V.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

JURISDICTION

230. Q. How can the court acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases?

A. In order for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. If the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Evangelista vs. People, 620 SCRA 134, 5
May 2010.)

CORRELATION

231. Q. Can the court disregard the findings of the preliminary investigation which was
conducted upon its order? Give your reason/s.

A. Yes. There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court in disregarding
the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered. Judicial action on the motion to
quash Information rests in the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In denying the motion,
the trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo vs. Judge Mogul
(1987) that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the
sound discretion of the court. The court is not dutifully bound by such finding of the
investigating prosecutor.

Further, in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Judge How (2000) the Supreme Court
emphasized that the court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits
of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be
an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.
(Evangelista vs. People, supra.)

RULE 110
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

232. Q. In the prosecution of criminal cases, who has the duty to bring the accused or those
who are perceived to be guilty to the fold of the law?

A. It is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be

charged with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private
complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have
transgressed it.

Thus, the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. (Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company vs. Reynado, 627 SCRA 88, 9 August 2010.)

233. Q. In case the private complaint was not able to include all persons who ought to be charged
in the Complaint, what should be done by the public prosecutor?

A. In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Reynado, supra, the OSG correctly
suggested that the proper remedy should have been the inclusion of certain
employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with respondents
in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the
officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be
charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public
prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are
probably guilty thereof were charged.
 2

234. Q. If the accused raised in a Demurrer to Evidence the issue of the absence of the
elements of the crime committed, how would you rule the motion as the judge?

A. I will deny the motion. In Singian, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 3rd Division (706 SCRA 451,
30 September 2013), the Supreme Court held that the presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits, and the validity and merits of
a party's defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence,
are better ventilated during trial proper.

235. Q. In case there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the Information
(rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and the
recital in the Information (rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of
the same provision), would this constitute a violation of the accused’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

A. No. In People vs. Tionloc (818 SCRA 1, 15 February 2017), the Supreme Court held that:
The allegations in the Information charged appellant with rape through sexual intercourse
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC and said allegations or recital in the
Information determine the nature of the crime committed. The character of the crime is
not determined by the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital
of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.

RULE 111
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

236. Q. Explain when can there be suspension of the civil case arising from the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense?

A. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome
of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court
hearing the criminal action declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist. (Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, 679 SCRA 114, 23 August 2012.)

237. Q. When can there be an independent civil action?

A. The independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. Because of the distinct
and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the
offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or
cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res
judicata. (Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, supra.)

238. Q. Will the filing of a collection suit after the dismissal of the estafa case constitute
forum shopping?

A. No, it will not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing
of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases
filed by the offended party arose from the same act or omission of the offender, they are,
however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on
culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
There can also be no forum-shopping if the law expressly allows the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. (Lim
vs. Kou Co Ping, supra)

RULE 112
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

239. Q. Define probable cause as a requirement for purposes of filing an Information in

court.
 3

A. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. (San Miguel Corporation vs.
Puzon, Jr., 631 SCRA 48, 22 September 2010.)

240. Q. Who determines probable cause in filing the criminal action in court? Is this
absolute?

A. Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a

preliminary investigation. The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the
resolution of the prosecutor.

By way of exception, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly

established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when
he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law. (San Miguel Corporation vs. Puzon, Jr., supra.)

241. Q. Is the determination of probable cause part of the trial in criminal cases?

A. No. A preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of

probable cause is not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the
parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. (Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company vs. Reynado, 627 SCRA 88, 9 August 2010.)

242. Q. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) transmitted a letter, with attached Sworn
Affidavits of witnesses subscribed before a Notary Public, to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for purposes of preliminary investigation. Was there a substantial
compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court? Discuss.

A. Yes. In Soriano vs. People (611 SCRA 191, 1 February 2010), applying the ruling in
Soriano vs. Hon. Casanova (2206) the Supreme Court held that: The BSP letter, taken
together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the requirements
provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people
who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled
that: The affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary
investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses
who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance
with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano vs. Hon. Casanova be
applied in Soriano vs. People— once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

243. Q. In the same problem above, will the filing of the complaint by the BSP Governor or
the Monetary Board, having no authority to institute the case, be a ground for the
quashal of the Information?

A. The BSP did not institute the complaint but merely transmitted the affidavits of the
complainants to the DOJ. The Supreme Court held that since the offenses for which
Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated by
"any competent person" with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the
offender. Thus, the witnesses who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the
purview of "any competent person" who may institute the complaint for a public
crime.

In Soriano vs. People, supra, the Supreme Court said that the ruling in Soriano vs. Hon.
Casanova was also adopted and elaborated upon in the recent case of Santos-Concio vs.
 4

Department of Justice. (2008) Instead of a transmittal letter from the BSP, the Court
in Santos-Concio was faced with an NBI-NCR Report, likewise with affidavits of
witnesses as attachments. Ruling on the validity of the witnesses’ sworn affidavits
as bases for a preliminary investigation, the Supreme Court held that a preliminary
investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent
person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn
to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. It also cited the ruling in Ebarle
vs. Sucaldito that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need
not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense subject
thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for
preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The preliminary
investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and
evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court.

RULE 113
ARREST

244. Q. Explain the doctrine of “fruit of poisonous tree”.

A. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the
existence of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law
enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable
within the context of the Constitution and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such
unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. Thus, an "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree." (Villamor vs. People, 821 SCRA 328, 22
March 2017.)

Simply put, the fruit of the poisonous tree is used to describe evidence that is obtained
illegally. If the source (the "tree") of the evidence or evidence itself is tainted, then
anything gained (the "fruit") from it is tainted as well. Thus, the seizure and confiscation
of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

245. Q. What are the elements of warrantless arrest or arrest in flagrante delicto under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure?

A. There are two (2) elements that must concur:

(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Villamor
vs. People, supra; See also People vs. Collado, 698 SCRA 628, 17 June 2013; Rebellion
vs. People, Rebellion vs. People, 623 SCRA 343, 5 July 2010.)

