory where it was confirmed12that their contents are indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.13

For his part, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and offered his version
of what transpired on the day he was arrested. He narrated that between 3:00 to 4:00 in
the afternoon of July 29, 2010, he was in front of the public market collecting bets for
jueteng, when two (2) men unknown to him suddenly approached him and gave their
numbers; and that when they were about to pay, they handcuffed and arrested him for
allegedly selling drugs. Sanchez then insisted that when he was frisked, the men were
only able to find money from the bets he collected and that they only made it appear that
they recovered sachets containing shabu from him.14

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision15 dated May 21, 2014, the RTC found Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced him as follows: (a) for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, the RTC sentenced Sanchez to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, among others; and (b) for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the RTC
sentenced Sanchez to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, among others.16

The RTC found that the buy-bust team validly arrested Sanchez who was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu to the poseur-buyer; and that after his arrest, the arresting
officers discovered two (2) more sachets, also containing shabu, from his pocket. Further,
the RTC found that the arresting officers followed the procedures in conducting buy-bust
operation, and that the evidence were preserved as the chain of custody thereof was not
broken.17

Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed to the CA.18

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated February 19, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with
modifications, further ordering Sanchez to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for violating Section
5, Article II of RA 9165, and P300,000.00 for violating Section 11, Article II of the same
law.20 It held that the prosecution had successfully established the elements necessary
to convict Sanchez of the crimes charged.21 It further held that the arresting officers had
shown an unbroken chain of custody over the seized drugs, and thus, their integrity and
evidentiary value were preserved.22

Hence, this appeal.23

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Sanchez's
conviction for the crimes charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.24 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."25

Here, Sanchez was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.26 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.27

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of
custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime.28

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers
must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.29 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 30 the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 31 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,32 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of thecorpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 33

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 34 In fact,
the IRR of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA
10640 - provides that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless
seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure
and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.35 In
other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure
laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 36 In People v.
Almorfe,37the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.38 Also, in People v. De Guzman,39 it was emphasized that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.40
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Sanchez.

While it appears that representatives from the DOJ and the media were present during
the conduct of the inventory as evidenced by their signatures on the Certificate of
Inventory,41 a more careful scrutiny of the records shows that the buy-bust team
conducted the marking, inventory, and photography where the arrest was made, 42 and
merely made the aforesaid representatives sign the Certificate of Inventory upon the buy-
bust team's arrival at their office. Moreover, the said procedures were not done in the
presence of any elected public official. During trial, IO1 Tabuyo admitted to these
procedural mishaps, viz.:

[Pros. Crispin Lamong, Jr.] Q: Now, after your recovered [the] 2 sachets and the 1
piece P500.00 buy-bust money, what did you do next?

[IO1 Tabuyo] A: We conducted an inventory at the transaction area, your honor.

Q: When you said, in the transaction area, how did you conduct an inventory? [sic]

A: We made marking and photographs.

Q: Marking on what items, mr. witness?

A: All, the 3 plastic sachets, sir.

xxxx

Q: Mr. witness, aside from the request you made, what else transpired at the PDEA
Office?

A: We requested a DOJ representative to sign the inventory.

Q: Aside from the DOJ representative what else requested Mr. Witness made by
your office? [sic]
A: The media representative[,] [Y]our [H]onor.

Q: And were the DOJ representative and media representative were able to sign the
inventory? [sic]

A: Yes[,] [S]ir.

xxxx

Q: While the DOJ representative and the media representative signing what happened
next[,] if any, mr. witness? [sic]

A: They signed, [Y]our [H]onor.

Q: How about you[?] [W]hat were you doing then at the time the DOJ representative and
the media representative signing, [mr.] witness? [sic]

A: I was there[,] [Y]our [H]onor[,] to witness that they signed.

Q: And how about the accused[?] [W]here was he when these DOJ and media
representatives were signing?

A: There also, [S]ir

.

Q: Mr. [w]itness, do you have any proof to show that these indeed the DOJ representative
and the media representative signing?

A: Yes, pictures.

Q: And who took the pictures?

A: Our photographers, [Y]our [H]onor.43 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives
from the DOJ and the media during the actual conduct of inventory and photography to
ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus, remove any suspicion of
tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which could considerably
affect a case. However, minor deviations may be excused in situations where a justifiable
reason for non-compliance is explained. In this case, despite the non-observance of the
witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the prosecution. For instance,
in an attempt to justify the absence of any elected public official during the conduct of
inventory and photography, IO1 Tabuyo stated on cross-examination that:

[Atty. Loida Martirez] Q: Mr. Witness, in your Certificate of Inventory[,] it appears that
there are only three (3) persons who signed, you as the seizing officer, a media
representative, and a DOJ representative.

[IO1 Tabuyo] A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Where was the elected public official? [W]hy was he not present at the place?

A: We were not able to get one elected official because it was a rush operation and
after the inventory we proceeded right away to our office.

Q: So you are now trying to tell us that you did not coordinate with any barangay
official that is why they were not present, Mr. Witness.

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And is it not a requirement that you have to coordinate with a local official, Mr.
Witness, so that they will be present during the inventory[?] [sic]

A: No, ma'am.

Q: That is not a requirement Mr. Witness?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: So you went to Bacnotan [P]ublic [Mjarket which is a public place and you were not
able to see even one elected public official at the place, Mr. Witness?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: That is just very near the municipal hall, is that correct, Mr. Witness?

A: (no answer)

Q: So you also did not coordinate with the Bacnotan Police, Mr. Witness?

A: We coordinate, ma'am, [sic]

Q: You coordinate with the Bacnotan PNP.

A: The precinct at the left side of the public market.

Q: You just coordinated with them after the operation when you were there already, is
that correct?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: You just saw the police sub-station there, is that correct?

A: No, ma'am.44 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible.45 However, in People v. Umipang,46 the
Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest effortswere employed in
contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to
be regarded as a flimsy excuse."47Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual
serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds
for non-compliance.48These considerations arise from the fact that these officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for
a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand
knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed
in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, the apprehending officers are compelled
not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince
the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure,
and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.49

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression — as in fact the only reason
given was that they were conducting a "rush operation" — the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Sanchez have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the sale and
possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of
proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti, failing in which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.50

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.51

"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raise, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction." 52

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 19, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06911 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Joey Sanchez y Licudine is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 231983, MARCH 7, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
VS.
CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA A.K.A. "IPYANG", AND DEREK JOSEPH LUMAYA,
ACCUSED
CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA A.K.A. "IPYANG", ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Crispian Merced

Lumaya a.k.a. "Ipyang" (Crispian) assailing the Decision 2 dated September 14, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01846, which affirmed the Joint
Judgment3 dated March 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court ofNegros Oriental, Branch
30 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 21618, 21622, and 21623, finding Crispian guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5, 11, and 12, respectively, of Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."

The Facts
In an Information5 dated March 20, 2013, Crispian and his co-accused Derek Joseph
Lumaya (Derek; collectively, the accused) were charged of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, before
the RTC, the accusatory portion of which reads:

Criminal Case No. 21618

That on or about the 4th day of March, 2013, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring together and
mutually aiding one another not being then authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally sell and/or deliver to a poseur buyer one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly called "shabu[,"] a dangerous drug.

Contrary to Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165.6

Crispian was likewise charged in two (2) separate Informations7 dated March 20, 2013 of
the crimes of Illegal Possession of Drugs and of Drug Paraphernalia, respectively defined
and penalized under Sections 11 and 12, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 21622

That on or about the 4th day of March, 2013, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not being then authorized
by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess ten (10) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a total aggregate weight of 20.44 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly called "shabu," a dangerous drug.

That the accused is found positive for use of Methamphetamine, as reflected in Chemistry
Report No. DT-023/024-13.

Contrary to Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.8

Criminal Case No. 21623

That on or about the 4th day of March, 2013, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not being then authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess or have under his
control the following items[,] to wit:

One (1) piece Scissor[s]

 Two (2) pieces rolled tin foil
Two (2) pieces elongated tin foil
One (1) piece lighter
One (1) piece improvised bamboo clip

which are equipmen[t], instruments, apparatus or paraphernalia fit or intended for

smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body[.]

Contrary to Section 12, Art. II of R.A. 9165.9

The prosecution alleged that a tip was received by the Philippine National Police (PNP) -
Dumaguete Station that a certain "Ipyang", who was later identified as Crispian, was
peddling illegal drugs in San Jose Extension, Barangay Taclobo, Dumaguete City
(Taclobo ). Acting on the said tip, the police operatives successfully conducted a test-buy
operation at his house in Taclobo at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of February 26,
2013. The following day, they applied for a search warrant- which was likewise issued on
the same day - before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 40 (subject
warrant). Meanwhile, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 4, 2013, a
confidential informant (informant) reported to the police officers of the PNP - Dumaguete
Station that Crispian was again selling illegal drugs at his house. Despite the standing
subject warrant, a buy-bust operation was organized in coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency.10

Thus, at around 11:40 in the evening, the buy-bust team, together with the informant,
proceeded to the target area in Barangay Motong. When the accused arrived, Derek
immediately asked the informant how much shabu he would be buying, to which the
informant replied that it was Police Officer I Harry Dumaguit (POl Dumaguit), the
designated poseur-buyer, who wanted to purchase ₱500.00 worth of shabu. Crispian then
pulled out one (1) sachet of shabu and gave it to PO1 Dumaguit, who, in turn, handed
over the PS00.00 buy-bust money. After examining the sachet of shabu, POI Dumaguit
declared his authority as a police officer, prompting Crispian to run away. However, the
other police operatives rushed towards the accused and arrested them. 11 A body search
was then conducted, and ten (10) additional sachets of suspected shabu were recovered
from Crispian's possession. Instead of marking the drugs upon seizure, the team decided
to execute the subject warrant and went to the house of Crispian. Thereat, several drug
paraphernalia were found and confiscated.12 Shortly after, PO1 Dumaguit conducted the
requisite marking and inventory of all the seized items in the presence of the accused, as
well as an elected public official and representatives from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and media.13 Concurrently, Police Officer 2 Xandro Paclauna (P02 Paclauna) took
photos, apparently showing eighteen (18) sachets of shabu. 14 After the operation, the
team went back to the police station and prepared the letterrequest for laboratory
examination.15Subsequently, PO1 Dumaguit brought the said letter-request, together with
only eleven (11) seized sachets of shabu, to the PNP Negros Oriental Crime Laboratory,
where they were received by Police Chief Inspector Josephine Llena (PCI Llena). 16 PCI
Llena then examined and confirmed that the same contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.17

For their part, the accused interposed the defense of denial. Derek alleged that at around
8:00 o'clock in the evening of March 4, 2013, he was in the house of his live-in partner
when he received a text message from his cousin, Crispian, inviting him for dinner. At
around 9:30 o'clock that same evening, he fetched Crispian and proceeded to Nilo's
tocino joint on a motorcycle. After dinner, the accused were on their way to the house of
Crispian's friend in Candau-ay, Dumaguete City when it started to rain; they decided to
let the rain pass at the house of Crispian’s other friend in Barangay Motong. When the
rain stopped, they then proceeded to Candauay, and on the way Derek saw a drunk man
wobbling on the road, so he stopped the motorcycle. The man, however, suddenly
grabbed him, introduced himself as a police officer, and took out a gun. Crispian
attempted to escape, but the other police officers arrived, fired their guns, and accosted
him. They then arrested the accused and effected a body search on them. Subsequently,
they all went to Crispian's house to execute the subject warrant and conduct an
inventory.18 According to the accused, they were not informed that the said inventory was
a result of the buy-bust operation and/or implementation of the subject warrant.19
Thereafter, they were brought to the police station.

The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" upon arraignment. 20 However, only Derek
testified for the defense, while Crispian, through counsel, waived his right to present
evidence.21

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Judgment22 dated March 23, 2014, the RTC found the accused guilty as
charged, and accordingly, sentenced them as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 21618, the
accused were sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordered to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00 each; (b) in Crim. Case No. 21622, Crispian was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00; and (c) in Crim.
Case No. 21623, Crispian was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2) years, as
maximum, and ordered him to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00. 23 It found that the prosecution
duly established with moral certainty all the essential elements of the crimes charged.24
On the contrary, it did not give credence to Derek's uncorroborated defense of denial in
light of the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Moreover,
Crispian failed to overcome the presumption of regularity afforded to police officers, as
he waived his right to present any evidence thereto.25

Aggrieved, the accused appealed26 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision27 dated September 14, 2016, the CA affirmed the convictions of the
accused, holding that the prosecution competently established an unbroken chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs.28 It ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs were preserved, as it was shown that PO 1 Dumaguit had exclusive custody
of the same from the time they were confiscated from the accused until they were brought
to the crime laboratory for testing. In fact, he was able to positively identify them in court
as the same drugs recovered from the accused.29

Furthermore, the CA held that the belated marking of the seized drugs was warranted,
since the police officers feared that the accused’s companions might escape and that the
contraband stored in Crispian's house would disappear.30

Only Crispian filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Crispian's conviction should be
upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Prefatorily, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 31 The appeal confers
the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.32

Here, Crispian was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, as well as Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, respectively
defined and penalized under Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of RA 9165. Case law states
that in every prosecution for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the following elements must
be proven with moral certainty: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.33 Meanwhile, in
instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
the prosecution must establish the necessary elements thereof, to wit: (a) the accused
was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession
was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.34 And finally, to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with
Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, the prosecution must show: (a)possession or
control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended
for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body; and (b)such possession is not authorized by law.35

In all these instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia be established beyond reasonable doubt, considering that the prohibited
drug and/or drug paraphernalia form an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime/s.
The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the
identity of the dangerous drugs and/or drug paraphernalia on account of switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence, the prosecution must be able to account for each
link of the chain from the moment of seizure up to presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti.36

In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police
officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value.37 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 38
the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.39

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 40 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064041 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. 42 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.43 In People v. Almorfe,44 the Court stressed that for the above-saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.45 Also, in People v. De Guzman,46 it was emphasized
that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because
the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist .47

While it appears that the apprehending officers in this case did conduct a physical
inventory and photography of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, it is,
nonetheless, baffling that the number of sachets shown in the photographs taken (i.e.,
eighteen [18]) do not correspond with the number of sachets for which the accused, as
per the subject Informations and inventory report,48 were herein charged (i.e., eleven
[11]). This discrepancy - if left unaccounted for - clearly renders suspect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs because not only would it be difficult to determine
the actual identity of the drugs for which the accused are charged (that is, which eleven
[11] among the eighteen [18] sachets displayed in the photos taken were the charges
based on), but a numerical variance would also arouse suspicions of planting and/or
switching. Indeed, when the law requires that the drugs be physically inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure, it follows that the drugs so inventoried and
photographed should - as a general rule - be the self-same drugs for which the charges
against a particular accused would be based. The obvious purpose of the inventory and
photography requirements under the law is precisely to ensure that the identity of the
drugs seized from the accused are the drugs for which he would be charged. Any
discrepancy should therefore be reasonably explained; otherwise, the regularity of the
entire seizure procedure would be put into question.

During trial, P02 Paclauna was questioned about the variance between the number of
drug sachets in the photos taken and the number of sachets reflected in the Informations
and examined by the chemist. Unfortunately, he failed to give any tenable explanation
therefor:

COURT: You were the one who took these photographs?

P02 Paclauna: Yes, sir.
Q: Which of these items are the, [sic] point to me where is the sachet being sold by the
accused here?
A: I can't say, sir, which .....
Q: Which one? You were supposed to take photographs of the items being bought or
seized? Where are the seized items and the bought items, which one?
A: I could not see clearly, sir, the "kuan'', sir.
Q: You cannot tell which one is the...?
A: I cannot clearly see, sir.
Q: So it is possible that the bought item is not here?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: There's no photograph of the bought item here? How about these, are these the seized
items, all of these?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many items were seized?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: You do not know?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The chemist examined eleven (11) sachets, are there eleven (11) sachets here?
There are eighteen (18) sachets, how come there are eighteen (18) sachets in the
picture? The accused is charged with how many? Possession?
Pros. Montenegro
Possession- Section 11, Section 12, and Section 5.

x x x x49 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In addition, the photos do . not display the drug paraphernalia supposedly recovered
during the execution of the subject warrant in Crispian's house. Accordingly, it is difficult
to believe that the seized drug paraphernalia were lawfully recovered from Crispian's
house, as there were no photos to support the same. The records of this case show that
the lower court had, in fact, noted such absence. But all the same, the prosecution failed
to give a credible excuse therefor:

COURT: Ten (10) sachets, one (1) piece scissor, two (2) pieces rolled tin foil, two (2)
pieces elongated tin foil, one (1) lighter, where are these items in the picture? Where are
the tin foils here, pair of scissors? Lighter, where is the lighter here? Where in the picture?
You cannot see a lighter. Okay, you are discharged.50 (Underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, it deserves mentioning that the police officers also failed to observe the
proper procedure in marking the seized items.

According to case law, "[t]he first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the
dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs
or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature
or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied,
because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the
marking as reference.Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous
drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they
are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching,
planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon
confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable
in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value." 51 To note, "[m]arking
upon immediate confiscation has been interpreted to include marking at the nearest
police station, or x x x the office of the apprehending team."52
In this case, it is undisputed that the police officers did not immediately mark the sachets
of shabu at the place of confiscation during the buy-bust operation or at the nearest police
station. Instead, they proceeded to the house of Crispian to implement the subject search
warrant and only thereafter, conducted the marking. To justify the deviation, they
proffered that that they could not "allow [the accused’s] companions to escape and bring
the possible huge amount of shabu."53 Thus, they marked the items "only after the search
of the house of the parents of Crispian."54

However, PO1 Dumaguit himself admitted that the actual marking of drugs would only
take a short time, particularly less than five (5) minutes.1âwphi1 He likewise mentioned
that there were around nine (9) to ten (10) police operatives at the scene, to wit:

Q: And along with you in this operation, Officer Dumaguit, how many law enforcers were
with you?
A: All the Dumaguete City Intel personnel sir.
Q: Around how many sir?
A: Around nine (9) or 10.
x x x x55
Q: Officer, how long did it take you to just mark the buy bust item just to put the initial of
the person arrested, (sic) the date? How long do you (sic) usually take you to mark the
items?
A: It depends sir.
Q: I am not referring to the inventory. I am just referring to the marking of the item.
A: It will just take a short time sir.
Q: In less than a minute?
A: It's not possible sir because we still have to take the tape, ballpen, and [sic]
Q: Less than five (5) minutes?
A: Yes sir.

x x x x56 (Underscoring supplied)

If the police officers themselves admitted that the marking would only take less than five
(5) minutes, and that there were around nine (9) to ten (10) police companions to secure
the same, then there appears to be no appreciable reason as to why the marking could
not have been made immediately after the drugs sachets were seized. By the police
officers' own account, this short period of time would have barely affected their impending
implementation of the subject warrant. More so, it was not claimed that the safety of the
police officers would have been prejudiced if the marking was done at the place of seizure.
Hence, the police officers were not justified in not following the procedure set in the law.
To reiterate, "[t]he rule requires that [marking] should be done in the presence of the
apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence." 57
By and large, the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers militate against
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.58 It is well-settled that the
procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.59 Perforce, since the prosecution failed to provide
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA
10640, as well as its IRR, Crispian’s acquittal is in order.

Notably, the acquittal of Crispian on account of the police officers' failure to comply with
the chain of custody rule should likewise result in the acquittal of his co-accused, Derek.
This is because Derek was charged in Criminal Case No. 21618 for the alleged illegal
sale of "one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu[,"] a dangerous drug"; this sachet is the same sachet for which Crispian was
charged also in Criminal Case No. 21618 , and hence, part of the seized items whose
integrity and evidentiary value had been compromised. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, states that:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. - (a) An appeal taken by one or
more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. (Underscoring
supplied)

While it is true that it was only Crispian who successfully perfected his appeal, the rule is
that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the entire case out in the open, including
those not raised by the parties.60Considering that under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment - as in this
case - shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal,61 Derek should likewise be
acquitted herein.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.62

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 14, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01846 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Crispian Merced Lumaya a.k.a. "Ipyang" and his co-
accused Derek Joseph Lumaya are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause their immediate release, unless they are
being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 230065, MARCH 14, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
VS.
MARCELINO CRISPO Y DESCALSO ALIAS "GOGO" AND ENRICO HERRERA Y
MONTES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Marcelino Crispo y

Descalso alias "Gogo" (Crispo) and Enrico Herrera y Montes (Herrera; collectively,
accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2dated March 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 0711 7, which affirmed the Decision3dated October 24, 2014
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 12-293828 and
12-293829 finding: (a) accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"; and (b)Crispo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of the same law.

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging accused-
appellants of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portions of which state:

Crim. Case No. 12-293828

That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said [accused-
appellants], conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, not
being then authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly sell one (1) heatsealed
transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO THREE (0.023) gram of
white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Crim. Case No. 12-293829

That on or about November 19, 2012, in the City of Manila, Philippines, [Crispo], not being
then authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and knowingly possess or have under his control three (3) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance weighing zero point
zero three seven (0.037) gram, zero point zero two five (0.025) gram and zero point zero
one nine (0.019) gram or in the total weight of zero point zero eight one (0.081) gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that at around 1:30 in the afternoon of November 19, 2012,8 a
confidential informant (CI) tipped the Manila Police District Station 4 (MPD) of the alleged
illegal drug activities of a certain alias "Gogo" (later identified as Crispo) at Ma. Cristina
Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Thus, after coordinating with the operatives of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency, the MPD organized a buy-bust operation at the said area,
with Police Officer (PO) 2 Dennis Reyes (P02 Reyes) as the poseur buyer. Upon arrival
at the area at around 5:30 in the afternoon of even date, the CI and P02 Reyes saw Crispo
talking to his runner, Herrera, and decided to approach them. As they went nearer,
Herrera approached the CI and P02 Reyes, while Crispo remained about five (5) to six
(6) meters away. P02 Reyes then signified his intention of buying shabu, prompting
Herrera to get the marked money from him, and thereafter, approach Crispo in order to
remit the money and get a sachet containing white crystalline substance from the latter.
When Herrera handed over the sachet to P02 Reyes, the latter performed the pre-
arranged signal, directly causing his backups to rush into the scene and apprehend
accused-appellants. Upon frisking accusedappellants, the arresting officers recovered
three (3) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Crispo. The
accused-appellants and the seized items were then taken to the barangay office where
the arresting officers, inter alia, conducted the inventory and photography in the presence
of two (2) barangay kagawads, as indicated in the Receipt of Property/Evidence Seized.9
After examination10 at the Crime Laboratory, it was confirmed that the sachets seized
from accused-appellants contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. 11
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged 12 and offered their version
of the events. According to Crispo, he was just on board a tricycle going to his niece's
house when suddenly, a car with five (5) policemen in civilian clothes blocked the tricycle's
path. One of the policemen then poked a gun at Crispo, and told him, "Mga pulis kami,
sumama ka sa presinto." Fearful for his life, Crispo complied. Upon arrival at the police
station, the policemen demanded from him ₱30,000.00 for his release; otherwise, they
will plant evidence against him. The policemen then proceeded to show him four (4)
sachets of shabu which will be used against him. For his part, Herrera averred that he
was riding a bicycle when he accidentally bumped a brown van. Three (3) men then
alighted from the van, arrested him, and took him to the police station. Thereat, an affidavit
was purportedly prepared for him and that he signed the same even without reading it out
of confusion.13

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated October 24, 2014, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and, accordingly, sentenced them as follows: (a)
for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the RTC sentenced accused-appellants to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of PS00,000.00; and (b) for
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the R TC sentenced Crispo to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in
the amount of ₱300,000.00.15

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes
charged as it was shown that accused-appellants sold to P02 Reyes one (l) sachet of
shabu and that after their arrest, three (3) more sachets of shabu were found in Crispo’s
possession. On the other hand, the RTC did not give merit to accused-appellants'
imputation of ill-motive against their arresting officers after finding it unsubstantiated. 16
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed17 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision18 dated March 1 7, 2016, the CA affi1med the RTC ruling. 19 It held that the
prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crimes
charged. Further, the CA ruled that the absence of representatives from the DOJ and the
media during the conduct of the inventory is not fatal to the prosecution of accused-
appellants, so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved.20
Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-
appellants' conviction for the crimes charged.

The Court’s Ruling

I.

During the pendency of this appeal, the Court received a letter21 dated September 7, 2017
from the Bureau of Corrections, informing it that Herrera had already died on April 3, 2017.
Attached thereto is a duplicate copy of Herrera's Certificate of Death 22 issued by the
Officer of the Civil Registrar General.

Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the consequences of Herrera's
death are as follows:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.- Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

In People v. Jao,23 the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused
pending appeal on his liabilities,24 as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore. "25

Thus, upon Herrera's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action against
him is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
As such, the criminal case against him is hereby dismissed, and declared closed and
terminated.26

II.

With respect to Crispo, the Court finds his appeal meritorious.

It must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and,
thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 27 "The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law."28

Here, Crispo was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.29 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.30

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of
custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime.31

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.32 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,33 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 34 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,35 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs), the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidencethat had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the[said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti,and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 36

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.37 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064038 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team. 39 In other words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and
its IRR does not ipso factorender the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.40 In People v.Almorfe,41 the Court explained that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.42 Also, in People v. De Guzman, 43 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.44

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Crispo.

An examination of the records reveals that while the inventory and photography of the
seized items were made in the presence of two (2) elected public officials, i.e., Barangay
Kagawads Ramon Amtolim and Helen Tolentino, as evidenced by their signatures on the
Receipt of Property/Evidence Seized,45 the same were not done in the presence of
representatives from either the DOJ and the media. This fact was confirmed by P03
Manolito Rodriguez (P03 Rodriguez), a member of the buy-bust team that apprehended
Crispo, in his testimony in direct and cross-examinations, to wit:

[Asst. Pros. Alexander T. Yap]: What happened at the barangay? What barangay by the
way?
[P03 Rodriguez]: I forgot the number of the barangay, sir.
Q: Who was, was there an official of the barangay with you?
A: I remember two Kagawad[s], sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened at the barangay?
A: They signed as witnesses in the inventory receipt, sir.
Q: Who signed the inventory?
A: [The] Barangay Kagawad[s], sir.

xxxx

[Atty. Rosemarie G. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales)]: Mr. Witness, according to you, you
already proceeded to the barangay?
[P03 Rodriguez]: Yes, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Mr. Witness, were you able to see when the markings of the evidences (sic) were
done?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Where were you at that time?
A: At the barangay hall, ma'am.
Q: How about the accused at that time, where were they?
A: They were with us also, ma'am.
Q: Were they assisted [by] any counsel at that time?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: Were there any members of the DOJ?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: Were there any members of the media?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: According to you the inventory of the evidences (sic) were witnessed by the
Kagawads?
A: Yes, ma' am.
Q: An these kagawads? Who called the kagawads?
A: We, ma'am.
Q: They were already at the area when they arrived?
A: Yes, ma'am.46 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives
from the DOJ and the media to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and
thus, remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence which could considerably affect a case. However, minor deviations may be
excused in situations where a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In this
case, despite the non-observance of the witness requirement, no plausible explanation
was given by the prosecution .. In fact, the poseur-buyer, P02 Reyes, only feigned
ignorance as to the reason why no representatives of the DOJ and the media were
present during the inventory of the seized items:

[Atty. Gonzales): By the way, Mr. Witness, prior to the operation considering that
you would be conducting a buy-bust operation, was there any coordination with
the DOJ?
[P02 Reyes): I do not know if [SP03 Agapito Yadao, the buy-bust team leader,) did
that, ma'am.
Q: How about with any media representative?
A: I do not know, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Mr. Witness, when these evidences (sic) were likewise being marked was there
any presence of the DOJ now?
A: None, ma'am.
Q: How about the presence of the media now?
A: None, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Why was there none?

A: When we arrested them we immediately proceeded to the Barangay[.]
Q: That's the only your (sic) explanation?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Despite the fact that it is a buy-bust operation which was prepared by your office?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: With all documents prepared and Pre-operation Report prepared?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: You just merely did not consider getting all the required persons to comply with Sec.
21?
A: I do not know with Yadao, ma'am.47 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible.48 However, a justifiable reason for such
failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required
witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced.49 In People v.
Umipang,50 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were
employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable - without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." 51 Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.52 These considerations arise from
the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment
they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his
arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with
the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, police officers
are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but mustin fact,
also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the
mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were
reasonable.[[53]]

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Crispo have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the sale and
possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of
proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti, failing in which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.54

Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the arresting officers, which were
unfortunately left unjustified, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
against Crispo, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.55 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is
a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.56 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for
noncompliance with the aforesaid provision, Crispo’s acquittal is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x.57
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.58

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:

(a) Crim. Case No. 12-293828 is hereby DISMISSED and declared CLOSED and
TERMINATED insofar as accused-appellant Enrico Herrera y Montes is
concerned due to his supervening death pending appeal; and

(b) The appeal of accused-appellant Marcelino Crispo yDescalso is GRANTED. The

Decision dated March 1 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
07117 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, he is ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 230657, March 14, 2018]

ANGELITO MAGNO, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE PHILIPPINES, OF THE REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Angelito Magno
(petitioner) assailing the Decision2 dated September 16, 2016 and the Resolution 3dated
February 15, 2017 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in SB-15-SCA-0001, which nullified and
set aside the Orders dated September 30, 20134 and November 28, 20145 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. DU-10123,
and found that petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated.

The Facts

On May 14, 2003, an Information6 was filed before the RTC charging, inter alia, petitioner
(who was then serving as Investigative Agent IV of the National Bureau of Investigation)
with Multiple Frustrated Murder and Double Attempted Murder.7 After arraignment,
petitioner objected to the formal appearance of one Atty. Adelino Sitoy (Atty. Sitoy), who
intended to act as a private prosecutor for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman). In the Orders dated September 25, 2003 and October 1, 2003, the RTC
ruled that only the Ombudsman may prosecute the instant case, to the exclusion of any
other entity/person other than those authorized under Republic Act No. 6770. 8 The
Ombudsman and Atty. Sitoy questioned the RTC's aforesaid Orders to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which, in a Decision dated September 26, 2005, ruled that the private
prosecutor may prosecute the case and appear for the People of the Philippines in
collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman. Eventually, the matter
reached the Court,9 which nullified the CA's pronouncements on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the Ombudsman and Atty. Sitoy should have sought
recourse from the SB instead (Private Prosecutor Case).10

While the Private Prosecutor Case was still pending before the CA, the latter court issued
a temporary restraining order (TRO), and thereafter, a preliminary injunction enjoining the
RTC from implementing its Orders dated September 25, 2003 and October 1, 2003. This
notwithstanding and upon motion by the prosecution, the CA clarified in a Resolution
dated January 19, 2005 that the injunctive writs do not operate to enjoin the proceedings
in Crim. Case No. DU-10123, provided that it is conducted in the presence of the private
prosecutor. Thus, the prosecution moved to set the case for trial and started presenting
one of its witnesses on March 29, 2005. In the course of the prosecution's presentation
of witnesses, the RTC sustained petitioner's objection on the admissibility of one of the
witness's testimony, prompting the prosecution to elevate the matter to the SB (Objection
Case). Initially, the SB issued a sixty (60)-day TRO enjoining the RTC from proceeding
with Crim. Case No. DU-10123. In a Decision dated February 12, 2007, the SB dismissed
the Objection Case.11

Meanwhile and after the expiration of the TRO in the Objection Case, petitioner filed
on March 16, 2006 a Motion to Set Case for Continuous Hearing before the RTC,
invoking his right to speedy trial. In an Order dated June 16, 2006, the RTC granted
petitioner's motion, and accordingly, set the hearing on September 1, 2006. 12 The
prosecution moved for reconsideration13 but the same was denied in an Order dated
August 18, 2006.14 Thus, under threat of being cited in contempt, the prosecution
continued its presentation of witnesses on September 1, 2006. Such presentation
continued all the way until June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested to reset the
hearing to August 16, 2007 due to the handling prosecutor's illness. However, it appears
that from such postponement until around early 2010, no hearings were conducted in the
case. In fact, records show that there were only two (2) incidents during that time, namely:
(a) petitioner's Motion for Substitution of Bond and Cancellation of Annotation which was
resolved on October 9, 2009; and (b) Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation's Motion
to Release a vehicle involved in a case which was resolved on December 9, 2013. 15

In view of the foregoing, petitioner moved for the continuation of the trial, the hearing of
which was set on April 22, 2010, which was further reset to September 2, 2010. At
the September 2, 2010 hearing, only petitioner's counsel appeared. Thus,
on September 17, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss16 on the ground of violation
of his right to speedy trial. In such motion, petitioner not only pointed out the various
postponements and cancellations of hearings by the prosecution from the filing of the
information until 2007, but also highlighted the hibernation of the case from 2007 until his
Motion to Set Case for Hearing filed in April 2010. For its part, the prosecution filed an
Opposition17to petitioner's motion, and at the same time, prayed that it be allowed to
present further evidence.18

The RTC Ruling

In an Order19 dated September 30, 2013, the RTC granted petitioner's motion to dismiss
on the ground of violation of the latter's right to speedy trial.20 It found that Crim. Case No.
DU-10123 had already been pending for thirteen (13) years and yet, remained
unresolved. In particular, the RTC pointed out that from 2007 onwards, the case has
ceased to move forward due to the inaction of the State. 21

The prosecution moved for reconsideration,22 which was, however, denied in an

Order23 dated November 28, 2014. Aggrieved, the prosecution filed a petition
for certiorari24 before the SB.

The SB Ruling

In a Decision25 dated September 16, 2016, the SB set aside the RTC ruling and,
accordingly, ordered the reinstatement of Crim. Case No. DU- 10123 and for the RTC to
conduct further proceedings immediately.26 It held that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated, pointing out that
both the prosecution and petitioner contributed to the delays in the case. In this regard,
the SB opined that it is equally the responsibility of both the prosecution and the defense
to move for the continuation of the trial.27

Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 but the same was denied in a Resolution29dated
February 15, 2017; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the SB correctly ascribed grave
abuse on the part of the RTC when the latter court found that petitioner's right to speedy
trial has been violated.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminarily, the Court points out the distinct approach in dealing with Rule 45 petitions
for review on certiorari that seek to review a ruling of a lower court, such as the SB,
regarding a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the
correctness of the SB ruling in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule
65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In ruling for legal
correctness, the Court must view the SB ruling in the same context that the petition
for certiorari was presented to the latter court. Hence, the Court has to examine the SB
ruling from the prism of whether or not it correctly determined the presence or absence
of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed ruling, i.e., that of the RTC.30

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. It is the
exercise of a power in an arbitrary manner. It must be so patent or gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. Case law provides that grave abuse of discretion exists when
the act is: (a) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (b) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 31

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA erred in ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. As will be explained hereunder, the RTC
ruling finding that petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated finds support in
prevailing law and jurisprudence.
An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal
cases by Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. "This right to a speedy trial
may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its 'salutary
objective' being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever
legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of
the right to speedy trial, the old legal maxim, 'justice delayed is justice denied' must be
reiterated. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much
more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a
speedy trial."32 In Tan v. People,33 the Court made a thorough discussion on the matter,
to wit:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of
justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is
not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious
and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where
justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights
of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.

xxxx

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hocbasis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his
right; and (d) Prejudice to the defendant. x x x.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked
by the State. x x x.34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the right to speedy trial (as well as the right to speedy disposition of cases) should
be understood as a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved would not be sufficient. Pertinently, this right is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied such
right, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (a) the length of delay; (b)
the reasons for the delay; (c) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused;
and (d) the prejudice caused by the delay.35

Examining the incidents of this case vis-a-vis the aforesaid jurisprudential parameters in
determining the existence of violation of such right, the Court holds that petitioner's right
to speedy trial had been violated.

First, more than a decade has elapsed from the time the Information in Crim. Case No.
DU-10123 was filed on May 14, 2003, until the RTC promulgated its Orders dated
September 30, 2013 and November 28, 2014 dismissing the case on the ground of
violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial. Notably, when the RTC dismissed the case,
the prosecution has yet to complete the presentation of its evidence in chief.

Second, for the purpose of determining whether or not a violation of petitioner's right to
speedy trial indeed exists, the Court deems it appropriate to highlight two (2) distinct
periods, namely: (a) the period from the filing of the information on May 14, 2003 until
June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested to reset the hearing due to the handling
prosecutor's illness (First Period); and (b) from June 7, 2007 until September 17, 2010
when petitioner finally filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial (Second Period).

As may be gleaned from the records, the numerous delays and postponements that
occurred during the First Period were excusable, as Crim. Case No. DU-10123 was
plagued with various incidents that reached the higher courts, i.e., the Private Prosecutor
and Objection Cases, which even issued TROs and/or preliminary injunctions that
undeniably contributed to the hampering of the proceedings before the RTC.

On the other hand, the very long delay that occurred during the Second Period largely
remains unjustified. Records reveal after trial was postponed on June 7, 2007 and reset
to August 16, 2007, there is no showing that the August 16, 2007 setting or any hearing
thereafter actually took place. During this time, it appears that the prosecution never lifted
a finger to keep the proceedings in Crim. Case No. DU-10123 from stalling. Worse,
despite the fact that two (2) incidents were raised in this case during the Second
Period36 which would have alerted the prosecution as to the long, drawn-out pendency of
this case, the latter remained indifferent in pursuing the case and never pushed for the
continuation of trial.

Third, petitioner was not remiss in asserting his right to speedy trial. Records show that
during the First Period and after the TROs and/or injunctions issued by the higher courts
enjoining the proceedings on the main were already dissolved, petitioner filed on March
16, 2006 a Motion to Set Case for Continuous Hearing, already invoking such right.37 In
fact, this directly resulted in the Court ordering the prosecution to continue with the
presentation of its witnesses. Unfortunately, the case progress bogged down once again
after the prosecution asked for a postponement of the June 7, 2007 hearing, and
thereafter, failed to move forward with the proceedings. In fact, the prosecution only
moved to continue the presentation of its evidence after petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.

Fourth, the Court recognizes the prejudice caused to petitioner by the lengthy and
unjustified delay in Crim. Case No. DU-10123. To stress, the right to speedy trial is not
merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice
but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time. As already adverted to, the "salutary objective"
of this right is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense
of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose. In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan,38 the Court stated that the tactical
disadvantages as well as the looming unrest brought by this lengthy and unjustified
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual, viz.:

Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy
trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability
of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under
a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be
drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor,
nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain
its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused
suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable
delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked
by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper
for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the
defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the
State.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the resolution of Crim. Case No. DU-
10123 as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, the
Court concludes that petitioner's right to speedy trial had been violated. As such, the RTC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in ordering the dismissal of Crim. Case No. DU-10123
on this ground. While this pronouncement should, as a matter of course, result in the
acquittal of petitioner that would bar his further prosecution for the same offense,40 it does
not necessarily follow that he is entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that
the same is proven in a subsequent case which the private complainant/s may opt to
pursue.41

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 16, 2016 and
the Resolution dated February 15, 2017 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-15-SCA-0001 are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 30, 2013 and
November 28, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56 in Crim. Case
No. DU-10123 are REINSTATED. Accordingly, Crim. Case No. DU-10123
is DISMISSED on the ground of violation of the accused's right to speedy trial, without
prejudice to any civil action which the private complainant/s may file against him.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 20865, March 14, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
VS.
ROMEO ANTIDO y LANTAYAN a.k.a. ROMEO ANTIGO y LANTAYAN alias "JON-
JON", ACCUSED-APPELLANT

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In a Resolution1 dated April 7, 2014, the Court affirmed the Decision2 dated December 7,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04602 finding accused-
appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo yLantayan alias "Jon-Jon"
(accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, the pertinent
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
December 7, 2012 Decision of the CA in CAG. R. CR-HC No. 04602 and AFFIRMS said
Decision finding accusedappellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo
Antigo yLantayan alias "Jon-Jon" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to paragraph 5 of Article 266-B,
under RA 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuaand ordered to pay private complainant the following amounts: (a) ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b)₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, consistent with existingjurisprudence.3

However, it appears that before the promulgation of the said Resolution, accused-
appellant had already died on December 28, 2013, as evidenced by his Certificate of
Death.4

As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside the April 7,
2014 Resolution and enter a new one dismissing the criminal case against accused-
appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment[.]

In People v. Culas, 5 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused
pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,] based solely thereon.1âwphi1As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delictoin senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section l, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
 conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 6

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is
well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the
victim, AAA,7 may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a
separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law
and procedural rules.8

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated April
7, 2014 in connection with this case; (b) DISMISS Criminal Case No. 03-212115 before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29 by reason of the death of accused-appellant
Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon"; and
(c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
VS.
NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06127, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
October 1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 11427 finding accused-appellant Nestor Año y Del Remedios (Año)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the RTC, charging Año with violation
of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
Criminal Case No. 11427

That on or about the 3rd day of August 2009 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to poseur buyer, P02 Ruel T. Ayad, 0.03 gram
of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
which substance was found positive to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Php.200.00,
in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The prosecution alleged that at around five (5) o’clock in the afternoon of August 3, 2005
and after receiving information about Año’s drug activities at Daangbakal, Guitnangbayan
II, Police Officer (PO) 2 Ruel T. Ayad (P02 Ayad), PO1 Aldwin Ortilla (POl Ortilla), and
POl Jenesis A. Acuin7 (PO1 Acuin) formed a buy-bust team designating P02 Ayad as the
poseur-buyer, with POl Ortilla and PO1 Acuin as back-ups, and marked two (2) ₱100.00
bills to be used in the operation.8 Thereafter, the team headed to the house of Año where
P02 Ayad knocked on the door and upon seeing Año, whispered that he "wants to score"
worth P200.00. Año replied that he has drugs with him and gave P02 Ayad a transparent
plastic sachet, while the latter simultaneously handed the marked money as payment. As
Año placed the money inside his pocket, P02 Ayad introduced himself as a policeman,
causing Año to flee. Fortunately, P02 Ayad caught Año and asked him to empty his
pockets which produced the two (2) ₱100.00 bills. Due to the commotion caused by Año's
relatives who were preventing his arrest, the team moved at a distance of around 100
meters from the place of arrest, marked the confiscated sachet, and completed the
inventory thereat. Barangay Captain Leo S. Buenviaje (Brgy. Captain Buenviaje)
witnessed and signed the Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items,9 photographs were also
taken in the presence of Año, P02 Ayad, and PO1 Acuin. 10 On the same day, P02 Ayad
delivered the seized sachet to the Crime Laboratory where it was turned over to Police
Inspector Forensic Chemist Beaune V. Villaraza (FC Villaraza) for examination. In
Laboratory Report No. D-198-09,11 FC Villaraza confirmed that the seized sachet was
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.12

Upon arraignment, Año pleaded not guilty and denied the charges leveled against him.
He claimed that on said date, he was at home celebrating the 4 th birthday of his nephew
when suddenly, three police officers whom he identified to be P02 Ayad, PO1 Ortilla, and
PO1 Acuin, forcibly arrested him and brought him to the police station for inquiry. The
following day, he learned that he was being charged of drug pushing. 13
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found Año guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00. 15
The RTC found all the elements for the prosecution of sale of dangerous drugs present,
noting that the identity of Año as the seller of the illegal drug was clearly established when
he was arrested in fiagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation.16

Aggrieved, Año elevated his conviction before the Court of Appeals (CA). 17

The CA Ruling

In a Decision18 dated December 4, 2015, the CA upheld the RTC ruling,19 likewise finding
that all the elements constituting the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs were
present. Moreover, it ruled that the apprehending officers duly complied with the chain of
custody rule under Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9165, as P02 Ayad testified in detail the links in the chain of custody of the
seized drug from the time of its confiscation until its presentation in court as evidence.
Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Año is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 20 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."21
Here, Afio was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an
accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.22 It is likewise essential for a conviction
that the drugs subject of the sale be presented in court and its identity established with
moral certainty through an unbroken chain of custody over the same. In cases like this,
the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti.23

In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule,
outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in
order to ensure that their integrity and evidentiary value are preserved. 24 Under the said
section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,25 the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and take
photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused or theperson from
whom such items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same;
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination purposes. 26 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,27 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, ‘planting’ or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 28

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21of RA9165 may not always be possible. 29 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064030- provide that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will
not automatically render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team.31 In other words, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165
and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.32 In People v. Almorfe,[[33]] the Court explained that for the
above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.34 Also, in People v. De Guzman,35 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.36

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized items from Año which were unfortunately, left unjustified,
thereby putting into question their integrity and evidentiary value.

As the prosecution submits, upon Año's arrest, PO1 Ortilla called Brgy. Captain Buenviaje
to witness the marking and to sign the inventory. After which, P02 Ayad marked the sachet
of shabu subject of the sale with Año's intials, "NDRA," while PO1 Ortilla prepared an
inventory of the seized items, which was signed by Brgy. Captain Buenviaje as witness,
and had them photographed. Thereafter, the buy-bust team escorted Año to the police
station and turned over the sachet for examination to FC Villaraza.

While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the attached
Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items,37 the records are glaringly silent as to the
presence of the required witnesses, namely, the representatives from the media and the
DOJ. To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, as
well as its IRR requires the presence of the following witnesses during the conduct of
inventory and photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel; (b) any elected public official; and (c) a representative from the media and the
DOJ.38 In their absence, the prosecution must provide a credible explanation justifying
the noncompliance with the rule; otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165
(and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165) would not apply.

Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural
lapse. It then follows that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items
seized from Año, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
which resultantly warrants his acquittal.39 It is well-settled that the procedure under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.40
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 41
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As
such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 4, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06127 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, accused-appellant Nestor Año y Del Remedios is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. The Director of Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 15-02-47-RTC, March 21, 2018]

RE: REPORT OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE SOLIVER C. PERAS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CEBU CITY (RTC), BRANCH 10, ON THE ACTS OF INSUBORDINATION
OF UTILITY WORKER I CATALINA Z. CAMASO, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, RTC.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative matter stemmed from a Complaint for Gross Insubordination (With a
Request for Psychiatric Evaluation)1 dated November 5, 2014 filed before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) by Executive Judge Soliver C. Peras (Judge Peras) of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 10, against Catalina Z. Camaso
(Camaso), Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC.

The Facts

In his complaint, Judge Peras alleged that on September 10, 2014, he issued a
Memorandum2 temporarily detailing Camaso to Branch 10 to assist in the filing, delivery,
and mailing of letters and correspondences in the said court.3 As Camaso neither
reported to the same branch nor proffered an explanation therefor, Judge Peras sent her
two (2) subsequent memoranda4 directing her to explain in writing such non-compliance;
however, Camaso ignored such directives.5 Further, Judge Peras averred that Camaso
has been acting and behaving "strangely and abnormally," as exhibited by the latter's
following acts: (a) claiming that she will not retire upon reaching the age of 65, citing that
she is a "national employee;" and (b) sitting on top of the backrest of a chair and resting
her feet on the seat of the same chair, placing herself in danger of falling. 6 In view of the
foregoing, Judge Peras requested the OCA to conduct a psychiatric evaluation on
Camaso to determine her fitness to work. Further, should the evaluation yield normal
results, he requested the conduct of an administrative investigation against Camaso on
the ground of gross insubordination.7

On the basis of Judge Peras's allegations, the OCA issued a Memorandum 8 dated
September 10, 2015 recommending that the matter be referred to Dr. Prudencio P.
Banzon, Jr. (Dr. Banzon), Senior Chief Staff Officer of the Court's Medical and Dental
Services, for the conduct of a neuro-psychiatric evaluation on Camaso and a report be
submitted thereafter.9 Subsequently, Dr. Banzon submitted a letter10 dated April 28,
2016, attaching thereto the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation Report,11 as well as the
Psychological Report12 of Camaso. In the said letter, Dr. Banzon stated that the
examinations done on Camaso indicate that she is suffering from Delusional Disorder,
Mixed Type (Grandiose and Persecutory), and that in the absence of psychiatric
management, she will be unable to maintain good inter-personal relationships with her
co-workers.13 In light thereof, the OCA issued a Memorandum 14 dated January 23, 2017
recommending that Camaso be required to comment on why she should not be dropped
from the rolls for being mentally unfit.15
In her handwritten Letter-Comment,16 Camaso averred that she was just following a
certain administrative order which provides that employees of the lower court are not
required to be assigned to any office outside of their job description. She further
maintained that Judge Peras's imputation of gross insubordination has no basis,
contending that Judge Peras has no jurisdiction over her as she is assigned to the RTC
Library, which is under the supervision of the OCA.17

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum18 dated December 6, 2017, the OCA recommended that Camaso be

dropped from the rolls without forfeiture of any benefits due her, for being mentally unfit
to perform her duties.19

Giving credence to the findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist who examined
Camaso, the OCA found that the latter's mental incapacity impairs her efficiency and
usefulness in the workplace and her ability to relate to her fellow employees. In this
regard, the OCA opined that her situation would adversely affect the performance of her
co-employees and that it would be unfair to them, to other deserving applicants, and to
the public if Camaso is allowed to continue her employment in the name of mercy and
compassion.20

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Camaso should be dropped from the
rolls for being mentally unfit to perform her duties.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.

Section 93 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

(RRACCS)21 authorizes and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of
employees who, inter alia, are no longer fit to perform his or her duties. Portions of this
provision pertinent to this case read:

Section 93. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. — Officers and
employees who are x x x shown to be physically and mentally unfit to perform their duties
may be dropped from the rolls subject to the following procedures:
c. Physically Unfit
xxxx

3. An officer or employee who is behaving abnormally and manifests continuing mental

disorder and incapacity to work as reported by his/her co-workers or immediate
supervisor and confirmed by a competent physician, may likewise be dropped from the
rolls.

4. For the purpose of the three (3) preceding paragraphs, notice shall be given to the
officer or employee concerned containing a brief statement of the nature of his/her
incapacity to work.

In this case, Judge Peras received reports from Camaso's colleagues regarding the
latter's strange and abnormal behavior, thus, prompting the OCA to recommend that
Camaso be subjected to a series of tests to evaluate her neuro-psychiatric well-
being.22 After conducting such tests, the psychologist found that there are already: (a)
deterioration in almost all facets of Camaso's mental functioning; and (b) distortion in her
perception of things, making a limited grasp of reality.23 These findings are then
corroborated by the psychiatrist, who found Camaso to be suffering from a psychological
impairment, i.e., Delusional Disorder, Mixed Type (Grandiose and Persecutory), which
gives her a distorted view of reality that affects her social judgment, planning, and
decision-making.24 Worse, when asked to comment on this case, Camaso not only failed
to refute such findings against her, but also exhibited her impaired mental cognition and
deteriorating mental health.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is constrained to drop Camaso from the rolls. At this
point, the Court deems it worthy to stress that the instant case is non-disciplinary in
nature. Thus, Camaso's separation from the service shall neither result in the forfeiture of
any benefits which have accrued in her favor, nor in her disqualification from re-
employment in the government service.25

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(a) DROP FROM THE ROLLS the name of Catalina Z. Camaso (Camaso), Utility Worker
I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10 for being
mentally unfit to perform her duties. However, she is still qualified to receive the
benefits she may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the
government;

(b) DECLARE as VACANT the position held by Camaso; and

(c) INFORM Camaso of her separation from the service or dropping from the rolls at her
last known address appearing in her 201 file.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 225695, MARCH 21, 2018]

IRENEO CAHULOGAN, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Ireneo Cahulogan
(petitioner) assailing the Decision2 dated November 6, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated
June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01126-MIN, which affirmed
the Judgment4 dated October 4, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City,
Misamis Oriental, Branch 41 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 2011-507, convicting petitioner of
the crime of Fencing, defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1612,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law of 1979."5

The Facts

On April 18, 2011, an Information6 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the
crime of Fencing, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about January 14, 2011 [,] at about 4:00 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon, at Bugo,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or in any manner deal, Two Hundred Ten (210) cases of Coca
Cola products worth Php52,476.00 owned by and belonging to the offended party
Johnson Tan which accused know, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of Theft, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid sum of Php52,476.00.

Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as Anti-Fencing Law of

1979.7
The prosecution alleged that private complainant Johnson Tan (Tan), a businessman
engaged in transporting Coca-Cola products, instructed his truck driver and helper,
Braulio Lopez (Lopez) and Loreto Lariosa (Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola
products (subject items) worth P52,476.00 to Demins Store. The next day, Tan
discovered that contrary to his instructions, Lopez and Lariosa delivered the subject items
to petitioner's store. Tan then went to petitioner and informed him that the delivery to his
store was a mistake and that he was pulling out the subject items. However, petitioner
refused, claiming that he bought the same from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not
present any receipt evidencing such transaction. Tan insisted that he had the right to pull
out the subject items as Lariosa had no authority to sell the same to petitioner, but the
latter was adamant in retaining such items. Fearing that his contract with Coca-Cola will
be terminated as a result of the wrongful delivery, and in order to minimize losses, Tan
negotiated with petitioner to instead deliver to him P20,000.00 worth of empty bottles with
cases, as evidenced by their Agreement8 dated January 18, 2011. Nonetheless, Tan felt
aggrieved over the foregoing events, thus, prompting him to secure an authorization to
file cases from Coca-Cola and charge petitioner with the crime of Fencing. He also
claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but he had no update as to the
status thereof.9

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty,10 but chose not to present any evidence
in his defense. Rather, he merely submitted his memorandum, 11maintaining that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment13 dated October 4, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period often (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.14

The RTC found that the prosecution had successfully established the presence of all the
elements of the crime of Fencing, considering that Lariosa stole the subject items from
his employer, Tan, and that petitioner was found to be in possession of the same. The
RTC noted that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner would have been
forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source since Lariosa: (a) sold to
him the subject items at a discount and without any corresponding delivery and official
receipts; and (b) did not demand that such items be replaced by empty bottles, a common
practice in purchases of soft drink products.15

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated November 6, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction. 18It held
that Lariosa's act of selling the subject items to petitioner without the authority and
consent from Tan clearly constituted theft. As such, petitioner's possession of the stolen
items constituted prima facie evidence of Fencing - a presumption which he failed to
rebut.19

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration20 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution21 dated June 8, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's
conviction for the crime of Fencing.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

"Time and again, it has been held that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers
the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law."22

Guided by this consideration, the Court finds no reason to overturn petitioner's conviction
for the crime of Fencing.

Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."23 The same Section also states that a
Fence "includes any person, firm, association, corporation or partnership or other
organization who/which commits the act of fencing."24

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or
theft has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft; and (d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another.25 Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie
presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article,
item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.26

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that:
(a) Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject items without authority and consent from his
employer, Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and confidence reposed
upon him as a truck helper;27 (b) petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa and was
in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances, petitioner should have been
forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with
Lariosa did not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter
did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common
practice among dealers of soft drinks;28 and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made
evident by the fact that he bought the subject items for just P50,000.00, lower than their
value in the amount of P52,476.00. "[T]he Court finds no reason to deviate from the
factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility
of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference should be
accorded to the same."29

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on petitioner, pertinent portions of Section 3 of

PD 1612 read:

Section 3. Penalties. - Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder

indicated:

a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000
pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed
reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised
Penal Code shall also be imposed.
xxxx

Notably, while the crime of Fencing is defined and penalized by a special penal law, the
penalty provided therein is taken from the nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). In Peralta v. People,30 the Court discussed the proper treatment of penalties found
in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,31 otherwise known as the "Indeterminate
Sentence Law," viz.:

Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum
and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the
special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of
People v. Simon that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a
special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC.
Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the
Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.32

Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under
the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules
applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.33

Applying the foregoing and considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances present in this case, the Court finds it proper to sentence petitioner to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.

At this point, the Court notes that as may be gleaned from its whereas clauses, PD 1612
was enacted in order to provide harsher penalties to those who would acquire properties
which are proceeds of the crimes of Robbery or Theft, who prior to the enactment of said
law, were punished merely as accessories after the fact of the said crimes. 34 This
rationale was echoed in Dizon-Pamintuan v. People35 where the Court held that while a
Fence may be prosecuted either as an accessory of Robbery/Theft or a principal for
Fencing, there is a preference for the prosecution of the latter as it provides for harsher
penalties:

Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an
accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty
applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55,
and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60
thereof. Noting, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is
rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such
robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because
of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of
the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and
theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612.
However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal
in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand,
and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The state may thus choose
to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the
preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum
prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property.36

While PD 1612 penalizes those who acquire properties which are proceeds of Robbery
or Theft, its prescribed penalties are similar to the latter crime in that they are largely
dependent on the value of the said properties. In fact, a reading of Section 3 of PD 1612
and Article 309 of the RPC (which provides for the prescribed penalties for the crime of
Theft) reveals that both provisions use the same graduations of property value to
determine the prescribed penalty; in particular, if the value: (a) exceeds P22,000.00, with
additional penalties for each additional P10,000.00; (b) is more than P12,000.00 but not
exceeding P22,000.00; (c) is more than P6,000.00 but not exceeding P12,000.00; (d) is
more than P200.00 but not exceeding P6,000.00; (e) is more than P50.00 but not
exceeding P200.00; and (f) does not exceed P5.00. However, with the recent enactment
of Republic Act No. 10951,37 which adjusted the values of the property and damage on
which various penalties are based, taking into consideration the present value of money,
as opposed to its archaic values when the RPC was enacted in 1932,38 the graduation of
values in Article 309 was substantially amended, without any concomitant adjustment for
PD 1612. This development would then result in instances where a Fence, which is
theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of Robbery/Theft, will be punished more
severely than the principal of such latter crimes. This incongruence in penalties therefore,
impels an adjustment of penalties.

However, while it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.39 As
the Court remains mindful of the fact that the determination of penalties is a policy matter
that belongs to the legislative branch of the government, it finds it prudent to instead,
furnish both Houses of Congress, as well as the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Department of Justice, pursuant to Article 540 of the RPC, copies
of this ruling in order to alert them on the aforestated incongruence of penalties, all with
the hope of arriving at the proper solution to this predicament.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2015 and the
Resolution dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01126-
MIN finding petitioner Ireneo Cahulogan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Fencing defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Fencing Law," are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 233325, APRIL 16, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
PASTORLITO V. DELA VICTORIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

BEFORE THE COURT IS AN ORDINARY APPEAL1 FILED BY ACCUSED-

APPELLANT PASTORLITO V. DELA VICTORIA (DELA VICTORIA) ASSAILING THE
DECISION2 DATED APRIL 7, 2017 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (CA) IN CA-G.R.
CR-HC NO. 01428-MIN, WHICH AFFIRMED THE DECISION3 DATED MARCH 25,
2014 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BUTUAN CITY, BRANCH 4 (RTC) IN
CRIM. CASE NO. 13139, FINDING DELA VICTORIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF VIOLATING SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. (RA)
9165,4 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002."

THE FACTS

THIS CASE STEMMED FROM AN INFORMATION5 FILED BEFORE THE RTC

CHARGING DELA VICTORIA WITH THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL SALE OF
DANGEROUS DRUGS, DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER SECTION 5, ARTICLE II
OF RA 9165, THE ACCUSATORY PORTION OF WHICH STATE:
 CRIM. CASE NO. 13139

THAT ON OR ABOUT 10:35 O'CLOCK [SIC] IN THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 9,

2008 AT BUTUAN CITY, PHILIPPINES AND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT, THE ABOVE-NAMED ACCUSED, WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF
LAW, DID THEN AND THERE WILLFULLY, UNLAWFULLY[,] AND FELONIOUSLY
SELL AND DELIVER TO A [POSEUR-BUYER] FOR A CONSIDERATION OF P500.00
MARKED MONEY[,] ONE (1) SMALL SACHET OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
[METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ["SHABU"]
WEIGHING ZERO POINT ZERO ONE ZERO SIX (0.0106) GRAM, WHICH IS A
DANGEROUS DRUG.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

THE PROSECUTION ALLEGED THAT ON OCTOBER 8, 2008, A POLICE ASSET

INFORMED THE PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) REGIONAL
OFFICE THAT DELA VICTORIA, WHO IS ON THE PDEA'S WATCHLIST OF DRUG
PERSONALITIES, WAS SELLING DRUGS AT LANGIHAN ROAD COMER ONG YIU
ROAD, BRGY. SAN IGNACIO, BUTUAN CITY.7 AFTER CONDUCTING
SURVEILLANCE, A BUY-BUST TEAM WAS FORMED, WHICH WAS COMPOSED OF
PDEA OPERATIVES INVESTIGATION OFFICER (IO) I SOTERO B. IBARRA, JR. (IO1
IBARRA), AS THE DESIGNATED POSEUR-BUYER,8 AND IO1 RODELIO M.
DAGUMAN, JR. (IO1 DAGUMAN), AS THE ARRESTING OFFICER,9 AMONG
OTHERS. ON OCTOBER 9, 2008, THE BUY-BUST TEAM, TOGETHER WITH THE
ASSET, PROCEEDED TO THE TARGET AREA. AS SOON AS DELA VICTORIA SAW
THEM, HE APPROACHED THE ASSET AND THE LATTER INTRODUCED IO1
IBARRA AS A COUSIN INTERESTED IN BUYING SHABU. DELA VICTORIA ASKED
IF HE HAD MONEY AND IO1 IBARRA REPLIED, "AW-MATIC," GIVING THE MARKED
P500.00 BILL, WHILE DELA VICTORIA SIMULTANEOUSLY HANDED OVER ONE (1)
PLASTIC SACHET OF SUSPECTED SHABU. AFTER INSPECTING THE SAME, IO1
IBARRA MADE A "MISSED CALL" TO IO1 DAGUMAN, THE PRE-ARRANGED
SIGNAL, BY WHICH TIME, DELA VICTORIA STARTED TO WALK AWAY.
HOWEVER, THE OPERATIVES CAUGHT UP AND ARRESTED DELA VICTORIA IN
FRONT OF A TINSMITH'S SHOP.10 THEY THEN BROUGHT DELA VICTORIA INSIDE
THE PDEA VEHICLE WHERE AN INITIAL SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED, AND THE
MARKED MONEY WAS RECOVERED. THEREAFTER, THEY WENT TO THE PDEA -
REGIONAL OFFICE XIII (LIBERTAD, BUTUAN CITY) WHERE IO1 IBARRA MARKED
THE CONFISCATED SACHET, PREPARED THE INVENTORY,11 AND TOOK
PICTURES,12 WHILE DELA VICTORIA REMAINED INSIDE THE CAR UNTIL
BARANGAY CAPTAIN FLORENCIO M. CAÑETE ARRIVED.13 AFTER SECURING
THE NECESSARY LETTER-REQUEST,14 IO1 IBARRA DELIVERED THE SACHET TO
THE PNP CRIME LABORATORY WHERE IT WAS RECEIVED BY POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR CRAMWELL T. BANOGON, WHO CONFIRMED THAT THE
SUBSTANCE INSIDE THE SEIZED SACHET TESTED POSITIVE FOR THE
PRESENCE OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, A DANGEROUS DRUG.15
FOR HIS PART, DELA VICTORIA DENIED THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, CLAIMING
THAT AT 10:30 IN THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 9, 2008, HE WAS MAKING A
"TAHO" CONTAINER IN THEIR FAMILY-OWNED TIN SHOP, WHEN A PERSON
APPROACHED, POINTED A GUN, AND ARRESTED HIM FOR ALLEGEDLY SELLING
DRUGS. HE AVERRED THAT HE WAS FORCED TO BOARD A PDEA MOTOR
VEHICLE, WHERE HE WAS REPEATEDLY ASKED QUESTIONS. WHEN THEY
ARRIVED AT THE PDEA OFFICE, HE WAS SHOWN A P500.00 BILL AND A SMALL
CELLOPHANE, BOTH OF WHICH, HE CLAIMED WERE MERELY PLANTED BY THE
PDEA OPERATIVES IN ORDER TO CHARGE HIM WITH THE SAID CRIME.16

THE RTC RULING

IN A DECISION17 DATED MARCH 25, 2014, THE RTC FOUND DELA VICTORIA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING SECTION 5, ARTICLE II
OF RA 9165 AND ACCORDINGLY, SENTENCED HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY
OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P500,000.00 WITHOUT
SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY.18

THE RTC HELD THAT THE PROSECUTION SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS AS IT WAS ABLE TO
PROVE THAT: (A) ONE (1) SACHET OF SHABU WAS SOLD DURING THE BUY-
BUST OPERATION; (B) DELA VICTORIA WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE
SELLER OF THE SAID DANGEROUS DRUG; AND (C) THE DANGEROUS DRUG
WAS IN THE CUSTODY OF IO1 IBARRA FROM THE TIME OF THE SALE UNTIL IT
WAS MARKED BY HIM.19 MOREOVER, THE RTC RULED THAT THERE WAS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 21,
ARTICLE II OF RA 9165 EVEN IF THE MARKING AND INVENTORY WERE DONE AT
THE PDEA OFFICE.20

AGGRIEVED, DELA VICTORIA APPEALED21 TO THE CA.

