G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002
MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES,
JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,
JOSEPH L. NUÑEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS,
FERNANDO T. TORRES,
LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES,
JR.,
IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS,
MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T.
GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the
Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ
and CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors.
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area
of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is
situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo,
Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was
the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands,
which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." On March
24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include
additional co-applicants.4 Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively
referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).5
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world
with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners.
The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the
Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.
According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares
of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to
prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their
predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of
the Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession
of the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his
name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and "W-1" testimonies of J. Torres on
16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the
property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928
(Exhibit "X" and "X-1"; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado
Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva
before the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He
owned and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax
purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on
3 February 1957 (Exhibit "I" and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique
by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit "H"). During the
ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson
of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of
Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name
under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration
No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15
December 1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5.
October 1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "G").
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of
Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit "P-1" to "P-3").
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE
AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought
portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6
November 1985 (Exhibit "Q" to "Q-3").
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS,
DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA,
CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA,
ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA
MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA
GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a
Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit "S" to "S-3").
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA
MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new
OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO
CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January
1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")."6
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor
appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors to present
their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case
submitted for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later
set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the presentation
of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to
appear again despite due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order
submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration
court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of
the court’s decision, as follows:
"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the
witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual,
open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-
in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to by
witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and
one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of
the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were
paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was planted
to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to
establish registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the
Court can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to "private rights."
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734,
1983 "private rights" is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of
acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private
rights" means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory Information
title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands xxx" (underscoring
supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants
have acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside
the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that
as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March
18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from
the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated
July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which
established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation
No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation. (Exhibit "K")."7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6,
1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming
their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the
decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration
court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in
their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a
decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the
land registration court’s decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February
18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order
directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on
the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously
classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) under its
Integrated Social Forestry Program ("ISF" for brevity), filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is
situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They
claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates
of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary
conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed
that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the
public domain.8
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and
declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land
registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec.
1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands
of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
(Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been
segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is
confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a
Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No.
269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private
respondent Collado’s application that "said parcel of land known as Psu-162620
is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application and are not
within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied).
The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents
which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should have
forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
"x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the
public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition
of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and
Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have
the said properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the
Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest
reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands
are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the
same into private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate
lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172
SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA
387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may
be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339)."9
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR
CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG
AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
INTERVENORS’ PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED
OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated
July 26, 190410 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation ("MWR" for
brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal
description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners’ claim over
the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside
the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights." They point
out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are "subject to
existing private rights, if any there be." Petitioners contend that their claim of
ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-
interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim
that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by
individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva
before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners’ arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11 The Spaniards
first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias12which laid the foundation that "all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."13 Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage
Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree
of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the
Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated
in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural
lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.15
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights,
interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through
the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first
Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands."16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After
the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141"
for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this
day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded
title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed
Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on
February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under
the Torrens system.18 The Torrens system requires the government to issue a
certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the
title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of
the certificate.19 PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted
on June 11, 1978,20 amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain.21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,22 explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of
the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor
of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the
Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary
starting point to secure recognition of the state’s power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership
of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they
were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To
remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution
affirming the Regalian doctrine."
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and
Utilization of Natural Resources" barred the alienation of all natural resources
except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State
could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in
Section 8, Article XIV24 on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the
Nation". The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2
of Article XII25 on "National Economy and Patrimony".
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution
readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all
natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals,
lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and
contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential
to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and
recreational purposes."26
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the Court
had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of
whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of
RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for
brevity).28 The Court defined watershed as "an area drained by a river and its
tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The
most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most
important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not
only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is
an "intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be answered now."
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by
such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed
areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development
Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case.
That report concluded as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland
of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig
waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil
and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks.
Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the
Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains
to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would
mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the
Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest
in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldn’t care less even if it
would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it.
From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource – water.
xxx
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road
building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would
not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive
watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and
implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens."
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and
Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the
parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of
natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones.
Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities
could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of
the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they
vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of
EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended.
He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the
public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may
have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a
concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment
title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.29 Or, that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty
years preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA
141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA
1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved
on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners’ application for
registration was filed on April 25, 1985.30 As amended, Section 48 (b) now
reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act
requires that the applicant must prove the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued."31
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title
because of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether
under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or
under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had
acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of
acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then,
the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved
as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’
application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer
be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b)
of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded.
It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public
lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela
vs. Court of Appeals,32 the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
"x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both
acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
‘The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant
can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for
the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.’ "
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals33 is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not
contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the
Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified
as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that
Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject
land. The Court ruled:
"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there
be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did
not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation
No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more
than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969.
At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was
no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest
reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation
No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices
if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number
of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real
estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and
possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the
government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year
possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short
of the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,
as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the "private rights"
recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes,
we held that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to exclude his
land from a military or forest reservation must show "x x x by clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x
means for the acquisition of public lands."
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.A.
No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which
prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition
of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period
lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that
the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession."
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot
prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners
contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of 3,780
hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite
Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this
excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are
considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33,
DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS.
14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE
WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN
PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE
SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation
of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive
Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island
of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same,
together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite
purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to
private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance
with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of
Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are more
particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a portion of the
Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province
of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked "1" on sketch plan, being
N-74’-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal;
thence N 33’ 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40’ 26 W 1538.50 m. to
point 3; thence N 30’ 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75’ 02 W 704.33 m.
to point 5; thence N 14’ 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43’ 25 W 477.04
m. to point 7; thence N 71’ 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31’ 05 W
1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due
North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence
Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point
16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to
point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00
m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due
South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence
Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27;
thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three
thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a portion of
alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked
"1" on sketch plan being N 74’ 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1.
Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due
North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence
Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point
12; thence S. 31’ 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71’ 38 E 458.36 m. to
point 14; thence S 43’ 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14’ 18 E 1399.39
m. to point 16; thence S 75’ 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30’ 50 E
503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40’ 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33’
23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two
hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637
issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location
of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners
is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage.34 Proclamation
No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974,
WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND
REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND
EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765
DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE
AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to
the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974
which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and
San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and
revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to
private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly
described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation
amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan
Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by
the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the
Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-
33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation.
Beginning at a point marked "1" on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of
1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely
within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is
needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.35 Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an
official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character
of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March
18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The
Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL – AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described
on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading
for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the
operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on
June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation,
amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod
Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D.
1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as
contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering & Infrastructure Section"
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had
occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by
several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land
registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report37 dated
March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that
the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended
the dismissal of the application for registration. The Report states:
"COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San
Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration
of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found
that a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was
previously the subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC
Record No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986
in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for
Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984,
respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12,
Marikina Watershed. x x x
"WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court
for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the application
in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining
supplied)."
Likewise, in a letter38 dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector,
DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter
states:
"That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT
ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in
Psu-162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
"x x x
"That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the
Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to
disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social
Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for rejection
(Underlining supplied)." Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex "3"
and made an integral part hereof."
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T.
Collado’s [as original applicant] application is the technical description39 of the
Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division
of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the
Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show
clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within
a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the
instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such
Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification
is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they
submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners’ possession
as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would have been only
eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result
will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly
possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners’
case falters even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on
April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where
petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may
be applied to this case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands"
do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply."40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republic’s
petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of
the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land
registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor
General received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991. 41 Petitioners point
out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for
annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 12942 only on August
6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory.
Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed the
petition for annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May
6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that
the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over
the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private
land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land
registration court’s jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the
proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable
and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and
convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a
portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain.
Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural
infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are
immaterial since the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the
Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are
therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,43 as follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain,
and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant.
Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the
Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be
attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not
bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations."
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns
over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,44 which involved the registration of public
lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata
and estoppel to silence the Republic’s claim over public lands. The Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply
when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor
does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy,
and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality."
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State
of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they
filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take
steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENR’s ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENR’s
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26,
1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED
RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN
PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS
BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND
PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,
President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive
Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain
parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios
Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and Paenaan,
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under the
Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated
in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point "1" on
plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as
amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force and
effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines"
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime
between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona
fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified
recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The
certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR
to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of
twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.45 The
DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San
Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest
Occupants the DENR had conducted.46
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the
pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert
their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the
land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991
confirming petitioners’ imperfect title. Intervenors’ counsel received a copy of
the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new
trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land
registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued
by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court
from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its petition
for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a
petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure47 provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the inertvenor’s rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial
court," as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs.
Court of Appeals48 reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the
case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants
at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x
and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant
petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision
by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is
simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants.
It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it
is a means to an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the validity
of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly
possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors
did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in
question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the
Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival
groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already
claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of
the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also
spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups including
malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the rules would
blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991
of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC
Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed
on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of
his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in
Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan
Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa
and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to
Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of
Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had
acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have
received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she
was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella
Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-
in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a
barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the
time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's
father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax
receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the
realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots
1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James
Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14,
1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes
on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and
Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office
of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these
locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment
of annual taxes thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in
the philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are
hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are
found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the
United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that
the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973. 10
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to
prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed
the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights
of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at
the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior
right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and
reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining
companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and
registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already
vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly
declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The
June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims
of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of
the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining
Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha
subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's
evidence is that it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim
consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required
affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological
mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet
redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots
1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral
claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution
of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and
had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration
was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that
time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and
Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area
from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected
his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and
enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral
lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other
person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include
prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location
is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such
inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location.
By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the
public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there
is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the
public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling
Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.)
"When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant
by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with
the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of
all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the
extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before
as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a
vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the
mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues."(18
R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez,
 Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming
Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266) it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining
of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as
undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same
held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of
although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies
with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest"
between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface
rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public
and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling,
domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this
the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties
subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially
of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of
in its practical application.
law. 13