246. Q. John Lawrence, alias “Utoy,” went to the house of Malvino to pay the debt of his wife in the
amount of P5,000.00. He requested Moymoy, alias “Palaboy,” to accompany him. Without
their knowledge, SPO1 PALABAN and PO1 NANINILIP were at a distance of 20 meters
from the house of Malvino due to a tip from a reliable informant that there was an on-
going illegal gambling in the house.

While Utoy was giving the money to Matalino as payment of his wife’s debt, SPO1
PALABAN and PO1 NANINILIP barged into the house of Matalino. They confiscated a
calculator, a polletos, and P5,000.00. Utoy, Palaboy and Matalino were charged with illegal
gambling in violation of PD No. 1602 as amended by R.A. No. 9287. They were convicted
by the RTC and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed.

The case was brought to the Supreme Court, raising the issue on the admissibility of
evidence considering that the accused was not arrested in flagrante delicto. However, they
failed to raise the illegality of the arrest during the trial. If you are the Justice in-charge or
the ponente, how would you rule?

A. The conviction of the accused should be reversed. The case of Villamor vs. People, supra,
has similar factual milieu and according to the Supreme Court, any question regarding the
 5

legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before arraignment. Failure to do so

constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest especially when the
accused actively participated during trial. However, it was clarified that such waiver is only
confined to the defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized
during an illegal arrest. In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that
constitute the offense of illegal gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and
as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287.

Under the said law, a collector or agent is "any person who collects, solicits or produces
bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in
possession of gambling paraphernalia. On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or
supervisor is defined as, "any person who exercises control and supervision over the
collector or agent. The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling
paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific
overt acts that constitute the offense. All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the
Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in violation of
Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal gambling
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

Further, as held in People vs. Racho, (2010) without the confiscated shabu, appellant's
conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his
arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. The legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver
of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

247. Q. If you are the counsel for the accused, when do you raise the objection as to the
illegality of his arrest?

A. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. (Rebellion vs. People, supra; People vs. Amper, 620 SCRA 204, 5 May 2010.)

RULE 114
BAIL

248. Q. Under the Constitution and the rules of criminal procedure, who are entitled to
bail?

A. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also provides that no person charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. (People vs. Sobrepeña, Sr., 812 SCRA 145, 5 December 2016.)

249. Q. What is the determining factor in a non-bailable offense?

A. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of

whether the evidence of guilt is strong, which is a matter of judicial discretion that
remains with the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, to determine the existence of strong
evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. The court's grant or refusal of bail
must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution on the basis of which should
be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to
 6

indicate the guilt of the accused. (Balanay vs. Adalim-White, 778 SCRA 1, 11 January
2016.)

250. Q. Explain the nature of a summary hearing required to be conducted by the Judge in
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong against the accused?

A. In People vs. Plaza, (2009) the Court defined summary hearing and expounded the
court's discretionary power to grant bail to an accused. A summary hearing is defined as
'such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.' On such hearing, the Court does not sit to try
the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-
examination. (People vs. Sobrepeña, Sr., supra.)

251. Q. Is the granting of bail by the court to the accused charged with a capital offense
enough ground for his acquittal considering that the evidence against him is weak?

A. A grant of bail does not prevent the trial court, as the trier of facts, from making a final
assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. As the Court ruled in People vs.
Baldoz, (2001) "such appreciation of evidence is at best preliminary and should not
prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after
full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is
convicted in due course. (People vs. Brita, 741 SCRA 494, 24 November 2014.)

252. Q. Will a hearing be required, despite non-objection of the public prosecutor, in bail
application for non-bailable offense? Explain.

A. Yes. It is basic that bail hearing is necessary even if the prosecution does not interpose any
objection or leaves the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court. Thus,
in Villanueva vs. Judge Buaya, (2010) the respondent judge was held administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting an ex parte motion for bail without
conducting a hearing. In order for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, he must
first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This
discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in
the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against
the accused. (Balanay vs. Adalim-White, supra.)

253. Q. What is the purpose in setting the bail application for hearing, whether bail is a
matter of right or discretion?

A. Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required
in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held in past
cases that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application
for bail of an accused, the court may still require the prosecution to answer questions in
order to ascertain, not only the strength of the State's evidence, but also the adequacy of
the amount of bail. (Balanay vs. Adalim-White, supra.)

254. Q. Mr. Victor Dimanarig is a duly elected member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Iliyan, Province of Gumirikgitik. He was charged with murder and
presently detained at the municipal jail of the said town. His counsel filed a Motion
for his temporary liberty in order to attend the session of the Sanguniang Bayan of
Iliyan. The Motion was not set for hearing nor was the prosecution required to file
its comment. According to Judge Anthony Tavern, it is not necessary because the
prosecution has no witnesses to present. The furloughs granted to Dimanarig
happened six times.

Is the action taken by Judge Tavern correct? Explain.

A. No. Judge Tavern is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex
parte motions, allowing Dimanarig’s temporary liberty without setting the same for
 7

hearing. If hearing is indispensable in motions for bail, more so in motions for temporary
liberty. (Balanay vs. Adalim-White, supra.)

In People vs. Hon. Maceda, reiterated in Trillanes IV vs. Judge Pimentel Sr., the
Supreme Court held that "all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business
or occupation or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also basic that litigious
motions that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper
which the court should not act upon. These rules are so elementary that not to know them
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

RULE 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

255. Q. What is custodial interrogation?

A. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities

after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. (Tanenggee vs. People, 699 SCRA 639, 26 June 2013.)

256. Q. What are the rights of a person under custodial investigation?

A. A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, viz:

(1) to remain silent;

(2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and
(3) to be informed of the two other rights above. (Tanenggee vs. People, supra.)

257. Q. Is the proscription of an admission made by a respondent without counsel applies

in administrative proceedings? Explain.

A. No. In Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission, the Supreme Court declared that the
right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation. Amplifying further on the matter, the Court
made clear, in the recent case of Carbonel vs. Civil Service Commission, that the right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during
custodial investigation, thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those
made in an administrative investigation. (Tanenggee vs. People, supra.)