THE CA RULING

IN A DECISION22 DATED APRIL 7, 2017, THE CA AFFIRMED DELA VICTORIA'S

CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.23 IT FOUND THE PRESENCE OF ALL
THE ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS THROUGH IO1
IBARRA'S TESTIMONY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT DID NOT FIND DELA
VICTORIA'S DEFENSE OF PLANTING OF EVIDENCE SUBSTANTIATED. FURTHER,
THE CA HELD THAT WHILE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 21, ARTICLE
II OF RA 9165 WERE NOT PERFECTLY ADHERED TO BY THE PDEA OPERATIVES,
SINCE THE MARKING OF THE SACHET WAS DONE AT THE PDEA OFFICE AND
NOT IN THE PRESENCE OF DELA VICTORIA, THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY
VALUE OF THE SAME WERE SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN DULY PRESERVED. IT
NOTED THAT IO1 IBARRA'S MARKING ON THE CONFISCATED SACHET WAS
CLEARLY INDICATED ON THE CERTIFICATE OF INVENTORY, LETTER-REQUEST
FOR EXAMINATIONS, AND CHEMISTRY REPORT SUBMITTED.24

HENCE, THIS APPEAL.

THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT

THE ISSUE FOR THE COURT'S RESOLUTION IS WHETHER OR NOT THE CA

CORRECTLY UPHELD DELA VICTORIA'S CONVICTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF
DANGEROUS DRUGS.

THE COURT'S RULING

THE APPEAL IS MERITORIOUS.

AT THE OUTSET, IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT AN APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES

OPENS THE ENTIRE CASE FOR REVIEW AND, THUS, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE
REVIEWING TRIBUNAL TO CORRECT, CITE, AND APPRECIATE ERRORS IN THE
APPEALED JUDGMENT WHETHER THEY ARE ASSIGNED OR
UNASSIGNED.25"THE APPEAL CONFERS THE APPELLATE COURT FULL
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND RENDERS SUCH COURT COMPETENT TO
EXAMINE RECORDS, REVISE THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM, INCREASE THE
PENALTY, AND CITE THE PROPER PROVISION OF THE PENAL LAW."26
IN THIS CASE, DELA VICTORIA WAS CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER SECTION 5,
ARTICLE II OF RA 9165. NOTABLY, IN ORDER TO PROPERLY SECURE THE
CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED CHARGED WITH ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS
DRUGS, THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE: (A) THE IDENTITY OF THE BUYER
AND THE SELLER, THE OBJECT, AND THE CONSIDERATION; AND (B) THE
DELIVERY OF THE THING SOLD AND THE PAYMENT.27

CASE LAW STATES THAT THE IDENTITY OF THE PROHIBITED DRUG MUST BE
ESTABLISHED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY, CONSIDERING THAT THE
DANGEROUS DRUG ITSELF FORMS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI OF THE CRIME. THUS, IN ORDER TO OBVIATE ANY UNNECESSARY
DOUBT ON ITS IDENTITY, THE PROSECUTION HAS TO SHOW AN UNBROKEN
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OVER THE SAME AND ACCOUNT FOR EACH LINK IN THE
CHAIN OF CUSTODY FROM THE MOMENT THE DRUGS ARE SEIZED UP TO
THEIR PRESENTATION IN COURT AS EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME.28

SECTION 21, ARTICLE II OF RA 9165 OUTLINES THE PROCEDURE WHICH THE

POLICE OFFICERS MUST FOLLOW WHEN HANDLING THE SEIZED DRUGS IN
ORDER TO PRESERVE THEIR INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE.29 UNDER
THE SAID SECTION, PRIOR TO ITS AMENDMENT BY RA 10640,30 THE
APPREHENDING TEAM SHALL, AMONG OTHERS, IMMEDIATELY AFTER SEIZURE
AND CONFISCATION CONDUCT A PHYSICAL INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPH
THE SEIZED ITEMS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED OR THE PERSON
FROM WHOM THE ITEMS WERE SEIZED, OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE OR
COUNSEL, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MEDIA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (DOJ), AND ANY ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIAL WHO SHALL BE
REQUIRED TO SIGN THE COPIES OF THE INVENTORY AND BE GIVEN A COPY
OF THE SAME, AND THE SEIZED DRUGS MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE PNP
CRIME LABORATORY WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR (24) HOURS FROM CONFISCATION
FOR EXAMINATION.31 IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. MENDOZA,32 THE COURT
STRESSED THAT "[W]ITHOUT THE INSULATING PRESENCE OF THE
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MEDIA [AND] THE [DOJ], [AND] ANY ELECTED
PUBLIC OFFICIAL DURING THE SEIZURE AND MARKING OF THE [SEIZED
DRUGS), THE EVILS OF SWITCHING, 'PLANTING' OR CONTAMINATION OF THE
EVIDENCE THAT HAD TAINTED THE BUY-BUSTS CONDUCTED UNDER THE
REGIME OF [RA] 6425 (DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972) AGAIN REARED
THEIR UGLY HEADS AS TO NEGATE THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE
SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION OF THE [SAID DRUGS) THAT WERE EVIDENCE
HEREIN OF THE CORPUS DELICTI, AND THUS ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE
TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE INCRIMINATION OF THE ACCUSED. INDEED, THE
X X X PRESENCE OF SUCH WITNESSES WOULD HAVE PRESERVED AN
UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY."33

THE COURT, HOWEVER, CLARIFIED THAT UNDER VARIED FIELD CONDITIONS,

STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 21, ARTICLE II
OF RA 9165 MAY NOT ALWAYS BE POSSIBLE.34 IN FACT, THE IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS (IRR) OF RA 9165 – WHICH IS NOW CRYSTALLIZED
INTO STATUTORY LAW WITH THE PASSAGE OF RA 1064035– PROVIDES THAT
THE SAID INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPHY MAY BE CONDUCTED AT THE
NEAREST POLICE STATION OR OFFICE OF THE APPREHENDING TEAM IN
INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEIZURE, AND THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 21, ARTICLE II OF RA 9165 – UNDER
JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS – WILL NOT RENDER VOID AND INVALID THE SEIZURE
AND CUSTODY OVER THE SEIZED ITEMS SO LONG AS THE INTEGRITY AND
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED BY
THE APPREHENDING OFFICER OR TEAM.36 IN OTHER WORDS, THE FAILURE OF
THE APPREHENDING TEAM TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURE LAID
OUT IN SECTION 21, ARTICLE II OF RA 9165 AND ITS IRR DOES NOT IPSO
FACTO RENDER THE SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OVER THE ITEMS AS VOID AND
INVALID, PROVIDED THAT THE PROSECUTION SATISFACTORILY PROVES THAT:
(A) THERE IS JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR NON-COMPLIANCE; AND (B) THE
INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE PROPERLY
PRESERVED.37 IN PEOPLE V. ALMORFE,38THE COURT EXPLAINED THAT FOR
THE ABOVE-SAVING CLAUSE TO APPLY, THE PROSECUTION MUST EXPLAIN
THE REASONS BEHIND THE PROCEDURAL LAPSES, AND THAT THE INTEGRITY
AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED EVIDENCE HAD NONETHELESS
BEEN PRESERVED.39 ALSO, IN PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN,40 IT WAS EMPHASIZED
THAT THE JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR NON-COMPLIANCE MUST BE PROVEN
AS A FACT, BECAUSE THE COURT CANNOT PRESUME WHAT THESE GROUNDS
ARE OR THAT THEY EVEN EXIST.41

IN THIS CASE, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PDEA OPERATIVES COMMITTED
UNJUSTIFIED DEVIATIONS FROM THE PRESCRIBED CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE,
THEREBY PUTTING INTO QUESTION THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE
OF THE ITEMS PURPORTEDLY SEIZED FROM DELA VICTORIA.

FIRST, RECORDS SHOW THAT IO1 IBARRA FAILED TO MARK THE CONFISCATED
SACHET IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED, DELA VICTORIA. DURING TRIAL,
IO1 IBARRA TESTIFIED THAT:

[PROSECUTOR FELIXBERTO L. GUIRITAN] Q: HOW ABOUT THAT SACHET OF

SHABU YOU BROUGHT ON BUY-BUST? WHAT DID YOU DO TO IT?
[IO1 IBARRA] A: IT WAS IN MY POSSESSION, SIR.
Q: WHAT DID YOU DO TO IT?
XXXX
A: I JUST GOT HOLD OF IT AND WHEN WE ARRIVED IN THE OFFICE I PLACED
MARKING ON IT.42
XXXX
[DEFENSE COUNSEL ATTY. JESUS A. TANTAY] Q: IT SEEMED THAT THE
BARANGAY CAPTAIN ARRIVED FIRST IN YOUR OFFICE BEFORE THE ACCUSED
WAS PHOTOGRAPHED? OR THAT MR. WITNESS THE ACCUSED ARRIVED FIRST
BUT HE WAS NOT TAKEN OUT OF THE VEHICLE NOT UNLESS THE BARANGAY
CAPTAIN WOULD ARRIVE, CORRECT?
[IO1 IBARRA] A: WE DID NOT LET THE ACCUSED DISEMBARK FROM THE
VEHICLE UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN BECAUSE WE
IMMEDIATELY FETCHED THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN X X X.
Q: SO IT MEANS THAT YOU REALLY HAD ENOUGH TIME TO DO ANYTHING TO
THE ACCUSED WHILE HE WAS CONFINED AND AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC INSIDE
THE VEHICLE?
A: WE WERE JUST TALKING TO HIM INSIDE THE VEHICLE, SIR. XXXX
Q: SO EVERYTHING FROM PHOTOGRAPHING OF THE ALLEGED EVIDENCE;
MARKED MONEY, SHABU AND THE MAKING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
INVENTORY, MAKING OF THE REQUEST FOR LABORATORY
EXAMINATION, ETC. WERE DONE IN THE OFFICE?
A: YES, SIR.
X X X X43 (EMPHASES AND UNDERSCORING SUPPLIED)
AS MAY BE GLEANED ABOVE, IO1 IBARRA MARKED THE SEIZED SACHET AND
PREPARED THE CERTIFICATE OF INVENTORY AT THE PDEA OFFICE. NOTABLY,
THESE WERE NOT DONE IN THE PRESENCE OF DELA VICTORIA SINCE AT THAT
TIME, HE WAS BEING HELD INSIDE THE PDEA VEHICLE WHILE WAITING FOR
THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN TO ARRIVE.

IN THIS RELATION, IT DESERVES POINTING OUT THAT THE SAID MARKING AND
PREPARATION OF INVENTORY WERE NOT EVEN DONE AT THE PLACE OF
ARREST OR AT THE NEAREST POLICE STATION. WHILE SECTION 21, ARTICLE II
OF RA 9165 ALLOWS THE SAME TO BE CONDUCTED AT THE NEAREST OFFICE
OF THE APPREHENDING TEAM, IF PRACTICABLE, THE PROSECUTION IN THIS
CASE, DID NOT EVEN CLAIM THAT THE PDEA OFFICE WAS THE NEAREST
OFFICE FROM THE TINSMITH'S SHOP WHERE THE DRUGS WERE SEIZED.
WHEN CROSS-EXAMINED ON THIS POINT, IO1 IBARRA STATED THAT:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL ATTY. JESUS A. TANTAY] Q: I NOTICED THAT, AND THIS IS

A PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, THAT THE TINSMITH'S SHOP THAT WE ARE
REFERRING TO IS JUST VERY NEAR THE LANGIHAN POLICE STATION THAN
YOUR OFFICE WHICH IS JUST AROUND SIX KILOMETERS FROM THE SCENE, IS
NOT THAT CORRECT?
[SO2 IBARRA] A: YES, SIR, THAT IS TRUE.
Q: BUT YOU DID NOT BOTHER TO REFER FIRST, OUT OF SOME RESPECT TO
THAT OFFICE WHICH HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PLACE, TO REPORT THE
INCIDENT AND WHERE YOU COULD PROPERLY OR CONVENIENTLY MARK
THE SHABU OR OTHER EVIDENCE, MR. WITNESS?
A: WE NO LONGER STOPPED BY THEIR OFFICE, SIR.
Q: BUT IF YOU CHOSE TO DO IT YOU COULD HAVE DONE IT MR. WITNESS?
A: IT IS NOT OUR PRACTICE TO STOP BY THE POLICE STATION, SIR.
Q: BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN THE PRACTICE OF YOUR OFFICE TO GO TO THE
BARANGAY HALL, WHICH HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME SCENE MR.
WITNESS, WHERE YOU COULD MAKE THE INVENTORY OR PERHAPS
PHOTOGRAPHING OF THE EVIDENCE AND WHERE YOU COULD SUMMON OR
REQUEST THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS TO SIGN THE INVENTORY, IS THAT
CORRECT?
A: WE JUST CALLED UP THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND REQUESTED HIM TO
PROCEED TO OUR OFFICE BECAUSE HE WAS ALREADY IN HIS HOUSE, SIR.
X X X X44 (EMPHASIS AND UNDERSCORING SUPPLIED)
AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE LANGIHAN POLICE STATION AND THE SAN
IGNACIO BARANGAY HALL HAVE A CLOSER PROXIMITY TO THE PLACE OF
ARREST THAN THE PDEA OFFICE. IO1 IBARRA'S EXPLANATION THAT IT IS "NOT
[THEIR] PRACTICE TO PASS BY THE POLICE STATION" HARDLY JUSTIFIES A
DEVIATION FROM THE RULE. IN FACT, CONTRARY TO IO1 IBARRA'S CLAIM, THE
BARANGAY CAPTAIN ADMITTED THAT HE WAS ACTUALLY AT THE BARANGAY
HALL WHEN HE WAS SUMMONED BY THE PDEA OPERATIVES ON THE DATE OF
THE INCIDENT.45 THUS, TRANSPORTING THE SEIZED ITEMS ALL THE WAY TO
THE PDEA OFFICE FOR MARKING AND INVENTORY, WHEN THE SAME COULD
HAVE BEEN IMMEDIATELY DONE AT THE LANGIHAN POLICE STATION OR AT
THE SAN IGNACIO BARANGAY HALL, CASTS SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE
INTEGRITY OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG. IN PEOPLE V. DAHIL,46 THE COURT
EXPLAINED THAT:
MARKING AFTER SEIZURE IS THE STARTING POINT IN THE CUSTODIAL LINK;
HENCE, IT IS VITAL THAT THE SEIZED CONTRABAND BE IMMEDIATELY MARKED
BECAUSE SUCCEEDING HANDLERS OF THE SPECIMENS WILL USE THE
MARKINGS AS REFERENCE. THE MARKING OF THE EVIDENCE SERVES TO
SEPARATE THE MARKED EVIDENCE FROM THE CORPUS OF ALL OTHER
SIMILAR OR RELATED EVIDENCE FROM THE TIME THEY ARE SEIZED FROM THE
ACCUSED UNTIL THEY ARE DISPOSED OF AT THE END OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS, THUS, PREVENTING SWITCHING, PLANTING OR
CONTAMINATION OF EVIDENCE.

IT MUST BE NOTED THAT MARKING IS NOT FOUND IN R.A. NO. 9165 AND IS
DIFFERENT FROM THE INVENTORY-TAKING AND PHOTOGRAPHY UNDER
SECTION 21 OF THE SAID LAW. LONG BEFORE CONGRESS PASSED R.A. NO.
9165, HOWEVER, THIS COURT HAD CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT FAILURE OF
THE AUTHORITIES TO IMMEDIATELY MARK THE SEIZED DRUGS WOULD CAST
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF THECORPUS DELICTI.47
SECOND, THERE WAS NO DOJ REPRESENTATIVE DURING THE CONDUCT OF
THE INVENTORY AND NO JUSTIFICATION GIVEN FOR THE
ABSENCE.48 RECORDS SHOW THAT IT WAS ONLY THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN
AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WHO SIGNED THE INVENTORY WHEN
THEY SEPARATELY ARRIVED AND WERE SHOWN THE CONFISCATED ITEMS
AND THE INVENTORY ONLY AFTER AFFIXING THEIR SIGNATURES:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL ATTY. JESUS A. TANTAY] Q: THE ONLY ONE WHO WAS
ABLE TO SIGN THE INVENTORY MR. WITNESS WAS THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN?
[SO2 IBARRA] A: THERE WAS ALSO ONE MEMBER OF THE PRESS WHO WAS
ABLE TO SIGN THE INVENTORY.
Q: OF COURSE THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND THE MEDIA MAN DID NOT GO
TOGETHER TO YOUR OFFICE, THEY ARRIVED ALTERNATELY?
A: YES, SIR.

Q: There was no representative from the DOJ at that time, correct?

A: Yes, sir, there was none.49 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The mere marking of the seized drugs, as well as the conduct of an inventory, in
violation of the strict procedure requiring the presence of the accused, the media, and
responsible government functionaries, fails to approximate compliance with Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165.50 The presence of these personalities and the immediate marking
and conduct of physical inventory after seizure and confiscation in full view of the
accused and the required witnesses cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality.51 While non-compliance is allowed, the same ought to be justified. Case
law states that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were exerted by the
PDEA operatives to comply with the mandated procedure as to convince the Court that
the attempt to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. Since this was
not the case here, the Court is impelled to conclude that there has been an unjustified
breach of procedure and hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised.52 Consequently, Dela Victoria's acquittal is in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict
this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as
this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights
for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the
guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.53

"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to
prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as
amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but
also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately,
the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not
raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate
court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to
ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether
justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the
appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a
conviction."54
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 7, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01428-MIN is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Pastorlito V. Dela Victoria is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. NO. P-18-3833 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 14-4370-P), APRIL 16, 2018]
JULIUS E. PADUGA, COMPLAINANT,
V.
ROBERTO "BOBBY" R. DIMSON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
VALENZUELA CITY, BRANCH 171, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint1 dated May 5, 2014 filed before
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by complainant Julius E. Paduga
(complainant) against respondent Roberto "Bobby" R. Dimson (respondent), Sheriff IV of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 171, (RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171),
accusing the latter of usurpation and abuse of authority.

The Facts

In the letter-complaint, complainant alleged that respondent personally attended to the

execution proceedings in connection with a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 221 (RTC-QC Br. 221), despite not having been deputized by
said court to do so. He also claimed that respondent is a sheriff of an entirely different
court, i.e., RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171, averring further that: (a) on April 21, 2014,
respondent personally went with the sheriff of RTC-QC Br. 221 to complainant's address
for the purpose of enforcing the aforesaid RTC-QC Br. 221 ruling; (b) on April 24, 2014,
respondent attended the conference between the parties-litigants in the case decided by
RTC-QC Br. 221; (c) on April 28, 2014, respondent returned to complainant's address to
check if the latter's group already complied with the notice to vacate issued by the sheriff
of RTC-QC Br. 221, and even threatened them to call police authorities if they do not
leave; (d) on April 29, 2014, respondent personally supervised the execution of the RTC-
QC Br. 221 ruling and even handed financial assistance to those who voluntarily vacated
the property subject of litigation; and (e) sometime in the first week of May 2014,
respondent returned to the property and supervised its fencing.2
Complying with the OCA's directive,3 respondent submitted his Comment4 dated
February 26, 2015 denying the charges against him. He explained that as a brother-in-
law of one of the counsels in the case ruled upon by the RTC-QC Br. 221, he only assisted
in the implementation of the amicable settlement in order to prevent physical conflict
between the parties.5 Respondent further averred that he neither interfered nor
participated in any of the processes relative to the execution of the RTC-QC Br. 221 ruling,
and only went there on his brother-in-law's behest, to ensure the prompt delivery of
financial assistance to the defendants.6 Finally, respondent claimed that he never
introduced himself as a sheriff of another court and that he did all these things in his
personal capacity and never during official time.7

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum8 dated December 8, 2017, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that
respondent be found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Less
Serious Dishonesty, and Simple Neglect of Duty, and accordingly, be meted the penalty
of suspension for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act will merit the most severe penalty from the Court.9

The OCA found respondent guilty of usurpation of authority and abuse of authority - which
in turn, constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service - as his mere
presence and manifest involvement with the parties absent a writ of execution and without
being deputized to do so are unequivocal acts signifying his encroachment of the duties
and functions of the actual person tasked to implement the ruling of the RTC-QC Br. 221,
i.e., the Sheriff of the same branch.10 The OCA further pointed out that respondent is
likewise guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty as the official records reveal that he was not
on leave on those dates when he personally appeared at the property subject of litigation,
thus, belying his claim that he committed said acts in his personal capacity.11 Finally, the
OCA pointed out that respondent's meddling with the affairs of RTC-QC Br. 221 rendered
him guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty as he failed to perform his duties as Sheriff in RTC-
Valenzuela Br. 171.12

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for the acts complained of.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and the recommendations of the OCA. Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service involves the demeanor of a public officer which tends
to tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office.13
On the other hand, Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth,
which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or
intent to violate the truth. Under CSC, Resolution No. 06-0538, dishonesty may be
classified as serious, less serious or simple.14 Section 4 of said Resolution states that
Less Serious Dishonesty necessarily entails the presence of any one of the following:
circumstances: (a) the dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government
which is not so serious as to qualify under Serious Dishonesty; (b) the respondent did not
take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act; and (c) other
analogous circumstances.

Finally, Simple Neglect of Duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper
attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.15

As correctly found by the OCA, respondent is guilty of all three (3) of these offenses,
considering that: (a) as a Sheriff in RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171, he encroached on the
authority, duties, and functions of the Sheriff of RTC-QC Br. 221 when he personally
appeared at the property subject of a ruling in said court, without being deputized to do
so; (b) respondent lied when he claimed to have done so during his personal time, when
the truth of the matter is that he acted during official time, as evidenced by his
accomplished Daily Time Record showing his presence in his station in RTC-Valenzuela
Br. 171 on those instances; and (c) in attending to such matter extraneous to his duties
as Sheriff of RTC-Valenzuela Br. 171, he neglected his own duties and functions in the
same court. Clearly, respondent must be held administratively liable for the aforesaid
offenses.

Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

(RRACCS),16Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service and Less Serious
Dishonesty are grave offenses punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the
second offense;17 on the other hand, Simple Neglect of Duty is a less grave offense
punishable by suspension for 1 a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. 18
Applying Sections 49 (c)19 and 5020 of the RRACCS to this case and it appearing that this
is respondent's first offense for all the charges, the OCA correctly recommended that
respondent be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit the most severe penalty from
the Court, i.e., dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered finding respondent Roberto "Bobby" R.

Dimson, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 GUILTY of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Less Serious Dishonesty, and
Simple Neglect of Duty. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to be
attached to respondent's records.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 17-12-135-MeTC, April 16, 2018]

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. ARNO D. DEL ROSARIO, COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, BRANCH 41, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (METC),
QUEZON CITY.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative matter stemmed from a letter1 dated September 6, 2017 requesting
that Mr. Arno Del Rosario (Del Rosario), Court Stenographer II of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 41 (MeTC) be dropped from the rolls due to his absences
without official leave.

The Facts

The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS)
of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) show that Del Rosario has not submitted
either his daily time record from February 3, 2017 to the present or any application for
leave covering such period, thus making him absent without approved leave since said
date.2 In addition, the records of Employees' Welfare and Benefits Division, OAS of the
OCA reveal that it received an application for retirement3 from Del Rosario effective
February 3, 2017; however, further verification showed that he has not submitted the
documents necessary for its approval.4

In view of the foregoing, Del Rosario's name was excluded from the payroll starting April
2017. This notwithstanding, the Personnel Division stated that he is still in the plantilla of
personnel and is therefore considered in active service.5 Thus, in a letter6 dated
September 6, 2017, Presiding Judge Analie B. Oga-Brual requested to drop Del Rosario
from the rolls or declare his position vacant considering his absences without official
leave.

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum7 dated November 23, 2017, the OCA recommended that Del Rosario
be: (a) dropped from the rolls due to his absences without official leave, and his position
be declared vacant; and (b) informed about his separation from the service. The OCA,
however, clarified, that Del Rosario is still qualified to receive the benefits that he may be
entitled to under existing laws and may still be re-employed in the government service.8

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Del Rosario should be dropped from the
rolls due to his absences without official leave.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.

Section 107, Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017
RACCS)9 authorizes and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of
employees who, inter alia, are absent without approved leave for an extended period of
time. Pertinent portions of this provision read:

Section 107. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. Officers and employees
who are absent without approved leave, x x x may be dropped from the rolls within thirty
(30) days from the time a ground therefor arises subject to the following procedures:

a. Absence Without Approved Leave

1. An official or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL)
for at least thirty (30) working days may be dropped from the rolls without prior
notice which shall take effect immediately.

He/she shall, however, have the right to appeal his/her separation within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice of separation which must be sent to his/her last
known address.

xxxx
This provision is in consonance with Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave,
as amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2007,10
which states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. - An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be
considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the
service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x.

xxxx

In this case, it is undisputed that Del Rosario had been absent without official leave since
February 3, 2017. Verily, his prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the
public service as it disrupted the normal functions of the court. 11It contravened the duty
of a public servant to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency.12 It should be reiterated and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is
circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and
maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary. By failing to report for work since February
3, 2017 up to the present, Del Rosario grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of
his office. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability
imposed on all those in the government service.13

In view of the foregoing, the Court is constrained to drop Del Rosario from the rolls. At
this point, the Court deems it worthy to stress that the instant case is non-disciplinary in
nature. Thus, Del Rosario's separation from the service shall neither result in the forfeiture
of any benefits which have accrued in his favor, nor in his disqualification from re-
employment in the government service.14

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(a) DROP FROM THE ROLLS the name of Mr. Arno Del Rosario, Court Stenographer II
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41, effective February 3, 2017
for being on continuous absence without official leave since said date. However, he
is still qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws and
may still be re-employed in the government;

(b) DECLARE as VACANT the position of Mr. Arno Del Rosario; and

(c) INFORM Mr. Arno Del Rosario of his separation from the service or dropping from the
rolls at his last known address appearing in his 201 file, i.e., No. 61 Vermillion Street,
Barangay Tunkong Mangga, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. NO. 12084, JUNE 06, 2018]
HERNANIE P. DANDOY, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. ROLAND G.
EDAYAN, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a verified letter-complaint1 dated December 17,
2010 filed by Hernanie P. Dandoy (Dandoy) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against respondent Atty. Roland G. Edayan (respondent) for violation of Canons 1,
3, and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).2

The Facts

In the complaint, Dandoy alleged that on October 17, 2006, respondent notarized: (a) a
Special Power of Attorney3 (SPA) executed by his (Dandoy) father, Jacinto S. Dandoy
(Jacinto), in favor of a certain Antoine Cyrus C. Garzo (Garzo) granting the latter authority
to offer as collateral two (2) parcels of land located in San Juan, Siquijor; and (b) a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Real Estate4 (Deed) of Dandoy's late grandmother, Eutiquia
Sumagang, wherein his father was also one of the parties.5According to Dandoy, Jacinto
could not have been present before respondent on October 17, 2006 because he passed
away on July 13, 1999.6 He added that, through the SPA and the Deed, Garzo was able
to mortgage the two (2) parcels of land as security for a P400,000.00 loan. The mortgage
was, however, foreclosed and the mortgaged properties were not redeemed to the great
prejudice of Dandoy and his siblings.7 In support thereof, Dandoy attached a certified true
copy of the SPA, death certificate of Jacinto stating that he died on July 13, 1999, a copy
of the Deed, and a copy of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 8 dated October 17, 2006
executed by Garzo on behalf of Jacinto and Felipe Dandoy (Felipe), Dandoy's uncle.

In his Sworn Statement9 dated May 22, 2011, respondent admitted to having notarized
the two (2) documents, but claimed that he verified the identities of the signatories thereto
through their residence certificates. He narrated that on the said date, two (2) persons
came to his office claiming to be Jacinto and Felipe and asked him to draft and notarize
the SPA and the Deed. He added that Felipe even confirmed the identity of Jacinto in the
same manner that the witnesses to the documents, who were likewise present at that
time, confirmed the identities of the two. Finally, he submitted that while residence
certificates are not mentioned in the list of competent evidence of identity enumerated
under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice 10 (2004 Notarial Rules),
these are still necessary for the proper execution of the notarial act as it is still prescribed
by various laws, i.e., Commonwealth Act No. 465,11 the Notarial Law,12 and the Local
Government Code.13
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation14 dated October 22, 2015, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner (IBP-IC) found respondent administratively liable for failure to comply with
the 2004 Notarial Rules, and accordingly, recommended that respondent's notarial
commission, if existing, be revoked and that he be disqualified from being commissioned
as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. 15

The IBP-IC found that respondent failed to confirm the identity of the person claiming to
be Jacinto through the competent evidence of identity required by the 2004 Notarial Rules
the controlling rules on notarial practice at the time of the notarization of the SPA and the
Deed, not the Notarial Law invoked by respondent. In this regard, the IBP-IC pointed out
that under the 2004 Notarial Rules, competent evidence of identity includes: (a) a
government-issued identification document bearing their respective photographs, which
clearly does not include the community tax certificate presented in this case; and (b)
affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, etc. who is personally
known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, which, in this case,
was not satisfied by the statements made by Felipe or Garzo as to the identity of Jacinto
because they are privy to the Deed and the SPA. Finally, the IBP-IC noted the apparent
discrepancy between the signatures affixed by the person claiming to be Jacinto in the
SPA and in the Deed which, to the IBP-IC, should have already raised suspicion on
respondent's part and prompted him to require a signature and photograph-bearing
identification card from said person. Being a notary public, and therefore an officer of the
court, the IBP-IC pointed out that respondent must strictly comply with the rules on notarial
practice as may be issued by the Court.16

The IBP-IC, however, found the evidence insufficient to show that respondent wilfully and
maliciously conspired with Garzo and Felipe in depriving Dandoy and his siblings of their
grandmother's property in order to hold him administratively liable under the CPR. 17
In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
above report and recommendation of the IBP-IC. Dissatisfied, respondent sought
reconsideration,19 which the IBP denied in a Resolution20 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found respondent
liable for violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the findings and adopts the recommendations of the IBP with
modifications.

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the act of notarization is impressed with
public interest. Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.21 A notarial document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credence.22 As such, a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties in order to preserve
the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.23In this light, the Court
has ruled that notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.24

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary's presence personally at
the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified through competent evidence of identity.25 Section 12, Rule II of the same rules
defines "competent evidence of identity" as follows:

Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.- The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on:

(a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual; or

(b)
the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to these Rules, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signed the same is the very person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.26

In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP, was remiss in the faithful observance
of his duties as a notary public when he failed to confirm the identity of the person claiming
to be Jacinto through the competent evidence of identity required by the 2004 Notarial
Rules. Jurisprudence27 provides that a community tax certificate or cedula is no longer
considered as a valid and competent evidence of identity not only because it is not
included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Rules; but moreso, it does
not bear the photograph and signature of the persons appearing before them, which the
Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which notaries public can
ascertain the person's identity. Records show that Jacinto passed away on July 13, 1999,
and therefore, clearly could not have appeared before respondent to sign and execute
the two (2) documents. Had respondent been more circumspect in performing his duties
as notary public and asked for the photograph-andsignature-bearing identification
document required by the 2004 Notarial Rules, he would have immediately discovered
that the person before him was not the person whom he purports to be. All told, by
accepting the residence certificates presented by the person who claimed to be Jacinto
as evidence of identity, respondent made it appear that Jacinto personally appeared
before him and subscribed the SPA and the Deed in violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules
and to the detriment of Dandoy and his siblings.

Moreover, the statements made by the witnesses to the documents as regards the identity
of the persons who claimed to be Felipe and Jacinto and those made by the person
purporting to be Felipe as regards the latter do not comply with the 2004 Notarial Rules'
requirements on competent evidence of identity. Section 12 clearly states that the credible
witness/es making the oath – as to the identity of the individual subscribing the document
must: not be a privy to the document, etc.; personally know/s the individual subscribing;
and, must either be (a) personally known to the notary public, or (b) must show to the
notary public a photograph-and-signature-bearing identification document. In this case,
Felipe and Garzo were both privies to the document, and the records are bereft of any
evidence showing that the other witnesses to the document had shown to respondent the
documentary identification which the 2004 Notarial Rules require.

Moreover, as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. 28By
notarizing the subject documents, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well for violation of the CPR, particularly
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 thereof which provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As a final note, the Court finds it unfortunate that notwithstanding the findings of the IBP,
respondent still fails to recognize the fact that his actions violated the provisions of the
2004 Notarial Rules, as he maintains that the residence certificates presented before him
sufficiently complied with the Rules' identification requirements.29 It must be remembered,
however, that a lawyer is duty-bound to keep abreast of legal developments; 30 the
changes in our notarial rules are no exception.
As herein discussed, respondent's failure to properly perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also
in undermining the integrity of the office of a notary public and in degrading the function
of notarization.31 He should thus be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, 32 he should be
meted out with the modified penalty of immediate revocation of his notarial commission,
if any, disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2)
years, and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Roland G. Edayan

(respondent) GUILTY of violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court resolves to: SUSPEND him from
the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKE his incumbent commission as a notary
public, if any; and, PROHIBIT him from being commissioned as a notary public for two
(2) years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law, the revocation of his notarial commission, and his
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public shall take effect immediately
upon receipt of this Resolution by respondent. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a
Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 228504, JUNE 06, 2018]

PHILSYNERGY MARITIME, INC. AND/OR TRIMURTI SHIPMANAGEMENT
LTD.,PETITIONERS,
V.
COLUMBANO PAGUNSAN GALLANO, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 21, 2016
and the Resolution3 dated November 9, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 136970 which affirmed the Decision4 dated May 8, 2014 and the Resolution5dated
June 30, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No.
OFW (M)-01-000095-14, granting respondent Columbano Pagunsan Gallano, Jr.'s
(respondent) claim for permanent total disability benefits in accordance with the IBF
JSU/PSU-IMMAJ Collective Agreement (CBA), as well as ten percent (10%) attorney's
fees.

The Facts

Respondent was employed by petitioner Philsynergy Maritime, Inc. (Philsynergy), for and
in behalf of petitioner Trimurti Shipmanagement Ltd. (Trimurti; collectively, petitioners),
as Master (or Ship Master) on board the vessel M.V. Pearl Halo under a six (6)-month
employment contract6 that was signed on September 21, 2012, with a basic monthly
salary of US$1,847.00, among others, and covered by a CBA.7 After undergoing the
required pre-employment medical examination (PEME) where the company-designated
physician declared him fit for sea duty,8 respondent, who was then 62 years old, boarded
the vessel on October 5, 2012.9

On October 10, 2012, at around 10:00 in the evening and while in the performance of his
duties, respondent felt a sudden numbness on the left side of his body and noticed that
his speech was slurred. He was immediately provided first aid and his condition allegedly
improved after taking an Isordil10 tablet which respondent had personally brought to the
vessel.11 On the next day, his symptoms recurred, but which did not improve despite
taking another dose of Isordil. Thus, respondent was brought to a local hospital in Poro,
New Caledonia, where he was confined for eleven (11) days and underwent physical
therapy from October 15 to 21, 2012.12 His CT scan (computed tomography scan)
revealed "middle cerebral artery deep right infarct without associated hemorrhagic
alteration," while his MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) showed "ischemic
cerebrovascular accident stroke ischemique, right middle deep lobe." 13

As a result, respondent was repatriated on October 23, 2012 for further medical treatment
and referred to a company-designated physician, who diagnosed him to be suffering from
"Cerebrovascular Infarct Middle Cerebral Artery, Right [and] Hypertension." 14 The
foregoing illnesses were declared by the company-designated physician to be not work-
related, ratiocinating that the risk factors for cerebrovascular infarct (brain stroke or
cerebrovascular accident [CVA]) were hypertension, Diabetes Mellitus, smoking, lifestyle,
dyslipidemia, family history, age[,] and sex, while the cause for hypertension was
multifactorial in origin which included "genetic predisposition, poor lifestyle, high salt
intake, smoking, Diabetes Mellitus, age[,] and increased sympathetic activity." 15
After series of follow-up check-ups, the company-designated physician, in a Medical
Report 16 dated March 9, 2013, noted that respondent's treadmill stress test already
showed normal results and his blood pressure controlled. In addition, the company-
designated physician opined that his cardiovascular condition has stabilized, but
nonetheless advised him to continue home exercises/rehabilitation and medication. Thus,
respondent was directed to undergo a repeat laboratory examination in time for his next
follow-up session on April 4, 2013.17 Records, however, are bereft of showing that the
foregoing directives were complied with.

Meanwhile, the company-designated Cardiologist, in a letter18 dated March 6, 2013

addressed to the company-designated physician, explicated that the medicine (Isordil)
brought by respondent on board the vessel is a medication used to treat patients with
angina (chest pain), and that while the latter denied taking any maintenance medications,
the company-designated Cardiologist opined that possession of the same suggests that
"he [(respondent)] may be experiencing some symptoms for which he was given that
medications previously."

On the other hand, claiming that his physical condition did not improve after having
suffered a brain stroke on board M.V. Pearl Halo while in the performance of his duties,
and that more than 120 days had lapsed from the time he was repatriated, respondent
sought for the payment of total disability benefits from petitioners, which the latter
refused.19 Thus, on April 24, 2013, respondent filed a complaint 20 for total permanent
disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages, and attorney's fees against petitioners
and Philsynergy's President, Capt. Reynold L. Torres, before the NLRC, docketed as
NLRC Case No. (M) NCR-04-06135-13.

In their defense,21 petitioners denied respondent's claim for disability benefits, averring in
the main that the latter fraudulently concealed a previously diagnosed medical condition
for which he was prescribed medication (Isordil), and which he failed to disclose during
his PEME; hence, he was disqualified to receive any compensation and benefits provided
under Section 20 (E)22 of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Employment Contract23 (2010 POEA-SEC).24 They likewise contended that
even on the assumption that there was no concealment, petitioners were not liable under
the CBA since respondent's disability did not result from an accident, 25 adding too that
his illnesses, Cerebrovascular Infarct Middle Cerebral Artery, Right and Hypertension,
were declared by the company-designated physician as not work-related, and therefore,
not compensable.26 Moreover, they averred that his claim for reimbursement of medical
expenses had already been paid,27 while the moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees, were without factual and legal bases.28
In the interim, respondent sought the opinion of an independent physician, Dr. Efren R.
Vicaldo, a Cardiologist from the Philippine Heart Center, who, in a Medical
Certificate29dated July 1, 2013, declared his illnesses, hypertensive cardiovascular
disease and cerebrovascular disease, to be work aggravated/related, and assessed his
health and resulting disability as Impediment Grade VII (41.80%), on the justification that
respondent was required maintenance medication to control his hypertension and to
prevent future cardiovascular complications, as well as change in his lifestyle. Thus, the
independent physician declared him unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity.

The Labor Arbiter's Ruling

In a Decision30 dated October 31, 2013, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of respondent
and ordered petitioners to pay the latter US$60,000.00 in accordance with the 2010
POEA-SEC, as well as ten percent (10%) attorney's fees.31

The LA held that the provision of the CBA on disability benefits that was incorporated in
respondent's employment contract was inapplicable since it covered only those
disabilities resulting from accidental injury.32 It likewise ruled out fraudulent concealment
on the part of respondent for lack of proof showing that he was already suffering from
high blood pressure that triggered his brain stroke or that he was aware of the same at
the time he boarded the vessel. In fact, respondent's PEME showed a normal blood
pressure reading which only proved that the latter did not have a pre-existing medical
condition at the time he boarded the vessel. Even on the assumption that respondent's
illness was a pre-existing condition given that he carried on board medication to address
the same (i.e., Isordil), such was not conclusive proof that he has suffered or was
suffering from an elevated blood pressure since he may have carried them as a handy
security in case of an unforeseen instance of elevated blood pressure.33 The LA likewise
ruled that respondent's diagnosed hypertension was work-related since it is listed as an
occupational disease under Section 32-B of the 2010 POEA-SEC, and that it was not
capable of partial disability assessment.34 Thus, the LA awarded respondent total
disability benefits notwithstanding the Grade VII impediment rating given by respondent's
independent physician, pointing out that the latter has also declared the former unfit to
resume work as a seafarer in any capacity.35 Lastly, the LA ordered petitioners to pay
respondent attorney's fees for having been compelled to litigate to protect his rights and
interests, while the latter's claim for moral and exemplary damages were denied for lack
of factual and legal bases.36

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In a Decision37 dated May 8, 2014, the NLRC affirmed the LA ruling with modification
ordering petitioners to solidarity pay respondent US$151,470.00 representing total and
permanent disability compensation benefits in accordance with Appendix 3
(Compensation Payments) of the CBA.38

The NLRC agreed with the LA that there was no concealment on the part of respondent
since his PEME showed fitness for work and normal blood pressure with no heart
problem. It also ruled that his possession of Isordil did not ipso facto mean that he was
hypertensive and under medical maintenance, and that even if respondent's hypertension
pre-existed his employment, such would not bar him from claiming disability
compensation as he was clearly asymptomatic of any cerebrovascular events before he
boarded the vessel and that its symptoms only manifested at the time he was subjected
to the strains of work and while in the performance of his duties. 39 The NLRC gave more
weight to the "unfit to work" findings of respondent's independent physician given that
even the company-designated physician failed to declare respondent fit to work as
evidenced by his last medical report which showed the latter's need for continued
rehabilitation and medication.40 Lastly, it pointed out that the CBA contemplates all kinds
of accident or unforeseen events that cause physical harm or injury to the body, and that
the illness suffered by respondent was an unforeseen event that physically injured the
brain.41

In a Resolution42 dated June 30, 2014, the NLRC denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and granted respondent's motion ordering petitioners to pay respondent
attorney's fees.43 Hence, the matter was elevated to the CA via a petition for certiorari.44

The CA Ruling

In a Decision45 dated June 21, 2016, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in awarding total and permanent disability benefits in favor of respondent
pursuant to the CBA. The CA agreed that respondent's brain stroke was work-
aggravated/related which rendered him incapacitated to work. It noted the lack of showing
that respondent suffered from any form of ailment prior to his cardiovascular accident,
and that petitioners failed to refute the latter's claim that the nature of his work constantly
exposed him to varying circumstances, such as extreme hot and cold temperature, harsh
weather conditions, and the mental stress associated with his work as Ship Master. It
likewise observed that the company-designated physician failed to declare respondent fit
to work despite the lapse of 120/240 days, rendering his disability as total and permanent.
Finally, the CA sustained the award of attorney's fees as respondent was clearly
compelled to litigate to protect his interests.46
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration47 but the same was denied in a
Resolution48 dated November 9, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the
NLRC's findings that respondent is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits
under the CBA.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is denied.

I.

It is settled that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits

is governed by law, by the parties' contracts, and by the medical findings. By law, the
relevant statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 19949 (formerly Articles 191 to 193) of the
Labor Code50 in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X51 of the Amended Rules on Employee
Compensation (AREC).52 By contract, the material contracts are the POEA-SEC, the
parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement, if any, and the employment agreement
between the seafarer and the employer. In this case, respondent executed his
employment contract with petitioners during the effectivity of the 2010 POEA-SEC; hence,
its provisions are applicable and should govern their relations.

Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is liable for disability
benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of
his contract. In this regard, Section 20 (E) thereof mandates the seafarer to disclose all
his pre-existing illnesses in his PEME, failing in which, he shall be disqualified from
receiving the same, to wit:
E. A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and
shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits. This is likewise a just cause
for termination of employment and imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions.

In this case, petitioners claim that there was willful concealment of a pre-existing medical
condition (i.e., hypertension or heart condition) on the part of respondent, which thus
disqualified him from claiming disability benefits under the 2010 POEA-SEC. Petitioners
anchor their contention on the fact that respondent personally carried on board Isordil, a
medication used to treat people with chest pain, which he failed to disclose during his
PEME. In this relation, petitioners submitted the opinion of their specialist that while
respondent denied taking any maintenance medications, the fact that the latter had with
him Isordil suggests that "he may be experiencing some symptoms for which he was
given that medications previously."53

The argument is untenable.

Pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC, an illness shall be considered as pre-existing if prior

to the processing of the POEA contract, any of the following conditions is
present: (a) the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing
illness or condition; or (b) the seafarer had been diagnosed and has knowledge of such
illness or condition but failed to disclose the same during the PEME, and such cannot be
diagnosed during the PEME.54 In this case, the evidence on record is devoid of any
indication that any of the conditions is present.

Isordil (isosorbide dinitrate) tablets are taken for the prevention of angina pectoris or chest
pain due to coronary artery diseases.55 It is, however, not a medication directly used for
hypertension, which illness petitioners claim respondent to be suffering from prior to his
engagement, as well as the reason for his repatriation. Hypertension refers to persistently
high blood pressure, regardless of the cause, and because it usually does not cause
symptoms for many years – until a vital organ is damaged – high blood pressure has been
called the silent killer.56 To properly determine whether a person suffers from
hypertension, it is imperative that he or she undergoes medical check-ups, and
consequently, procures a diagnosis from a medical doctor. In this case, no such diagnosis
was presented by petitioners. Moreover, there was no clear showing that respondent was
taking Isordil as maintenance medication for his hypertension or that it was the
appropriate medication for his condition that gave rise to his brain stroke. At the most,
petitioners submitted the opinion of a specialist, claiming that respondent may have
previously experienced some symptoms of hypertension for the bare reason that he had
with him Isordil. Clearly, this opinion deserves scant consideration as the same is clearly
tentative and speculative in nature. In the final analysis, petitioners failed to demonstrate
that respondent's act of carrying Isordil per se conclusively established the fact he had
actual knowledge of his medical condition, and consequently, concealed the same in his
PEME. At any rate, it is well to note that had respondent been suffering from a pre-existing
hypertension at the time of his PEME, the same could have been easily detected by
standard/routine tests conducted during the said examination, i.e., blood pressure test,
electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, and/or blood chemistry.57 However, respondent's PEME
showed normal blood pressure with no heart problem, which led the company-designated
physician to declare him fit for sea duty.58
Accordingly, no error can be imputed against the CA in sustaining the finding that there
was no concealment on the part of respondent that would have effectively barred him
from claiming disability compensation.

II.

Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC provides that a seafarer shall be entitled to
compensation if he suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his
contract. A work-related illness is defined as "any sickness as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied."59 Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC reads:

SECTION 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all
of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described
risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other
factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

During the term of his contract and while in the performance of his duties as a Ship
Master, respondent undeniably suffered from brain stroke, a CVA, and hypertension –
both of which are found listed under Section 32-A, and therefore, deemed work-related.

For CVA to be considered as a compensable occupational disease, Sub-item Number 12,

Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC requires all of the following conditions to be met:

12. CEREBROVASCULAR EVENTS

13.
All of the following conditions must be met:
a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment,
there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by
an unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.
b. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient
severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a
cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to
strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the
 performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is
reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
d. If a person known hypertensive or diabetic, he should show compliance with
prescribed maintenance and doctor-recommended lifestyle changes. The
employer shall provide a workplace conducive for such compliance in
accordance with Section 1 (A) paragraph 5.
e. In a patient not known to have hypertension or diabetes, as indicated on his
last PEME[.]

Similarly, for hypertension to be compensable, Sub-item Number 13 of Section 32-A

provides:

13. END ORGAN DAMAGE RESULTING FROM UNCONTROLLED

HYPERTENSION

Impairment of function of the organs such as kidneys, heart, eyes and brain under
the following conditions are considered compensable:
a. If a person is a known hypertensive or diabetic, he should show compliance
with prescribed maintenance medications and doctor-recommended
lifestyle changes. The employer shall provide a workplace conducive for
such compliance in accordance with Section 1 (A) paragraph 5.
b. In [sic] a patient not known to have hypertension has the following on his
last PEME: normal BP, normal CXR and ECG/treadmill[.] (underscoring
supplied)

In this case, records show that respondent's brain stroke was brought about by his
hypertension which occurred only while in the performance of his duties as a Ship Master
on board M.V. Pearl Halo. As discussed, there was no indication that respondent was
known to be previously suffering from hypertension, and considering further that his last
PEME showed normal blood pressure, chest x-ray and ECG results, his illnesses and the
resulting disability were correctly declared to be compensable.

III.

For another, petitioners assert that respondent's disability claim remains dismissible since
he filed the complaint for recovery of benefits without resort to the joint appointment of a
third doctor.60

The conflict-resolution procedure invoked by petitioners is found in Section 20 (A) of the

2010 POEA-SEC which states:

SEC. 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

2. x x x However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention

arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer
until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established
by the company-designated physician.
3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the
seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount
equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-
designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his
sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance
shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.

x x x x

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In
the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-
designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-
designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to
comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the
right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third

doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that when a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness
while on board the vessel, his fitness or degree of disability shall be initially determined
by the company-designated physician. However, the seafarer is not absolutely bound by
the findings of the company-designated physician as he is allowed to seek a second
opinion and consult a doctor of his choice. In case of disagreement between the findings
of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's private physician, the parties
shall jointly agree to refer the matter to a third doctor whose findings shall be final and
binding on both.

In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,61 the Court held that the
seafarer's non-compliance with the foregoing conflict-resolution procedure results in the
affirmance of the fit-to work certification of the company-designated physician. However,
it bears to note that "[a] seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes that the
company-designated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness
to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods"62 provided for by law.
Thus, in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar,63 the Court emphasized that:

A seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes that the company-designated

physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the
expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification
from the company-designated physician, the seafarer has nothing to contest and
the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and
permanent.64 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, there is no showing that respondent received a timely conclusive and
definitive assessment of his ailment. As borne from the records, the company-designated
physician's last medical report was issued on March 9, 2013, 65 or way beyond the 120-
day period reckoned from the time of respondent's repatriation on October 23, 2012. The
said report also failed to provide a definite assessment of respondent's fitness to work or
disability. While respondent's cardiovascular condition has stabilized, the company-
designated physician nonetheless still advised the latter to continue his home
exercises/rehabilitation and medications indefinitely with no clear indication as to what
kind of rehabilitation is still needed for his further treatment. The same holds true for the
previous medical report dated February 7, 201366 issued by the company-designated
physician which, other than the advice to continue rehabilitation and medications, failed
to show that further medical treatment was necessary to address respondent's temporary
total disability, thus further discounting the justification to extend the 120-day period to
240 days.

Absent the required certification from the company-designated physician, the seafarer
has therefore nothing to contest and perforce, negates the need for him to comply with
the third-doctor referral provision under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. As
case law states, without a valid final and definitive assessment from the company
designated physician within the 120/240-day periods, the law already steps in to consider
seafarer's disability as total and permanent.67
In petitions for certiorari brought before the CA, it must be highlighted that the latter's
parameter of analysis in cases elevated to it from the NLRC is the existence of grave
abuse of discretion which may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and
conclusions reached are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.68 Given that the NLRC's ruling was amply supported by the evidence on
record and current jurisprudence on the subject matter, the CA cannot be faulted in not
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC granting respondent's total and
permanent disability benefits.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court clarifies that respondent's disability benefits
should be awarded pursuant to the provisions of the 2010 POEA-SEC, and not the CBA
as held by the NLRC and the CA. To be entitled to compensation in accordance with
Appendix 3 (Compensation Payments) of the CBA, [69 a seafarer must suffer an injury as
a result of an accident, which is defined in jurisprudence as "an unintended and
unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of
events or that could not be reasonably anticipated; an unforeseen and injurious
occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct. Accident is that
which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."70 Here, respondent was suffering from an
occupational disease; hence, it cannot be said that respondent figured into an accident.
Accordingly, respondent is entitled to the total disability compensation under the 2010
POEA-SEC in the amount of US$60,000.00. Nevertheless, the CA correctly granted the
award of attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award, as the same is in
accord with law and jurisprudence.71

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 21, 2016 and the
Resolution dated November 9, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136970
are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION ordering petitioners Philsynergy Maritime,
Inc. and/or Trimurti Shipmanagement Ltd. to jointly and severally pay respondent
Columbano Pagunsan Gallano, Jr. the amount of US$60,000 or its equivalent amount in
Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing total and permanent disability
benefits in accordance with the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Employment Contract, as well as ten percent (10%) thereof, as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 229380, JUNE 06, 2018]
LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Leniza Reyes y
Capistrano (Reyes) assailing the Decision2 dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated
January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821, which affirmed
the Decision4 dated June 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12-0627 finding Reyes guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165, the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly possess and have in her custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which substance
was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a dangerous
drug, in violation of the above cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6,
2012, a group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1)
Jefferson Monteras (PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc,
Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman
with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay
Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the
said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if
she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong
magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something out from her
breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand.8 PO1 Monteras immediately
confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-
1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents, conducted the inventory and
photography before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles. 9 Thereafter, PO1 Monteras
proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the seized item for
examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed 10
that the substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.11

For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on
November 5, 2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree
and was about to board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a
certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was blocked
by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The
latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied
having. She was then brought to the police station where the police officers extorted from
her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give
the money, the police officers took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings. 12

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision13 dated June 16, 2014, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and penalized under Section
11, Article II of RA 9165. Accordingly, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with an order for
her immediate arrest.14

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested
and thereupon, found to be in possession of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to
the police officers upon her arrest. Likewise, it observed that the chain of custody of the
seized item was sufficiently established through the testimony of PO1 Monteras, which
was not ill-motivated.15

Aggrieved, Reyes appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling
In a Decision17 dated May 20, 2016, the CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime
charged.18 It held that the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet of shabu
was valid as she was caught in flagrante delicto in its possession and was legally arrested
on account thereof.19 The CA likewise found substantial compliance with the chain of
custody rule and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item were
properly preserved.20

However, it corrected the quantity of shabu stated in the RTC's dispositive portion to 0.04
gram in order to conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza and accordingly, modified the
penalty imposed to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months, as maximum.21

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 22 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."23

"Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon
the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become]
'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), 25Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In
other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.26
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be
[e]ffected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.27In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot
be reversed.28

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should –
as a general rule – be complied with:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may
be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest
of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.29

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the
other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest,
an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.30

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission
of an offense is essential. [The scenario under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure [contemplates that] the officer himself witnesses the crime;
while in Section 5 (b) of the same, [the officer] knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed."31

Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act
test, showing that "the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police
officers suggesting that [she] was in possession of illegal drugs at the time [she]
was apprehended."32 Absent any overt act showing the commission of a crime, the
warrantless arrest is rendered invalid, as in a case where a person was apprehended for
merely carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney without acting suspiciously.33
Similarly, in People v. Racho,34 a search based solely on a tip describing one of the
passengers of a bus was declared illegal, since at the time of apprehension, the said
accused was not "committing a crime in the presence of the police officers," nor did he
commit a crime or was about to commit one.35

In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do
anything as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime when she was just passing
by.36 During cross-examination, PO1 Monteras revealed:

[Atty. Cynthia D. Iremedio]: Mister Witness these two youngsters, the only information
that they gave you is that there is a woman with a tattoo?

[PO1 Monteras]: Yes ma'am.

Q: No further description regarding this woman was given to you?

A: Long haired and with tattoo on the left arm ma'am.

Q: And no description of the tattoo on her left hand?

A: None ma'am.

COURT: What is the tattoo on her left arm?

A: I think it was a Dragon sir.

Q: These two persons did not mention to you the name of the accused?

A: Yes ma'am.

Q: Aside from those description, you will agree with me that this long hair and a dragon
tattoo can be possessed by any other person aside from the accused?

A: Yes ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now Mister Witness you did not conduct further investigation on these two persons?

A: Not anymore ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now, Mister Witness, can you describe to us when you saw this accused?

A: While we were at the corner of the Diversion Road we saw a female persons (sic)
coming towards us who fits the description given by the two teenagers ma'am.

Q: And despite the description, this accused merely passes in front of you and did
nothing wrong against you?

A: Yes ma'am.
xxxx

Q: But when you greeted her "good evening" there is nothing unsual with this accused?

A: She smelled of liquor ma'am.

Q: She was not holding anything or acting in a suspicious manner which will elicit
a response from you?

A: None ma'am.

x x x x37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes.
PO1 Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously
or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could
be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that
she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is
bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of
liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.39

Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is
determined from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay
tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has
just committed a crime."41 In this case, records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even
admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers' tip and that, everything happened
by "chance."42 Surely, to interpret "personal knowledge" as to encompass unverified tips
from strangers would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the
authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the
rigorous requisites under Section 5 (b), Rule 113.43

Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the
subject item as lacking in credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the
testimony of PO1 Monteras, claimed that when the police officers asked Reyes if she
purchased shabu, she turned her back and voluntarily showed the plastic sachet
containing the same which she retrieved from her brassiere. According to jurisprudence,
the issue of credibility of a witness's testimony is determined by its conformity with
knowledge and consistency with the common experience of mankind. 44 As the Court
observes, it is rather contrary to ordinary human experience for a person to willfully exhibit
incriminating evidence which would result in his or her conviction for a crime, absent any
impelling circumstance which would prompt him or her to do so.

In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the
sachet of shabu to the police officers. In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that at the time
of arrest, Reyes was so intoxicated that she "simply let her senses down" and showed
the shabu to PO1 Monteras;46 but later, in the same Comment, the OSG argued that
Reyes was actually "in her right senses when she reminded the police officers" that they
were not allowed to frisk a woman.47 These material inconsistencies clearly render
suspect the search conducted on Reyes's person and likewise, destroy the credibility of
the police officers who testified against Reyes.48 In order to deem as valid a consensual
search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and in no uncertain terms,
obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent thereof
established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown in this case.

In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized
from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal
liability.

Besides, the Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations from
the prescribed chain of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, through their
admission that only the Barangay Captain was present during the marking and inventory
of the seized items.51 Records are further bereft of any showing that efforts were made
by the police officers to secure the presence of the other necessary personalities under
the law or provide any justification for their absence, which could have excused their
leniency in strictly complying with the said procedure.52 Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,
prior to its amendment by RA 10640,53 requires, among others, that the apprehending
team shall immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory
and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same,
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.54 It is well-settled that unjustified non-
compliance with the chain of custody procedure would result in the acquittal of the
accused,55 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2016 and the
Resolution dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
to cause her immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 226485, JUNE 06, 2018]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
BERNIE DELOCIEMBRE YANDALES AND DHATS ADAM Y DANGA, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by accused-appellants Bernie

Delociembre y Andales (Bernie) and Dhats Adam y Danga (Dhats; collectively, accused-
appellants) assailing the Resolution2 dated April 17, 2017 of the Court, which affirmed the
Decision3 dated March 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
07231 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as "The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78 (RTC), docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-10-163376, charging
accused-appellants of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory
portion of which states:

That on or about the 7th day of April, 2010, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, without lawful authority did
then and there willfully and unlawfully sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport, or act as broker in the said
transaction, a dangerous drug, to wit: Five (5) pieces of transparent heat sealed plastic
sachet marked as "EXH-A-1 MPA 4/7/2010, EXH-A-2 MPA 4/7/2010, EXH-A-3 MPA
4/7/2010, EXH-A-4 MPA 4/7/2010["] and "EXH-A-5 MPA 4/7/2010" with twenty one point
forty one twenty nine (21.4129) grams of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The prosecution alleged that on April 7, 2010, a buy-bust team composed of Senior
Officer II Christopher Macairap7 (SOII Macairap), Inspector Officer I Junef Avenido (IO1
Avenido), and IO1 Renata Reyes (IO1 Reyes) was organized to conduct an entrapment
operation against Bernie, alias "Axe," who was reportedly "operating" within the area of
Quezon City.8 Accordingly, SOII Macairap instructed their informant to purchase twenty-
five (25) grams of shabu worth P150,000.00 from Bernie and arrange a meeting with him,
to which the latter agreed. Thus, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, the buy-bust team,
together with the informant, proceeded to the target area in NIA Road, Quezon City. Upon
arriving, the informant introduced IO1 Avenido, the designated poseur-buyer, to Bernie
and his companion, Dhats. Dhats then handed over a folded cardboard paper with a Lotto
6/49 logo containing a white crystalline substance to IO1 Avenido, who, in turn, paid
Bernie using the marked money. As Bernie was about to count the money, IO1 Avenido
executed the pre-arranged signal by taking off his cap, and consequently, accused-
appellants were apprehended. Shortly after, the team left the area and proceeded to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) office. Thereat, the requisite marking and
inventory were done in the presence of Barangay Kagawad Jose Ruiz, Jr. and accused-
appellants, while SOII Macairap took pictures of the same. Subsequently, IO1 Avenido
delivered the seized drugs to the PDEA laboratory where they were received by Forensic
Chemical Officer Jappeth Santiago (FCO Santiago) who confirmed that they tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and meferonex, a dangerous drug.
Consequently, FCO Santiago turned over the said items to the custody of the trial court.9
For their part, accused-appellants raised the defenses of denial and alibi. Bernie claimed
that at around twelve (12) o'clock in the afternoon of April 7, 2010, while he was at home
preparing his son for school, he noticed that PDEA agents Renato Reyes and Roy Allan,
the alleged bosses of his brother "Axe," were knocking at the latter's door. When asked
about the whereabouts of "Axe," Bernie told them that "Axe" left for Aklan to visit his wife.
Subsequently, they left but came back shortly to invite Bernie to the PDEA office. After
joining the agents in the PDEA office, Bernie was again asked of "Axe's" whereabouts. In
the interim, he noticed some illegal drugs placed on the table and saw Dhats for the first
time. After being questioned, Bernie was purportedly taken to the city hall for inquest. 10

Meanwhile, Dhats maintained that at around twelve (12) o'clock in the afternoon of even
date, he and his wife were having lunch at their house when six (6) armed men suddenly
arrived in search of "Axe," whom he allegedly knew by name. He was then handcuffed
and brought to the PDEA office where he was joined by Bernie. Thereafter, he was taken
to Camp Crame for medical examination. According to Dhats, IO1 Avenido demanded
the amount of P100,000.00 for his release, but since he could not produce the same, he
was brought to the city hall for inquest.11

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment12 dated December 12, 2014, the RTC found accused appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. 13 It held
that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime charged, as it was able to show
that: (a) an illegal sale of shabu actually took place during a valid buy-bust operation; (b)
accused-appellants were positively identified in open court as the malefactors; and (c) the
forensic examination of the seized drugs yielded positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochlorideand meferonex. Moreover, it ruled that accused-
appellants' unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi could not prevail over the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who had no ill-motive to testify against them.14
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed15 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated March 31, 2016, the CA affirmed in toto the Judgment of the RTC. 17
It found, among others, that while certain requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165 were
not complied with, the prosecution nevertheless established an unbroken chain of custody
of the seized drugs, which were preserved from the time of seizure to receipt by the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in court. Besides, the arresting
officers provided justifiable reasons why the marking could not be done at the place of
arrest, i.e. a Muslim compound, since the same was – at that time – already getting
crowded, and because one of the suspects allegedly belonged to a Muslim clan. Further,
the absence of a DOJ representative had already become a trivial matter, considering
that there was an elected local official present during the inventory. 18

Undaunted, accused-appellants elevated19 the matter to the Court.

