G.R. No.

175768 December 11, 2013

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES EDGARDO M. CRISTOBAL and MA. TERESITA S. CRISTOBAL, Respondents.

SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 appeal1 dated 26 December 2006 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80874, which affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13, Malolos, Bulacan in LRC Case No. P-65-2003, denying the Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession filed by the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (petitioner).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 14 September 1998, respondents Spouses Edgardo M. Cristobal and Ma. Teresita S. Cristobal obtained
a loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the amount of ₱4,500,000.00. The loan
was secured by two real estate mortgages and its three amendments, which respondents executed in
favor of petitioner.5

Despite demand, respondents failed to pay their loan, resulting in the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction
sale of their mortgaged properties (subject properties). In the auction sale, petitioner emerged as the
highest bidder, so a Certificate of Sale was issued in its name. This certificate was duly registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan on 11 September 2002.6

Consequently, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the properties covered by the mortgage.
However, this went unheeded, forcing petitioner to file with the trial court a petition seeking a Writ of
Possession over the foreclosed properties.7

On 30 June 2003, the RTC issued an Order8 to wit:

It is uncontroverted that the 12 month redemption period has not yet expired hence it is incumbent upon
the petitioner bank to post bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve
months. However, petitioner did not proffer any evidence from whence the Court could base the bond
required under Section 7 of Act 3135.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

In disposing of the application, the lower court ruled that petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence
from which it could base the amount of bond required in an application for a writ of possession done
within the 12 month redemption period.9

Petitioner seasonably moved to reconsider the judgment,10 but this was also denied in an Order11 dated
22 September 2003, herein quoted as follows:
Acting on the "Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration (to the Decision dated June 30, 2003) with Motion for
Leave of Court to Recall Petitioner’s Witness" and taking note that the 12-month period for redemption
in this case has already expired as of September 11, 2003, the Court finds no useful purpose nor
compelling reason to reconsider its decision dated June 30, 2003, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed via a Petition for Certiorari on 4 December 2003.12 Petition argued that
"granting arguendo that petitioner should have presented evidence for the purpose of fixing the bond,
the redemption period already expired on September 11, 2003; hence, posting of a bond is no longer
necessary."13 This appeal was however dismissed by the CA in a Decision dated 10 August 2006, the
relevant portion of which is herein quoted as follows:14

Indeed, while the posting of a bond is no longer necessary upon the expiration of the redemption period,
it is however required that ownership over the property be consolidated with the purchaser of the
foreclosed property. Verily, the presentation of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the purchaser
is a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a writ of possession.

We have examined the record vis-à-vis petitioner’s insistence on its entitlement to the writ and found
that the claim is premature. The record is bereft of any indication that petitioner bank has consolidated
its ownership over the subject parcels of land. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

In affirming the RTC, the CA explained that in accordance with Section 7 of Act 3135, the trial court has
the duty to issue a writ of possession before the lapse of the 12-month redemption period; but this is
qualified by the receipt of an ex-parte application and the posting of the required bond.15 In this case,
the trial court denied the application because petitioner failed to discharge its burden of providing ample
information upon which the amount of the bond could be based.16

Moreover, even if the 12-month redemption period had already expired and the need for a bond already
dispensed with, possession could not yet be given to petitioner until the ownership is consolidated and a
new transfer certificate of title issued in its name.17

On 24 August 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 arguing that "the grounds upon which
We [the CA] anchored the denial of the petition has [sic] since disappeared in light of the consolidation of
titles over the subject properties by the petitioner."19 In a Resolution promulgated on 6 December
2006,20 the CA denied petitioner’s Motion in the following wise:

x x x Anent the claims of a supervening event, petitioner should be minded that it is not precluded from
re-filing the petition for a writ of possession in the Court a quo especially so since it now meets the grounds
for the issuance of the said writ.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Hence, the instant Petition.

This Court noted the following pleadings: (a) respondent’s Comment dated 21 March 2007;21 (b)
petitioner’s Reply dated 10 July 2007;22 (c) respondent’s Memorandum dated 20 November 2007;23 and
(d) petitioner’s Memorandum dated 24 November 2007.24

ISSUE

Considering that the 12-month redemption period has already lapsed and the need for a bond already
dispensed with, we reduce the issue to whether or not consolidation of title is necessary before possession
may be automatically given to petitioner.

THE COURT’S RULING

Petitioner insists that a review of Act 3135 will reveal that there is "absolutely nothing therein which
provides that consolidation of ownership over the foreclosed property is required before a writ of
possession may be issued."25 Moreover, even assuming that consolidation is indeed required, petitioner
faults the CA for refusing to recognize the fact that it had already consolidated its ownership over the
subject properties, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-432045 (M) and T-
432046 (M) in its name on 6 April 2004.26

On the other hand, respondent alleges that the consolidated titles under petitioner’s name were not
submitted in the trial court. As such, petitioner cannot raise it as an issue for the first time in appeal.27

We rule that a remand of this case to the trial court is necessary for the reception of evidence to
determine if consolidation has taken place, this being a necessary requisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession.

Petitioner can only demand

possession after the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new transfer
certificate of title.

