LADERA VS. HODGES (G.R. NO. 8027-R, VOL.

48, NO. 12, O.G. 5374, SEPTEMBER 23, 1952)

APRIL 23, 2015 | YUMMY

FACTS:

1. Hodges entered into a contract promising to sell a lot to Ladera under

certain terms and conditions. One of which is that the contract may be
rescinded and annulled in case Ladera failed to make the monthly
payment 60 days after it is due.
2. After the execution of the contract, Ladera built a house on the lot
assessed at 4,500 pesos. However, Ladera failed to pay the agreed
installments so Hodges rescinded the contract and filed an action for
ejectment.
3. The MTC ruled in favor of Hodges and issued an alias writ of execution.
Pursuant thereto, the sheriff levied upon all rights, interests and
participation over the house. Notices of sale were posted, however, were
not published in a newspaper of general circulation.
4. An auction sale was then conducted but Ladera was not able to attend as
she had gone to Manila. The house was then sold to one Avelina Magno
as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Ladera sold the same lot to one Manuel
Villa and on the same day purchased the house from Magno for 200
pesos. This, however, was not recorded.
5. Ladera then returned to Iloilo and learned what happened. She went to see
the sheriff and represented that the property can still be redeemed and so
she gave him 230 pesos. It does not appear, however, that it was turned
over to Hodges. Thereupon, Ladera filed an action against Hodges, the
sheriff, Magno and Villa to set aside the sale and recover the house.
6. The lower court ruled in favor of Ladera on the ground of non-compliance
based on Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On appeal, Hodges contends that
the house, built on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable
 or personal property. The sale of the land was also made without proper
publication required by law.
ISSUE: Was the house movable or immovable?

RULING: Immovable.

1. As enumerated in the Civil Code, immovable property includes lands,

buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. The law
does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot was the
one who built the construction.
2. Also, Ladera did not declare his house to be a chattel mortgage. The
object of the levy or sale was real property and its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation was indespensible. Without it, the
execution sale was void.
3. In addition, Magno, the alleged purchaser at the auction sale, was a mere
employee of Hodges and the low bid made by her as well as the fact that
she sold the house to Villa on the same day Hodges sold him the land,
proves that she was merely acting for and in behalf of Hodges.
4. In the sale of immovables, the lack of title of the vendor taints the rights
of the subsequent purchasers. Possession in good faith is not equivalent to
title.
5. The principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere
accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said
accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.

Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor Digest

G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962

Facts: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by
motor vehicles in Mindanao with main offices in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). Petitioner likewise owned a
land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries
are placed thereon in wooden and cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a
P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Tax
Appeals but it sustained the City Assessor's decision, while the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
sustained the same.

Note: This is merely a case digest to aid in remembering the important points of a case. It is still
advisable for any student of law to read the full text of assigned cases.

Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipments are considered immobilized and thus
subject to a realty tax

Held: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held that said machineries and equipments are not
subject to the assessment of real estate tax.

Said equipments are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not esential and
principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on without
repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in another shop
belonging to another
GR No. L-17870
Property Law: Immovable Property
Facts:
The City Assessor of Cagayan De Oro City assessed a realty tax on several
equipment and machineries of Mindanao Bus Co., a public utility solely engaged in
transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks.. The machineries sought to be
assessed by the respondent as real properties are sitting on cement or wooden
platforms.
The petitioner appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals on the ground
that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the assessment of
the city assessor.

Additional note (for recit purposes):

– The machineries sought to be assessed by the respondent as real properties are
the following:
o Hobart Electric Welder Machine;
o Storm Boring machine;
o Lathe machine with motor;
o Black and Decker Grinder;
o PEMCO Hydraulic Press;
o Battery charger (Tungar charge machine); and
o D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel.
– These machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipment to
produce finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like
offered to the general public indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes
for which petitioner has never engaged in, to date.”
Issue:
Whether the equipment and machineries in question, are considered immovable
properties, and therefore, subject to realty tax.
Held:
No. The equipment and machineries in question, are movable properties, and
therefore, not subject to realty tax.
Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be
“essential and principal elements” of an industry or works without which such
industry or works would be “unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose
for which it was established.”
The tools and equipment in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not
essential and principal elements of petitioner’s business of transporting
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as
movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service.
Even without such tools and equipment, its business may be carried on, as
petitioner has carried on, without such equipment, before the war. The
transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shops if
its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to
another.