258. Q. How is confession or admission treated?

A. It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is

proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.

In People vs. Muit, it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the
knowledge and information given by him.

RULE 117
MOTION TO QUASH

259. Q. In what stage of the criminal proceedings should the accused move for the quashal
of the information? What is the effect for failure to file a timely motion?

A. The accused may move to quash the information, on any grounds, at any time before
entering his plea.

Jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be
timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment,
 8

failing in which, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the regularity of
his arrest. (People vs. Cunanan, 753 SCRA 275, 16 March 2015.)

260. Q. What test should be applied in considering a Motion to Quash the Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense? Explain.

A. It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on such ground, the test is whether the
facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation
contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute
the defense of the accused against the charge under the information must be proved by
him during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a
motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not
constitute the offense. (Soriano vs. People, 611 SCRA 191, 1 February 2010.)

261. Q. Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari the proper remedy against an Order denying a
Motion to Quash?

A. No. In Soriano vs. People, the Supreme Court said that it has consistently held that a
special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion
to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to
enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses
he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Soriano
vs. People, supra.)

RULE 119
TRIAL

262. Q. What is demurrer to evidence in criminal cases? Explain.

A. A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt. (People vs. Go, 732 SCRA 216, 6 August 2014.)

263. Q. Is the lower court’s adverse resolution of demurer to evidence subject for review by
the appellate court? Explain.

A. No. The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. A lower court’s order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the
appellate courts will not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide
whether such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely
abused, thereby amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such
abuse will not suffice. (Singian, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 3rd Division, supra.)

264. Q. What is the effect if the demurer to evidence is granted by the court?

A. The grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed

because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. (People vs. Go, supra.)

265. Q. What is the remedy of the prosecution if the granting of the demurrer to evidence is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion?

A. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When grave abuse of discretion is present, an
order granting a demurrer becomes null and void. (People vs. Go, supra.)

266. Q. What is the exception to the rule that the granting of demurrer to evidence amounts
to the acquittal of the accused. Explain.
 9

A. The exception is when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy. For instance, the Court ruled that when there is a finding that there
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by
granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void.

In People vs. Laguio, Jr., the Supreme Court has already settled that the appellate court
may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result
in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an
appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the
accused against double jeopardy is not violated. (People vs. Go, supra.)

267. Q. What is grave abuse of discretion as a ground for questioning the acquittal of the
accused pursuant to the grant of his demurrer to evidence?

A. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish
that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its
authority to dispense justice. (People vs. Go, supra; See also People vs.
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, 645 SCRA 726, 21 March 2011.)

RULE 120
JUDGMENT

268. Q. What is the effect of a void judgment or order?

A. A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose.
In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any
action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to
vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. (People vs. Go,
732 SCRA 216, 6 August 2014.)

269. Q. Is it necessary that the convict appear before the trial court for the promulgation or
affirmance or modification by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals of the
judgment of conviction? Explain the procedure.

A. No. Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, set the decisional
and statutory guidelines on the procedure after affirmance or modification by Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals of judgments of convictions in criminal cases.

In the case of People vs. Sumilang, it was explained that the certified copy of the
judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court, not for the
promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of the judgment
against him. It is not necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant because it is to be
presumed that accused or his attorney had already been notified thereof in accordance
with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of the Rule 53 (now sections 9 and 10 of Rule 51), and
that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is merely to see that
it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of the court of first instance is
necessary to that end. (Almuete vs. People, 693 SCRA 167, 12 March 2013.)

The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for
"promulgation" of the judgment of the appellate court should, therefore, be
immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage entailing
unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the convict
was already under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and the place of
confinement is at some distance from the station of the court. Upon receipt of the
certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the convict is under
detention, the trial court should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or
commitment order so that the prisoner may be considered remitted or may be
 10

transferred to the corresponding prison facility for confinement and service of

sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately order the
bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and
thereafter issue the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall
submit to the Supreme Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen (15)
days from date of such execution. (Almuete vs. People, supra.)

270. Q. What is the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments? What are the exceptions that
suspend the application of this doctrine?

A. The doctrine holds that "a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified,
even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest
court of the land, rendered it. 1

However, the Supreme Court has suspended the application of this rule based on certain
recognized exceptions, viz:

Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension
of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be
considered are the following:

(a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,

(b) the merits of the case,

(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules,

(d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and

(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 2 (Almuete vs. People, 693 SCRA
167, 12 March 2013.)

271. Q. What is the requirement for a judgment of acquittal?

A. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state

whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Abellana vs. People, 655 SCRA 683, 17 August 2011.)

272. Q. If the judgment is acquittal, does it follow that the accused is also exonerated from
his civil liability, if any?

A. No. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended
party in the same criminal action. In other words, the "extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Abellana vs. People, supra.)

273. Q. What is the reason for holding an accused civilly liable despite being acquitted?

A. In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., the Supreme Court elucidated on the civil liability of the accused
despite his exoneration in this wise:

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. xxx
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to

1
Apo Fruits Corporation vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 632 SCRA 727 (12 October 2010). See Peña vs.
Government Service Insurance System, 533 Phil. 670 (2006).
2
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665 (2003). See Dra. Baylon vs. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau, 442
Phil. 217 (2002).
 11

repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. (Abellana vs. People, supra.)

274. Q. What is the general rule on the effect of judgment of acquittal? What is the
exception?

A. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. In People vs. Banig (679
SCRA 133, 23 August 2012), the Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling in People
vs. Court of Appeals that a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination
of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in
jeopardy for the same offense.

True, the finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception as when the trial court
commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such a
case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned through the extraordinary writ
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

RULE 122
APPEAL

275. Q. How is appeal taken to the Supreme Court if the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals is not death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment?

A. The Court had already explained in Batistis vs. People that:

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on
appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is appeal by petition for review on certiorari
that raises only questions of law. (Olarte vs. People, 761 SCRA 576, 6 July 2015.)