Jurisprudence articulates that "[t]he purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. After
the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right."28 In fact, in Sps. Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank,29 we
have held that:

Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period,
becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no
longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into
the absolute right of a confirmed owner.1âwphi1 At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon
proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot
exercise its discretion.

Hence, for petitioner to be issued a writ of possession, it must first clearly show that it has consolidated
ownership of the subject properties in its name. It is only at this point that issuance of the writ becomes
a ministerial function of the courts.

The issue of whether or not

petitioner has consolidated
ownership in its name is a question
of fact best left to the determination
of the lower court.

On this score, petitioner insists that we must take cognizance of a supervening event –that it has already
consolidated the property’s title in its name, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-432045
(M) and T-432046 (M).[30]] While the Court has "ample authority to review and resolve matters not
assigned and specified as errors by either of the parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and
determination of the same essential and indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the case,"31
we agree with the respondents that the Court cannot automatically accede to the alleged consolidation,
for the matter is essentially a question of fact best left to the determination of the lower court. In Republic
v. Malabanan, 32 we held that:

[T]his Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is. on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one oflaw, the same must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

Here, no question of law is involved, for it is clear that petitioner has the right to possession once it has
established that ownership has been consolidated in its name. Consolidation is essentially factual in
nature, as it requires the presentation of evidence.33

Consequently, and in the interest of substantial justice, a remand of this case to the lower court is
necessary to receive evidence if indeed consolidation has taken place, for the issuance of a writ of
possession.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Malolos, Bulacan, for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
G.R. No. 127997 August 7, 1998]
 FELIX VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALMARIO GO MANUEL, respondents. DECISION
 ROMERO, J.:

For the Courts resolution is the petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
39731 entitled Almario Go Manuel v. Felix Villanueva[1] dated January 30, 1996, involving an action for
sum of money.

In 1991, private respondent, Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money with damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 against petitioner, Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora.
The subject matter of the action involved a check dated June 30, 1991 in the amount of P167,600.00
issued by petitioner in favor of private respondent. The check supposedly represented payment of loans
previously obtained by petitioner from private respondent as capital for the formers mining and fertilizer
business. The check when duly represented for payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. A
demand was made upon petitioner to make good the check but he failed to do so. Private respondent
then filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22[2] before the Cebu City
Prosecutors Office and the subject civil complaint for sum of money. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers
that his principal obligation only amounts to P23,420.00.
On July 27, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against co-
defendant Felix Villanueva, directing the latter to pay the former P167,600.00, the dismissal of this case
with respect to co- defendant Melchora Villanueva, and finally with costs against the husband.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Apparently aggrieved, both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner prayed for
the reversal of the trial courts decision and contended that his principal obligation is only P23,420.00,
while private respondent sought interest of ten percent (10%) of the principal obligation; twenty-five
percent (25%) as attorneys fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court subject to the
modification that petitioner was directed to additionally pay private respondent attorneys fees and
litigation expenses in the amount of ten (10%) percent of P167,600.00, and the entire obligation to earn
interest at six (6%) percent per annum from the filing of the complaint. [4] Petitioner now comes before
this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals as follows: (a) the Court of
Appeals erred in not ruling that the five (5%) and ten (10%) percent interest imposed is not enforceable
due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner
is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the
Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power or authority to repeal the usury law.[5]

The petition should be denied.
 Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases

brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such, this Court is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.[6] The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[7]

After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise issues which would
constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of the trial and appellate courts.

As regards the matter of legal interest, this Court, in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[8] laid down the following guidelines:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi- contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts
is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVII on Damages
of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual

and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due is that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore,
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
x x x.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.

Applying the foregoing rules, since the principal obligation in the amount of P167,600.00 is a loan, the
same should earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the time the complaint was
filed until the finality of this decision. On the other hand, if the total obligation is not satisfied it shall
further earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the finality of the decision until
payment thereof, the interim period being deemed to be a forbearance of credit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 39731 dated
January 30, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of legal interest to be paid is
TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum of the amount due computed from the time the complaint was filed
until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of TWELVE
PERCENT (12%) per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment thereof is
satisfied. No costs.
[G.R. No. 121422. February 23, 1999]

NOEL CRUZ y DIGMA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH VI, MANILA, respondents.

DECISION PARDO, J.:

The case before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] denying for lack of
merit the petition for certiorari filed by the accused to annul the following orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Manila[2] in Criminal Case No. 90-85059, to wit:

(a) The order dated January 18, 1993, made in open court admitting the formal offer of evidence of the
prosecution;

(b) The order dated December 20, 1993, denying the petitioners demurrer to evidence;

(c) The order dated July 8, 1994, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal possession of a .38 caliber
revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside the Manila Pavilion Hotel along U.N.
Ave., Manila.

On June 25, 1990, Assistant Prosecutor Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
an information[3] against the accused for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866[4], the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about June 19, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) firearm .38 cal.
Colt revolver bearing Serial Number 376420 with six (6) live ammunitions, without first having secured
the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.