The Proceedings Before the Court

In a Resolution20 dated April 17, 2017, the Court upheld the CA's conviction of accused-
appellants finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165.21
Dissatisfied, accused-appellants moved for reconsideration,22 arguing, among others,
that the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory procedures in the handling
and disposition of the seized drugs as provided under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. 23

The Court’s Ruling

The Court grants the motion for reconsideration.

At the outs.et, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 24 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 25

In this case, accused-appellants were charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Case law states that
in every prosecution for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the following elements must be
proven with moral certainty: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 26 Moreover, it is
likewise essential that the identity of the prohibited drugs be established beyond
reasonable doubt, considering that the prohibited drug itself forms an integral part of the
corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody
from the moment the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.27

In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police
officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value.28 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 29
the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice [DOJ], and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.30 In the case of People v. Mendoza,31 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout
the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the
evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain
of custody."32

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.33 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064034 – provides that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, – under justifiable grounds – will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.35 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its
IRR does not ipso factorender the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.36 In People v. Almorfe,37the Court stressed that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.38 Also, in People v. De Guzman,39 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.40

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from
the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from accused-appellants.

An examination of the records reveals that while the requisite inventory of the seized
drugs was conducted in the presence of accused-appellants and an elected public official,
the same was not done in the presence of the representatives from the media and the
DOJ. More significantly, the apprehending officers failed to proffer a plausible explanation
therefor.

During his cross-examination, IO1 Avenido admitted that the DOJ office is near the place
of arrest, as in fact, it was only a five (5) minute walk therefrom. However, when asked if
he bothered to pass by it to secure a DOJ representative, he did not provide a categorical
answer, and instead, disavowed responsibility therefor, claiming that there were other
members of the buy-bust team who were assigned to accomplish such task, to wit:

Q: The arrest allegedly happened at NIA Agham, correct?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: The DOJ agency building is right there, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: About 5 minutes walk?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you bother to pass the DOJ Building to get a DOJ representative?
A: We have other team members assigned to that, sir but I don't remember why they
haven't brought any DOJ representative at that time. sir.
Q: Did you bother to get Public Attorney from the Public Attorney's Office which was also
located at the DOJ Agency Building at Agham NIA Road?
A: I don't clearly remember, sir but we have the public elected official as a witness.
xxxx
Q: I was referring to the counsel of the accused. Did you furnish them of counsel of their
own choice or a counsel from the government?
A: Yes, sir. During that time we appraise their rights. The other members because we
have a designation in our team I think they are the one who contacted the witnesses for
the accused. I think they only brought the Kagawad, sir.

x x x x41 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, IO1 Reyes disclaimed liability but maintained that it was their team leader, SOII
Macairap, who was specifically assigned to contact the representatives from the media
and DOJ, viz:

Q: Did you contact a DOJ representative to witness the inventory taking?

A: From what I recall, it was our team leader who assigned the persons who would
call the DOJ representative and the media representative, sir.
Q: Do you have any evidence that they were actually called?
A: The Kagawad that they called came together with our team leader, sir.
Q: How about the media man, do you have any evidence that he was contacted?
A: I could not recall anything about it, it is the team leader who can answer it, sir.

xxxx

Q: And considering that you actually know those rights, did you get a counsel for the
herein accused during their custody?
A: Actually, nobody came. It was the duty of our team leader to task a personnel who
would make the call but when the Barangay Kagawad came, our team leader decided
to conduct the inventory, sir.
Q: Even without counsel?
A: Yes, sir, probably so that we would not exceed the allowable time as provided in
Section 21 as to the handling of the evidence, sir.

x x x x42 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Verily, apart from the unsubstantiated allegations of the prosecution witnesses, there was
no showing that the apprehending officers attempted to contact and secure the presence
of representatives from the media and the DOJ. Furthermore, no plausible reasons were
given as to why their presence could not be easily secured. Neither would IO1 Reyes's
claim – that SOII Macairap decided to immediately conduct the inventory despite the
absence of the other witnesses in order "not to exceed the allowable time as provided in
Section 21 as to the handling of the evidence" – have any credence, considering that SOII
Macairap himself was never presented in court to corroborate it. Besides, the fact that it
would take someone only five (5) minutes of walk to reach the DOJ building from the
place of arrest clearly repudiates such claim.

Without a doubt, procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were
unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti had been compromised.43 The procedure in Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal
drug suspects.44 As such, since the prosecution in this case failed to provide justifiable
grounds for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the acquittal of
accused-appellants is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.45
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 211, Article II] of RA 9165, as
amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also
justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings
before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of
the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed
out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from
fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had
been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."46

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution dated April
17, 2017 of the Court affirming the Decision dated March 31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07231 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one
is ENTERED ACQUITTING accused-appellants Bernie Delociembre yAndales and Dhats
Adam y Danga of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
to cause their immediate release, unless they are being lawfully held in custody for any
other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 229787, JUNE 20, 2018]

RICKY ANYAYAHAN Y TARONAS, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Ricky Anyayahan
y Taronas (Anyayahan) assailing the Decision2 dated November 29, 2016 and the
Resolution3 dated January 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
38171, which affirmed the Decision4 dated October 9, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 273 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 2013-4119-D-MK and 2013-4120-
D-MK finding Anyayahan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations6 filed before the RTC charging
Anyayahan of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, the
accusatory portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 2013-4119-D-MK

(For violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165)

That on or about the 9th day of January 2013, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell, deliver and give away without authority from
law to SP01 BADALF V. MONTE of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task
Group (SAID-SOTG) of the Marikina City, posing as a buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with marking "RTA-01-09-13 (1)"
and recorded net weight of 0.05 gram, which gave positive result to the test
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 2013-4120-D-MK

(For violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165)

That on or about the 9th day of January 2013, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, knowingly and unlawfully have in his
possession, direct custody and control one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet with marking "RTA-01-09-13 (2)" and recorded net weight of 0.05 grams, of white
crystalline substance, which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The prosecution alleged that at around 6:00 in the evening of January 9, 2013, the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG), Philippine National
Police (PNP) in Marikina City received a report from a confidential informant that a certain
alias "Ricky," later identified as Anyayahan, was selling drugs in his house along Tanguile
Street, Barangay Marikina Heights, Marikina City.9 In response thereto, a buy-bust team
was formed with Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Arnel Manuel as the team leader and
SPO1 Badalf V. Monte (SPO1 Monte) as the designated poseur-buyer, among others.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team, accompanied by the informant, proceeded to the target
area where they saw Anyayahan. SPO1 Monte and the informant approached
Anyayahan, and the informant introduced SPOI Monte as the buyer of shabu worth
P300.00. SPO1 Monte then handed over three (3) marked one hundred-peso (P100.00)
bills as payment, afterwhich, Anyayahan told SPO1 Monte to wait as he entered his
house.10 Upon his return, Anyayahan pulled out from his right pocket two (2) small pieces
of transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, and gave one (1)
sachet to SPO1 Monte, while he returned the other sachet inside his pocket. After
inspecting the contents, SPO1 Monte placed his arm around the shoulders of Anyayahan
as he waved his other hand which was the pre-arranged signal. He then introduced
himself as a police officer, arrested Anyayahan, and ordered the latter to bring out the
contents of his pocket from where the other plastic sachet of suspected shabu, together
with the buy-bust money, was recovered.11 Upon confiscation, marking, and photography
conducted at the place of arrest, an inventory was prepared12 which was later on signed
by Kagawad Ernie Arigue and a media representative named Edwin Moreno. Thereafter,
SPO1 Monte brought Anyayahan to the SAID-SOTG, PNP where he gave the items to
Police Officer (PO) 1 Rey G. Diola of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office,
who turned over the same for examination to Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector
(PSI) Margarita M. Libres (PSI Libres).13 PSI Libres subsequently confirmed14 that the
substance inside the two (2) confiscated plastic sachets, weighing 0.05 gram each, tested
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.15

For his part, Anyayahan denied the charges against him, narrating that at around 7:30 in
the evening of the same date, he and his live-in partner, Dina Gonzales (Dina), were
walking to a store when they passed by four (4) men, one of whom asked if he was
"Ricky." Anyayahan answered "[y]es," and as they were about to cross the street, one of
them suddenly grabbed his collar, introduced themselves as policemen and frisked him.
He was thereafter brought to Barangay Tanguile Taas where the said policemen brought
out three (3) pieces of P100.00 bills and two (2) plastic sachets of shabu which were
allegedly recovered from him.16

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision17 dated October 9, 2015, the RTC ruled as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No.
2013-4119-D-MK, Anyayahan was acquitted for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and
instead, convicted for Illegal Possession of 0.05 gram of shabu under Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165; (b) in Criminal Case No. 2013-4120-D-MK, Anyayahan was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. Accordingly, he
was sentenced to suffer for each criminal case the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.18

In acquitting Anyayahan of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the RTC held that the
prosecution failed to prove the element of consideration under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165, noting that SPO1 Monte was unclear as to when he handed the buy-bust money to
Anyayahan. Neither were markings placed thereon, nor did SPO1 Monte remember the
serial numbers.19 Likewise, the prosecution failed to produce the original copy of the said
money and merely offered as evidence its photocopy. 20Notwithstanding these findings,
the RTC convicted Anyayahan for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs for both the
criminal cases, since all the elements of the said crime were established and it was clear
that Anyayahan had in his custody two (2) sachets of shabu – one used in the alleged
sale, and the other recovered from his pocket after arrest.21

Furthermore, the RTC declared that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items were properly preserved, and that there was no break in the chain of custody from
the time of their seizure by SPO1 Monte until their turnover to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.22

Aggrieved, Anyayahan appealed23 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision24 dated November 29, 2016, the CA affirmed Anyayahan's conviction for
the crimes charged in the two (2) criminal cases. It ruled that all the essential elements of
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were duly proven by the prosecution through
SPO1 Monte's detailed narration of the incident.25 In addition, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drugs were not compromised, as their whereabouts were
accounted for.26 On the other hand, Anyayahan's defense of frame-up remained
unsupported and failed to overcome the categorical and positive testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses.27

Anyayahan filed a motion for reconsideration,28 which was however denied by the CA in
a Resolution29 dated January 27, 2017. Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Anyayahan's
conviction for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 30"The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."31

In this case, Anyayahan was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. Notably, in order to
properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with this offense, the prosecution
must establish the following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.32

Besides, case law states that the identity of the prohibited drug must be established with
moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its
identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the crime.33

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.34 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,35 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 36 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,37 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 38

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 39 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064040 – provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds– will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.41 In other words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and
its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves. that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.42 In People v. Almorfe,43the Court explained that for the
above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.44 Also, in People v. De Guzman,45 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.46

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers unjustifiably deviated from the
prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Anyayahan.

Records failed to show that SPO1 Monte conducted the requisite inventory in the
presence of an elected official, a media representative, and a DOJ representative. In his
testimony during trial, he admitted that it was only after he had finished the Inventory of
Evidence47 that he proceeded to the Barangay Hall and procured the signatures of the
barangay official and the media representative, without, however, mentioning the
presence of any representative from the DOJ:
[Prosecutor Linda Adame-Conos (Pros. Conos)] Q: Mr. Witness, what point in time did
these witnesses Kagawad Ernie Adigue and Edwin Moreno affixed [sic] their signatures?
[SPO1 Monte] A: At the time I finished the Inventory of Evidence SPO1 Manuel Arnel told
me at that time no one is available at the Barangay Hall of Marikina Heights because they
attended the SOCA at the Marikina Sports Center so they decided to proceed at the
Barangay Hall for the barangay officials.

Q: How long a time did you stay at the Barangay Hall waiting for these officials for
them to affix their signatures?
A: More or less, Ma'am, an hour.
x x x x48 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Q: Mr. Witness, when you went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay Marikina Heights and
waited for the arrival of the barangay officials, who were in possession of the specimen
again?
A: It is with me, Ma'am.
Q: After the witnesses affixed their signatures as appearing in the Inventory of Evidence,
what happened next, if you remember?
A: After we presented to the media representative the Inventory of Evidence and after he
signed it we immediately brought the arrested person to the Amang Rodriguez Hospital
for medical check-up.
x x x x49 (Underscoring supplied)

In fact, as may be gleaned above, SPO1 Monte had to wait for, more or less, an hour for
the barangay officials to arrive from the Marikina Sports Center in order to have them sign
the said documents at the Barangay Hall.50
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused, representatives from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given copies thereof. The mere production of the inventory, without the necessary
personalities physically witnessing the proceeding, fails to approximate compliance
with the mandatory procedure under the law,51 as in this case.

Furthermore, the said witnesses were likewise absent during the required photography of
the seized drugs. SPO1 Monte himself admitted that photographs were taken at the crime
scene and immediately upon the arrival of the police officers (not the barangay official
and media representative) at the Barangay Hall:

[Pros. Conos] Q: Mr. Witness, what else were prepared at the crime scene, if you
remember?
[SPO1 Monte] A: The photographs of PO2 Bartolome Rosales
Q: Where was it taken, Mr. Witness?
A: At the place of operation and at the Barangay Hall of Barangay Marikina Heights.52
From the foregoing testimony, it can be inferred that these photographs were taken even
before the arrival of the barangay officials and the media representative, contrary to the
procedure set above.

It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of

substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality.53While non-compliance is allowed, the same ought to be justified.
Therefore, it must be shown that earnest efforts were exerted by the police officers
involved to comply with the mandated procedure as to convince the Court that the attempt
to comply was reasonable under the given Circumstances. Since this was not the case
here, the Court is impelled to conclude that there has been an unjustified breach of
procedure and hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. Consequently, Anyayahan's acquittal is in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 54
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.55
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2016 and
the Resolution dated January 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38171
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Ricky
Anyayahan y Taronas is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release; unless he is being lawfully held
in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 233702, JUNE 20, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
MANUEL GAMBOA Y FRANCISCO @ "KUYA," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Manuel

Gamboa yFrancisco @ "Kuya" (Gamboa) assailing the Decision2 dated May 31, 2017 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07857, which affirmed the
Decision3 dated October 15, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 (RTC)
in Crim. Case Nos. 14-303187 and 14-303188 finding Gamboa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Gamboa of
the crime of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined
and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portions of
which state:

Criminal Case No.14-303187

That on or about January 31, 2014, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver, transport or distribute or give
away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell or offer for sale to a police officer / poseur buyer one (1) heat - sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO FOUR ONE (0.041) gram of
white crystalline substance containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly
known as Shabu a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.6

Criminal Case No. 14-303188

That on or about January 31, 2014, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not having been authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control (1) heat -sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO
ONE (0.021) gram, of white crystalline substance containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, commonly known as Shabu a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.7

The prosecution alleged that on January 30, 2014, the chief of Manila Police District
(MPD) gave instructions to organize a buy-bust operation against one alias "Kuya" who
was allegedly engaged in rampant selling of shabu at Moriones St., corner Elena St.,
Tondo, Manila. In response thereto, a team was formed where PO2 Richard Nieva (PO2
Nieva) was designated as the poseur-buyer, while Senior Police Officer 18 Brigido
Cardifio and Police Officer 3 Noel R. Benitez (PO3 Benitez) served as back-ups. PO2
Nieva prepared the buy-bust money9 and after coordinating with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the team, together with the confidential informant,
proceeded to the target area the following day. Upon arrival thereat, the informant
approached Gamboa and introduced PO2 Nieva as a buyer of shabu. The latter asked
Gamboa if he could buy P200.00 worth of shabu, handing as payment the buy-bust
money, and in turn, Gamboa gave PO2 Nieva a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. Afterwhich, PO2 Nieva removed his bull cap, the pre-arranged signal,
prompting the back-up officers to rush towards the scene and arrest Gamboa.
Subsequently, a preventive search was conducted on Gamboa, where they recovered
another plastic sachet and the buy-bust money. PO2 Nieva immediately marked the two
(2) plastic sachets and inventoried the items at the place of arrest in the presence of
Gamboa and a media representative named Rene Crisostomo. Photographs of the
confiscated items were also taken by PO3 Benitez during the marking and inventory.
Thereafter, PO2 Nieva brought Gamboa and the seized drugs to the police station where
PO3 Benitez prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination.10 After securing the
letter-request, PO2 Nieva delivered the same to Police Chief Inspector Erickson
Calabocal (PCI Calabocal), the forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, who later on confirmed after examination that the substance inside the
seized items were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,11 a dangerous
drug.12

For his part, Gamboa denied the allegations against him, claiming that on said day, he
was just walking along Pavia Street13 when three (3) unidentified men arrested him for
vagrancy because of his tattoos. He was then brought to the precinct where police officers
interrogated him and told him to point to something. When he refused, photographs were
taken and he was later on imprisoned.14

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision15 dated October 15, 2015, the RTC found Gamboa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly,
sentenced him as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 14-303187, to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 14-303188, to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P300,000.00.16 It held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the
elements of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs and that, there
was no break in the chain of custody of the seized drugs given that: (a) PO2 Nieva
immediately marked and inventoried the seized items at the place of arrest; (b) Gamboa,
an investigator, and a media representative were present during the said proceedings;
(c) PO2 Nieva personally turned over the items for examination to PCI Calabocal; and (d)
PCI Calabocal confirmed that the substance inside the sachets tested positive for
shabu.17 In addition, the RTC ruled that while a representative from the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and a barangay official were absent during the inventory, the failure to
strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 was not fatal since the police officers
actually sought the presence of a media man to witness the proceedings.18

Aggrieved, Gamboa appealed19 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision20 dated May 31, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling, 21 finding all the
elements of the crimes charged present as Gamboa was caught in flagrante
delictoselling shabu and in possession of another sachet containing the same
substance.22The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were
duly preserved, considering that the sachets remained in PO2 Nieva's possession from
the time of its confiscation until they were transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination.23
Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Gamboa's
conviction for Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 24"The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."25

Here, Gamboa was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.26 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.27

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of
custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to its presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.28
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.29 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,30 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.31 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,32 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs), the evils of
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared
their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused.Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."33

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 34 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064035 – provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds– will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.36 In other words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and
its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.37 In People v. Almorfe,38the Court explained that for the
above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.39 Also, in People v. De Guzman,40 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.41
In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from
the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Gamboa.

An examination of the records reveals that while the seized items were properly marked
by PO2 Nieva immediately upon confiscation at the place of the arrest and in the presence
of Gamboa and a media representative, the same was not done in the presence of any
elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ. In fact, such lapse was
admitted by PO2 Nieva when he stated that:

[Fiscal Maria Cielo Rubie O. Galicia (Fiscal Galicia)]: You make the marking at the place.
Were there barangay officials present during the marking of the evidence, Mr. Witness?
[PO2 Nieva]: My other co-policemen went to the barangay office, ma'am.
xxxx
Fiscal Galicia: Were there barangay officials present?
[PO2 Nieva]: No, ma'am.
[Fiscal Galicia]: Why, Mr. Witness?
[PO2 Nieva]: No one arrived to witness, ma'am.
xxxx
Fiscal Galicia: Who called, Mr. Witness for this barangay official?
[PO2 Nieva]: We called for the barangay official by the other operatives but no one
went to the area, ma'am.
[Fiscal Galicia]: When you came to the area, what else did you do if any, Mr. Witness?
[PO2 Nieva]: The one who arrived there was the media man Mr. Rene Crisostomo,
ma'am.
[Fiscal Galicia]: And what did he do if any in the area?
[PO2 Nieva]: He witnessed the evidences and he signed the form of the seized evidence,
ma'am.
x x x x42 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives
from the DOJ or the media to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus,
remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of evidence
which could considerably affect a case. However, minor deviations may be excused in
situations where a justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In this case, despite
the non observance of the witness requirement, no plausible explanation was given by
the prosecution. In an attempt to justify their actions, PO2 Nieva testified that:

[Fiscal Galicia]: You mentioned earlier that no one came to the area, no one from the
barangay came to the area to witness the marking of the evidence. What barangay did
you try to call, Mr. Witness?
[PO2 Nieva]: I was not the one who called but it was my companion because I was
concentrated with the subject, ma'am.
[Fiscal Galicia]: Why Mr. Witness just call and why not go to the barangay and there
marked the evidence?
[PO2 Nieva]: Violating the Section 21 of the Republic Act 9165 that if I transferred the
evidences to the barangay not in the crime scene.
[Fiscal Galicia]: But there's no witness at the crime scene to witness the markings, no one
in the barangay came?
[PO2 Nieva] Yes, ma'am but the media man arrived.
x x x x43 (Underscoring supplied)

It is well to note that the absence of these representatives does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.44 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or
a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required
witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced. 45 In People v.
Umipang,46 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were
employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." 47 Verily, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the barangay chairperson, any
member of the barangay council, or other elected public official are unacceptable as
justified grounds for non-compliance.48 These considerations arise from the fact that
police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning from the moment they have
received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest –
to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements
beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure
prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not
only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court
that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under
the given circumstance, their actions were reasonable.49

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Gamboa have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the sale and
possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of
proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti failing in which, renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.50 Consequently, Gamboa's acquittal is in order.
As a final .note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 51
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."52

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07857 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Manuel Gamboa y Francisco@ "Kuya" is ACQUITTED of
the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 233480, JUNE 20, 2018]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
MELANIE B. MERCADER, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Melanie B. Mercader

(Mercader) assailing the Decision2 dated March 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08110, which affirmed the Decision3 dated October 3, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 03-26511 and
03-26512 finding Mercader guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging
Mercader of the crime of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and II, Article II of RA 9I65, the
accusatory portions of which state:

Crim. Case No. 03-26511

That on or about the 8th day of September 2003, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law to sell or otherwise dispose of any dangerous drug, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to POI Christopher Anos,
who acted as a poseur buyer, One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, for and in the (sic) consideration of the sum of
P 200.00, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted by the PNP
Crime Laboratory gave a positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Crim. Case No. 03-26512

That on or about the 8th day of September 2003, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having
been lawfully authorized by law to possess/use any dangerous drugs, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control Two (2)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.02 gram and 0.02 gram respectively
and/or with total weight of 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance, which after the
corresponding laboratory examination conducted thereon by the PNP Crime Laboratory
both gave positive results to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around five (5) o'clock in the afternoon of September 8,
2003, the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Marikina City received a report from a
confidential informant that Mercader and her husband, alias "Tisoy," were selling drugs
at their house located in Corazon Compound, Cogeo, Antipolo City. Acting upon this
report, a buy-bust team was formed headed by Police Officer 2 Edwin Daño (PO2 Daño),
together with Police Officer 1 (PO1) Christopher Anos (PO1 Anos) who was designated
as the poseur-buyer, with PO1 Roberto Muega and PO1 Richie Gaerlan as back-ups.
After conducting a pre-operation procedure and coordinating with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the PNP of Antipolo, the buy-bust team together with
the confidential informant, proceeded to the target area. As soon as the informant saw
Mercader, he approached her, introduced PO1 Anos as a buyer from Marikina, and asked
if the latter could purchase shabu. Mercader asked how much PO1 Anos wanted and the
latter replied "Dos lang, pang-gamit namin" as he handed to her the marked money. In
turn, Mercader took from her right pocket a plastic sachet of suspected shabu. Upon
receipt of the same, PO1 Anos tied his shoe lace, which was the pre-arranged signal, and
the other police officers rushed in to arrest Mercader. At that point, Tisoy tried to come
near them, but was warned by Mercader to run away. Subsequently, a preventive search
was conducted on Mercader which yielded two (2) more plastic sachets of
suspected shabu. Upon confiscation, PO1 Anos marked the items at the place of arrest
with "LBM-CA BUY BUST," "LBM-CA POSS I," and "LBM-CA POSS II." Thereafter, the
police officers brought her to the Marikina Police Station where they made a request for
laboratory examination of the seized items. After securing the letter-request, PO1 Anos
delivered the said items to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service where they were examined
by Forensic Chemical Officer-Police Senior Inspector Annalee R. Porro who confirmed
that they tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.8

For her part, Mercader denied the charges against her, claiming that at around seven (7)
o'clock in the evening of September 8, 2003, she was on her way home with her two (2)
children when a police officer suddenly held her hand and accused her of selling drugs.
Despite not finding drugs on her, she was forcibly taken to the police station of Marikina
City where the police officers extorted money from her.9

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision10 dated October 3, 2015, the RTC ruled as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No.
03-26511, Mercader was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 03-26512, Mercader was
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.11
The RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of both illegal
sale and possession of dangerous drugs, through the testimonies of the police officers,
showing that Mercader sold shabu to PO1 Anos during the buy-bust operation and had
in her possession two (2) more plastic sachets containing the same. On the other hand,
the RTC did not give credence to Mercader's defenses of denial and extortion for lack of
substance. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the lack of prior surveillance and the failure to
offer the marked monies as evidence, do not invalidate the buy-bust operation, since the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were properly preserved and the
chain of custody sufficiently established to convict Mercader.12

Aggrieved, Mercader appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated March 17, 2017, the CA affirmed Mercader's conviction for the
crimes charged.15 It ruled that Mercader was validly arrested and that all the elements of
the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs were duly proven by the
prosecution.16 Moreover, the CA found that there was an unbroken chain of custody since
PO1 Anos had in his possession the subject sachets from the time of their seizure until
their turnover to the crime laboratory.17

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Mercader's
conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 18"The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."19

In this case, Mercader was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.20 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his/her conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or
object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.21

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on its identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment
the drugs are seized up to its presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 22

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.23 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,24 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 25 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,26 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs), the evils of
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared
their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain
of custody."27
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 28 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064029 provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds– will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.30 In other words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and
its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.31 In People v. Almorfe,32 the Court explained that for the
above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.33 Also, in People v. De Guzman,34 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.35

Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Mercader.

First, records reveal that the marking of the seized items was not done in the presence
of any elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ and the media.
Despite the failure to observe this requirement, no justifiable ground was given to explain
such lapse. In fact, there is actually no mention of these required witnesses in this case.

Second, no physical inventory, as well as photography, of the seized items were taken.
PO1 Anos admitted the lack of inventory when he testified that:

[Atty. Vilma Mendoza]: But you did not prepare any inventory during that time?
[PO1 Anos]: No, Ma'am.
Q: You did no take any list of the confiscated items from the suspect?
A: No, Ma'am.
Q: It was not recorded in the police blotter?
A: No, Ma'am.
x x x x36 (Underscoring supplied)

Notably, PO2 Daño contradictorily testified that PO1 Anos prepared a written inventory
which Mercader signed. He likewise stated that photographs were taken of the items and
existed in the file.37 Despite the seemingly conflicting statements made by the police
officers, it remains that nothing on the record shows that the required inventory or
photography of the seized items was conducted. Besides, neither of the said documents
mentioned by PO2 Daño were offered in evidence before the trial court. 38

Case law states that the mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical
inventory and taking of photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities
under the law, fails to approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.39 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of
RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality.40 Compliance under the rule ensures the integrity of the
confiscated drug and clearly establishes the corpus delicti, failing in which, indicates the
absence of an element of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.41 "In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot
be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug x x x [which] must be
established with moral certainty."42 Consequently, the non-compliance with the chain of
custody rule under the procedure set forth by law is a sufficient ground to acquit Mercader
altogether.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle the guilty alike against any manner of high-
handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 43
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records ofthe case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."44

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 17, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08110 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Melanie B. Mercader is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause her immediate
release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 18-04-79-RTC, June 20, 2018]

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. FLORANTE B. SUMANGIL, CLERK III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH 119.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative matter stemmed from a letter1 dated February 5, 2018, informing the
Court that Mr. Florante B. Sumangil (Sumangil), Clerk III, Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 119 (RTC), has been on absence without official leave (AWOL) since
December 2017.

The Facts

The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS),
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), show that Sumangil has not submitted his Daily
Time Record (DTR) since December 27, 2017 up to the present 2 or filed any application
for leave.3 Thus, he has been on AWOL since December 1, 2017.4

In a letter5 dated February 5, 2018, Acting Presiding Judge Bibiano G. Colasito of the
RTC forwarded to the OCA the letter-report6 of Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Maria
Bernadette B. Opeda (Atty. Opeda) relative to Sumangil's prolonged absences without
leave starting on December 27, 2017. Atty. Opeda reported that she was informed by
Sumangil's housemate that the latter left for Mindanao last December 31, 2017. On the
other hand, Sumangil's daughter, Dyna Sumangil, told her that none of her relatives had
seen her father and that the latter visited his own mother but had not returned. Atty. Opeda
also inquired from his friends but no one knew his whereabouts. 7

To date, Sumangil has yet to submit his DTR or a duly approved application for leave.
Accordingly, his salaries and benefits were withheld pursuant to Memorandum WSB No.
2d-2018 dated February 20, 2018.8

The OCA informed the Court of its findings based on the records of its different offices
that: (a) Sumangil is still in the plantilla of court personnel, and thus, considered to be in
active service; (b) he has not filed any application for retirement; (c) no administrative
case is pending against him; and (d) he is not an accountable officer.9

In a Report10 dated April 3, 2018, the OCA recommended that: (a) Sumangil's name be
dropped from the rolls effective December 1, 2017 for having been absent without official
leave; (b) his position be declared vacant; and (c) he be informed about his separation
from the service at his last known address on record at 117 Pasadena, Barangay 70,
Zone 9, Pasay City. The OCA added, however, that Sumangil is still qualified to receive
the benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the
government.11

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendations.

Section 107 (a) (1), Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(2017 RACCS)12 authorizes the dropping from the rolls of employees who have been
continuously absent without official leave for at least thirty (30) working days, without the
need for prior notice:

Rule 20

DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS

Section 107. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. Officers and
employees who are absent without approved leave, have unsatisfactory or poor
performance, or have shown to be physically or mentally unfit to perform their duties may
be dropped from the rolls within thirty (30) days from the time a ground therefor
arises subject to the following procedures:

a. Absence Without Approved Leave

1. An official or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL)

for at least thirty (30) working days may be dropped from the rolls without prior
notice which shall take effect immediately.

He/she shall, however, have the right to appeal his/her separation within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice of separation which must be sent to his/her last
known address. (Underscoring supplied)

Based on the cited provision, Sumangil should be separated from the service or be
dropped from the rolls in view of his continued absences since December 2017.

Sumangil's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as

it disrupted the normal functions of the court,13 and in this regard, contravened his duty
as a public servant to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency.14 The Court stresses that a court personnel's conduct is laden with the heavy
responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the
Judiciary.15 By failing to report for work since December 2017, Sumangil grossly
disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the
high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government service. 16

Nevertheless, as the OCA correctly pointed out, dropping from the rolls is non-disciplinary
in nature, and thus, Sumangil's separation from the service shall neither result in the
forfeiture of his benefits nor disqualification from reemployment in the government. 17

WHEREFORE, Mr. Florante B. Sumangil, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 119, is hereby DROPPED from the rolls effective December 1, 2017 and his
position is declared VACANT. He is, however, still qualified to receive the benefits he
may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served upon him at the address appearing in his 201 file
pursuant to Section 107 (a) (1), Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. NO. 12156, JUNE 20, 2018]
PAULINO LIM, COMPLAINANT,
V.
ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated March 9, 2015 filed by Paulino Lim
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera (respondent), praying that the
latter be meted disciplinary sanctions for defrauding the former by issuing a worthless
check as guarantee for the payment of respondent's loan.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in June 2014 in the hallway of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then inquiring
about the status of a case. The two (2) became acquainted after striking a conversation
with each other. The following month, or in July 2014, respondent borrowed from
complainant the amount of P75,000.00, which the former needed immediately. 2
Complainant did not think twice in lending money to respondent and issuing in his favor
BDO Check No. 03565553 dated July 3, 2014 for P75,000.00, especially since the latter
issued a guarantee check (Union Bank Check No. 0003405780 4 dated July 19, 2014) to
ensure payment of the loan. Subsequently, respondent made several other loans in the
amounts of P150,000.00, P10,000.00, and another P10,000.00, for which he no longer
issued any guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to have been taken by respondent's
sweet talk and promises of payment considering the millions he expects to receive as
contingent fee in one (1) of his cases.5

However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check No. 0003405780, it was
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take or
return complainant's calls nor respond to the latter's text messages. He completely
avoided complainant.6 Consequently, complainant's lawyer wrote a demand letter7 dated
October 15, 2014 for the payment of respondent's indebtedness in the aggregate amount
of P245,000.00, but to no avail. Thus, complainant was constrained to file an
administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 8

In an Order9 dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed respondent to submit his answer to
the complaint within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order, failing which
the case shall be heard ex parte.10 However, respondent filed no answer.11 Subsequently,
a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing12 scheduled on November 13, 2015 was sent
to respondent on October 20, 2015, during which the latter did not appear.13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation14 dated November 14, 2016, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner (IC) found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year and be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P75,000.00 with legal
interest reckoned from July 19, 2014.15 The other loans alleged by complainant were not
duly proven. 16

The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Citing the case of
Foronda v. Alvarez, Jr.,17 the IBP IC held that the issuance of a check that was later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on him and hence, constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.18 The penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was
based on the case of Lao v. Medel,19 where the Court meted the same penalty for gross
misconduct committed by deliberately failing to pay just debts and issuing worthless
checks.20

In a Resolution21 dated June 14, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the aforesaid
report and recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for the issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records showing the existence of the loan obligation
incurred by respondent as evidenced by complainant's BDO Check No. 0356555 dated
July 3, 2014, as well as Union Bank Check No. 0003405780 dated July 19, 2014 issued
by respondent to guarantee the payment of said loan but which was dishonored upon
presentment for the reason "Account Closed," the Court concurs with the findings and
adopts the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, except for the return to
complainant of the amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest.

Time and again, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any
gross misconduct that a lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his professional or
in his private capacity. Good character is an essential qualification for the admission to
and continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-
professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action, 22 as in this
case.

It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from complainant for which he issued
a post-dated check that was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his obligation
despite repeated demands. It has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to
pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checksconstitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility." 23
Thus, the IBP IC correctly ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which explicitly states:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In Enriquez v. De Vera,24 the Court categorically pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing
a worthless check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious
misconduct penalized by suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which
no conviction of the criminal charge is even necessary. Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
'"designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of
issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed
a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated." 25 Being a lawyer,
respondent was well aware of, or was nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and
coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly violated the law and thereby
"exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest
and public order."26

In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to
appear at the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence of
his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his
oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court. 27 Respondent should
stand foremost in complying with the directives of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
not only because as a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal orders of duly constituted
authorities, as well as court orders and processes, but also because the case involved
the very foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law. Therefore, his lack of
concern or interest in the status or outcome of his administrative case would show how
much less he would regard the interest of his clients.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him, for which he
must suffer the consequence.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.28 In the cases of Lao v. Medel,29Rangwani v.
Dino,30 and Enriquez v. De Vera,31 the Court imposed the penalty of one (1)-year
suspension from the practice of law for deliberate failure to pay just debts and for the
issuance of worthless checks. In Sanchez v. Torres,32 the Court increased the penalty to
two (2) years in light of the amount of the loan which was P2,200,000.00, and the fact
that respondent therein had repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer and
a motion for reconsideration, which he nonetheless failed to submit, and had likewise
failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Considering, therefore, that the
amount of the loan proven by complainant herein is P75,000.00, the Court sustains the
recommended penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law. With respect,
however, to the return of the amount of P75,000.00 which respondent received from
complainant, the same cannot be sustained. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed
to continue as a member of the Bar.33 In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,34 the Court held that its
"findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities
of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which
have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement – as the same should be
threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature."35 Thus, the return of the P75,000.00
clearly lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is found GUILTY of violating Rule

1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's Oath,
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year to commence
immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has
started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4435-RTJ), June 25, 2018]
SAMUEL N. RODRIGUEZ, Complainant,
v.
HON. OSCAR P. NOEL, JR., EXECUTIVE JUDGE/PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is the complaint-affidavit1 filed by complainant Samuel N.

Rodriguez (Rodriguez) against respondent Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. (respondent) of the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 35 (RTC), for violation of the Rules
of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Discretion, and Bias and Partiality, relative to Misc. Case No. 3957, entitled "In the Matter
of Determination of Bail, Charles Emmanuel A. Gabato II, Cyrex Basalo, Arjay Balansag,
and Exequiel A. Labrador, Jr., Petitioner," and Civil Case No. 8588, entitled "Golden
Dragon International Terminals, Inc. (GDITI), represented by its president, Virgilio S.
Ramos, v. Samuel N. Rodriguez."

The Facts

In the complaint-affidavit, Rodriguez stated that he took over the operations of Golden
Dragon International Terminals, Inc. (GDITI) at MAKAR Wharf, General Santos City, after
the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (As Amended)2 dated January 8, 2014
issued in relation to Civil Case No. 10433 was implemented. GDITI is in the business of
receiving and disposing the liquid and solid wastes generated by docking vessels.4 The
previous management, headed by a certain Cirilo Basalo 5 (Basalo), was supposed to
cease from handling the operations of GDITI, but when the latter defied the injunctive writ,
Rodriguez filed a motion for its reimplementation, which was granted.6Consequently, on
June 26, 2015, Rodriguez and the court sheriff went to the port to inspect the operations
and saw a truck reportedly owned by Basalo transporting solid wastes from the docking
vessel. While he was taking pictures of the truck, another vehicle driven by Basalo
suddenly came from behind with the intent to sideswipe him. He initially dodged the
vehicle but was nonetheless hit when he tried to chase it. While he was on the ground,
another vehicle stopped in front of him and a number of armed men stepped out and
pointed their guns at him. Fortunately, he was able to run away and hide. 7

As a result of the incident, Rodriguez filed a complaint8 for Frustrated Murder on June 29,
2015 against Basalo and his companions.9 However, on June 28, 2015, a Sunday,
respondent issued a Temporary Release Order10 in favor of Basalo and one of his
companions, Arjay J. Balansag (Balansag). Rodriguez argued that while executive judges
can act on petitions for bail on Sundays and holidays, a petition for bail must be filed
before the court can act on it; here, it was only on June 29,2015, or the following Monday,
that Basalo and his companions actually filed the Petition (Determination of Bail),
docketed as Misc. Case No. 3957.11

Another, Rodriguez claimed that in Civil Case No. 8588, respondent issued, on July 10,
2015,12 a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining him from causing any act
that might cause violence and to maintain the status quo in GDITI. A Notice13 of special
raffle was also issued by respondent and was received by Rodriguez's aunt on the same
date.14 To his surprise, however, on July 14, 2015, 15 the 72-hour TRO was extended for
another twenty (20) days, or way beyond the 72-hour period. Rodriguez claimed that he
was also not furnished a copy of the notice of hearing relative to the extension of the
TRO.16

Pursuant to the 1st Indorsement17 dated August 26, 2015 of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), respondent filed his comment18 on December 21, 2015. On the
issue of the propriety of the issuance of the June 28, 2015 Temporary Release Order,
respondent averred that the accused were, in fact, arrested and detained by the police
on June 26, 2015. On the evening of June 28, 2015, which fell on a Sunday, a
representative of the accused, together with their lawyer,19 went to his house bringing
with them a petition for bail. After a review of the pleading, he issued an Order 20 dated
June 28, 2015 directing the City Prosecutor to file a comment 21 which the latter did22on
the same day with the recommended amount of bail. The accused accordingly posted
bail. Thus, he issued the June 28, 2015 Order at 10:00 p.m., directing the temporary
release of the accused, and stating that the required bond had been deposited with him
and will be turned over for proper issuance of receipt to the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC) at the soonest practicable time.23 This explains why the stamp of the OCC in all
the documents was dated June 29, 2015, the following working day. 24
On the issue of the propriety of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO, respondent claimed
that he issued the same on July 10, 2015, a Friday, in his capacity as an Executive Judge.
As no raffle could be conducted within that 72-hour period as required by the Rules of
Court because it was a weekend, the special raffling was set the following Monday, or on
July 13, 2015 with the case eventually being raffled to him. Unfortunately, he could not
immediately act on it because he and his staff had to take a 70-minute drive from General
Santos City using the Enhanced Justice on Wheels (EJOW) bus to conduct hearings in
Malungon, Sarangani Province.25 Neither could he determine and provide the exact time
of their return to the city given the number of hearings scheduled in the EJOW program.
Thus, the hearing for the extension of the TRO - for the parties to maintain the status
quo and refrain from causing any act that might trigger violence - was set the day after,
or on July 14, 2015; Rodriguez, however, was not directed to cease and desist from his
business operations.26

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum27 dated January 15, 2018, the OCA recommended that respondent be
reprimanded for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and be reminded to be more
circumspect in the performance of his duties.

The OCA found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he issued the
assailed orders relative to the TRO. According to the OCA, the TRO was issued on July
10, 2015, Friday, at 8:00 a.m., and expired after 72 hours on July 13, 2015, Monday, at
8:01 a.m.28 Based on this timeline, the OCA held that respondent, on July 14, 2015,
extended the TRO for another twenty (20) days, beyond the period allowed by the Rules.
In this regard, the OCA pointed out that under Item No. 9, Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,29 gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge, which, under Section 11 (A) of the same
Rules, merits the penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension from office, or a
fine. However, considering that this is respondent's first infraction of this nature after his
sixteen (16) years of service in the Judiciary and his justifiable explanation for failing to
schedule the required summary hearing due to the hectic schedule of the EJOW, the
OCA, instead, recommended the penalty of reprimand.30

The OCA, however, was silent on the matter of the issuance of the Temporary Release
Order in Misc. Case No. 3957.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violation of the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and Bias and Partiality.

The Court's Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the OCA did not make any explicit
finding/recommendation on the administrative charge against respondent in connection
with the issuance of the Temporary Release Order in Misc. Case No. 3957. This
notwithstanding, the Court is not without power and authority to directly act on the matter.
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests in the Court administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Consistent with this authority, the
Court has the discretion to directly rule on the administrative charge against respondent
relative to Misc. Case No. 3957, even in the absence of prior action from the OCA.

To recount, Rodriguez charges respondent with administrative liability because he issued

the June 28, 2015 Temporary Release Order before the petition for bail was filed with the
OCC on June 29, 2015.

The argument is untenable. Records show that the accused in Misc. Case No. 3957 were
arrested and detained at the Criminal Investigation and Detention Unit of General Santos
City - within respondent's territorial jurisdiction-on June 26, 2015, a Friday. Among those
detained were Basalo and Balansag who were accused of Frustrated Murder. Frustrated
Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal, the penalty lower by one degree than that
provided for consummated murder.31 Considering that they are not charged with an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, Basalo and
Balansag were entitled to bail as a matter of right as guaranteed by the Constitution32 and
pursuant to Section 4,33 Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Cognizant of the same, and
intending to secure their immediate release from detention before they are charged in
court,34 Basalo and Balansag's representative, Atty. V. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla, went to
respondent's house on June 28, 2015, a Sunday, with the petition for bail. 35 After
reviewing the same, respondent then ordered the City Prosecutor to comment thereon,
with which the latter immediately complied and stated the recommended amount of bail.
Since Basalo and Balansag immediately posted the required bail, respondent issued the
Order on the same date, directing the temporary release of the accused. Considering that
all these incidents occurred on a Sunday (June 28, 2015), when government offices,
including the OCC, were expectedly closed and where no pleadings could be filed, the
amount paid by the accused as bail, as well as their petition for bail, the City Prosecutor's
Comment, and respondent's Temporary Release Order were all turned over for proper
filing to and stamp-dated by the OCC on June 29, 2015 - the next working day.

In short, while the petition for bail was filed with the OCC only on June 29, 2015, the
application for bail and comment thereon by the City Prosecutor had been submitted to
and considered by respondent on June 28, 2015 before he issued the order for the
temporary release of the accused. There is nothing in the law or the rules that prevented
respondent from acting on the bail application submitted to him on a weekend.
Accordingly, respondent acted in accordance with the rules in granting the application for
bail.

As regards the 72-hour TRO, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of
the OCA.

Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court pertinently states:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - x x x.

However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex
parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from
issuance, but shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section
as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining
order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining
order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided
herein.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Based on t.he above provision, the following are the parameters for the issuance of an ex-
parte TRO: (1) it is issued only in matters of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury; (2) it shall be effective for only 72 hours counted
from its issuance; (3) within this original 72-hour period, the issuing judge must conduct
a summary hearing to determine the propriety of extending the TRO; and (4) in no case
shall the total period of the TRO which shall include the original 72 hours exceed twenty
(20) days.

In this case, the Court agrees that respondent extended the TRO beyond the period
allowed by Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, considering that at the time he issued
the order extending the TRO on July 14, 2015, the original 72-hour TRO issued on July
10, 2015 had already expired at 8:01 a.m. of July 13, 2015. Thus, in conducting the
summary hearing and issuing the July 14, 2015 Order, respondent in effect revived what
would have already been an expired 72-hour TRO and extended the same to a full twenty
(20) day period beyond the Rules' contemplation. The Rules' requirements are very clear,
basic, and leave no room for interpretation. Clearly, therefore, respondent erred in failing
to comply with these elementary provisions.

As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.36 It does not mean, however,
that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care
in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.37 As the Court held in OCA v.
Vestil,38 citing De Leon v. Corpuz:39

The observance of the law, which respondent judge ought to know, is required of every
judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; x
x x failure to consider a basic and elementary rule, a law or principle in the
discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

Canon 1 (Rule 1.01) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Canon 3 states that "A judge
should perform his official duties honestly and with impartiality and diligence." By his
actuations, respondent judge has shown his lack of integrity and diligence, thereby
blemishing the image of the judiciary.40

As already noted, respondent had been remiss in the issuance of the July 14, 2015 Order
extending the TRO and the scrupulous observance of the requisites therefor. Under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge, which, under Section
11 (A) of the same Rule, warrants any of the following sanctions:

Section 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The Court, however, observes that this is respondent's first infraction of this nature in his
sixteen (16) years of service in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Court is satisfied with his
explanation that he had to attend to his duties at the EJOW, thus constraining him to delay
by one (1) day the conduct of the summary hearing for the extension of the TRO.
Together, these circumstances mitigate respondent's liability. Well-taken, therefore, is the
OCA's recommendation that respondent merits only the penalty of reprimand, similar to
the Court's action in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr.,41Mondejar v. Buban,42 and OCA v.
Mendoza.43

WHEREFORE, Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Branch 35 is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall definitely be dealt with more severely by this
Court. He is further reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.

Let this Resolution be noted in the personal record of respondent judge.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 12011, June 26, 2018]

NICANOR D. TRIOL, Complainant,
v.
ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR., Respondent.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated November 3, 2014 filed by

complainant Nicanor D. Triol (complainant) against respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili,
Jr. (respondent) praying for the latter's disbarment.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he and his sister, Grace D. Triol (Grace), are co-owners of a
parcel of land with an area of 408.80 square meters situated in Quezon City and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129010 (subject land). Sometime in January 2011,
complainant decided to sell the subject land to a certain Leonardo P. Caparas (Caparas)
but was unable to do so, as he could not obtain the signature of Grace who was already
residing in the United States (U.S.) at that time. Subsequently, complainant discovered
that a Deed of Absolute Sale2 dated March 11, 2011 (subject deed) was executed and
notarized by respondent supposedly conveying the subject land to Fajardo without the
authority of complainant and Grace; neither did they give their consent to the same, as
they allegedly did not personally appear before respondent when the subject deed was
notarized. Moreover, complainant found out that their purported community tax
certificates stated in the subject deed were fake. Accordingly, he filed a disbarment
complaint against respondent.3

In his defense,4 respondent disavowed knowledge of the execution and notarization of

the subject deed, claiming that he did not know complainant, Grace, and Caparas. He
maintained that his signature on the subject deed was forged, since he would never
notarize an instrument without the signatory parties personally appearing before him. He
likewise asserted that he could not have notarized it, as he was not a commissioned
notary public in Quezon City in 2011.5

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation6 dated August 14, 2015, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint, there being no substantial
evidence to show that respondent is guilty of violating Section 1 (b) (7), Rule XI of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (2004 Notarial Rules).7 The Investigating Commissioner
found that respondent was not aware of the execution and notarization of the subject
deed, as he was able to establish that the signature affixed on the subject deed was not
his by virtue of the specimen signature that he provided in his Answer.8

In a Resolution9 dated April 29, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly, imposed the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, as well as
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for the same period. It
likewise directed the revocation of his current notarial commission, if any, and ordered
the Commission on Bar Discipline Director Ramon S. Esguerra (CIBD Dir. Esguerra) to
prepare an extended resolution explaining its action.10

In an undated Extended Resolution,11 CIBD Dir. Esguerra explained the recommendation

of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years and to disqualify him from being commissioned as notary public for the
same period pursuant to the case of Tenoso v. Echanez.12 CIBD Dir. Esguerra observed
that while respondent provided his specimen signature in his Answer, he failed to
substantiate its genuineness and authenticity, given that he did not submit a copy of his
signature appearing in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court or any other official
document containing the same specimen signature. As such, the probative value of the
subject deed containing his notarization, as well as the certifications 13 from the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City that he was not a commissioned
notary public in 2011 and 2012, stands.14

Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,15 which was denied in a

Resolution16 dated May 27, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP.

It is settled that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested
with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined."17

In this light, Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Notarial Rules requires a duly-
commissioned notary public to perform a notarial act only if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document is: (a) in the notary's presence personally
at the time of the notarization; and (b) personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules.18 In other words, a notary public is not allowed to notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party's free act and deed.19
Parenthetically, in the realm of legal ethics, a breach of the aforesaid provision of the
2004 Notarial Rules would also constitute a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), considering that an erring lawyer who is found to be remiss in his
functions as a notary public is considered to have violated his oath as a lawyer as
well.20 He does not only fail to fulfill his solemn oath of upholding and obeying the law and
its legal processes, but he also commits an act of falsehood and engages in an unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct.21 Thus, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the CPR categorically state:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

In this case, records show that respondent indeed violated the 2004 Notarial Rules when
he notarized the subject deed without complainant and Grace personally appearing
before him, much more without the requisite notarial commission in 2011.22Significantly,
it was established that both complainant and Grace could not have personally appeared
before respondent, since Grace was already residing at the U.S. at the time of the
supposed notarization. Furthermore, complainant presented a Certification23 dated April
7, 2015 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC showing that respondent was also not a
commissioned notary public for and within Quezon City in 2012. On the other hand,
respondent, apart from his bare denials and unsubstantiated defense of forgery, failed to
rebut complainant's allegations and evidence. While respondent provided his specimen
signature in his Answer to support his defense of forgery, the same nonetheless remained
insufficient. As aptly observed by CIBD Dir. Esguerra, respondent did not even submit a
copy of his signature appearing in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court or any
other official document containing the same specimen signature to prove its genuineness
and authenticity. Case law states that where a party resorts to bare denials and
allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that
he committed the violation is sustained.24 Hence, no reasonable conclusion can be had
other than the fact that respondent notarized the subject deed m violation of the 2004
Notarial Rules.
In the same breath, respondent also violated the provisions of the CPR, particularly Rule
1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 thereof. By misrepresenting himself as a
commissioned notary public at the time of the alleged notarization, he did not only cause
damage to those directly affected by it, but he likewise undermined the integrity of the
office of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. 25 In so doing, his
conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing required from lawyers, and it is only but proper that he be sanctioned. 26

In a number of cases, the Court has sanctioned a number of lawyers who were remiss in
their duties as notaries public. In Dizon v. Cabucana, Jr.,27Isenhardt v. Real,28Bautista v.
Bernabe,29 and Gonzales v. Ramos,30 respondent notaries were all found guilty of
notarizing documents without the presence of the parties and were thus meted with the
penalty of disqualification as notaries public for a period of two (2) years, among others.
Moreover, in Japitana v. Parado (Japitana),31Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial
Practice,32 and Tenoso v. Echanez (Tenoso),33 respondent notaries repeatedly
performed notarial acts without the requisite commission and were consequently
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. However,
in Japitanaand Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, respondent notaries were
permanently barred from being commissioned as notaries public, while the respondent
notary public in Tenoso was disqualified for only a period of two (2) years with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the imposition of the penalties of suspension

from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for the same period, and revocation of the existing
commission, if any, against respondent is only just and proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr.

(respondent) GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years; PROHIBITS him from being commissioned
as a notary public for a period of two (2) years; and REVOKES his incumbent commission
as a notary public, if any. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law, the prohibition from being commissioned as notary
public, and the revocation of his notarial commission, if any, shall take effect immediately
upon receipt of this Decision by respondent. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a
Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 12012, JULY 02, 2018]
GERONIMO J. JIMENO, JR., COMPLAINANT,
V.
ATTY. FLORDELIZA M. JIMENO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This case stemmed from a Complaint1 dated July 10, 2012 filed by complainant Geronimo
J. Jimeno, Jr. (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), seeking the suspension/disbarment of respondent
Arty. Flordeliza M. Jimeno (respondent) for alleged: (a) unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
deceitful conduct, specifically, by falsifying a public document, in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); and (b) violation of her duty
to preserve her client's confidences in violation of Rule 21.01, Canon 21 of the CPR.

The Facts

Complainant claimed to have discovered that respondent, who is his cousin, sold the
property of his parents, the late Spouses Geronimo P. Jimeno, Sr. (Geronimo Sr.) and
Perla de Jesus Jimeno (Perla; collectively, Spouses Jimeno) located at Brgy. Gintong
Silahis, San Jose, Quezon City (Malindang property) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. RT-52411,2 through a Deed of Absolute Sale3 dated September 8, 2005
(subject deed) executed by respondent as attorney-in-fact of Geronimo Sr.4 He claimed
that the subject deed was falsified considering that: (a) the same bore the signature of
Perla who had already passed away on May 19, 2004, 5 or more than a year prior to the
execution thereof; (b) Geronimo Sr. was erroneously described as married to Perla, when
he was already a widower at the time; (c) Geronimo Sr. was made to appear as the
absolute and registered owner in fee simple of the property when the same is co-owned
by him and his ten (10) children (Jimeno children); and (d) Geronimo Sr.'s residence and
postal address was stated as "421 (formerly 137) Mayon Street, Quezon City," when the
same should have been "10451 Bridgeport Road, Richmond, British Columbia" as
indicated in the Special Power of Attorney6 dated July 9, 2004 (subject SPA) he executed,
authorizing respondent to administer and sell his real properties in the
Philippines.7 Complainant likewise alleged that respondent mentioned "so many
unnecessary and un-called for matters like [his] father having allegedly (sic) illegitimate
children" when his lawyer requested for copies of the titles and other documents
respecting the properties covered by the SPA, in violation of her duty to keep in
confidence whatever informations were revealed to her by the late Geronimo Sr. in the
course of their professional relationship (lawyer-client privilege).8

In her defense,9 respondent claimed that: (a) she was not the one who prepared or
caused the preparation of the subject deed and that all the necessary documents for the
sale of the Malindang property, including the subject SPA and the Deed of Waiver of
Rights and Interests10 dated July 4, 2005 executed by the Jimeno children in their parents'
favor (collectively, documents of sale), were merely transmitted by her cousin and
respondent's sister, Lourdes Jimeno-Yaptinchay (Lourdes), from Canada; (b) the sale of
the Malindang property was with the consent of all the Jimeno children, including
complainant; and (c) she merely signed the subject deed in good faith before endorsing
the same to the buyer, Melencio G. Aquino, Jr. (Aquino), for disposition. 11Respondent
further claimed that the contents of her email dated April 24, 2012 to complainant's lawyer
are "privileged communication" which are relevant to the subject of inquiry, and they did
not arise from the confidences and secrets of the late Geronimo Sr. She challenged
complainant's invocation of Canon 21, contending that the matter is personal to a client,
and is intransmissible in character.12

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

In a Report and Recommendation13 dated June 14, 2013, the IBP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner observed that while the sale of the Malindang property appeared to be a
unanimous decision of the Jimeno children, and the documents of sale which were all
prepared in Canada were merely sent to respondent in the Philippines, she allowed
herself to become a party to a document which contained falsehood and/or inaccuracies
in violation of her duties as a lawyer, namely: (a) to refrain from doing or consenting to
any falsehood; (b) to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client; and (c) to refrain from allowing his client to dictate the procedure in handling
the case.14 Accordingly, he recommended that respondent be reprimanded for her
acts,15 which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors (Board) in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-67816 dated September 28, 2014.

Dissatisfied, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 dated May 1, 2015. The
motion was granted by the Board in Resolution No. XXII-2016-27818 dated April 29, 2016,
increasing the imposed penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. The same Resolution likewise directed IBP-CBD Director Ramon S. Esguerra
(Director Esguerra) to prepare an extended resolution to explain the Board's action. 19
Director Esguerra thereafter submitted an Extended Resolution 20 holding that
respondent's dishonest acts in relation to the subject SPA and the subject deed constitute
blatant transgressions of her duties as a lawyer under Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He noted
that respondent never denied knowledge of Perla's demise and her own description of
her close relationship with the complainant's family bolsters such knowledge. However,
instead of advising Geronimo Sr. and the Jimeno children to execute an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Perla to enable the proper registration of the Malindang
property in their names preliminary to the sale to Aquino, she voluntarily signed the
subject deed despite the patent irregularities in its execution. He also rejected her reliance
on the purported assurances made by complainant's siblings, holding that her oath as a
lawyer mandates her to be cautious of the consequences of her action and enjoins her to
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. 21

Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration,22 which was denied by the Board in
Resolution No. XXII-2017-113523 dated May 27, 2017.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the records of the case were transmitted to
this Court.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for the acts complained of.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly
substantiated by the records.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer
is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations,
though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member
of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer's Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law
Profession,24 thus:
I,_________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.25 (Emphasis supplied)

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also
to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing
of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law, as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others.26

In line with the letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath, the Court has adopted and instituted
the Code of Professional Responsibility27 (CPR) to govern every lawyer's relationship with
his profession, the courts, the society, and his clients.28

Pertinent to this case are Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 19.01
of Canon 19, which provide:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

xxxx

Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the lawsand the
principles of fairness.
xxxx

CANON 19 - A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client x x x. (Italics supplied)
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement
with Director Esguerra's finding that respondent's acts in relation to the subject SPA and
the subject deed constitute blatant transgressions of her duties as a lawyer, as ordained
by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which engraves an overriding prohibition
against any form of misconduct.29 Additionally, the Court finds that respondent fell short
of her duty to impress upon her client compliance with the pertinent laws in relation
to the subject transaction. In this case, while seemingly aware of the demise of Perla that
rendered the Malindang property a co-owned property of Geronimo Sr. and the Jimeno
children, instead of advising the latter to settle the estate of Perla to enable the proper
registration of the property in their names preliminary to the sale to Aquino, she voluntarily
signed the subject deed, as attorney-in-fact of Geronimo Sr., despite the patent
irregularities in its execution. These irregularities are: (a) the fact that it bore the signature
of Perla, who was already deceased; (b) the erroneous description of Geronimo Sr. as
married to Perla despite the latter's demise and as being the absolute owner in fee simple
of the Malindang property which is a co-owned property; and (c) the erroneous statement
of Geronimo Sr.'s residence and postal address.

That respondent had no hand in the preparation of the documents of sale is of no moment
because as a lawyer, she is expected to respect and abide by the laws and the legal
processes.30 To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state
the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all
classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law.31

As a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of a voluntary
conveyance of property, particularly, the scope of the rights, interests, and participation
of the parties/signatories to the deed of sale, and the consequent transfer of title to the
properties involved, yet, she chose to disregard the patent irregularities in the subject
deed and voluntarily affixed her signature thereon. Notably, respondent did not
specifically admit nor deny knowledge of the demise of Perla, but her claim of such strong
ties to complainant's family bolsters knowledge thereof.32 Besides, her awareness of
Perla's demise even prior to the affixture of her signature on the subject deed may be
sufficiently inferred from her averments, among others, that: (a) when Perla got sickly
sometime in the early part of 2004, Lourdes began giving her a series of phone
calls regarding the disposition of Spouses Jimeno's real properties; 33 and (b) she was
never remiss in her duty to inform the Jimeno children, through Lourdes and Teresita
Jimeno-Roan, about the legal repercussions and legal complications of pushing through
and continuing with the negotiations with the prospective buyers of the Malindang
property,34which admittedly continued even after the demise of Perla.35However, despite
being aware that something was amiss with the documents of sale, respondent allowed
herself to become a party to the subject deed which contained falsehood and/or
inaccuracies in violation of her duties as a lawyer.

Respondent's claims that she acted in good faith,36 and that she relied on the assurance
of full responsibility from the ten (10) Jimeno children 37 cannot relieve her of
administrative liability. As a lawyer, she cannot invoke good faith and good intentions as
justifications to excuse her from discharging her obligation to be truthful and honest in
her professional actions since her duty and responsibility in that regard are clear and
unambiguous.38

Thus, despite complainant's admission that he "agreed in principle for the sale of the
properties of their parents in the Philippines to generate funds for their support and
medical attention x x x,"39 the Court cannot turn a blind eye on respondent's act of
permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents which she herself
signed. To allow this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that lawyers are
constrained to obey their clients' wishes, even if for laudable purposes, would effectively
sanction wrongdoing and falsity which would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of
the court.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their
clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It is worthy to
emphasize that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of
truth and justice, and must be held within the bounds of reason and common
sense.40Respondent's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of her client
does not warrant a course of action not in accordance with the pertinent laws and legal
processeses.

All told, respondent is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
Rule 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR by allowing herself to
become a party to the subject deed which contained falsehood and/or inaccuracies.

On the other hand, the Court finds no merit in the charge of violation of the rule 41 on
lawyer-client privilege42 for lack of proper substantiation.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended for any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the Lawyer's Oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 43

Verily, the act of respondent in affixing her signature on a deed of sale containing
falsehood and/or inaccuracies constitutes malpractice and gross misconduct in her office
as attorney. Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers committed
falsehood or knowingly allowed the commission of falsehood by their clients, the Court
imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Jimenez v.
Francisco,44 a lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for
permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents. Similarly,
in Bongalonta v. Castillo45 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who committed
falsehood in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and of the CPR. In view of the antecedents in
this case, the Court finds it appropriate to sustain the recommended suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months.

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte v. Abellana:46
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is
granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the
Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members
of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception x x x evinces an unworthiness
to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a
member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary
sanctions.47 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Flordeliza M. Jimeno (respondent) is found GUILTY of

violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she
is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, with a STERN
WARNING that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon her
receipt of this Decision. She is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court
that her suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where
she has entered her appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 226013, JULY 02, 2018]

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, PETITIONER,
V.
RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
105 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2dated July
18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which denied petitioner Luzviminda
Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.

