RECTO LAW

PCI LEASING VS GIRAFFE (2007) recto law

The Court has treated a purported financial lease as actually a sale of a movable property on
installments and prevented recovery beyond the buyer's arrearages.

FRIA

PAL VS SPS. KURANGKING (2003) stay order; claim

The stay order is effective from the date of its issuance until the dismissal of the
petition or the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings.
A "claim" is said to be "a right to payment, whether or not it is reduced to judgment,
liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, legal
or equitable, and secured or unsecured."

RUBBERWORLD VS NLRC (1999) labor cases

Among the actions suspended are those for money claims before labor tribunals, like the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the labor arbiters.

SPS. SOBRAJUANITE VS ASB (2005) rescission

Clearly then, the complaint filed by Sobrejuanite is a claim as defined under the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. The complaint for rescission with damages
would fall under the category of claim considering that it is for pecuniary considerations.

METROBANK VS CAMERON GRANVILLE (2007) preference of lien

Petitioner bank's preferred status over the unsecured creditors relative to the mortgage liens
is retained, but the enforcement of such preference is suspended.

RCBC VS IAC ( 1992)

The stay order covers all creditors, secured or unsecured. Such suspension "shall not
prejudice or render ineffective the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally
unsecured creditor.

CORDOVA VS REYES DAWAY (2007) pro rata for money claim

Considering that petitioner did not fall under any of the provisions applicable to preferred
creditors, he was deemed an ordinary creditor under Article 2245: Credits of any other kind or class,
or by any other right or title not comprised in the four preceding articles, shall enjoy no preference.
This being so, Article 2251 (2) states that: Common credits referred to in Article 2245 shall be
paid pro rata regardless of dates.

TRANSPORTATION

FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION , vs CA(1998) pipeline concession

The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a
common carrier. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the definition of "common carrier" in the
Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air.
It does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle.
In fact, in the United States, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers.

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. SULPICIO LINES charter party

If the charter is a contract of affreightment, which leaves the general owner in possession of
the ship as owner for the voyage, the rights and the responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner.
The Charterer is free from liability to third persons in respect of the ship.

CALVO VS UCPB (2002) customs broker

Petitioner is a common carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her
business: that as such, she is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods; that
to prove extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the possibility that
some other party could be responsible for the damage; and that improper packing of the goods
could be a basis to exempt petitioner from liability, but petitioner accepted the cargo without
exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans.

ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING, INC., petitioner, vs . COURT OF

APPEALS limited clientele
Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather
than scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed
and publicly known routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. To be sure,
petitioner fits the test of acommon carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test to
determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in
by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity
or extent of the business transacted." In the case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in
the business of shipping and lighterage, offering its barges to the public, despite its limited clientele
for carrying or transporting goods by water for compensation..

SPOUSES CRUZ, , vs. SUN HOLIDAYS, INC., beach resort

Indeed, respondent is a common carrier. Its ferry services are so intertwined with its main
business as to be properly considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of respondent's ferry services
in its resort operations is underscored by its having its own Coco Beach boats. And the tour
packages it offers, which include the ferry services, may be availed of by anyone who can afford to
pay the same. These services are thus available to the public.
That respondent does not charge a separate fee or fare for its ferry services is of no moment.
It would be imprudent to suppose that it provides said services at a loss.

BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING N.V. and JARDINE

DAVIES TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE FIRST
INSURANCE CO., INC.,(2002). Prima facie negligence
Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule,
are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost
or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting
the goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden
of proving that they observed such diligence.
COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner , vs. UCPB (2003) ensuiring
seaworthiness
According to the Court, where loss of cargo results from the failure of the officers of a
vessel to inspect their ship frequently so as to discover the existence of cracked parts, that loss
cannot be attributed to force majeure, but to the negligence of those officers. Here, the Court found
that the petitioner did not present sufficient evidence showing what measures or acts it had
undertaken to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel or that it had exercised extraordinary diligence.
However, the Court ruled that petitioner should not be held liable for more than what was declared
by the shippers/consignees as the value of the goods in the Bills of Lading. It held that the liability
of a common carrier for the loss of goods, by stipulation in the bill of lading, be limited to the value
declared by the shipper.

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., CA (2001) certificates of seaworthiness

Neither may petitioner escape liability by presenting in evidence certificates that tend to
show that at the time of dry-docking and inspection by
the Philippine Coast Guard, the vessel MT Maysun, was fit for voyage. These pieces ofvevidence do
not necessarily take into account the actual condition of the vessel at the timevof the
commencement of the voyage.

FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, vs . CA (1999) police report

In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the
seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the
Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the
petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager,
Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect
the safety of its passengers.

LA MALLORCA vs CA (1966) 4-year old

PASSENGER RELATION CONTINUES UNTIL PASSENGER HAS REASONABLE
TIME TO LEAVE CARRIER'S PREMISES. — The relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier
at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises

EQUITABLE LEASING VS SUYOM (2002) registered owner rule

The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned;
consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In
contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the
registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. Since petitioner remained the
registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths and the injuries
arising from the negligence of the driver.

DUAVIT VS CA (1989) stolen vehicle

OWNER OF A VEHICLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING THE
VEHICLE IF DRIVEN WITHOUT THE OWNER'S CONSENT BY ONE NOTEMPLOYED
BY HIM
DELA TORRE VA CA (2011) limited liability/ civil code provisions
The only person who could avail of this is the shipowner, Concepcion. He is the very person
whom the Limited Liability Rule has been conceived to protect.
Although certain statutory rights and obligations of charter parties are found in the Code of
Commerce, these provisions as correctly pointed out by the RTC, are not applicable in the present
case. Indeed, none of the provisions found in the Code of Commerce deals with the speci�c rights
and obligations between the real shipowner and the charterer obtaining in this case. Necessarily, the
Court looks to the New Civil Code to supply the deficiency.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS VS CA (1993) charter party

It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise
that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-
party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and
control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the charterer.

METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT VS ADALA (2007) franchise

Moreover, this Court has construed the term "franchise" broadly so as to include, not only
authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also those granted by
administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchises has been delegated by Congress.

SPS. TEODORO/PERENA VS SPS. ZARATE (2012) school service

The operator of a school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of the law. He is bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of his business. He is presumed to be negligent
when death occurs to a passenger. His liability may include indemnity for loss of earning capacity
even if the deceased passenger may only be an unemployed high school student at the time of the
accident.

GAMBOA VS TEVES (2011) control test / beneficial ownership test

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital"
required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding
capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the
hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the
corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]."

GAMBOA VS TEVES (2012)

Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights, is essential."
In short, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens must apply separately to each
class of shares, whether common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any other class of
shares.
INSURANCE

GULF RESORTS, INC, vs. PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION,

(2005) contract of adhesion
It is basic that all the provisions of the insurance policy should be examined and interpreted
in consonance with each other. 25 All its parts are reflective of the true intent of the parties. The
policy cannot be construed piecemeal. Certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to
control; neither do particular words or phrases necessarily determine its character. Petitioner cannot
focus on the earthquake shock endorsement to the exclusion of the other provisions. All the
provisions and riders, taken and interpreted together, indubitably show the intention of the parties
to extend earthquake shock coverage to the two swimming pools only.

PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. , vs CIR (2009) HMO not an

insurance contract
However, assuming that petitioner's commitment to provide medical services to its
members can be construed as an acceptance of the risk that it will shell out more than the prepaid
fees, it still will not quality as an insurance contract because petitioner's objective is to provide
medical services at reduced cost, not to distribute risk like an insurer.

GREPALIFE VS CA (1999) binding receipt

The Supreme Court held that a "binding receipt" does not insure by itself; that no insurance
contract was perfected between the parties with the non-compliance of the conditions provided in
the binding receipt and concealment having been committed by private respondent.

LALICAN VS INSULAR LIFE (2009) reinstatement of policy

The stipulation in a life insurance policy giving the insured the privilege to reinstate it upon
written application does not give the insured absolute right to such reinstatement by the mere filing
of an application. The insurer has the right to deny the reinstatement if it is not satisfied as to the
insurability of the insured and if the latter does not pay all overdue premium and all other
indebtedness to the insurer. After the death of the insured the insurance Company cannot be
compelled to entertain an application for reinstatement of the policy because the conditions
precedent to reinstatement can no longer be determined and satisfied.

INSULAR LIFE VS EBRADO (1977) void beneficiary

We do not think that a conviction for adultery or concubinage is exacted before the
disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. More specifically, with regard to the disability
on "persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation,"

FILIPINO MERCHANTS INSURANCE CO., INC vs CA (1989) insurable interest on

property
VENDEE OF GOODS INSURED HAS AN EQUITABLE TITLE EVEN BEFORE
DELIVERY ON PERFORMANCE OF CONDITIONS OF SALE. — Herein private respondent,
as vendee/consignee of the goods in transit has such existing interest therein as may be the
subject of a valid contract of insurance. His interest over the goods is based on the perfected
contract of sale. The perfected contract of sale between him and the shipper of the goods operates
to vest in him an equitable title even before delivery or before he performed the conditions of the
sale.