RULE 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

276. Q. What is a search warrant?

A. A search warrant is defined as a written order issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge, and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search
for the personal property described therein and bring it to the court.
277. Q. What are the requisite for the issuance of a search warrant?

A. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:

(1) probable cause is present;

(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;

(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce;

(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and

(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
(Petron LPG Dealers Association vs. Ang, 783 SCRA 162, 3 February 2016.)

278. Q. Where shall the application for search warrant be filed?

A. Generally, the search warrant application must be filed with the court which has territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the offense was alleged to be committed. This, however,
is not an iron-clad rule. For compelling reasons, which must be expressly stated in
the application, a search warrant application may be filed in a court other than the
one having jurisdiction over the place where the purported offense was committed
and where the search warrant shall be enforced. (Petron Gasul LPG Dealers
Association vs. Lao, 797 SCRA 65, 18 July 2016.)
 12

279. Q. Is the application for the issuance of search warrant a criminal action? Explain.
A. No. In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are totally different from those of a criminal
action. It stressed that the application for and issuance of a search warrant is not a
criminal action but a judicial process, more particularly, a special criminal process
designed to respond to an incident in the main case, if one has been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. (Petron Gasul LPG Dealers Association vs. Lao, supra.)

280. Q. Who has the power to issue search warrant? How is this power exercised?

A. The power to issue search warrant is inherent in all courts, such that the power of courts
to issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their jurisdiction is not
intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power.

PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRED FOR PURPOSES OF THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT:

Search warrant shall be issued only upon probable cause personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. In turn, probable
cause for search warrant refers to such "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place to be searched.”

PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING AN INFORMATION:

On the other hand, probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information refers to “such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any
offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.” Thus, while Ty vs. NBI
Supervising Agent De Jemil, refers to preliminary investigation proceedings, and the instant case is
concerned with applications for the issuance of search warrants, both are resolved based on the same
degree of proof; the pronouncement in Ty may therefore apply to the present controversy. (Petron LPG
Dealers Association vs. Ang, supra.)

281. Q. What is the required probable cause for the issuance of a valid search warrant?
Explain.

A. Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import
absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is concerned only
with the question of whether the affiant has reasonable grounds to believe that the
accused committed or is committing the crime charged. (People vs. Gayoso, 821 SCRA
516, 27 March 2017; See also Petron LPG Dealers Association vs. Ang, supra.)

282. Q. Under the Constitution, a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant, otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Give at least one
exception.

A. One of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Under Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the
subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers during a buy bust operation
for violation of R.A. No. 9165, in People vs. Collado (698 SCRA 628, 17 June 2013),
were held as valid.
 13

CROSS-REFERENCE

Every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the authority of the State,
regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance;
otherwise, it is void. (See also Petron LPG Dealers Association vs. Ang, supra.)
 14

VI.
EVIDENCE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

It is a basic rule in evidence that he who alleges must prove his case or claim by the degree of
evidence required. xxx Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. (Manlar Rice Mill, Inc. vs. Deyto,
715 SCRA 81, 29 January 2014.)

The omission to rebut that which would have naturally invited an immediate, pervasive and stiff
opposition creates an adverse inference that either the controverting evidence presented will only
prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted evidence indeed speaks of the truth. (Castro vs.
Palenzuela, 689 SCRA 30, 21 January 2013.)

“It is well to remember that good intentions do not win cases, evidence
does.” (Catacutan vs. People, 656 SCRA 524, 31 August 2011.)

“The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof.” (Social Security Commission vs. Favila, 646 SCRA 462, 28 March 2011.)

RULE 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

283. Q. What is the effect of the statements made in the pleadings by a party to a case?

A. It is settled that statements made in the pleadings in the course of judicial proceedings are
considered judicial admissions. Judicial admissions cannot be controverted by the party
making the admissions. They are conclusive and legally binding as against the pleader
who cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was
pleaded. (Centennial Transmarine, Inc. vs. Quiambao, 762 SCRA 264, 8 July 2015.)

284. Q. What are the instances where a party in a case can make judicial admissions which
bind them?

A. A party may make judicial admissions:

(a) in the pleadings;

(b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or
(c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.

285. Q. Can a judicial admission be contradicted by the admitter himself? Explain.

A. No. It is an established principle that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the

admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and absent
any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can
offset it. (De Guzman vs. Filinvest Development Corporation, 746 SCRA 65, 14
January 2015.)

Further, in Vidar vs. People (611 SCRA 216, 1 February 2010), the Supreme Court held
that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take
a position contradictory to or inconsistent with his pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not
require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Moreover, when a party
adopts a certain theory in the court below, he is not allowed to change his theory on
appeal, for to allow him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but would
also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

286. Q. During the pre-trial, the parties entered into a stipulation. Can the stipulation be
considered a judicial admission?

A. Yes. Stipulation of facts at the pre-trial constitutes judicial admissions which are binding
and conclusive upon the parties. (People vs. Eyam, 686 SCRA 408, 26 November 2012.)
 15

RULE 130
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE

287. Q. What does corpus delicti means in drug cases?

A. Corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential. (Cacao vs.
People, 610 SCRA 636, 22 January 2010.)

288. Q. What is the purpose of the chain of custody rule in drug cases?

A. The chain of custody requirement aims to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item are preserved, so much so that doubts as to the identity of
the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or
testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came
into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine
its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. (People vs. Basilio, 751 SCRA
351, 23 February 2015; People vs. Eyam, 686 SCRA 408, 26 November 2012.)

289. Q. What is the effect if the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody in drug
cases?

A. The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case. There
can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on
whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug. In People vs. Casimiro, citing People vs. Mapa, the Supreme Court
acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the
prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. Equally true in Zarraga vs.
People, the Court also acquitted the accused in view of the prosecution’s failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu. (Cacao vs. People, supra.)

290. Q. Can the accused be still held criminally liable for violations of R.A. No. 9165 despite
failure to faithfully observe the provision of Section 21? Explain your answer.