The Facts

Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on
December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three
(3) months but were not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would
constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he
was much older than Luzviminda.4 As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by
Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually
approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan on July 1, 2012.5 In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition
of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she could
cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry
again.7
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing.
Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition except the government, Luzviminda was
allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation and absent any
objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted
as proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the testimony
of the witnesses.8

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision9 dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that
while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines
– provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the alien – the same
does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e.,petitioner, who procured the
same. Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a
Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she
herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;10 hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as

follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts
cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the Civil Code,
the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who
are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.13
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse
of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of
the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.
The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married
to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because
he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.14 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,15 the Court held:

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his
or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country.
The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

According to Republic v. Orbecido III,17 the following elements must concur in order for
Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.18 In the same case, the Court also initially
clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who
procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.19

However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),20 the Court En

Bancextended the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed
marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse. Pertinent
portions of the ruling read:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

xxxx

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging
that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right
to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital
bond.

xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither
can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the
Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as
not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. x x x.

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore,
the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter's national law.

xxxx

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic,
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all
too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend
with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her
Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine
and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

xxxx

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. To our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to
those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We

disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse,
any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded
as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to
the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article
XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement
of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world,
mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all
marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of
rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x
x.21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between
a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of
who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino
citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.22

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's
petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored
on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a
Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot
just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree,
as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in
Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably,
the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an
examination of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to
the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 233974, JULY 02, 2018]

CATALINA F. ISLA, ELIZABETH ISLA, AND GILBERT F. ISLA, PETITIONERS,
V.
*
GENEVIRA P. ESTORGA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Catalina F. Isla
(Catalina), Elizabeth Isla, and Gilbert F. Isla (collectively, petitioners) assailing the
Decision2 dated May 31, 2017 and the Resolution3 dated August 24, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101743, which affirmed with modification the Decision4
dated December 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112 (RTC)
in Civil Case No. 07-0014, directing petitioners to pay respondent Genevira P. Estorga
(respondent) the following sums: (a) P100,000.00 representing the principal of the loan
obligation; (b) an amount equivalent to twelve percent (12%) of P100,000.00 computed
from November 16, 2006 until full payment, representing interest on the loan; (c) an
amount equivalent to six percent (6%) of the sums due in (a) and (b) per annum computed
from the finality of the CA Decision until full payment, representing legal interest; and (d)
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The Facts

On December 6, 2004, petitioners obtained a loan in the amount of P100,000.00 from

respondent, payable anytime from six (6) months to one (1) year and subject to interest
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per month, payable on or before the end of each month.
As security, a real estate mortgage5 was constituted over a parcel of land located in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1326736 and registered under the
name of Edilberto Isla (Edilberto), who is married to Catalina (subject property). When
petitioners failed to pay the said loan, respondent sought assistance from the barangay,
and consequently, a Kasulatan ng Pautang7 dated December 8, 2005 was executed.
Petitioners, however, failed to comply with its terms, prompting respondent to send a
demand letter8 dated November 16, 2006. Once more, petitioners failed to comply with
the demand, causing respondent to file a Petition for Judicial Foreclosure 9 against them
before the RTC.10
For their part,11petitioners maintained that the subject mortgage was not a real estate
mortgage but a mere loan, and that the stipulated interest of ten percent (10%) per month
was exorbitant and grossly unconscionable.12 They also insisted that since petitioners
were not the absolute owners of the subject property - as the same was allegedly owned
by Edilberto – they could not have validly constituted the subject mortgage thereon. 13

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated December 10, 2012, the RTC granted the Petition for Judicial
Foreclosure, finding that petitioners themselves admitted that: (a) they obtained a loan in
the amount of P100,000.00 and that the said loan was secured by a real estate mortgage
over the subject property; and (b) the subject mortgage was annotated on TCT No.
132673.15 Further, the RTC observed that while it is true that the present action pertains
to a judicial foreclosure, the underlying principle is that a real estate mortgage is but a
security and not a satisfaction of indebtedness. Thus, it is only proper to render petitioners
solidarily liable to pay respondent and/or foreclose the subject mortgage should they fail
to fulfill their obligation.16

Consequently, the RTC directed petitioners to pay respondent the amounts of

P100,000.00 with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from December 2007 until
fully paid and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Alternatively, in the event that petitioners fail
to pay or deposit with the Clerk of Court the said amounts within a period of six (6) months
from receipt of a copy of the RTC Decision, it held that the subject property will be
foreclosed and sold at public auction to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the surplus, if any,
will be delivered to petitioners with reasonable interest under the law. 17

Aggrieved, respondent appealed18 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated May 31, 2017, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision,
and accordingly, ordered petitioners to pay respondent the following sums: (a)
P100,000.00 representing the principal of the loan obligation; (b) an amount equivalent
to twelve percent (12%) of P100,000.00 computed per year from November 16, 2006 until
full payment, representing interest on the loan; (c) an amount equivalent to six percent
(6%) of the sums due in (a) and (b) per annum computed from the finality of the CA
Decision until full payment, representing legal interest; and (d) P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees.20

The CA held that in light of the registry return receipt bearing the signature of Catalina, it
was established that petitioners indeed received the demand letter dated November 16,
2006.21 Meanwhile, it did not agree with the RTC's order providing petitioners alternative
remedies, which remedies are, by law, mutually exclusive. Thus, since respondent's
Petition for Judicial Foreclosure was essentially an action to collect a sum of money, she
is then barred from causing the foreclosure of the subject mortgage.22

Moreover, the CA ruled that the RTC erred in imposing the interest rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from December 2007 until full payment. It likewise held that the
stipulated interest of ten percent (10%) per month on the real estate mortgage is
exorbitant. And finally, it declared that respondent is entitled to the award of attorney's
fees based on equity and in the exercise of its discretion.23

Undaunted, petitioners sought partial reconsideration,24 claiming that the award of

attorney's fees was without factual, legal, and equitable justification and should therefore
be deleted.25 The same, however, was denied in a Resolution26 dated August 24, 2017;
hence, the instant petition, claiming that the CA gravely erred not only in awarding
attorney's fees despite the absence of factual justification in the body of its Decision but
also in imposing interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum interest until full payment.27
In her Comment,28 respondent retorted that the CA's award of attorney's fees was proper
and within the discretion of the court. Likewise, the CA correctly imposed interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum to the principal loan obligation of petitioners. 29

The Issues Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in awarding: (a) twelve
percent (12%) interest on the principal obligation until full payment; and (b) attorney's
fees.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

I.
In their petition, petitioners contest the interest imposed on the principal amount of the
loan at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand
until full payment, as stated in paragraph 2 of the CA ruling. In this regard, they argue that
pursuant to ECE Realty and Development, Inc. v. Hernandez (ECE Realty),30 the
applicable interest rate should only be six percent (6%).31

The argument is untenable.

Case law states that there are two (2) types of interest, namely, monetary interest and
compensatory interest. Monetary interest is the compensation fixed by the parties for the
use or forbearance of money. On the other hand, compensatory interest is that imposed
by law or by the courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. Accordingly, the right to
recover interest arises only either by virtue of a contract (monetary interest) or as
damages for delay or failure to pay the principal loan on which the interest is demanded
(compensatory interest).32

Anent monetary interest, the parties are free to stipulate their preferred rate. However,
courts are allowed to equitably temper interest rates that are found to be excessive,
iniquitous, unconscionable, and/or exorbitant,33 such as stipulated interest rates of three
percent (3%) per month or higher.34 In such instances, it is well to clarify that only the
unconscionable interest rate is nullified and deemed not written in the contract; whereas
the parties' agreement on the payment of interest on the principal loan obligation
subsists.35 It is as if the parties failed to specify the interest rate to be imposed on the
principal amount, in which case the legal rate of interest prevailing at the time the
agreement was entered into is applied by the Court.36 This is because, according to
jurisprudence, the legal rate of interest is the presumptive reasonable compensation for
borrowed money.37

In this case, petitioners and respondent entered into a loan obligation and clearly
stipulated for the payment of monetary interest. However, the stipulated interest of ten
percent (10%) per month was found to be unconscionable, and thus, the courts a quo
struck down the same and pegged a new monetary interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, which was the prevailing legal rate of interest for loans and forbearances of
money at the time the loan was contracted on December 6, 2004.

In Spouses Abella v. Spouses Abella,38 the Court was also faced with a situation where
the parties entered into a loan with an agreement to pay monetary interest. Since the
stipulated rate of interest by the parties was found to be unconscionable, the Court struck
down the same and substituted it with the prevailing legal interest rate at the time the loan
was perfected, i.e., twelve percent (12%) per annum. In holding that such rate shall persist
in spite of supervening events, the Court held:

Jurisprudence is clear about the applicable interest rate if a written instrument fails to
specify a rate. In Spouses Toring v. Spouses Olan [(589 Phil. 362 [2008])], this court
clarified the effect of Article 1956 of the Civil Code and noted that the legal rate of interest
(then at 12%) is to apply: "In a loan or forbearance of money, according to the Civil Code,
the interest due should be that stipulated in writing, and in the absence thereof, the rate
shall be 12% per annum."
Spouses Toring cites and restates (practically verbatim) what this court settled in Security
Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 [(331 Phil. 787
[1996])]: "In a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that stipulated in
writing, and in the absence thereof, the rate shall be 12% per annum."

Xxxx

The rule is not only definite; it is cast in mandatory language. From Eastern Shipping
[Lines, Inc. v. CA] [(G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78)] to Security Bank to
Spouses Toring, jurisprudence has repeatedly used the word "shall," a term that has long
been settled to denote something imperative or operating to impose a duty. Thus, the rule
leaves no room for alternatives or otherwise does not allow for discretion. It requires the
application of the legal rate of interest.

Our intervening Decision in Nacar v. Gallery Frames [(716 Phil. 267 [2013])] recognized
that the legal rate of interest has been reduced to 6% per annum[.]

Xxxx

Nevertheless, both Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 and
Nacar retain the definite and mandatory framing of the rule articulated in Eastern
Shipping, Security Bank, and Spouses Toring. Nacareven restates Eastern Shipping:

Xxxx

Thus, it remains that where interest was stipulated in writing by the debtor and creditor in
a simple loan or mutuum, but no exact interest rate was mentioned, the legal rate of
interest shall apply. At present, this is 6% per annum, subject to Nacar 's qualification on
prospective application.

Applying this, the loan obtained by respondents from petitioners is deemed subjected to
conventional interest at the rate of 12% per annum,the legal rate of interest at the time
the parties executed their agreement. Moreover, should conventional interest still be due
as of July 1, 2013, the rate of 12% per annum shall persist as the rate of conventional
interest.

This is so because interest in this respect is used as a surrogate for the parties' intent, as
expressed as of the time of the execution of their contract. In this sense, the legal rate
of interest is an affirmation of the contracting parties' intent; that is, by their
contract's silence on a specific rate, the then prevailing legal rate of interest shall
be the cost of borrowing money. This rate, which by their contract the parties have
settled on, is deemed to persist regardless of shifts in the legal rate of interest.
Stated otherwise, the legal rate of interest, when applied as conventional interest,
shall always be the legal rate at the time the agreement was executed and shall not
be susceptible to shifts in rate.39 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Following this pronouncement, the Court rules that the CA correctly imposed a straight
monetary interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the principal loan obligation
of petitioners to respondent, reckoned from the date of extrajudicial demand until finality
of this ruling. At this point, suffice it to say that petitioner's reliance on ECE Realty is
misplaced primarily because unlike in this case, the amount due therein does not partake
of a loan obligation or forbearance of money.

In addition, not only the principal amount but also the monetary interest due to respondent
as discussed above shall itself earn compensatory interest at the legal rate, pursuant to
Article 2212 of the Civil Code, which states that "[i]nterest due shall earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this
point."40 To be sure, Article 2212 contemplates the presence of stipulated or conventional
interest, i.e., monetary interest, which has accrued when demand was judicially made.
In cases where no monetary interest had been stipulated by the parties, no accrued
monetary interest could further earn compensatory .interest upon judicial demand. 41
Thus, the principal amount and monetary interest due to respondent shall earn
compensatory interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from judicial demand, i.e., the
date of the filing of the complaint on July 24, 2007,42 to June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

II.
On the issue of attorney's fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered as
part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.43 The power of the
court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 44 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification.45 It must clearly state the reasons for awarding attorney's
fees in the body of its decision, and not merely in its dispositive portion.46

In this case, the CA awarded the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees premised
merely on the general statement "upon equity and in the exercise of [its] discretion." 47
Hence, since the CA failed to "clearly state the reasons for awarding attorney's fees in
the body of its decision", the Court finds it proper to delete the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31, 2017
and the Resolution dated August 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
101743 are hereby MODIFIED as follows:
 1. Petitioners Catalina F. Isla, Elizabeth Isla, and Gilbert F. Isla are ORDERED to pay
respondent Genevira P. Estorga:
(a)
P100,000.00 representing the principal loan obligation;

(b)
Monetary interest on the principal loan obligation at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the date of default, i.e., extrajudicial demand on November 16, 2006, until
finality of this ruling;

(c)
Compensatory interest on the monetary interest as stated in letter (b) at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from judicial demand, i.e., July 24, 2007, to June 30, 2013, and
thereafter, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this
ruling; and

(d)
Legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum imposed on the sums due in
letters (a), (b), and (c) from finality of this ruling until full payment; and
2. The award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NOS. 231655 AND 231670, JULY 02, 2018]

FELISA AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
V.
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (HAVING BEEN SUBSTITUTED IN
LIEU OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION), RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1assailing the Amended Decision2
dated May 26, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated March 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP. Nos. 06204 and 06286, which nullified and set aside the Orders
dated May 7, 20104 and May 11, 20115 (RTC Orders) of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 54 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-11356 directing the National Power
Corporation (NPC) or its assignee to compensate petitioner the amount of P7,845,000.00
representing the 100% zonal value of the subject land as initial payment.

The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint6 for recovery of possession with damages
or payment of just compensation dated January 9, 2001 filed by petitioner Felisa
Agricultural Corporation (petitioner) against NPC before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-11356. Petitioner claimed that in 1997, it discovered that the NPC's transmission
towers and transmission lines were located within a 19,635-square meter (sq. m.) portion
(subject land) of its lands situated in Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Further verification
revealed that the transmission towers were constructed sometime before 1985 by NPC
which entered the subject land without its knowledge and consent. 7

For its part,8 NPC denied having entered the subject land without any authority, and
claimed that petitioner's President, Jovito Sayson, granted it the permit to enter 9on
September 21, 1989 for the construction of the 138 KV Mabinay-Bacolod Transmission
Line. It further countered that since the transmission lines have been in existence for more
than ten (10) years, a continuous easement of right of way has already been established.
Considering, however, that the action was brought beyond the five-year prescriptive
period to do so in accordance with the NPC Charter, the claim is barred by prescription. 10
In the course of the proceedings, the parties agreed to narrow down the issue to the
payment of just compensation and agreed to settle the case at the price of P400.00/sq.
m. but the proposed compromise did not push through in view of the failure of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) to act on the Deed of Sale entered into by the parties. 11
Subsequently, petitioner moved that NPC be immediately ordered to pay the amount of
P7,845,000.0012 representing the 100% zonal value of the subject land 13 in accordance
with Republic Act No. (RA) 8974.14 NPC opposed the motion, contending that the said
law only applies to expropriation cases initiated by the government to acquire property for
any national government infrastructure project.15

The RTC Ruling

In an Order16 dated May 7, 2010, the RTC granted the motion and directed NPC or its
assignee to compensate petitioner in the amount of P7,845,000.00 as initial payment. 17
It likewise denied the NPC's motion for reconsideration18 in an Order19 dated May 11,
2011, explaining further that the "initial payment is not the [j]ust [c]ompensation that is
determined in the decision that shall dispose the case. The law so provides to obviate the
long litigation and the landowner is partially paid."20

Unperturbed, NPC filed a petition for certiorari21 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB
SP. Nos. 06204 and 06286.22

The CA Ruling
In a Decision23 dated June 27, 2014, the CA granted the certiorari petition, thereby
nullifying and setting aside the RTC Orders.24 It ruled that RA 8974 finds no application
to the recovery of possession case as it only applies to an expropriation proceeding. 25
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,26contending that RA 8974 applies even
if the government failed or refused to file an expropriation case considering that: (a) the
recovery of possession case partakes of the nature of an inverse expropriation
proceedings; and (b) the initiatory complaint was filed after its effectivity.27

Subsequently, respondent National Transmission Corporation (respondent), which

assumed the electrical transmission function and the transmission-related cases of NPC,
was substituted as party respondent in the case.28

In an Amended Decision29 dated May 26, 2016, the CA denied the motion.30 It ruled that
since the taking of the property occurred sometime in 1985, RA 8974 which was approved
and took effect subsequent thereto does not apply, and the provisions of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court should govern the case.31 Accordingly, it remanded the case to the RTC
for the determination of just compensation plus legal interest reckoned from the time of
the taking of the subject land.32

Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration, 33which was, however, denied in a
Resolution34 dated March 17, 2017; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in
holding that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and not RA 8974 should govern the case.

The Court's Ruling

Preliminarily, it bears pointing out that the RTC Orders subject of the certiorari petition
before the CA merely pertained to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value
of the subject land. At that time, the first stage of the expropriation proceedings, i.e., the
determination of the validity of the expropriation, has not been completed since no order
of expropriation has yet been issued by the RTC, albeit it is not contested that the NPC's
entry in the subject land was done for a public purpose,35i.e., the construction/installation
of transmission towers and lines which fall within the term "national government
projects."36 It is settled that there is no need to determine with reasonable certainty the
final amount of just compensation until after the trial court ascertains the provisional
amount to be paid.37
The general rule is that upon the filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the
right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property. An exception to this procedure is provided by RA 8974 with respect to national
government projects, which requires the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the
property to be expropriated as the provisional value. 38 It must be emphasized, however,
that whether a deposit is made under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or the provisional
value of the property is paid pursuant to RA 8974, 39 the said amount serves the double-
purpose of: (a) pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and (b) indemnity for
damages if the proceedings are dismissed.40

Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court requires the expropriator to deposit the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property to be expropriated prior to entry. The
assessed value41 of a real property constitutes a mere percentage of its fair market value
based on the assessment levels fixed under the pertinent ordinance passed by the local
government where the property is located.42 In contrast, RA 8974 requires the payment
of the amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal value 43 of the property, which is
usually a higher amount.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Gingoyon,44 the Court recognized that while
expropriation proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for
private property, the deposit requirement under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court "impeded
immediate compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the
determination of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed."45
Thus, it categorically declared that "[i]t is the plain intent of [RA] 8974 to supersede
the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of 'immediate payment' in
cases involving national government infrastructure projects."46The same case
further ruled:

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a

substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the
standard, which it did through the enactment of [RA] 8974. Specifically, this
prescribes the new standard in determining the amount of just compensation in
expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well
as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ
of possession. Of course, rules of procedure, as distinguished from substantive matters,
remain the exclusive preserve of the Supreme Court by virtue of Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the Constitution. Indeed, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the
continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all matters
regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and
conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents
affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court."47 (Emphases supplied)
Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be
enjoyed by the owner of the property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to
receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property
is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the
sole province of the legislature to legislate on.48

Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a retroactive
application.49 It is well known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive
effect only governs rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law.
However, if a right be declared for the first time by a subsequent law, it shall take
effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former laws,
provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.50

In this case, the government had long entered the subject land and constructed the
transmission towers and lines. However, petitioner initiated inverse condemnation
proceedings after the effectivity of RA 8974 on November 26, 2000;51 hence, procedurally
and substantially, the said law should govern. Notably, the payment of the provisional
value of the subject land equivalent to 100% of its current zonal value is declared for the
first time by the said law which is evidently more favorable to the landowner than the mere
deposit of its assessed value52as required by Rule 67. Accordingly, the application of the
provisions of RA 8974 to the instant case is beyond cavil. Besides, there is no legal
impediment to the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent, as successor
of NPC, despite entry to the subject land long before the filing of the inverse condemnation
proceedings before the RTC because physical possession gained by entering the
property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership
thereon. In Republic v. Hon. Tagle,53 the Court explained:

The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or
occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there
may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the
bundle of rights that constitute ownership.

x x x [M]ere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title,
which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.
Its actual occupation, which renders academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself
include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership. x x x.

x x x Ineludibly, [the] writ [of possession] is both necessary and practical, because
mere physical possession that is gained by entering the property is not equivalent
to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to
possess, the expropriated property.54 (Emphases supplied)
Section 1 of RA 8974 declares the State's policy to ensure that owners of real property
acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just
compensation. However, the sad truth is that several cases reached this Court wherein
various government agencies, including respondent, had constructed transmission lines,
tunnels, and other infrastructure before it decided to expropriate the properties upon
which they built the same. Still, in other cases, the property owners were compelled to
initiate inverse condemnation proceedings due to the government's long inaction to
commence expropriation proceedings to acquire their land. As early as the 1960 case of
Alfonso v. Pasay City,55the Court had pronounced its disapproval of such practice and its
vigilance in the defense of the rights of the unpaid landowner who has been deprived of
possession, thus:

This Tribunal does not look with favor on the practice of the Government or any of its
branches, of taking away property from a private landowner, especially a registered one,
without going through the legal process of expropriation or a negotiated sale and paying
for said property without delay. The private owner is usually at a great and distinct
disadvantage. He has against him the whole Government, central or local, that has
occupied and appropriated his property, summarily and arbitrarily, sometimes, if not more
often, against his consent. There is no agreement as to its price or its rent. In the
meantime, the landowner makes requests for payment, rent, or even some
understanding, patiently waiting and hoping that the Government would soon get around
to hearing and granting his claim. The officials concerned may promise to consider his
claim and come to an agreement as to the amount and time for compensation, but with
the not infrequent government delay and red tape, and with the change in administration,
specially local, the claim is pigeon holed and forgotten and the papers lost, [or] mislaid x
x x. And when finally losing patience and hope, he brings a court action and hires a lawyer
to represent him in the vindication of his valid claim, he faces the government represented
by no less than the Solicitor General or the Provincial Fiscal or City Attorney, who blandly
and with self-assurance, invokes prescription. The litigation sometimes drags on for
years. In our opinion, that is neither just nor fair. When a citizen, because of this practice
loses faith in the government and its readiness and willingness to pay for what it gets and
appropriates, in the future said citizen would not allow the Government to even enter his
property unless condemnation proceedings are first initiated, and the value of the
property, as provisionally ascertained by the Court, is deposited, subject to his disposal.
This would mean delay and difficulty for the Government, but all of its own making. 56
Notably, in its Answer,57 NPC invoked prescription of petitioner's claim,58 and despite the
agreement to settle the case at the price of P400.00/ sq. m., the proposed compromise
did not push through in view of the failure of the OSG for a number of years to duly act
on the Deed of Sale entered into by the parties,59 prompting petitioner to file the motion
for the payment of the provisional value of the subject land. Since the NPC's entry in the
subject land on September 21, 1989, or for almost twenty-nine (29) years, the registered
owner had been effectively deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the subject land
without having been paid a single centavo.
The Court reminds the government and its agencies that it is their obligation to
immediately initiate eminent domain proceedings whenever they intend to take private
property for any public purpose, which includes the payment of the provisional value
thereof.60

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA erred in setting aside the RTC Orders
which should be, perforce, reinstated. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the
RTC for the determination of just compensation for the subject land, taking into
consideration, the relevant standards61 set forth under RA 8974.

It must be emphasized that RA 8974 does not take away from the courts the power to
judicially determine the amount of just compensation. It merely provides relevant
standards in order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, and sets the
minimum price of the property as the provisional value 62 to immediately recompense the
landowner with the same degree of speed as the taking of the property, which reconciles
the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental
equity.63

Nonetheless, it is settled that where actual taking was made without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the
property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that
it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation.64 Any other interpretation would be repugnant to the Constitution which
commands the exproriator to pay the property owner no less than the full and fair
equivalent of the property from the date of taking.65

The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,66 is that:

[W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the
plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have
been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed,
due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall
extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property
at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just;
i.e., "just not only to the individual whose property is taken," "but to the public, which is to
pay for it." 67
However, it must be emphasized that in determining just compensation, the courts must
consider and apply the parameters set by the law and its implementing rules and
regulations in order to ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount as just
compensation that is contradictory to the objectives of the law. Be that as it may, when
acting within such parameters, courts are not strictly bound to apply the same to its
minutest detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant its strict
application. Thus, the courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the
application of the guidelines subject to the jurisprudential limitation that the factual
situation calls for it and the courts clearly explain the reason for such deviation.68
Finally, the Court deems it proper to modify the amount of the provisional value from
P7,845,000.00 to P7,854,000.00 computed by multiplying the area of 19,635 sq. m.
occupied by the transmission lines69 by the zonal value of the subject land at P400.00/sq.
m. Moreover, it must be clarified that the government's initial payment of the land's
provisional value does not excuse it from avoiding payment of interest on any difference
between the amount of final just compensation adjudged and the initial payment70 (unpaid
balance). Legal interest shall be imposed on the unpaid balance at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the time of taking,i.e., from entry in the subject land on
September 21, 1989,71 until June 30, 2013; thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until
fully paid, the just compensation due petitioner shall earn interest at the rate six percent
(6%) per annum.72

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated May 26, 2016
and the Resolution dated March 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP.
Nos. 06204 and 06286 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated May
7, 2010 and May 11, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 54 (RTC)
in Civil Case No. 01-11356 directing the National Power Corporation or its assignee
(respondent National Transmission Corporation) to compensate petitioner the provisional
value of the subject land in an amount equivalent to its 100% zonal value, herein
recomputed at P7,854,000.00, is REINSTATED. The records of the case are
REMANDED to the RTC for reception of evidence on the issue of just compensation in
accordance with the guidelines afore-discussed.

The RTC is directed to conduct the proceedings in said case with reasonable dispatch,
and to submit to the Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within
sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 12062, JULY 02, 2018]

HEIR OF HERMINIGILDO* A. UNITE, REPRESENTED BY HIS SOLE HEIR,
FLORENTINO S. UNITE, COMPLAINANT,
V.
 ATTY. RAYMUND P. GUZMAN, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Petition for Disbarment 1 filed on December 9,
2014 by Florentino S. Unite (complainant), as the sole heir of Herminigildo A. Unite
(Herminigildo), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent Atty.
Raymund P. Guzman (respondent) for violation of Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), his oath as a lawyer, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
(Notarial Rules).2

The Facts

In his Petition for Disbarment, complainant alleged that on December 19, 2012,
respondent notarized a Deed of Self Adjudication with Sale and/with Deed of Absolute
Sale3 (Deed) executed by Jose Unite Torrices (Torrices), claiming to be the sole heir of
Herminigildo, in favor of one Francisco U. Tamayo (Tamayo), covering a parcel of land
located in Ballesteros, Cagayan and covered by a title4 under Herminigildo's name.
According to complainant, the Deed was executed with only Torrices's community tax
certificate (CTC) as evidence of identity.5 Complainant asserted that he is the only
surviving heir of his father, Herminigildo, as Torrices is his cousin. As a result of
respondent's acts, the Deed was recorded in the Registry of Deeds, which caused the
cancellation of his father's title and the issuance of a new one in the name of Tamayo. 6
Complainant added that on October 20, 2014, he filed a complaint for the annulment of
the Deed and Tamayo's title, with liquidation/accounting and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros, Cagayan, Branch 33, docketed as Civil Case No. 33-
471-2014.7 In support of his Petition, complainant attached copies of the Deed, Certificate
of Death of Herminigildo,8 his birth certificate,9 the marriage contract of his
parents,10Tamayo's Transfer Certificate of Title,11 and the Complaint12 in Civil Case No.
33-471-2014 with its annexes.13

In his Answer,14 respondent denied the charges against him and claimed that he complied
with the requirements of the Notarial Rules. Particularly, he verified the identity of the
parties to the Deed from their current government identification documents with pictures
and CTCs.15 He further inquired from the parties, especially from Torrices, their capacity
to execute the Deed.

In reply16 to respondent's Answer, complainant pointed out, among others, that: (a)a CTC
is no longer considered a competent evidence of identification as it does not bear the
photograph and signature of the individua1;17(b) the other documents presented by
Torrices as proof of being the sole heir did not cure the absence of the required competent
evidence of identity;18(c) and the pendency of Civil Case No. 33-471-2014 does not bar
the instant administrative action.19

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated April 21, 2015, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner (IBP-IC) found respondent administratively liable for violation of the
Notarial Rules. The IBP-IC held that respondent failed to confirm the identity of the parties
to the Deed through the presentation of competent evidence of identity as required by the
Notarial Rules, pointing out, in this regard, that a CTC is not one of the enumerated
evidence of identity under the Rules.21 Accordingly, the IBP-IC recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and be
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year. 22

In a Resolution23 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the above-
findings but reduced the recommended penalty imposed on respondent to reprimand,
"considering that [r]espondent personally knows the affiant and the [CTC] then will
suffice."

Dissatisfied, complainant moved for reconsideration,24 which the IBP Board of Governors
denied in a Resolution25 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found respondent
liable for violation of the Notarial Rules.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the findings and adopts the recommendations of the IBP with
modifications.

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the act of notarization is impressed with
public interest. Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. 26 A notarial document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credence.27 As such, a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties in order to preserve
the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.28 In this light, the Court
has ruled that notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.29

Under Section 2 (b) (1) and (2), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules, a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is "in the notary's presence
personally at the time of the notarization," and is "personally known to the notary public
or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity."30
Section 12, Rule II of the same rules, as amended by the February 19, 2008 En Banc
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, defines "competent evidence of identity" thus:

Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase "competent evidence of

identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a)
At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual; such as but not limited to, passport,
driver's license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of
Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification,
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS)
card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate
of registration, government office ID, certification from the National Council for the Welfare
of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
certification; or

(b)
The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP-IC, clearly failed to faithfully observe
his duties as a notary public when he failed to confirm the identity of Torrices through the
competent evidence of identity required by the Notarial Rules. This fact is clear from the
Deed itself which shows that Torrices presented only his CTC when he appeared before
respondent. Jurisprudence31 provides that a community tax certificate or cedula is no
longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of identity not only because it is not
included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Rules; more importantly, it
does not bear the photograph and signature of the person appearing before notaries
public which the Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which
they can ascertain the person's identity.
While respondent argues that, apart from the CTC, he required all the parties to the Deed
to present at least two (2) current government identification documents and conducted
further interviews to ascertain their capacity and personality to enter into the transactions,
the Deed itself, however, belies this contention. Had respondent indeed required – and
had the parties presented – current government identification documents at the time of
the Deed's notarization, respondent should have reflected these facts on the Deed's.
acknowledgement portion in the same manner that the Deed reflected Torrices' CTC. By
notarizing the Deed notwithstanding the absence of the competent evidence of identity
required by the Notarial Rules, respondent undoubtedly failed to properly perform his duty
as a notary public.

In this regard, the Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governor's finding that
respondent personally knows the affiant, hence, the CTC suffices. Under Section 2 (b),
Rule IV of the Notarial Rules quoted above, a notary public may be excused from requiring
the presentation of competent evidence of identity of the signatory before him only if such
signatory is personally known to him. In this case, the acknowledgment portion of the
Deed does not state that Torrices is personally known to respondent, as the Rules
require; rather, it simply states that Torrices is known to me (respondent), thus:

"Personally came and appeared before me on this ___day of ____ at [sic] Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan, Jose U. Torrices with his CTC No. appearing below his signature known
to me and to me known to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument
and who acknowledged to that the same is her [sic] free act and voluntary deed." 32
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, nowhere in the Deed did respondent declare that Torrices is personally
known to him so as to excuse the presentation of any of the enumerated competent
evidence of identity. Moreover, it should be clarified that the phrase "personally known"
contemplates the notary public's personal knowledge of the signatory's personal
circumstances independent and irrespective of any representations made by the
signatory immediately before and/or during the time of the notarization. 33 It entails
awareness, understanding, or knowledge of the signatory's identity and circumstances
gained through firsthand observation or experience which therefore serve as guarantee
of the signatory's identity and thus eliminate the need for the verification process of
documentary identification. In this case, if indeed respondent personally knows Torrices,
as the IBP Board of Governors surmised, there would have been no need for respondent,
as he asserted in his Answer, to require the parties to present at least two (2) current
government identification documents and conduct further interviews to ascertain their
capacity and personality to execute the Deed.

Lastly, as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.34 By
notarizing the subject Deed, he engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct which makes him liable as well for violation of the CPR, particularly Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 thereof which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

As herein discussed, respondent's failure to properly perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also
in undermining the integrity of the office of a notary public and in degrading the function
of notarization.35 He should thus be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. Consistent with jurisprudence,36 he should be meted out with
the modified penalty of immediate revocation of his notarial commission, if any,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years,
and suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Raymund P. Guzman GUILTYof
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public,
if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, and

disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect immediately
upon receipt of this Resolution by respondent. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a
Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
its information and guidance, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 229861, JULY 02, 2018]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
FRANCISCO EJERCITO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated October 28, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR. HC. No. 01656, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated
April 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of xxxxxxxxxxx,4 Branch 60 (RTC) in Crim. Case
No. CEB-BRL-1300 finding accused-appellant Francisco Ejercito (Ejercito) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, in
relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act
No. (RA) 8353,5 otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information6 filed before the RTC charging Ejercito of the
aforesaid crime, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 10th day of October, 2001 at past 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor, who is only
fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the offense against her will and
consent and which act demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor as a human
being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that at around six (6) o'clock in the evening of October 10, 2001,
AAA, then a fifteen (15) year old high school student, was cleaning the chicken cage at
the back of their house located in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx when suddenly, she saw Ejercito
pointing a gun at her saying, "Ato ato lang ni. Sabta lang ko. Ayaw gyud saba para dili
madamay imo pamilya." AAA pleaded, "Tang, don't do this to me" but the latter replied,
"Do you want me to kill you? I will even include your mother and father." Thereafter,
Ejercito dragged AAA to a nearby barn, removed her shorts and underwear, while he
undressed and placed himself on top of her. He covered her mouth with his right hand
and used his left hand to point the gun at her, as he inserted his penis into her vagina and
made back and forth movements. When he finished the sexual act, Ejercito casually
walked away and warned AAA not to tell anybody or else, her parents will get killed. Upon
returning to her house, AAA hurriedly went to the bathroom where she saw a bloody
discharge from her vagina. The following day, AAA absented herself from school and
headed to the house of her aunt, CCC, who asked if she was okay. At that point, AAA
tearfully narrated the incident and requested CCC to remain silent, to which the latter
reluctantly obliged.8

Haunted by her harrowing experience, AAA was unable to focus on her studies. Wanting
to start her life anew, AAA moved to the city to continue her schooling there. However,
Ejercito was able to track AAA down, and made the latter his sex slave. From 2002 to
2005, Ejercito persistently contacted AAA, threatened and compelled her to meet him,
and thereafter, forced her to take shabu and then sexually abused her. Eventually, AAA
got hooked on drugs, portrayed herself as Ejercito's paramour, and decided to live
together. When Ejercito's wife discovered her husband's relationship with AAA, the former
filed a complaint against AAA before the barangay. By this time, even AAA's mother, BBB,
found out the illicit relationship and exerted efforts to separate them from each other.
Finally, after undergoing rehabilitation, AAA finally disclosed to her parents that she was
raped by Ejercito back in 2001 and reported the same to the authorities on September 3,
2005.9

In his defense, Ejercito pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, and maintained that
he had an illicit relationship with AAA. He averred that during the existence of their affair
from 2002 to 2004, he and AAA frequently had consensual sex and the latter even
abandoned her family in order to live with him in various places in xxxxxxxxxxx. He even
insisted that he and AAA were vocal about their choice to live together despite vehement
objections from his own wife and AAA's mother. Finally, he pointed out that when AAA
was forcibly taken from him by her mother, as well as police authorities, no charges were
filed against him. Thus, he was shocked and dismayed when he was charged with the
crime of Rape which purportedly happened when they were lovers.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision11 dated April 8, 2013, the RTC found Ejercito guilty beyond reasonable.
doubt of the crime charged and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to separately pay AAA and her parents P50,000.00
each as moral damages.12

Aggrieved, Ejercito appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated October 28, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification,
convicting Ejercito of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the RPC, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him
to pay the offended party, AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum to be imposed on all monetary awards from finality
of the ruling until fully paid.15

Agreeing with the RTC's findings, the CA held that through AAA's clear and
straightforward testimony, the prosecution had established that Ejercito raped her in
2001. On the other hand, it did not give credence to Ejercito's sweetheart defense,
pointing out that assuming arguendo that he indeed eventually had a relationship with
AAA, their first sexual encounter in 2001 was without the latter's consent and was
attended with force and intimidation as he pointed a gun at her while satisfying his lustful
desires.16

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Ejercito's conviction for the crime of
Rape must be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Time and again, it has been held that in criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."17

Based on this doctrine, the Court, upon careful review of this case, deems it proper to
correct the attribution of the crime for which Ejercito should be convicted and,
consequently, the corresponding penalty to be imposed against him, as will be explained
hereunder.

At the onset, the Court observes that the CA, in modifying the RTC ruling, erroneously
applied the old Rape Law, or Article 335 of the RPC, since the same was already repealed
upon the enactment of RA 8353 in 1997. To recount, the Information alleges "[t]hat on or
about the 10th day of October 2001 x x x [Ejercito], with lewd design and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor who is only fifteen (15) years old
at the time of the commission of the offense against her will and consent x x x"; hence, in
convicting Ejercito of Rape, the CA should have applied the provisions of RA 8353, which
enactment has resulted in the new rape provisions of the RPC under Articles 266-A in
relation to 266-B, viz.:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

x x x x

Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxxx
For a charge of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as
amended by RA 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act under the circumstances
mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of
Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.18

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of
all the elements of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as
amended by RA 8353. Through AAA's positive testimony, it was indeed established that
in the evening of October 10, 2001, AAA, then just a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was
cleaning chicken cages at the back of her house when suddenly, Ejercito threatened her,
removed her lower garments, covered her mouth, and proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her without her consent. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found AAA's
testimony to be credible, noting further that Ejercito failed to establish any ill motive on
her part which could have compelled her to falsely accuse him of the aforesaid act. In this
relation, case law states that the trial court is in the best position to assess and determine
the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference
should be accorded to the same.19 As there is no indication that the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court therefore finds no reason to deviate from its factual
findings.

The Court remains mindful that Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,20 which, to note, was passed
prior to RA 8353 on June 17, 1992, equally penalizes those who commit sexual abuse,
by means of either (a) sexual intercourse or (b) lascivious conduct, against "a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse," viz.:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x

xxxx
In Quimvel v. People (Quimvel),21 the Court set important parameters in the
application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, to wit:

(1) A child is considered as one "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other

sexual abuse" when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
"under the coercion or influence of any adult":

To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one
"exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse."This is anchored on the
very definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children
who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or(b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group.

Correlatively, Sec. 5 (a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with

child prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a
child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child
is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or
influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence, the law
punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against
children. x x x.22 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

(2) A violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused
committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior
sexual affront:
[T]he very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3 (b) of RA 7610 does not require
that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act
complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610. occurs even though the accused
committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior
sexual affront.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

(3) For purposes of determining the proper charge, the term "coercion and
influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and
intimidation"as used in the Information; in fact, as these terms are almost used
synonymously, it is then "of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA
7610 and by the Information are different":

The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover
"force and intimidation" as used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law
Dictionary defines "coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress" while "[undue]
influence" is defined as "persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will."
On the other hand, "force" refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength
directed to an end" while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as "unlawful
coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear." As can be gleaned, the terms are used
almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by
RA 7610 and by the Information are different. And to dispel any remaining lingering
doubt as to their interchangeability, the Court enunciated in Caballo v. People [(710
Phil. 792, 805-806[2013])] that:

x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under thecoercion or influence of

any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation
which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto,
Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse
involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined
as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child

to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way
that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile,
"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the
wishes of one who wields it."24 (emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the Court, in Quimvel, observed that although the Information therein did not
contain the words "coercion or influence" (as it instead, used the phrase "through
force and intimidation"), the accused may still be convicted under Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610. Further, following the rules on the sufficiency of an Information, the Court
held that the Information need not even mention the exact phrase "exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other abuse" for the accused to be convicted under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610; it was enough for the Information to have alleged that the
offense was committed by means of "force and intimidation" for the prosecution
of an accused for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 to prosper. 25

In this case, it has been established that Ejercito committed the act of sexual
intercourse against and without the consent of AAA, who was only fifteen (15)
years old at that time. As such, she is considered under the law as a child who is
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;" hence, Ejercito's act
may as well be classified as a violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.

Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, as afore-discussed and

Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be
convicted under the former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish
certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same
case, then the law which is more special in nature, regardless of the time of
enactment, should prevail. In Teves v. Sandiganbayan:26

It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in
general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed
way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter
shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. Or
where two statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail over the other.27 (Emphases supplied)

After much deliberation, the Court herein observes that RA 8353 amending the RPC
should now be uniformly applied in cases involving sexual intercourse committed
against minors, and not Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Indeed, w}file RA 7610 has been
considered as a special law that covers the sexual abuse of minors, RA 8353 has
expanded the reach of our already existing rape laws. These existing rape laws
should not only pertain to the old Article 33528 of the RPC but also to the provision
on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b)29 of RA 7610 which, applying Quimvel's
characterization of a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse,"
virtually punishes the rape of a minor.

It bears to emphasize that not only did RA 8353 re-classify the crime of Rape from
being a crime against chastity to a crime against persons, 30 it also provided for
more particularized instances of rape and conjunctively, a new set of penalties
therefor. Under RA 8353, Rape is considered committed not only through the
traditional means of having carnal knowledge of a woman (or penile penetration)
but also through certain lascivious acts now classified as rape by sexual assault:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, RA 8353 provides for new penalties for Rape that may be qualified under
the following circumstances:
Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall become reclusion perpetua to death.

When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the

occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or afinnity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any
law enforcement or penal institution;

3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children
or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;

4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling

and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the
commission of the crime;

5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency
Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;

7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-
military units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to
facilitate the commission of the crime;

8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation or disability;

9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and
10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Significant to this case, the above-highlighted provisions of RA 8353 already

accounted for the circumstance of minority under certain peculiar instances. The
consequence therefore is a clear overlap' with minority as an element of the crime
of sexual intercourse against a minor under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. However, as
it was earlier intimated, RA 8353 is not only the more recent statutory enactment
but more importantly, the more comprehensive law on rape; therefore, the Court
herein clarifies that in cases where a minor is raped through sexual intercourse,
the provisions of RA 8353 amending the RPC ought to prevail over Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610 although the latter also penalizes the act of sexual intercourse against a
minor.

The Court is not unaware of its previous pronouncements in People v.

Tubillo,31citing the cases of People v. Abay32 and People v. Pangilinan33 (Tubillo, et
al.), wherein the potential conflict in the application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, on
the one hand, vis-a-vis RA 8353 amending the RPC, on the other, was resolved by
examining whether or not the prosecution's evidence focused on the element of
"coercion and influence" or "force and intimidation." In Tubillo:
To reiterate, the elements of rape under Section 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.

On the other hand, the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, are: (1) the
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It is also stated
there that children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse are those
children, whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration
or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

In the recent case of Quimvel v. People, the Court ruled that the term "coercion and
influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and
intimidation." Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion as compulsion; force;
duress, while undue influence is defined as persuasion carried to the point of
overpowering the will. On the other hand, force refers to constraining power,
compulsion; strength directed to an end; while jurisprudence defines intimidation
as unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. As can be gleaned, the
terms are used almost synonymously. Thus, it is not improbable that an act of
committing carnal knowledge against a child, twelve (12) years old or older,
constitutes both rape under Section 266-A of the RPC and child abuse under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

In People v. Abay, the Court was faced with the same predicament. In that case,
both the elements of Section 266-A of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610
were alleged in the information. Nevertheless, these provisions were harmonized,
to wit:

Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for
sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal
Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12
years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under At1icle 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for
the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the
Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized
by a special law. (Emphasis supplied)

In Abay, the offended party was thirteen (13) years old at the time of the rape
incident. Again, the information therein contained all the elements of Article 266-A
(1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.Nevertheless, the Court observed
that the prosecution's evidence only focused on the specific fact that accused
therein sexually violated the offended party through force and intimidation by
threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial
designs. Thus, accused therein was convicted of the crime of rape under Article
266-A (1) of the RPC. Notably, the prosecution did not tackle the broader scope of
"influence or coercion" under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Similarly, in People v. Pangilinan, the Court was faced with the same dilemma
because all the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610 were present. It was ruled therein that the accused can be charged with
either rape or child abuse and be convicted therefor. The Court observed, however,
that the prosecution's evidence proved that accused had carnal knowledge with
the victim through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai sword.
Thus, rape was established. Again, the evidence in that case did not refer to the
broader scope of "influence or coercion" under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
In the present case, the RTC convicted Tubillo for the crime of rape because the
prosecution proved that there was carnal knowledge against by means of force or
intimidation, particularly, with a bladed weapon. On the other hand, the CA
convicted Tubillo with violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 because the charge
of rape under the information was in relation to R.A. No. 7610.

After a judicious study of the records, the Court rules that Tubillo should be
convicted of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC.

A reading of the information would show that the case at bench involves both the
elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. As
elucidated in People v. Abay and People v. Pangilinan, in such instance, the court
must examine the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused on the specific
force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader concept of
coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with the victim.

Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or

intimidation employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the
RPC. The prosecution presented the testimony HGE who narrated that Tubillo
unlawfully entered the house where she was sleeping by breaking the padlock.
Once inside, he forced himself upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and inserted
his penis in her vagina. She could not resist the sexual. attack against her because.
Tubillo poked a bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo employed brash force
or intimidation to carry out his dastardly deeds.

In fine, Tubillo should be found guilty of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC
with a prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610.34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned therefrom, the Court examined the evidence of the prosecution
to determine "whether it focused on the specific force or intimidation employed by
the offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal
knowledge with the victim."35 The premise in Tubillo that "coercion or influence" is
the broader concept in contrast to "force or intimidation" appears to have been
rooted from that statement in Quimvel wherein it was mentioned that "[t]he term
'coercion and influence' as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover 'force
and intimidation' as used in the Information."36 However, Quimvel did not intend to
provide any distinction on the meanings of these terms so as to determine whether
an accused's case should fall under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or RA 8353 amending
the RPC, much more foist any distinction depending on what the prosecution's e
vidence "focused" on. In fact, the Court in Quimvel stated "the terms ['coercion
and influence' and 'force and intimidation'] are used almost synonymously"; 37 as
such, the Court in Quimvel held that "[i]t is then of no moment that the
terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different"; 38 and
that "the words 'coercion or influence' need not specifically appear"39 in order for
the accused to be prosecuted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. As such, the Court
misconstrued the aforesaid statement in Quimvel and misapplied the same to
somehow come up withTubillo, et al.'s "focus of evidence" approach.

However, the mistaken interpretation of Quimvel in Tubillo, et al. only compounds

the fundamental error of the "focus of evidence" approach, which is 'to rely on
evidence appreciation, instead of legal interpretation. Ultimately, there is no cogent
legal basis to resolve the possible conflict between two (2) laws by ascertaining
what was the focus of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Presentation of
evidence leads to determining what act was committed. Resolving the application
of either RA 8353 amending the RPC or Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 already
presupposes that evidentiary concerns regarding what act has been committed
(i.e., the act of sexual intercourse against a minor) have already been settled.
Hence, the Court is only tasked to determine what law should apply based on legal
interpretation using the principles of statutory construction. In other words, the
Court need not unearth evidentiary concerns as what remains is a pure question
of law - that is: in cases when the act of sexual intercourse against a minor has
been committed, do we apply RA 8353 amending the RPC or Section 5 (b) of RA
7610?Herein lies the critical flaw of the "focus of evidence" approach, which was
only compounded by the mistaken reading of Quimvel in the cases of Tubillo, et al.
as above-explained.

Neither should the conflict between the application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 and
RA 8353 be resolved based on which law provides a higher penalty against the
accused. The superseding scope of RA 8353 should be the sole reason of its
prevalence over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. The higher penalty provided under RA
8353 should not be the moving consideration, given that penalties are merely
accessory to the act being punished by a particular law. The term "'[p]enalty' is
defined as '[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of
imprisonment or fine'; '[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person
who commits a deliberate or negligent act.'"40 Given its accessory nature, once the
proper application of a penal law is determined over another, then the imposition
of the penalty attached to that act punished in the prevailing penal law only follows
as a matter of course. In the final analysis, it is the determination of the act being
punished together with its attending circumstances - and not the gravity of the
penalty ancillary to that punished act - which is the key consideration in resolving
the conflicting applications of two penal laws.
Notably, in the more recent case of People v. Caoili (Caoili),41 the Court
encountered a situation wherein the punishable act committed by therein
accused,i.e., lascivious conduct, may be prosecuted either under "Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610"
or "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610." In resolving the matter,
the Court did not consider the "focus" of the evidence for the prosecution nor the
gravity of the penalty imposed. Rather, it is evident that the determining factor in
designating or charging the proper offense, and consequently, the imposable
penalty therefor, is the nature of the act committed, i.e., lascivious conduct, taken
together with the attending circumstance of the age of the victim:

Accordingly, for the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court takes
this opportunity to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging
the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:

1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the
offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.

2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime
should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium period.

3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below
eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to
fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua.42

Thus, being the more recent case, it may be concluded that Caoili
implicitlyabandoned the "focus of evidence" approach used in the Tubillo, et al.
rulings. Likewise, it is apt to clarify that if there appears to be any rational
dissonance or perceived unfairness in the imposable penalties between two
applicable laws (say for instance, that a person who commits rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC,43 as amended by
RA 8353 is punished less than a person who commits lascivious conduct against
a minor under Section 5 (b) of RA 761044), then the solution is through remedial
legislation and not through judicial interpretation. It is well-settled that the
determination of penalties is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch
of government.45 Thus, however compelling the dictates of reason might be, our
constitutional order proscribes the Judiciary from adjusting the gradations of the
penalties which are fixed by Congress through its legislative function. As
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta had instructively observed in his opinion in
Caoli:

Curiously, despite the clear intent of R.A. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence
and special protection against child abuse, the penalty[reclusion temporal
medium] when the victim is under 12 years old is lower compared to the penalty
[reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old
and below 18. The same holds true if the crime of acts of lasciviousness is attended
by an aggravating circumstance or committed by persons under Section 31, Article
XII of R.A. 7610, in which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In
contrast, when no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the crime of
acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when committed against a child under
12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child is 12 years old and
below 18. This is because, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term in the case of the younger victims shall be taken from reclusion temporal
minimum, whereas as [sic] the minimum term in the case of the older victims shall
be taken from prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum. It is a basic
rule in statutory construction that what courts may correct to reflect the real and
apparent intention of the legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors
or obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints, but not those due to oversight, as
shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is clear, and to
correct it would be to change the meaning of the law. To my mind, a corrective
legislation is the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for acts
of lasciviousness committed against a child.46(Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds that in instances
where an accused is charged and eventually convicted of having sexual
intercourse with a minor, the provisions on rape under RA 8353 amending the RPC
should prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Further, to reiterate, the "focus of
evidence" approach used in the Tubillo, et al. rulings had already been abandoned.

In this case, it has been established that Ejercito had carnal knowledge of AAA
through force, threat, or intimidation. Hence, he should be convicted of rape under
paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. To note,
although AAA was only fifteen (15) years old and hence, a minor at that time, it was
neither alleged nor proven that Ejercito was her "parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" so as to qualify the crime and
impose a higher penalty. As such, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 266-B
of the same law, Ejercito should be meted with the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
as ruled by both the RTC and the CA. Further, the Court affirms the monetary
awards in AAA's favor in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid,
since the same are in accord. with prevailing jurisprudence.47

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR. HC. No. 01656 is hereby AFFIRMED
withMODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Francisco Ejercito is hereby found
GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, he is ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 224678, JULY 03, 2018]

SPOUSES JOSE MANUEL AND MARIA ESPERANZA RIDRUEJO
STILIANOPOULOS, PETITIONERS,
V.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LEGAZPI CITY AND THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March 16, 2016
and the Resolution3 dated May 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
104207, which partially reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated August 19, 2013 and
the Order5 dated April 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch
2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10805, and accordingly, held that the claim of petitioners
Spouses Jose Manuel (Jose Manuel) and Maria Esperanza Ridruejo Stilianopoulos
(collectively; petitioners) against the Assurance Fund is already barred by prescription.

The Facts

This case stemmed from a Complaint6 for Declaration of Nullity of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 42486, Annulment of TCT No. 52392 and TCT No. 59654, and Recovery
of Possession of Lot No. 1320 with Damages (subject complaint) filed by petitioners
against respondents The Register of Deeds for Legazpi City (RD-Legazpi) and The
National Treasurer (National Treasurer), as well as Jose Fernando Anduiza (Anduiza),
Spouses Rowena Hua-Amurao (Rowena) and Edwin Amurao (collectively; Spouses
Amurao), and Joseph Funtanares Co, et al. (the Co Group) before the RTC.

Petitioners alleged that they own a 6,425-square meter property known as Lot No. 1320,
as evidenced by TCT No. 134507 in the name of Jose Manuel, who is a resident of Spain
and without any administrator of said property in the Philippines.8On October 9, 1995,
Anduiza caused the cancellation of TCT No. 13450 and issuance of TCT No. 42486 9 in
his name.10

Thereafter, Anduiza mortgaged Lot No. 1320 to Rowena. 11 As a result of Anduiza's

default, Rowena foreclosed the mortgage, and consequently, caused the cancellation of
TCT No. 42486 and issuance of TCT No. 52392 12 in her name on July 19, 2001.13 On
April 15, 2008, Rowena then sold Lot No. 1320 to the Co Group, resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 52392 and issuance of TCT No. 5965414 in the latter's name.15
According to petitioners, their discovery of the aforesaid transactions only on January 28,
2008 prompted them to file a complaint for recovery of title on May 2, 2008. 16 However,
such complaint was dismissed for petitioners' failure to allege the assessed value of Lot
No. 1320. Thus, they filed the subject complaint on March 18, 2009, praying that: (a) TCT
Nos. 42486, 52392, and 59654 in the respective names of Anduiza, Rowena, and the Co
Group be annulled; (b) all defendants be held solidarily liable to pay petitioners damages
and attorney's fees; and (c) the RD-Legazpi and the National Treasurer, through the
Assurance Fund, be ordered to pay petitioners' claims should the defendants be unable
to pay the same in whole or in part.17 In support of their complaint, petitioners claimed
that they were deprived of the possession and ownership of Lot No. 1320 without
negligence on their part and through fraud, and in consequence of errors, omissions,
mistakes, or misfeasance of officials and employees of RD-Legazpi.18

In their defense, Spouses Amurao and the Co Group both maintained that they purchased
Lot No. 1320 in good faith and for value, and that petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed, considering that they only had ten (10) years from the issuance of TCT No.
42486 in the name of Anduiza on October 9, 1995 within which to file a complaint for
recovery of possession.19 For their part,20 the RD-Legazpi and the National Treasurer
also invoked the defense of prescription, arguing that the right to bring an action against
the Assurance Fund must be brought within six (6) years from the time the cause of action
occurred, or in this case, on October 9, 1995 when Anduiza caused the cancellation of
petitioners' TCT over Lot No. 1320.21 Notably, Anduiza did not file any responsive
pleading despite due notice.22

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision23 dated August 19, 2013 the RTC: (a) dismissed the case against Spouses
Amurao and the Co Group as they were shown to be purchasers in good faith and for
value; and (b) found Anduiza guilty of fraud in causing the cancellation of petitioners' TCT
over Lot No. 1320, and thus, ordered him to pay petitioners the amount of P5,782,500.00
representing the market value of Lot No. 1320, as well as P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (c) held the National Treasurer, as custodian of the Assurance Fund,
subsidiarily liable to Anduiza's monetary liability should the latter be unable to fully pay
the same.24

Prefatorily, the RTC characterized the subject complaint filed on March 18, 2009 as one
for reconveyance based on an implied trust, which is subject to extinctive prescription of
ten (10) years ordinarily counted from the time of the repudiation of the trust, i.e., when
Anduiza registered TCT No. 42486 in his name on October 9, 1995. This notwithstanding,
the RTC found that since: (a) petitioners are residing in Spain; (b) they are in possession
of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 13450 registered in their names; and (c)
Anduiza's act of fraudulently cancelling their title was unknown to – if not effectively
concealed from – them, the ten (10)-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from
their actual discovery of the fraud in 2008.25 As such, petitioners' complaint for
reconveyance – as well as their claim against the Assurance Fund which has a six (6)-
year prescriptive period – has not prescribed.26

Anent the merits of the case, the RTC found that Anduiza had indeed acquired title over
Lot No. 1320 in bad faith and through fraud – a fact which is further highlighted by his
failure to refute petitioner's allegations against him on account of his omission to file a
responsive pleading despite due notice.27 This notwithstanding, the RTC held that
petitioners could no longer recover Lot No. 1320 from Spouses Amurao and/or the Co
Group as the latter are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, absent any
evidence to the contrary. As such, it is only proper that Anduiza be made to pay
compensatory damages corresponding to the value of the loss of property, as well as
exemplary damages as stated above.28

Finally, the RTC found that Anduiza alone could not have perpetrated the fraud without
the active participation of the RD-Legazpi. It then proceeded to point out that the evidence
on record clearly established the irregularities in the cancellation of petitioners' title and
the issuance of Anduiza's title, all of which cannot be done successfully without the
complicity of the RD-Legazpi. Hence, the Assurance Fund may be held answerable for
the monetary awards in favor of petitioners, should Anduiza be unable to pay the same
in whole or in part.29

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration,30 while the RD Legazpi and the
National Treasurer moved for a partial reconsideration;31 both of which were denied in an
Order32 dated April 30, 2014. Thus, they filed their respective notices of appeal. 33
However, in an Order34 dated June 11, 2014, petitioners' notice of appeal was denied due
course due to their failure to pay the appellate docket and other lawful fees. 35
Consequently, the Co Group moved for a partial entry of judgment, 36which the RTC
granted in an Order37 dated July 22, 2014. As such, only the appeal of the RD-Legazpi
and the National Treasurer questioning the subsidiary liability of the Assurance Fund was
elevated to the CA.38

The CA Ruling

In a Decision39 dated March 16, 2016, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling
insofar as the National Treasurer's subsidiary liability was concerned.40 It held that
petitioners only had six (6) years from the time Anduiza caused the cancellation of TCT
No. 13450 on October 9, 1995, or until October 9, 2001, within which to claim
compensation from the Assurance Fund. Since petitioners only filed their claim on March
18, 2009, their claim against the Assurance Fund is already barred by prescription. 41
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,42 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution43 dated May 19, 2016; hence, this petition.44

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners'
claim against the Assurance Fund has already been barred by prescription.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is granted.

I. Nature and Purpose of the Assurance Fund

It is a fundamental principle that "a Torrens certificate of Title is indefeasible and binding
upon the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction x x x in a
direct proceeding for cancellation of title."45 "The purpose of adopting a Torrens System
in our jurisdiction is to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. This is to avoid
any possible conflicts of title that may arise by giving the public the right to rely upon the
face of the Torrens title and dispense with the need of inquiring further as to the ownership
of the property."46
As a corollary, "every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him
to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. When a certificate
of title is clean and free from any encumbrance, potential purchasers have every right to
rely on such certificate. Individuals who rely on a clean certificate of title in making
the decision to purchase the real property are often referred to as 'innocent
purchasers for value' and 'in good faith."'47"Where innocent third persons, relying
on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the
property[,] the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation
of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public
confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under
the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been
regularly or irregularly issued."48

The rationale for the rule on innocent purchasers for value "is the public's interest in
sustaining 'the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful ownership
of the land or of any encumbrance' on it."49Notably, the term "innocent purchaser for
value" may also refer to an innocent mortgagee who had no knowledge of any defects in
the title of the mortgagor of the property, such as in this case.

However, while "public policy and public order demand x x x that titles over lands under
the Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends the stability of the
country's economy[,] x x x [p]ublic policy also dictates that those unjustly deprived
of their rights over real property by reason of the operation of our registration laws
be afforded remedies."50 Thus, as early as the 1925 case of Estrellado v. Martinez,51 it
has been discerned that remedies, such as an action against the Assurance Fund, are
available remedies to the unwitting owner:

The authors of the Torrens system x x x wisely included provisions intended to safeguard
the rights of prejudiced parties rightfully entitled to an interest in land but shut off from
obtaining titles thereto [because of the indefeasibility of a Torrens title]. [Therefore,] [a]s
suppletory to the registration of titles, pecuniary compensation by way of damages
was provided for in certain cases for persons who had lost their property. For this
purpose, an assurance fund was created. x x x52(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Assurance Fund is a long-standing feature of our property registration system which
is intended "to relieve innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that a
certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to land x x x."53Originally,
claims against the Assurance Fund were governed by Section 101 54 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." The language of this provision was
substantially carried over to our present "Property Registration Decree," i.e., Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1529,55 Section 95 of which reads:
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. – A person who, without negligence on
his part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest
therein in consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of the
Torrens system or arising after original registration of land, through fraud or in
consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or
in any entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the provisions of this
Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law from bringing an
action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein, may bring an action
in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be paid out of the
Assurance Fund.

In Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental v. Anglo, Sr.56 (Anglo, Sr.), the Court held that
"[b]ased solely on Section 95 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the following conditions
must be met: First, the individual must sustain loss or damage, or the individual is
deprived of land or any estate or interest. Second, the individual must not be negligent.
Third, the loss, damage, or deprivation is the consequence of either (a) fraudulent
registration under the Torrens system after the land's original registration, or (b)
any error, omission, mistake, or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or
memorandum in the registration book. [And] [f]ourth, the individual must be barred or
otherwise precluded under the provision of any law from bringing an action for the
recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein."57

Anent the first ground (i.e., item [a] of the third condition above), it should be clarified that
loss, damage, or deprivation of land or any estate or interest therein through fraudulent
registration alone is not a valid ground to recover damages against the Assurance Fund.
Section 101 of PD 1529 explicitly provides that "[t]he Assurance Fund shall not be liable
for any loss, damage or deprivation caused or occasioned by a breach of trust, whether
express, implied or constructive or by any mistake in the resurvey or subdivision of
registered land resulting in the expansion of area in the certificate of title." It is hornbook
doctrine that "[w]hen a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title of
property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party."58 However, as
stated in Section 101 of PD 1529, the inability to recover from the defrauding party does
not make the Assurance Fund liable therefor.

Instead, the loss, damage or deprivation becomes compensable under the

Assurance Fund when the property has been further registered in the name of an
innocent purchaser for value. This is because in this instance, the loss, damage or
deprivation are not actually caused by any breach of trust but rather, by the operation of
the Torrens system of registration which renders indefeasible the title of the innocent
purchaser for value. To note, it has been held that a mortgagee in good faith (such
as Rowena) stands as an innocent mortgagee for value with the rights of an
innocent purchaser for value.59
In the 1916 case of Dela Cruz v. Fabie,60 the Court discussed that it is necessary for the
property to have transferred to a registered innocent purchaser – not to a mere registered
purchaser – before recovery from the Assurance Fund may prosper, viz.:

The Attorney-General did not err when he wrote in his brief in the preceding case: "To
hold that the principal may recover damages from the assurance fund on account of such
a fraudulent act as that charged to Vedasto Velazquez in this case would be equivalent
to throwing open the door to fraud, to the great advantage of the registered landowner
and his agent and to the ruin and rapid disappearance of the assurance fund, and the
general funds of the Insular Treasury would become liable for the claims for indemnity in
cases where none such was due. This course would in time wreck the Insular Treasury
and enrich designing scoundrels." (Brief, p. 16.)

xxxx

The simple allegation contained in the complaint that Fabie is a registered purchaser is
not the same as that of his being a registered innocent purchaser. The fact of the sale
and the fact of the registration are not sufficient to allow the understanding that it was also
admitted in the demurrer that he was an innocent purchaser.