On June 26, 1990, before the arraignment of the accused, his parents, Timoteo and Ana Cruz, filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, a petition[5] for habeas corpus in his behalf. Thereafter, the accused
was arraigned in the Manila court and pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and formally offered its
evidence, the trial court issued an order[6] dated January 18, 1993, admitting in evidence the gun and
ammunition seized from the accused, over his objections. After the prosecution had rested its case,
petitioner, on motion and upon leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. On December 20, 1993, the
trial court denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his evidence.[7] Instead, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an order[8] dated July 8, 1994.

On October 27, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the three
(3) orders, namely: the order admitting the prosecutions formal offer of evidence; the order denying his
demurrer to evidence; and the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, for being issued
capriciously, arbitrarily and whimsically, in utter disregard of controlling law and jurisprudence, and with
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On November 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and ordered the trial court to
temporarily refrain from further proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 90-85059.

On August 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision[9] denying the petition for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed orders were interlocutory in nature and not reviewable by
certiorari. Petitioner should wait until the trial court has decided the case on its merits and if aggrieved,
appeal from his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the trial courts order admitting the allegedly
inadmissible evidence involved questions of facts, which are not reviewable in petitions for certiorari.
There being no error in jurisdiction, whatever error in judgment committed by the trial court can not be
corrected by certiorari.

Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial courts order admitting in evidence
the gun and ammunition, which are allegedly inadmissible for being the fruits of an illegal warrantless
arrest and search. He further claims that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
Petitioner contends that the questioned orders, while admittedly interlocutory in nature, are no longer
subject to amendment or correction by the trial court, hence, a review thereof is warranted to prevent
extreme prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner prays for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain the
trial court from proceeding with the criminal case pending this petition; a writ of preliminary injunction
after the expiration of the TRO; and to reverse the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals.

We resolve to deny the petition.

We find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course
of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or
review on certiorari, but may be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the
decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.[10] When the court has jurisdiction over
the case and person of the accused, any error in the application of the law and the appreciation of
evidence committed by a court after it has acquired jurisdiction over a case, may be corrected only by
appeal.[11]

Regarding the denial of the demurrer to evidence, we have likewise ruled that the question of whether
the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the defendant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court. The error, if any, in
the denial of the demurrer to evidence may be corrected only by appeal. The appellate court will not
review in such special civil action the prosecutions evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has
or has not established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure
prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to present his evidence, after which the trial
court, on its own assessment of the evidence submitted, will then properly render its judgment of
acquittal or conviction.[12] If judgment is rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the
judgment and raise the same defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.[13]

Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory
orders are patently erroneous[14] or issued with grave abuse of discretion,[15] the remedy of certiorari
lies.

Petitioner insists that he falls within the above exceptions, warranting a review of the denial of his petition
for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner stresses that he was illegally arrested, and
consequently any evidence taken after the subsequent search on his person is inadmissible in evidence.
He points to alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to show that he was
illegally arrested. He maintains

that the evidence presented is insufficient to sustain a conviction due to the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses. He likewise claims that the prosecution has failed to establish that the gun and
ammunition presented during the trial were the same items confiscated from him.

We disagree. The trial court, in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, squarely addressed the
above contentions. The trial court ruled that the seized evidence was admissible, and that the evidence
presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction, if the accused presented no contrary evidence.

We find neither error nor patent abuse of discretion in the rulings of the trial court on these issues. Thus,
upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, he may present his evidence.[16] After trial on the
merits, and the court issues a verdict of conviction, petitioner may seasonably appeal such decision,
raising once again his defenses and objections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby DENIES the petition. We order the trial court to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-85059, with deliberate dispatch.
[G.R. No. 140679. January 14, 2004]
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MANNY A.
DOMINGCIL, appellant. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.:

For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the appellant Manny Domingcil
was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, for violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver mixed dried marijuana leaves, tops and seeds in brick form, wrapped with
paper placed in a plastic bag, a prohibited drug, weighing 800 grams, to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust
operation conducted by Police Officers of Laoag City, in violation of the aforesaid law.[1]

Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.[2] The case thereafter proceeded to trial.

The Case for the Prosecution

On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferds Upholstery Shop located
in Barangay 2, Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police Station. He reported to Chief Investigator SPO4
Rodrigo Ventura that the appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of marijuana. Oliver recounted
telling the appellant that he knew of someone who was interested and ready to buy marijuana, and
instructing him to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store located in front of the Divine Word College
of Laoag at General Segundo Avenue, Laoag City at around 1:30 p.m. of that same day.[3]

Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the
appellant. He assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos, SPO2
Warlito Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie Agustin, all
assigned at the Investigation Section of the Laoag Police Station as back- up. The marked buy-money
consisting of one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G- 242745 was recorded in the police blotter in accordance
with standard operating procedure.[4]

Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team left the precinct on board two (2) owner-type
jeeps and posted themselves near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the Divine Word College. Five
minutes later, SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General Segundo Avenue.[5] Oliver immediately
approached the appellant, who was then standing between the Macmac Store and a xerox center, and
introduced poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who was sporting casual clothes and slippers: Pare, daytoy tay
gumatangen (Friend, this is the buyer). At this point, the appellant who was carrying an orange plastic
bag, brought out a brick-like item wrapped in newspaper. He handed the item to SPO1 Dalusong, who
forthwith checked the same by making a small hole through it. Convinced that the brick-like item was
indeed marijuana, SPO1 Dalusong handed the P500 bill to the appellant. He thereupon scratched his head,
a signal to the back-up men that the transaction had been consummated.[6] Momentarily, the back-up
officers, who had earlier positioned themselves separately in different strategic locations near the poseur-
buyer, rushed to the scene and arrested the appellant. SPO1 Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag
containing the suspected marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant and recovered
the buy-money from the latters pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters where
he was booked, and the incident was recorded in the police blotter.[7] The suspected marijuana was
brought to and initially examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB), who certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture of marijuana leaves with
seeds.[8]

On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the examination of
samples of the suspected marijuana taken from the appellant.[9] On September 6, 1998, SPO1 Loreto
Ancheta, evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the orange plastic bag containing the
suspected marijuana to the PNP provincial crime laboratory service in Camp Juan, Laoag City. The bag,
together with SPO4 Venturas letter-request, was received by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos.[10] On
September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and the confiscated item, and were
duly received by SPO4 Tampos.[11] The latter, in turn, handed the item to Police Superintendent Theresa
Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the Crime Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San
Fernando, La Union, who conducted an examination of representative samples extracted from the
suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant.[12] On the basis of her examination, Superintendent
Cid issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with the following findings:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED :

One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing eight hundred grams (800) wrapped with
newspaper pages contained in an orange plastic bag.

... PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION :

To determine the presence of marijuana on the above-mentioned specimen. FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen prove POSITIVE result to the test
for marijuana, a prohibited drug.[13]

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that sometime in the first week
of August 1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to canvass the price for the repair of the
upholstery of a passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a certain Belrey Oliver who was an
employee of the Ferds Upholstery Shop. In the course of their conversation, Oliver asked the appellant
where he came from and what his occupation was. Upon being told that he helped in harvesting mangoes
in Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered refreshments to Gamiao and the appellant. While taking their
snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted to back up the promotion of certain policemen who, in the
future, might be able to return the favor to them. When the appellant asked in what way they could
extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for somebody in Cagayan from whom they could buy one (1)
kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Olivers suggestion. The latter handed to him the amount of P700.00 to
cover the purchase of the marijuana. The appellant immediately went to the terminal bound for Cagayan
to look for somebody from that province who could be of help. When he could not find anyone, he decided
to personally take the trip. He then instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his mother
that he was going to Cagayan.

The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After

three (3) days, he was able to buy one kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag City on
August 12, 1994, he went to Ferds Upholstery Shop at 11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured
the order. After seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him to take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m.
of the same day in front of the Divine Word College where they would hand over the marijuana to the
policemen they intended to help.

At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmacs Store and took his merienda. Momentarily, Oliver
arrived alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they walked southward, away from the Macmacs
Store, looking for the policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They walked back northward,
at which point they encountered an owner-type jeep which suddenly stopped. He was nonplussed when
Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his knapsack containing the marijuana, and pushed him inside the
jeep. He was made to sit beside the driver with another policeman, while Oliver seated himself at the back
seat with another policeman. The jeep they were riding was followed by a patrol car. Still dazed at the
sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver four times, Why is it that this is now happening to me(?), but Oliver
did not respond. At the police station, he was immediately locked up. That afternoon, SPO4 Ventura and
SPO2 Ramos, accompanied by Oliver, brought him to the City Fiscals Office. He was later brought to the
provincial hospital where he was subjected to a physical check-up. That was the last time he saw or heard
of Oliver.[14]

On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment,[15] the dispositive portion of which reads :

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused Manny Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The quantity of marijuana involved is more than 750 grams; hence, in
accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay the costs.

Hence, the present appeal.

The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not instigated in looking for marijuana and
bringing it to Laoag.

2. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO bill, despite his
denial that he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
police officers who are presumed to be regularly performing their official duties, there being no improper
motive attributed to them.

3. The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.[16]

The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Oliver
instigated him to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence and probative weight to his
testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.

The appeal has no merit.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The reason for this rule is
that the trial court is in a better position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[17] After a thorough and careful
review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was sufficiently established by
the evidence, and the trial courts judgment is well-supported by law and jurisprudence.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[18] In this case, the
prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of marijuana to
poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation.

q How has the case involving drug or marijuana involving the accused brought to your attention or to your
office, for that matter?

a Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny Domingcil at the
Upholstery Shop along Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that he ordered P500.00 worth of
marijuana.

q Who ordered from whom?
 a Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.

q By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at that time?

a SPO4 Ventura, sir.

q Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter?

a Yes, sir.

q And because of that information from Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4 Ventura do?

a SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir.

q Where will the operation take place?

a In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag, sir.

q And did you have any participation in that operation?

a Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).

q At what time was the operation scheduled to be executed?

a 1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.

q For the said operation, what preparations, if any, did your group take?

a Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.

q What was the plan?

a To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.

q And you said that you were to act as poseur buyer, anything was given to you in connection with your
specific participation?