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the
agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its
miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the
Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's
rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, rights?
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was
grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the government
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and
established under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of
completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as
public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
occupying the surface.
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137,
providing as follows:
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935,
declared:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of
Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to
government established under the Constitution.
the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting
locations as of the date of their respective locations.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act,
which may be found on or under the surface.
the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or
the obtention of a patent over it. 15As the land had become the private property SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted
and Atok. are excluded and excepted from all such patents.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was
subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or
abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription.
However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at
bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and
exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support
their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964
and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession
of their predecessors-in-interest. 16The trial judge, who had the opportunity to
consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence
of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without
sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas
had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not
in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private
land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land
in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him
the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights
over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals
therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted
to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the
registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is
of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the
public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use
be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural
and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is
SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing
Cases to this Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases,
and the former is proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the Court of Land Registration
dismissing an application for registration of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of
1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and
perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property in such province is
entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole
archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute,
practically it is a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new
sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject
to the former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.
Page 212 U. S. 450
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands
occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369,
32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit
of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be
deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by
the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards
of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for
many years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for
failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the
Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one
occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the
Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the
registration of certain land. The application was granted by the court on March
4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Benguet on behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also on behalf of
the United States, those governments having taken possession of the property
for public and military purposes. The Court of First Instance found the facts and
dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed by
the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of
error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an
Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years
before the Treaty of
Page 212 U. S. 456
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his
ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and
had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the
custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier
date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and
he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners
by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in
accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from
the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he
made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems
to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet could not
be conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been
designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine government
and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership,
under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process,
however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The
government has spent some energy in maintaining that this case should have
been brought up by appeal, and not by writ of error. We are of opinion, however,
that the mode adopted was right. The proceeding for registration is likened to
bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a proceeding in
rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens Act, such as was discussed
in Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity,
and is an assertion of legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either
pigeon hole. A writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this Court,
an appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for
not applying the general rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134
U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of
Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Page 212 U. S. 457
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is suggested
that, even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the
Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet
among others from its operation. But that act deals with the acquisition of new
titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun
under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and
is entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496, of
1902, which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout
the Philippine Archipelago," § 2, and authorized in general terms applications
to be made by persons claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the
applicant does. He is entitled to registration if his claim of ownership can be
maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below -- namely,
whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the government, shortly
stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the
Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that
there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of
June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good;
that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and
so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to
respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct
that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the
Treaty of Paris, to which the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed
without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its
earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those
Page 212 U. S. 458
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in legal
theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United
States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that,
as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain
had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in
his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the
civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not
certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that
province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the
Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good.
Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow that,
in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser
when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems
to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island
of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not
have permitted and had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race
in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North
American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to
occupy the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking
over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far
as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their
country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32
Stat. 691, all the property and rights acquired there by the
Page 212 U. S. 459
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States
with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding
what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying
the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws."
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from § 12, it is hard to
believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any
person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by
"property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which
presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed
to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association --
one of the profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by § 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact
rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but
not all, Spanish conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for
not more than sixteen hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native
or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps might be
satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be
public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such
circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were
owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every
native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the
wilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the provision that
we have quoted as to the administration of the property and rights acquired by
the United States such land and property as shall be designated by the President
for military or other reservations,
Page 212 U. S. 460
as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what property
and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than
the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against
the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and
sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt
or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of
the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought
not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even
beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to
decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines
were to be dealt with as the power and inclination of the conqueror might
dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for
the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such
clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the
land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the
plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized
as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did
not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers, or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14
of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion
in Valenton v. Murciano,3 Phil. 537, while it commands viceroys and others,
when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm
those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
Page 212 U. S. 461
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of
all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The
fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of
Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited
in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the
principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was
recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to
admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which
Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that, for private
ownership, there must have been a grant by competent authority; but instantly
descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who have been in
possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty
years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when
this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the
very terms of the decree. But, it is said, the object of this law was to require the
adjustment or registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to
require everyone to get a document of title or lose his land. That purpose may
have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been applicable to
all. The regulations purport to have been made "for the adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals." (We follow the translation in the
government's brief.) It does not appear that this land ever was royal land or
wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is provided that
"interested parties not included within the two preceding
Page 212 U. S. 462
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may
legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said
lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following
manner."
This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be
owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not asking an
adjustment of the lands of which they are unlawfully enjoying the possession,
within one year, and threatens that the treasury "will reassert the ownership of
the state over the lands," and will sell at auction such part as it does not reserve.
The applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted
that the natural construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the
council of state. That report puts forward as a reason for the regulations that, in
view of the condition of almost all property in the Philippines, it is important to
fix its status by general rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period
legalizes completely all possession, recommends in two articles twenty and
thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then suggests that interested parties
not included in those articles may legalize their possession and acquire
ownership by adjustment at a certain price.

It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may
prove" possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read
every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in
any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost.

Page 212 U. S. 463

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal
decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of
adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought,
should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege.
As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is
quoted by the Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the common
law prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present
a problem not without difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition. We
have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change
of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles
now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion
that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks,
and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among
whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost
forgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed.
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE
HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of
respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their
complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null
and void. What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual
support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion
was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they
must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by
unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the government
through the appropriate public officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested
in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but
implied, that land not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be
disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war with settled principles of
constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court
makes clear that there is no legal justification for nullifying the right of
respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his
favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he
"acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in
accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was
made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing
an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga
Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26,
1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano
David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the
filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings
in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent
in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse
claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance
of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent,
the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic
Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under Section 38 of
Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on
fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the
patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible....
In this case the land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained
the public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.... The only
remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on
the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud committed by
defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land
involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747,
entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No.
V-9033, because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the
auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to
Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an
officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his
deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land since
1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different
conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration. The first error assigned
predicated an accretion having taken place, notwithstanding its rejection by
respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard what was accepted by
respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by
reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further consideration. Neither of
the other two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its holding that
authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the government to dispute
the validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a
public land patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set
forth at the outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at
this legal proposition set forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador
Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is,
furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the Government,
represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands
vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done
by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that
the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. The
cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered lands
or public lands over which vested rights have been acquired but notwithstanding
such fact the Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants."5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is
invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that dates back
to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908 decision. As was there categorically
stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed.
Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the
defendant can not question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government."7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals.8 Bereft as petitioners were of the right of
ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot,
in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally
issued." 10 The second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection,
of the well-known distinction in public law between the government authority
possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate
to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading
of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with
reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity,
it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound
did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such
two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary
to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a
recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a case of
Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal
feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a
manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which was adopted by the
present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather
than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much
more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v.
Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated
in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in these words: "We having
acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or
in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that
all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us
according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to
us or to our viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking
into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their
probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary
for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving
them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to
the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power
of legislation is vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that
character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was
found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation,
its being correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. 21What was held in
Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus: "There
being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by
the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public
domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." 24 It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent restatement of the
doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant,
having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No.
463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the
same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public
domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.