There is no law or doctrine that authorizes such an interpretation. The plaintiff must set
forth in his complaint all the facts that necessarily conduce toward the result sought by
his action. The action was for the purpose of recovering from the assurance fund
indemnity for the damage suffered by the plaintiff in losing the ownership of his land as a
result of the registration obtained by an innocent holder for value (purchase). It is a
necessary requirement of the law that the registered property shall have been
conveyed to an innocent holder for value who shall also have registered his
acquisition. Necessarily the complaint must show these facts as they are required by the
law. x x x61(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Later, in the 1936 case of La Urbana v. Bernardo,62 the Court qualified that ''it is a
condition sine qua non that the person who brings an action for damages against the
assurance fund be the registered owner, and, as to holders of transfer certificates of
title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value."63

In sum, the Court herein holds that an action against the Assurance Fund on the ground
of "fraudulent registration under the Torrens system after the land's original registration"
may be brought only after the claimant's property is registered in the name of an innocent
purchaser for value. This is because it is only after the registration of the innocent
purchaser for value's title (and not the usurper's title which constitutes a breach of trust)
can it be said that the claimant effectively "sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land
or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the land under the
operation of the Torrens system." The registration of the innocent purchaser for value's
title is therefore a condition sine qua non in order to properly claim against the Assurance
Fund.

II. Action for Compensation Against

the Assurance Fund; Prescriptive Period

An action for compensation against the Assurance Fund is a separate and distinct
remedy, apart from review of decree of registration or reconveyance of title, which can be
availed of when there is an unjust deprivation of property. 64 This is evident from the
various provisions of Chapter VII of PD 1529 which provide for specific parameters that
govern the action.

Among others, Section 95 of PD 1529 cited above states the conditions to claim against
the Assurance Fund. Meanwhile, Section 96 of the same law states against whom the
said action may be filed:

Section 96. Against whom action filed. – If such action is brought to recover for loss or
damage or for deprivation of land or of any estate or interest therein arising wholly through
fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of the court personnel, Register of
Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the performance of their
respective duties, the action shall be brought against the Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the land is situated and the National Treasurer as defendants. But
if such action is brought to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or
of any interest therein arising through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or
misfeasance of person other than court personnel, the Register of Deeds, his
deputy or other employees of the Registry, such action shall be brought against
the Register of Deeds, the National Treasurer and other person or persons, as co-
defendants. It shall be the duty of the Solicitor General in person or by representative to
appear and to defend all such suits with the aid of the fiscal of the province or city where
the land lies: Provided, however, that nothing in this Decree shall be construed to deprive
the plaintiff of any right of action which he may have against any person for such loss or
damage or deprivation without joining the National Treasurer as party defendant. In every
action filed against the Assurance Fund, the court shall consider the report of the
Commissioner of Land Registration. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As Section 96 of PD 1529 provides, "if [the] action is brought to recover for loss or damage
or for deprivation of land or of any interest therein arising through fraud, negligence,
omission, mistake or misfeasance of person other than court personnel, the Register of
Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the Registry, such action shall be brought
against the Register of Deeds, the National Treasurer and other person or persons, as
co-defendants." The phrase "other person or persons" would clearly include the usurper
who fraudulently registered the property under his name.

To recover against the Assurance Fund, however, it must appear that the execution
against "such defendants other than the National Treasurer and the Register of Deeds"
is "returned unsatisfied in whole and in part." "[O]nly then shall the court, upon proper
showing, order the amount of the execution and costs, or so much thereof as remains
unpaid, to be paid by the National Treasurer out of the Assurance Fund." Section 97 of
PD 1529 states:

Section 97. Judgment, how satisfied. – If there are defendants other than the National
Treasurer and the Register of Deeds and judgment is entered for the plaintiff and against
the National Treasury, the Register of Deeds and any of the other defendants, execution
shall first issue against such defendants other than the National Treasurer and the
Register of Deeds. If the execution is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and
the officer returning the same certificates that the amount due cannot be collected
from the land or personal property of such other defendants, only then shall the
court, upon proper showing, order the amount of the execution and costs, or so
much thereof as remains unpaid, to be paid by the National Treasurer out of the
Assurance Fund. In an action under this Decree, the plaintiff cannot recover as
compensation more than the fair market value of the land at the time he suffered the loss,
damage, or deprivation thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the afore-cited provision, it is apparent that a prior declaration of insolvency or

inability to recover from the usurper is not actually required before the claimant may file
an action against the Assurance Fund. Whether or not funds are to be paid out of the
Assurance Fund is a matter to be determined and resolved at the execution stage of the
proceedings. Clearly, this should be the proper treatment of the insolvency requirement,
contrary to the insinuation made in previous cases on the subject.65

Another important provision in Chapter VII of PD 1529 is Section 102, which incidentally
stands at the center of the present controversy. This provision sets a six (6)-year
prescriptive period "from the time the right to bring such action first occurred" within which
ore may proceed to file an action for compensation against the Assurance Fund, viz.:

Section 102. Limitation of Action. – Any action for compensation against the Assurance
Fund by reason of any loss, damage or deprivation of land or any interest therein shall be
instituted within a period of six years from the time the right to bring such action
first occurred: Provided, That the right of action herein provided shall survive to the legal
representative of the person sustaining loss or damage, unless barred in his lifetime; and
Provided, further, That if at the time such right of action first accrued the person entitled
to bring such action was a minor or insane or imprisoned, or otherwise under legal
disability, such person or anyone claiming from, by or under him may bring the proper
action at any time within two years after such disability has been removed,
notwithstanding the expiration of the original period of six years first above provided.
(Emphasis supplied)

Jurisprudence has yet to interpret the meaning of the phrase "from the time the right to
bring such action first occurred''; hence, the need to clarify the same.

The general rule is that "a right of action accrues only from the moment the right to
commence the action comes into existence, and prescription begins to run from that time
x x x."66 However, in cases involving fraud, the common acceptation is that the period of
prescription runs from the discovery of the fraud. Under the old Code of Civil Procedure,
an action for relief on the ground of fraud prescribes in four years, "but the right of action
in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud."67
Meanwhile, under prevailing case law, "[w]hen an action for reconveyance is based on
fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery
is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title. x x x
The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed
to have taken place at the time of registration."68

However, in actions for compensation against the Assurance Fund grounded on fraud,
registration of the innocent purchaser for value's title should only be considered as a
condition sine qua non to file such an action and not as a form of constructive notice for
the purpose of reckoning prescription. This is because the concept of registration as a
form of constructive notice is essentially premised on the policy of protecting the innocent
purchaser for value's title, which consideration does not, however, obtain in Assurance
Fund cases. As earlier intimated, an action against the Assurance Fund operates as form
of relief in favor of the original property owner who had been deprived of his land by virtue
of the operation of the Torrens registration system. It does not, in any way, affect the
rights of the innocent purchaser for value who had apparently obtained the property from
a usurper but nonetheless, stands secure because of the indefeasibility of his Torrens
certificate of title. The underlying rationale for the constructive notice rule – given that it
is meant to protect the interest of the innocent purchaser for value and not the original
title holder/claimant – is therefore absent in Assurance Fund cases. Accordingly, it should
not be applied, especially since its application with respect to reckoning prescription
would actually defeat the Assurance Fund's laudable purpose.

The Assurance Fund was meant as a form of State insurance that allows recompense to
an original title holder who, without any negligence on his part whatsoever, had been
apparently deprived of his land initially by a usurper. The ordinary remedies against the
usurper would have allowed the original title holder to recover his property. However, if
the usurper is able to transfer the same to an innocent purchaser for value and he is
unable to compensate the original title holder for the loss, then the latter is now left without
proper recourse. As exemplified by this case, original title holders are, more often than
not, innocently unaware of the unscrupulous machinations of usurpers and later on, the
registration of an innocent purchaser for value's title. If the constructive notice rule on
registration were to apply in cases involving claims against the Assurance Fund, then
original title holders – who remain in possession of their own duplicate certificates of title,
as petitioners in this case – are in danger of losing their final bastion of recompense on
the ground of prescription, despite the lack of any negligence or fault on their part. Truly,
our lawmakers would not have intended such an unfair situation. As repeatedly stated,
the intent of the Assurance Fund is to indemnify the innocent original title holder for his
property loss, which loss is attributable to not only the acts of a usurper but ultimately the
operation of the Torrens System of registration which, by reasons of public policy, tilts the
scales in favor of innocent purchasers for value.

Thus, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the
deliberations on this case, the constructive notice rule on registration should not be made
to apply to title holders who have been unjustly deprived of their land without their
negligence. The actual title holder cannot be deprived of his or her rights twice – first, by
fraudulent registration of the title in the name of the usurper and second, by operation of
the constructive notice rule upon registration of the title in the name of the innocent
purchaser for value. As such, prescription, for purposes of determining the right to
bring an action against the Assurance Fund, should be reckoned from the moment
the innocent purchaser for value registers his or her title and upon actual
knowledge thereof of the original title holder/claimant. As above-discussed, the
registration of the innocent purchaser for value's title is a prerequisite for a claim against
the Assurance Fund on the ground of fraud to proceed, while actual knowledge of the
registration is tantamount to the discovery of the fraud. More significantly, this
interpretation preserves and actualizes the intent of the law, and provides some form of
justice to innocent original title holders. In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,69 this
Court exhorted that:

[I]n seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x x70
In this case, it has been established that petitioners are residents of Spain and designated
no administrator over their property, i.e., Lot No. 1320, in the Philippines. They remain in
possession of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 13450 in their names,71 the
surrender of which was necessary in order to effect a valid transfer of title to another
person through a voluntary instrument.72 As the records show, not only did Anduiza, the
usurper, forge a deed of sale purportedly transferring petitioners' property in his favor,73
they were also not required by the RD-Legazpi or through a court order to surrender
possession of their owner's duplicate certificate of title for the proper entry of a new
certificate of title74 in Anduiza's favor. Neither was the issuance of TCT No. 42486 in the
name of Anduiza recorded/registered in the Primary Entry Book, nor was a copy of the
deed of sale in his favor kept on file with the RD-Legazpi.75 Consequently, petitioners
were not in any way negligent as they, in fact, had the right to rely on their owner's
duplicate certificate of title and the concomitant protection afforded thereto by the Torrens
system, unless a better right, i.e., in favor of an innocent purchaser for value, intervenes.76
As it turned out, Anduiza mortgaged Lot No. 1320 to Spouses Amurao, particularly
Rowena. As a result of Anduiza's default, Rowena foreclosed the mortgage, and
consequently, caused the cancellation of TCT No. 42486 and issuance of TCT No. 52392
in her name on July 19, 2001.77 Spouses Amurao and later, the Co group, in whose favor
the subject lot was sold – by virtue of the final judgment of the RTC – were conclusively
deemed as innocent purchasers for value. Their status as such had therefore been settled
and hence, cannot be revisited, lest this Court deviate from the long-standing principle of
immutability of judgments, which states:

A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in
the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors,
the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The
noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle
in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect
and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the
power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck
down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its
operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all
bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.78

In this regard, the RTC held that the Assurance Fund would be subsidiarily liable to
petitioners, should the judgment debt be left unsatisfied from the land or personal property
of Anduiza. If the constructive notice rule were to be applied, then petitioners' claim
against the Assurance Fund filed on March 18, 2009 would be barred, considering the
lapse of more than six (6) years from the registration of Spouses Amurao's title over the
subject lot on July 19, 2001. However, as earlier explained, the constructive notice rule
holds no application insofar as reckoning the prescriptive period for Assurance Fund
cases. Instead, the six (6)-year prescriptive period under Section 102 of PD 1529 should
be counted from January 28, 2008, or the date when petitioners discovered the
anomalous transactions over their property, which included the registration of Rowena's
title over the same. Thus, when they filed their complaint on March 18, 2009, petitioners'
claim against the Assurance Fund has not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the CA erred in
ruling otherwise.

To recount, the CA held that prescription under Section 102 of PD 1529 runs from the
time of the registration of the title in favor of the person who caused the fraud, i.e., the
usurper.79 As basis, the CA relied on the case of Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Heirs of
Valdez (Guaranteed Homes, Inc.),80 wherein the Court made the following statement:

Lastly, respondents' claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper. Section 101
of P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any loss,
damage or deprivation of any right or interest in land which may have been caused by a
breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive. Even assumingarguendo that
they are entitled to claim against the Assurance Fund, the respondents' claim has
already prescribed since any action for compensation against the Assurance Fund
must be brought within a period of six (6) years from the time the right to bring
such action first occurred, which in this case was in 1967.81 (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful perusal of the Guaranteed Homes, Inc. case in its entirety, the Court herein
discerns that the foregoing pronouncement on prescription was mere obiter dicta, and
hence, non-binding.82 Actually, the issue for resolution in that case revolved only around
petitioner Guaranteed Homes, Inc.'s motion to dismiss Pablo Pascua's (respondent's
predecessor) complaint for reconveyance on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action. Ultimately, the Court held that respondent's complaint failed to state a cause of
action for the reasons that: (a) the complaint does not allege any defect in the TCT
assailed therein; (b) the transfer document relied upon by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. (i.e.,
the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales) was registered and
had an operative effect; and (c) respondent cannot make a case for quieting of title since
their title was cancelled, but added, as an aside, that the claim against the Assurance
Fund would be improper "since the Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any loss,
damage or deprivation of any right or interest in land which may have been caused by a
breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive", and moreover, "[e]ven
assuming arguendo that they are entitled to claim against the Assurance Fund, the
respondents' claim has already prescribed."83 Thus, as it was not a pronouncement that
was made in relation to the actual issues involved, the quoted excerpt by the CA from
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. is not binding jurisprudence and hence, would not necessarily
apply to this case.
In any event, the reckoning of the six (6)-year period from the time a certificate of title was
issued in favor of the usurper is incorrect doctrine.84 At the risk of belaboring the point,
the registration of the property in the name of an innocent purchaser for value is integral
in every action against the Assurance Fund on the ground of "fraudulent registration under
the Torrens system after the land's original registration." This is because it is only at that
moment when the claimant suffers loss, damage or deprivation of land caused by the
operation of the Torrens system of registration, for which the State may be made
accountable. To follow the CA's ruling based on the obiter dictum in Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. is to recognize that the right of action against the Assurance Fund arises already at
the point when the usurper fraudulently registers his title. By legal attribution, this latter
act is a breach of an implied trust, which, however, by express provision of Section 101
of PD 1529, does not render the Assurance Fund liable. Thus, the CA committed
reversible error in ruling that the prescriptive period under Section 102 of PD1529 for filing
a claim against the Assurance Fund should be reckoned from the registration of the
usurper's title. On the contrary, the period should be reckoned from the moment the
innocent purchaser for value registers his or her title and upon actual knowledge thereof
of the original title holder/claimant. In this light, the claim has yet to prescribe.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 16, 2016 and the
Resolution dated May 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104207 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 19, 2013 and the Order
dated April 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 2 (RTC),
are hereby REINSTATED in toto. Accordingly, the RTC is hereby DIRECTEDto conduct
execution proceedings with reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 235652, JULY 09, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
XXX AND YYY,* ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants XXX and YYY
(accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated August 25, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 08446, which affirmed the Judgment3 dated
October 23, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 21802-B, 21803-B, 21804-B, and 24608-B, convicting them of
multiple counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons defined and penalized under Section 4
in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, 4 otherwise known as the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."

The Facts

This case stemmed from various Informations5 filed before the RTC, charging accused-
appellants and a certain John Doe of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, among
others, the accusatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 21802-B

The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses XXX and YYY of
the crime of Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208, committed as
follows:

That for the period comprising the years 2008, 2009, 2010 up to March 5, 2011, in the
City of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating with each other, by
deception and taking advantage of the vulnerability of the minor complainant being the
biological parents of the minor complainant having custody and control over AAA, 14
years old, born on 14 December 1996, did then and there maintain for the purpose of
prostitution and/or pornography said minor complainant by then and there providing food,
shelter and clothing to induce and persuade the said minor complainant, by using the
computer and webcam and internet connections, for the minor complainant to engage in
private chat wherein persons, usually foreigners would pay a fee, for the minor
complainant to show her genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area, and to perform simulated
sexual explicit activities as by touching and fondling her genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic
area, and uttering words as "FUCK ME!" "LICK ME", instilling in the mind of the minor
complainant that the same is necessary for their support and daily sustenance as the
earnings she derives from such activities will pay for the family's food, rental and utilities
in violation of the said law.

With the presence of the qualifying circumstances that (i) the trafficked person AAA, 14
years old, born on 14 December 1996, is a child and (ii) the accused are the parents of
the minor complainant.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 21803-B

The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses XXX and YYY of
the crime of Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208, committed as
follows:

That for the period comprising the year 2010 up to March 5, 2011, in the City of Cabuyao,
Province of Laguna, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring and confederating with each other, by deception and taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the minor complainant being the biological parents of the
minor complainant having custody and control over BBB, 10 years old, born on 14 May
2000, did then and there maintain for the purpose of prostitution and/or pornography said
minor complainant by then and there providing food, shelter and clothing to induce and
persuade the said minor complainant, by using the computer and webcam and internet
connections, to dance naked in front of the camera being viewed through the internet, by
a person/s, usually a foreigner named "Sam", who pays a fee, for the minor complainant
to: (i) for the minor complainant to engage in private chat wherein persons, usually
foreigners would pay for a fee, for the minor complainant to show her genitals, buttocks,
breasts, instilling in the mind of the minor complainant that the same is necessary for their
support and daily sustenance as the earnings she derives from such activities will pay for
the family's food, rental and utilities in violation of the said law.

With the presence of the qualifying circumstances that (i) the trafficked person BBB, 10
years old, born on 14 May 2000, is a child and (ii) the accused are the parents of the
minor complainant.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 21804-B.

The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses XXX and YYY of
the crime of Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208, committed as
follows:

That for the period comprising the year 2010 up to March 5, 2011, in the City of Cabuyao,
Province of Laguna, Philippines within the . jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring and confederating with each other, by deception and
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the minor complainant being the biological parents
of the minor complainant having custody and control over CCC, 9 years old, born on July
24, 2001, did then and there maintain for the purpose of prostitution and/or pornography
said minor complainant by then and there providing food, shelter and clothing to induce
and persuade the said minor complainant, by using the computer and webcam and
internet connections, to dance naked in front of the camera being viewed through the
internet, by person/s, usually a foreigner named "Sam", who pays a fee, for the minor
complainant to: (i) for the minor complainant to engage in private chat wherein persons,
usually foreigners would pay for a fee, for the minor complainant to show her genitals,
buttocks, breasts, pubic area[,] instilling in the mind of the minor complainant that the
same is necessary for their support and daily sustenance as the earnings she derives
from such support and daily sustenance as the earnings she derives from such activities
will pay for the family's food, rental and utilities in violation of the said law.

With the presence of the qualifying circumstances that (i) the trafficked person, CCC, 9
years old, born on July 24, 2001, is a child and (ii) the accused are the parents of the
minor complainant.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Criminal Case No. 24608-B

The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses XXX and JOHN
DOE, whose name and personal circumstances are yet unknown, for the crime of Section
4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", committed as follows:

That sometime in April 2010 or in the dates prior thereto in the City of Cabuyao, Province
of Laguna, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused XXX, being the mother of herein complainant AAA, 14 years old, born on 14
December 1996, by taking advantage of the vulnerability of the minor complainant as
being the mother accused exerts influence and control over the minor complainant with
the intention and purpose of exploitation and prostitution, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit, transport and provide complainant minor AAA, for the
purpose of prostitution by then and there bringing her from their residence in Cabuyao,
Laguna to the hotel room occupied by one JOHN HUBBARD, a foreign national in Makati
City wherein the said John Hubbard had sexual intercourse with the minor complainant
in exchange of material consideration in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).

With the qualifying circumstances that the trafficked person, AAA, 14 years old, born on
14 December 1996, is a child and that the accused is a parent and exercises parental
authority over the trafficked person as she is the mother of complainant AAA.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

The prosecution claimed that AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses XXX
and YYY. AAA claimed that sometime in April 2010, when she was just 13 years old, her
mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John Hubbard who
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged that from 2008 to
2011, XXX ordered her to engage in cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week in
pornographic websites where AAA was shown in her underwear and made to do sexual
activities in front of the computer. For their part, BBB and CCC corroborated AAA's
statements, both averring that from 2010-2011, XXX ordered them to dance naked in
front of the computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and
chatting with a certain "Sam," their usual client. BBB and CCC alleged that during those
sessions, their father YYY would be outside the room or fixing the computer. The children
all claimed that they were made to do sexual activities to earn money for their household
expenses which were collected by YYY in remittance centers.10

Sometime in February 2011, AAA sought the assistance of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) as she wanted her and her siblings to be rescued.
AAA was then taken by the DSWD Social Worker, who then coordinated with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After making an investigation and a technical verification
of the pornographic websites which revealed photos and transactions of AAA, the NBI
applied for and was granted a search warrant. Subsequently, the law enforcement
authorities implemented the search warrant, resulting in the rescue of AAA, BBB, and
CCC, the confiscation of the computer units and paraphernalia connected with the alleged
crimes, and the arrest of both XXX and YYY.11

For their defense, accused-appellants denied the accusations and claimed not knowing
any motive for their children's accusations as XXX is a housewife, while YYY works at a
printing press. They alleged that AAA ran away when she was impregnated by her
boyfriend and denied that computer gadgets were confiscated from them.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment13 dated October 23, 2015, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons as defined
and penalized under RA 9208. Accordingly, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00 for each count, and to pay the victims
the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each count.14 All other charges15 against them were dismissed for being superfluous
as they are deemed subsumed under the crimes for which they were convicted. 16

The RTC found that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the fact that
accused-appellants had conspired and confederated with one another to maintain and
exploit their children, AAA, BBB, and CCC, into committing cybersex with several
foreigners through various websites. In this regard, the RTC pointed out that accused-
appellants' assertion that the charges against them are merely fabricated cannot be given
credence in light of the children's clear and straightforward testimonies and the lack of ill
motive to testify against their own parents.17

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.18

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated August 25, 2017, the CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction,

with the following modifications: (a) YYY's conviction is reduced to three (3) counts of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons; and (b) the awards of damages for the victims were
increased to P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. 20

In affirming accused-appellants' respective convictions, the CA gave credence to the

testimonies of the three (3) children-victims who not only positively identified accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, but also straightforwardly explained the acts
of sexual exploitation perpetuated against them by their own parents. This
notwithstanding, the CA found it appropriate to find the children's father, YYY, guilty for
only three (3) counts of Qualified Trafficking, as he was only named as an accused in
three (3) of the four (4) total Informations21 for such crime filed before the RTC.22

Hence, this appeal.23

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not XXX and YYY are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) and three (3) counts, respectively, of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The same provision further provides
that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does
not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph." ." The crime of
"Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified under, among others, the following
circumstances:

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – The following are considered as qualified

trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

x x x x

(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public
officer or employee;

xxxx

In this case, accused-appellants were charged of three (3) counts each of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208.
XXX was further charged with another count of the same crime under Section 4 (a) also
in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of the same law. Section 4 (a) and (e) of RA 9208
reads:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training
or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

x x x x

(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;

xxxx

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation
to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208 as the prosecution had established beyond reasonable
doubt that: (a) they admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC, who
were all minors when the crimes against them were committed; (b) they made their
children perform acts of cybersex for different foreigner customers, and thus, engaged
them in prostitution and pornography; (c)they received various amounts of money in
exchange for the sexual exploitation of their children; and (d) they achieved their criminal
design by taking advantage of their children's vulnerability as minors and deceiving them
that the money they make from their lewd shows are needed for the family's daily
sustenance.

In the same manner, the courts a quo likewise correctly convicted XXX of one (1) count
of the same crime, this time under Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA
9208, as it was shown that XXX transported and provided her own minor biological child,
AAA, to a foreigner in Makati City for the purpose of prostitution, again under the pretext
that the money acquired from such illicit transaction is needed for their family's daily
sustenance.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of
the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact,
the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the
witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference should be accorded to
the same.24 As such, accused-appellants' conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons
must be upheld.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on accused-appellants, Section 10 (c) of RA 9208

states that persons found guilty of Qualified Trafficking shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000.00 but not more than P5,000,000.00.
Thus, the courts a quo correctly sentenced them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00 for each count of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

Finally, the courts a quo correctly ordered accused-appellants to pay the victims the
amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of Qualified Trafficking in Persons as such amounts are at par with prevailing
jurisprudence.25 Further, the Court deems it proper to impose on all monetary awards due
to the victims legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until
full payment.26

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 25, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 08446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas
follows:
(a)
In Criminal Case No. 21802-B, XXX and YYY are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons defined and penalized under Section 4 (e) in
relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208. Accordingly, they are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00. In addition,
they are ordered to pay the victim, AAA, the amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, both with legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from finality of judgment until fully paid;

(b)
In Criminal Case No. 21803-B, XXX and YYY are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons defined and penalized under Section 4 (e) in
relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208: Accordingly, they are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00. In addition,
they are ordered to pay the victim, BBB, the amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, both with legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from finality of judgment until fully paid;

(c)
In Criminal Case No. 21804-B, XXX and YYY are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons defined and penalized under Section 4 (e) in
relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208. Accordingly, they are. sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00. In
addition, they are ordered to pay the victim, CCC, the amounts of P500,000.00 as moral
damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, both with legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid; and

(d)
In Criminal Case No. 24608-B, XXX is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons defined and penalized under Section 4 (a) in relation to
Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208. Accordingly, she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00. In addition, she is
ordered to pay the victim, AAA, the amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and Pl
00,000.00 as exemplary damages, both with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 231130, JULY 09, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
GERALD TAMAYO CORDOVA AND MARCIAL DAYON EGUISO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Gerald Tamayo Cordova
(Cordova) and Marcial Dayon Eguiso (Eguiso; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing
the Decision2dated November 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.
HC. No. 02093, which affirmed the Decision3 dated May 18, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 47 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 05-27806, 05-27807, and 05-
27808, finding: (a) accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"; and (b)Cordova guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 of the same Act.

The Facts

An Information5 was filed before the RTC accusing Cordova of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs, and two (2) Informations6 charging Cordova and Eguiso of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portions of which state:

Crim. Case No. 05-27806

That on or about the 8th day of April 2005, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused [(Cordova)], not being
authorized by law to sell, trade, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, deliver, give away to a poseur-buyer one (1) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic packet containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
weighing 0.02 gram, in exchange for a price of P200.00 in marked money consisting of
two (2) one hundred peso bills with Serial Nos. DK121965 and VP 387750, in violation of
the aforementioned law.

Act contrary to law.7

Crim. Case No. 05-27807

That on or about the 8th day of April 2005, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused [(Cordova)], not being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control five (5)
elongated heat-sealed transparent plastic packets each containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 0.15 gram, in violation of the aforementioned
law.
Act contrary to law.8
Crim. Case No. 05-27808

That on or about the 8th day of April 2005, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused [(Eguiso)], not being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his posses8ion and under his custody and control one (1)
elongated heat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.04 gram, in violation of the aforementioned law.

Act contrary to law.9

The prosecution alleged that in the afternoon of April 7, 2005, members of the City Anti-
Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task Group (CAID-SOTG) of the Bacolod City Police
Office received information that a certain Bobot Cordova was engaged in selling of illegal
drugs and hosting pot sessions at the place rented by his sister in Purok Sigay, Barangay
2, Bacolod City. After surveillance, members of the CAID-SOTG decided to conduct a
buy-bust operation at around 1:30 in the afternoon of April 8, 2005 with PO3 10 Charlie E.
Sebastian (PO3 Sebastian) and the asset acting as poseur-buyers.11

On even date, PO3 Sebastian and the asset went to Cordova's place and were met at
the door by Cordova, with Eguiso beside him holding an elongated plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance. Cordova asked what they wanted and the asset
introduced PO3 Sebastian as a buyer of shabu. Cordova asked how much they will buy
and PO3 Sebastian answered that they want P200.00 worth of shabu. PO3 Sebastian
then gave the marked money to Cordova, who then went to the kitchen and got something
from the sole of his slippers. Cordova went back to PO3 Sebastian and handed him a
plastic sachet containing suspected shabu.12

Thereafter, PO3 Sebastian made a missed call to his colleagues, who then rushed to the
scene, and announced that they are police officers. Subsequently, PO3 Sebastian frisked
Cordova, which yielded five (5) more elongated plastic sachets of suspected shabu,
empty plastic sachets, and the marked money. The team further searched the kitchen
and confiscated drug repacking paraphernalia. PO3 Sebastian also collected one (1)
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance after he conducted a body search
on Eguiso.13

Accused-appellants were arrested and PO3 Sebastian marked his initials on the
confiscated sachets and prepared an inventory of the seized items in their presence. 14
After the arrest, barangay officials were informed of the buy bust operation and went to
the scene. Cordova and Eguiso were later brought to the barangay hall where PO3
Sebastian took photographs of the seized items and accused-appellants.15 PO3
Sebastian took custody of the items and kept it in his locker at their office on April 8, 2005
since allegedly there was no evidence custodian in their police station, which hence,
prompted him to deliver the same on April 11, 2005 where it was received at 11:10 a.m.
by a non-uniformed personnel of the crime laboratory.16 Police Senior Inspector Alexis
Guinanao (PSI Guinanao) later confirmed that the plastic sachets submitted by PO3
Sebastian all yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride,17 a dangerous drug.18

In their defense, Cordova claimed that he was with his girlfriend and Eguiso in the house
rented by his sister when suddenly armed persons entered the house without identifying
themselves. Accused-appellants claimed not knowing the armed men except PO3
Rolando Malate. Accused-appellants were threatened that if any illegal item was found,
a case for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 will be filed against them, and if they
surrender the drug items, only a case for Section 11 of the same Act will be filed. When
a body search on Cordova yielded nothing, accused-appellants were brought to the police
station and detained. Between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m., the police took Cordova to the barangay
hall where he was made to sign a document and his photograph taken. Cordova claimed
that there were no representatives from the media and the DOJ when the inventory was
conducted and that Eguiso was not present when the alleged inventory took place. 19

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision20 dated May 18, 2015, the RTC found Cordova liable for the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, as well as ordered him to pay a fine of P500,000.00. It also found Cordova
and Eguiso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
and accordingly, sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum, as well as to each
pay P300,000.00 as fine.21

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of Illegal Sale
of Dangerous Drugs as one (1) sachet of shabu was sold during the buy-bust operation.
PO3 Sebastian positively identified and narrated in detail how Cordova handed the sachet
of shabu to him, which was presented and duly identified in court. Moreover, the elements
of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were also established as five (5) heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were recovered from the person of
Cordova, while one (1) elongated plastic sachet was recovered from the person of
Eguiso.22 On the other hand, the RTC did not give merit to Cordova and Eguiso's defense
of denial and frame-up for being unsubstantiated. It also found sufficient the explanation
with respect to the examination of the drugs after the 24 hour mandatory period. 23
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed24 to the CA. Pending appeal, Eguiso applied for
and was granted bail.25

The CA Ruling

In a Decision26 dated November 8, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. 27 It held that
the prosecution, through the testimony of PO3 Sebastian, was able to prove that Cordova
committed the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. It also ruled that Cordova and
Eguiso's unlawful possession of the sachets of shabu has been duly established.28 Anent
the custody of the seized items, the CA held that the absence of the representatives from
the media and the DOJ are not fatal because the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs were properly preserved, in accord with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA 9165. On this score, the CA noted that there was an unbroken chain of custody
despite the request for examination being made on April 8, 2005 and the drugs being
forwarded on April 11, 2005 three days after.29

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-
appellants' conviction for the crimes charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 30 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."31

Here, Cordova was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, while Eguiso was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused
charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment.32 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged
with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.33

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in
the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.34

Pertinently, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining
the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.35 Under the said section, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640,36 the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately
after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and
the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.37 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,38 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.Indeed, the x x x presence of
such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 39

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 40 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 41 – provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds – will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.42 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its
IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.43 In People v. Almorfe,44the Court explained that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.45 Also, in People v. De Guzman,46 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.47

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the deviations from the prescribed
chain of custody rule were unjustified, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Cordova and Eguiso.

First. As stated-above, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that the apprehending
team shall immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of, among others, the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized. However, as admitted by PO3 Sebastian, Eguiso, who
is one of the accused-appellants, was not present during the required photography of the
seized items as shown by his absence in the photos taken, viz.:
[Atty. Gene Sonota (Atty. Sonota)]: Can you explain why in Exhibit "L" only Gerarld [sic]
Cordova was photographed? Where was Eguiso then?

[PO3 Sebastian]: Because at that time the main subject of our drug operation was
Cordova and it just so happened that Eguiso was present in the residence of Bobot
Cordova during said buy-bust operation. Maybe our office made an oversight in not
including Eguiso in the picture.48 (Emphasis supplied)

PO3 Sebastian accounted for Eguiso's absence by claiming that "maybe our office made
an oversight x x x." Clearly, this plain – and worse, even tentative – excuse of oversight
cannot be taken as a justifiable reason that would excuse non-compliance with the
procedure set forth by law. "It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21[, Article II]
of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality. Therefore, it must be shown that earnest efforts were exerted by
the police officers involved to comply with the mandated procedure so as to convince the
Court that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances." 49
Second. Records also fail to disclose that the other required witnesses, i.e., the
representatives from the DOJ and the media, were present during the required inventory
and photography of the seized items as required by law. As evinced by the Certification 50
signed by the barangay kagawads, the signatures of Eguiso, i.e., the other accused-
appellant, as well as the representatives from the media and the DOJ attesting to the
propriety of the police action are clearly missing therefrom.

In fact, there is dearth of evidence to show that the police officers even attempted to
contact and secure these witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that buy-bust operations
are usually planned out ahead of time. Neither did the police officers provide any
explanation for their non-compliance, such as a threat to their safety and security or the
time and distance which the other witnesses would have had to consider. 51

Finally. It appears that the chain of custody of the seized items was actually tainted by
irregular circumstances. In particular, records52 show that the time of apprehension on
April 8, 2005 was at 1:50 p.m. As disclosed by PO3 Sebastian during trial, the said items
were not delivered to the crime laboratory immediately because there was no chemist
present in the afternoon of April 8, 2005, a Friday, viz.:

[Atty. Sonota]: You will agree with me that after the recovery of the items on April 8, 2005,
it was only on April 11, 2005, or three days after, that the items were presented to the
forensic chemical officer for examination of the specimens?

[PO3 Sebastian]: Yes, sir.53

[Prosecutor Gwendolyn Tiu]: Please tell us the reason why it took you 3 days to deliver
the specimen to the laboratory?

[PO3 Sebastian]: It took us 3 days to submit the said specimen to the PNP Crime
Laboratory because on the day of operation that was April 8, it was Friday afternoon
and after the recovery we immediately made a request to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
which after forwarding the said specimen to the said office, there was no chemist
present at that particular time and it was only on Monday morning that the chemist
was present, April 11, 2005.54

Based on the testimony of PSI Guinanao, there was an agreement between the crime
laboratory and the police drug unit with respect to the procedure on apprehensions made
on Fridays to Sundays:
[Atty. Sonota]: In short, if the apprehension happens on a Friday and Saturdays and
Sundays, according to you, your office was close [sic] supposing on Monday is an official
holiday this specimen cannot be delivered to your office?

[PSI Guinanao]: We have an agreement with the apprehending officers especially the
DEU that if ever there are apprehensions on Friday we give them our cellphone number
so that they can reach us and we can open our office.

[Atty. Sonota]: In short, for 3 days the specimen which was allegedly confiscated on April
8, 2005 remained in the possession of the apprehending officer up to the time April 11,
2005 when it was delivered to your office?

[PSI Guinanao]: That is right, sir.55

However, this agreement was not followed by the police officers. Instead, the items seized
from Cordova and Eguiso were merely stored in the locker of PO3 Sebastian.56 The
request for laboratory examination was only received at 11:10 a.m. of April 11, 2005 by a
certain non-uniformed personnel by the name of Edwin Albarico. 57 Thus, three (3) days
had already passed since the items were seized from accused-appellants, during which
they were merely stored in PO3 Sebastian's locker. To note, the prosecution failed to
explain what security measures were employed to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items seized would not be compromised during the interim.

In People v. Abetong,58 the Court acquitted the accused therein considering, among
others, the failure of the police officers to explain the delay in the delivery of the drugs to
the chemist. It was held that "[w]hile the delay in itself is not fatal to the prosecution's case
as it may be excused based on a justifiable ground, it exposes the items seized to a higher
probability of being handled by even more personnel and, consequently, to a higher risk
of tampering or alteration,"59 as in this case.

Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
which were glaringly unjustified by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused-appellants, as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti had been compromised.60 As such, the Court finds accused-
appellants' acquittal in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.61

In People v. Miranda,62 prosecutors were strongly reminded that "they have the positive
duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA
9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge
but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the
fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not
raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court,
including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain
whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable
reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate
court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."63

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 8, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR. HC. No. 02093 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellants Gerald Tamayo Cordova and Marcial Dayon
Eguiso are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of
Gerald Tamayo Cordova, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 8962, JULY 09, 2018]

JILDO A. GUBATON, COMPLAINANT,
V.
ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from an affidavit-complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Jildo A. Gubaton (complainant) against respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin
D. Amador (respondent) on the ground of gross immoral conduct and/or immorality.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that respondent, a former Assistant Prosecutor at the City

Prosecutor's Office in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, was having an illicit romantic
relationship with his wife, Ma. Bernadette R. Tenorio-Gubaton (Bernadette), since 2005
up to the present.2

He averred that it was in the early part of 2008, while working in the United States of
America (USA), when he discovered the illicit relationship. Complainant and Bernadette's
house helper informed him through a phone call that a man whom she knows to be "Fiscal
Amador" often visits Bernadette. The house helper also told him that respondent spends
nights at their house and stays with Bernadette in their bedroom. When complainant
called Bernadette's dental clinic to verify the information, it was the secretary who took
his call. Upon inquiry, the latter confirmed that respondent and Bernadette have been
carrying on an illicit affair.3

Sometime in August 2009, complainant returned to the country. On his first night home,
despite his pleas, Bernadette refused to lie and sleep with him; instead, she demanded
that he sleep in another room, to which he acceded in order to avoid any argument. Since
then, Bernadette has refused to sleep with him. Further, complainant discovered some
birth-control pills and condoms in their house, in Bernadette's dental clinic, and in her
handbag. When he confronted her about it, she merely denied ownership thereof. He also
alleged that Bernadette wrote love letters/notes4 to respondent, as in fact, one of these
letters had the word "fiscal"5on it.6

Complainant likewise alleged that he personally saw respondent and Bernadette together
in various places in Malaybalay City. At one instance, he saw them kissing while inside a
vehicle; when he approached to confront them, respondent ran away. 7

The illicit affair of respondent and Bernadette was known to other people as well.
Complainant's sister, Nila Canoy,8 told him about it during phone calls while he was still
in the USA,9 as narrated in her affidavit.10 Likewise, Carlos Delgado (Delgado), Chief of
Barangay Public Safety Office in Poblacion, Malaybalay City, and one Edgar Navarez
(Navarez), an employee of the Bureau of lnternal Revenue (BIR) and a resident of
Casisang, Malaybalay City, knew of the affair and executed their respective affidavits 11
relative thereto.

In defense,12 respondent denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that he was
merely acquainted with Bernadette and they would only see each other on various
occasions and social gatherings. He also denied the incident where complainant allegedly
saw him and Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle.13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After due proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), through Commissioner Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (Commissioner
Gomos), issued a Report and Recommendation14 dated June 27, 2012 recommending
the dismissal of the affidavit-complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

Commissioner Gomos found that the information supplied by complainant and

Bernandette's house helper, Bernadette's clinic secretary, and complainant's sister, Nila,
about the alleged illicit affair were purely hearsay. Likewise, the supposed love
letters/notes offered in evidence did not prove that the same were written by Bernadette
to respondent. Similarly, the affidavit executed by Delgado did not positively refer to
respondent, while that of Navarez contained general statements of an affair between
respondent and Bernadette.15 As for the affidavit executed by Nila, the same is clearly
biased in view of the latter's relationship with complainant.16 Finally, with respect to the
incident where complainant allegedly saw respondent and Bernadette kissing inside a
vehicle and attempted to confront them, Commissioner Gomos found the same to be
contrary to human experience, reasoning that an offended husband would be expected
to do more than just confront them under the circumstances.17

In a Resolution18 dated June 22, 2013, however, the IBP Board of Governors reversed
the June 27, 2012 Report and Recommendation, and instead, suspended respondent
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent moved for
reconsideration,19 which was denied in a Resolution 20 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not grounds exist to hold
respondent administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
should be held administratively liable with modification, however, as regards the penalty
to be imposed.

It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise.21

In this case, substantial evidence exist to prove complainant's claim that respondent had
illicit affairs with Bernadette and hence, should be adjudged guilty of gross immorality.

As per complainant's own account, he actually saw respondent and Bernadette together
on various intimate occasions. In fact, he attempted to confront them at one time when
he saw them kissing inside a vehicle, although respondent was able to evade him.22 The
Court is inclined to believe that complainant's imputations against respondent are
credible, considering that he had no ill motive to accuse respondent of such a serious
charge – much more a personal scandal involving his own wife – unless the same were
indeed true.

Complainant's statements were corroborated by the affidavit executed by Navarez, who

works in BIR, Malaybalay City as a messenger and therefore, goes around the city in
relation to his work. Navarez categorically stated that respondent and Bernadette have
been carrying on an illicit affair while complainant was in the USA, and further averred
that he had seen them together on different intimate occasions. He even saw them kissing
each other at one instance.23 Notably, it must be highlighted that Navarez is a neutral and
disinterested witness and hence, his declarations deserve ample consideration.

Moreover, complainant's sister, Nila, described to complainant, while the latter was in the
USA, how respondent would often visit Bernadette and spend the night in their residence,
while she was still living with Bernadette and their children thereat. She narrated that
Bernadette first introduced respondent to her as a "cousin" from Davao City. However,
the two would often have lunch in the house and thereafter, respondent would even spend
some time with Bernadette inside the latter's bedroom. Nila likewise recounted that
whenever the two of them arrived home in one vehicle, they would kiss each other before
alighting therefrom.24

In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that complainant offered in evidence love
letters/notes supposedly written by Bernadette to respondent to prove the existence of
their illicit relationship. The authenticity of these love letters/notes, although not expressly
shown to be written by Bernadette or received by respondent, were not refuted.
Consequently, they lend credibility to complainant's claim.

Finally, it should be clarified that while the information supplied by complainant and
Bernadette's house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary about the alleged illicit affair
constitute hearsay, the same should not be completely disregarded. Under the doctrine
of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The doctrine on independently
relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third
person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually
made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in
itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of
such fact. Accordingly, the hearsay rule does not apply, and hence, the statements are
admissible as evidence.25 Verily, complainant personally attests that the information
about the illicit affair between respondent and his wife have been relayed to him by
complainant's house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary. Clearly, the making of such
statements is circumstantially relevant to this case and therefore, may be considered in
evidence against respondent. Besides, in Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of
Umali, Jr. v. Hernandez:26

The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary administrative proceedings against

judges and justices where bribery proceedings are involved is not a novel thought in this
Court; it has been advocated in the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D.
Brion in the administrative case of Justice Ong before this Court. The Opinion essentially
maintained that the Court could make a conclusion that bribery had taken place when the
circumstances – including those derived from hearsay evidence – sufficiently prove its
occurrence. It was emphasized that [t]o satisfy the substantial evidence requirement
for administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented
and corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay.27 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Given that the purported hearsay are supplemented and corroborated by other evidence
that are not hearsay, the Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the same
pronouncement to this particular case.

For his part, respondent only proffered a bare denial of the imputed affair. He insists that
he was merely acquainted with Bernadette and that they would only see each other during
social gatherings or by pure accident. The thrust of his denial was that, although they
would see each other on occasion, such meetings were innocent, as in instances when
she gave him a short ride from his office to the trial court, the times when he visited her
dental clinic for a procedure and during its anniversary celebration, and when he
"bumped" into her at a department store and she apologized to him for her husband's
jealousy.28

Suffice it to say that "[d]enial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit credibility, it must
be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. If unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence [as in this case] it is negative and self-serving, deserving no greater
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters." 29 In
any event, the Court observes that the alleged "accidental" and "innocent" encounters of
respondent and Bernadette are much too many for comfort and coincidence. Such
encounters actually buttress the allegations of the witnesses that they carried on an illicit
affair.

All told, the Court finds that substantial evidence – which only entail "evidence to support
a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise"
– exist to prove complainant's accusation of gross immorality against respondent.

Based on jurisprudence, extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as offensive to the

sanctity of marriage, the family, and the community. When lawyers are engaged in
wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual recourse is for the
erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.30This is because
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.31 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment,
depending on the circumstances of the case. In case of suspension, the period would
range from one year32 to indefinite suspension.33 Under the given circumstances, the
Court sees fit to impose on respondent a penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year.34
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross
immorality. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court
that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where
he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in
respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 226405, JULY 23, 2018]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER,
V.
EFREN BONGAIS, HOUSING AND HOMESITE REGULATION OFFICER IV, CITY
HOUSING AND SETTLEMENTS OFFICE, CALAMBA CITY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated April
7, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated July 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139835, which modified the Decision4 dated September 16, 2014 and the Order5
dated January 12, 2015 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), and found
respondent Efren Bongais (Bongais) guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.

The Facts

The present case stemmed from a Letter-Complaint6 dated September 30, 2010 filed
before the Ombudsman by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging Bongais,
among others,7 in his capacity as Housing and Homesite Regulation Officer IV of the City
Housing and Settlements Office, City of Calamba, Laguna, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty by conniving and confederating with other known public officers and private
individuals in defrauding the Bank of the Philippine Islands Family Bank (BPI Family). The
complaint alleged that sometime in 2002, the local government of Calamba expropriated
a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-443878 (subject title)
issued in the name of Ferdinand Noguera (Noguera). Thereafter, the owner's duplicate
copy of the subject title was surrendered to the local government and placed under the
custody of Bongais. In May 2005, however, the said duplicate copy was lost. Thus, on
May 3, 2005, Bongais executed an Affidavit of Loss 9 stating that he discovered that the
owner's duplicate copy of the subject title was missing and that despite diligent efforts on
his part to locate the said title, the same remains missing and thus presumed lost. The
following day, or on May 4, 2005, Bongais submitted the Affidavit of Loss to the Register
of Deeds (RD) for annotation.10

On August 25, 2005, however, records show that an Affidavit of Recovery11 was allegedly
executed by Bongais, albeit the same was filed with the RD and annotated at the back of
the original title only on August 6, 2007.12

On January 4, 2008, the City of Calamba filed a petition13 praying for the nullification of
the lost owner's duplicate copy of the subject title and issuance of a new title in its place. 14
During the pendency of the said petition, it was discovered that the subject title was
already cancelled by the RD and replaced with TCT No. T-70886115 issued in the name
of Technoasia Airconditioning Refrigeration, Inc. (Technoasia) by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale,16 which was executed on June 4, 2008 by the attorney-in-fact of Noguera's
heirs in favor of Technoasia. Subsequently, Technoasia sold the property to spouses
Reuel Rene and Elizabeth Miravite17 (Spouses Miravite) who, in order to pay for the
purchase price, obtained a loan from the BPI Family with the property as collateral. As a
result, TCT No. T-708861 was cancelled and TCT T-73013918 was issued in the name of
Spouses Miravite. Not long after, the BPI Family received information that its transaction
with Spouses Miravite was irregular; thus, it requested the latter to put up another
collateral, but to no avail.19

In his Counter-Affidavit,20 Bongais denied the allegations against him and maintained that
he was not privy to the transaction between the bank and the other parties thereto. He
claimed that his participation was limited to the physical custody of the duplicate copy of
the subject title, which was part of his duties as personnel of the City Planning and
Development Office, and that he observed due diligence in handling said title by securing
it in a file cabinet which is beyond the access of other persons. Further, he denied having
executed an Affidavit of Recovery after he caused annotation of the Affidavit of Loss on
the copy of the said title in the RD's custody, pointing out that the signatures appearing
in both affidavits were different.21

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Decision22 dated September 16, 2014, the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative
case against the other public officers, but found Bongais guilty of Grave Misconduct, and
accordingly, meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service and its accessory
penalties.23 While the Ombudsman did not find any conspiracy among Bongais and his
co-respondents in the resulting fraudulent transaction, it found sufficient reason to hold
Bongais liable for the loss of the subject title, maintaining that while he claimed that its
loss might have been due to thievery – considering that it was securely kept inside the
office file cabinet over which no other person had access – Bongais did not state nor
show that the cabinet or its lock was destroyed or damaged due to its forcible opening.
Neither did he offer any explanation as to how the alleged thievery was done. In this
regard, the Ombudsman noted that in August 2005, Bongais also lost another title in his
custody covering a property likewise expropriated by the City of Calamba. To the
Ombudsman, notwithstanding the importance of these documents, Bongais did not report
the incidents to the proper authorities, thus, giving the impression that he had a hand in
their loss. Accordingly, the Ombudsman concluded that the loss of these titles, which
were under Bongais's official custody on two different occasions, showed "gross neglect
of duty amounting to grave misconduct"24 on his part.

Aggrieved, Bongais sought reconsideration,25 which the Ombudsman denied in an

Order26 dated January 12, 2015. Thus, he elevated the case to the CA via Petition for
Review27 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision28 dated April 7, 2016, the CA granted the petition, and accordingly, modified
the Ombudsman Decision, finding Bongais guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty only and
imposing on him the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months. 29 According to
the CA, there is nothing in the records that supports the Ombudsman's conclusion that
Bongais intentionally or flagrantly disregarded established rules or laws in order to hold
him liable for grave misconduct. In this regard, it pointed out that there is no evidence that
Bongais participated in or had any direct connection with those who perpetuated the
fraud. On the contrary, records show that as soon as he discovered that the owner's
duplicate copy of the subject title was missing, Bongais immediately executed an Affidavit
of Loss and caused its annotation on the title in the custody of the RD. While an Affidavit
of Recovery was subsequently recorded in the RD, causing the cancellation of the subject
title and issuance of a new one in Technoasia's name, the CA observed that the same
does not bear Bongais's signature, and thus, could not be attributed to him. Additionally,
the CA pointed out that while he is the only person who had access to the storage facility
where the said title was kept and the same lacked any sign of forcible opening, it could
not be concluded that he deliberately lost the copy of the title or that he was consciously
indifferent to the consequences of the act. To the CA, Bongais was, at most, careless as
he failed to give proper attention to how he had stored the lost owner's duplicate copy of
the subject title, which careless act can be categorized as Simple Neglect of Duty. 30

Dissatisfied with the CA ruling, the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene
and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration,31 arguing that it "was not expressly
impleaded as a party-respondent in the case," and thus, prayed for leave to intervene. 32
In a Resolution33 dated July 26, 2016, the CA denied the Ombudsman's Omnibus Motion
for lack of interest to intervene in the proceeding; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in denying the
Ombudsman's Omnibus Motion to Intervene.

The Court's Ruling

The Ombudsman argues, in the main, that the CA erred in denying its Omnibus Motion
to Intervene, reasoning out that as the protector of the people against errant government
employees, it has the legal interest to intervene and defend its decision before the CA. 34
In support, it cites Ombudsman v. Quimbo35 (Quimbo), which in turn cited Ombudsman
v. De Chavez36 (De Chavez) and Ombudsman v. CA and Macabulos37 (Macabulos). In
this light, the Ombudsman reiterates that the evidence warrant the finding of
administrative liability on Bongais's part for Gross Neglect of Duty tantamount to Gross
Misconduct. 38

For his part, Bongais asserts that the Ombudsman has no legal interest to intervene in
the proceeding, citing Ombudsman v. Sison39 (Sison) and Republic v. Namboku Peak,
Inc;40 and that, in any case, the CA did not err in downgrading the offense to Simple
Neglect of Duty as there is no sufficient evidence to prove the charge of Grave
Misconduct.41

Jurisprudence defines intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not originally

impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. 42 It is, however,
settled that intervention is not a matter of right, but is instead addressed to the sound
discretion of the courts43 and can be secured only in accordance with the terms of the
applicable statute or rule.44 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court prescribes the manner by which
intervention may be sought, thus:
Section 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Section 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (Emphases supplied)
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the intervenor must possess
legal interest in the matter in controversy. Legal interest is defined as such interest that
is actual and material, direct and immediate such that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.45 In addition to legal interest,
the intervenor must file the motion to intervene before rendition of the judgment, the
intervention being ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation, not an independent
action.46 Corollarily, when the case is resolved or is otherwise terminated, the right to
intervene likewise expires.47

The Court agrees that the Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in
administrative cases resolved by it. In the 2008 case of Ombudsman v.
Samaniego48(Samaniego), the Court categorically ruled that, even if not impleaded as a
party in the proceedings, the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to intervene and
defend its ruling in administrative cases before the CA, its interest proceeding, as it is,
from its duty to act as a champion of the people and to preserve the integrity of the public
service. Thus, the Court explained:

[T]he Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are
public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss
investigations directed against them. Its function is critical because public interest (in the
accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake.

xxxx

In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman
correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim,
it invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary
authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases
against public officials. To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its
salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and accountability.
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into
whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense
punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was
in keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the
integrity of public service that petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully
within the parameters of its authority.

It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the
exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the
Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as
provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.

xxxx

Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose
decision was in question. This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful)
of the power, duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when
defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government
personnel, the offense is committed against the government and public interest.
What further proof of a direct constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public
officers is necessary?49 (Emphases supplied)

The Court reiterated Samaniego and upheld the Ombudsman's standing to intervene in
De Chavez, Quimbo – cited by the Ombudsman – and recently, in Ombudsman v.
Gutierrez50 (Gutierrez). It appears, therefore, that as matters stand, Samaniegoremains
to be the prevailing doctrine, and thus, the Court upholds the Ombudsman's personality
to intervene in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases. In asserting that "there is
a need for [it] to uphold the existence and exercise" of its "administrative disciplinary
power x x x endowed by no less than the Constitution and [Republic Act] No. 6770", 51 the
Ombudsman, in this case, had indubitably shown such legal interest sufficient to clothe it
with personality to intervene in the proceeding. Since its power to ensure enforcement of
its Decision and Order was in danger of being impaired, the Ombudsman had a clear
legal interest in defending its right to have its judgment carried out.

The Court is likewise aware of the 2010 case of Sison, 52 cited by Bongais, where it
disallowed the Ombudsman's intervention despite the ruling in Samaniego. The Court
held in Sison that, as the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case
and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service, the Ombudsman is not an
appropriate party to intervene in the appeal of its decision. This is because in acting as
the adjudicator, the Ombudsman is not an active combatant in such proceeding, and thus,
must remain detached and impartial, leaving the opposing parties to contend their
individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without its active
participation. The Court concluded then that the government party with the standing to
appeal is the one prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. The Court
took a similar stance in the earlier case of Ombudsman v. Magno53 (Magno) as well as in
the 2012 case of Ombudsman v. Liggayu54 (Liggayu).

It should be pointed out, however, that in these cases, the Ombudsman moved to
intervene after the CA had already rendered judgment on the appeal of its administrative
ruling. Thus, it would appear that the Court was impelled to deny the Ombudsman's
intervention in these cases because it was already filed beyond the allowable period. In
the 2017 case of Gutierrez, the Court clarified this apparent conflict between Sison,
Magno, and Liggayu, on the one hand, and Samaniego, De Chavez, and Quimbo on the
other hand, as it held that:

[A]s things currently stand, Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. The
Ombudsman has legal interest in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases.
Petitioner could not then be faulted for filing its Omnibus Motion before the appellate court

x x x.
xxxx

It is [the] requirement of timeliness that petitioner failed to satisfy, prompting the appellate
court to issue the July 23, 2009 Resolution denying the Omnibus Motion. This course of
action by the CA finds jurisprudential basis in Magno, Sison, and Liggayu. x x xA review
of these cases would show that the Ombudsman prayed for the admission of its
pleading-in-intervention after the CA has already rendered judgment, and despite
the Ombudsman's knowledge of the pendency of the case, in clear contravention
of Sec. 2, Rule 19. This substantial distinction from the cases earlier discussed
justifies the denial of the motions to intervene in Magno, Sison, and Liggayu.x x x
xxxx

Thus, in the three cases that seemingly strayed from Samaniego, it can be said that
under the circumstances obtaining therein, the appellate court had a valid reason
for disallowing the Ombudsman to participate in those cases because the latter
only moved for intervention after the CA already rendered judgment. By that time,
intervention is no longer warranted.55 (Emphases supplied)

In the face of the clarification made in Gutierrez, it should now be considered as settled
doctrine that the Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene in appeals from its rulings
in administrative cases, provided, that the Ombudsman moves for intervention before
rendition of judgment, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules Court, lest its motion be denied
as the Court did in Sison, Magno, and Liggayu.
The rule requiring intervention before rendition of judgment, however, is not inflexible. As
jurisprudence has shown, interventions have been allowed even beyond the period
prescribed in the Rule when demanded by the higher interest of justice; to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard; to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the
parties;56 or, because of the grave legal issues raised,57 as will be shown below. Stated
otherwise, the rule may be relaxed and intervention may be allowed subject to the court's
discretion after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.58 After all, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully
and completely available for justice; its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice.59

Concrete examples of the exception to the period rule in intervention are the cases of
Quimbo and Macabulos, cited by the Ombudsman, where the Court allowed the
Ombudsman to intervene despite the fact that the CA had already rendered its decision.
Other examples are Ombudsman v. Santos 60 (Santos) and Ombudsman v. Beltran61
(Beltran). Notably, the Court's action allowing the Ombudsman's belated intervention in
these cases present a contrary argument to the conclusion reached in Gutierrez as
regards Sison, Magno, and Liggayu 's deviation from Samaniego, as discussed above.

In Quimbo and Macabulos, as well as Santos and Beltran, it may be observed that apart
from the sufficiency of the Ombudsman's findings of administrative liability, the validity or
constitutionality of the Ombudsman's powers and mandate was put in issue. For example,
the issue of whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to directly impose sanctions
on the public official or employee it found to be at fault was raised and addressed by the
Court in Quimbo, Santos, and Beltran. For this reason, the Court considered the
Ombudsman as the real party-in-interest, considering the "essence of the Ombudsman's
constitutionally and statutorily conferred powers establishing its clear legal interest in
ensuring that its directive be implemented."62Macabulos, on the other hand, presented
the questions of whether or not the Ombudsman is barred by prescription from
investigating a complaint filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the act
complained of, and whether or not the penalty of dismissal pending appeal is immediately
executory. The Court, in Macabulos, allowed the intervention, as it declared that "x x x
the appellate court not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman but also delved into
the investigatory power of the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not impleaded
as a party when the case was appealed to the [CA] in accordance with Section 6, Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to move for
intervention and reconsideration of the decision in order to prevent the undue restriction
of its constitutionally mandated investigatory power."63 Thus, it would appear that the
Court allowed the Ombudsman's belated intervention in Quimbo, Macabulos, Santos, and
Beltran because of the grave legal issues raised that affected the Ombudsman's mandate
and power, which, as mentioned, may be considered as an exception to the general rule
reinforced in Gutierrez that the intervention must be timely made by the Ombudsman
before rendition of judgment.

Translating these principles to the current petition, the status of the Ombudsman as a
party adversely affected by – and therefore with the legal standing to assail – the CA
Decision did not automatically warrant the grant of its motion to intervene. Since the Court
does not find any of the excepting circumstances laid down in jurisprudence, including
those laid down in Santos, Beltran, Macabulos, and Quimbo, obtaining in this case, the
general rule provided under Section 2 of Rule 19, as reinforced in Gutierrez, squarely
applies. Hence, while the Ombudsman had legal interest to intervene in the proceeding
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139835, the period for the filing of its motion to intervene had already
lapsed as it was filed after the CA had promulgated its Decision.

Additionally, it is well to point out that prior to the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Intervene,
the Ombudsman was, pursuant to the Rules,64 specifically furnished the following
orders/resolutions of the CA: (1) Resolution65 dated May 22, 2015 requiring therein
respondent NBI to file its Comment; (2) Resolution66 dated August 12, 2015 directing the
NBI to show cause why the Petition for Review should not be submitted for decision
without its Comment for failure to file the same despite actual receipt of the CA's May 22,
2015 Resolution; (3) Resolution67 dated October 20, 2015 noting the Manifestation68 filed
by the NBI Director; (4) Resolution69 dated February 17, 2016 submitting for decision the
Petition for Review without the NBI's comment, the filing thereof having been deemed
waived for the NBI's failure to file the same within the allowed period; and (5) Notice of
Decision70 dated April 7, 2016.71 Despite these notices and the NBI's clear failure to act
(on Bongais's petition) to defend the Ombudsman Decision that was in danger of being
impaired, the latter chose not to take action until the CA had rendered its Decision
modifying its (the Ombudsman's) ruling. Worse, it did not offer any justifiable explanation
for its belated attempt at intervention, other than the feeble excuse that "it was not
expressly impleaded as a respondent"72 in Bongais's petition. To the Court's mind, in
choosing not to act sooner, the Ombudsman had clearly waived its legal standing to
intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 139835, which the Court cannot now restore.

All told, the CA did not commit reversible error when it denied the Ombudsman's Omnibus
Motion to Intervene. While the Ombudsman had legal standing to intervene in Bongais's
petition for review before the CA, the period for the filing of its motion to intervene had
already lapsed as it was filed after the CA had promulgated its assailed Decision.
Consequently, the present petition must be denied, without the need to delve into the
merits of the substantive arguments raised.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated April 7, 2016
and the Resolution dated July 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 139835
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018]

RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN
MASBATE, Petitioners,
v.
RICKY JAMES RELUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated January 12, 2017
and the Omnibus Resolution3 dated October 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 144406, which set aside the Orders dated December 4, 2015 4 and January
7, 20165 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 8 (RTC) in Special
Proceeding (SP) No. FC-15-239, directed the remand of the case to the RTC for trial, and
granted respondent Ricky James Relucio (Ricky James) "temporary custody" once a
month for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours over the minor, Queenie Angel
M. Relucio (Queenie), his illegitimate daughter with petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate
(Renalyn), on top of visitation rights fixed at two (2) days per week.