Aside from the element of essentiality, Article 415 (5) of the New Civil Code also
requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land.

But in the case at bar the equipment in question are destined only to repair or
service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or
permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. Said equipment may not,
therefore, be deemed real property.

Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. vs Wearever Textile Mills Inc.,

G.R. No. 58469
May 16, 1983

Facts:
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and
Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati
Leasing filed a petition for judicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati
Leasing’s application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant thereto, the
sheriff enforcing the seizure order and removed the main motor of the subject machinery. In a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery
on the ground that the same cannot be the subject of replevin because it is a real property
pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means
of bolts and the only way to remove it from Wearever textile’s plant would be to drill out or
destroy the concrete floor. When the motion for reconsideration of Makati Leasing was denied
by the Court of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the
parties.

Held:
The said machinery is a personal property. Like what was involved in the Tumalad case, if
a house of strong materials, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a
chattel mortgage thereon, as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third
party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which
is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be
likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from the
denying the existence of the chattel mortgage. The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside
and the order of the lower court was reinstated.

Evangelista v. Alto Surety

Evangelista v. Alto Surety

Facts:

In 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted Civil Case No. 8235 of the CFI Manila (Santos Evangelista vs.
Ricardo Rivera) for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was
levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy of said
writ and the corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. In due
course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held in
compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case on 8 October 1951. The corresponding definite
deed of sale was issued to him on 22 October 1952, upon expiration of the period of redemption. When
Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that
he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true
owner of said property. It appears that on 10 May 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had
been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held, on 29 September 1950, in
compliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case 6268 of the same court (Alto Surety & Insurance
vs. Maximo Quiambao, Rosario Guevara and Ricardo Rivera)" in which judgment for the sum of money,
had been rendered in favor of Alto Surety. Hence, on 13 June 1953, Evangelista instituted an action
against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house, and
securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered
judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to
Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October 1952, until said delivery.
The decision was however reversed by the Court of Appeals, which absolved Alto Surety from the
complaint on account that although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista had been filed with the
Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of Alto Surety, Evangelista did not acquire thereby a
preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the house in question were immovable property.

Issue:

Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with, for
purpose of attachment, as immovable property?

Held:

The court ruled that the house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal
property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As held in Laddera vs. Hodges (48 OG
5374), "a true building is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a
usufructuary or lessee.” The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached, as "personal
property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that
"Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was
not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction” is untenable. Parties to a deed of
chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said contract.
However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon
the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract.
The rules on execution do not allow, and should not be interpreted as to allow, the special consideration
that parties to a contract may have desired to impart to real estate as personal property, when they are
not ordinarily so. Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The regulation governing sales
on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of property
is suited to its character, not to the character which the parties have given to it or desire to give it. The
regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties, may have privately given to the
property levied upon. The court therefore affirms the decision of the CA with cost against Alto Surety.

Tsai v. CA
October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom),
secured by a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located
therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract. PBCom again granted a second loan
to EVERTEX which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached
thereto. These listed properties were similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed. After the date of the
execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and
equipments. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet
its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX under
Act 3135 and Act 1506 or "The Chattel Mortgage Law". PBCom then consolidated its ownership over the lot
and all the properties in it. It leased the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the factory,
lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries.

EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages against PBCom,
alleging inter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not valid, and that PBCom,
without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were not included in the Real
and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the second contract which is a Chattel Mortgage,
and neither were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale.

ISSUES:
1) W/N the contested properties are personal or movable properties
2) W/N the sale of these properties to a third person (Tsai) by the bank through an irregular foreclosure sale
is valid.

HELD:

1) Nature of the Properties and Intent of the Parties

The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real
property mortgaged does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil
Code. While it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel
Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery and equipment as
chattels.