3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of
Justice Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the
sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection
with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor,
the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This
is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered
thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject
to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should
be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter
the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners
cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an
attitude, they railed to accord deference to controlling precedents. As far back
as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings
under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the
Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both
take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration
issued is conclusive and final." 30Such a view has been followed since
then. 31 The latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing
excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of
a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect
of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise
in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years." 33 It is quite
apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.
G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BATAAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and restated
by the petitioners in their petition are accurate:
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales
Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the
parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly
described and bounded as follows:
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )
Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the
defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate
of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc.,
for the two parcels of land above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1,
Sgs-2409, while Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot
2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach Development
Corporation I
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action
for reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062. 2
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds:
1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all administrative
remedies before filing the case in court;
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become
indefeasible and imprescriptible;
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the
Solicitor General and not by the Director of Lands. 3
The then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the complaint in the Order
of October 7, 1977,4 adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought to
be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands
Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the
land.
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11, 1977 and
filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 .5 The Solicitor General then
moved for an extension of thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal
and to pay the docket fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be followed
by another motion for extension filed by the Solicitor General, resulting in the
Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another extension of fifteen days from
December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension lapsed, instead of
an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals was
filed.
According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and in
a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss, the
correctness of its decision must be decided in the assumed truth and accuracy
of the allegations of the complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands in
question are forest lands; hence, inalienable.
b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite clear and
positive evidence to the contrary.
c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not
initiated by the Director of Lands.
d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for alleged
failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. 6
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set aside the
Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No.
4062, and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the
answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the
action for reversion.
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefore. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates
the premises for granting a review:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court; and
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower
court as to call for supervision .7
We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance with grave
abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for
reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause
of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion,
of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the
Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the
lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic's complaint'
was never denied specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein)
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.
If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become
moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.10
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands to the dominion of the State.11 Thus, before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain. 12
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer
any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of
the public forest. 13
The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land
is by remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues
involved.
Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient
administration of justice is ensured. However, the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.14They must
lead to the proper and just determination of litigation, without tying the hands
of the law or making it indifferent to realities.1âwphi1

Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available

only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. 15 The long line of decisions denying the petition for
certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in instances where
the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the instances when certiorari was
given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare
and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of
justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, 16 or when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 17

We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give
due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of public
concern which is the disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less than the
Constitution protects its policy.

We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the appellate

court, in the absence of a clear showing that the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of substance in a manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that the
respondent Court has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been committed by the respondent
court. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of

Appeals is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF
CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C.
REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS,
INC., respondents.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application
for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral
Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950
hectares. The land was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province
of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act
No. 236.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and
the Director of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua.1 In due course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on
December 11, 1961 against the whole world except the oppositors.
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a
compromise agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted
by their respective counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had
since died), the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs
of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under
the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as applicants)
renounced their claims and ceded —
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement,
adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval,
but out of this area, 1,500 hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their
counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of
the areas respectively allocated to them, all the parties also mutually waived and
renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454 of the Santiago
Cadastre.
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the
compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken
the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as
being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. The Solicitor General contends that —
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions
for registration;
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had
legal authority to enter into the compromise agreement;
3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of
the compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part
therein;
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the
compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that
drew his attention to the "patently erroneous decision" and requested him to
take immediate remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's
arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is
not. According to them, as pointed out in the application for registration, the
private character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to
wit:
1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest;
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of
Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the
effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and
appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered
under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by Don
Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act)
presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by the court,
distinguishing it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the
presumption is always that the land involved belongs to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that
all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The
applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim;
he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than
factual evidence of possession and title. 5
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and
presented by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the
large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification
of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the
effect that according to the Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of
Isabela issued in 1896, the property in question was registered under the
Spanish system of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua.
But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document,
the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it not
being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not
constituting primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document
on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of
land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not
pertaining to the public domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the
character of the land as private which the applicant has the obligation of
establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land
Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for
registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is
not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to
establish a proper title for official recognition.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely
on the compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement
included private persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their
ownership over the land subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the
land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who had presented
nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What was
done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties
taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted
any substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing
but the agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the
land.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the
compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of
title required of the private respondents.

As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should

be pointed out that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode
of acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the
inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and second, actual, public,
adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later
reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these
conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as
anything more than prima facie evidence of possession. 7

Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after
all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this
is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal,
acting as agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding
until they are actually received by the Solicitor General." 8

It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it
must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside.
Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the
Registration Court so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to
establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the property.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is

ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of
the petition is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further
appropriate proceedings therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and
thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law may warrant. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129401 February 2, 2001 '3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from OCT No. P-
28131 the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte is ordered to issue 8
new title to the said portion in the name of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin
FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of
Ortega;
JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA,
MARIA S. TEUDER, MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA
LICARDO, FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE '4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay jointly and
MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE severally to [petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
ALVAREZ-GONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS
ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-DABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. (P4,784,846.00) as rentals due from 1979 to the present, plus accrued
POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-interest of interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease Contract between NDC and PASAR.
JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate, petitioners, (Exhibit 54)
vs.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN
'5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also ordered to pay
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED
jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHTY
SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION, LEPANTO
SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS AND
CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE
SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2,086,398.60) as accrued rentals of PHILPHOS
FERTIUZER CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF
from 1979 to present, plus the accrued interest for non-payment pursuant
DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents.
to paragraph 2 of the same Lease Contract cited above;

The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner:

'6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners]
P200,000.00 as indemnity for the value of the ancestral home;
"1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development
Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate government and private sector
'7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners]
efforts for a planned development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in
the sum of P250,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's fees and the further
the [P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in the successful
sum of P50,000.00 as expenses for litigation;
prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction No. 962 authorized LSBDA
to acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial
Development Estate (LIDE) by way of negotiated sales with the landowners. '8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit down together
and discuss the possibility of a compromise agreement on how the
improvements introduced on the landholding subject of the present suit
"2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 057
should be disposed of and for the parties to submit to this Court a joint
SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464,920 square meters, located at Barangay
manifestation relative thereto. In the absence of any such compromise
Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte, covered under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579,
agreement, such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to Article 449
3425, 1292 and 4251 under the name of said vendor.1âwphi1.nêt
of the New Civil Code.

"3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA fired a Miscellaneous Sales

'Costs against [respondents].
Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together with other
lots acquired by LSBDA with an aggregate area of '442,7508 square meters.'
'SO ORDERED.'"4
"4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in the name of [Respondent] Ruling of the Court of Appeals
LSBDA on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was
transcribed in the Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12,
Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be privately owned are
1983 in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14, 1989, LSBDA
assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-respondent] National presumed to be part of the public domain, the CA held that, first, there was no
Development Company (NOC) as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate competent evidence to prove that the property in question was private in
character. Second, possession thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen into
of Title "vas issued on March 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. The subject property was ownership, absent any showing that the land had been classified as
leased to [Respondents] Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining alienable. Third, the property had been untitled before the issuance of the
Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were guilty
Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation
(PHILPHOS) and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO). of laches, because they had failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their
title, if they had any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on "the part of
LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the property.
"5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by
judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 12) of Ormoc City, a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals Hence, this Petition.5
and damages against the above-named [respondents] which complaint was
later on amended on May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed their respective The Issues
Answers. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:6
'WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners] and against
[respondents].
"A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the Late Joaquin
Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void.
'1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14, 1980 in favor of
LSBDA, (Exhibit PP and 25) conveying the subject property to said
LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio; "B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an
Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid.