a I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of P500.00, sir. q And what will you do with that P500.00?

a The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed me to reflect the serial number of the money in the
police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as marked money.

q And after the serial number was entered in the police blotter, what next did you do?

a Before we went out of the station, the team or companions of SPO4 Ventura went ahead to the place
where the transaction will take place, sir.

q And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura who went ahead?

a Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and myself were the ones
who went together.

q Who went ahead to the place where the sale will take place?
 a The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.
 q And
did you reach the place where the transaction will take place? a Yes, sir.

q Before you started to the place where the transaction will take place in front of the Divine Word College
of Laoag, did you know then the face of Manny Domingcil?

a No, sir.
 q How did you know his face then?

a Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that the person is Manny Domingcil.

q So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at the scene where the transaction would take place, Manny
Domingcil was already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you?
a Yes, sir.
 q After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?
 a We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.
 q
And after or as soon as you were near him, what happened next?
 a Belrey Oliver introduced Manny
Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir. q What did Oliver say?

a Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen, (which when translated into english[sic] means): Pare, this is the buyer.

q And so, what was the reaction of Manny Domingcil?

a Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the stuff that was ordered.

q And what did he say?

a Manny Domingcil said: There is, Pare.

q By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny Domingcil?

a Belrey Oliver, sir.

q Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from Manny Domingcil?

a Yes, sir.

q Where?

a At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.

q That was what Oliver told you when he ordered the stuff?

a Yes, sir.

q When Manny Domingcil said: There is, pare, what transpired next, if any?

a I told him: Can I look at it and he brought out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a newspaper inside
an orange plastic bag.

q And after he had brought out the said thing, what did you do with it? a I checked the contents if it is real
marijuana, sir.

q You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper and you said you checked its contents?

a Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small hole at the side. q And what was the result of your
inspection?
 a I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.
 q And, so what did you do then?

a After I found out that it was marijuana I handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill, sir.
q And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill, what did you do next? a I gave the signal to my
companions, sir.
 q And what did your companions do when you gave the signal?
 a They apprehended
Manny Domingcil, sir.

q What was your signal?
 a I scratched my head, sir.

q And, what was your attire at that time you bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny Domingcil?

a Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.

q And all the time during your transaction with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey Oliver?

a At my side, sir.
 q And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say anything?
 a None, sir.
 q And after
giving your signal to your companion police officers who were

nearby and they rushed to your place where you were, what happened? a They apprehended Manny
Domingcil, sir.

q And what about the marijuana which you said Manny Domingcil sold to you?

a I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.
 q And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know what
happened to it?

a SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill from the pocket of Manny Domingcil.

q And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did your group go? a To the police station, sir.

q Do you know if any records were made to your police station when you returned or arrived there?

a Yes, sir.
 q What for example?

a They made a request ... we reflected in the police blotter the apprehension of Manny Domingcil, the
confiscation of the marijuana and the recovery of the marked money in the amount of P500.00.

q Was the serial number of the P500 bill you recovered from the pocket of Manny Domingcil recorded?

a Yes, sir.

q And do you know what happened to the stuff later on after you returned to the police station?

a They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an initial examination on the confiscated marijuana,
sir.[19]

The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4 Rodrigo
Ventura, then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and conducted the
operation and was part of the buy-bust team itself.[20] SPO4 Ventura remained steadfast and unwavering
on cross-examination despite intense grilling by the defense counsel.[21]

Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory
Center at San Fernando, La Union, confirmed[22] Dr. Joseph Adayas initial finding[23] that the substance
seized from the appellant was indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.

It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos[24] and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta[25] that the
confiscated marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later presented as
evidence in court.

The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete picture
of how the appellants illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to his
apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were
in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the same. More importantly, all
the persons who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the performance of their official
duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the
buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. [26]

The appellants bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim that he was merely instigated by
Oliver into procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the straightforward and positive testimonies of
the prosecution

witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met Belrey Oliver in the course of his canvass
for the upholstery of his brothers jeepney, would readily leave his errand behind and allow a stranger to
talk him into buying a prohibited drug, a known criminal activity for which he could be prosecuted, and if
convicted, sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All this he was willing to risk, in exchange for an empty
promise of alleged future favors from another who was also unknown to the appellant. The appellant
supposedly traveled to and spent almost three days in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to
accommodate a newly found acquaintance, who handed the appellant the meager sum of P700.00 for the
intended purpose. The Court cannot give credence to such a preposterous stance as advanced by the
appellant and confirmed by his supposed corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.

It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and observation of
mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the
court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of
human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies that do not adhere to this
standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence.[27] Besides, instigation, or the appellants
claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor because the
same can easily be concocted and is a common standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28] Thus, in People vs. Bongalon,[29] the Court held:

As we have earlier stated, the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances, law enforcers
resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However, like
alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be, concocted,
hence, commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not
to mention the well-being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the policemens alleged rotten
reputation, accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely
for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists.