The Facts

Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living
together with Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, or
in April 2015, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving
Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James.6

Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate
(Renalyn's parents) took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When
asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy of a
Special Power of Attorney7 (SPA) executed by Renalyn granting full parental rights,
authority, and custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition
for habeas corpus and child custody8 docketed as SP No. FC-15-239 before the RTC
(petition a quo).9
A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015, where Renalyn brought Queenie and
expressed the desire for her daughter to remain in her custody.10

The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated December 4, 2015, the RTC ruled that the custody of three (3)-year-
old Queenie rightfully belongs to Renalyn, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code, which states that "[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age shall be
separated from the mother x x x." The RTC likewise found that, while Renalyn went to
Manila to study dentistry and left Queenie in the custody of her parents, her intention was
to bring Queenie to Manila at a later time. Thus, in the fallo of said Order, the RTC
declared that it will "NOT GIVE FURTHER DUE COURSE" to the petition a quo.12

Dissatisfied, Ricky James moved for reconsideration,13 lamenting the "[extraordinary]

speed in the issuance of the x x x award of custody over the child to [petitioners]." 14 He
claimed that the hearing conducted on December 3, 2015 was not the kind of hearing that
was procedurally contemplated under A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,15 otherwise known as the
"Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors,"
because the RTC merely propounded random questions without placing the witnesses
on the stand to testify under oath. Moreover, he was allegedly deprived of his right to due
process when the RTC refused to give further due course to the petition a quo.16

The motion was denied in an Order17 dated January 7, 2016, wherein the RTC
emphasized that Queenie was born out of wedlock, for which reason she shall be under
the parental authority of her mother, Renalyn, pursuant to Article 176 18 of the Family
Code. In addition, the RTC faulted Ricky James for failing to present credible evidence in
court to demonstrate that Renalyn is unfit to take custody of their daughter.19

Aggrieved, Ricky James filed an appeal20 before the CA, imputing error upon the RTC:
(a) in not conducting a full blown trial and not receiving evidence; (b) in granting sole
custody to Renalyn without giving paramount consideration to the best interests of the
child; and (c) in not granting him shared custody and/or visitation rights. 21 Ricky James
insisted that the tender-age presumption in Article 213 of the Family Code is rebuttable
by evidence of the mother's neglect, abandonment, and unemployment, among other
factors, and claimed that Renalyn abandoned Queenie when she went to live in Manila
and failed to seek employment to support her daughter.22

For their part, Renalyn and her parents (petitioners) moved for the outright dismissal of
the appeal on the ground that no appeal can be had against an order denying a motion
for reconsideration. In addition, petitioners argued that being the illegitimate father of
Queenie, Ricky James has absolutely no right of custody over her, and that Renalyn's act
of entrusting the care of Queenie to her parents was not a renunciation of parental
authority but only a temporary separation necessitated by her need to adjust to her
studies, which she undertook to improve her and Queenie's life.23

On September 2, 2016, the case was referred to mediation, but the parties were unable
to arrive at a settlement.24

The CA Ruling

In a Decision25 dated January 12, 2017, the CA set aside the assailed RTC Orders and
remanded the case to the lower court for determination of who should exercise custody
over Queenie.26 The CA found that the RTC hastily dismissed the petition a quoupon
Queenie's production in court, when the objective of the case was to establish the
allegation that Renalyn had been neglecting Queenie, which was a question of fact that
must be resolved by trial.27 Citing Section 18 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that,
"[a]fter trial, the court shall render judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the
proper party considering the best interests of the minor," the CA declared that the
dismissal by the RTC of the petition a quo was not supported by the Rules.28

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the RTC Orders granting custody to Renalyn "pending the
outcome of the case," stating that only Queenie's mother, Renalyn, has parental authority
over her as she is an illegitimate child. Further, the CA declared that the RTC must thresh
out Renalyn's capacity to raise her daughter, which shall, in tum, determine whether or
not the tender-age presumption must be upheld, or whether Queenie's well-being is better
served with her remaining in the custody of her maternal grandparents in the exercise of
their substitute parental authority or with Ricky James, who was Queenie's actual
custodian before the controversy.29

Finally, the CA granted Ricky James visitation rights of two (2) days a week, with provision
for additional visitation days that may be permitted by Renalyn.30

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,31 while Ricky James filed a motion for
clarification32 asking that he be allowed to pick up Queenie from petitioners' residence on
a Friday afternoon and to return the child on a Sunday afternoon. 33 In their
Comment,34 petitioners argued that the arrangement proposed by Ricky James is not
within the scope of his visitation rights, but that he may, through Renalyn's written
consent, take Queenie home on certain family occasions.35

In its Omnibus Resolution36 dated October 3, 2017, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, insisting on its application of the case of Bagtas v.
Santos,37 which held that a trial is still necessary to determine the issue of custody despite
the production of the child.38 On the other hand, the CA ruled in favor of Ricky James'
motion for clarification, granting the latter what it calls a " limited and temporary custody"
that will allow him to take Queenie out once a month, or on the first Saturday of each
month, for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours, but which shall not reduce his
visitation days fixed at two (2) days per week.39 In so holding, the appellate court cited
"humane and practical considerations"40 and argued that it is in Queenie's best interest
to have an exclusive time with Ricky James.41

Undaunted, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, maintaining that
the RTC correctly dismissed the petition a quo after the hearing on December 3, 2015 on
the grounds that: (a) the purported custodial right that Ricky James seeks to enforce in
filing his petition has no legal basis; (b) the petition a quo does not comply with the
requisites for habeas corpus petitions involving custody of minors; and (c) there are no
more factual issues to be resolved as it had already been admitted by Renalyn during the
hearing that she goes to Manila to study but that she comes home every week for Queenie
and whenever there is a problem.42

Ricky James filed a Comment/Opposition43 as well as an Urgent Omnibus Motion44 to

dismiss the petition and for immediate execution pending appeal of the Omnibus
Resolution dated October 3, 2017, claiming that the instant petition was filed out of time
and that it was erroneous for petitioners to state that the last day of filing fell on November
4, 2017, a Saturday, which compelled them to file their petition on November 6, 2017, a
Monday. By his calculation, the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, which commenced
to run upon petitioners' receipt on October 19, 2017 of the Omnibus Resolution dated
October 3, 2017, ended on November 3, 2017, a Friday, and not on November 4, 2017. 45

The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly remanded the
case a quo for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partially meritorious.

I.
At the outset, it must be stressed that while petitioners may have erroneously determined
the expiration of the reglementary period for filing the instant petition, which resulted in
the same being filed a day late on November 6, 2017, the Court finds it proper to overlook
this procedural lapse given the compelling merit of the petition in the interest of substantial
justice.

The Court has declared that rules on the perfection of appeals, particularly on the period
of filing thereof, must occasionally yield to the loftier ends of substantial justice and equity.
In the same manner that the CA took cognizance of respondent's appeal from the denial
of his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dated December 4, 2015,46 which is
technically prohibited under the Rules of Court, so shall this Court hold that the ends of
justice would be served better when cases are determined, not on mere technicality or
some procedural nicety, but on the merits – after all the parties are given full opportunity
to ventilate their causes and defenses. Lest it be forgotten, dismissal of appeals purely
on technical grounds is frowned upon. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not override –
substantial justice.47

In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that the fundamental policy of the State,
as embodied in the Constitution in promoting and protecting the welfare of children, shall
not be disregarded by the courts by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve
the family and the youth.48 The State is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, it safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall
not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony.49

Accordingly, the Court shall delve into the substantive arguments propounded in this
case.

II.

It is settled that habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where "the rightful custodyof
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." 50 In custody cases involving
minors, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right
of custody over a child. The grant of the writ depends on the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful
custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondents; and (3) that
it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not
that of the respondents.51
"The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development,
as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As
regards parental authority, 'there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.'" 52

As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children.53 However, insofar as illegitimate children are
concerned, Article 17654 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be
under the parental authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn)
are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children (such as Queenie),
notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority,
mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and
the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the
mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care.55

In addition, Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called tender-age
presumption, stating that "[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." The
rationale behind the rule was explained by the Code Commission in this wise:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who
is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
"compelling reasons" for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the
mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. x x x56

According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons"

to wrest away custody from a mother over her child although under seven (7) years of
age: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. 57

As the records show, the CA resolved to remand the case to the RTC, ratiocinating that
there is a need to establish whether or not Renalyn has been neglecting Queenie, 58 for
which reason, a trial is indispensable for reception of evidence relative to the preservation
or overturning of the tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code.59 In
opposition, petitioners contend that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code would not even apply in this case (so as to determine Renalyn's unfitness as a
mother) because the said provision only applies to a situation where the parents are
married to each other.60 As basis, petitioners rely on the Court's ruling in Pablo-Gualberto
v. Gualberto V61 (Pablo-Gualberto), the pertinent portion of which reads:

In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule
99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory character. Article 213
and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor are
married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation
or a de facto separation. x x x62

For easy reference, Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court, which were cited in Pablo-Gualberto, are quoted hereunder in full:

Article 213 of the Family Code

Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court

Section 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. – When

husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the
question to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought
before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the
court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and
control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose
which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty. If, upon such hearing, it appears that both parents
are improper persons to have the care, custody, and control of the child, the court may
either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or
sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to
any suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society. The court may in conformity
with the provisions of the Civil Code order either or both parents to support or help support
said child, irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may make any order that is just
and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to visit the
child or have temporary custody thereof. Either parent may appeal from an order made
in accordance with the provisions of this section. No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefor.

Notably, after a careful reading of Pablo-Gualberto, it has been determined that the
aforequoted pronouncement therein is based on a previous child custody case,
namely, Briones v. Miguel63(Briones), wherein the Court pertinently held as follows:
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This
provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each
other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they
are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner
and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision
allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding
the obligation of petitioner to support the child.64

For guidance, the relevant issue in Briones for which the stated excerpt was made is
actually the application of Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court insofar as it permits
the child over ten (10) years of age to choose which parent he prefers to live with. As
the Court's ruling in Briones was prefaced: "[t]he Petition has no merit. However, the
assailed Decision should be modified in regard to its erroneous application of Section 6
of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court."65 Accordingly, since the statement in Pablo-
Gualbertoinvoked by petitioners, i.e., that "Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate
a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other x x x," was based
on Briones, then that same statement must be understood according to its proper context
– that is, the issue pertaining to the right of a child to choose which parent he prefers to
live with. The reason as to why this statement should be understood in said manner is
actually not difficult to discern: the choice of a child over seven (7) years of age (first
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) and over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court) shall be considered in custody disputes only between married
parentsbecause they are, pursuant to Article 211 of the Family Code, accorded joint
parental authority over the persons of their common children. On the other hand, this
choice is not available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such as
Queenie (second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code), because sole parental
authority is given only to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article
176 of the Family Code). Thus, since the issue in this case is the application of the
exception to the tender-age presumption under the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code, and not the option given to the child under the first paragraph to choose
which parent to live with, petitioners' reliance on Pablo-Gualberto is grossly misplaced.

In addition, it ought to be pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code, which was the basis of the CA's directive to remand the case, does not
even distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children – and hence, does not factor
in whether or not the parents are married – in declaring that "[n]o child under seven [(7)]
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise." "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction."66 As
such, petitioners' theory that Article 213 of the Family Code is herein inapplicable – and
thus, negates the need for the ordered remand – is not only premised on an erroneous
reading of jurisprudence, but is also one that is fundamentally off-tangent with the law
itself.

III.

The Court cannot also subscribe to petitioners' contention that even if there are
compelling reasons to separate Queenie from her mother, Renalyn, pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, Ricky James would still not acquire
custody over their daughter because there is no provision of law granting custody rights
to an illegitimate father.67

In the event that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214
of the Family Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by
the surviving grandparent. However, the same Code further provides in Article 216 that
"[i]n default of parents or judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:"

Article 216. x x x
(1)
The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;

(2)
The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
and

(3)
The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.

The same order of preference with respect to substitute parental authority is reiterated in
Section 13 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, the "Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors," to wit:

Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody. – After an answer has been filed or after
expiration of the period to file it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody
of the minor. As far as practicable, the following order of preference shall be observed in
the award of custody:

(a) Both parents jointly;

(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen
is unfit;

(c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the
minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent
chosen is unfit or disqualified;

(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or
disqualified;

(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless the
former is unfit or disqualified; or

(f) Any other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and
guidance for the minor.

It was not disputed that Ricky James was in actual physical custody of Queenie when
Renalyn left for Manila to pursue her studies until the instant controversy took place. As
such, Ricky James had already assumed obligations and enjoyed privileges of a custodial
character, giving him a cause of action to file a case of habeas corpus to regain custody
of Queenie as her actual custodian.

Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified
the father of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article
216 even if he were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot
adopt a rigid view, without running afoul to the overarching consideration in custody
cases, which is the best interest of the minor. Even way back, Article 363 of the Civil
Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property
of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount.68 Under present rules, A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC explicitly states that "[i]n awarding custody, the court shall consider the best
interests of the minor and shall give paramount consideration to [her] material and moral
welfare. The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and
conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the
minor encouraging to [her] physical, psychological and emotional development. It also
means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the minor."69
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Queenie's best interest demands that a proper
trial be conducted to determine if she had, indeed, been neglected and abandoned by her
mother, rendering the latter unfit to exercise parental authority over her, and in the event
that Renalyn is found unsuitable, whether it is in Queenie's best interest that she be in
the custody of her father rather than her grandparents upon whom the law accords a far
superior right to exercise substitute parental authority. In the case of Bagtas v.
Santos,70 which was a tug-of-war between the maternal grandparents of the illegitimate
minor child and the actual custodians of the latter, the Court faulted the trial court for
hastily dismissing the petition for habeas corpus and awarding the custody of the minor
to the grandparents without conducting any trial. The import of such decision is that the
preference accorded by Article 216 of the Family Code does not automatically attach to
the grandparents, and is conditioned upon the determination of their fitness to take care
of their grandchild. In ruling as it did, the Court ratiocinated that the child's welfare being
the most important consideration, it is not bound by any legal right of a person over
the child. Reiterating its pronouncement in the early case of Sombong v. CA,71 the Court
held that:

[I]n passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an
equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives
his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human nature
and considered generally equitable and just Therefore, these cases are decided, not on
the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as
in the case of adults, but on the court's view of the best interests of those whose welfare
requires that they be in custody of one person or another. Hence, the court is not bound
to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the
consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to
require. In short, the child's welfare is the supreme consideration.

Considering that the child's welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so
demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt
such measures as may be proper under the circumstances.72

The Court cannot close its eyes to the sad reality that not all fathers, especially those who
have sired children out of wedlock, have risen to the full height of a parent's responsibility
towards his offspring. Yet, here is a father of an illegitimate child who is very much willing
to take on the whole gamut of parenting. He, thus, deserves, at the very least, to be given
his day in court to prove that he is entitled to regain custody of his daughter. As such, the
CA's order to remand the case is proper.
IV.

While the appellate court correctly remanded the case for trial, the Court, however, holds
that it erred in granting Ricky James temporary custody for a limited period of twenty-four
(24) consecutive hours once every month, in addition to visitation rights, invoking
"humane and practical considerations,"73 which were based solely on Ricky James'
allegations.

It should be stressed that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides for temporary
visitation rights, not temporary custody, as follows:
Section 15. Temporary visitation rights. – The court shall provide in its order awarding
provisional custody appropriate visitation rights to the non-custodial parent or parents,
unless the court finds said parent or parents unfit or disqualified.

The temporary custodian shall give the court and non-custodial parent or parents at least
five days' notice of any plan to change the residence of the minor or take him out of his
residence for more than three days provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights of
the non-custodial parent or parents.

It is only after trial, when the court renders its judgment awarding the custody of the minor
to the proper party, that the court may likewise issue "any order that is just and reasonable
permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have
temporary custody," pursuant to Section 18 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, to wit:

Section 18. Judgment. – After trial, the court shall render judgment awarding the custody
of the minor to the proper party considering the best interests of the minor.

If it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court
may designate either the paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his oldest
brother or sister, or any reputable person to take charge of such minor, or to commit him
to any suitable home for children.

In its judgment, the court may order either or both parents to give an amount necessary
for the support, maintenance and education of the minor, irrespective of who may be its
custodian. In determining the amount of support, the court may consider the following
factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of
the minor; (2) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor;
(3) the standard of living the minor has been accustomed to; and (4) the non-monetary
contributions that the parents would make toward the care and well-being of the minor.
The court may also issue any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent
who is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary
custody. (Emphasis supplied)

By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court overturned
the tender-age presumption with nothing but Ricky James' bare allegations, to which the
Court cannot give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the issue surrounding Renalyn's
fitness as a mother must be properly threshed out in the trial court before she can be
denied custody, even for the briefest of periods, over Queenie.

In view of the disposition in Silva and Briones and the rules quoted above, the Court can
only uphold Ricky James' visitation rights, which shall be limited to two (2) days per week,
without prejudice to Renalyn allowing him additional days. However, consistent with the
aforesaid cases, as well as the more recent case of Grande v. Antonio,74 Ricky James
may take Queenie out only upon the written consent of Renalyn. Contrary to the
posturing75 of the appellate court, the requirement for the consent of the mother is
consistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code with respect to children under seven (7) years of age, which may
be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. 76 Until and unless
Ricky James is able to substantiate his allegations, he can only claim visitation rights over
his daughter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 12,
2017 and the Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 144406 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION deleting the grant
of limited and temporary custody for lack of legal and factual basis. The grant of visitation
rights of two (2) days per week shall be maintained. Respondent Ricky James Relucio
may take his daughter, Queenie Angel M. Relucio, out but only with the written consent
of petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate in accordance with this Decision.

The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 8 is DIRECTED to immediately
proceed with hearing Special Proceeding No. FC-15-239 upon notice of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 217744, JULY 30, 2018]
JOSE Z. MORENO, PETITIONER,
V.
RENE M. KAHN, CONSUELO MORENO KAHN-HAIRE, RENE LUIS PIERRE KAHN,
PHILIPPE KAHN, MA. CLAUDINE KAHN MCMAHON, AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 24,
2014 and the Resolution3 dated March 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 129232, which affirmed the Orders dated January 18, 2012 4 and October 11,
20125 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
12-004 dismissing motu proprio the complaint filed by petitioner Jose Z. Moreno (Jose)
for non-compliance with Article 151 of the Family Code.

The Facts

Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he and his family have
been occupying two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
181516 and 1815176 (subject lands) co-owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent
Consuelo Moreno KahnHaire (Consuelo) and his nephews and nieces (Consuelo's
children), respondents Rene M. Kahn (Rene), Rene Luis Pierre Kahn (Luis), Philippe
Kahn (Philippe), and Ma. Claudine Kahn-McMahon (Claudine; collectively,
respondents).7

Around April or May 2003, through numerous electronic mails (emails) and letters,
respondents offered to sell to Jose the subject lands for the amount of US$200,000.00
(US$120,000.00 to be received by Consuelo and US$20,000.00 each to be received by
her children),8 which Jose accepted. Notably, the agreement was made verbally and was
not immediately reduced into writing, but the parties had the intention to eventually
memorialize the same via a written document. Over the next few years, Jose made partial
payments to respondents by paying off the shares of Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine,
leaving a remaining balance of US$120,000.00 payable to Consuelo.9

However, in July 2010, Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and thereafter,
informed Jose of her intent to convert the earlier partial payments as rental payments
instead. In response, Jose expressed his disapproval to Consuelo's plan and demanded
that respondents proceed with the sale, which the latter ignored. 10 He then claimed that
on July 26, 2011, without his consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold 11their
shares over the subject lands to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership of the subject
lands to him. Consequently, TCT Nos. 181516 and 181517 were cancelled and new
TCTs, i.e., TCT Nos. 148026 and 148027,12 were issued in Rene's name. Upon learning
of such sale, Jose sent a demand letter13 to Rene, and later on to Consuelo, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine,14 asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale
agreed upon. As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay
lupon for conciliation proceedings between him and Rene only, since Consuelo, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine are all living abroad. As no settlement was agreed upon, 15 Jose
was constrained to file the subject complaint16for specific performance and cancellation
of titles with damages and application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 12-004.17

The RTC Proceedings

In an Order18 dated January 18, 2012, the RTC motu proprio ordered the dismissal of
Jose's complaint for failure to allege compliance with the provision of Article 151 of the
Family Code which requires earnest efforts to be made first before suits may be tiled
between family members.

Jose moved for reconsideration,19 arguing that: (a) the RTC cannot motu proprio order
the dismissal of a case on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent,i.e.,
non-compliance with Article 151 of the Family Code; (b) Article 151 does not apply to the
instant case, contending that while Consuelo is indeed his full-blooded sister, her co--
defendants namely his nephews Rene, Luis, and Philippe, and niece Claudine are not
considered members of the same family as him and Consuelo and (c) assuming Article
151 of the Family Code applies, he has complied with the earnest efforts requirement as
he tried convincing Consuelo to change her mind through email correspondences, and
even underwent barangay conciliation proceedings with Rene.20

In an Order21 dated October 11, 2012, the RTC denied Jose's motion, ruling, inter alia,
that Article 151 of the Family Code applies, despite the fact that Consuelo had other co-
defendants (i.e., her children) in the suit, as the dispute, which led to the filing of the case,
was mainly due to the disagreement between full-blooded siblings, Jose and Consuelo.22

Aggrieved, Jose filed a petition for certiorari23 before the CA.

The CA Ruling
In a decision24 dated September 24, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that
the motu proprio dismissal of Jose's complaint was proper in light of Article 151 of the
Family Code which mandates such dismissal if it appears from the complaint/ petition that
no earnest efforts were made between party-litigants who are members of the same
family.25 The CA likewise agreed with the RTC's finding that Jose's main cause of action
was against his full-blooded sister, Consuelo, and as such, the fact that his nephews and
nieces were impleaded as co-defendants does not take their situation beyond the ambit
of Article 151.26 Finally, the CA opined that the barangay conciliation proceedings cannot
be deemed as substantial compliance with the earnest efforts requirement of the law as
the participants therein were only Jose and Rene, and without the other defendants. 27

Undaunted, Jose moved for reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution29 dated March 17, 2015; hence, this petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not: (a) the CA correctly affirmed the
RTC's motu proprio dismissal of Jose's complaint; and (b) Article 151 of the Family Code
is applicable to this case.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Article 151 of the Family Code reads:

Article 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.

Palpably, the wisdom behind the provision is to maintain sacred the ties among members
of the same family. "As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a
sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family.
It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation
is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between
close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers."30 Thus, a party's
failure to comply with this provision before filing a complaint against a family member
would render such complaint premature;31 hence, dismissible.

This notwithstanding, the Court held in Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales32 that non-
compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is
not a jurisdictional defect which would authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before
them motu proprio. Rather, it merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-
compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be
invoked by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer. Otherwise, such ground is deemed waived, viz.:

The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal
of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been made.

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The
appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code x x x.

xxxx

The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:

xxxx

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The appellate court's reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds
for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided
under Section l, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the
court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu
proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia: (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action. x x x.

xxxx

Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among
members of the same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v.
Versoza ([Versoza] 135 Phil. 84, 94 [1986]), a case for future support which was
dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that there was no such allegation of
infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code.
While the Court ruled that a complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise and as such the absence of the required allegation in the complaint cannot
be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:

Xxxx

Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a
compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of
action. Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to one where the
conciliation process at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were described
as a "condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court." In such instances,
the consequence is precisely what is stated in the present Rule. Thus:

The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a

motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection
which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The
complaint was answered by respondents without a prior motion to dismiss have been
filed. The decision in favour of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis
of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any
defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in
the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that
respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection

is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could
not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioner's complaint, invoke the
objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise,
the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu
propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.33 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In this case, a plain reading of the records shows that the RTC ordered the dismissal of
Jose's complaint against respondents for his alleged failure to comply with A1ticle 151 of
the Family Code – even before respondents have filed a motion or a responsive pleading
invoking such non-compliance. As such ground is not a jurisdictional defect but is a mere
condition precedent, the courts a quo clearly erred in finding that a motu proprio dismissal
was warranted under the given circumstances.

Even assuming arguendo that respondents invoked the foregoing ground at the earliest
opportunity, the Court nevertheless finds Article 151 of the Family Code inapplicable to
this case. For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively
between or among "members of the same family." Once a stranger becomes a party to
such suit, the earnest effort requirement is no longer a condition precedent before the
action can prosper.34 In Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. v. Acuña,35 the Court
explained the rationale behind this rule, to wit:

[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such
efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintenance of an
action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto.. whether as a necessary or
indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to
suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that
wranglings between or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither
practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property
disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle
their differences among themselves.36

In this relation, Article 150 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants: and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

In this light, case law states that Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed strictly,
it being an exception to the general rule. Hence, any person having a collateral familial
relation with the plaintiff other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family Code
is considered a stranger who, if included in a suit between and among family members,
would render unnecessary the earnest efforts requirement under Article 151. 37Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others.38

In this instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are full-blooded siblings; and
(b) Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, which make them
nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine are considered "strangers'' to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is
concerned. In this relation, it is apt to clarify that whi1e it was the disagreement between
Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains that Rene,
Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully impleaded as co-defendants Jose’s complaint
as they are co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In view of the inclusion “strangers"
to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full-blooded siblings, the Court concludes
that the suit is beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce, the courts a
quo gravely erred in dismissing Jose's complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest
effort requirement therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2014 and
the Resolution dated March 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129232
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 12-004
is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
205 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 229826, JULY 30, 2018]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
PATRICIA CABRELLOS Y DELA CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Patricia

Cabrellos yDela Cruz (Cabrellos) assailing the Decision2 dated September 13, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02020, which affirmed the Joint
Judgment3 dated February 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros
Oriental, Branch 45 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 05-0163-A and 05-0162-A finding
Cabrellos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Sections
5 and 11, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Cabrellos
with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portions of which
read:

Crim. Case No. 05-0163-A

That on September 22, 2005 at about 12:45 in the afternoon at Barangay Iniban,
Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, without lawful authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously SELL and DELIVER to a poseur buyer Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
locally known as Shabu, weighing 0.08 gram, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.6

Crim. Case No. 05-0162-A

That on September 22, 2005 at 12:45 in the afternoon, more or less, at Barangay Iniban,
Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
her possession, control and custody, 0.64 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, without lawful authority.
Contrary to law.7

The prosecution alleged that on September 22, 2005 and acting upon a tip from a
confidential informant regarding Cabrellos's alleged illegal drug activities in Ayungon,
Negros Oriental, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and the Provincial Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Group organized a buy-bust team, with PO3 Allen June
Germodo (PO3 Germodo) acting as poseur-buyer and PO2 Glenn Corsame (PO2
Corsame) as immediate back-up. The buy-bust team, together with the informant, then
went to Cabrellos's house. Thereat, the informant introduced PO3 Germodo as
a shabubuyer. After PO3 Germodo gave Cabrellos the two (2) marked P500.00 bills,
Cabrellos took out two (2) plastic sachets containing suspected shabu from her bag and
handed it over to PO3 Germodo. Upon receipt of the sachets, PO3 Germodo placed
Cabrellos under arrest, with the rest of the buy-bust team rushing to the scene. The police
officers searched Cabrellos's bag and discovered seventeen (17) more sachets
containing suspected shabu therein. The police officers then brought Cabrellos and the
seized items to the Ayungon Police Station for the conduct of photography and inventory
of the seized items. However, since only a barangay kagawad was present at the
Ayungon Police Station at that time, the police officers brought Cabrellos and the seized
items to the Dumaguete Police Station wherein they conducted a second inventory, this
time in the presence of a representative each from the DOJ and the media. Thereafter,
the seized sachets were brought to the crime laboratory where the contents thereof were
confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8
In her defense, Cabrellos testified that she was inside her house tending to her child when
suddenly, two (2) unidentified persons came into their house looking for her husband.
When she told them that her husband was not around, she was brought to the police
station for selling shabu, and there, made to sign a document already signed by a
barangay official. She was detained for three (3) months at the Dumaguete Police Station
before she was transferred to Bais City Jail.9

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Judgment10 dated February 25, 2015, the RTC convicted Cabrellos of the
crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. 05-
0163-A, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and
(b) in Criminal Case No. 05-0162-A, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and to
pay a fine of P300,000.00.11

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish Cabrellos's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, considering that: (a) she was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabuto the poseur-buyer; and (b) in the search incidental to her arrest,
she was discovered to be in possession of seventeen (17) more sachets of shabu. On
the other hand, it did not give credence to Cabrellos' bare denial as it stood weak in the
face of the detailed and candid testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. 12
Aggrieved, Cabrellos appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision 14 dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.15 It held that
the testimonies of the police officers had established the fact that Cabrellos was caught
in the act of selling illegal drugs, and that in the course of her arrest, she was found in
possession of more sachets containing illegal drugs. In this regard, the CA ruled that the
police officers substantially complied with the chain of custody requirement as the identity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were duly established and preserved. 16
Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Cabrellos is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.17"The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."18

In this case, Cabrellos was charged with Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.19 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements
to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified
as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.20 In both instances, case law instructs
that it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 21

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.22 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,23 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 24 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,25 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence
of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 26

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 27 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064028 – provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds – will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.29 In other words, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and
its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved.30 In People v. Almorfe,31the Court explained that for the
above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.32 Also, in People v. De Guzman,33 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.34

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Cabrellos.

Initially, it would appear that the arresting officers complied with the witness requirement
during inventory, as seen in the Receipt of Property Seized35 dated September 22, 2005
which contains the signatures of the required witnesses, i.e., a public elected official, a
representative from the DOJ, and a representative from the media. However, no less than
PO3Germodo admitted in open court that they actually conducted two (2) separate
inventories in different places and in the presence of different witnesses. Pertinent
portions of his direct testimony read:

[Pros. Yuseff Cesar Ybañez, Jr.]: After you were able to make the said marking, were you
able to take pictures with the accused inside her house?
[PO3 Germodo]: No, sir. We only took pictures during the inventory at the police
station of Ayungon.
xxxx

Q: Mr. Witness, after you have prepared, and signed of the properties seized and gone
with the markings of the property seized, what did you do then, if any?
A: We conducted the inventory of the confiscated items together with the witness, the
[B]rgy. Kagawad Raul Fausto and he signed the inventory.
Q: And after Raul Fausto signed the inventory, what happened then, if any?
A: Since there was no report from the media [and] the Department of Justice, we
proceeded to Dumaguete City.
Q: Where did you proceed in Dumaguete City?
A: In our office.
Q: Where is your office located?
A: It is located at PNP compound, Locsin St., Dumaguete City.
Q: After you arrived there, what happened then?
A: I called the media representative and the DOJ.
Q: And did they arrive, the media representative and the DOJ representative?
A: Yes.
Q: After they arrived, what transpired at your office?
A: We conduct (sic) again an inventory.
Q: After conducting the second inventory, what did you do then, if any?
A: After the inventory we made a request for PNP crime laboratory. 36
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the arresting officers conducted two (2)
separate inventories, both of which are glaringly non compliant with the required
witnesses rule: (a) in the inventory conducted at the Ayungon Police Station, only a public
elected official – Brgy. Kagawad Raul Fausto – was present thereat; and (b) on the other
hand, the inventory conducted at the Dumaguete Police Station was witnessed only by
representatives from the DOJ and the media. To make matters worse, the arresting
officers attempted to cover up such fact by preparing a single inventory sheet signed by
the witnesses at different times and places. Verily, the chain of custody rule laid down by
RA 9165 and its IRR contemplates a situation where the inventory conducted on the
seized items is witnessed by the required personalities at the same time. The wordings
of the law leave no room for any piecemeal compliance with the required witnesses rule
as what happened in this case. Otherwise, the avowed purpose of the required witnesses
rule – which is to prevent the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of the corpus
delicti resulting in the tainting of its integrity and evidentiary value – will be greatly
diminished or even completely negated.

At this point, it is well to note that the non-compliance with the required witnesses rule
does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.37 However, a justifiable reason
for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the
required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be
adduced.38 In People v. Umipang,39 the Court held that the prosecution must show
that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under
the law for "[a] sheer statement that representatives were unavailable – without so much
as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."40Verily,
mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.41 These
considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time –
beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation and
consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing fully well that they
would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state the reasons for
their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted
earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstance, their actions were reasonable.42
To reiterate, PO3 Germodo admitted that they had to re-do the inventory at the
Dumaguete Police Station for it to be witnessed by the DOJ and media representatives.
However, the re-conduct of the inventory at the Dumaguete Police Station was no longer
witnessed by the public elected official who was left behind at the Ayungon Police Station.
Unfortunately, no excuse was offered for such mishap; and worse, they even tried to
trivialize the matter by making the required witnesses sign a single inventory sheet
despite the fact that they witnessed the conduct of two (2) separate inventories. Thus, for
failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances
exist which would excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to conclude that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Cabrellos have
been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the Illegal Sale and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of
proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti, failing in which, renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.43 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section
21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as
a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of
illegal drug suspects.44 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds
for non-compliance with the aforesaid provision, Cabrellos's acquittal is perforce in order.
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 45
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 [, Article II] of RA 9165, as
amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but
also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the
fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not
raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court,
including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain
whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable
reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate
court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction." 46

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02020 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Patricia Cabrellos y Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause her
immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 227147, JULY 30, 2018]

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER,
V.
ALFONSO O. PINEDA, JR., AND JOSEPHINE C. PINEDA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 75 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Amended
Order1 dated July 21, 2016 and the Order2 dated September 1, 2016 of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 2814-15 SM which dismissed petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.'s
(petitioner) complaint for sum of money against respondents Alfonso O. Pineda, Jr. and
Josephine C. Pineda (respondents) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

In its Complaint3 dated October 12, 2015, petitioner alleged that on October 23, 2014, it
extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, 4 in the amount of
P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal monthly installments of P23,242.00, which was secured
by a Chattel Mortgage5 constituted on a vehicle owned by respondents. Notably, the
Promissory Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this
Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial
Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office,
a[t] its sole option."6 Due to respondents' default, petitioner demanded payment of the
whole remaining balance of the loan, which stood at P510,132.00 as of June 8, 2015,
excluding penalty charges. As the demand went unheeded, petitioner filed the instant suit
for sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC,
further alleging that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal.7
The RTC Proceedings

In an Order8 dated March 28, 2016, the RTC issued a Writ of Replevin, due to
respondents' continued failure to pay their monetary obligations to petitioner and/or
surrender their vehicle subject of the Chattel Mortgage.

However, in an Amended Order9 dated July 21, 2016, the RTC recalled the Writ of
Replevin and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It pointed out that since: (a) petitioner's principal place of business is in
Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila; and (b) respondents' residence is in Porac, Pampanga,
it has no jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants, warranting the dismissal of the
complaint.10

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 which was, however, denied in an

Order12 dated September 1, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed
petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

"Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act
in a case. In addition to being conferred by the· Constitution and the law, the rule is settled
that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations
in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief
sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted."13 This is markedly different from the concept of venue, which only pertains to
the place or geographical location where a case is filed. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.,14 the Court exhaustively differentiated these
concepts, to wit:
Petitioner confuses the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. In City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil.
Economic Zone Authority:
On the one hand, jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive
law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the court or tribunal where the Constitution or
a statute says it can be brought. Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be
brought at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a
court which has no jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the
case.

On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action
or proceeding should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A
party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed waived. When the
venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.

Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. Jurisdiction

is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter ofprocedurallaw.15

In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for, inter alia, sum of money involving the amount
of P510,132.00. Pursuant to Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, 16as
amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7691,17 the RTC irrefragably has
jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. Thus, it erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint
on the ground of its purported lack of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue which, as already
discussed, are not synonymous with each other. Even assuming arguendo that the RTC
correctly pertained to venue, it still committed grave error in dismissing petitioner's
complaint, as will be explained hereunder.

Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS

Section 1. Venue of real actions. – Actions affecting title to or possession of real property,
or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial
court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. – If any of the defendants does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be
commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found.

Section 4. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.

In Briones v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court succinctly discussed the rule on venue,
including the import of restrictive stipulations on venue:
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception,
jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. [(581 Phil. 381, 386 [2008])] instructs that
the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions
arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain
exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue,
as qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or
merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed
upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential
is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must

be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words,such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall
only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words
of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.19 (Emphases and
underscoring in the original)

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory Note – which reads
"[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be
brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any place
where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option" 20 – is
indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions
arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial Region; or(b) any place
where petitioner has a branch/office. In light of petitioner's standing allegation that it has
a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue has been properly laid, unless such
allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on.

Finally, even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the
courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Without
any objection at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is
deemed waived.21 The Court's ruling in Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. v.
Nolasco22 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts
as well as in the Courts of First Instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or
impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to
dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the
trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, be cannot on appeal or in a special
action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed
waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss,
the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperlv laid, as for all practical
intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to
the parties for whose convenience the rules onvenue had been devised. The trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.23 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In sum, the RTC erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's complaint before it. As such,
the complaint must be reinstated, and thereafter, remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Order dated July 21, 2016 and
the Order dated September 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM is REINSTATED and REMANDED to
the RTC for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 233572, JULY 30, 2018]

ALFREDO A. RAMOS, PETITIONER,
 V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March 21, 2017
and the Resolution3 dated August 4, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 38528, which affirmed the Decision4 dated August 27, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12-0227, finding
petitioner Alfredo A. Ramos (Ramos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

On May 8, 2012 an Information was filed before the RTC charging Ramos of violation of
Section 11, A1ticle II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of May 2012, in the Municipality of Angono, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having been authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in his custody and control 0.05 gram
of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet,
which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The prosecution alleged that on May 1, 2012, acting upon the information of a police asset
that a certain "Nonong" later identified as Ramos - was bringing in shabu from Lupang
Arienda to Barangay (Brgy.) San Roque, Angono, Rizal, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)
Pablo Medina (SPO1 Medina), together with three (3) other police officers, took their
positions at Col. Guido St., Brgy. San Roque. After waiting for a while, Ramos arrived at
the location, and later, two (2) unidentified men came and talked to him. The three (3)
men then started fighting, which prompted the police officers to approach and pacify them.
However, the men escaped, except for Ramos who was caught by SPO1 Medina. Ramos
then took something from his pocket and tried to throw away a pack of cigarettes
containing a plastic sachet, which SPO1 Medina was able to intercept. Thereafter, the
latter proceeded to the Angono Police Station where he turned over Ramos and the
seized items to police investigator SPO1 Ian Voluntad (SPO1 Voluntad) for marking and
taking of photographs. Thereat, SPO1 Voluntad marked the plastic sachet with "AAR-1"
and the cigarette pack as "AAA-2" and then delivered the items to the crime laboratory
where it was confirmed7 that the seized items contained 0.05 gram of methamphetamine
hyrdrochloride or shabu, an illegal drug.8

In his defense, Ramos pleaded not guilty and denied the charge against him. He then
narrated that on the date he was arrested, he received a call from his friend Brandon
Balais (Balais) who invited him to go to Angono, Rizal for Balais's birthday. At around 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, he arrived at the Angono Caltex gas station, lit a cigarette, and
while waiting, a man in civilian clothes started to frisk him. Thereafter, the man showed
him a cigarette case with shabu inside and claimed that he owned it. When he denied, he
was brought inside an office where a report was instantly prepared against him.9

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision10 dated August 27, 2015, the RTC found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00.11

The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that
Ramos committed the crime charged as he was caught in flagrante delicto by the
arresting police officers in possession of a sachet containing shabu. In this regard, the
RTC pointed out that the chain of custody of the seized drug had been preserved, since
it was brought to the crime laboratory on the date of the seizure.12

Aggrieved, Ramos appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated March 21, 2017, the CA upheld the RTC ruling, finding all the
elements of the crime present, and further holding that the prosecution was able to
establish an unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drug from the time of its confiscation
by SPO1 Medina until its identification in court. It ruled that despite the failure to strictly
follow the requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the following
circumstances show substantial compliance thereof: (a) the marking and inventory of the
subject specimen were immediately done at the police station; and (b) the absence of
representatives from the DOJ and the media, or any elected official during the inventory
was justified, since SPO1 Medina exerted efforts to secure their presence but they failed
to appear. The CA further pointed out that while the photographs of the seized items were
not presented as evidence, SPO1 Medina testified that pictures were actually taken by
SPO1 Voluntad. Finally, the CA held that it is within the prosecution's discretion whether
or not to present SPO1 Voluntad but in any case, the failure to do so was not crucial in
proving Ramos's guilt.15

Unperturbed, Ramos moved for reconsideration16 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution17 dated August 4, 2017; hence, this petition.18

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Ramos is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review, and thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 19"The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 20

In this case, Ramos was charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined
and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. In order to properly secure the
conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.21 Notably, it is essential that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in
order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for
each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.22

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.23 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,24 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.25 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,26 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of
the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared
their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain
of custody."27

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible.28 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.29 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not
ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.30 In People v. Almorfe,31the Court explained that for the above-saving
clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.32 Also, in People v. De Guzman,33 it was emphasized
that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because
the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.34

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Ramos.

It is glaring from the records that no less than SPO1 Medina admitted on cross-
examination that the inventory of the drugs purportedly seized from Ramos was
conducted without the presence of any elected public official or representatives from
both the DOJ and the media.35 When questioned on the reason behind such irregularity,
SPO1 Medina offered the following justification:
[PROSECUTOR CO]: In this inventory it appears that there is no signature coming from
an elected official, media representative and DOJ representative, why is it so?

[SPO1 Medina]: At that time, there were no available barangay kagawad(s), Sir.

[PROSECUTOR CO]: How [about] the media and the DOJ representative, did you exert
effort at that time?

[SPO1 Medina]: We exerted effort but there nobody was (sic) available, Sir.36
At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible.37 However, a justifiable reason for such
failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses
under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced.38 In People v. Umipang,39 the Court held
that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives
were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as
a flimsy excuse."40 Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance.41 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily
given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full
well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section
21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for
their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted
earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstance, their actions were reasonable.42

Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special
circumstances exist which would excuse their transgression - as in fact the only reason
given was that "they exerted effort but nobody was available" - the Court is constrained
to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Ramos have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of
proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti, failing in which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.43 Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that the procedure
in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.44Accordingly, since the prosecution
failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance therewith, Ramos's acquittal is in
order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.45
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction." 46

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2017 and the
Resolution dated August 4, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38528 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alfredo A. Ramos
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 235258, AUGUST 06, 2018]
FENIX (CEZA) INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER,
V.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, HON.
HEAD OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, AND THE CAGAYAN SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 29,
2016 and the Resolution3 dated September 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 36899, which upheld the Resolutions dated May 7, 20144and July 23, 20145
of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 (RTC Br. 8) dismissing the
petition for indirect contempt filed by petitioner Fenix (CEZA) International, Inc. (petitioner)
on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

The Facts

On December 12, 2002, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA) issued
Executive Order No. (EO) 156,6 which provided, among others, for the ban on importation
of all types of used motor vehicles, except those that may be allowed under its provisions.
The constitutionality of the said issuance was then questioned before the Court in Hon.
Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.7(Southwing) where the Court
held that Section 3.1 of EO 156- which provided for the aforesaid ban was "declared
VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base area."8

Meanwhile, on April 4, 2005, PGMA issued EO 418,9 Section 2 of which provides a

specific duty in the amount of P500,000.00 in addition to the regular rates of import duty
imposed on the list of articles listed in Annex A of the EO, as classified under Section 104
of the Tariff and Customs Code,10 as amended. This prompted petitioner a domestic
corporation engaged in, inter alia, the conversion, rebuilding, reconditioning, and
maintenance of imported used motor vehicles - to file a petition for declaratory relief 11
against respondents the Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.(respondents) before the RTC
Br. 8 (Fenix Case). Essentially, the Fenix Case sought for the nullity of EO 418 for being
an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and for violating the due process and
equal protection clauses in the Constitution. After due proceedings, the RTC Br. 8
promulgated a Decision12 dated March 13, 2009 declaring EO 418 void and
unconstitutional. On reconsideration, however, the RTC Br. 8 issued a Resolution 13 dated
April 21, 2009 limiting its earlier declaration of nullity and unconstitutionality to Section 2
of EO 418 only. Respondents elevated the matter before the Court, which in turn, issued
a Minute Resolution14 dated November 15, 2010 affirming the RTC Br. 8 ruling. As the
Court pronouncement became final and executory, the RTC Br. 8 issued a Writ of
Execution15 dated June 14, 2011 against respondents, resulting in the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) allowing the importations made by petitioner.

In the meantime, another case questioning the validity of EO 156 was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6 by Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc.
(Forerunner). The issue of the propriety of the issuance of injunctive relief in that case
was elevated all the way to the Court in Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi
Resources, Inc.16 (Forerunner). In ruling against the injunctive relief, the Court ruled that
Forerunner did not have any legal right which .entitles it to such relief, considering that
EO 156 is a valid exercise of police power, as already declared with finality in Southwing.
The ruling in Forerunner likewise mentioned that: (a) EO 418 did not repeal EO 156, as
EO 156 is very explicit in prohibiting the importation of used motor vehicles, while EO 418
merely modified the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles,
without expressly revoking the importation ban; and (b) the ruling in the Fenix Case did
not have any effect, much less reverse the pronouncements in Southwing, which upheld
the ban on importations of used motor vehicles into the Philippines outside the fenced-in
freeport export zones.17

Alarmed by the seemingly clashing rulings of the Court, the Automotive Rebuilding
Industry of Cagayan Valley sought for a dialogue with the BOC, which resulted in the
enforcement of the provisions of EO 156 by the latter. According to petitioner, the BOC
consequently disallowed its importations of used motor vehicles, over its vehement
objections. Claiming that such disallowance is directly contradictory to the Writ of
Execution issued in the Fenix Case, petitioner filed the instant petition for indirect
contempt18 against respondents before the RTC Br. 8, docketed as S.C.A. No. II-5557
(Contempt Case).19

For respondents' part,20 they contend that: (a) the Contempt Case is already barred by
prior judgment in Southwing and Forerunner which upheld the validity of EO 156 and
further decreed that the same was not repealed by EO 418; (b) petitioner is guilty of forum
shopping as it attempts tore-litigate an issue already settled in Southwing and Forerunner;
and (c) there is nothing in the rulings of the RTC Br. 8 that EO 418 impliedly repealed EO
156.21

The RTC Ruling

In a Resolution22 dated May 7, 2014, the RTC Br. 8 granted respondents' motion to
dismiss. The RTC found that while Southwing, Forerunner, and the Fenix Case differ with
respect to the parties involved, causes of action, and subject matter, they nevertheless
involve the same issue, i.e., the validity and applicability of EOs 156 and 418, as all cases
refer to the importation of used motor vehicles. Thus, res judicata applies in the Contempt
Case. Relatedly, the RTC Br. 8 concluded that since res judicata is applicable to the
Contempt Case, then petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.23

Further, the RTC Br. 8 pointed out that the Fenix Case did not rule on the repeal of EO
156 by EO 418 and that the Writ of Execution issued in connection therewith only enjoined
respondents from implementing Section 2 of EO 418, and not EO 156. 24

Petitioner moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied in a Resolution26dated
July 23, 2014. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed27 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision28 dated November 29, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that res
judicata applies to this case since the validity and propriety of the prohibition against the
importation of used motor vehicles were already settled in Southwing and Forerunner. As
such, petitioner can no longer re-litigate the same issue in this Contempt Case, and
petitioner is consequently guilty of forum shopping. Further, the CA held that respondents'
act of prohibiting the importation of used motor vehicles is not contemptuous as they were
only enforcing EO 156, which had already been sustained in Southwing and Forerunner.29

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,30 which was, however, denied in
a Resolution31 dated September 28, 2017; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The. issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the RTC
Br. 8's dismissal of the Contempt Case on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.
It rests on the principle that parties should not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.32

This judicially created doctrine exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness,
expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquility. Moreover, public policy, judicial
orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace
and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments, that
controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose, that inconsistent
judicial decision shall not be made on the same set of facts, and that there be an end to
litigation which, without the doctrine of res judicata, would be endless.33

The doctrine of res judicata is encapsulated in Section 47 (b) and (c), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto.

Under the afore-quoted provision, there are two (2) distinct concepts of res judicata,
namely: (a) bar by former judgment; and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. In Spouses
Ocampo v. Heirs of Dionisio,34 the Court eloquently discussed these concepts as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree
of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This
is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently,
any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.

The bar by prior judgment requires the following elements to be present for it to operate:
(a) a former final judgment that was rendered on the merits; (b) the court in the former
judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (c) identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. In
contrast, the elements of conclusiveness of judgment are identity of: (a) parties; and (b)
subject matter in the first and second cases.35

Meanwhile, there is fon1m shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court." Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned
because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the
administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets. In Heirs of
Sotto v. Palicte,36 the Court provided the test to determine whether or not a party is guilty
of forum shopping, to wit:

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata
in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present,
namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.37
In this case, res judicata, whether through bar by prior judgment or through
conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply. While the private parties in Southwing,
Forerunner, and the Fenix Case are all importers of used motor vehicles, the cases filed
before the Court dealt with different issues and causes of action. In particular, the
Southwing and Forerunner cases dealt with the constitutionality of the ban on importation
of used motor vehicles as provided under EO 156, while the Fenix Casedealt with the
constitutionality of EO 418. On the other hand, the issue in the Contempt Case is limited
to whether or not respondents committed indirect contempt by going against the wordings
of the Writ of Execution in the Fenix Case. Clearly, Southwing, Forerunner, and the Fenix
Case do not bar the Contempt Casefrom proceeding. In view of the inapplicability of res
judicata in this case, it then necessarily follows that there was no forum shopping.

In fine, the courts a quo erred in ruling that the Contempt Case is barred by res judicata
and/or forum shopping. Thus, it is only proper to remand the case for further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2016 and
the Resolution dated September 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
36899 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, S.C.A. No. II-5557 is hereby
REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch
8 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 212987, AUGUST 06, 2018]

ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN, PETITIONER,
V.
ANTONIO S. CAISIP, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated January 23, 2014
and the Resolution3 dated May 20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
129824, which affirmed the Decision4 dated January 31, 2013 and the Order5 dated April
2, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66 (RTC) in Special Civil
Action Case No. 58-C-12, upholding the motu propriodismissal of petitioner Elizabeth M.
Lansangan's (petitioner) complaint for failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation
proceedings before recourse to the courts.
The Facts

This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages 6 dated June 27,
2012 filed before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion,
Tarlac (MCTC) by petitioner against respondent Antonio Caisip (respondent), docketed
as Civil Case No. 2738-12.

Petitioner, a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park, Concepcion, Tarlac,

alleged that respondent, a resident of Barangay Sto. Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac, executed
a promissory note7 in her favor in the amount of €2,522.00 payable in three (3)
installments. As respondent defaulted in his obligation under the promissory note and
refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply therewith, the latter was constrained to
file the said complaint.8

Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him
in default and for the MCTC to render judgment,9 which was granted in an Order10 dated
August 28, 2012. Accordingly, the case was submitted for resolution.11

The MCTC Ruling

In an Order12 dated September 3, 2012, the MCTC motu proprio dismissed without
prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. (RA)
7160,13 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991," which requires the
prior referral of the dispute between residents of the same barangay for conciliation
proceedings before the filing of a case in court.14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,15 which was, however, denied in an Order16dated

September 25, 2012. In the said Order, the MCTC opined that petitioner's failure to refer
the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings rendered it without jurisdiction to rule on
her complaint.17 Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari18before the RTC.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated January 31, 2013, the RTC upheld the motu proprio dismissal of
petitioner's complaint. It ruled that prior barangay conciliation proceedings before the filing
of the instant complaint is jurisdictional; thus, non-compliance therewith warrants its
dismissal.20
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,21 but the same was denied in an Order22dated April
2, 2013. Undeterred, she appealed23 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision24 dated January 23, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that since
the party-litigants are both residents of Concepcion Tarlac, petitioner's complaint should
have undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings before raising the
matter before the courts.25

Undaunted, Elizabeth moved for reconsideration,26 which was denied in a Resolution27

dated May 20, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the motu
proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds that may be raised in a
motion to dismiss a complaint, to wit:

Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;

(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;

(c) That venue is improperly laid;

(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;

(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of
the statute of frauds; and

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As a general rule, the above-listed grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at the
earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds
are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the motu proprio
dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis
pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

In this case, the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner's
failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances,
is a condition precedent before filing a case in court. As Section 412 (a) of RA 7160
provides, the conduct of barangay conciliation proceedings is a pre-condition to the filing
of a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon, to wit:

Section 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. — No

complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat
chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
Under Section 409 (a) of RA 7160, "[d]isputes between persons actually residing in the
same barangay [(as in the parties in this case)] shall be brought for amicable settlement
before the lupon of said barangay."

Lifted from Presidential Decree No. 1508,28 otherwise known as the "Katarungang
Pambarangay Law," the primordial objective of a prior barangay conciliation is to reduce
the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which
has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in courts. Subject to certain
exemptions,29 a party's failure to comply with this requirement before filing a case in court
would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a condition
precedent, pursuant to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.30

Notably, in Aquino v. Aure,31 the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a
jurisdictional requirement, such that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over
the person of the defendant,32viz.:

Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent [of prior barangay conciliation]
could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on [the] ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the
same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object
to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a
quo.33

Similarly, in Banares II v. Balising,34 it was mentioned that the non-referral of a case for
barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature, and
may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a
responsive pleading.35

Here, the ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior
barangay conciliation proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact,
respondent was declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite due
notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to order the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court
finds it proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court
of origin, for its resolution on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 23, 2014 and the
Resolution dated May 20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129824 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2738-12 is hereby
REINSTATED and REMANDED to the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-
Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac for resolution on the merits, with reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 234052, AUGUST 06, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
MARICEL PATACSIL Y MORENO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Maricel Patacsil

yMoreno (Patacsil) assailing the Decision2 dated March 30, 2017 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07298, which affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated February 5,
2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
2012-0497-D and 2012-0498-D, finding Patacsil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging Patacsil with
the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory
portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 2012-0497-D

That on or about the 28th of September 2012, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, MARICEL
PATACSIL [y] MORENO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in
her possession, custody and control Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) contained
in five (5) sealed plastic sachets, all weighing .357 gram, without authority to possess the
same.

Contrary to Article II, Section 11, R.A. 9165.6

Criminal Case No. 2012-0498-D

That on or about the 28th day of September 2012, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MARICEL
PATACSIL [y] MORENO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, sell and
deliver to a poseur-buyer Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) contained in one (1)
heat-sealed plastic sachet, weighing more or less 0.033 gram, in exchange for P300.00,
without authority to do so.

Contrary to Article II, Section 5, R.A. 9165.7

The prosecution alleged that at around two (2) o'clock in the afternoon of September 28,
2012 and acting upon a tip of an asset regarding Patacsil's purported illegal drug activities
at Torio's Compound, Sitio Silungan, Bonuan, Binloc, Dagupan City, the police officers of
the Dagupan Police Station organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 Francisco S.
Meniano, Jr. (PO3 Meniano) acting as the poseur-buyer. Upon arriving at the target area,
the asset introduced PO3 Meniano to Patacsil as someone who wanted to buy shabu.
When PO3 Meniano handed over the marked money to Patacsil, the latter took out one
(1) plastic sachet containing suspected shabu from her cellphone pouch and gave the
same to PO3 Meniano. As soon as PO3 Meniano ascertained the plastic sachet's
contents, he performed the pre-arranged signal, prompting the buy-bust team to rush. in
and arrest Patacsil. During the arrest, the police officers inspected Patacsil's cellphone
pouch and recovered five (5) more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
therefrom. The buy-bust team then took Patacsil and the seized plastic sachets, first to
the hospital for medical examination, and thereafter, to the police station for marking and
inventory procedures. Finally, the seized plastic sachets were taken to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where it was confirmed that they indeed contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu,8 a dangerous drug.9

In her defense, Patacsil pleaded not guilty to the charges against her and offered her
version of the events. She narrated that on the day she was arrested, she just arrived
home after visiting her live-in partner in jail, when suddenly, six (6) men in civilian clothes
appeared in front of her house, with two of them putting their hands around her shoulder,
and at a gun point, told her to kneel down in front of her house. After the men briefly
searched her abode, she was then taken to the police station where she was forbidden
to talk to her relatives. She was then taken to a hospital for medical reasons, and
subsequently charged with the aforesaid crimes.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision11 dated February 5, 2015, the RTC found Patacsil guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced her as follows: (a)
in Criminal Case No. 2012-0497-D, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and to
pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 2012-498-D to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. 12

The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes
charged as it was shown that Patacsil sold to PO3 Meniano one (1) plastic sachet of
shabu, and that after her arrest, five (5) more plastic sachets of shabuwere found in her
possession. It found that Patacsil's bare denial cannot overcome the positive testimony
of the police officers who conducted the buy bust operation. It likewise observed that
Patacsil failed to advance ill motives on the part of the police officers to impute such grave
crimes against her, as she even admitted during cross examination that she came to know
PO3 Meniano only when the latter testified during trial.13

Aggrieved, Patacsil appealed14 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision15 dated March 30, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.16 It upheld
Patacsil's conviction, holding that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crimes charged. It further ruled that PO3 Meniano's failure
to immediately mark the seized items and to let the witnesses sign the confiscation receipt
does not ipso facto result in unlawful arrest nor in the inadmissibility of evidence, as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. 17 It found that
contrary to Patacsil's claim, she was validly arrested in flagrante delicto, thereby, making
the seized items admissible.18

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Patacsil's
conviction for the crimes charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal has merit.

Preliminarily, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 19 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."20

Here, Patacsil was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged
with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b)the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.21 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.22

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of
custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime.23

In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police
officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value.24 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 25
the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must
be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.26 In the case of People v. Mendoza,27 the Court stressed
that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the
(DOJ), or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."28

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 29 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 30 – provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds – will
not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.31 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its
IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.32 In People v. Almorfe,33the Court explained that for the above
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.34 Also, in People v. De Guzman,35 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.36

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed
unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Patacsil.

Here, a plain examination of PO3 Meniano's handwritten Confiscation Receipt37dated

September 28, 2012 – which stood as the inventory receipt – shows that while PO3
Meniano claims that representatives from the media witnessed the conduct of inventory,
no such representatives signed the document. Further, it also appears that no public
elected official was present when such inventory was made. When asked about these
procedural deviations by both the prosecution and defense lawyers, PO3 Meniano
testified as follows:

[Prosecutor Ann Karen Go]: This confiscation receipt states the serial nos. as well as
number of sachets that you were able to buy and confiscate from Maricel Patacsil, it also
states that the witnesses are media representatives, who were the media
representatives because they are not named in this confiscation receipt?
[PO3 Meniano]: There are two (2) media representatives present but I could no
longer remember, they are from GMA and ABS-CBN.

Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court the reason why they did not sign this
confiscation receipt, Mr. Witness?
A: Because I was in a hurry in submitting the confiscation receipt, I forgot to let
them sign.

x x x x

[Atty, Sylvania Vinoya-Gonzales]: Mr. Witness, you forgot to invite barangav

officials and you forgot to ask the media representatives to gn as witnesses. Why,
how many were you during that time, where was the Investigator?
[PO3 Meniano]: I did not forget to call them. They were not around.

Q: Who were not around?

A: The barangay officials.

Q: What about the media representatives?

A: It is because the shabu was asked to be submitted so, we forgot to let the media
representatives to sign.38 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible.39 However, a justifiable reason for such
failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required
witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced. 40Mere statements
of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.41These considerations arise from
the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time – beginning from the
moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the
time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the
necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly
comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.42

In this case, PO3 Meniano himself admitted that no public elected official, e.g.,barangay
officials, was present during the inventory because "they were not around" and that he
simply forgot to let the media representatives sign the inventory receipt because he
"forgot" to do so. Verily, these flimsy excuses do not justify a deviation from the required
witnesses rule, hence, the Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Patacsil – which constitute the corpus delicti
of the crimes charged – have been compromised.43 It is well-settled that the procedure in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.44 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the aforesaid procedure, Patacsil's acquittal
is perforce in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. 45

"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely. complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."46

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 30, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07298 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, accused-appellant Maricel Patacsil y Moreno is ACQUITTED from
the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause her
immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[GR NO. 232950, AUG 13, 2018]

 KENNETH SANTOS Y ITALIG, PETITIONER,
V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2]dated August 30, 2016
and Resolution[3] dated July 10, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 37743 affirming with modification the Decision[4] dated June 10, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 88635 finding
petitioner Kenneth Santos y Italig (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165[5] and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information[6] dated September 13, 2012 charging petitioner
with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:

That on or about the 11th day of September, 2012 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control [t]hirteen (13) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
each containing MARIJUANA leaves and fruiting tops weighing 0.39 gram, 0.36 gram,
0.34 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.34 gram, 0.39 gram, 0.37 gram, 0.38 gram, 0.37 gram, 0.39
gram, 0.38 gram, 0.38 gram & 1.24 gram, which when subjected for laboratory
examination gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Marijuana, a dangerous drug, in gross
violation of the above-cited law[.]

Contrary to law.[7]

The prosecution alleges that on September 11, 2012, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, the
team of police officers led by one Police Chief Inspector Mendoza and consisting of Police
Officer (PO) 3 Jeffred Pacis (PO3 Pacis), Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 John Bombase
(SPOl Bombase), a certain PO3 Ablaza, and PO2 Joel Rosales (PO2 Rosales) conducted
a routine patrol along Libis Talisay, Barangay 12, Caloocan City. Thereafter, PO3 Pacis
and SPO1 Bombase rested for a while in front of a store.[8]
While there, at a distance of about five (5) meters, PO3 Pacis noticed petitioner, standing
at a street comer and removing something from his pocket. PO3 Pacis saw that it was a
plastic sachet, prompting him to alert SPO1 Bombase. Discreetly, they approached
petitioner to further scrutinize what he was holding in his hands. At a distance of an arm's
length, PO3 Pacis saw that petitioner was holding a plastic sachet containing marijuana.
When PO3 Pacis and SPO1 Bombase introduced themselves as police officers, petitioner
attempted to run. However, PO3 Pacis was able to immediately grab petitioner's hands
and recover the plastic sachet from him.[9]

Thereafter, SPO1 Bombase apprised petitioner of his rights, while PO3 Pacis conducted
a search on the body of petitioner. The search yielded another twelve (12) plastic sachets
of marijuana from petitioner's pocket. PO3 Pacis marked the seized plastic sachets with
"KSI/JP-1" to "KSI/JP-14" and the date 09-11-12; after which, they returned to the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs, Samson Road, Caloocan City, and turned over the confiscated plastic
sachets and the person of petitioner to the investigator. Subsequently, petitioner and the
confiscated sachets were brought to the crime laboratory for examination. While petitioner
tested negative[10] for drug use, the specimens found in the plastic sachets tested
positive[11] for marijuana, a dangerous drug.[12]

For his defense, petitioner claimed that on September 11, 2012, between 5:00 to 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon, he was watching a basketball game at Orcania Street, Caloocan
City when five (5) men approached him and invited him to the police station. When he
asked what his violation was, they merely told him to go with them. He was first brought
to the Diosdado Macapagal Medical Center (now Caloocan City Medical Center) where
he was examined and thereafter, to the police station where he was frisked and the police
recovered his cellphone and wallet. Subsequently, two (2) persons, who introduced
themselves as "Tanod" and "Ex-O," arrived and claimed to be the victims of a robbery-
snatching incident. However, they denied that petitioner was the perpetrator thereof. After
they left, the police asked petitioner for P10,000.00; otherwise, they would file a criminal
case against him. When petitioner replied that he had no money, they showed him an ice
bag containing dried marijuanaleaves, which they threatened to use as evidence against
him. The following day, he was subjected to inquest proceedings.[13]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[14] dated June 10, 2015, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00.[15]
In convicting petitioner, the RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the offense charged, to wit: (1) petitioner was in possession of dried leaves
of marijuana, a dangerous drug, after a valid warrantless arrest by PO3 Pacis; (2)
petitioner was not authorized by law to possess said marijuana; and (3) petitioner freely
and consciously possessed the same.[16] Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish
the identity of the seized drugs in accordance with the requirements of Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 notwithstanding the absence of a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), or an elected public official during the inventory of the
seized items. As the integrity and evidentiary value thereof were preserved by the
arresting officers, the RTC ruled that the chain of custody of the seized items had been
satisfactorily established.[17] In contrast, it rejected petitioner's defenses of denial and
alibi, as the latter failed to prove the same with convincing evidence.[18]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[19]his conviction to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[20] dated August 30, 2016, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction with the
modification decreasing the maximum penalty to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months.