'2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the owner in fee
simple of the 735,333 square meters real property subject of the present
action and defendant NDC is ordered to segregate the same area from OCT
P-28131 and CONVEY the same to the Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
"C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches.
"D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance
and the damages awarded by the trial court."
In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity of LSBDA's title.
In resolving this issue, it will also ascertain whether, before the issuance of the
title, the land was private or public.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of LSBDA
Petitioners argue that LSBDA's title to 73 hectares of the 402- hectare Leyte
Industrial Development Estate was void, having allegedly been obtained from
Calixtra Yap who had no right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to the
disputed property by acquisitive prescription, because they and their
predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty
years.7 Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings, petitioners further
claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the permission of the trial
court.
Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate court maintain that
petitioners have not shown that the land had previously been classified as
alienable and disposable. Absent such classification, they argue that possession
of it, no matter how long, could not ripen into ownership.
We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First, there was no showing
that the land had been classified as alienable before the title was issued to
LSBDA; hence, petitioners could not have become owners thereof through
acquisitive prescription. Second, petitioners' challenge to LSBDA's title cannot
be granted, because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a collateral
attack, which is not allowed by law.
Public Character of the Land
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.8 In Menguito v. Republic,9 the Court held that "[u]nless
public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
'occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title.' To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable."
A person in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of a public
land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect title thereto. That title may
be the subject of judicial confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the Public
Land Act, which provides:
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall he entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter."
Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073,10 paragraph "b" of the
aforecited provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. The provision reads:
"SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII,
of the Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945."
It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed
property. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive
prescription, they fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land had
previously been classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion
of the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was "without factual
basis."11 Instead, they maintain that the private character of the land was
evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial
court and even the Supreme Court.12
Petitioners' arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive
proofs of ownership, let alone of the private character of the land. At best, they
are merely "indicia of a claim of ownership."13 In Spouses Palomo v. CA,14 the
Court also rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent any
showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified as alienable.
Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property, which Joaquin
Ortega and several vendors executed, do not prove that the land was private in
character. The question remains: What was the character of the land when
Ortega purchased it? Indeed, a vendee acquires only those rights belonging to
the vendor. But petitioners failed to show that, at the time, the vendors were
already its owners, or that the land was already classified as alienable.
Also misplaced is petitioners' reliance on Ortega v. CA,15 in which the Supreme
Court allegedly recognized the private character of the disputed property .In that
case, the sole issue was "whether the respondent judge x x x acted in excess of
jurisdiction when he converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an action for quieting
of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax declaration of a
parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the legal wife, who
are the legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Joaquin Ortega."16 The Court did not at all make any ruling that the
property had been classified as alienable.
In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an action quasi in
rem that was binding only between the parties.17 The present respondents as
well as the Bureau of Lands, which subsequently declared that the land was
public, are not bound by that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein.
While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly recognizing the
private character of the disputed property, they make no claim that these cases
directly involve the classification of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a
party thereto.
Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as alienable is on
the claimant.18 In the present case, petitioners failed to discharge this burden.
Hence, their possession of the disputed property, however long, cannot ripen
into ownership.
LSBDA's Title
Equally unmeritorious is the argument of petitioners that the title of LSBDA is
void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title was derived from Calixtra Yap,
who was allegedly not the owner of the property. Petitioners assume that
LSBDA, having acquired the rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her
imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid
of factual or legal basis.
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not on the
conveyance made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 issued
by the director of the Bureau of Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had filed an
application for patent, the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and
found that the land was part of the public domain. After compliance with the
notice and publication requirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a public
auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.19
Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the
land was public, because the Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor
stipulated that "the seller is the absolute owner in fee simple of the x x x
described property."20 It is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin
with, the power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to private
entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the
reclassification of the property. Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was
made by Yap as seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised not by
petitioners but by LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved.
Conclusion
In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to stand on. Absent
any showing that the land has been classified as alienable, their possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot ripen into ownership. In other words,
they have not become owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDA's
title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from Yap. Finally,
petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge a certificate of title that has
already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap, they should seek
redress, not in these proceedings, but in a proper action in accordance with law.

In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yap's conveyance demonstrated its
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
position that the disputed land was part of the public domain. That this was so
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt
can be inferred from LSBDA's subsequent application for a Miscellaneous
Sales Patent and, in a public auction, its purchase of the property from the
Bureau of Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which she
did not have.

Collateral Attack

There is another reason for denying the present Petition. Petitioners insist that
they "are not seeking the re-opening of a decree under the Torrens system."
Supposedly, they are only "praying for the segregation of 735,333 square meters
of land, or 73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-28131 issued to
LSBDA."21 This disputation is mere quibbling over words, plain and simple.

Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the modification of

LSBDA's OCT, which allegedly encompassed even a parcel of land allegedly
belonging to them. Hence, the present suit, purportedly filed for the "recovery
of real property and damages," is tantamount to a collateral attack not
sanctioned by law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree,
expressly provides:

"SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -- A certificate of title

shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."

It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter
be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles
would be lost.22

Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of
one year from the time of its registration and issuance.23 Section 32 of PD 1529
provides that "[u]pon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the
fraud." Although LSBDA's title was registered in 1983, petitioners filed the
amended Complaint only in 1990.

Reconveyance

Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them.
This cannot be allowed. Considering that the land was public before the
Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing
to ask for the reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is an
action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor
General, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which reads as
follows:

"SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the [Republic] of the Philippines."

Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the entire case of
petitioners rest on the theory that they have acquired the property by acquisitive
prescription; and that Yap, without any right or authority, sold the same to
LSBDA.
G.R. No. 73974 May 31, 1995
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Represented by the Director of
Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON, MANUEL G. ATIENZA,
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (Lucena Branch) and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the
decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court reversing the decision of the
former Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II at Lucena City 2 which
annulled Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13840 and Free Patent (FP)
No. 324198 issued to Manuel Atienza for a 17-hectare piece of land which
turned out to be within the forest zone in Pagbilao, Quezon.
On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a parcel of land
located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, with an area of 172,028 square
meters. By virtue of such award, he was issued on May 5, 1967, OCT No. P-
13840.
Sometime in 1968, an investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in
connection with alleged land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It appeared that
some of the free patents, including that of Atienza's, were fraudulently acquired.
Thus, on March 19, 1970, a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II,
against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying their applications
for free patent, the survey plans, and other documents pertinent to said
applications.
In its decision dated October 4, 1972, the court acquitted the accused of the
crime charged but, finding that the land covered by the application for free
patent of private respondent was within the forest zone, declared as null and
void OCT No. P-13840 in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of
Quezon to cancel the same.
Meanwhile, before the promulgation of said decision, or on May 10, 1972, then
Acting Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco filed for the petitioner a
complaint against Atienza, the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and the Rural Bank
of Sariaya, which was later dropped as defendant and, in an amended complaint,
substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines as actual mortgagee of
the subject parcel of land. Docketed as Civil Case No. 7555, the complaint
prayed for the declaration of nullity of FP No. 324198 and OCT No. P-13840.
In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no longer within
the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for
free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land "was already alienable and
disposable public agricultural land." Since the subject land was a very small
portion of Lot 5139 of the Pagbilao Cadastre, an area which had been declared
disposable public land by the cadastral court on March 9, 1932 in Cadastral
Case No. 76 entitled "El Govierno Filipino de las Islas Filipinas contra Jose
Abastillas, et al., G.L.R.O. cadastral Record No. 1124," he also averred that the
Director of Lands had given due course to free and homestead patent
applications of claimants to Lot 5139. He further alleged that through a certain
Sergio Castillo, he had been in possession of the land since the Japanese
occupation, cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon. The DBP,
after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title, even granted him
a loan with the subject property as collateral. Finally, he stated that his acquittal
in the criminal case proved that he committed no fraud in his application for
free patent.
On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a decision with the categorical
finding based on "solid evidence" that "the land in question was found definitely
within the forest zone denominated as Project 21-A."
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, (J)udgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring as null and void Original Certificate of Title No. P-13840 in the
name of defendant Manuel G. Atienza, as well as Free Patent No. V-324198;
(b) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the Development Bank of
the Philippines, Lucena City Branch, the sum of P15,053.97, and all interests
due thereon; and
(c) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in question was not within the
unclassified public forest land and therefore alienable land of the public domain.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court relied only on the arguments he raised
since petitioner had not filed any brief, and arrived at the conclusion that "(t)he
litigated land is part of public land alienable and disposable for homestead and
[F]ree Patent." On December 27, 1985, the appellate court set aside the lower
court's decision, declared as valid and subsisting Atienza's OCT, and dismissed
the cross-claim of the DBP.
After receiving a copy of said decision, Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili informed the Director of Lands of the adverse decision of the appellate
court, which noted that no appellee's brief had been filed in said court. Agcaoili
also stated that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been furnished
with the appellant's brief; that the Bureau of Lands received notice of hearing
of the record on appeal filed by the appellant but the OSG had not been informed
of the "action taken thereon;" that since the Bureau of Lands had been furnished
directly with relevant pleadings and orders, the same office should "take
immediate appropriate action on the decision;" and that it may file a motion for
reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from January 6, 1986, the date of
receipt by the OSG of the copy of the decision sought to be appealed.
On January 28, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file
motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated February 12,
1986. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was likewise
denied.
The instant petition for review on certiorari raises the following arguments: (a)
petitioner was denied due process and fair play when Atienza did not furnish it
with a copy of his appellant's brief before the then Intermediate Appellate Court
thereby depriving it of the opportunity to rebut his assertions which later
became the sole basis of the assailed decision of December 27, 1985; (b) the
appellate court erred in holding that the land in question is part of the alienable
and disposable public land in complete disregard of the trial court's finding that
it forms part of the unclassified public forest zone; and (c) the appellate court
erred in declaring that the land in question could be alienated and disposed of
in favor of Atienza.
We find for the petitioner.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal,
particularly if the appeal is meritorious. 3 Respect for the appellant's right,
however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellee's similar
rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules
of Court. 4
Of paramount importance is the duty of an appellant to serve a copy of his brief
upon the appellee with proof of service thereof. 5 This procedural requirement
is consonant with Section 2 of Rule 13, which mandates that all pleadings and
papers "shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected
thereby." The importance of serving copies of the brief upon the adverse party
is underscored in Mozar v. Court of Appeals, 6 where the Court held that the
appellees "should have been given an opportunity to file their appellee's brief
in the Court of Appeals if only to emphasize the necessity of due process."
In this case, however, the Court of Appeals, oblivious of the fact that this case
involves public lands requiring as it does the exercise of extraordinary caution
lest said lands be dissipated and erroneously alienated to undeserving or
unqualified private individuals, decided the appeal without hearing the
government's side.
Atienza avers that he furnished Atty. Francisco Torres, a lawyer in the Bureau
of Lands and designated special attorney for the Office of the Solicitor General,
with two copies of the appellant's brief, thereby implying that it was not his fault
that petitioner failed to file its appellee's brief.
Such an assertion betrays a lack of comprehension of the role of the Solicitor
General as government counsel or of the OSG as the government's "law
office." 7 Only the Solicitor General, as the lawyer of the government, can bring
or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore,
actions filed in the name of the Republic, if not initiated by the Solicitor
General, will be summarily dismissed. 8 Specifically, he is empowered to
represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings, 9 such
as, an action for cancellation of title and for reversion of a homestead to the
government. 10 Hence, he is entitled to be furnished with copies of all court
orders, notices and decisions. Consequently, service of decisions on the
Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period for
filing appeals and for finality of decisions. His representative, who may be a
lawyer from the Bureau of Lands, has no legal authority to decide whether or
not an appeal should be made. 11
Service of the appellant's brief on Atty. Torres was no service at all upon the
Solicitor General. It may be argued that Atty. Torres could have transmitted one
of the two copies of appellant's brief upon the Solicitor General, but such
omission does not excuse Atienza's failure to serve a copy of his brief directly
on the Solicitor General.
On the part of the appellate court, its decision based solely on, and even quoting
verbatim from, the appellant's brief was certainly arrived at in grave abuse of
discretion. It denied appellee (petitioner herein) of the opportunity to be heard
and to rebut Atienza's allegations, in rank disregard of its right to due process.
Such violation of due process could have been rectified with the granting of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the appellate court, 12 but even the
door to this recourse was slammed by the appellate court with the denial of
petitioner's motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 12, 1986, which ruling erroneously applied
the Habaluyas doctrine. 13
Atienza's claim is rooted in the March 9, 1932 decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Tayabas in Cadastral Case No. 76, which was not given much
weight by the court a quo, and for good reasons.
Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to present proof that
he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants who answered the
petition filed by the then Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings.
The document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy, indicated the
claimants simply as "Jose Abastillas et al." In support of that decision, Atienza
presented a certification purportedly issued by someone from the Technical
Reference Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of Lands,
stating that "Lot 5886 is a portion of Lot 5139 Pagbilao Cadastre," which
evidence is, however, directly controverted by the sketch plan showing that the
land in controversy is actually outside the alienable and disposable public lands,
although part of Lot 5139.
The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system.
In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 23 we ruled that the indefeasibility
of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by
means of fraud. The "fraud" contemplated by the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is
actual and extrinsic, that is, "an intentional omission of fact required by
law," 24 which in the case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state
that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest
lands.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the decision of the court a quo dated July 27, 1981, is
REINSTATED.