The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police informant, does not enfeeble the case for the
prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their
invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with inasmuch as his or her
narration would be merely corroborative, especially so in this case, when the poseur-buyer himself
testified on the sale of the illegal drug.[30]

The appellants claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy
money and did not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof is not supported
by the records. The records show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the marked money,
was in fact offered in evidence by the prosecution. [31] The appellant would surely have objected if the
prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the bill. The appellant did not do so. The only
ground for his objection to the admission of the marked money was that it was self-serving.

Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the
absence of the original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy-bust
operation is not indispensable in drug cases;[32] it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover, the
appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery thereof, which is
committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug. The consideration for the transaction
is of no moment. [33]

The law defines deliver as a persons act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with or without
consideration.[34] Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and the delivery of prohibited
drugs, the consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently established even in the
absence of the marked money. The erasures and alterations in the Joint Affidavit of the policemen
involved in the buy-bust operation did not debilitate the case of the prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit
of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any party. Second. The investigator who prepared the
Joint Affidavit erroneously stated that the two P500.00 bills were used by the policemen who conducted
the buy-bust operation bearing Serial Numbers AA823675 and G242745. As shown by the prosecutions
evidence the policemen used only the P500.00 bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of the
drug. Hence, the Joint Affidavit of the policemen had to be corrected to reflect the truth.

All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by
evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact that the prosecutions
evidence fully shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to reverse
or even modify the findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16,
in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
marie

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
 This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato[2] admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippines
citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the
port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children.
On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A.
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his
qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law, stated -
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No.270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as
SCN Case No.031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee
on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of
petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness against
him, he remarked: novero

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense
that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part,
we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.[3]

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that
petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct

himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2;
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.[4]

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by

petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,[5] in which petitioner
stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto
Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization,
it was contended that his petition must fail.[6] The state also annexed income tax returns[7] allegedly filed
by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family.
To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay
in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel
had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually
lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed
a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract[8] and a Joint-Affidavit[9] executed by petitioner and his
wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no
marriage license had been required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and
Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of
marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953,
they had already been married. ella
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,[10] petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the
trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court
and brought up for the first time on appeal.[11] The appellate court held:

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No.270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor...This is
a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come
forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for
citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M.
Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant
to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and
failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for
the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies
of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law.

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with
his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalizationnigel

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because he
is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . ."It is not only that the person having
the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able
to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus
avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." ...Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The monthly
pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative
because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and
precarious

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES,
THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLCATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER
NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION
AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A
PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. brando

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal
of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere
"scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"[12] so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[13] of the Rules of Court which provides
that -

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable
and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for
the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.[14]
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.[15] We are not persuaded. Indeed, the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford
the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.[16] Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by
the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of
Appeals, thus: nigella

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly
filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition
for naturalization is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776.
Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving
the instant appeal.[17]

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as
a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was
annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet[18] of the Special
Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this,
petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income
tax returns - are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt
on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying
upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the
issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St.,
Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that
since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published,[19] with the petition
and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7.[20] This is allegedly
because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e.,
to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the
applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one time or another.[21] It is settled, however, that naturalization
laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant.[22] As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization
shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence.[23] This provision and the rule
of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial
compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the
instant petition ought to be denied. marinella

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
MEROPE CATALAN ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE

G. R. No. 183622 Present:

x --------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:
 Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] and

Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
 Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232
on the ground of litis

pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to
file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her
contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch
54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3] The trial court ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in
Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action
to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid
and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the
previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested
party who

may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.[4]

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been
filed by an uninterested person, the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she
insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedents properties, the RTC should
have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the
wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari.
Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing
a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the
merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for
the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters
of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special
proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner
of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be
barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed
by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private
respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The
first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that
matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed
as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of
those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse,
the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a
marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceeding. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal
of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny
the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not
being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for
letters of administration by the trial court is in place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was
illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding
that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol
still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage
between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the
estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed,
we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality. This

doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that
the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to
wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was
no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is
the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under
the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and

the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of
evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential
right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with
Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court
of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62 May 31, 2011

LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE
SAMSON, Petitioners,
 vs.
 ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 184495

ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO,

Petitioners,
 vs.
 GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.)

GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC,
LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. 187109

ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO,

Petitioners,
 vs.
 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,

P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO
PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS,
A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON,
Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen)
and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto
a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.
Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured nearby
police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.

On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas
corpus1 before the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and
Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis
Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006,2 the Court issued a writ
of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R.

SP No. 95303.

By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006,3 the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits from
the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that
they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and disappearance of the three but
their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with plate
number RTF 597. Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land Transportation Office
(LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been manufactured as of July 26, 2006.

Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.

Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on June 26,
2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men wearing bonnets abduct Sherlyn
and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that tied and blindfolded, the three
were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.4

Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his house, he
was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified armed men, repaired to his house;
that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez) was taken to a place in Mercado,
Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew "Sierra," "Tanya," "Vincent" and "Lisa"; and that
Enriquez described the appearance of two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom he was
familiar with as the two had previously slept in his house.5

Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and detained for five
months, testified that when he was

detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw two women fitting the descriptions of Sherlyn and
Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare.6

Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to neutralize
the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups, declared that he conducted an inquiry on
the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.7

While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was sought by the mayor of Hagonoy.
Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Army’s 7th Infantry Division in Fort
Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of his infantry as in fact his name did not
appear in the roster of troops.8

Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied that his
office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597.9

On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness stand as hostile witnesses.

Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino
nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing anything about the abduction of Ramirez
nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.10

Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names of Ka Lisa and
Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct
an investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.11

When pressed to elaborate, he stated: "I said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka
Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened in Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya,
Your Honor, and another one. That was the report coming from the people in the area."12

By Decision of March 29, 2007,13 the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in this wise:

As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for habeas
corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of one’s detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons
subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers, means and resources to
conduct an investigation. x x x.

It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings by
initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v.
Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of
obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically
abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong evidence that
the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.

The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and appropriate
actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the
outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. They
also moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino,
Sherlyn’s mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly
met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp.

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo14 With Prayers for Inspection
of Place and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No. 179994. The petition
impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria
Macapagal- Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then
Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col.
Anotado) and Donald Caigas.

Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in
office.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of the
following places:

1. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija 2. 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan

3. Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan

4. Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan

5. The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th Infantry Batallion at Barangay Banog,
Bolinao, Pangasinan

6. 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan 7. Army Detachment at Barangay
Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan

8. Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military personnel as a caretaker;

By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo returnable to the
Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo
petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.

Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General, filed their
Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.15 In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac and Lt. Mirabelle
reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus case.

Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate and verify the
identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision of the appellate court ordering the
police, the Commission on Human Rights and the National Bureau of Investigation to take further action
on the matter.16

Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry
Battalion based in Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24th Infantry
Battalion detachment was reported to be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed
that he found no untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was no
report of the death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police.17

Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent records, papers
and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three, and that the police exhausted all possible
actions available under the circumstances.18

In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on Adoracion
Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial.

Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11, 2007,
accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were soldiers. She averred that she did not
report the incident to the police nor inform Sherlyn’s mother about the visit.19

Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally detained
by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in Limay,
Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in detention.20

In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,21 Manalo recounted: xxxx
 59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?

Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th IB.

Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.

Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita akong babae
na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw,
nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na
dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang umuwi
at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn
Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba.

x x x x.

61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?

Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si ‘Allan Alvin’ (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si Donald
Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na ‘master’ o ‘commander’ ng kanyang mga tauhan.

Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen Empeño at Manuel
Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni ‘Allan[.]’ Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay
nasa katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn.

xxxx 62. x x x x

Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at Karen ay
ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na siya’y ginahasa.

xxxx 63. x x x x xxxx

Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay ako, si
Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni
Donald Caigas. x x x x

xxxx

66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?

Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang safehouse
sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics and emphasis in the original)

On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to the witness stand.

Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him because he was
very active in conducting lectures in Bataan and even appeared on television regarding an incident involving
the 24th Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn, Karen and Merino to
be detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area.

Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment in Camp Tecson,
testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it conduct military operations as it only serves as
a training facility for scout rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any command relation with
either the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion.22

By Decision of September 17, 2008,23 the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-
G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino in CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.

Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002
(Amparo case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from
detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino.

Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the] PNP’s unfinished
investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those truly
responsible.

SO ORDERED.

In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily on the
testimony of Manalo in this wise:

With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly prove
the fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand account that military
and civilian personnel under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of Oscar Leuterio that the latter
was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.

His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with respect to
his meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay.
Raymond Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. In fact,
he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory proof, however,
the Court will presume that he is still alive.

The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside. His narration and those of
the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the
three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be moved from
place to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the respondents.

His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x. xxxx

The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo

Boyles Davalan were of no help either. Again, their averments were the same negative ones which cannot
prevail over those of Raymond Manalo. Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army
scout rangers. Even Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camp’s use for purposes other than training cannot
be discounted.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons, [Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino], are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being
not held for a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity

to issue any inspection order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas
corpus case, it found that the three detainees’ right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence,
the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP
to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain
the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the
three.

Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17, 2008
Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-captioned case-
subject of the present Decision.

Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the amparo aspect
is concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No. 184495, the second
above-captioned case.
By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R. Nos.
1844461-62.24

Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite
Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to
comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing persons. By
Resolution of March 5, 2009,25 the appellate court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:

While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents "to immediately RELEASE, or cause
the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino," the
decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term "immediately" does not mean that that it is
automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision
rendered is immediately executory. x x x.

Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the
Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.

Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal under
Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not have issued, and did not issue, a writ of
execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied)

Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
Empeño challenged the appellate court’s March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their motion to cite respondents
in contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last above- captioned case subject of the
present Decision.

Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in the amparo and habeas
corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from government service.26 The AFP has denied that
Arnel Enriquez was a member of the Philippine Army.27 The whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain
unknown.28

In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows: I

...THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY

OF RAYMOND MANALO.

II
 THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO

SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEñO
AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY.