In the first mortgage contract, reflective of the true intention of PBCOM and EVERTEX was the typing
in capital letters, immediately following the printed caption of mortgage, of the phrase "real and chattel." So
also, the "machineries and equipment" in the printed form of the bank had to be inserted in the blank space of
the printed contract and connected with the word "building" by typewritten slash marks. Now, then, if the
machineries in question were contemplated to be included in the real estate mortgage, there would have been
no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically mentioning as part III of Schedule A a listing of the
machineries covered thereby. It would have sufficed to list them as immovables in the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage of the land and building involved. As regards the second contract, the intention of the parties is
clear and beyond question. It refers solely to chattels. The inventory list of the mortgaged properties is an
itemization of 63 individually described machineries while the schedule listed only machines and
2,996,880.50 worth of finished cotton fabrics and natural cotton fabrics.

UNDER PRINCIPLE OF STOPPEL

Assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the
parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. As far back
as Navarro v. Pineda, an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it
is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it.
2) Sale of the Properties Not Included in the Subject of Chattel Mortgage is Not Valid

The auction sale of the subject properties to PBCom is void. Inasmuch as the subject mortgages were
intended by the parties to involve chattels, insofar as equipment and machinery were concerned, the Chattel
Mortgage Law applies. Section 7 provides thereof that: "a chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the
property described therein and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed
in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary
notwithstanding." Since the disputed machineries were acquired later after the two mortgage contracts were
executed, it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include subject machineries with the
properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages.

As the lease and sale of said personal properties were irregular and illegal because they were not
duly foreclosed nor sold at the auction, no valid title passed in its favor. Consequently, the sale thereof
to Ruby Tsai is also a nullity under the elementary principle of nemo dat quod non habet, one cannot give
what one does not have.

Serg's v. PCI Leasing

Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000

FACTS:

 PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of
replevin.
 Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
 The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery, with word that he would
return for other machineries.
 Petitioner (Serg’s Products) filed a motion for special protective order to defer enforcement of the
writ of replevin.
 PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties were still personal and
therefore can still be subjected to seizure and writ of replevin.
 Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415
of the Civil Code.
 Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries
In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the Petitioner, the appellate court, Citing the
Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only
been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties."

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of immobilization.

Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ
issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property.

Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery
of personal property only.

Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended
by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners
in the factory built on their own land.They were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making
industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have
become “immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.”

However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.Under the principle
of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found
therein.

Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be
and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or
hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon,
real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.”

The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the Writ of Replevin

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)

Facts:

On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon
City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after
6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as
evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:

Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the
issuance of search warrants.

Held:

Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating
that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the
facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect
that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a
means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve
as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.

LOPEZ V. OROSA AND PLAZA THEATRE

103 SCRA 98
FACTS:

1. Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill.

2. Orosa, who lived in the same province as Lopez, one dayapproached Lopez and
invited the latter to make an investment inthe theatre business.

3. Orosa, his family and close friends apparently were forming acorporation named
Plaza Theatre.

4. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, therewas an oral

agreement between Lopez and Orosa that Lopezwould be supplying the lumber for the
construction of the theatre.The terms were the following: one, Orosa would be
personallyliable for any account that the said construction would incur; two,payment
would be by demand and not by cash on delivery.

5. Pursuant to the agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber for theconstruction. Lopez
was only paid one-third of the total cost.

6. The land on which the building has been erected was previously owned by Orosa,
which was later on purchased by the corporation.

7. Due to the incessant demands of Lopez, the corporation mortgaged its properties.

8. On an earlier relevant date, the corporation obtained a loan with Luzon Surety
Company as surety and in turn, the corporation executed a mortgage over the land and
building. In the registration of the land under Act 496, such mortgage wasn’t revealed.

9. Also due to the demands of Lopez, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his
shares of stock in the corporation.

10. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza
theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid
balance; and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in
public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance; or
that the shares of stock be sold in public auction. Lopez also had lis pendens be
annotated in the OCT.

11. The trial court decided that there was joint liability between defendants and that the
materialman’s lien was only confined tothe building.
ISSUES:

W/N the materialmen’s lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the
building attaches to said structure alone and doesn’t extend to the land on which the
building is adhered to?

HELD:

The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of materials used for the
construction and repair of a building is also extended to land on which the building was
constructed is without merit. For while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the
land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building
in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thing—
that a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, in the absence of
any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same
owner.

Appelant invoked Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides—“With respect
to determinate real property and real rights of the debtor, the following are preferred:
xxx Credits for reflection, not entered or recorded, and only with respect to other credits
different from those mentioned in four next preceding paragraphs.” Close examination
of the abovementioned provision reveals that the law gives preference to unregistered
refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the refectionary or
work was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the lien so
created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of
which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid
value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said
structure and to no other property of the obligors.