GEAGONIA VS CA (1995) mortgagor-mortgagee

As to a mortgaged property, the mortgagor and the mortgagee have each an independent
insurable interest therein and both interests may be covered by one policy, or each may take out a
separate policy covering his interest, either at the same or at separate times.

GREPALIFE VS CA(1999) loss-payable mortgage clause

Consequently, where the mortgagor pays the insurance premium under the group insurance
policy, making the loss payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagor's interest, and
the mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance, the mortgagee
is simply an appointee of the insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does not make the mortgagee
a party to the contract.

SPS. CHA VS CA (1997) insurable interest

INSURABLE INTEREST; LESSOR HAS NO INSURABLE INTEREST IN GOODS
AND MERCHANDISE INSIDE THE LEASED PREMISES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 17 OF THE INSURANCE CODE.

UCPB VS MASAGANA (1999) non-payment of premium

An insurance policy, other than life, issued originally or on renewal, is not valid and binding
until actual payment of the premium. Any agreement to the contrary is void. The parties may not
agree expressly or impliedly on the extension of credit or time to pay the premium and consider
the policy binding before actual payment.

MR
Finally in the instant case, it would be unjust and inequitable if recovery on the policy would not be
permitted against Petitioner, which had consistently granted a 60- to 90-day credit term for the
payment of premiums despite its full awareness of Section 77. Estoppel bars it from taking refuge
under said Section, since Respondent relied in good faith on such practice. Estoppel then is the fifth
exception to Section 77||| (UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Masagana Telemart, Inc., G.R.
No. 137172 (Resolution), [April 4, 2001], 408 PHIL 423-447)

PHILIPPINE PRYCE ASSURANCE VS CA (1994) surety

No contract of suretyship or bonding shall be valid and binding unless and until the
premium therefor has been paid, except where the obligee has accepted the bond, in which case the
bond becomes valid and enforceable irrespective of whether or not the premium has been paid by
the obligor to the surety

PHILAMCARE HEALTH VS CA (2002) concealment

Thus, "(A)lthough false, a representation of the expectation, intention, belief, opinion, or
judgment of the insured will not avoid the policy if there is no actual fraud in inducing the
acceptance of the risk, or its acceptance at a lower rate of premium, and this is likewise the rule
although the statement is material to the risk, if the statement is obviously of the foregoing
character, since in such case the insurer is not justified in relying upon such statement, but is
obligated to make further inquiry .
SUNLIFE OF CANADA VS CA (1995) non-disclosure
The waiver of a medical examination [in a non-medical insurance contract] renders even
more material the information required of the applicant concerning previous condition of health and
diseases suffered, for such information necessarily constitutes an important factor which the
insurer takes into consideration in deciding whether to issue the policy or not x x x."
Anent the finding that the facts concealed had no bearing to the cause of death of the
insured, it is well settled that the insured need not die of the disease he had failed to disclose to the
insurer. It is suffcient that his nondisclosure misled the insurer in forming his estimates of the risks
of the proposed insurance policy or in making inquiries.

GENERAL INSURANCE VS NG HUA (1960) other insurance clause

Violation of a warranty that there were no other insurances on the property insured entitles
the insurer to rescind.

-----

CHOA TIEK SENG V. COURT OF APPEALS (1990) all-risks policy

It is the duty of the respondent insurance company to establish that said loss or damage falls within
the exceptions provided for by law, otherwise it is liable therefor. An "all risks" provision of a
marine policy creates a special type of insurance which extends coverage to risks not usually
contemplated and avoids putting upon the insured the burden of establishing that the loss was due
to peril falling within the policy's coverage. The insurer can avoid coverage upon demonstrating that
a specific provision expressly excludes the loss from coverage. In this case, the damage caused to the
cargo has not been attributed to any of the exceptions provided for nor is there any pretension to
this effect. Thus, the liability of respondent insurance company is clear.