Such denial notwithstanding, petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration.

Considering the clear allegations thereunder, the appellate court would have
done well, in the interest of justice, not to blindly adhere to technical rules of
procedure by dismissing outright said motion. As we declared in Villareal v.
Court of Appeals: 14

. . . The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are afforded
a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and air their side. The essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling taken. (Emphasis
supplied)

In view of the foregoing and the long-standing procedural rule that this Court
may review the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals in the event that they
may be contrary to those of the trial court, 15 in order to attain substantial justice,
the Court now reviews the facts of the case.

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be
privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral
or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership
unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 16

In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands of the public
domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources 17 (now the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources). 18 Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of the
President. 19 Courts have no authority to do so. 20

Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the

burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public
domain lies upon the private claimant 21 who, in this case, is Atienza. The
records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and absolute
evidence 22 to overcome said presumption and to support his claim.
G.R. No. 128017 January 20, 1999 Map No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951'." 1 and, hence, not capable of
private appropriation and occupation. 2
RAMON ITURALDE, petitioner,
vs. In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that "Forest land, like
ALFREDO FALCASANTOS, respondent. mineral timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private
ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until
On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the heirs of. Pedro
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition." 3
Mana-ay a parcel of land located at Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan Province, with
an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less, more particularly described as follows:
In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: "Thus,
before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
A parcel of land, situated at Bañas, Lantawan Basilan. Bounded on the North
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
by property of Alejandro; Marso; on the East by property of Ramon Bacor;
positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect
on the South by property at Atty. Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property
titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released
of Librada Guerrero. Containing an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less.
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain." 4
However, on November 3, 1986, respondent applied with the Bureau of Lands
in Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to him of the same parcel of land
Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land
under free patent. On November 17, 1986, petitioner filed a protest to such
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. " 5
application.

On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving
respondent a period of one hundred twenty (120) days to exercise the right to
repurchase the land by reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he incurred in the
purchase of the property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's
application for free patent.
On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order declaring that
respondent had waived his right of repurchase, and rejected his application for
free patent for lack of interest, and allowed petitioner to file a public land
application for the subject land.
On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to vacate the land
in question, but respondent refused.
And the rule is "Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership."6
What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in question
by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land. Consequently, he
cannot lawfully claim to be the owner of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the Courts hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the complaint of
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, in Civil Case No.
441-63.
No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Basilan
province, a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with
preliminary injunction of the subject parcel of land.

In Answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land occupied by him
belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and that he had introduced
improvements thereon such as coconut and other fruit trees.

After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court rendered decision
declaring petitioner the owner and the possessor of the subject parcel of land
with all the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Bañas,
municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares,
and ordering respondent to vacate the land in question, to pay petitioner the
amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee, the amount of five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, the three hundred pesos
(P300.00) as judicial cost.

In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of
Appeals.

On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision reversing the
appealed decision, and entering a new judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint without prejudice to any action that petitioner may take if the subject
land was declassified from forest land to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.

Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial
court's decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint because when the
Director of Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land application for said
property, it was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of
the public domain.

We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that "the evidence is
unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C.
G.R. No. 163766 June 22, 2006 8. That for Lot 3138-A the applicant hereby prays for the benefit granted under
the Land Registration Act and/or under the benefits provided for by P.D. No.
1529, as applicant and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
continuous, and peaceful occupation and possession of the said land since time
vs.
immemorial in [the] concept of true owners and [adverse] to the whole world;
CANDY MAKER, INC., as represented by its President, ONG YEE
x x x11
SEE,* Respondent