A. Yes. In any event, it is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure
to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, for as
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken. In People vs. Diaz (752 SCRA 17, 25
February 2015), it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the
necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the moment it was
seized from appellant up to the time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus
delicti.

B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

1. BEST EVIDENCE RULE

291. Q. Explain the Best Evidence Rule?

A. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence
(such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule.
The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the
document.

The Best Evidence Rule comes into play when a reproduction of the original or oral
evidence is offered to prove the contents of a document. "The purpose of the rule
requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a
party is in possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute
inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better
evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose
and defeat." (Marquez vs. Espejo, 629 SCRA 117, 25 August 2010.)
 16

2. SECONDARY EVIDENCE

3. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

292. Q. What is Parol Evidence Rule?

A. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as

containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to
contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or
instrument. (Marquez vs. Espejo supra.)

293. Q. Explain the scope of the application of the parol evidence rule?

A. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
"between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be
invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to
the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert
a right originating in the instrument.

Moreover, under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, it provides that:

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;

Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties
that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to
mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
(Marquez vs. Espejo, supra.)

294. Q. Artemio and his co-heirs executed an Extra- Judicial Settlement of Estate and
Absolute Sale adjudicating among themselves Lot 3154 (consisting of 469 sq.m.)
and selling a 207-sq.m. portion of the same to spouses Sillero. The document did
not, however, identify the portion being sold as Lot No. 3154-A. Immediately after
the sale, spouses Sillero sold Lot 3154-A to Macalino by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
Macalino, intending to have Lot 3154-A registered in his name, discovered that the
portion occupied by him consists of 140 sq.m. only and not 207 sq.m. Macalino
claimed that the 207 sq.m. property sold by spouses Sillero to him consists of Lot
3154-A with an area of 140 sq.m. and Lot 3154-C with an area of 67 sq.m. Thus, he
filed against Artemio a Complaint for Quieting of Title over Lot3154-C. Petitioners,
in order to further their case, rely on the failure of the Absolute Sale to state that the
207-square meter portion conveyed by Artemio and his coheirs to the spouses
Sillero was Lot 3154-A. Artemio, on the other hand, puts emphasis on the fact that
the Deed of Sale between Macalino and the spouses Sillero expressly stated that the
lot subject of the sale was Lot 3154-A only. Plainly, the parties' respective arguments
hinge on two relevant documents which they adopted as common exhibits - (1) the
Absolute Sale subject of which, among others, is the conveyance made by Artemio
and his co-heirs to the spouses Sillero; and (2) the Deed of Sale between the spouses
Sillero and Macalino. There is no dispute regarding the contents of these
documents, that is, neither of the parties contests that the Absolute Sale did not
state that the 207-square meter portion sold to the spouses Sillero was Lot 3154-A
nor that the Deed of Sale between Macalino and the spouses Sillero expressly
mentioned that the subject of the sale between them was Lot 3154-A.

Based on the facts, will the parol evidence rule apply? Explain.
 17

A. Petitioner Macalino was not a party in the Extra Judicial Settlement and Absolute Sale
executed by Artemio and his co-heirs. Likewise, Artemio was not a party to the Deed of
Sale entered into by and between Gil and the spouses Sillero. Hence, the inapplicability of
the Parole Evidence Rule. What is really in issue is whether the admitted contents of the
said documents adequately or correctly express the true intention of the parties to the
same.

It has been held that when the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in
issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the
parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the
contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such
intent. In view of this and since the Parol Evidence Rule is inapplicable in this case, an
examination of the parties' respective parol evidence is in order. Indeed, examination of
evidence is necessarily factual and not within the province of a petition for review on
certiorari which only allows questions of law to be raised. However, this case falls under
one of the recognized exceptions to such rule, i.e., when the CA's findings are contrary to
that of the trial court. (Macalino, Jr. vs. Pis-an, 791 SCRA 672, 1 June 2016.)

295. Q. While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof
are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the party
proponent. What is then the effect if the party failed to deny the genuineness and
due execution of the document subject of the case? Explain.

A. In Santos vs. Alcazar (718 SCRA 636, 12 March 2014), it was held that the genuineness
and due execution of the subject document is deemed admitted. By the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of such document is meant that the party whose signature
it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in
the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp,
which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery x
x x; or that it was unauthorized x x x; or that the party charged signed the instrument in
some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out x x x; or that it was
never delivered x x x, are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution.

296. Q. Is there a need for a proof of due execution and authenticity of the subject
document of the case, if the adverse party has already made an admission?

A. There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the
genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party. The document
is "valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the
agreement they had entered into. In Santos vs. Alcazar, supra, the absence of rebutting
evidence occasioned by petitioners’ waiver of their right to present evidence renders the
Acknowledgment as the best evidence of the transactions between the parties and the
consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the effect of the admission is such that "a
prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence
on his part and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of
new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant.

297. Q. Is the medical certificate as a documentary evidence of the prosecution in rape

cases necessary? Explain.

A. The absence of a medical certificate is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Case law has
it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be offered to prove
the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical
certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such
testimony is credible. Moreover, the absence of external injuries does not negate rape. In
fact, even the presence of spermatozoa is not an essential element of rape. (People vs.
Lagangga, 777 SCRA 363, 9 December 2015.)
4. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS

298. Q. What are the guiding principles in the interpretation of a written agreement, like
contracts, under our substantive and procedural laws? Explain.
 18

A. According to the Supreme Court, in Marquez vs. Espejo, supra, guidance is provided by
the following articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation of contracts:

Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail over the former.

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

On the other hand, under our Procedural Law, Rule 130, Section 13 of the Rules of
Evidence provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise
enlightening:

Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances.– For the proper

construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he
is to interpret.

C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

1. QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES

299. Q. Who is considered as a credible witness?

A. Testimonial evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience. A
credible witness must, therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical story. (De
Leon vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 710 SCRA 443, 20 November 2013.)