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. V. SULPICIO LINES (1999) seaworthiness

SEAWORTHINESS, IMPLIEDLY WARRANTED. — A common carrier is a person or
corporation whose regular business is to carry passenger or property for all persons who may choose
to employ and to remunerate him. MT Vector fits the definition of a common carrier under Article
1732 of the Civil Code. Thus, the carriers are deemed to warrant impliedly the seaworthiness of the
ship. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a
sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in
seaworthy condition the vessel involved in its contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty
prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. V. PAP CO., LTD (2013) materiality of location
Considering that the original policy was renewed on an "as is basis," it follows that the renewal
policy carried with it the same stipulations and limitations. The terms and conditions in the renewal
policy provided, among others, that the location of the risk insured against is at the Sanyo factory in
PEZA. The subject insured properties, however, were totally burned at the Pace Factory. Although
it was also located in PEZA, Pace Factory was not the location stipulated in the renewal policy.
There being an unconsented removal, the transfer was at PAP's own risk.
FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING & INSURANCE CO., INC. V. HERNANDO (1991)
pour atrui
It is settled that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to a third party,
such third party can directly sue the insurer. First Insurance cannot evade its liability as insurer by
hiding under the cloak of the insured. Its liability is primary and not dependent on the recovery of
judgment from the insured. ". . . the insurer's liability accrues immediately upon the occurrence of
the injury or event upon which the liability depends, and does not depend on the recovery of
judgment by the injured party against the insured |||

PAN MALAYAN INSURANCE CORP. V. CA (1990) accidental meaning

ACCIDENT OR ACCIDENTAL; DEFINED. — It cannot be said that the meaning given by
PANMALAY and CANLUBANG to the phrase "by accidental collision or overturning" found in
the first part of sub-paragraph (a) is untenable. Although the terms "accident" or "accidental" as
used in insurance contracts have not acquired a technical meaning, the Court has on several
occasions defined these terms to mean that which takes place "without one's foresight or
expectation, an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known
cause and, therefore, not expected. Certainly, it cannot be inferred from jurisprudence that these
terms, without qualification, exclude events resulting in damage or loss due to the fault, recklessness
or negligence of third parties. The concept "accident" is not necessarily synonymous with the
concept of "no fault". It may be utilized simply to distinguish intentional or malicious acts from
negligent or careless acts of man.

FIRST QUEZON CITY INSURANCE CO., INC. V. CA (1993) limit of liability

LIMITATION OF INSURER'S LIABILITY STIPULATED THEREIN; EXPLAINED; CASE
AT BAR. — The insurance policy clearly placed the maximum limit of the petitioner's liability for
damages arising from death or bodily injury at P12,000.00 per passenger and its maximum liability
per accident at P50,000.00. Since only one passenger was injured in the accident, the insurer's
liability for the damages suffered by said passenger is pegged to the amount of P12,000.00 only.
What does the limit of P50,000.00 per accident mean? It means that the insurer's maximum liability
for any single accident will not exceed P50,000.00 regardless of the number of passengers killed or
injured therein.

VILLACORTA V. INSURANCE COMMISSION (1980) authorized driver vis-à-vis theft

clause
Where the insured's car is wrongfully taken without the insured's consent from the car service and
repair shop to whom it had been entrusted for check-up and repairs (assuming that such taking was
for a joy ride, in the course of which it was totally smashed in an accident), respondent insurer is
liable and must pay insured for the total loss of the insured vehicle under the theft clause of the
policy.|||
BANKING

SIMEX INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. CA (1990) diligence

BANK'S NEGLIGENCE IN THEIR DUTIES TOWARDS THEIR CLIENTS WARRANTS
AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; REASON THEREOF. — As a business affected with
public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. |||

GUINGONA, JR. V. CITY FISCAL OF MANILA (1984) estafa

Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan
Association is that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was
transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount
deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals.
While the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to
return or deliver the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the
amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315,
par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public
respondents have no jurisdiction.|||

VITUG vs CA (1990) survivorship agreement

Joint accounts may be subject of a survivorship agreement whereby the co-depositors agree to
permit either of them to withdraw the whole deposit during their lifetime and transferring the
balance to the survivor upon the death of one of them

EJERCITO V SANDIGANBAYAN (2006) trust accounts

The money deposited under the trust agreement (“Trust account”) is intended not merely to remain
with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected
by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks
in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