On March 27, 2000, the MTC issued an Order12 admitting the Amended
At bar is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
Application and resetting the initial hearing to June 23, 2000. However, upon
set aside the May 21, 2004 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
the requests of the LRA for the timely publication of the Notice of Initial
CV No. 73287, which affirmed in toto the October 12, 2001 Decision 2 of the
Hearing in the Official Gazette,13 the court moved the hearing date to September
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay, Rizal in Land Registration Case No.
22, 2000,14 then on January 26, 200115 and until finally, to June 15, 2001.16
99-0031 declaring respondent the owner of the parcels of land designated as
Lots 3138-A and 3138-B in Plan CSD. 04-018302, Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its
Opposition17 to the Amended Application in which it alleged that the lot subject
Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase Lot No. 3138 Cad.
of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is
688 of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, a parcel of land located below the
considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its jurisdiction
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. According to the
Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan Floodway,
LLDA, the projection of Lot No. 3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-04-018302 in its
and on the southeast by a legal easement.
topographic map based on the Memorandum18 of Engineer Christopher
Pedrezuela of the Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA
On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and indicated that it is "located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50
signed a Subdivision Plan of the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was meters referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water" and under
subdivided into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A with an area of 10,971 square meters, Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the property is a public land which forms part
and Lot No. 3138-B with an area of 239 square meters.3 The technical of the bed of the Laguna Lake. This Memorandum was appended to the
description of Lot No. 3138 was also prepared by Fernandez, and was approved application.
by the Regional Technical Director of the Bureau of Lands on April 14, 1998. 4
At the hearing conducted on August 31, 2001, the applicant marked in evidence
On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a the complementary copies of the Official Gazette and the People’s Tonight as
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. 5 The buyer declared Lot Exhibits "E-1" and "F-1," respectively.19
No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999 under Tax Declaration Nos. 004-18929,
004-18930 and 004-18931.6
Except as to the LLDA and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which
was represented by the duly deputized provincial prosecutor, 20 the court, upon
On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an application with the motion of the applicant, issued an Order of general default. 21
MTC of Taytay, Rizal, for the registration of its alleged title over Lot No. 3138-
A and Lot No. 3138-B under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
The applicant presented as witnesses its Treasurer, Fernando Co Siy, and
Antonio Cruz, one of the vendees.
Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Order7 on June 18, 1999 directing the
applicant to cause the publication of the notice of initial hearing and for the
Cruz testified that his grandparents owned the property,22 and after their demise,
Deputy Sheriff to post the same. The Administrator of the Land Registration
his parents, the spouses Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio Cruz, inherited
Authority (LRA) and the Directors of the Land Management Bureau (LMB)
the lot;23 he and his father had cultivated the property since 1937, planting palay
and Forest Management Bureau (FMB) were also instructed to submit their
during the rainy season and vegetables during the dry season; his father paid the
respective reports on the status of the parcels of land before the initial hearing
realty taxes on the property,24 and he (Cruz) continued paying the taxes after his
scheduled on October 29, 1999.
father’s death.25 Cruz insisted that he was the rightful claimant and owner of the
property.
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Antipolo City filed on August 18, 1999 his Report8 declaring that "[t]he land
Sometime in the 1980s, Apolonio Cruz executed an extrajudicial deed of
falls within the Alienable and Disposable Zone, under Land Classification
partition in which the property was adjudicated to Antonio Cruz and his sisters,
Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927"
Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five (5) other siblings who were
and that the property is the subject of CENRO Case No. 520(97) entitled
given other properties as their shares.26 He did not know why his ancestors
Perpetua San Jose v. Almario Cruz. On the other hand, the LRA, in its
failed to have the property titled under the Torrens system of registration. 27 He
September 21, 1999 Report,9 recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B on
left the Philippines and stayed in Saudi Arabia from 1973 to 1983.28Aside from
the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence,
this, he hired the services of an "upahan" to cultivate the property.29 The
inalienable and indisposable.
property is about 3 kilometers from the Laguna de Bay, and is usually flooded
when it rains.30
On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
approved Resolution No. 113, Series of 1993, providing that untitled shoreland
Fernando Co Siy testified that the applicant acquired Lot No. 3138 from siblings
areas may be leased subject to conditions enumerated therein.
Antonio, Eladia and Felisa,31 who had possessed it since 1945;32 that after
paying the real estate taxes due thereon,33 it caused the survey of the lot;34 that
The applicant filed its Amended Application10 on December 15, 1999 for the possession thereof has been peaceful35 and none of the former owners claims
confirmation of its alleged title on Lot No. 3138, alleging therein that: any right against it;36neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest
received information from any government agency that the lot is a public
land;37 the subject lot is 3 kms. away from Laguna de Bay,38 above its elevation
1. x x x the applicant is the President of CANDYMAKER[,] INC. and registered
and that of the nearby road;39 the property is habitable40 and was utilized as a
owner of a parcel of land located at Panghulo Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal riceland at the time it was sold by the former owners; 41 and that he was aware
with an area of TEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE that a legal easement is affecting the lot and is willing to annotate it in the land
(10,971) square meters and as fully described and bounded under Lot 3138-A
title.42
plan CSD-04-018302[,] copy of which and the corresponding technical
descriptions are hereto attached to form parts hereof;
On cross-examination by the LLDA counsel, Siy admitted that his knowledge
as to the distance of the lot with respect to the Laguna de Bay came from
xxxx "somebody residing in Taytay" and also from an adjacent owner of the lot;43 that
the lot is submerged in water since there is no land fill yet; 44 and that no
improvements had been introduced to the property.45
The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels of land in order to
determine its exact elevation.46 On September 14, 2001, a Survey Team of the
Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA, composed of Ramon D.
Magalonga, Virgilio M. Polanco, and Renato Q. Medenilla, conducted an actual
ground survey of the property. The team used a total station and digital survey
instrument to measure the elevation of the ground in reference to the elevation
of the lake water. A representative of the applicant witnessed the survey. The
team found that the lot is below the prescribed elevation of 12.50 m. and thus
part of the bed of the lake; as such, it could not be titled to the applicant. The
team also reported that the property is adjacent to the highway from the
Manggahan Floodway to Angono, Rizal. The LLDA moved that the application
be withdrawn, appending thereto a copy of the Survey Report. 47
The LLDA did not offer any testimonial and documentary evidence and agreed
to submit the case for decision based on its Opposition.
On October 12, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision granting the application for
registration over the lots. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the court hereby rendered judgment
confirming title of the applicants over the real property denominated as Lot
3138-A Csd-04-018302 of Cad-688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre; Lot 3138-B
Csd-04-018302 of Cad 688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.48
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the application for registration since the actual copies of the
Official Gazette (O.G.) where the notice of hearing was published were not
adduced in evidence; the applicant likewise failed to establish exclusive
ownership over the subject property in the manner prescribed by law. The
petitioner argued further that the requirements of Section 23, par. 1 of P.D. No.
1529, 49 as amended, are mandatory and jurisdictional, and that failure to
observe such requirements has a fatal effect on the whole proceedings. Citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals50 and Register of Deeds of
Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170,51 the Republic averred that a mere
certificate of publication is inadequate proof of the jurisdictional fact of
publication because the actual copies of the O.G. must be presented at the initial
hearing of the case. Moreover, witnesses were not presented to prove specific
acts to show that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
exclusive, open, continuous, and adverse possession of the subject lots in the
concept of the owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in accordance with Sec. 14,
par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529.52 It noted that the testimonies of the applicant’s
witnesses are more of conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
ownership. Other than the general statement that they planted rice and
vegetables on the subject lots, their possession could properly be characterized
as mere casual cultivation since they failed to account for its exclusive
utilization since 1945 or earlier. After stressing that tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership, it concluded that the subject lots rightfully
belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine.53
The applicant averred in its Appellee’s Brief54 that it had marked in evidence
the actual copy of the O.G. where the notice of initial hearing was published; in
fact, the MTC Decision stated that the copy of the O.G. containing the notice
was referred to as Exhibit "E-1." Moreover, Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. 1529 is
inapplicable since it speaks of possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Instead, par. 4 of the same
section55 should govern because the subject parcels of land are lands of private
ownership, having being acquired through purchase from its predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, inherited the same from their parents. It pointed out that
there were no adverse claims of interest or right by other private persons and
even government agencies like the Province of Rizal. Lastly, while tax
declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are
nonetheless prima facie evidence of possession.
On May 21, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment which dismissed the
appeal and affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC,56 holding that the copy of
the O.G., where the notice was published, was marked as Exhibit "E-1" during
the initial hearing. On the issue of ownership over the subject lots, the CA
upheld the applicant’s claim that the parcels of land were alienable and not part
of the public domain, and that it had adduced preponderant evidence to prove
that its predecessors had been tilling the land since 1937, during which palay
and vegetables were planted. In fact, before the lots were purchased, the
applicant verified their ownership with the assessor’s office, and thereafter
caused the property to be surveyed; after the lots were acquired in 1999 and a
survey was caused by the applicant, no adverse claims were filed by third
persons. Further, the CA ruled that tax declarations or tax receipts are good
indicia of possession in the concept of the owner, which constitute at least
positive and strong indication that the taxpayer concerned has made a claim
either to the title or to the possession of the property.
The Republic, now petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on the
following issues:
A. WHETHER THE LAND IN QUESTION MAYBE THE SUBJECT OF
REGISTRATION.
B. WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE RES CONSIDERING ITS INALIENABLE CHARACTER.
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COMPLIED WITH THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ON POSSESSION AS MANDATED BY
SECTION 14 OF P.D. NO. 1529.57
Petitioner asserts that the Engineer’s Survey Report 58 and the Laguna de Bay
Shoreland Survey59 both show that Lot No. 3138-A is located below the
reglementary lake elevation, hence, forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists
that the property belongs to the public domain as classified under Article 502
of the Civil Code.60 Citing the ruling of this Court in Bernardo v.
Tiamson,61 petitioner avers that the subject lot is incapable of private
appropriation since it is a public land owned by the State under the Regalian
doctrine. On this premise, petitioner avers that the MTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and as a consequence, its decision is null
and void.
Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence
to warrant the registration of the property in its name as owner. The testimonies
of the two witnesses only proved that the possession of the land may be
characterized as mere casual cultivation; they failed to prove that its
predecessors occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously
and adversely in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Engineer’s Survey Report and the
Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey have no probative value because they were
neither offered nor admitted in evidence by the MTC. It points out that
petitioner failed to invoke these reports in the appellate court.
It was only when the petition was filed with this Court that the respondent
learned of its existence. Petitioner’s reliance on the reports/survey is merely an
afterthought. The case of Bernardo v. Tiamson is irrelevant because the factual
issues are different from those of this case.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation 62 with this Court,
appending thereto the report63 conducted by the survey team of the LLDA
Engineering and Construction Division on April 12, 2005. It stated that the
10,971 sq m property subject of the case is below the 12.5 elevation, and that
the profile distance of the property from the actual lake waters is about 900 m.
to 1 km.
The issues in this case are the following: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction
over the amended application; (2) whether the property subject of the amended
application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if so, (3)
whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its
ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
The petition is meritorious.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over
respondent’s application for registration since a copy of the O.G. containing the
notice of hearing was marked and adduced in evidence as Exhibit "E-1." The
representative of the OSG was present during the hearing and interposed his
objection thereto.
On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the property subject of
this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land until July
18, 1966. However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registerable title
over the property.
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942,
reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, nay apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting the phrase
"for at least thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945;" thus:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, and occupation
by the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. —The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.64
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption
is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State.65 Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.66 The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does
not operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and
occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State.67
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the
government, whether express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the State.68 The rationale for the period "since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945" lies in the presumption that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest
thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open and notorious
possession.
A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof through acquisitive
prescription. In Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals,69 the Court declared that:
x x x [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that ‘(o)wnership and other
real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years,’ this provision of law must be read in
conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ‘x x x
(o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law.’ Hence, a prescriptive title to real
estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for
a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y
buena fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession
of the property through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership
or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right.70
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator
or a legislative act or statute.71 Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable
and disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence
to show the real character of the land subject of the application.72
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land.73Actual possession consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.74 A mere casual cultivation of portions
of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership; such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State.75
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property is alienable
agricultural land. Romeo Cadano of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per
L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927."76 However, under
R.A. No. 4850 which was approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and below
the maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands
which form part of the bed of said lake. Such lands denominated as lakeshore
areas are linear strips of open space designed to separate incompatible element
or uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying and defining
development areas or zone. Such areas of the lake with an approximate total
area of 14,000 hectares form a strip of the lakebed along its shores alternately
submerged or exposed by the annual rising and lowering of the lake water. They
have environmental ecological significance and actual potential economic
benefits.
Under Section 1 of the law, the national policy of the State is to promote and
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and
the surrounding provinces, cities and towns within the context of the national
and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to
carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation
of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore
town of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake
for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like, created
deep concern on the part of the Government and the general public over the
environmental impact of such development, on the water quality and ecology
of the lake and its related river systems. The inflow of polluted water from the
Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
around the lake and the increasing urbanization have induced the deterioration
of the lake, and that water quality studies have shown that the lake will
deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. The floods in the
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns are also influenced by the
hydraulic system of the Laguna de Bay, and any scheme of controlling the
floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems.
This prompted then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue on October 17, 1978
P.D. 813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850. Under Section 6 of the law, the LLDA
is empowered to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
effectively carry out the policies and programs therein provided including the
policies and projects of the LLDA, subject to the approval of the National
Economic Development Authority.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE.
The Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal is DIRECTED to dismiss the
application for registration of respondent Candymaker, Inc. in Land
Registration Case No. 99-0031. No costs.