Concurring with the RTC, the CA found that petitioner knowingly possessed and had
under his control marijuana without legal authority to do so, and that he was arrested in
flagrante delicto, which is justified under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the CA held that there was substantial compliance with the procedure set
forth under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 regarding the custody and handling of the
seized items, considering that the integrity and evidentiary value thereof had been
preserved by the apprehending officers. On this score, the CA posited that the links in the
chain of custody of the seized items were all established by the prosecution. [21]

However, considering that petitioner had in his possession a total of 5.68 grams of
marijuana, the CA ruled that the maximum term of imprisonment in this case should be
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Simon.[22]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[23] but was denied in a Resolution[24] dated July 10,
2017; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming petitioner's
conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

In his petition, petitioner insists that his conviction was erroneous considering the illegality
of his warrantless arrest, the non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165, as well as its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), and the broken chain of
custody of the allegedly confiscated plastic sachets containing marijuana. On the other
hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the
Philippines, maintains that his in flagrante delicto arrest was valid, that there was
substantial compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR, and that the prosecution
had established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized items.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that an appeal in criminal cases leaves the whole
case open for review, and the appellate court has the duty to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment, whether or not assigned or unassigned. [25] The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[26]

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual
under the circumstances set forth in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
(a)
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
(b)on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
(c) while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Section 5 (a) above-cited speaks of an in flagrante delicto arrest, where the concurrence
of two (2) elements is necessary, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.[27] Non-confluence of these elements renders an in flagrante delicto
arrest constitutionally infirm.
In this case, records show that petitioner was actually committing a crime when he was
arrested. A cursory examination of the testimony given by PO3 Pacis before the RTC will
show that at the time of his arrest, petitioner had in his possession a plastic sachet
containing marijuana, to wit:

PROS. GALLO – And you said that you saw this male person in red shirt, what was he
doing at that time?
PO3 PACIS – He was standing at the comer street and then he drew out something from
his right pocket, Ma'am.
Q – So what now if he draw out something from his pocket?
A – Then I take a look at him and I saw him examining a plastic sachet, Ma'am.
COURT – This person that you saw, was he walking or sitting?
A – He was standing at the corner, your Honor.
PROS. GALLO – Was there anybody near him at that time?
A – None, ma'am.
Q – And you said that you were at the distance of five (5) meters, were you able to see
the contents of that plastic sachet?
A – Not yet, Ma'am.
Q – So what now?
A – I informed SPO1 Bombase about what I saw and then we discreetly approached that
male person, Ma'am.
Q – What was the reason why you have to approach that person?
A– Because I want to know what he was looking at on his hands. Ma'am.
Q – So what did you see?
A – When I approached him I saw a plastic sachet of marijuana from his hands, Ma'am.
Q – How far were you already from that person when you saw the plastic sachet of
marijuana?
A – About a tapping distance, Ma'am.
Q – You want to tell the Honorable Court that at that tapping distance the person did not
notice you?
A – Yes, Ma'am.
Q – Why?
A – Because he was busy looking at the plastic sachet, Ma'am. x x x x[28] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Records reveal that when PO3 Pacis and SPO1 Bombase approached petitioner, they
were not effecting a warrantless arrest just yet; hence, there was no intrusion into the
person of petitioner. Their purpose was merely to investigate into what appeared to be
suspicious actuations of the latter. It was only upon closer scrutiny that they were able to
discern exactly what the plastic sachet contained; hence, the warrantless arrest that they
effected. immediately thereafter is clearly justified under Section 5 (a) above-quoted, it
having been established that petitioner was actually committing a crime, i.e., having in
his possession marijuana, a dangerous drug, without legal authority to do so, in the
presence of the arresting officers, and which personal knowledge they obtained in the
performance of their investigative duties as police officers.

Notwithstanding the validity of petitioner's warrantless arrest, however, the Court is wont
to acquit him on the basis of the non-observance of the stringent requirements under the
IRR of RA 9165,[29] Section 21 of which partly states:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photographthe same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
(a) be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items;

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the foregoing
procedure. However, failure to do so will not ipso factorender the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid provided: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.[30] For the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and value of the
seized evidence had been preserved.[31] Further, the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, as the Court cannot presume what these grounds
are or that they even exist.[32] Notably, these rules have been effectively set into law with
the passage of RA 10640.

As the records disclose, there were unjustified deviations committed. by the police officers
in the handling of the confiscated items after petitioner's arrest in breach of the chain of
custody procedure as discussed above. First, while it is true that a physical inventory[33]
of the seized items was prepared by the investigating officer, SPO3 Fernando Moran
(SPO3 Moran), no photographs thereof were taken. Second, although it appears that the
physical inventory had been prepared in the presence of petitioner who merely refused
to sign,[34] it was not shown that a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), as well as an elected public official had been present during the inventory.
If any of them had been present, they should have signed the physical inventory itself and
been given a copy thereof.

The mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of
photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities under the law, as in this
case, fails to approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 21 of
RA 9165.[35] In People v. Mendoza,[36] the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating
presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime
of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate
the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were
evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would
have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."[37]

To make matters worse, no practicable reasons were given by the arresting officers, such
as a threat to their safety and security or the time and distance which the other witnesses
might need to consider,[38] for such non-compliance. It is well-settled that the procedure
in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as
a simple procedural technicality. Therefore, it must be shown that earnest efforts were
exerted by the police officers involved to comply with the mandated procedure so as to
convince the Court that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances.[39] Evidently, such is not the case here, thereby leading to no other
conclusion than that there was an unjustified breach of procedure rendering the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti in this case highly suspect. Consequently,
petitioner's acquittal is in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.[40]

"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justifyany
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the. integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."[41]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2016 and the
Resolution dated July 10, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37743 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Kenneth Santos y Italig is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 12160, AUGUST 14, 2018]

BUENAVISTA PROPERTIES, INC., COMPLAINANT,
V.
ATTY. AMADO B. DELORIA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a verified complaint1 dated March 4, 2005 filed
by complainant Buenavista Properties, Inc. (BPI) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) against respondent Atty. Amado B. Deloria (Atty. Deloria) for allegedly
violating multiple provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
include Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 on conflict of interest, Rule 12.02, Canon 12
on forum shopping, and Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 for failure to file
the necessary pleadings on behalf of his client.

The Facts

On May 7, 1992, BPI, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws,
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement2 (JVA) with La Savoie Development Corporation3
(LSDC), represented by Atty. Deloria, for the development of a parcel of land into a mixed-
use commercial and residential subdivision and for the sale of the subdivided lots. BPI
alleged that the plans, applications, and other documents of LSDC relative thereto were
submitted to, processed, and evaluated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) at the time when Atty. Deloria was one of its Commissioners.4

LSDC then sold the subdivided lots, albeit at very low prices. Further, LSDC
misrepresented5 itself as the owner of the lots, prompting BPI to demand that LSDC
refrain from further selling them. However, LSDC disregarded BPI's demands; 6 hence,
the latter filed a complaint7against the former for termination of contract, recovery of
property and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (civil case) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City. With Atty. Deloria as counsel, LSDC filed an answer with
counterclaim and a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction 8
to direct BPI to execute the deeds of absolute sale and release the corresponding titles
to the lot buyers. However, LSDC's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was denied.9

Thereafter, the lot buyers demanded LSDC to release the titles covering the subdivided
lots; in turn, LSDC demanded the same from BPI. However, BPI refused, contending that
it was not a party to the transactions between LSDC and the lot buyers, and that LSDC
sold the lots despite its objections. Eventually, the RTC also denied LSDC's prayer for a
writ of mandatory injunction.10
Subsequently, LSDC, through Atty. Deloria, filed a complaint 11 against BPI before the
HLURB to compel the latter to execute the deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles of
the subdivided lots, the same reliefs prayed for in LSDC's answer with counterclaim in
the civil case. Meanwhile, BPI further alleged that in order to shield LSDC from liability,
Atty. Deloria convinced the lot buyers that the former was responsible for the non-delivery
of their titles. Thus, several lot buyers appointed 12 him as counsel to file cases on their
behalf against BPI before the HLURB.13

In March 2004, however, lot buyers Spouses Corazon Flores (Corazon) and Roberto
Flores (collectively, Spouses Flores), through their attorney-in-fact Mariano L. Celis,14
filed a criminal case for estafa15 against LSDC President Jeanne G. Menguito (Menguito),
premised on the latter's misrepresentation that she was the owner of the lot that Corazon
purchased. An Information16 was later filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City.17

Thereafter, Atty. Deloria filed several complaints18 for delivery of title against BPI before
the HLURB on behalf of the lot buyers, which included the case entitled "Marlon Bautista,
Luisito V. Ingalia, and Wilfredo Latuja, represented by Atty. Amado B. Deloria, Attorney-
in-Fact v. Buenavista Properties, Inc. and/or Josephine Conde, President" docketed as
HLURB Case No. REM-C-03-8-171.19

On September 6, 2005, Corazon executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay20 stating, among

others, that she was induced by a "fixer" to engage the services of Atty. Deloria as her
lawyer for the purpose of filing a case against BPI before the HLURB. She also attested
that although Atty. Deloria represented her before the HLURB, he neglected his duties as
counsel by refusing to communicate with her and failing to file the required pleadings. 21
Finally, BPI alleged22 that Atty. Deloria made it appear that a certain Madelyn Hesola
(Hesola) was the secretary of the President of BPI and in such capacity, received the
HLURB's Notice of Decision23 of a judgment against BPI, by reason of which Atty. Deloria
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution.24 However, BPI denied that Hesola was its
employee, much more the secretary of its President. It likewise alleged that Atty. Deloria
misquoted various provisions in the JVA in a position paper he filed before the HLURB. 25
In view of the foregoing, BPI prayed for the suspension or disbarment of Atty. Deloria for
committing multiple violations of the CPR, to wit: (a) Rule 1.03,26 for encouraging the lot
buyers to file cases against BPI in order to deflect the charges that the lot buyers have
against LSDC; (b) Rules 2.0327 and 8.0228 for convincing the Spouses Flores to withdraw
the estafa case against Menguito and to appoint him as lawyer to file a case against BPI
instead; (c) Rules 1.0129 and 10.0230 when he resorted to lies with respect to the
employment of Hesola and for misquoting the JVA in his pleadings; (d) Rule 1.01 for
inducing the lot buyers to file cases against BPI; (e) Rules 15.0131 and 15.0332 for acting
as counsel for LSDC and the lot buyers at the same time; (j) Rule 12.0233 for having filed
two (2) cases involving the same parties, issues, facts, and reliefs; (g) Canon 1734 and
Rules 18.0335 and 18.04,36Canon 18,37 for failing to file the necessary pleadings on
behalf of Corazon in the HLURB case; and (h) Rule 6.0338 for acting as counsel for LSDC
after leaving the government service as HLURB Commissioner.39

In his defense,40 Atty. Deloria argued that while the plans of the subdivision project of BPI
were submitted to the HLURB in 1992 for evaluation, he wielded no influence to approve
the said plans because the evaluation and approval of subdivision plans were vested with
the Commissioner for Planning. He added that being only one of the four (4)
commissioners of the HLURB, which always acted as a collegial body, he had very limited
functions. Moreover, he denied that he resorted to machinations and "hoodwinked" the
lot buyers into engaging him as their lawyer, explaining that he only wanted to help the
fully-paid lot buyers to obtain their titles.41

Atty. Deloria likewise claimed that it was the staff of LSDC who served the Notice of
Decision issued by the HLURB to Hesola. Further, he asserted that Section 7 (b) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6713,42 otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which proscribed his appearance before
the HLURB within one (1) year from resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, no longer applies to him, considering that he has retired as HLURB Commissioner
thirteen (13) years prior to becoming LSDC's counsel.43

Finally, he averred that: (a) being an artificial person incapable of experiencing physical
suffering or mental anguish, BPI cannot institute this action; (b) assuming without
admitting that it can do so, no resolution of the Board of Directors of BPI was passed
authorizing the filing of this complaint; (c) LSDC has the authority, under the JVA, to sell
lots in the subdivision project; (d) the right to the delivery of the title of a buyer who has
fully paid cannot be affected by any misunderstanding or litigation between the parties to
a JVA; and (e) the complaint is tainted with bad faith, considering that two (2) days before
the filing of the present complaint, the President of BPI informed him of an imminent
disbarment case should he fail to cause the withdrawal of the lot buyers' complaints
against BPI.44

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation45 dated July 20, 2016, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Deloria administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended
that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. 46
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Deloria did not violate Rules 1.03, 2.03,
and 8.02 of the CPR on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, Atty. Deloria
was found not guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 10.02 of the CPR as BPI failed to show
that he had a role in the wrongful designation of Hesola or that he knowingly misquoted
the JVA in a position paper he filed with the HLURB.47
However, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Deloria guilty of violating Rules
15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR for representing conflicting interests. Records show that on
March 30, 2004, Corazon filed the estafa case against Menguito, President of LSDC,
whose lawyer was Atty. Deloria. The basis for the estafa charges was Menguito's
misrepresentation that she was the owner of the lot Corazon purchased. Thereafter, or
on June 15, 2004, Atty. Deloria, on behalf of Corazon, filed a complaint for delivery of title
with the HLURB against BPI with LSDC as third-party respondent. Thus, Atty. Deloria
simultaneously represented LSDC President Menguito and Corazon, a lot buyer, who had
conflicting interests. Likewise, he represented several lot buyers as complainants in the
HLURB case against BPI while also representing LSDC as third-party respondent therein.
The Investigating Commissioner noted that Atty. Deloria failed to show that he obtained
the written consent of the parties concerned.48

Similarly, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Deloria liable for violating Rule
12.02 of the CPR on forum shopping, having prayed in its answer with counterclaim with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the civil case before
the RTC that BPI be directed to execute the deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles
covering the subdivided lots, and thereafter, when the prayer for injunction was denied,
filed a complaint before the HLURB praying for the same reliefs. In fact, the HLURB
eventually dismissed the complaint filed before it on the ground of litis pendentia, finding
the presence of all the elements therefor.49

Finally, Atty. Deloria was also found to have violated Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR for his failure to file the necessary pleadings for his client
and to inform and communicate with her, as attested to by Corazon in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay.50

As regards the alleged violation of Rule 6.03 of the CPR, the Investigating Commissioner
found no violation thereof, as the proscription under Section 7 (b) of RA 6713 prohibiting
a former public officer from engaging in certain transactions applies only for a period of
one (1) year after his/her resignation, retirement, or separation from office. As Atty.
Deloria was engaged as LSDC's counsel thirteen (13) years after his retirement from
HLURB, the prohibition no longer applies to him. Moreover, BPI failed to prove that Atty.
Deloria intervened in any of the transactions where LSDC was involved during his stint
as HLURB Commissioner.51

Parenthetically, as regards BPI's standing to institute the present case, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that a corporate entity may institute disbarment proceedings, 52 as in
this case.
In a Resolution53 dated June 17, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the aforesaid
report and recommendation.54

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not grounds exist to hold Atty. Deloria
administratively liable for any violations of the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

After a punctilious review of the records, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the IBP
Board of Governors that Atty. Deloria should be held administratively liable in this case.

Atty. Deloria represented

conflicting interests

Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR state:

CANON 15 - x x x
Rule 15.01 – A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own
interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
xxxx
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Hornilla v. Salunat,55 the Court explained the test to determine conflict of interest, to
wit:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney
to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.56

"The rule against conflict of interest also 'prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are
parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases,' since the representation of
opposing clients, even in unrelated cases, 'is tantamount to representing conflicting
interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which the Court cannot
allow."'57 Moreover, the requirement under Rule 15.03 is quite clear. A lawyer must secure
the written consent of all concerned parties after a full disclosure of the facts;58failure to
do so would subject him to disciplinary action59as he would be found guilty of representing
conflicting interests.60

In this case, Atty. Deloria represented Menguito, the President of LSDC, in the criminal
case for estafa that the Spouses Flores filed against her. Subsequently, however, Atty.
Deloria filed a complaint61 for delivery of title against BPI on behalf of Corazon before the
HLURB. As such, Atty. Deloria simultaneously represented Menguito and Corazon
despite their conflicting interests, considering that Corazon's estafa case against
Menguito was premised on the latter's and LSDC's alleged misrepresentation 62 of
ownership over the lots sold and LSDC's eventual failure to deliver the title. 63 It must be
stressed that it was LSDC that obligated itself to ensure the transfer of the ownership of
the purchased lot to Corazon, a lot buyer, pursuant to the Contract to Sell 64executed
between them. Thus, Atty. Deloria's simultaneous representation of Menguito and
Corazon sans their written consent after a full disclosure of the facts violated the rules on
conflict of interest.

Moreover, he represented several lot buyers as complainants in HLURB Case No. REM-
C-03-8-1171 against BPI while also representing LSDC as third-party respondent therein.
In fact, he even filed a Position Paper65 on behalf of both the complainants therein and
LSDC. Such dual representation without the written consent of the parties again
constitutes a violation of Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, warranting
disciplinary action therefor.

Atty. Deloria committed

forum shopping

Likewise, Atty. Deloria violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the CPR on forum shopping,
which states:

CANON 12 – x x x
xxxx
Rule 12.02 – A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than appeal or certiorari.66 There is forum shopping when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights or causes of action; and
(c) identity of relief sought.67
In the civil case before the RTC, Atty. Deloria, on behalf of LSDC, filed an answer with
counterclaim and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction68
to direct BPI to execute the deeds of absolute sale and release the titles covering the
purchased subdivided lots. Notwithstanding the RTC's denial of LSDC's application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in an Order69 dated August 11, 1998, as well as
the pendency of the main case therein, Atty. Deloria nonetheless lodged a complaint 70
before the HLURB praying for the same relief as that pleaded for in its answer with
counterclaim – to compel BPI to execute deeds of absolute sale and deliver the titles over
the subdivided lots. Clearly, the elements of litis pendentia are present, considering: (a)
the identity of parties, i.e., BPI and LSDC; (b) identity of rights or causes of action, i.e.,
BPI and LSDC being parties to the JVA, from which sprang their respective rights and
obligations; and (c) identity of reliefs sought, i.e., to compel BPI to execute the deeds of
absolute sale and deliver the titles of the purchased lots. In fact, the HLURB in its
Decision71 dated September 27, 2000 dismissed LSDC's complaint based on the same
ground.

Atty. Deloria neglected his

duties to his client

Finally, Atty. Deloria violated Canon 17 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR,
which state:

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
In this case, Corazon attested to the fact that Atty. Deloria failed to communicate with and
inform her, as his client, about her complaint against BPI before the HLURB. Likewise,
Atty. Deloria failed to file the required position paper and draft decision before the HLURB.
As such, he neglected the legal matters entrusted to him and failed to serve his client with
competence and diligence, for which he must be clearly held administratively liable.
Penalty imposed upon
Atty. Deloria

In Quiambao v. Bamba,72 the Court explained that the penalty solely for a lawyer's
representation of conflicting interests on the basis of jurisprudence is suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) to three (3) years.73On the other hand, in the case of
Williams v. Enriquez,74the Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for six (6) months upon the respondent for violating the rule on forum shopping.
Finally, in Pilapil v. Carillo,75 the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for six
(6) months after finding that he had failed to file a petition for certiorari from the adverse
decision rendered in the case of his client despite the latter's repeated follow-ups. The
Court imposed a similar penalty in Quiachon v. Ramos76 for respondent's failure to keep
the client informed of the status of the case and to promote the client's cause, thereby
neglecting the case entrusted to him.

In view thereof, and under the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that a
penalty of two (2) years suspension from the practice of law would suffice. Further, Atty.
Deloria is warned that a repetition of this and other similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amado B. Deloria is found GUILTY of violating Rules

15.01 and 15.03 of Canon 15, Rule 12.02 of Canon 12, Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

The suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt by
respondent of this Decision. Respondent is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation
to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial
bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in
respondent's personal record as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 232905, August 20, 2018]
OSCAR D. GAMBOA, PETITIONER,
v.
MAUNLAD TRANS, INC. AND/OR RAINBOW MARITIME CO., LTD. AND CAPT.
SILVINO FAJARDO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated January 24, 2017
and the Resolution3 dated July 5, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
141109 which annulled and set aside the Decision 4 dated March 18, 2015 and the
Resolution5 dated April 29, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC LAC No. OFW (M) 02-000112-15, and instead, dismissed petitioner Oscar D.
Gamboa's (petitioner) complaint for disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees.

The Facts

On January 17, 2014, petitioner entered into a nine (9)-month contract of employment6as
Bosun with respondent Maunlad Trans, Inc. (MTI), for its principal, Rainbow Maritime Co.,
Ltd. (RMCL), on board the vessel, MV Oriente Shine, a cargo vessel transporting logs
from Westminster, Canada to several Asian countries.7 Prior thereto, or in 2013, petitioner
was likewise hired by MTI on board MN Global Mermaid, also a cargo vessel.8

After undergoing the required pre-employment medical examination (PEME) where he

was declared fit for duty,9 petitioner disembarked and joined the vessel on January 24,
2014 that was then docked at Tokushima, Japan.10 The following day, or on January 25,
2014, petitioner assisted in the unloading of raw logs from the vessel, as well as in the
clean-up thereafter of the debris and log residue that were meter-deep. As petitioner could
not withstand the strong odor of the logs and was gasping for breath, the latter asked for
leave which was granted, and as such, was excused from the activity.11 However, the
incident already triggered an asthma attack on petitioner which initially started as a cough
that was later accompanied by wheezing breath. 12

On February 4, 2014, during the voyage back to Westminster, Canada, petitioner claimed
that he slipped and lost his footing while going down the ship's galley, which caused a
writhing pain on the upper left side of his back.13 The ship master, Captain Julius B. Cloa
(Captain Cloa), gave him Salonpas for his back, as well as medicine for his persistent
cough.14 On February 12, 2014, during the rigging operation, petitioner experienced back
pain and difficulty in breathing that prompted Captain Cloa to disembark him for medical
consultation at the Mariner's Clinic, Ltd., in Canada.15 While the foreign port doctor, Dr.
Stanley F. Karon, took note of petitioner's back pain, it was his diagnosed asthma that
prompted the said doctor to declare him unfit for duty. 16

Thus, on February 15, 2014, petitioner was medically repatriated17 and brought to Marine
Medical Services where he was seen by a company-designated physician, Dr. Mylene
Cruz-Balbon, who confirmed his bronchial asthma.18 Subsequent check-ups further
disclosed that petitioner was suffering from "Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar
Spine" and was found to have a "metallic foreign body on the anterior cervical area noted
on x-ray,"19 which, as pointed out by the company-designated physician, was not related
to the cause of petitioner's repatriation.20 Petitioner was thereafter referred to orthopedic
doctors, Dr. Pollyana Gumba Escano (Dr. Escano),21for rehabilitation and therapy, and
Dr. William Chuasuan, Jr. (Dr. Chuasuan),22 for expert evaluation and management. 23

On May 14, 2014, the company-designated physician, Dr. Karen Frances Hao-Quan,
issued a medical report24 to respondent Captain Silvino Fajardo (Captain Fajardo) stating
that petitioner still has occasional asthma attacks that have not been totally controlled
despite three (3) months of maintenance medication. She also noted that petitioner still
has tenderness and muscle spasm on his left paraspinal muscle. As such, the company-
designated physician gave an interim assessment of "Grade 8 (orthopedic) - 2/3 loss of
lifting power and Grade 12 - (pulmonary) slight residual or disorder."25

Likewise, the orthopedic specialist, Dr. Escano, consistently reported that petitioner has
not been relieved of his back pain despite rehabilitation, and further recommended that
the latter undergo MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) of the spine,26 which she pointed
out could be done only after the removal of the foreign bodies embedded in petitioner's
neck area.27 She added that there was a need to control petitioner's blood pressure and
asthma which prevented them from doing spiral stabilization exercises on him.28

Since MTI refused to shoulder the extraction procedure as it was not part of the cause for
petitioner's repatriation, the latter had the procedure done at his expense. 29However, MTI
still denied petitioner's request for MRI, and instead, issued medical certificates indicating
petitioner's illness as "Bronchial Asthma; Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar Spine,
Left Parathoracic Muscle Strain."30

Thus, on June 4, 2014, petitioner filed a complaint 31 for non-payment of his sickness
allowance, medical expenses, and rehabilitation fees, against MTI, before the NLRC,
docketed as NLRC Case No. SUB-RAB I (OFW) 7-06-0106-14. The complaint was
subsequently amended32 on June 18, 2014 to include a claim for permanent total
disability benefits pursuant to the IBF JSU/AMOSUP (IMMAJ) Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA)33 for failure of the company-designated physician to make a final
assessment within the mandated 120-day period, and further impleaded RMCL and
Captain Fajardo (respondents) as parties thereto.

On June 20, 2014, petitioner's pu1mono1ogist, Dr. Edgardo O. Tanquieng, issued a note
to the company-designated physician suggesting petitioner's disability to be "Grade 12 -
slight residual or disorder."34 On the other hand, petitioner's orthopedic specialist, Dr.
Chuasuan, in his letter35 dated July 10, 2014, explicated that petitioner's degenerative
changes may have occurred overtime and could not have developed during his 22-day
stay on board the vessel, hence, was a pre-existing condition.

Meanwhile, petitioner claimed that he still suffered from severe back pain and asthma
attacks, which prompted him to consult on June 27, 2014, an independent physician, Dr.
Sonny Edward Urbano of the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital, who declared him
unfit for work or maritime voyage given that he was found to be suffering from
"Hypertension stage II, Hypertensive cardiovascular disease, Bronchial asthma,
Community acquired pneumonia."36

In their defense, respondents denied liability contending, among others, that the
complaint was prematurely filed given that the 120-day period had not yet expired at the
time petitioner filed his complaint on June 4, 2014, and that the latter even returned for a
follow-up check-up with his attending specialist on June 20, 2014.37 They further
contended that petitioner was not entitled to disability benefits under the CBA as his
condition was not due to an accident,38 and that his illnesses were not compensable,
considering that his degenerative changes (back condition) was declared by the specialist
to be a pre-existing condition, while his bronchial asthma was not work-related since he
already manifested its symptoms at the time he joined the vessel on January 24,
2014.39 They likewise averred that petitioner failed to follow the procedure in contesting
the findings of the company-designated physician.40 Lastly, they asserted that the claims
for sickness allowance and reimbursement for medical and transportation expenses had
already been paid,41 while the damages and attorney's fees sought were without factual
and legal bases.42

The Labor Arbiter's Ruling

In a Decision43 dated October 25, 2014, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioner,
and accordingly ordered respondents to jointly and severally pay him permanent total
disability benefits pursuant to the CBA in the amount of US$127,932.00, P100,000.00
moral damages, P50,000.00 exemplary damages, and ten percent (10%) of the total
judgment award as attorney's fees.44

In so ruling, the LA held that the complaint was not prematurely filed given that it was
initially for non-payment of sickness allowance and reimbursement of medical expenses,
and that even if it subsequently sought payment of disability benefits, there was already
an interim assessment made by the company-designated physician on May 14, 2014
equivalent to Grade 8 (orthopedic) - 2/3 loss of lifting power, and Grade 12 (pulmonary) -
slight residual or disorder, notwithstanding that petitioner was still continuously suffering
from back pain.45 Moreover, the LA has observed that petitioner cannot be faulted in not
observing the procedure for contesting the assessment since the company-designated
physicians themselves were in disagreement as to the management of his
condition.46 Finally, the LA did not give credence to respondents' claim that petitioner was
not involved in any accident on board MV Oriente Shine, noting that the Ship Master's
"Report of Medical Treatment"47 dated February 12, 2014 showed that he had prescribed
"Salonpas" and "paracetamol" for petitioner's back pain.48 Considering that petitioner has
not recovered from his spinal injury that rendered him incapable to resume work, and his
bronchial asthma, being a listed illness under Item Number 20 of Section 32-A of the 2010
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC), the LA declared his entitlement to permanent total disability benefits under the
CBA.49 The LA also awarded moral and exemplary damages as petitioner was subjected
to unfair treatments from respondents, as well as attorney's fees for having been
compelled to litigate to protect his rights and interests.50

Aggrieved, respondents appealed51 the LA Decision to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In a Decision52 dated March 18, 2015, the NLRC affirmed with modification the LA
Decision by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages. 53 It ruled that
petitioner's illnesses, i.e., bronchial asthma and degenerative changes or osteoarthritis,
were work-related diseases arising out of and in the course of petitioner's employment.
They are listed as occupational diseases under the 2010 POEA-SEC.54 It held that since
the company-designated physicians failed to controvert the foreign doctor's declaration
that petitioner was unfit for duty at the time the latter was repatriated, and considering
further that petitioner remained incapacitated to resume his duties despite a partial
permanent disability assessment on May 14, 2014, the finding of unfitness to work
remained, warranting petitioner's entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. 55 It
likewise sustained the applicability of the CBA, holding that while Article 28.1 56 thereof
speaks of disability as a result of an accident, paragraphs 28.2 to 28.4, 57 on the other
hand, merely referred to the general term "disability" which may result from accident,
injury, disease, and illness.58

On the contrary, the NLRC disagreed with the findings of the LA that the company-
designated physician refused to provide medical care and attention after the May 14,
2014 check-up session, noting that the medical reports showed that petitioner was
subsequently attended to by respondents' specialists on various occasions; hence, there
was no bad faith on the latter's part to warrant the award of moral and exemplary
damages.59

Respondents moved for partial reconsideration60 which was denied in a

Resolution61dated April 29, 2015, prompting them to elevate the matter to the CA
on certiorari.62

The CA Ruling

In a Decision63 dated January 24, 2017, the CA annulled and set aside the NLRC
Decision, and instead, dismissed the complaint.64 It ruled that petitioner had no cause of
action at the time he filed his complaint given that the May 14, 2014 assessment was not
final, and that he was still undergoing treatment well within the allowable 240-day
treatment period.65 It likewise found no basis to support petitioner's claim that he is
entitled to permanent total disability benefits, holding that the latter's independent
physician examined him only once66 and that the lapse of the 120-day period did not
automatically entitle him thereto.67

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration68 was denied in a Resolution69 dated July 5, 2017;
hence, the petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that
petitioner is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised and resolved by this Court
on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because the Court, not being a
trier of facts, is not duty bound to reexamine and calibrate the evidence on
record.70Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
generally accorded finality and respect.71 There are, however, recognized exceptions to
this general rule, such as the instant case, where the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts and the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 72

It is settled that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits

is governed by law, by the parties' contracts, and by the medical findings. By law, the
relevant statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 19973 (formerly Articles 191 to 193) of the
Labor Code74 in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X75 of the Amended Rules on Employee
Compensation. By contract, the material contracts are the POEA-SEC, which is deemed
incorporated in every seafarer's employment contract and considered to be the minimum
requirements acceptable to the government, the parties' Collective Bargaining
Agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the
employer.

Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which is the rule applicable to this case since
petitioner was employed in 2014, governs the procedure for compensation and benefits
for a work-related injury or illness suffered by a seafarer on board sea-going vessels
during the term of his employment contract, to wit:

SEC. 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

2. x x x However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention

arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer
until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established
by the company-designated physician.

3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the
seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount
equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-
designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his
sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance
shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.

x x x x

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In
the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-
designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-
designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to
comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the
right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor
may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

xxxx

Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, a "work-related" illness is defined as "any sickness as a

result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the
conditions set therein satisfied."76

In the case at bar, petitioner was diagnosed with "Bronchial Asthma; Degenerative
Changes, Thoracolumbar Spine, Left Parathoracic Muscle Strain." In a medical report
dated May 14, 2014, the company-designated physician gave petitioner an "interim"
assessment of Grades 8 and 12 for his orthopedic and pulmonary conditions,
respectively.77 While the orthopedic specialist, in his medical report dated July 10, 2014,
opined that petitioner's Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar Spine, Left Parathoracic
Muscle Strain "may be [a] pre-existing"78 condition, and therefore not work-related, the
pulmonary specialist, on the other hand, merely reiterated the previous disability rating of
Grade 12, i.e., slight residual or disorder.79 From the foregoing medical report, it can be
reasonably inferred that petitioner's bronchial asthma was deemed a work-related illness
unlike his degenerative changes of the spine (back condition), which was declared by the
specialist to be not work-related in view of the specialist's observation that it was a pre-
existing condition that "could not have developed during his [22-day] period on board."80

However, there are conditions that should be met before an illness, such as degenerative
changes of the spine, can be considered as pre-existing under the 2010 POEA-SEC,
namely: (a) the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing
illness or condition; or (b) the seafarer had been diagnosed and has knowledge of such
illness or condition but failed to disclose the same during PEME, and such cannot be
diagnosed during the PEME,81 none of which had been established in this case.

Moreover, degenerative changes of the spine, also known as osteoarthritis, 82 is a listed

occupational disease under Sub-Item Number 21 of Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC
if the occupation involves any of the following:

a. Joint strain from carrying heavy loads, or unduly heavy physical labor, as among
laborers and mechanics;
b. Minor or major injuries to the joint;
c. Excessive use or constant strenuous usage of a particular joint, as among
sportsmen, particularly those who have engaged in the more active sports
activities;
d. Extreme temperature changes (humidity, heat and cold exposures) and;
e. Faulty work posture or use of vibratory tools[.]

Here, petitioner, as Bosun of respondents' cargo vessel that transported logs, undeniably
performed tasks that clearly involved unduly heavy physical labor and joint strain. Hence,
the NLRC cannot be faulted in finding petitioner's back problem to be work-related.

In the same vein, petitioner's bronchial asthma, which is also a listed occupational
disease, undeniably progressed while in the performance of his duties and in the course
of his last employment contract. Respondents' assertion that the said illness also existed
prior to petitioner's embarkation, and therefore a pre-existing ailment, was not
substantiated given that no such declaration was made by the company-designated
physician or the attending specialist. Besides, such fact alone does not detract from the
compensability of an illness. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in
the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits
incident thereto. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small
measure, to the development of the disease.83 Perforce, absent controverting proof that
petitioner's illnesses were not work-related, no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the NLRC in declaring petitioner's bronchial asthma and degenerative changes of the
thoracolumbar spine to be compensable ailments.

II.

Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, when a seafarer suffers a work-
related injury or illness in the course of employment, the company-designated physician
is obligated to arrive at a definite assessment of the former's fitness or degree of
disability within a period of 120 days from repatriation. 84 During the said period, the
seafarer shall be deemed on temporary total disability and shall receive his basic wage
until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company
to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-
SEC and by applicable Philippine laws. However, if the 120-day period is exceeded and
no definitive declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical
attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum
of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a
permanent partial or total disability already exists.85 But before the company-designated
physician may avail of the allowable 240-day extended treatment period, he must perform
some significant act to justify the extension of the original 120-day
period.86 Otherwise, the law grants the seafarer the relief of permanent total
disability benefits due to such non-compliance.87

In this regard, the Court, in Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. v. Quiogue,

Jr.,88 summarized the rules regarding the company-designated physician's duty to issue
a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading, as follows:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the

seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the
seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated fails to give his assessment within the period of 120
days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total;
 3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the 120
days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical
treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and
treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to
prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient, justification to
extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the
extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent
and total, regardless of any justification.89(Emphases supplied)

Case law states that without a valid final and definitive assessment from the company-
designated physician within the 120/240-day period, the law already steps in to consider
petitioner's disability as total and permanent.90 Thus, a temporary total disability becomes
total and permanent by operation of law.91

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the company-designated physician issued an
"interim" assessment on May 14, 2014, or just 88 days from petitioner's repatriation on
February 15, 2014, declaring his disability to be "Grade 8 (orthopedic) - 2/3 loss of lifting
power and Grade 12 - (pulmonary) slight residual or disorder."92 The gradings were based
on the findings that petitioner's asthma was "still not totally controlled," while his back
problem "still presents with tenderness and muscle spasm on the left paraspinal
muscle."93 Being an interim disability grade, the declaration was merely an initial
determination of petitioner's condition for the time being and therefore cannot be
considered as a definite prognosis. Notwithstanding the temporariness of his findings, the
company-designated physician, however, failed to indicate the need for further
treatment/rehabilitation or medication, and provide an estimated period of treatment to
justify the extension of the 120-day treatment period. In fact, while petitioner had
subsequent follow-up sessions, the company-designated physician still failed to arrive at
a definitive assessment within the 120-day period or indicate the need for further medical
treatment. Evidently, without the required final medical assessment declaring petitioner
fit to resume work or the degree of his disability, the characterization of the latter's
condition after the lapse of the 120-day period as total and permanent ensued in
accordance with law, since the ability to return to one's accustomed work before the
applicable periods elapse cannot be shown.94 Thus, because of these circumstances,
petitioner should be entitled to permanent total disability benefits by operation of law.

Notwithstanding petitioner's apparent entitlement to permanent total disability benefits as

discussed above, the CA nonetheless declared petitioner's complaint to have been
prematurely filed on June 4, 2014 due to the fact that there was no final disability
assessment issued at that time. However, it should be made clear that what was filed on
June 4, 2014 was for non-payment of sickness allowance, medical expenses, and
rehabilitation fees. Petitioner only sought permanent total disability benefits when he filed
his amended complaint therefor on June 18, 2014. At that time, the 120-day period within
which the company-designated physician should have issued a final assessment of
petitioner's condition already lapsed. Further, as mentioned, there was no reason for
respondents to extend this period to 240 days since no sufficient justification exists to
extend the treatment period for another 120 days. As such, contrary to the findings of the
CA, petitioner had rightfully commenced his complaint for disability compensation on June
18, 2014, or after the expiration of the 120-day period from the time of his repatriation on
February 15, 2014 (i.e., 123 days). As aptly ruled in C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc.
v. Taok,95 "a seafarer may pursue an action for total and permanent disability
benefits if x x x the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his
fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period
and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his
temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days x x
x,"96 as in this case.

Neither is petitioner's complaint for disability compensation rendered premature by his

failure to refer the matter to a third-doctor pursuant to Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010
POEA-SEC. It bears stressing that a seafarer's compliance with the conflict-resolution
procedure under the said provision presupposes that the company-designated physician
came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration
of the 120-day or 240-day periods. As aptly pointed out in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v.
Munar,97 absent a final assessment from the company-designated physician, the seafarer
had nothing to contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as
total and permanent.98 Hence, although petitioner did consult an independent physician
regarding his ailment, the lack of a conclusive and definite assessment from respondents
left him nothing to properly contest and as such, negates the need for him to comply with
the third-doctor referral provision under the 2010 POEA-SEC.

III.

With petitioner declared to be totally and permanently disabled by operation of law in view
of the company-designated physician's failure to issue a final assessment within the given
period, the corollary matter to be determined is the amount of benefits due him under the
2010 POEA-SEC or the CBA,99 of which petitioner is a member.

Article 28 of the CBA on disability provides:

Article 28: Disability
A seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of an
accident whilst in the employment of the Company regardless of
fault, including accidents occurring while travelling to or from the ship,
28.1 and whose ability to work as a seafarer is reduced as a result thereof,
but excluding permanent disability due to willful acts, shall in addition to
sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of this
Agreement.

The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor

appointed by the Company. If a doctor appointed by or on behalf of the
28.2 seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
nominated jointly between the Company and the Union and the decision
of this doctor shall be final and binding on both parties.

The Company shall provide disability compensation to the seafarer

28.3 in accordance with APPENDIX 3, with any differences, including
less than ten percent (10%) disability, to be pro rata.

A seafarer whose disability, in accordance with 28.2 above is assessed

at fifty percent (50%) or more under the attached APPENDIX 3 shall, for
the purpose of this paragraph, be regarded as permanently unfit for
further sea service in any capacity and be entitled to one hundred percent
(100%) compensation. Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than
28.4
fifty percent (50%) disability but certified as permanently unfit for further
sea service in any capacity by the Company nominated doctor, shall also
be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) compensation. Any
disagreement as to the assessment or entitlement shall be resolved in
accordance with clause 28.2 above.
 Any payment effected under 28.1 to 28.4 above, shall be without
28.5 prejudice to any claim for compensation made in law, but may be
deducted from any settlement in respect of such claims.

x x x x
(Emphases
supplied)100

Under Article 28.1, a seafarer suffering from permanent disability as a result of an

accident regardless of fault shall be entitled to disability benefits. An accident is an
unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the
usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated; an unforeseen and
injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct.
Accident is that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design,
and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.101

In this case, records fail to disclose that petitioner's illnesses were the result of an
accident. Nevertheless, petitioner's disability is still compensable under Article 28.3
thereof which expressly provides that "the Company shall provide disability
compensation to the seafarer in accordance with APPENDIX 3 x x x."102

In NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. Illescas,103 the Court declared that the
seafarer's sustained back injury was not the result of an accident but nonetheless ordered
the payment of his disability in accordance with the provisions of the CBA.

Here, since the company-designated physician failed to arrive at a final and definitive
assessment of petitioner's disability within the prescribed period, the law deems the same
to be total and permanent, which is classified as Grade 1 104 under the POEA-SEC. As
such, its equivalent rate under APPENDIX 3 of the CBA is the 100% rating, and the
amount of compensation for petitioner's position as Bosun, which is for "Junior Officers
and Ratings Above AB"105 for the year 2014, is in US$127,932.00.106

Finally, with respect to the award of attorney's fees in favor of petitioner, the Court finds
the same to be in order pursuant to Article 2208107 of the New Civil Code as petitioner
was clearly compelled to litigate to satisfy his claims for disability benefits. However, the
claims for moral and exemplary damages are not warranted for lack of substantial
evidence showing that respondents acted with malice or in bad faith in refusing
petitioner's claims.108

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 24, 2017 and the
Resolution dated July 5, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141109 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 18, 2015 and the
Resolution dated April 29, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
LAC No. OFW (M) 02-000112-15 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 232154, August 20, 2018]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BENJAMIN FERIOL Y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before this Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Benjamin

Feriol yPerez (Feriol) assailing the Decision2 dated June 14, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07201, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
November 27, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 14-104 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the RTC, charging Feriol with the
crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portion of which states:

On the 28th day of January 2014, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, without
the necessary license or prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, and distribute a total of zero point
twenty three (0.23) gram of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in consideration of P500.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The prosecution alleged that at around four (4) o'clock in the afternoon of January 28,
2014, the Makati City Police received an information from a confidential info ant (CI) that
a certain "Allan," who was later on identified as Feriol, was engaged in illegal drug
activities along Sampaloc Street, Barangay Cembo, Makati City. Acting on the
information, a buy-bust team was organized with Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council
Operative Delno A. Encarnacion (MADAC Encarnacion) as the designated poseur-
buyer and Police Officer 1 Mark Anthony L. Angulo (PO1 Angulo) as the immediate
back-up. Subsequently, the team, together with the CI, proceeded to the target area
where the latter introduced MADAC Encarnacion to Feriol as buyer of shabu. MADAC
Encarnacion handed over the marked money in the amount of P500.00 to Feriol who, in
turn, gave him a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. MADAC
Encarnacion then executed the pre-arranged, signal, causing PO1 Angulo to rush and
assist him in arresting Feriol. The buy-bust team conducted a body search upon Feriol
and recovered from the latter's left pocket the marked money. Due to security reasons,
the buy-bust team brought Feriol and the seized items to the barangay hall, where the
required inventory and photography were conducted in the presence of Feriol and
Barangay Kagawad Roderick P. Bien (Kagawad Bien). Afterwards, Feriol and the
seized items were turned over to the investigator on duty, Senior Police Officer 1
Ramon D. Esperanzate, who then prepared the letter request for laboratory
examination. Shortly after, the said letter request and the plastic sachet were given to
MADAC Encarnacion, who delivered the same to the crime laboratory for examination,
during which the substance recovered from Feriol tested positive for the presence
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.7

In his defense, Feriol denied the accusations against him, claiming that at around four
(4) o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 2014, he was taking a bath inside his house
when he heard a number of individuals shouting his name. He averred that upon
opening the door of the bathroom, someone suddenly poked a gun at him and asked for
his ID. Thereafter, he was handcuffed and brought to the barangay hall where all the
pieces of evidence were shown to him.8

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision9 dated November 27, 2014, the RTC found Feriol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount
of P500,000.00.10 It ruled that the prosecution adequately proved all the elements of the
crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. Moreover, it established an unbroken chain of
custody over the seized dangerous drug, as it was shown that: (a) MADAC Encarnacion
purchased from Feriol a sachet containing a white crystalline substance which he
marked with "Allan"; (b) after conducting the inventory and photography, MADAC
Encarnacion delivered the seized drug to the crime laboratory; (c) upon delivery, the
said drug was received and examined by the forensic chemist, who confirmed that it
was shabu; and (d) the said drug was officially brought to the court and presented as
evidence.11

In addition, the RTC observed that the apprehending officers' failure to secure the
representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media during the conduct
of inventory was not fatal – and thus did not render Feriol's arrest void and the evidence
obtained from him inadmissible – as it was proved that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items were duly preserved.12

Aggrieved, Feriol appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated June 14, 2016, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.15 It
found no showing that the chain of custody had been broken from the moment the
dangerous drug was seized by the apprehending officers until such time that it was
introduced in evidence. Furthermore, it declared that Feriol had the burden of proving
that the confiscated item had been tampered with, the integrity of the evidence is
presumed to have been preserved absent any showing of bad faith or ill will on the part
of the apprehending officers. Feriol, however, failed to discharge such burden in this
case.16

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Feriol's
conviction for the crime charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.17"The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 18

In this case, Feriol was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In order to properly secure
the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
following elements must be proven with moral certainty: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment.19 Case law instructs that it is essential that the identity of the dangerous
drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show
an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on their identity on account of switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for
each link of the chain from the moment that the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.20

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers
must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.21 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,22 the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public officialwho shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.23 In the case of People v. Mendoza,24 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout
the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the
evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs) that were evidence herein of
the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would
have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."25

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 26 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064027 – provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds – will not
render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.28 Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.29 In People v. Almorfe,30 the Court explained that for the above-
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.31 Also, in People v. De Guzman,32 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.33

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the apprehending officers
committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby
putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drug allegedly
seized from Feriol.

In this case, while the, inventory34 and the photography of the seized items were made
in the presence of Feriol and an elected public official, the records do not show that the
said inventory and photography were done before any representative from the DOJ and
the media. The apprehending officers did not bother to acknowledge or explain such
lapse, as the records even fail to disclose that there was an attempt to contact or secure
these witnesses' presence.

In the recent case of People v. Miranda,35 the Court held that "the procedure in Section
21[, Article II] of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside
as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects. Therefore, as the requirements are clearly set
forth in the law, then the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses
in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of
whether or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it
risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the
evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the
first time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further review."36

In the same vein, the Court, in recent drug cases, has exhorted:

[P]rosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as
amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but
also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the
proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately,
the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not
raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate
court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to
ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether
justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the
appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused and, perforce, overturn a
conviction.37

Thus, in view of the prosecution's failure to provide justifiable grounds which would
excuse their transgression in this case, the Court is constrained to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from Feriol have been
compromised, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As
such, Feriol's acquittal is in order.38

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 14, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07201 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin Feriol y Perez is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[GR No. 235980, Aug 20, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
v.
JOSEPH PONTIJOS LIBRE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal [1]filed by accused-appellant Leonila Pueblas Libre
@ "Inday Nilay" (Leonila) assailing the Decision[2] dated August 28, 2015 and the
Resolution[3] dated February 2, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-
HC No. 01817, which affirmed in totothe Decision[4] dated January 24, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 13 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-96141 finding
Leonila and her co-accused, Joseph Pontijos Libre @ "Joyjoy" (Joseph; collectively, the
accused), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165,[5]otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information[6]dated June 8, 2012 filed before the RTC
charging the accused with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 6th day of June, 2012, at about 12:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping x x x each other, with
deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there sell and deliver
to a police [poseur buyer] one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic pack containing 24.80
grams of white crystalline substance, which, after laboratory examination, gave positive
results to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The prosecution alleged that on June 5, 2012, the Regional Anti-Illegal Drug Special
Operations Task Group 7 (RAIDSOTG-7), Cebu City received a report from a confidential
informant that Leonila and a cohort, later identified as Joseph, were engaged in
selling shabu in Cebu City and neighboring cities and municipalities. Acting upon the
report, Police Officer 1 Julius Codilla (PO1 Codilla), together with the confidential
informant, proceeded to Colonade Mall at Colon St., Cebu City, where he was introduced
to the accused as buyer of shabu. It was agreed that a sale of 25 grams of shabu for
P100,000.00 would take place between twelve (12) o'clock that midnight and one (1)
o'clock in the morning of the next day at a designated place along Pelaez Extension,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Cebu City.[8]

After the meeting, PO1 Codilla reported the agreement to their office and a buy-bust
operation was consequently organized in coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, Regional Office VII.[9] A Pre-Operation Report[10] was then
prepared, and the buy-bust money, consisting of one marked P500.00 bill placed on top
of wad papers, was entered in the Police Blotter.[11] Later in the evening, the buy-bust
team went to the target area and positioned themselves at strategic places. PO1 Codilla
and the informant waited along the road for the accused's arrival, carrying with them the
boodle money. Soon after, the accused arrived, got out from their car, and approached
PO1 Codilla. Joseph then took out a medium-sized transparent plastic sachet of
suspected shabu from the right pocket of his maong pants and handed the same to PO1
Codilla, who inspected it and gave the marked money to Leonila, who demanded
payment. At that point, PO1 Codilla reversed his ball cap – the pre-arranged signal –
which prompted the other members of the buy-bust team to rush towards the scene,
informed the accused of their constitutional rights, and arrested them. The team
recovered the marked money from Leonila and likewise seized the accused's vehicle,
ignition key, and cellphones.[12]

PO1 Codilla marked the confiscated plastic sachet with "JPL/LPL-BB 06/06/12" and
conducted an actual physical inventory at the crime scene. [13] The inventory was
witnessed by representatives from the media and a councilor of Barangay Sta.
Cruz.[14] Photographs of the seized items, the accused, and the witnesses signing the
inventory were taken.[15] Subsequently, the accused were brought to the RAIDSOTG-7
and eventually detained at Station 3, Cebu City Police Office holding cell; [16] while the
marked sachet was submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP), Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 7 for examination,[17] and later tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.[18]

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty and denied the charges leveled against
them. They claimed that at about six (6) o'clock in the evening of June 5, 2012, they were
at the second floor of Chowking, Colonade Mall, Colon St., Cebu City waiting for their
order, when three (3) persons approached them and invited them to go outside. They
were then made to board a vehicle, blindfolded, and brought to the RAIDSOTG-7 where
they were investigated separately. Later, they were brought to the reclamation area in
Mandaue City. All the while, the police officers kept asking them about the identity of their
supposed employer and even threatened to kill them if they would not cooperate. They
were eventually brought back to the RAIDSOTG-7, made to sign a document against their
will, and were consequently charged. They asserted that they have nothing against those
who testified against them, noting that they were not the same police officers who brought
them for investigation and planted evidence against them. Further, they admitted that
media representatives were present and took photographs of them, their phones, their
vehicle, and the pack of white crystalline substance.[19]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[20] dated January 24, 2014, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of RA 9165,
and accordingly, sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 each.[21]
The RTC found that the prosecution had successfully established all the elements of the
crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. Further, it pointed out that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official function must prevail over the mere denials of the
accused, more so considering that they did not assail the genuineness of the chain of
custody form nor of the inventory, as well as the accuracy of the photographs.[22]
Aggrieved, the accused appealed[23] to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[24] dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed the accused's conviction in
toto,[25] finding that all the elements constituting the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs were present.[26]Moreover, it observed that the integrity and identity of the
seized shabu were preserved and the chain of custody thereof was unbroken.[27]
Unperturbed, the accused moved for reconsideration, [28] which was, however, denied in
a Resolution[29] dated February 2, 2017; hence, this appeal filed by one of the
accused, i.e., Leonila.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the conviction of the accused for
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review, and thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. [30] "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law."[31]

In this case, the accused were charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 5,[32] Article II of RA 9165. In order to properly secure
the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, jurisprudence
requires that the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.[33] Of these elements, proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled
with the presentation before the court of the dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti of the
crime, are crucial.[34] Consequently, the prosecution must show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same by accounting for each link in the chain of custody from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti, in order
to prove its identity beyond reasonable doubt.[35]

Considering the importance of ensuring that the dangerous drugs seized from an accused
is the same as that presented in court, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640,[36]and Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 provide the procedures that the apprehending team should
observe in the handling of the seized illegal drugs in order to preserve their identity and
integrity as evidence. As part of the procedure, the apprehending team
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom the items were seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
officialwho shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and, within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation, the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.[37]According to jurisprudence,
the law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives from
the DOJ and the media in order to remove any suspicion of tampering, switching, planting
or contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a case, and thus, ensure
that the chain of custody rule is observed.[38] Since the police actions relative to the
handling of the drugs seized in this case were committed in 2012, and thus prior to RA
9165 's amendment by RA 10640, the presence of all three witnesses during the conduct
of inventory and photography is required.

It is important to state, however, that while the "chain of custody" rule demands strict
compliance from the police officers, the saving clause under Section 21, Article II of the
IRR of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA
10640 – provides that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 under justifiable grounds – will not irretrievably prejudice the prosecution's
case and render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.[39]

In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure
laid down in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the item/s as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item/s are properly
preserved.[40] In People v. Almorfe,[41] the Court explained that for the saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless
been preserved.[42] Additionally, People v. De Guzman[43] emphasized that the
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.[44]Finally, in
explaining the procedural lapse/s, People v. Umipang[45] stressed that the prosecution
must establish the fact that genuine and earnest efforts were employed in contacting
and securing the presence of the representativesenumerated under Section 21 (1),
Article II of RA 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so, so as to
convince the Court that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances.[46]

Applying the above principles, the Court finds that the police officers in this case
committed unexplained and unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the item
purportedly seized from the accused.

While the prosecution was able to show that the seized item was inventoried and
photographed by the police officers in the presence of the accused, representatives from
the media, and barangay councilor Quintana, records fail to disclose that said inventory
and photography were conducted in the presence of a representative from the DOJ as
required by law.

Notably, the absence of a DOJ representative during the inventory and photography of
the seized drugs is not per se fatal to the prosecution's cause. However, as earlier
intimated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate that genuine and earnest
efforts were employed in securing the presence of the DOJ representative or that there
exists a justifiable reason for non-compliance. Here, the police officers, in their affidavits,
merely stated that "the team exerted efforts to contact any representative from the
Department of Justice but to no avail."[47] Far from satisfying the legal requirement, this
statement partakes of a mere general conclusion that is bereft of any discernible detail
regarding the steps and efforts the police officers had undertaken to secure the presence
of the DOJ representative. As the Court held in People v. Umipang,[48] "[a] sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable – without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances – is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse"[49] – as in this case – and hence,
not a valid excuse for non-compliance.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality.[50] Accordingly, in light of the unjustified breach of procedure as explained
above, the Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised.[51] As such, the acquittal of the accused-
appellant, Leonila, is in order.

In addition, Leonila's co-accused in this case, Joseph, must also be acquitted in view of
Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which
states:
Section. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable
to the latter.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
While it is true that it was only Leonila who successfully perfected her appeal, the rule is
that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the entire case out in the open, including
those not raised by the parties.[52] Considering that, under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment – as in this
case – shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their
judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and
executory,[53] Leonila's acquittal for the crime charged is likewise applicable to Joseph.[54]

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x. [55]
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[,Article II] of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the prescribed procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."[56]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 28, 2015 and the
Resolution dated February 2, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No.
01817 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the accused Joseph
Pontijos Libre @ "Joyjoy" and Leonila Pueblas Libre @ "Inday Nilay" are ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause their
immediate release, unless they are being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 225783, AUGUST 20, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
CHRISTOPHER BAPTISTA Y VILLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Christopher Baptista y

Villa (Baptista) assailing the Decision2 dated September 11, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06275, which affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated June 11,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 14935-
13 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the RTC, charging Baptista with the
crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of October 3, 2011 at Brgy. 3, [M]unicipality
of San Nicolas, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly sell one (1) [heat-sealed] transparent plastic sachet containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug,
weighing 0.0389 gram, worth Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) to poseur-buyer, IO1
DEXTER D. REGASPI, without the necessary license or authority from the appropriate
government agency or authority to do so.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The prosecution alleged that at around five (5) o'clock in the afternoon of October 3, 2011,
a confidential informant (CI) told Intelligence Officer 1 (IO1) Dexter D. Regaspi (IO1
Regaspi) that a certain Christopher Baptista alias "Toti" was selling shabu at Brgy. 8, San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and other nearby barangays. The CI and IO1 Regaspi then arranged
a meet-up with Baptista who, however, could not sell them shabu worth P500.00 at the
time because he had no available stock. As such, IO1 Regaspi and the CI returned to the
office where they planned a buy-bust operation.7At around seven (7) o'clock in the
evening, the buy-bust team went to the transaction area. IO1 Regaspi gave the marked
money to Baptista, who, in turn, handed over one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet. After
examining the same, IO1 Regaspi executed the pre-arranged signal by removing his ball
cap and immediately declared his authority as a Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) agent, while Police Officer 3 Joey P. Aninag (PO3 Aninag) and the rest of the
buy-bust team rushed to the scene.8 IO1 Regaspi then marked the plastic sachet with his
initials "DDR," but since it was about to rain, the requisite inventory could not be
conducted. Thus, the team went back to the PDEA Office wherein IO1 Regaspi prepared
the inventory9 of the seized items in the presence only of a media representative, while
IO1 Ranel Cañero took photographs10 of the same.11 After the requests for laboratory12
and medical examinations13 were made, the apprehending officers proceeded to the
Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, where they were informed that
there was no chemist available.14

Eventually, at around 4:30 in the morning of the following day, they proceeded to the
PDEA Regional Office 1 Regional Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where the
seized item tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu, a dangerous drug.15

In his defense, Baptista denied the charges against him.16 He claimed that in the evening
of October 3, 2011, he was on his way to the tiangge located in front of a church to drink
with a friend. Before reaching the tiangge, however, some unknown men grabbed and
handcuffed him and shortly after, he and his friend were brought to an office where he
was accused by the PDEA agents of selling shabu. Later, at around two (2) o'clock in the
morning of the following day, the PDEA agents took him to the municipal hall. 17
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision18 dated June 11, 2013, the RTC found Baptista guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and accordingly, sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. 19
It ruled that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime charged, as it was
established that Baptista sold the seized drug to IOI Regaspi in exchange for the P500.00
marked money recovered from him.20 On the other hand, it held that his unsubstantiated
defense of denial could not prevail over the credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who positively identified him as the seller of the said drug. 21

Moreover, the RTC found that the buy-bust team complied with the procedural
requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.22 It ruled that the conduct of
inventory and photography in the PDEA Office was valid, even if the same were made
without the presence of a barangay official and a representative from the Department of
Justice (DOJ), since the same provision principally requires the presence of the accused
during the inventory, which was complied with.23

Aggrieved, Baptista appealed24 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision25 dated September 11, 2015, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.26
Among others, it ruled that the apprehending officers' non-compliance with the
requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 was amply justified, considering that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug were properly preserved. 27

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Baptista's conviction for the crime
of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Preliminarily, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.28 "The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 29

In this case, Baptista was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In every prosecution for
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, it is essential that the following elements are proven with
moral certainty: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 30Case law states
that it is equally essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt, considering that the prohibited drug itself forms an integral part of the
corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the dangerous drug so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drug on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody
from the moment the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.31

In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police
officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity
and evidentiary value.32 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,33
the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and
confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.34 In the case of People v. Mendoza,35 the Court stressed that " [wlithout
the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the
evils of switching, 'planting,' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the. [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti,
and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."36

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.37 In fact,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064038 – provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance
with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds
– will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 39Tersely put, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso factorender the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.40 In People v. Almorfe,41 the Court stressed that
for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.42 Also, in People v. De Guzman,43
it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as
a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.44

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the apprehending officers
committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting
into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Baptista.

Records disclose that while the inventory and photography of the seized plastic sachet
were conducted in the presence of Baptista and a representative from the media, the
same were not done in the presence of an elected public official and a representative
from the DOJ as required by the rules prevailing at that time (i.e., Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA 10640). In their testimonies, both IO1 Regaspi
and PO3 Aninag explicitly admitted these lapses, viz.:

IO1 Regaspi on Cross-examination

[Atty. Wayne Manuel]: When inventory was done at your office, we noticed in the
Certificate of Inventory that a certain Jaezem Ryan Gaces of the Bomba Radyo, Laoag
City was present, is that what you mean?

[IO1 Regaspi]: Yes, sir.

Q: At what point in time did he come?

A: At around 8:20, sir.

Q: At around 8:20 and of course, you had to call him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not call for any barangay officials?

A: We called for the barangay officials but the barangay officials did not come, sir.

Q: You did not try to call any member of the DOJ?

A: No, sir.

x x x x45 (Emphases and underscoring supplied )

PO3 Aninag on Direct Examination

[Prosecutor Robert Garcia]: Aside from you, who were also present in the conduct of
inventory if you still recall?

[PO3 Aninag]: One of the members of the media who is from Bombo Radyo.

x x x x46

The absence of the aforementioned required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.47 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnessesmust
therefore be adduced.48

In this case, IO1 Regaspi did not provide a sufficient explanation why no barangay official
was present during the requisite inventory and photography. Simply stating that the
witnesses were invited, without more, is too plain and flimsy of an excuse so as to justify
non-compliance with the positive requirements of the law. Worse, the police officers had
no qualms in admitting that they did not even bother contacting a DOJ representative,
who is also a required witness. Verily, as earlier mentioned, there must be genuine and
sufficient efforts to ensure the presence of these witnesses, else non-compliance with the
set procedure would not be excused.

Jurisprudence dictates that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.49 For indeed, however noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our
campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that must always
be executed within the boundaries of law.50

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus concludes that there has been an unjustified
breach of procedure and hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised.51 Consequently, Baptista's acquittal is in order.

As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x52

"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove
compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused,
the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the
court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully
examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any
deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction."53

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 11, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06275 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Christopher Baptista y Villa is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[ AC. No. 12196, Sep 03, 2018 ]

PABLITO L. MIRANDA, PETITIONER,
v.
ATTY. JOSE B. ALVAREZ , RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr. (respondent)
for disbarment and perpetual disqualification as a notary public on the grounds of gross
negligence and grave misconduct, as well as violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice[1](Notarial Rules).