JULIAN YAP
vs
SANTIAGO TANADA
; and
GOULDS PUMPS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
PROMULGATED: July 18, 1988PONENTE: J. NARVASAThis is a petition
for certiorari to review the orders of CFI Cebu City.Doctrine:

Article 415, par. 3 of the Civil Code considers and immovable property as
“everything
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deteriorating the object.” The pump does
not fit this description.It could be, and was, in fact,
separated from Yap’s premises without being broken of suffering
deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing
morecomplicated that the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners. The
case began in the City Court of Cebu with the filing of Goulds
Pumps International(Phil), Inc. of a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking
recovery of P1,459.30, representingthe balance of the price and installatio
n cost of a water pump in the latter’s premises. The Court
rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent after they presented evidence ex-
parte due tofailure of petitioner Yap to appear before the Court. Petitioner then
appealed to the CFI,particularly to the sale of Judge Tanada. For again failure to
appear for pre-trial, Yap wasdeclared in default. He filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by Judge Tanada.
On October 15, 1969, Tanada granted Gould’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Exe
cution. Yapforthwith filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order.
In the meantime, theSheriff levied on the water pump in question and by notice
scheduled the execution sale thereof.
But in view of the pendency of Yap’s motion, suspensio
n of sale was directed by Judge Tanada.It appears, however, that this was not made
known to the Sheriff who continued with the auctionsale and sold the property to
the highest bidder, Goulds. Because of such, petitioner filed aMotion to Set Aside
Execution Sale and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution. One of his argumentswas
that the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 29 of the New
Rules of
Court, “i.e. notice by publication in case of execution of sale of real property, the
pump and
its
accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with the character of
permanency.”
Such motion was denied by the CFI.
Whether or not the pump and its accessories are immovable property
No. The water pump and its accessories are NOT immovable properties. The
argument ofYap that the water pump had become immovable property by its being
installed in his residenceis untenable. Article 415, par. 3 of the Civil Code
considers and immovable property as
“everything attached to an immo
vable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deteriorating the object.” The
pump does
not fit this description. It could be, and was, in fact,
separated from Yap’s premises without being
broken of suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the
pump involvednothing more complicated that the loosening of bolts or dismantling
of other fasteners.

MACHINERY & ENGINEERING SUPPLIES, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-7057. OCTOBER 29, 1954.

Concepcion, J.:

Doctrine: Said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry" carried on said immovable and tended "directly to
meet the needs of said industry." For these reasons, they were already
immovable pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code.

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for replevin in the CFI of Manila against
Ipo Limestone Co., Inc. and Dr. Antonio Villarama for the recovery of the
machineries and equipments sold and delivered to defendants at their
factory in Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Respondent judge issued order for
Provincial Sheriff to seize and take immediate possession of the properties.
But the equipment could not possibly be dismantled without causing damage
to the wooden frames attached to them. As Roco, pet's president, insisted in
dismantling it on his own responsibility, alleging that bond was posted for
such, the deputy sheriffs directed that some of the supports thereof be cut.
Defendant filed counter-bond. Trial court ordered return and reinstallation of
machineries. Petitioner deposited them along the road, near the quarry of
the defendant without reinstallation rendering them useless. Petitioner
complains that the respondent Judge had disregarded his manifestation that
equipments seized are the Petitioner's property until fully paid for and as
such never became immovable and ordinarily replevin may be brought to
recover any specific personal property unlawfully taken or detained from the
owner thereof, provided such property is capable of identification and
delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property or
incorporeal personal property.

Issue: W/N the equipment can be seized by the sheriff?

Ruling: When the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent, Ipo

Limestone Co., Inc., the machinery and equipment in question appeared to
be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said
premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be
separated from the latter "without breaking the material or deterioration of
the object." Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it became necessary, not
only to unbolt the same, but, also, to cut some of its wooden supports.
Moreover, said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry" carried on said immovable and tended
"directly to meet the needs of the said industry." For these reasons, they
were already immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article
415 of Civil Code of the Philippines, which are substantially identical to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 334 of the Civil Code of Spain. As such
immovable property, they were not subject to replevin.