300. Q. How can the court assess the credibility of the prosecution witnesses?

A. One thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses’ credibility is the fact that they had no
motive to prevaricate against the accused. They were not actuated by improper motive to
fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against them. Where there is no
evidence, to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive,
the presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit. (Vidar vs. People, 611 SCRA 216, 1 February 2010.)

301. Q. How can bias on the testimony of the prosecution witness be proven?

A. For personal motive on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be
appreciated as showing bias, its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.
(Vidar vs. People, supra.)

302. Q. If the credibility of the witness is at issue, what is the prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction?

A. When the credibility of the witness is in issue, the trial court's assessment is accorded
great weight unless it is shown that it overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated a
certain fact or circumstance of weight which, if properly considered, would alter the result
of the case. (People vs. Lagangga, supra.)
 19

303. Q. In case of inconsistency between the affidavit of a witness and his testimony in open
court, which shall prevail?

A. It is settled that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered

incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court,
and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness
in court, the testimony commands greater weight. (People vs. Cabtalan, 666 SCRA 174,
15 February 2012.)

304. Q. In the event that the party failed to present its witness who prepared a document
previously marked during the pre-trial, what is the effect of its probative value?
Explain.

A. It has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay, if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness
stand. Moreover, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded
probative value. It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived
of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or
writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide
the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere
hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the document renders its contents
suspect and of no probative value. (Marina Port Services, Inc. vs. American Home
Assurance Corporation, 766 SCRA 408, 12 August 2015.)

305. Q. In murder cases is the lone testimony of the witness enough to reach a verdict of
conviction of the accused?

A. Yes. It is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough
to warrant conviction. In appealed cases, if both the trial court and the CA found that the
testimony is credible, it is entitled to full faith. (People vs. Bustamante, 616 SCRA 203,
19 March 2010.)

306. Q. What is the weight of testimonial evidence compared to documentary evidence as

regards to murder cases for purposes of computing the loss of earning capacity of
the victim?

A. Testimonial evidence, if not questioned for credibility, bears the same weight as
documentary evidence. Testimonies given by the deceased's spouse, parent, or child
should be given weight because these individuals are presumed to know the income of
their spouse, child, or parent.

If the amount of income testified to seemed incredible or unrealistic, the defense could
always raise their objections and discredit the witness or, better yet, present evidence that
would outweigh the evidence of the prosecution.

If the defense did not question the credibility of the witnesses during trial, they could
question it during appeal as a last resort. (Concurring opinion of Justice Leonen to the
Resolution of Justice Del Castillo in People vs. Wahiman, 758 SCRA 366, 16 June
2015.)

307. Q. How does the court treat the testimony of a child witness?

A. The Court has been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child-victims especially
in sensitive cases of rape. In People vs. Garcia, it was held that: Testimonies of child-
victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl’s revelation
that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled
to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as
 20

mere concoction. (People vs. Colentava, 750 SCRA 165, 9 February 2015; See A.M.
No. 004-07-SC, Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, 21 November 2000.)

308. Q. What is the presumption if the testimony is given by a public officer?

A. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies of public officers are given
full faith and credence, as they are presumed to have acted in the regular performance of
their official duties. (Republic vs. Daclan, 754 SCRA 125, 23 March 2015.)

Thus, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to
the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police
officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner unless
there is evidence to the contrary. (People vs. Eyam, 686 SCRA 408, 26 November
2012.)

However, presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself

override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome
by strong, clear and compelling evidence. (Cacao vs. People, supra.)

309. Q. In rape cases, can the accused be convicted with the sole testimony of the rape
victim? Explain.

A. Yes. Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even
secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the
forced coitus. In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the
single and most important issue to deal with. If the testimony of the victim is credible,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. (People vs. Lagangga, supra.)
The credibility ascribed by the trial judge to the victim and her testimony is an essential
aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of the unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, attitude, and conduct during their direct and
cross-examination. (People vs. Caga, 801 SCRA 231, 22 August 2016.)

310. Q. Is the filing of rape cases after years or months of its occurrence diminish the
credibility of the witness? Explain.

A. The filing of complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission may or may
not dent the credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the circumstances
attendant thereto. It does not diminish the complainant’s credibility or undermine the
charges of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the
threats of bodily harm, especially by one who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim.

In People vs. Domingo, it was ruled that the effect of fear and intimidation instilled in the
victim’s mind cannot be measured against any given hard-and-fast rule such that it is
viewed in the context of the victim’s perception and judgment not only at the time of the
commission of the crime but also at the time immediately thereafter. In any event, the
failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not necessarily an indication of a
fabricated charge. (People vs. Lomaque, 697 SCRA 383, 5 June 2013; People vs.
Venturina, 680 SCRA 508, 12 September 2012.)

311. Q. What are the factors to be considered in ascertaining whether an out-of-court

identification is positive or derivative?

A. In this jurisdiction, the totality of circumstances has to be adopted. Thus, the following
factors are to be taken into consideration:

1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time;
3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (Vidar vs. People, supra.)

312. Q. How are denials and alibi appreciated by the court in this jurisdiction?
 21

A. Denial and Alibi are inherently weak, if unsubstantiated, and are self-serving. (People vs.
Biglete, 673 SCRA 546, 18 June 2012.)

In Vidar vs. People, supra, the Supreme Court held that the twin defenses of denial and
alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily fail in view of the positive identification made
by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be
brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony.

313. Q. How are the testimonies of witnesses presented during the trial be treated on
appeal?

A. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of the witnesses, their
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.

In case that the defense in criminal cases is alibi, the Court had consistently stressed that it
is weak that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by
prosecution witnesses.

314. Q. Why do appellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses?

A. It is settled that the assessment of the witnesses' credibility is best left to the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to scrutinize the witnesses first hand and observe their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. (People vs. Camposano, 791
SCRA 111, 20 April 2016). Except, if it is shown that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated a certain fact or circumstance of weight which, if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case. (People vs. Lagangga, supra.)