The Facts

On January 16, 2012, complainant Pablito L. Miranda, Jr. (complainant) filed a Complaint-
Affidavit[2] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Commission on Bar
Discipline, averring that respondent notarized certain documents during the year 2010
notwithstanding that his notarial commission for and within the jurisdiction of San Pedro,
Laguna had already expired way back in December 31, 2005 and has yet to be renewed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna (RTC-San Pedro) where he
resides and conducts his notarial businesses.[3]
In support thereof, complainant listed the following addresses, all located in San Pedro,
Laguna, where respondent allegedly maintained his notarial offices: (a) Alvarez & Alvarez
Law Office at Room 202, 2nd Floor, Fil-Em Building, A. Luna St., Poblacion; (b) Golden
Peso Enterprises and Loan Center at Macaria Ave., Pacita Complex; and (c) Pacita
Arcade/Commercial Complex in Pacita Complex.[4] He also presented pictures of
respondent's offices in San Pedro, Laguna,[5] and documents to prove that respondent
notarized: (1) a 2010 Application for Business Permit[6] of one Ronald Castasus Amante
(Amante), which, coincidentally, also did not have a valid proof of identification and bore
a fictitious address; and (2) a Special Power of Attorney[7] (SPA), executed by Amante on
December 7, 2010.[8] Likewise, complainant submitted a copy of: (1) Certification No. 11-
0067[9] dated October 5, 2011 (October 5, 2011 Certification) issued by Catherin B.
Beran-Baraoidan,[10]Clerk of Court VI (COC Beran-Baraoidan) of the RTC-San Pedro,
stating that respondent was commissioned as a notary public for San Pedro, Laguna from
1998 to 2005; and (2) Certification No. 11-0053[11] dated September 21, 2011 (September
21, 2011 Certification) issued by COC Beran-Baraoidan, stating that "no document
entitled [SPA] x x x executed by [Amante] x x x notarized by [respondent] for the year
2010, is submitted before this Office."[12]

Furthermore, complainant claimed that respondent failed to comply with his duties under
the Notarial Rules, particularly: (a) to register one (1) notarial office only; (b) to keep only
one (1) active notarial register at any given time; (c) to file monthly notarial books, reports,
and copies of the documents notarized in any given month; and (d) to surrender his
notarial register and seal upon expiration of his commission.[13]

Also, complainant alleged that respondent authorized unlicensed persons to do notarial

acts for him using his signatures, stamps, offices, and notarial register, and that he further
violated Section 12, Rule II of the Notarial Rules regarding competent evidence of identity
by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, and causing it to appear that
persons have participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate.[14]Because of these acts, complainant asserted that respondent committed
grave violations of the Notarial Rules.[15]

In his Answer[16] dated March 7, 2012, respondent asserted that he was a duly
commissioned notary public in 2010 in Biñan, Laguna, as shown by the attached
Certification of Notarial Commission No. 2009-21[17] issued by Presiding Judge Marino E.
Rubia of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24 (RTC-Biñan).[18]

In compliance with the IBP's Order,[19]complainant submitted his Position

Paper,[20] additionally pointing out that in 1993, respondent notarized a Joint
Affidavit[21]despite the absence of a notarial commission therefor,[22] as well as an Affidavit
for Death Benefit Claim[23] in April 10, 2012 after his notarial commission for and within
Biñan, Laguna had already expired.[24]

For his part, respondent simply reiterated his defense that he was a duly commissioned
notary public in 2010 in Biñan, Laguna.[25]

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation[26]dated April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner (IBP-IC) found respondent administratively liable for violating the Notarial
Rules,[27] the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and the Lawyer's Oath, and
accordingly, recommended that respondent's notarial commission, if existing, be revoked,
that he be barred perpetually as a notary public, and that he be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a warning that any infraction
of the canons or provisions of law in the future shall be dealt with more severely. [28]

In particular, the IBP-IC found that: (a)respondent's three (3) notarial offices, including his
residence, are all within the jurisdiction of San Pedro, Laguna, whereas his notarial
commission existing in 2010 was not issued by the RTC-San Pedro but by the RTC-
Biñan; (b) respondent notarized an Affidavit of Death Benefit Claim and Amante's
Application for Business Permit in his notarial offices in San Pedro, Laguna which is
outside his notarial jurisdiction; and (c) respondent notarized the Application for Business
Permit even though it bore a fictitious address and lacked details regarding the signatory's
competent evidence of identity, thus causing it to appear that persons have participated
in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. To the IBP-IC, these facts,
taken together, clearly show that respondent violated his oath of office and his duty as a
lawyer, and committed unethical behavior as a notary public, for which he should be held
administratively liable.[29]

In a Resolution[30] dated May 11, 2013 (1stResolution), the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the above report and recommendation of the IBP-IC with
modification, reducing the recommended penalty of suspension to one (1) year, instead
of two (2) years.

Dissatisfied, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,[31] arguing that he maintains

only one (1) notarial office which is located at 888 Lucky Gem. Bldg., Brgy. San Antonio,
Biñan, Laguna, where he, together with one Atty. Edgardo Salandanan (Atty.
Salandanan) as Senior Partner, has been holding office and conducting all his notarial
works for several years. He added that the office in San Pedro, Laguna is managed and
owned by his son, Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr.[32] In his Comment,[33] complainant reiterated
his allegations against respondent and insisted that the latter be disbarred.

In a Resolution[34] dated May 4, 2014 (2ndResolution), the IBP Board of Governors

partially granted respondent's motion, and accordingly, modified the 1 st Resolution by
deleting the penalty of suspension "considering that [r]espondent's violation relates to the
Notarial Law."[35]

This time it was complainant who moved for reconsideration,[36] seeking, respondent's
disbarment. Notably, in his motion, complainant further pointed out that, as per the
Certification[37] dated May 7, 2015 issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC),
respondent "has been suspended from the practice of law for five (5) months x x x
effective upon receipt of the Resolution of the Court dated December 04, 2000 in G.R.
No. 126025 x x x and re-docketed as an Administrative Case No. 9723 x x x. Said
Resolution was received by the respondent on January 09, 2001" and "[t]o date, the said
order of suspension has not yet been lifted by the Court."

Complying with the IBP Board of Governors' Order[38] to comment, respondent merely
insisted that he is a full-fledged lawyer with Roll No. 20776, and that complainant filed this
administrative case simply to extort money from him.[39]

The IBP Board of Governors denied complainant's motion in a Resolution[40]dated August

31, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found respondent
administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

I.

Time and again, the Court has held "[t]hat notarization of a document is not an empty act
or routine. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, thus, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies[,] and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to
a private instrument. For this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined." [41]

The basic requirements a notary public must observe in the performance of his duties are
presently laid down in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The failure to observe the
requirements and/or comply with the duties prescribed therein shall constitute grounds
for the revocation of the notarial commission of, as well as the imposition of the
appropriate administrative sanction/s against, the erring notary public. [42]

In this case, the Court finds that respondent committed the following violations of the
Notarial Rules:

First, respondent performed notarial acts without the proper notarial commission
therefor.

Under the Notarial Rules, "a person commissioned as a notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made. Commission either means the grant of authority to perform
notarial [acts] or the written evidence of authority." [43] "Without a commission, a lawyer
is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts. A lawyer who acts as a notary
public without the necessary notarial commission is remiss in his professional duties and
responsibilities." [44]Moreover, it should be emphasized that "[u]nder the rule, only persons
who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission."[45]

In this case, it was established that respondent notarized a Joint Affidavit [46]in 1993 and
an Application for Business Permit,[47] as well as the SPA[48] of Amante, in 2010, all in San
Pedro, Laguna. However, as per the October 5, 2011 Certification[49] issued by COC
Beran-Baraoidan of the RTC-San Pedro, respondent was commissioned as a notary
public for and within San Pedro, Laguna only from 1998 to 2005, and that the said
commission has not been renewed in 2010 and therefore, already expired.

Furthermore, it was shown that although respondent has been issued a notarial
commission by the RTC-Biñan (which was valid from January 1, 2010 until December
31, 2011), he: (a) conducted business as a notary public during such time not only in his
Biñan, Laguna law office (which he shared with a certain Atty. Salandanan) but also in
his other law offices in San Pedro, Laguna, and thus, performed notarial acts beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the said commissioning court; and (b) notarized an Affidavit for
Death Benefit Claim[50] in Biñan, Laguna on April 10, 2012, during which time the said
commission had already expired.
Second, respondent notarized a document that is bereft of any details regarding the
identity of the signatory.

Under the Notarial Rules, "a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
signatory to the document is in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through
competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix
with a thumb or mark the notary public's notarial register. The purpose of these
requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and
to ascertain that the document is the signatory's free act and deed. If the signatory is not
acting of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial
act."[51]

In Gaddi v. Velasco,[52] the Court ruled that a notary public who notarizes a document
despite the missing details anent the signatory's competent evidence of identity not only
fails in his duty to ascertain the signatory's identity but also improperly notarizes an
incomplete notarial certificate, viz.:

In the present case, contrary to [Atty.] Velasco's claim that Gaddi appeared before him
and presented two identification cards as proof of her identity, the notarial certificate, in
rubber stamp, itself indicates: "SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS APR
22, 2010 x x x AT MAKATI CITY. AFFIANT EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER C.T.C. NO.
______ ISSUED AT/ON ______." The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco
had been remiss in his duty of ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the
document. Velasco did not comply with the most basic function that a notary public must
do, that is, to require the presence of Gaddi; otherwise, he could have ascertained that
the handwritten admission was executed involuntarily and refused to notarize the
document. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial
certificate. x x x[53] (Emphases supplied)

Similar to this case, the jurat of the 2010 Application for Business Permit which
respondent notarized did not bear the details of the competent evidence of identity of its
principal-signatory. While this application appears to be a ready-made form issued by the
Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna, this fact alone cannot justify respondent's non-
compliance with his duties under the Notarial Rules.

And third, respondent failed to forward to the Clerk of Court (COC) of the commissioning
court a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy of any
instrument acknowledged before him.

Under the Notarial Rules, a notary public must forward to the Clerk of Court, within the
first ten (10) days of the month following, a certified copy of each month's entries and a
duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before the notary
public.[54] According to case law, failure to comply with this requirement is "[a] ground for
revocation of a notary public's commission." [55]

As per the September 21, 2011 Certification[56] issued by COC Beran-Baraoidan, a copy
of the SPA executed by Amante was not submitted before the Office of the COC of the
RTC-San Pedro. This omission comes as no surprise considering that, as previously
discussed, his notarial commission therefor had already expired.

Accordingly, in view of respondent's numerous violations of the Notarial Rules, the Court
upholds the IBP's recommendation to revoke his incumbent notarial commission, if any,
as well as to perpetually disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public.

However, the Court cannot affirm the IBP's deletion of the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law, which penalty was originally recommended by the IBP-IC. It should be
emphasized that respondent's transgressions of the Notarial Rules also have a bearing
on his standing as a lawyer. As a member of the Bar, respondent is expected at all times
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might erode the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity
of the legal profession.[57] By flouting the Notarial Rules on numerous occasions,
respondent engaged in unlawful conduct which renders him liable for violation of the
following provisions of the CPR:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Thus, aside from the above-stated penalties, the Court further suspends respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence
on the subject matter.[58]

II.

Separately, in his Motion for Reconsideration in the Light of the New

Evidence,[59] complainant pointed out that, as per the May 7, 2015 Certification[60] issued
by the OBC, respondent had previously been suspended by the Court for five (5) months
in "Resolution x x x dated December 04, 2000 in G.R. No. 126025 x x x and re-docketed
as an Administrative Case No. 9723." Records of the OBC show that respondent received
the Order of Suspension (Resolution in G.R. No. 126025 [61] and re-docketed as
Administrative Case No. 9723) on January 9, 2001. [62] However, it does not appear that
the said suspension has already been lifted following the prescribed procedure
therefor.[63]

In Ladim v. Ramirez,[64] the Court explained that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not
automatic upon the expiration of the suspension period. The lawyer must still file before
the Court the necessary motion to lift suspension and other pertinent documents, which
include certifications from. the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where he
practices his legal profession and from the IBP's Local Chapter where he is affiliated
affirming that he ceased and desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in
court as counsel during the period of his suspension.[65] Thereafter, the Court, after
evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution
lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. [66] Prior
thereto, the "suspension stands until he has satisfactorily shown to the Court his
compliance therewith."[67]

Records do not show that respondent complied with the foregoing process. And yet, as
complainant averred, respondent has been practicing law, as demonstrated by photos
taken of court calendar of cases wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the
accused in two (2) criminal cases,[68] receipts issued bearing the Alvarez Law Office logo
for the payment of acceptance fee,[69] and a letter dated June 25, 2014 addressed to the
COC & Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the RTC-San Pedro signed by respondent as counsel for a
certain Spouses Caridad Capistrano and Renato Bagtas.[70]

Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby requires respondent to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held in contempt of court and/or further
disciplined for allegedly practicing law although his suspension therefor has yet to be
lifted.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr.
(respondent) GUILTY of violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, effective immediately, the
Court: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years; REVOKES his
incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and, perpetually DISQUALIFIEShim
from being commissioned as a notary public. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same
offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to
report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when
his suspension from the practice of law, the revocation of his notarial commission, and
his disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect.

Further, respondent is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice
why he should not be held in contempt of court and/or further disciplined for allegedly
practicing law despite the suspension therefor as discussed in this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (1) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; (2) the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance; and, (3) the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 232249, Sep 03, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
v.
WILT SAM BANGALAN Y MAMBA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated February 3, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07883, which affirmed the Judgment[3]dated
September 8, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 5 (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 14938, finding accused-appellant Wilt Sam Bangalan yMamba
(Bangalan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165,[4]otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."

The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information[5]filed before the RTC accusing Bangalan of
violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around 5:30 in
the afternoon of July 27, 2012, a team composed of members of the Philippine National
Police Tuguegarao City Police Station, with coordination from the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, conducted a buy-bust operation against Bangalan, during which
8.12 grams of dried marijuana leaves were recovered from him. The team, together with
Bangalan, then proceeded to the Tuguegarao City Police Station where the seized item
was marked, photographed, and inventoried in the presence of
Barangay Kagawad Remigio Cabildo (Kgwd. Cabildo). Thereafter, it was brought to the
crime laboratory where, after examination, it was confirmed to be marijuana, a dangerous
drug.[6]

In defense, Bangalan denied the charges against him, claiming instead, that he was
forcefully taken by two (2) men and brought to the police station where he was asked if
he knew a certain Ifan Lacambra. When he answered in the negative, the men hit him,
and committed to release him if he would just disclose where Ifan Lacambra is. When he
disclaimed any knowledge thereof, he was detained for selling marijuana. [7]

In a Judgment[8] dated September 8, 2015, the RTC found Bangalan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and, accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount
of P400,000.00.[9] The RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the
elements of the said crime, and further ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti were preserved. On the other hand, it rejected Bangalan's defense of
denial and frame-up for being unsubstantiated.[10]Aggrieved, Bangalan appealed[11] the
RTC ruling to the CA.

In a Decision[12] dated February 3, 2017, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling,
increasing the fine payable to P500,000.00.[13] Among others, the CA observed that while
there were slight deviations from the chain of custody rule, the same did not compromise
the corpus delicti.[14]

Hence, this appeal[15] seeking that Bangalan's conviction be overturned.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, [16] it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of thecorpus delicti of the
crime.[17] Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delictirenders the evidence for the
State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence,
warrants an acquittal.[18]

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. [19] As part of the chain
of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory,
and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same.[20] The law further requires that the said inventory and
photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely:

(a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,[21] "a representative from the
media AND the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official";[22]or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "[a]n elected public
official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service OR the media."[23]The
law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of
the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination
of evidence."[24]

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as
the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of
substantive law."[25]This is because "[t]he law has been crafted by Congress as safety
precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty
imposed may be life imprisonment."[26]

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict
compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible.[27]As such,
the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance;
and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.[28] The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21
(a),[29] Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which was
later adopted into the text of RA 10640.[30]It should, however, be emphasized that for the
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses,[31] and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven
as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.[32]

Anent the required witnesses rule, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution
proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the
presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness
of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is
for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances.[33] Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts
to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance.[34] These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily
given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing
fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. [35]

Notably, the Court, in People v. Miranda,[36] issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors

when dealing with drugs cases. It implored that "(since] the [procedural] requirements are
clearly set forth in the law, the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in
the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether
or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the
possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's
integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal,
or even not raised, become apparent upon further review." [37]

In this case, it is apparent that the inventory of the seized item was not conducted in the
presence of any representative of the DOJ and the media contrary to the afore-described
procedure. During trial, Police Officer 2 Albert Caranguian (PO2 Caranguian) effectively
admitted to this lapse when he testified as follows:
[Atty. Evaristo Caleda III]:

Q: Few questions, Your Honor. Were you a participant to the inventory of the property
seized?

WITNESS [PO2 Caranguian]:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And did you require or invite DOJ representative when you conducted the inventory?

A: I cannot remember, sir.

Q: Did you also require or invite media men when you conducted the inventory?

A: I cannot remember, sir.[38]

As earlier stated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for these witnesses'
absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that
genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their
presence. Similar to sheer statements of unavailability, the failure to remember if such
witnesses were present during the inventory, without more, is undoubtedly too flimsy of
an excuse and hence, would not pass the foregoing standard to trigger the operation of
the saving clause. To add, records are bereft of any indication that photographs of the
confiscated items were duly taken. This lapse was completely unacknowledged and
perforce, left unjustified by the prosecution altogether. Because of these deviations, the
Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items purportedly seized from Bangalan were compromised, which consequently
warrants his acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED.The Decision dated February 3, 2017 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07883 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Wilt Sam Bangalan y Mamba is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 236576, SEPTEMBER 05, 2018]

ARIEL P. HORLADOR, PETITIONER,
 V.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., MARINE* SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD.,
AND CAPTAIN MARLON L. MALANAO, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated February 3, 2017
and the Resolution3 dated December 15, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 136386, which affirmed the Decision4 dated February 28, 2014 and the
Resolution5 dated May 22, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 04-06497-13 finding petitioner Ariel P. Horlador (petitioner)
entitled to permanent and total disability benefits, with modification deleting the award of
attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award in his favor.

The Facts

On April 18, 2012, respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI), for and on
behalf of its foreign principal, respondent Marine Shipmanagement Ltd. (Marine), hired 6
petitioner as a Chief Cook on board the vessel PRAIA for a period of eight (8) months
starting from his deployment on June 19, 2012.7 On January 3, 2013 and while on board
the vessel, petitioner, while carrying provisions, suddenly felt a severe pain on his waist,
abdomen, and down to his left scrotum. As the pain persisted for a number of days, he
was airlifted to a hospital in Belgium where he was diagnosed with "infection with the
need to rule out Epididymitis and Prostatitis" and advised to undergo repatriation. 8 Upon
arrival in the Philippines, petitioner claimed that he immediately reported to PTCI and
asked for referral for further treatment, but was ignored. As such, he used his health card
in order to seek treatment at the Molino Doctors Hospital where he was diagnosed with
hernia.9Thereafter, petitioner consulted two (2) other physicians who similarly concluded
that the nature and extent of his illness permanently and totally prohibited him from further
working as a seaman due to his "Chronic prostatitis."10 Thus, he filed a complaint11 for,
inter alia, permanent and total disability benefits against PTCI, Marine, and respondent
Captain Marlon L. Malanao as the crewing manager (respondents).

For their part, respondents averred that petitioner is not entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits, contending that petitioner: (a) was not medically repatriated as his
discharge from the vessel was due to contract completion; (b) failed to comply with the
mandatory post-deployment medical examination; and (c) failed to prove his allegation
that he had contracted and was diagnosed with hernia.12

The Labor Tribunals' Ruling

In a Decision13 dated September 27, 2013, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed petitioner's
complaint for lack of merit, essentially upholding respondents' contentions in this case.14
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed15 to the NLRC.

In a Decision16 dated February 28, 2014, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's ruling,
and accordingly, ordered respondents to pay petitioner permanent and total disability
benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent and ten percent (10%)
thereof as attorney's fees.17 The NLRC found that: (a) petitioner was medically
repatriated; (b) after medical repatriation, he tried reporting to PTCI for post-employment
medical examination, but was ignored; and (c) petitioner's disability was indeed work-
related and diagnosed to be permanent and total, and thus, compensable. 18

Respondents moved for reconsideration,19 but was denied in a Resolution20 dated May
22, 2014. Dissatisfied, they filed a petition for certiorari21 before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision22 dated February 3, 2017, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling, with
modification deleting the award of attorney's fees.23 It held that the NLRC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in finding, among others, that petitioner suffered a compensable work-
related illness that caused his permanent and total disability, and that respondents denied
his request for treatment or post-employment medical examination.24 The CA, however,
found it appropriate to delete the award of attorney's fees for the NLRC's failure to present
the factual bases therefor.25

Both parties moved for reconsideration,26 which were, however, denied in a Resolution27
dated December 15, 2017. Hence, this petition assailing the aforesaid deletion of
attorney's fees.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly deleted the
award of attorney's fees in petitioner's favor.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

There are two (2) commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees - the ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services the former renders; compensation is
paid for the cost and/or results of legal services per agreement or as may be assessed.
In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered
by the court to be paid by the losing party to the winning party. The instances when these
may be awarded are enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code and is payable not to
the lawyer but to the client, unless the client and his lawyer have agreed that the award
shall accrue to the lawyer as additional or part of compensation.28 Particularly, Article
2208 of the Civil Code reads:

Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In labor cases involving employees' wages and other benefits, the Court has consistently
held that when the concerned employee is entitled to the wages/benefits prayed for,
he/she is also entitled to attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award due him/her.29

In this case, suffice it to say that the CA erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees,
considering that petitioner was found to be entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits and was forced to litigate to protect his valid claim. Thus, the reinstatement of
such award is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 3, 2017 and the
Resolution dated December 15, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136386
are MODIFIED in that the award of attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
total monetary awards due petitioner Ariel P. Horlador is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 213582, SEPTEMBER 12, 2018]

NYMPHA S. ODIAMAR,*PETITIONER,
V.
LINDA ODIAMAR VALENCIA, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by respondent Linda Odiamar
Valencia (respondent) assailing the Decision2 dated June 28, 2016 of the Court which
affirmed the Decision3 dated March 16, 2012 and the Resolution4 dated July 14, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CV No. 93624, with modification ordering petitioner
Nympha S. Odiamar (petitioner) to pay respondent the amount of P1,010,049.00
representing the remaining balance of petitioner's debt to the latter in the original amount
of P1,400,000.00.

In said motion, respondent prays for the imposition of legal interest on the monetary award
due her.5 She likewise insists that petitioner's loan obligation to her is not just
P1,400,000.00 but P2,100,000.00 and, as such, she should be made to pay the latter
amount.6

Respondent's contentions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court notes that there are two (2) types of interest, namely, monetary
interest and compensatory interest. Monetary interest is the compensation fixed by the
parties for the use or forbearance of money. On the other hand, compensatory interest is
that imposed by law or by the courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. In other words,
the right to recover interest arises only either by virtue of a contract (monetary interest) or
as damages for the delay or failure to pay the principal loan on which the interest is
demanded (compensatory interest).7

Anent monetary interest, it is an elementary rule that no interest shall be due unless it has
been expressly stipulated in writing.8 In this case, no monetary interest may be imposed
on the loan obligation, considering that there was no written agreement expressly
providing for such.9

This notwithstanding, such loan obligation may still be subjected to compensatory

interest, following the guidelines laid down in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,10 as follows:
Thus, from the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest
that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve
percent (12%) per annum — as reflected in the case of[Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
CA (Eastern Shipping Lines)11] and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for
Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for
Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 —
but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted,
nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only
until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum
shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable.

xxxx

To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern
Shipping Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts
or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The
provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the
measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed,
as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demandunder and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an

interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.12 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Applying the foregoing parameters to this case, petitioner's loan obligation to respondent
shall be subjected to compensatory interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the date of judicial demand, i.e., August 20, 2003,13 until June 30, 2013, and
thereafter at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality
of this ruling. Moreover, all monetary awards14 due to respondent shall earn legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid.

However, as to respondent's other contentions, suffice it to say that the same are mere
reiterations of the grounds already evaluated and passed upon in the Assailed Decision.
Therefore, there is no cogent reason to warrant a modification or reversal of the same.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision

dated June 28, 2016 of the Court is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, imposing
on petitioner Nympha S. Odiamar's liability to respondent Linda Odiamar Valencia in the
amount of P1,010,049.00 legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from the date of judicial demand, i.e., August 20, 2003, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this ruling.
Moreover, all monetary awards due to respondent shall earn legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 230651, SEPTEMBER 18, 2018]

ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER,
V.
THE QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA, QUEZON CITY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE, AND QUEZON CITY
TREASURER'S OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus1with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction assails the
constitutionality and legality of Quezon City (QC) Ordinance No. SP-2556, Series of
2016,2 otherwise known as "An Ordinance Approving the Schedule of Fair Market Value
of Lands and Basic Unit Construction Cost for Buildings, and Other Structures for the
Revision of Real Property Assessments in Quezon City, Pursuant to the Provisions of the
Local Government Code of 1991 [(LGC)] [Republic Act No. (RA) 7160], 3 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, and For Other Purposes" (2016 Ordinance). The
petition was filed against respondents the QC Government, represented by Mayor
Herbert Bautista, the QC Assessor's Office, and the QC Treasurer's Office (respondents).

The Facts

In 2010, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Department of Finance
(DOF) issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2010-01,4 directing all local government
units to implement Section 2195 of the LGC, which requires assessors to revise the real
property assessments in their respective jurisdictions every three (3) years. In the said
Memorandum, the assessors were also ordered to: (a) require all owners or
administrators of real properties, prior to the preparation of the revised schedule of Fair
Market Values (FMV), to file sworn statements declaring the true value of their properties
and the improvements thereon; and (b) comply with the DOF issuances relating to the
appraisal and assessment of real properties, particularly, DOF Local Assessment
Regulation No. 1-92, DOF Department Order No. 37-09 (Philippine Valuation Standards),
and DOF Department Order No. 2010-10 (Mass Appraisal Guidebook).6 Hence, given
that the last reevaluation of real property assessment values in QC was made way back
in 1995 under Ordinance No. SP-357, Series of 1995 (1995 Ordinance), which thus
rendered the values therein outdated,7 the QC Assessor prepared a revised schedule of
FMVs and submitted it to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of QC for approval pursuant to
Section 212 of the LGC.8

On December 5, 2016, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of QC enacted the assailed 2016

Ordinance, which: (a) approved the revised schedule of FMVs of all lands and Basic Unit
Construction Cost for buildings and other structures, whether for residential, commercial,
and industrial uses;9and (b) set the new assessment levels at five percent (5%) for
residential and fourteen percent (14%) for commercial and industrial classifications. 10 The
revised schedule increased the FMVs indicated in the 1995 Ordinance to supposedly
reflect the prevailing market price of real properties in QC. 11 The 2016 Ordinance was
approved on December 14, 2016, and pursuant to Section 6 thereof, the General Revision
of Real Property Assessment for lands shall become demandable beginning January 1,
2017, while that for Buildings and other Structures shall take effect beginning 2018. 12

On April 7, 2017, petitioner Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc.

(Alliance), allegedly a non-stock, non-profit corporation,13 filed the present petition,
praying that: (a) a TRO be issued to restrain the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance;
(b) the said Ordinance be declared unconstitutional for violating substantive due process,
and invalid for violating Section 130 of the LGC; and (c) the tax payments made by the
QC residents or individuals based on the 2016 Ordinance's revised schedule of FMVs be
refunded.14

In the petition, Alliance argued that the 2016 Ordinance should be declared
unconstitutional for violating substantive due process, considering that the increase in
FMVs, which resulted in an increase in the taxpayer's base, and ultimately, the taxes to
be paid, was unjust, excessive, oppressive, arbitrary, and confiscatory as proscribed
under Section 130 of the LGC.15

Moreover, it averred that the hike in the FMVs up to 500% of the previous values was
arbitrary and has no factual basis because the 2016 Ordinance contains no standard or
explanation on how the QC Assessor arrived at the new amounts in the Schedule of
FMVs.16

Alliance further pointed out that there was no real consultation prior to the enactment of
the 2016 Ordinance as required by law, noting that only a brief one (1)-day consultation
hearing was held in November 2016 before the approval of the 2016 Ordinance on
December 14, 2016. The short timeframe from the consultation to the approval reveals
that the proceedings were fast-tracked.17
It likewise argued that the abrupt effectivity of the 2016 Ordinance merely a month after
its enactment, i.e., from December 2016 to January 2017, is unreasonable as it compelled
the QC residents to pay exorbitant real property taxes for the year 2017 without giving
them sufficient time to prepare for the payment of the increased taxes. 18 Thus, the 2016
Ordinance is confiscatory because their inability to pay the real property taxes will result
in their property being declared as delinquent, and thereafter, auctioned to the
public.19This scenario also amounts to restraint of trade as applied to those properties
used in businesses.20

On April 18, 2017, the Court issued a TRO 21 against the implementation of the 2016
Ordinance and required respondents to file their comment.

In their Comment, 22 respondents countered that the petition is procedurally infirm

because Alliance: (a) failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under the LGC, which
were to question the assessments on the taxpayers' properties by filing a protest before
the City Treasurer, as well as to assail the constitutionality of the 2016 Ordinance before
the Secretary of Justice;23(b)violated the hierarchy of courts when it directly filed its
petition before this Court; 24(c) has no legal capacity to sue since its Certificate of
Registration as a corporation was revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in an Order dated February 10, 2004,25 and it has no separate juridical personality
as a homeowners' association due to its non-registration with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB);26 and (d) is not a real party-in-interest because it does not
own any real property in QC to be affected by the 2016 Ordinance. 27

On the substantive aspect, respondents posited that the 2016 Ordinance complied with
all the formal and substantive requisites for its validity. 28 In particular, they claimed that
twenty-nine (29) public consultations were conducted in barangay assemblies throughout
the six (6) districts of QC; in fact, Alliance's President, Gloria Soriano, was present and
had actively participated in two (2) of those assemblies.29

Further, respondents maintained that the resulting increase in tax due was reasonable
because the increase in FMVs was tempered by the decrease in the assessment levels
to minimize impact on the taxpayers. 30 They claimed that the assessment levels were
reduced from eighteen percent (18%) to five percent (5%) for residential classification,
and from forty-five (45%) to fourteen (14%) for commercial and industrial classifications.31

They also stressed that the QC Assessor arrived at the new FMVs in the 2016 Ordinance
using the approaches specified in DOF Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92, which
prescribes guidelines in assessing real properties.32 Respondents likewise averred that
the assessment was not fast-tracked as it underwent an immense study for three (3) years
from 2013 and was subjected to numerous public consultations.33 They emphasized that
the last adjustment in the schedule of FMVs was in 1995 and no revisions were made
since then until the 2016 Ordinance was enacted.34 They pointed out that the huge leap
in FMVs of lands after twenty-one (21) years was inevitable due to the interplay of
economic and market forces, highlighted by significant infrastructure and real estate
development projects, as well as the population growth in QC. 35 They further noted that
the FMVs in the 2016 Ordinance are fair and equitable, considering that those values are
even lower than the FMVs of QC's neighboring cities in Metro Manila, i.e.,Pasay,
Caloocan, Manila, and Mandaluyong.36

On July 14, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise filed its Comment, 37
arguing that the petition should be dismissed on the grounds of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, non-observance of the hierarchy of courts, and lack of locus
standi.38 It further alleged that the 2016 Ordinance was valid because Alliance failed to:
(a) overcome the presumption of constitutionality; (b)show that the substantial increase
in the assessed values of real properties violates the fundamental principles of taxation;
(c) prove that the public hearing required before passing an ordinance was not complied
with; and (d)submit evidence that the 2016 Ordinance was abruptly implemented. The
OSG added that Alliance failed to demonstrate its clear legal right to enjoin the
implementation of the subject ordinance.39

In the Reply, 40 Alliance argued, as regards its failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
that: first, the remedy of payment under protest as provided for in Sections 229 and 252
of the LGC is inapplicable in this case because such remedy requires prior payment of
taxes, which would be unfair and unreasonable on the part of its members who cannot
afford to pay the increased taxes;41and second, the remedy of appeal to the Secretary of
Justice would not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the 2016 Ordinance. 42

Alliance also contended that its petition raised only a question of law (i.e., whether
respondents gravely abused its discretion in increasing the FMVs up to 500% as
contained in the 2016 Ordinance) which is cognizable by the Court. 43 In any event, it
maintained that the petition is of transcendental importance warranting the relaxation of
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.44

Alliance further claimed that it has legal capacity to sue because it is merely representing
its trustees and members who filed the petition in their own personal capacities as
taxpayers and residents of QC. In fact, these trustees and members are the ones who
will suffer personal and substantial injury by the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance. 45

On the merits, Alliance posited that the 2016 Ordinance failed to comply with both the
procedural and substantive requirements for a valid ordinance, considering that: (a)the
alleged twenty-nine (29) public consultation/hearings were conducted without the
required written notices as prescribed under Article 276 (b) of the LGC's Implementing
Rules and Regulations;46(b) the 2016 Ordinance is unjust, excessive, oppressive, and
confiscatory, and is not based on the taxpayer's ability to pay;47(c) it failed to comply with
the assessment calendar prescribed under Section 2 of DOF Local Assessment
Regulation No. 1-92;48 and (d) there is no legal basis to increase the FMVs based on the
latest market developments.49

The Issues Before the Court

The main issues before the Court are: (1) on the procedural aspects, whether or not the
petition is infirm for violations of the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and hierarchy of courts, as well as Alliance's lack of legal capacity to sue; and (2) on the
substantive aspect, whether or not the 2016 Ordinance is valid and constitutional.

The Court's Ruling

I. Doctrines of Administrative Exhaustion and Hierarchy of Courts.

The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires that before a party may seek
intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in
the administrative level.50 The LGC provides two (2) remedies in relation to real property
tax assessments or tax ordinances. These are: (1) Sections 226 and 252 51 thereof which
allow a taxpayer to question the reasonableness of the amount assessed before the city
treasurer then appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals;52 and (2) Section 18753
thereof which allows an aggrieved taxpayer to question the validity or legality of a tax
ordinance by duly filing an appeal before the Secretary of Justice before seeking judicial
intervention. In the present case, Alliance admitted that these administrative remedies
were not complied with, and that the petition was immediately filed before the Court. 54

However, the rule on administrative exhaustion admits of exceptions,55 one of which is

when strong public interest is involved.

Although a petitioner's failure to exhaust the required administrative remedies has been
held to bar a petition in court,56 the Court has relaxed the application of this rule "in view
of the more substantive matters,"57 as in this case. In particular, a local government unit's
authority to increase the FMVs of properties for purposes of local taxation is a question
that indisputably affects the public at large. As for QC, the widespread effect of the 2016
Ordinance to its constituents is glaringly apparent, considering that QC has a land area
of 16,112.8 hectares, which is almost one-fourth of the entire Metro Manila. Moreover,
QC holds 23.3% of Metro Manila's total population.58 While taxation is an inherent power
of the State, the exercise of this power should not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory as explicitly prohibited under the LGC. As Alliance proffers, the alleged
exorbitant increase in real property taxes to be paid based on the assailed Ordinance
triggers a strong public interest against the imposition of excessive or confiscatory
taxes.59 Courts must therefore guard the public's interest against such government action.
Accordingly, the Court exempts this case from the rule on administrative exhaustion.

Meanwhile, the hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from directly resorting to this
Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. 60 Nevertheless, this doctrine
is not an iron-clad rule; it also admits of exceptions,61 such as when the case involves
matters of transcendental importance. In this case, Alliance argues that the
implementation of the 2016 Ordinance will directly and adversely affect the property
interests of around "3,085,786 million" residents of QC.62

In Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista (Ferrer, Jr.),63 the Court allowed the direct resort to it, noting that
the challenged ordinances would "adversely affect the property interests of all paying
constituents of (QC],"64 and that it would serve as a test case for the guidance of other
local government units in crafting ordinances. It added that these circumstances allow the
Court to set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition,
stressing that "[t]his is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed."65 Considering the circumstances of this case and the pronouncement in
Ferrer, Jr., the Court also deems it proper to relax the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Notwithstanding the exemption of this case from the above-discussed procedural

doctrines, the Court is constrained to dismiss the petition due to Alliance's lack of legal
capacity to sue.

II. Legal Capacity to Sue.

The Rules of Court mandates that only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized
by law may be parties in a civil action. Non-compliance with this requirement renders a
case dismissible on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue,which refers to "a
plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a
party."66
Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association,having no separate juridical
personality, lacks the capacity to sue in its own name.67 In this case, Alliance admitted
that it has no juridical personality, considering the revocation of its SEC Certificate of
Registration and its failure to register with the HLURB as a homeowner's association.
Nevertheless, Alliance insists that the petition should not be dismissed because it was
filed by the members of the Board of Trustees in their own personal capacities, as
evidenced by a letter68 dated March 10, 2017 (Authorization Letter) authorizing its
ostensible Treasurer, Danilo Liwanag (Liwanag), to file the petition in their behalf.

The Court disagrees. A perusal of the petition readily shows that it was filed by Alliance,
and not by the individual members of its Board of Trustees in their personal capacities.
As it is evident from the title and "Parties"69 section of the petition, the same was filed
solely in the name of "Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc.," as
petitioner. Moreover, the Authorization Letter above-adverted to clearly indicates that the
signatories therein signed merely in their official capacities as Alliance's trustees. 70
In fact, even assuming that the trustees intended to file the case in their own behalf,
Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court71 requires that their names as beneficiaries must
be included in the title of the case, which was, however, not done here. Thus, Alliance's
claim that the petition was filed by the trustees in their personal capacities is bereft of
merit.

For another, Alliance argued that the status of its authorized representative, Liwanag, as
a taxpayer and resident of QC, is sufficient to correct the procedural lapse.

This contention is erroneous. In Association of Flood Victims (AFV) v. Commission on

Elections,72 the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and/or mandamusbecause the
petitioner therein – being an unincorporated association – had no capacity to sue in its
own name and accordingly, its representative who filed the petition in its behalf, had no
personality to bring an action in court.73Moreover, in Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision
Homeowners Association,74 the Court held that the complaint filed by an unregistered
association cannot be treated as a suit by the persons who signed it.75

On these scores, the fact that Liwanag, a natural person, signed and verified the petition
did not cure Alliance's lack of legal capacity to file this case. By the same logic, the
signatures of the supposed trustees in the Authorization Letter did not confer Alliance with
a separate juridical personality required to pursue this case.

In the final analysis, there is no proper petitioner to the present suit. Should this case
proceed despite Alliance's legal non-existence, the Court will certainly remain in
continuous quandary as to who should the reliefs be granted to, since no other proper
party filed the case. It is noteworthy to mention that in the case of Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,76 the Court decided to give due course
to the petition despite the lack of legal capacity to sue of petitioner SPARK (also an
unincorporated association like Alliance) because individuals or natural persons joined as
co-petitioners in the suit, unlike in the present case.

All told, while this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrines of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, the Court is still constrained to dismiss
the petition due to Alliance's lack of legal capacity to sue. Thus, the resolution of the
issues anent the validity and constitutionality of Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-2556,
Series of 2016, while indeed of great public interest and of transcendental importance,
must nonetheless await the filing of the proper case by the proper party. Accordingly, the
Court no longer deems it necessary to resolve the other issues raised in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to petitioner Alliance of Quezon City

Homeowners' Association, Inc.'s lack of legal capacity to sue. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued on April 18, 2017 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 238338, OCTOBER 01, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
EDGARDO DELA ROSA YEMPAMANO @ "BOY," CRISELDA HUERTO Y DOCOT
@ "CECIL," AND RONALDO HUERTO Y DOCOT, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated November 29, 2016 rendered by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07579, which affirmed in toto the
Decision3 dated May 18, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC):
(a) in Criminal Case No. 14-518 finding accused-appellants Edgardo Dela Rosa y
Empamano @ "Boy" (Edgardo), Criselda Huerto y Docot @ "Cecil" (Criselda), and
Ronaldo Huerto y Docot (Ronaldo; collectively, accused-appellants) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002;" and (b) in
Criminal Case No. 14-519 finding accused-appellant Edgardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
The Facts

The prosecution alleged that on April 26, 2014, a buy-bust team composed of members
of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Special Operations Task Group of Makati City was
formed to respond to a tip5 regarding a male and a female peddling illegal drugs along
Makati Avenue, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City. After coordinating with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),6 the team, together with their asset, proceeded to the
target area where Edgardo, whom the asset called "Mang Boy," sold a plastic sachet
containing suspected shabu to Police Officer 1 Jojo Valdez (PO1 Valdez), the designated
poseur-buyer. Also present during the buy-bust transaction and arrested together with
Edgardo were Edgardo's wife, Criselda, and brother-in-law, Ronaldo.7 A search on the
person of Edgardo yielded four (4) more plastic sachets containing suspected shabu.
Thus, after accused-appellants were apprised of their rights, the arresting officers brought
them and the seized items to the barangay hall where the items were
marked,8photographed, and inventoried9 in the presence of Barangay Captain Benhur
Cruz (Brgy. Captain Cruz).10 Thereafter, the confiscated items were brought to the crime
laboratory for examination11 and tested positive12 for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Consequently, all three (3) accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs (0.10 gram),13 while Edgardo
was further charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs (0.41 gram).14

In defense, Edgardo and Criselda denied the charges and claimed that on April 25, 2014,
they, together with Ronaldo, were inside a bingo boutique along Makati Avenue when
police officers suddenly took them outside and eventually, handcuffed them. They were
then taken to the SAID office where they were detained for three (3) days. Thereafter,
they were asked to confess to their crimes and further, shown plastic sachets allegedly
recovered from them.15

In a Decision16 dated May 18, 2015, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly,
sentenced each of them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In addition, the RTC convicted Edgardo
for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and hence, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.17 The RTC found that the elements of the crimes charged were sufficiently
established by the prosecution and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items had been properly preserved.18
On appeal,19 the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction in a Decision20 dated November
29, 2016.21 Apart from echoing the findings and conclusions of the RTC, the CA stressed
that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 does not
automatically render void and invalid the seizure and custody of the confiscated items, so
long as the integrity and evidentiary value thereof have been properly preserved by the
arresting officers.22

Hence, this appeal23 seeking the reversal of accused-appellants' conviction for the crimes
charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, 24 it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of
the crime.25 Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delictirenders the evidence for the
State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence,
warrants an acquittal.26

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are
seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.27 As part of the chain of
custody procedure, the law requires that the apprehending team, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items.
The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of
RA 9165 by RA 10640,28 "a representative from the media AND the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official";29 or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640, "[a]n elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service OR the media."30 The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence."31

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as
the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of
substantive law."32 This is because "[t]he law has been crafted by Congress as safety
precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty
imposed may be life imprisonment."33
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict
compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible.34 As such,
the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.35 The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21
(a),36 Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which was
later adopted into the text of RA 10640.37 It should, however, be emphasized that for the
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses,38 and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven
as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist.39

Anent the required witnesses rule, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution
proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the
presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness
of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is
for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances.40 Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts
to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance.41 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily
given sufficient time – beginning from the moment they have received the information
about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest – to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing full
well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. 42

Notably, the Court, in People v. Miranda,43 issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors

when dealing with drugs cases. It implored that "[since] the [procedural] requirements are
clearly set forth in the law, the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in
the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether
or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the
possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's
integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal,
or even not raised, become apparent upon further review." 44

Records show that although the inventory of the seized items was conducted in the
presence of Brgy. Captain Cruz (an elected public official), no representatives from the
DOJ and the media were present to witness the same. During trial, PO1 Valdez, one of
the members of the buy-bust team and the designated poseur-buyer, explicitly admitted
that:

ATTY. PUZON:
 Q: You arrived at the Brgy. Hall at around?

WITNESS:

A: Around 2:00 in the morning of April 26, Ma'am.

Q: And upon arrival, you immediately prepared the Inventory Receipt, is that
correct?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

xxxx

Q: And during that time, the preparation of the Inventory was only witnessed by
[Barangay Captain] Benhur Cruz?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: There was no representative coming from DOJ?

A: None, Ma'am.

Q: Likewise, there was no representative coming from the media?

A: None, Ma'am.
x x x x45 (Emphases supplied)

Neither do the records reflect that these witnesses were present during the photography
of the seized items, which process is usually conducted contemporaneously with the
inventory thereof. As earlier discussed, the prosecution is put to task to justify the absence
of the required witnesses during the conduct of inventory and photography or, at the very
least, show that the arresting officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their
presence. Unfortunately, no such justification or demonstration was even proffered in this
case. In consequence, the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been compromised, which perforce already
warrants accused-appellants' acquittal. That being said, the Court finds it unnecessary to
delve into the other matters raised.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07579 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellants Edgardo Dela Rosa y Empamano @ "Boy," Criselda
Huerto y Docot @ "Cecil," and Ronaldo Huerto y Docot are ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause their immediate
release, unless they are being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 238522, OCTOBER 01, 2018]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
NORMAN BARADI Y VELASCO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated June 9, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08298, which affirmed the Joint Decision 3 dated
February 9, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 29
(RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 10462 and 10463, finding accused-appellant Norman Baradi y
Velasco (Baradi) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 charging Baradi of violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around 12:00 noon of July 11,
2014, operatives of the City Anti Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task Group (CAID-
SOTG) of San Fernando City, La Union conducted a buy-bust operation against Baradi,
during which: (a) he allegedly sold a plastic sachet containing 0.5890 gram of suspected
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; and (b) during his arrest, another sachet
containing 0.0245 gram of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was
recovered from him. Immediately after Baradi's arrest, the apprehending officers
conducted the marking, inventory, and photography in the presence of a barangay official,
a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, and a media representative at the place
where the buy-bust operation took place. Baradi was then brought to the police station
and thereafter, SPO1 Gilbert Andulay6(SPO1 Andulay), the poseur-buyer and the one
who took custody of the suspected drugs, took the seized sachets to the crime laboratory
where it was confirmed that the seized plastic sachets from Baradi contained shabu.7

For his part, Baradi denied the charges against him and invoked the defense of denial
and frame-up. He narrated that on the date and time he was arrested, he was supposed
to meet a certain "Fatima" at Long Beach Resort in Paringao, Bauang, La Union. While
aboard his car, he decided to approach two (2) individuals to ask if one of them was
Fatima. Suddenly, the said individuals attempted to open the door of his car, and
thereafter, a car driven by a certain "Police Officer Bautista" blocked his car and pointed
a gun at him. He was then taken to the San Fernando City Police Station where he and
his car were searched without the police finding anything. Afterwards, a barangay official,
a DOJ representative, and a media representative arrived, but he deemed it futile to talk
to them as he was already framed up and accused of selling drugs.8

In a Joint Decision9 dated February 9, 2016, the RTC found Baradi guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced him as follows: (a)
in Crim. Case No. 10462, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 10463, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. 10 The
RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the elements
of the crimes charged against Baradi, as he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu,
and thereafter, was found in possession of another sachet which also contained shabu.
The RTC also observed that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized from
Baradi were preserved as the apprehending officers complied with the chain of custody
rule.11 Aggrieved, Baradi appealed12 the RTC ruling to the CA.

In a Decision13 dated June 9, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Hence, this appeal seeking that Baradi's conviction be overturned.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
are: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment;14 while the elements of Illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 are: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.15 Here, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of the crimes charged
are present, as the records clearly show that Baradi was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu to the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Andulay, during a legitimate buy-bust operation by the
CAID-SOTG of San Fernando City, La Union; and that another plastic sachet
containingshabu was recovered from him during the search made incidental to his arrest.
Since there is no indication that the said courts overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds no reason to deviate
from their factual findings. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was in the
best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties.16

Further, the Court notes that the buy-bust team had sufficiently complied with the chain
of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of
the crime.17 Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the
State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence,
warrants an acquittal.18

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the dangerous
drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 19 As part of
the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical
inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure
and confiscation of the same.20 The law further requires that the said inventory and
photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,21 "a representative from
the media and the [DOJ], and any elected public official";22 or (b) if after the amendment
of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service orthe media."23 The law requires the presence of these witnesses
primarily "to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion
of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."24

In this case, it is glaring from the records that after Baradi was arrested during the buy-
bust operation and subsequently searched, the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Andulay,
immediately took custody of the seized plastic sachets and conducted the marking,
inventory, and photography thereof in the presence of a public elected official, a DOJ
representative, and a media representative right at the place where Baradi was arrested.
Thereafter, SPO1 Andulay secured the seized plastic sachets and delivered the same to
the forensic chemist at the crime laboratory, who in turn, personally brought the items to
the RTC for identification.25 In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that there is sufficient
compliance with the chain of custody rule, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti have been preserved. Perforce, Baradi's conviction must stand.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 9, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08298 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant
Norman Baradi y Velasco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accordingly, he is
sentenced as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 10462, to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 10463, to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NOS. 226199 AND 227242-54, OCTOBER 01, 2018]

ROSITA TUASON MARAVILLA AND CORAZON TUASON* MIRANDA, THROUGH
THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO, PETITIONERS,
V.
MARCELINO BUGARIN, ANGELITA CONTRERAS, BENJAMIN LAZATIN,
LOURDES MANIQUIZ, EDELBERTO* PADLAN, REMEDIOS NAVARRO, JOSE
PANGAN, EDUVEGES* REYES, ALEXANDER CRUZ, PRISCILLA CORTEZ, MILA
LAJA, ANTONIO DAANAY, GENEROSA SISON, PERFECTO DELA VEGA, AND
ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Orders dated March
18, 20162 and July 28, 20163 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (RTC-Manila),
Branch 47 (court a quo) in Civil Case Nos. 13-130387-130400, suspending the issuance
of the writ of execution of its Consolidated Decision4dated November 17, 2014 against
respondents in an unlawful detainer case grounded on the existence of a supervening
event, i.e., the filing of an eminent domain petition (expropriation case) over the subject
land.

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from separate complaints5 for unlawful detainer (ejectment
cases) filed by petitioners Rosita Tuason Maravilla and Corazon Tuason Miranda, through
their attorney-in-fact, Rubencito M. del Mundo (petitioners), before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (MeTC) between November 16 to 25, 2011, seeking to eject respondents
Marcelino Bugarin, Angelita Contreras, Benjamin Lazatin, Lourdes Maniquiz, Edelberto
Padlan, Remedios Navarro, Jose Pangan, Eduveges Reyes, Alexander Cruz, Priscilla
Cortez, Mila Laja, Antonio Daanay, Generosa Sison, Perfecto Dela Vega, and all other
persons claiming rights under them (respondents), from the portions ofthe parcel of land
located in San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31697 6 (subject
land) in the name of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Carlos Tuason. The complaints
commonly claimed that: (a) respondents have been in physical possession of the subject
land and paying monthly rentals until November 10, 2010; (b) petitioners decided to
terminate the leases effective March 17, 2011; (c) respondents refused petitioners'
demands to pay and to vacate; and (d) the complaints were filed within one (1) year from
the last demand.7

The complaints were consolidated before the MeTC, Branch 29 which rendered a
Decision8 dated May 28, 2013 in favor of petitioners, ordering respondents to vacate the
subject land and surrender its possession to petitioners, and to pay: (a) their respective
unpaid rentals as of the termination of the lease on March 17, 2011; (b) P5,000.00 each
as reasonable monthly compensation for the use and occupation of the subject land every
month thereafter; (c) attorney's fees; and (d) the costs of suit.9

The RTC-Manila Proceedings

In a Consolidated Decision10 dated November 17, 2014, the court a quo affirmed the
MeTC Decision in toto,11 prompting respondents to file an appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 138449.12 On the other hand, petitioners
moved for execution13 of the Consolidated Decision, citing Section 21,14Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. The motion was opposed15 by respondents, who contended that
supervening events have transpired that would render the execution of the said Decision
inequitable, i.e., the City of Manila had: (a) passed several ordinances authorizing the
City Mayor to acquire the subject land and appropriating funds therefor;16 and (b) already
made a formal offer to purchase the subject land. 17 Petitioners countered18 that
respondents failed to comply with the requirements for the stay of the execution of the
judgment, and thus, reiterated their motion for execution.19

In an Order20 dated April 20, 2015, the court a quo directed the issuance of a writ of
execution of the Consolidated Decision, holding that respondents failed to substantiate
their claim of the existence of a supervening event. Respondents moved for
reconsideration,21 but the same was denied in an Order22 dated June 30, 2015.

Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Motion to Deny/Suspend Issuance of Writ

of Execution23 dated January 28, 2016, raising the filing by the City of Manila before the
RTC-Manila of an expropriation case over the subject land,24 docketed as Civil Case No.
15-134874, which led to the issuance of an Order25 dated March 18, 2016, suspending
the issuance of the writ of execution of the said Consolidated Decision.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration,26 but the same was denied in an Order27dated July
28, 2016; hence, the instant petition.

Meanwhile, the CA rendered a Decision28 denying respondents' appeal in CA-G.R. SP.

No. 138449.29 On February 17, 2017, a Decision30 was rendered by the RTC-Manila,
Branch 42 in the expropriation case declaring the City of Manila to have the lawful right
to take the subject land, and ordering it to pay the amount of P31,262,000.0031 less the
amount of initial deposit,32 as the just compensation for the subject land.

The Issue before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the court a quo erred in suspending
the issuance of the writ of execution of its decision against respondents in the ejectment
cases on the ground of the existence of a supervening event.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In ejectment cases, the judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is

immediately executory,33 and is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom,
unlessotherwise ordered by the RTC, or in the appellate court's discretion, suspended or
modified,34or supervening events occur which have brought about a material change in
the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable. 35

In this case, the court a quo, through its March 18, 2016 and July 28, 2016 Orders
(assailed Orders), suspended the execution of its November 17, 2014 Consolidated
Decision against respondents in the ejectment cases. Essentially, it ruled that the City of
Manila's filing of the expropriation case to acquire the subject land constituted a
supervening event that warranted the aforesaid suspension.36

The Court disagrees.

There is no dispute that at the time the assailed Orders were issued the City of Manila
had filed an expropriation case to acquire the subject land, and in fact, obtained a ruling
in its favor. These occurrences notwithstanding, records fail to show that the City of Manila
had either: (1) priorly posted the required judicial deposit in favor of petitioners in order to
secure possession of the subject land, in accordance with Section 19 37 of the Local
Government Code of 1991;38 or (2) paid the original landowners, i.e., Carlos Tuason's
living heirs (the petitioners herein),39the adjudged final just compensation for the subject
land so as to consider the expropriation process completed and consequently, effectuate
the transfer of ownership to it.40 Thus, at the time the assailed Orders were issued,
petitioners remained the owners of the subject land, and therefore were entitled to all the
rights appurtenant thereto.

The Court, however, is at a quandary as to how the City of Manila's interest in the
expropriation case bears any direct relation to respondents' interest in the ejectment
cases, given that the latter were not, in any manner, shown to benefit from the
expropriation of the subject property. A perusal of Ordinance No. 8274 41which authorized
the City Mayor of Manila to cause the acquisition of the subject land (in line with the on-
site development42 project of the city43) reveals that respondents have not been
specifically named as beneficiaries, the expropriation having been made for the benefit
of "the qualified members/beneficiaries of the San Andres and Silayan Alley
Neighborhood Association, Inc.,"44 of which they have not been shown to be members.
Thus, even if the expropriation process be completed, it is non sequitur for respondents
to claim45 that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof, for certain
requirements must still be met and complied with. 46 Stated differently, absent any
competent proof showing that respondents have been identified and registered as
socialized housing program beneficiaries47for the particular locality/project, they cannot
claim any right over the subject land on the basis of the said ordinance, on which the
expropriation case is anchored. Consequently, the Court finds that respondents failed to
establish the existence of any supervening event or overriding consideration of equity in
their favor, or any other compelling reason, to justify the court a quo's issuance of the
assailed Orders suspending the execution of its Consolidated Decision against them
pending appeal.

A final point. The Court is not unaware of the fact that subsequent to the issuance of the
assailed Orders, the City of Manila has already been issued a writ of possession in the
expropriation case, which therefore authorizes it to take actual possession of the subject
land. However, the Court discerns that the City of Manila is not a party to this case, given
that it sprung from the ejectment cases which essentially involve a dispute on the mere
material possession of the subject land only between the petitioners and respondents
herein. As earlier mentioned, respondents have no direct interest and hence, should not
benefit from any ruling favoring the City of Manila in the expropriation case. Thus, under
this limited context, the Court finds it proper to completely reverse the assailed Orders,
and allow full execution of the Consolidated Decision insofar as the parties herein are
concerned. Suffice it to say that nothing precludes the City of Manila from enforcing the
writ of possession it obtained in the expropriation case to acquire physical possession of
the subject property, which circumstance the Court, however, cannot presume at this
point nor, in fact, properly consider without going beyond the parameters of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated March 18, 2016 and July 28,
2016 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47 (court a quo) in Civil Case
Nos. 13-130387-130400, suspending the issuance of the writ of execution of its
Consolidated Decision dated November 17, 2014 against respondents Marcelino
Bugarin) Angelita Contreras, Benjamin Lazatin, Lourdes Maniquiz, Edelberto Padlan,
Remedios Navarro, Jose Pangan, Eduveges Reyes, Alexander Cruz, Priscilla Cortez,
Mila Laja, Antonio Daanay, Generosa Sison, Perfecto Dela Vega, and all other persons
claiming rights under them, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE based on the
reasons stated in this Decision. The court a quo is directed to issue a writ of execution of
the Consolidated Decision dated November 17, 2014.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 228267, OCTOBER 08, 2018]

MARIA NYMPHA MANDAGAN, PETITIONER,
V.
RUFINO DELA CRUZ OF THE SKILLS AND LIVELIHOOD TRAINING CENTER AND
DING VILLAREAL OF THE GENERAL SERVICES DIVISION, BOTH OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT OF SAN JUAN CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated July 4, 2016,2
September 15, 2016,3 and October 28, 20164 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 145966, which dismissed petitioner Maria Nympha Mandagan's (Mandagan)
petition for certiorari before it on technical grounds, i.e., availing of a wrong remedy as
she should have purportedly filed an appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman's
(Ombudsman) ruling.

The Facts

Mandagan alleged that on July 28, 2014, her Honda CRV figured into a collision with a
Toyota Revo owned by the Local Government Unit of San Juan City, Metro Manila (LGU-
San Juan) and driven by respondent Rufino Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Administrative Aide
III of the Skills and Livelihood Training Center of LGU-San Juan. According to Mandagan,
it was discovered during police investigation that the Toyota Revo's last registration was
in 2002 and that Dela Cruz had no valid driver's license. Initially, Dela Cruz attempted to
evade liability by introducing himself as a government employee performing official duties,
but due to fear of possible administrative and civil charges against him, he later admitted
to his fault and pleaded for amicable settlement, promising that the LGU-San Juan shall
answer for the cost of the repairs of Mandagan's vehicle. 5 Thereafter, Mandagan made
follow-ups with respondent Ding Villareal (Villareal), Administrative Aide III of the General
Services Division of LGU-San Juan, who allegedly misrepresented that the Toyota Revo
driven by Dela Cruz was covered by insurance policies issued by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and Malayan Insurance.6 Despite the foregoing, Mandagan
was unable to reimburse the costs of repairs of her vehicle, prompting her to send demand
letters and make several calls to both Dela Cruz and Villareal (respondents). However,
respondents not only failed to heed Mandagan's demands and to answer her calls, they
also avoided her whenever she visited their office. 7 Hence, Mandagan filed an
administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Gross Negligence, and Serious
Dishonesty against respondents before the Ombudsman.8

In his defense, Villareal maintained that the Toyota Revo is indeed insured, and that upon
receiving the report of the vehicular accident, he immediately asked their accredited repair
shop and insurance providers to coordinate with Mandagan's insurance provider for the
purpose of repairing her vehicle.9 For his part, Dela Cruz insisted that he has a valid
driver's license which he surrendered to the police traffic investigator at the scene of the
accident. He likewise claimed that the investigation results were biased against him as
the person driving Mandagan's vehicle at the time of the accident was a former official of
the Philippine National Police.10Notably, both respondents asserted that they had no
obligation to cause the registration of the Toyota Revo as the same should be handled
by another division of the LGU-San Juan. 11

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Decision12 dated November 26, 2015, the Ombudsman dismissed Mandagan's

complaint against respondents for lack of factual and legal bases. 13 It found Mandagan's
allegations that the Toyota Revo was unregistered and that Dela Cruz did not have a valid
driver's license to be without merit as documents proving otherwise were presented
during trial. 14 In this regard, the Ombudsman opined that respondents cannot be said to
be remiss in their duties, considering that: (a) it has not been shown that, by the nature
of their positions in the LGU-San Juan, they are required to have the Toyota Revo
registered; and (b) as mere low-level employees of the LGU San Juan, they cannot be
faulted for any delay in facilitating the release of the money representing the repair costs
of Mandagan's vehicle.15

Mandagan moved for reconsideration16 but the same was denied in an Order17dated
March 10, 2016. Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari18 under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA.
The CA Ruling

In a Resolution19 dated July 4, 2016, the CA dismissed the petition on technical grounds.
It held that Mandagan's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to assail the Ombudsman's
ruling is to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a Rule
65 petition for certiorari.20

Undaunted, Mandagan filed two (2) motions for reconsideration, 21 both of which were,
however, denied in Resolutions dated September 15, 201622 and October 28, 2016,23
respectively. Hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari.

The Court's Ruling

Pertinent portions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, 24 otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," read:

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.- x x x

xxxx
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and
unappealable.

xxxx

This provision is reflected in Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. (AO) 07,25 as
amended, which further covers situations where a respondent is absolved of the charges
against him, to wit:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of

the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. In all other cases,
the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review
under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Based on the foregoing, case law recognizes two (2) instances where a decision,
resolution or order of the Ombudsman arising from an administrative case becomes final
and unappealable: (a) where the respondent is absolved of the charge; and (b) in case of
conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)-month salary.26 Nonetheless, in
Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario,27 the Court clarified that in situations where the Ombudsman's
ruling is deemed as "final and unappealable," an aggrieved party is not left without any
recourse, as he may avail of the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:

The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the
complainant in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the
Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the administrative charge, as in this
case. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective recourse, whether by
motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts, to
effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the right to appeal but
only in case he is found liable and the penalty imposed is higher than public censure,
reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine equivalent to one month salary.

The absence of any statutory right to appeal the exoneration of the respondent in
an administrative case does not mean, however, that the complainant is left with
absolutely no remedy. Over and above our statutes is the Constitution whose
Section 1, Article VIII empowers the courts of justice to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This is
an overriding authority that cuts across all branches and instrumentalities of government
and is implemented through the petition for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides. A petition for certiorari is appropriate when a tribunal, clothed with judicial or
quasi-judicial authority, acted without jurisdiction (i.e., without the appropriate legal power
to resolve a case), or in excess of jurisdiction (i.e., although clothed with the appropriate
power to resolve a case, it oversteps its authority as determined by law, or that it
committed grave abuse of its discretion by acting either outside the contemplation of the
law or in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction). The Rules of Court and its provisions and jurisprudence on writs of certiorari
fully apply to the Office of the Ombudsman as these Rules are suppletory to the
Ombudsman's Rules. The Rules of Court are also the applicable rules in procedural
matters on recourses to the courts and hence, are the rules the parties have to contend
with in going to the CA.28 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, considering that the Ombudsman ruling exonerated respondents from
administrative liability – a ruling which is deemed "final and unappealable" – Mandagan
correctly filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the Ombudsman ruling on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion,29 instead of a Rule 43 petition for review as
erroneously posited by the CA. On this note, since the Court recognizes that the dismissal
of Mandagan's petition for certiorari was due to a mere technicality, it is only appropriate
that this case be remanded to the CA for its resolution on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 4, 2016,

September 15, 2016, and October 28, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 145966 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this case is
REMANDED to the CA for its resolution on the merits.

SO ORDERED.