III

PETITIONERS’ DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM
BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED
ABDUCTION; MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE
ON POINTS IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.
IV

THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT

WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL PROCEDURAL
INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.29

In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows:

5. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of Places;

6. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of Documents;

7. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino Razon did not make
extraordinary diligence in

investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved parties...

8. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming from the highest echelon
of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of
the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved parties...

9. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent in this
case;

10. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command
responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties...

11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then Hermogenes
Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command responsibility in the enforced disappearance
and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties...30

In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues:

[1] Whether... the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.]

[2] Whether...there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an Amparo
decision[.]

[3] Whether...an appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an Amparo case[.]31

Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the testimony of
Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine
Army, as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to
cause the release of the aggrieved parties.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62

Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to the testimony
of Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures of Camp Tecson where he claimed to have
been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore that Camp Tecson is not under the
jurisdiction of the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalo’s testimony is incredible and full of
inconsistencies.32

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,33 an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having
taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the
personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on
detention. Thus it held:

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo’s
affidavit and testimony, viz:

x x x x.

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo’s statements were not corroborated by
other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated
by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic
specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,
also corroborate respondents’ accounts of the torture they endured while

in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the
"DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"
firms up respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. (citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On Manalo’s having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court in the
immediately cited case synthesized his tale as follows:

The next day, Raymond’s chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was
then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them
were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn
Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was
abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She
was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and
she was made to do the laundry.

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose
name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th
Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and
Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of
November 6 or

8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their
parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that
camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry
Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp
of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that
camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers
whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn
and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in
raising livestock.

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him
and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-
bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another
time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and
killed only his son right before Raymond’s eyes.

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge
of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in
Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and
experienced in the camp, viz:

x x x x.34 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo35
which assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother
Reynaldo’s abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of
Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of the
detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its
appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.

Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is "vague and incongruent
with [its] findings" for, so they contend, while the appellate court referred to the perpetrators as "misguided
and self-righteous civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry Division," it failed to identify who these
perpetrators are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald Caigas and Arnel Enriquez are not members of
the AFP. They furthermore point out that their co-petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and Palparan
have already retired from the service and thus have no more control of any military camp or base in the
country.36
There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for petitioners
to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the appellate court merely referred to "a few
misguided self- righteous people who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who disagree
with the country’s democratic system of government." Nowhere did it specifically refer to the members of
the 7th Infantry Division as the "misguided self-righteous" ones.

Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing to file
the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the
parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for
filing the petition on his behalf.37

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo38 provides:

The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order:

(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or

(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the
immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.

Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the
immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted
provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason—"to prevent the indiscriminate and
groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party."39

The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on Merino’s
behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the
writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.40

It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of

Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino’s behalf as they are not authorized
parties under the Rule.

G.R. No. 184495

Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo
well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were
filed.41

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued
in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade
the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance
or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike
the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x 42

Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or
performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.

On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in an
amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application insofar
as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in order.

Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo43 expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war
and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over
them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability,"
whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent
or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)44

It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity,45 and thus a
substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or
entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.46 Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right
to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.47

Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis 48 enlightens:

[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance...for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance...49 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes "responsibility" and "accountability," viz:

x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary
goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security
are restored.50 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine
criminal liability.51 The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are
concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo
cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound
to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only
to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing
administrative issuances, if there be any.52 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
would issue.53 In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination
of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
agency.

Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 985154 (RA 9851) to include command
responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide
and other crimes.55 RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those
superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their
power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.

The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found
to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the
records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle,
Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply
with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino.

The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as there
is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

G.R. No. 187109.

Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo
or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings
should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since
any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately
protect.

The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is
misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules
strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory
motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to
state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered
by an amparo proceeding.

In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary
proceedings56 in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory
without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.57

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the following judgment:

1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED with modification in that respondents in G.R. No.
184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col.
Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately release Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino from detention.

The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED.

2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are directed to forthwith comply
with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or reassignment
to other places of assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No. 184495, the incumbent
commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the incumbent battalion commander of the 24th
Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino from detention.1awphi1

Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio
Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain personally impleaded in the petitions to answer for
any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further investigation
to determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents.

All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed at
monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of their results.
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT
Petitioners, vs.
 MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-
co- petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical
technologist under a two- year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00.

Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are
covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11,
2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March
17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for
illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia
Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there
was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held
that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00,
representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of
January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution5 of April 22,
2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year
period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not
be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot
be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private
employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal
for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant
and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency
may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages
awarded to overseas Custom Search workers.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution7 of June
27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract
specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of
Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply
the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.

Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to
master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the
"customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country."

Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the
foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document
agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so
since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of
Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its
foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s
liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals,
Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local
agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or
both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law
governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied).
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate
the plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its
foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before
petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.

As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable
since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into,
that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and
Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country,
the same was not substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they
wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge.

The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will
govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract,
Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law
is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they
must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the
Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of
one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy11
(Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation
terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of termination,12
both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign
Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of
reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she
was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was
validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a
copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat,
as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the
correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was
validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa
was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in
order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may
serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the
express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.