315. Q. What is the recognized rule in the appreciation of the credibility of witnesses, if the
case is on appeal?

A. It is a well–settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of
witnesses are accorded respect since trial courts have first–hand account on the
witnesses’ manner of testifying and demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant
its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best
position to determine the issue of credibility. (People vs. San Gaspar, 720 SCRA 409, 2
April 2014.)

316. Q. Explain the Dead Man’s Statute Rule.

A. Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction. (Garcia vs. Robles Vda. de Caparas, 696 SCRA 649, 17 April
2013.)

317. Q. Flora is the owner of a farm being tilled by Eugenio as agricultural lessee under a
leasehold agreement. Before Flora passed away, she appointed her niece, Amanda,
as her attorney-in-fact. When Eugenio passed away, he was succeeded by his
children, Modesta, Christina, and Pedro. Amanda and Pedro entered into an
agricultural leasehold contract, installing and recognizing the latter as the lone
agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. When Pedro passed away, his wife
Dominga, took over as agricultural lessee. Pedro’s sisters filed a complaint for
nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against
Pedro’s surviving spouse. The only evidence presented was Amanda’s declaration in
her Affidavit that Pedro falsely represented to Flora and to her that he is the actual
cultivator of the land, and that when she confronted him about this and the alleged
alternate farming scheme between him and his sisters, Pedro allegedly told her that
he and his two sisters had an understanding about it and he did not have the
intention of depriving them of their cultivatory rights. There was no other evidence,
other than such verbal declaration, which proves the existence of such
arrangement. No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor have they
shown that they actually cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No receipt
 22

evidencing payment to the landowners of the latter’s share, or any other

documentary evidence, has been put forward.

Is the Affidavit of Amanda stating what Pedro has told her during his lifetime
admissible as evidence?
A. No. In Garcia vs. Robles Vda. de Caparas, supra, the Supreme Court held that Amanda’s
declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the
alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute
under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. Thus, since Pedro is
deceased, and Amanda’s declaration cannot be admitted and used against Pedro’s
surviving spouse, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to
contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior
death.

5. TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE

318. Q. What is hearsay evidence?

A. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought
to produce. (Espineli vs. People, 725 SCRA 365, 9 June 2014.)

319. Q. What is the exception to the non-application of the hearsay rule? Explain.

A. While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for
the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record
is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was
made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact
that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement
may be shown. (Espineli vs. People, supra.)

320. Q. What is the doctrine of independently relevant statements?

A. It is the evidence as to the making of the statement which is not secondary but primary,
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to
the existence of such a fact. (Espineli vs. People, supra.)

6. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE

321. Q. What is the probative value of a dying declaration?

A. A dying declaration is an evidence of the highest order; it is entitled to the utmost

credence on the premise that no x x x person who knows of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts on concocting lies
disappear. (People vs. Cabtalan, supra.)

322. Q. What are the requisites in order for the entries in the course of the business qualify
as an exception to the hearsay rule?

A. Before entries made in the course of business may qualify under the exception to the
hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them must establish that:

(1) the person who made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify;

(2) the entries were made at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer;

(3) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated therein;

(4) the entries were made in the professional capacity or in the course of duty of the entrant;
and,

(5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. (Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Oñate, 713 SCRA 678, 15 January 2014.)

RULE 131
 23

BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

323. Q. Who has the burden of proof if the party claims as purchaser in good faith and for
value? Explain.

A. It must be emphasized that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith
and for value lies upon him who asserts that standing. In discharging the burden, it is not
enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith that everyone is presumed to act
in good faith. The good faith that is here essential is integral with the very status that must
be proved. (Heirs of Spouses Joaquin Manguardia and Susana Manalo vs. Heirs of
Simplicio Valles and Marta Valles, 733 SCRA 668, 27 August 2014.)

324. Q. Who has the burden of proof in civil cases?

A. In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. Once the plaintiff has established his case, the
burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his
defense. (De Leon vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 710 SCRA 443, 20 November
2013.)

325. Q. Who has the burden of proof in dismissal of an employee due to loss of trust and
confidence in labor cases? Explain.

A. Unlike in other cases where the complainant has the burden of proof to prove its
allegations, the burden of establishing facts as bases for an employer’s loss of confidence
in an employee – facts which reasonably generate belief by the employer that the
employee was connected with some misconduct and the nature of his participation
therein is such as to render him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his
position – is on the employer.

While it is true that loss of trust and confidence is one of the just causes for termination,
such loss of trust and confidence must, however, have some basis. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. It is sufficient that there must only be some basis for
such loss of confidence or that there is reasonable ground to believe if not to
entertain the moral conviction that the concerned employee is responsible for the
misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him
absolutely unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position. (Sanden
Aircon Philippines vs. Rosales, 646 SCRA 232, 23 March 2011.)

RULE 132
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF

OF DOCUMENTS

326. Q. How can the genuineness of handwriting of a person be proven?

A. In Heirs of Corazon Afable Salud vs. Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. (788 SCRA 494, 6 April
2016), the Supreme Court said that under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a
handwriting may be proved by the following:

(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;

(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon, such opinion
being an exception to the opinion rule;

(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine specimen
thereof; and

(4) Expert evidence.

327. Q. Is the court bound by the opinion of a handwriting expert?

A. No. The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between the different
means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person. It is likewise clear from the
foregoing that courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to the
 24

opinions of handwriting experts, as resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.

(Heirs of Corazon Afable Salud vs. Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc., supra.)

328. Q. What is the probative value of a notarized document under the rules of evidence?
Explain.
A. As held in Gutierrez vs. Mendoza-Plaza, a notarized document enjoys a prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence. (Espineli vs. People, 725 SCRA 365, 9 June 2014.)

329. Q. What is the consequence of a defective notarized document?

A. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a
document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-
notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence. (Heirs of Corazon Afable Salud vs. Rural Bank
of Salinas, Inc., supra.)

C. OFFER AND OBJECTION

330. Q. What is the purpose of the formal offer?

A. The Rules of Court provide that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their
findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover,
it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court. (People vs. Villanueva, 629 SCRA 720, 1
September 2010.)