In 1996, the Board of Directors of LLDA approved Resolution No. 113, series
of 1996 relating to the Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval of the
Work and Financial Plan for its operationalization in the Laguna de Bay Basin.
Section 5 of the Resolution provides that the LLDA as a matter of policy is to
maintain all shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone
in consonance with the LLDA policies, plans programs for the improvement of
the water quality and pollution and conservation of the water resources of the
Laguna de Bay.

As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of

the LLDA based on the ocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as
the Memorandum of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela, the property is located
below the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the bed of the Laguna
de Bay, and, as such, is public land. Although the Report and Memorandum
were not offered as evidence in the MTC, the respondent admitted in its
Manifestation in this Court that the property is situated below the 12.50
elevation based on the survey of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla, the same
survey team who conducted an ocular inspection of the property on April 12,
2005, which thus confirmed the September 14, 2001 survey report. This is a
judicial admission in the course of judicial proceedings which is binding on it.77

Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights acquired
by occupants before the effectivity of the law are recognized. However, the
respondent failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-in-interest had acquired
registerable title over the property before July 18, 1966:

First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of the property,
and even failed to mention the names of his grandparents. He likewise failed
to present his father’s death certificate to support his claim that the latter died
in 1980. There is likewise no evidence when his mother died.

Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the extrajudicial partition

allegedly executed by his parents in 1980 where the property was supposedly
deeded to him and his sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five
siblings.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the property and planted
palay and vegetables, and that they had been paying the realty taxes over the
property before his parents died. However, no tax declarations under the
names of the spouses Apolonio Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblings were
presented, or realty tax receipts evidencing payment of such taxes. Indeed,
while tax receipts and tax payment receipts themselves do not convincingly
prove title to the land,78 these are good indicia of possession in the concept of
an owner, for no one in his right mind would pay taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.79 While tax receipts and
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute,
at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property,
particularly when accompanied by proof of actual possession of
property.80 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes not only manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the
government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.81

Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he

was "74 years old."82 He must have been born in 1927, and was thus merely
10 years old in 1937. It is incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating
the property with his father. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove
how many cavans of palay were planted on the property, as well as the extent
of such cultivation, in order to support the claim of possession with a bona
fide claim of ownership.

Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker "upahan" to help him cultivate the
property. He, however, failed to state the name of the worker or to even
present him as witness for the respondent.
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, respondents.
The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two
Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain
Executive Orders promulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of
legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development
and utilization of the country's natural resources. No longer is the utilization of
inalienable lands of public domain through "license, concession or lease" under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions1allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
The adoption of the concept of jura regalia2 that all natural resources are owned
by the State embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the
recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for
national economic development, but also for its security and national
defense,3 ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of "full control and
supervision by the State" in the exploration, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources. The options open to the State are through direct
undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-
sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or product-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
xxx xxx xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the mandate of the above-quoted provision, legislative acts4 were
successively issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative
power.5
To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in turn promulgated
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, the validity and constitutionality of which
are being challenged in this petition.
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her then
legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Provisional Constitution
and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, promulgated Executive
Order No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and
approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of
mining operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral
resources. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
Sec. 1. Existing mining permits, licenses, leases and other mining grants
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Bureau
of Mines and Geo-Sciences, including existing operating agreements and
mining service contracts, shall continue and remain in full force and effect,
subject to the same terms and conditions as originally granted and/or
approved.
Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
mineral resources, including renewal applications for approval of operating
agreements and mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and
may be approved; concomitantly thereto, declarations of locations and all
other kinds of mining applications shall be accepted and registered by the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences.
Sec. 3. The processing, evaluation and approval of all mining applications,
declarations of locations, operating agreements and service contracts as
provided for in Section 2 above, shall be governed by Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, other existing mining laws and their implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, however, that the privileges granted, as well as the
terms and conditions thereof shall be subject to any and all modifications or
alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order No.
279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture,
co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the
guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or
financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals. The pertinent provisions relevant to
this petition are as follows:
Sec. 1. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretary") is hereby authorized to
negotiate and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint venture,
co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources with any Filipino citizens,
or corporation or association at least sixty percent (60%) of whose capital is
owned by Filipino citizens. Such joint venture, co-production, or production-
sharing agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and shall include the minimum
terms and conditions prescribed in Section 2 hereof. In the execution of a joint
venture, co-production or production agreements, the contracting parties,
including the Government, may consolidate two or more contiguous or
geologically — related mining claims or leases and consider them as one
contract area for purposes of determining the subject of the joint venture, co-
production, or production-sharing agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The Secretary shall promulgate such supplementary rules and
regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions of
this Executive Order.
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued
on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned
"Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order
No. 279."6 Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order
No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases or agreements
which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining
to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares
or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1)
year from the effectivity of these guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No.
82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."7
Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82
enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the
effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure
to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining,
quarry and sand and gravel claims. Section 3 of DENR Administrative Order
No. 82 provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Letter of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs). The following
shall submit their LOIs and MPSAs within two (2) years from the effectivity
of DENR A.O. 57 or until July 17, 1991.
i. Declaration of Location (DOL) holders, mining lease applicants,
exploration permitees, quarry applicants and other mining applicants whose
mining/quarry applications have not been perfected prior to the effectivity of
DENR Administrative Order No. 57.
ii. All holders of DOL acquired after the effectivity of DENR A.O. No. 57.
iii. Holders of mining leases or similar agreements which were granted after
(the) effectivity of 1987 Constitution.
Failure to submit letters of intent and MPSA applications/proposals within the
prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand
and gravel claims.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative
Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc.8 to file the instant petition assailing
their validity and constitutionality before this Court.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines,
Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned
administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,
petitioner contends that both orders violate the
non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-
terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On
the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit
Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2)
years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall
cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
On July 2, 1991, the Court, acting on petitioner's urgent ex-parte petition for
issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction, issued a Temporary
Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500,000.00 bond, enjoining the
enforcement and implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and
82, as amended, Series of 1989 and 1990, respectively.9
On November 13, 1991, Continental Marble Corporation, 10 thru its President,
Felipe A. David, sought to intervene 11in this case alleging that because of the
temporary order issued by the Court , the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 in San
Fernando, Pampanga refused to renew its Mines Temporary Permit after it
expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that its rights and interests are prejudicially
affected by the implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82,
it joined petitioner herein in seeking to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and
82 and prayed that the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 be ordered to issue a Mines
Temporary Permit in its favor to enable it to operate during the pendency of the
suit.
Public respondents were acquired to comment on the Continental Marble
Corporation's petition for intervention in the resolution of November 28, 1991.12
Now to the main petition. If its argued that Administrative Order Nos. 57 and
82 have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining laws 13 which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279. Invoking
Section 7 of said Executive Order No. 279, 14 petitioner maintains that
respondent DENR Secretary cannot provide guidelines such as Administrative
Order Nos. 57 and 82 which are inconsistent with the provisions of Executive
Order No. 279 because both Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 merely
reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of location and all
other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, until
Congress opts to modify or alter the same.
In other words, petitioner would have us rule that DENR Administrative Order
Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his rule-making
power are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both contravene or subvert the
provisions of Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 or embrace matters not
covered, nor intended to be covered, by the aforesaid laws.
We disagree.
We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United
States v. Barrias. 15 The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power was
clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 16decided in
1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as
the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect its general provisions. By
such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long,
however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of
the law, they are valid."
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren 17 gave a brief delienation of the scope
of said power of administrative officials:
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress
(Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General
Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v.
Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals,
93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer,
78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June
27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency (Davis, Administrative
Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued
to implement said law, the basic prevails because said rule or regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim,
108 Phil. 1091).
Considering that administrative rules draw life from the statute which they seek
to implement, it is obvious that the spring cannot rise higher than its source. We
now examine petitioner's argument that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57
and 82 contravene Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 as both operate to repeal
or abrogate Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other mining laws
allegedly acknowledged as the principal law under Executive Order Nos. 211
and 279.
Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations
of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is
erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system
of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through
"license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional
mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or
lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and
other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to
operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration
and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Specifically, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, on
lease of mining claims under Chapter VIII, quarry permits on privately-owned
lands of quarry license on public lands under Chapter XIII and other related
provisions on lease, license and permits are not only inconsistent with
the raison d'etre for which Executive Order No. 279 was passed, but contravene
the express mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It force
and effectivity is thus foreclosed.
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, 18 the State
assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization
of the natural resources of the country. Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter
explicitly ordains that the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Consonant
therewith, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may
be undertaken by means of direct act of the State, or it may opt to enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or it may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country.
Given these considerations, there is no clear showing that respondent DENR
Secretary has transcended the bounds demarcated by Executive Order No. 279
for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of
discretion. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said
official to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be
necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Moreover, the
subject sought to be governed and regulated by the questioned orders is germane
to the objects and purposes of Executive Order No. 279 specifically issued to
carry out the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Administrative Order No. 57, in relation to
Administrative Order No. 82, impairs vested rights as to violate the non-
impairment of contract doctrine guaranteed under Article III, Section 10 of the
1987 Constitution because Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-
terminates and automatically converts mining leases and other mining
agreements into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from
effectivity of said guideline, while Section 3 of Administrative Order No. 82,
declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs within two
(2) years from the effectivity of Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17,
1991 shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand gravel permits.
In Support of the above contention, it is argued by petitioner that Executive
Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease
agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as provided under
Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent abandonment of
mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3,
Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No.
279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary
agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided
under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to
regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include the power to
preterminate existing mining lease agreements.
To begin with, we dispel the impression created by petitioner's argument that
the questioned administrative orders unduly preterminate existing mining leases
in general. A distinction which spells a real difference must be drawn. Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license,
concession or lease" granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or
before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. The intent
to apply prospectively said constitutional provision was stressed during the
deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, 19 thus:
MR. DAVIDE: Under the proposal, I notice that except for the [inalienable]
lands of the public domain, all other natural resources cannot be alienated and
in respect to [alienable] lands of the public domain, private corporations with
the required ownership by Filipino citizens can only lease the same.
Necessarily, insofar as other natural resources are concerned, it would only be
the State which can exploit, develop, explore and utilize the same. However,
the State may enter into a joint venture, co-production or production-sharing.
Is that not correct?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.
MR. DAVIDE: Consequently, henceforth upon, the approval of this
Constitution, no timber or forest concession, permits or authorization can be
exclusively granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor to any corporation
qualified to acquire lands of the public domain?
MR. VILLEGAS: Would Commissioner Monsod like to comment on that? I
think his answer is "yes."
MR. DAVIDE: So, what will happen now license or concessions earlier
granted by the Philippine government to private corporations or to Filipino
citizens? Would they be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS: This is not applied retroactively. They will be respected.
MR. DAVIDE: In effect, they will be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS: No. (Emphasis supplied)
During the transition period or after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on
February 2, 1987 until the first Congress under said Constitution was convened
on July 27, 1987, two (2) successive laws, Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,
were promulgated to govern the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, development and utilization of minerals. To carry out the purposes
of said laws, the questioned Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, now being
assailed, were issued by the DENR Secretary.
Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 provides:
ARTICLE 9
TRANSITORY PROVISION
9.1. All existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211,
except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and
quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less shall be
subject to these guidelines. All such leases or agreements shall be converted
into production sharing agreement within one (1) year from the effectivity of
 these guidelines. However, any minimum firm which has established mining
rights under Presidential Decree 463 or other laws may avail of the provisions
of EO 279 by following the procedures set down in this document.
It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No. 57
applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No.
211. It bears mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a
reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and
conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall
be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt
pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures
of the
non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution 20 do not apply to the aforesaid leases or agreements granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211.
They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to
achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 279 issued on July 25, 1987 by President Corazon
C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative power has the force and effect of a
statute or law passed by Congress. As such, it validly modified or altered the
privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases and
agreements under Executive Order No. 211 after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution by authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the guidelines
for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial
assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause,
mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. In the
1950 case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 21 where the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 34 changing the 50-50 sharecropping system in existing agricultural
tenancy contracts to 55-45 in favor of tenants was challenged, the Court,
upholding the constitutionality of the law, emphasized the superiority of the
police power of the State over the sanctity of this contract:
The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against: impairing the
obligation of contracts is not an absolute one and it is not to be read with literal
exactness like a mathematical formula. Such provisions are restricted to
contracts which respect property, or some object or value, and confer rights
which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statute
relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers
of the State, and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of
its police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the
health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the
contracts may thereby be affected; for such matter can not be placed by contract
beyond the power of the State shall regulates and control them. 22
In Ramas v. CAR and Ramos 23 where the constitutionality of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 1199 authorizing the tenants to charge from share to leasehold
tenancy was challenged on the ground that it impairs the obligation of contracts,
the Court ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of
the police power when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the
State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of
that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
under the new system mandated in Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the
amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
for all, especially the underprivileged.
The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources
are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. The
recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources was expressed
as early as the 1984 Constitutional Convention. In connection therewith, the
1986 U.P. Constitution Project observed: "The 1984 Constitutional Convention
recognized the importance of our natural resources not only for its security and
national defense. Our natural resources which constitute the exclusive heritage
of the Filipino nation, should be preserved for those under the sovereign
authority of that nation and for their prosperity. This will ensure the country's
survival as a viable and sovereign republic."
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may
not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract
from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and
the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage
of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211
provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would
lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automatic
conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing
agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all
such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could
not possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the
Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically
converted into
production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term
"production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded. Negotiation negates
compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant
petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting
of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative
Order No. 82.
We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably
directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they
were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public,
their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and
effect upheld.
We now, proceed to the petition-in-intervention. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of
the Revised Rules of Court, an intervention in a case is proper when the
intervenor has a "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof. "Continental Marble Corporation
has not sufficiently shown that it falls under any of the categories mentioned
above. The refusal of the DENR, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando,
Pampanga to renew its Mines Temporary Permit does not justify such an
intervention by Continental Marble Corporation for the purpose of obtaining a
directive from this Court for the issuance of said permit. Whether or not
Continental Marble matter best addressed to the appropriate government body
but certainly, not through this Court. Intervention is hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on July 2, 1991 is hereby LIFTED.