BSB GROUP vs SALLY GO (2010) account itself

The inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the
money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action. 51Given this perspective, we
deduce that the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be determined from the
indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the
prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court,
respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing
petitioner's trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50. The said
Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way involves the checks subject of the
testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said
Information make mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the
checks have allegedly been kept.|||
SALVACION VS CENTRAL BANK (1997) dollar account of rapist
The exemption from court process of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426 cannot be invoked
by a foreign transient who raped a minor, escaped and was held liable for damages to the victim.
The garnishment of his foreign currency deposit should be allowed to prevent an injustice and for
equitable grounds. The law was enacted to encourage foreign currency deposit and not to benefit a
wrongdoer

PDIC VS CA (2003) golden time deposits

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION; LIABLE ONLY FOR DEPOSITS
RECEIVED BY A BANK IN THE USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS; CASE AT BAR. — Under
its charter, PDIC (hereafter petitioner) is liable only for deposits received by a bank "in the usual
course of business." . . . That no actual money in bills and/or coins was handed by respondents to
MBC does not mean that the transactions on the new GTDs did not involve money and that there
was no consideration therefor.

RCBC VS HI-TRI DEV CORP (2012) notice to owner

As seen in the afore-quoted provision, the law sets a detailed system for notifying depositors
of unclaimed balances. This notification is meant to inform them that their deposit could be
escheated if left unclaimed. Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar
institutions are under obligation to communicate with owners of dormant accounts. The purpose of
this initial notice is for a bank to determine whether an inactive account has indeed been unclaimed,
abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner. If the depositor simply does not wish to touch the
funds in the meantime, but still asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then the
bank is no longer obligated to include the account in its sworn statement. 20 It is not the intent of
the law to force depositors into unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is only
interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left without an owner.
In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and the unclaimed balances are
eventually escheated to the Republic, the bank "shall not thereafter be liable to any person for the
same and any action which may be brought by any person against in any bank . . . for unclaimed
balances so deposited . . . shall be defended by the Solicitor General without cost to such
bank." 21 Otherwise, should it fail to comply with the legally outlined procedure to the prejudice of
the depositor, the bank may not raise the defense provided under Section 5 of Act No. 3936, as
amended.

MANALO VS CA (2001) appointment of a receiver

A bank which had been ordered closed by the monetary board retains its juridical personality which
can sue and be sued through its liquidator. The only limitation being that the prosecution or defense
of the action must be done through the liquidator. 31 Otherwise, no suit for or against an insolvent
entity would prosper. In such situation, banks in liquidation would lose what justly belongs to them
through a mere technicality.|||

REPUBLIC VS EUGENIO (2008) existing criminal case

The pre-existence of a money laundering offense case already filed before the courts is
not necessary before an inquiry under Sec. 11 of AMLA is warranted. It should be interpreted to
 mean "in the event there are violations" of the AMLA, and not that there are already cases
pending in court concerning such violations. 69 If the contrary position is adopted, then the
bank inquiry order would be limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and
wholly inutile as a means for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to
sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of the AMLA. Should that
be the situation, in all likelihood the AMLC would be virtually deprived of its character as a
discovery tool, and thus would become less circumspect in filing complaints against suspect
account holders. After all, under such set-up the preferred strategy would be to allow or even
encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints under the AMLA with the hope or expectation
that the evidence of money laundering would somehow surface during the trial
Still, even if the bank inquiry order may be availed of without need of a pre-existing case
under the AMLA, it does not follow that such order may be availed ofex parte. There are several
reasons why the AMLA does not generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the
bank inquiry order.

PDIC VS PCRBI (2011) examination vs investigation

The practical justification for not requiring the Monetary Board approval to conduct an
investigation of banks is the administrative hurdles and paperwork it entails, and the
correspondent time to complete those additional steps or requirements. As in other types of
investigation, time is always of the essence, and it is prudent to expedite the proceedings if an
accurate conclusion is to be arrived at, as an investigation is only as precise as the evidence on
which it is based. The promptness with which such evidence is gathered is always of utmost
importance because evidence, documentary evidence in particular, is remarkably fungible. A
PDIC investigation is conducted to "determine[e] whether the allegations in a complaint or
findings in a final report of examination may properly be the subject of an administrative,
criminal or civil action." 76 In other words, an investigation is based on reports of examination
and an examination is conducted with prior Monetary Board approval. Therefore, it would be
unnecessary to secure a separate approval for the conduct of an investigation. Such would
merely prolong the process and provide unscrupulous individuals the opportunity to cover their
tracks.
Indeed, while in a literary sense, the two terms may be used interchangeably, under
the PDIC Charter, examination and investigation refer to two different processes. To reiterate,
an examination of banks requires the prior consent of the Monetary Board, whereas an
investigation based on an examination report, does not.