331. Q. What is the consequence if the evidence is not formally offered?

A. In Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha the Supreme Court held that failure to make a
formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it.
Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
(People vs. Villanueva, supra.)

332. Q. What will happen to the documentary exhibits marked during the pre-trial but was
not formally offered in evidence? Explain your answer.

A. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or
trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as
evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and
value. (People vs. Villanueva, supra.)

333. Q. Distinguish identification of documentary evidence from its formal offer.

A. There is a significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its

formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by
the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party
rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an
exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be
emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the
court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.
(People vs. Villanueva, supra.)

334. Q. Is the rule on formal offer also applicable in tax cases filed with the Court of Tax
Appeals?

A. In Dizon vs. Court of Tax Appeals, one of the issues presented was whether the Court of
Tax Appeals and the CA gravely abused their discretion "in allowing the admission of the
pieces of evidence which were not formally offered" by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The Court held that, under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a
 25

court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove
every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the
pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require
that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA. x x x x x The presentation
of the BIR’s evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded
considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth
of BIR’s claims against the Estate. The BIR’s failure to formally offer these pieces of
evidence, despite CTA’s directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact
that not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission.
(People vs. Villanueva, supra.)

335. Q. What are the requisites for the court to consider evidence not formally offered?

A. In Mato vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that evidence, although not formally offered in
evidence, may be "admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz:

first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

In Ramos vs. Dizon, the Court deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into the
records because they had been presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case.
Likewise, the first requisite was deemed satisfied because one of the parties therein
explained the contents of the exhibits when interrogated by the respondents’ counsel.
(People vs. Villanueva, supra.)

336. Q. Can objection to the admissibility of evidence be raised for the first time on appeal?

A. No. As held by the Court in People vs. Domado, citing People vs. Hernandez, objection
to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. When a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal. (People vs. Diaz, 752 SCRA 17, 25 February 2015; See also People vs. Gabuya,
750 SCRA 560, 16 February 2015.)

337. Q. What is the remedy available to the party if the trial court erroneously rejected the
introduction of a certain document as evidence?

A. In Catacutan vs. People (656 SCRA 524, 31 August 2011), the Supreme Court has said
that, if an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it
should ask the court’s permission to have the exhibit attached to the record. The
party can avail the remedy provided for in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. (TENDER OFFER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE)

338. Q. Can the court’s denial of further presentation of evidence constitute denial of due
process?

A. No. Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments
or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is
the better accepted norm of procedural due process.

There is no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow the party to introduce
as evidence. It is well within the court's discretion to reject the presentation of evidence
which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is
specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding,
concerns an administrative matter. (Catacutan vs. People, supra.)

RULE 133
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE
 26

339. Q. What is preponderance of evidence?

A. Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater
weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible evidence’. It is evidence which
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. (Lim vs. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria, 675 SCRA 628, 4
July 2012.)

340. Q. What is the evidence required in civil cases?

A. It bears stressing that in civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence or "greater weight
of the evidence" is required. (Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs.
Mendoza, 675 SCRA 284, 27 June 2012; (Guidangen vs. Wooden, 666 SCRA 121, 15
February 2012.)

341. Q. Can bare allegations enough to constitute preponderance of evidence?

A. No. Bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence, documentary or otherwise,
sufficient to support a claim, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed. (LNS
International Manpower Services vs. Padua, Jr., 614 SCRA 322, 5 March 2010.)

342. Q. What is the required proof of special qualifying circumstances?

A. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal

certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the
crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the
concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must
be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Villanueva, 629 SCRA
720, 1 September 2010.)

343. Q. Is non-flight a proof of innocence?

A. No. In People vs. Alawig (706 SCRA 88, 18 September 2013), the Supreme Court held
that: While it has been ruled that an accused’s decision not to flee after the crime despite
an opportunity to do so is not characteristic of a guilty person, the opposite has also been
upheld in some cases. Appellant may not have indeed fled from the scene of the crime as
he even allowed himself to be subjected to paraffin test, but the same are not necessarily
indicative of a clear conscience. "Non-flight is not proof of innocence" as ruled in People
vs. Del Castillo. Thus, the fact that appellant did not flee may be a badge of innocence,
nevertheless, it is not a sufficient ground to exculpate him from his proven criminal
liability.

But in People vs. Biglete (673 SCRA 546, 18 June 2012), the Supreme Court held that
flight indicates a guilty conscience and an attempt to evade the arms of the law.

344. Q. What is circumstantial evidence?

A. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through
an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. (People vs.
Alawig, 706 SCRA 88, 18 September 2013.)

345. Q. Absent any direct evidence against the accused in a criminal case, can a
circumstantial evidence be relied on to convict him of the crime charged? Explain.

A. Yes. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court
may draw its finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient to convict the offender if:

i) there is more than one circumstance;

ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and
 27

iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.

All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided
that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others
as the guilty person. (Espineli vs. People, 725 SCRA 365, 9 June 2014; People vs.
Solano, Jr., 724 SCRA 397, 2 June 2014; People vs. Tanchanco, 670 SCRA 130, 18
April 2012; Diega vs. Court of Appeals, 615 SCRA 399, 15 March 2010.)

346. Q. What is the rule in the presentation of substantial evidence?

A. It is an inflexible rule that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with
substantial evidence, for any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand
without offending due process. (Island Overseas Transport Corporation vs. Beja, 776
SCRA 234, 7 December 2015.)

347. Q. What is the basic rule on allegations?

A. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given
credence. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Social Security Commission vs. Favila, 646 SCRA 462, 28 March 2011.)

348. Q. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding, and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. What are the recognized
exceptions?

A. The exceptions are as follows:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the CA in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. (Campos vs. Pastrana, 608 SCRA 55, 8 December
2009.)

349. Q. Give at least one circumstance when the Supreme Court can take cognizance of
certiorari petition, although what was raised is factual in nature?

A. One of these exceptions is when the lower courts failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case.
(Chua vs. People, 762 SCRA 523, 13 July 2015.)