the incllect is aware of physical objets, and ta a frwareness doesnot invarably play any cata roc in pod, the pment tht Socrates whit. Rather the sen) nae ogni of Socrates and hs whiteness case an lca ture copnltion ofthe srs, and the rac, wich he toediac proximate cause ofthe pment tha Soca wer iBone in which the otllct Is aware of Socrts ae ts ‘hiteness, not indirectly, but crety. Ths, he says tami. Tultive cognition the thing itself seen and appre tmediaciy. without any lcrmedary between ay! te scu90 and aps that “in intultive cognition nothing than the object and the at Is required to repent ject" Thu, in thee pases, Ockham cey cn {Endorse icc alt postion nthe theory o knowles Further although Ockham would ot deny thx some fu beliefs about contingent sates of afar Inthe py wd he inferred from other belts, be nm that otal oe elite about such contingent states of aff are of hi Since we cannot Know infinitely many proposition iw kaw any contingent propositions, we mist know some contr Proposition norineeentaly. > And although Oban ca ‘ne poin where he is dacussing passages fom ANB) 5 that our know edge of owr own mena css the most 1 that we have. he never suggests tha lof our ce 0 present sates of afar in de physical world mus be ined From them. His considered opinion i that nut ops tt physical objects cause evident judgments, is mich {tite cognitions of mental acts do. $0 a kta ff memory in Reportar Il, q 12-13 concerned he e+ true of our memories of pat states of afar in tepid ror Buin Reportatio 41, he ake stephenie Uhrection, contending that ovr memories of such past Sls invariably "follow from ovr memories 0 8 P* mental act 14 Certainty and Scepticism in Ockham’s Epistemology the question of whether certain and infalible knowledge is (ermology, And repeatedly, the debate about ts answer has erent depend on what standards of erat have been pled. Sone philosophers have maintained that bli ha Fc coun st knowledge of, only is re and i the Teves has some infalible sign by means of which he can things, among irtancs of belt that 9 eve gemine on (tis impossible that any of out belief should tay eomdiion Gi). These philosophers are known 28 epics, Fee they conclude tat certain and infalible knowledge Inpomilefr human beings A tiefold response (1) Fhe mot ambitions of theie opponents feept the wceptcs standards for certain and infalible Gtowledge and argue that these standards are sometimes met bers report that no raion petson should accept the se Tele And they substitute “lower” alterative standards for aging the subject. For seeps ave not came hat ieponble for us to have certain Knowledge 2s meawred by te lower" standards, and ofen have allowed that—for a te know we do have i, (3) Sill other pilosophers, of tonger constitution, have acceped the seeps’ standards andIn the present chapter, I want to consider this drama is played out on the sage of Tate 13th and ealy Heh ey Epistemology. since the whole play would conse oan ‘el {shal tur the spotlight on Henry of Ghent, Dus Se, ‘Willan Ockham, and. Nicolas of AULEECOUR. Many Fees avtne secondary erature Bil Ockham a8 the chi a de TMedicval sceptics But, constrasting Ockham with these ah rset argue that ef wrong 0 cast hm in tha 1. THE PROBLEM AS POSED BY HENRY OF GHENT Although Heney’sSummae quaestionum ordinararan peimariy'a theological work, It begins withthe question erste? knowledge or cerain cogation of anything i pot ‘let and if so, to what extent tis posible for human er fhe purely natural powers. Oa the one hand, Hem cio Mgumens that must be posible () For example, Asc Sialoain that knowlecge tthe natural activity and end ofan wind secoedingly that for which each uman being has ate ‘ese Bur enerything must be abl ro attain is end Bs pat Satur powers: and itis impossible that any nate ould fe frustrated?) Again, Augustine contend ‘Sho douber whether he knows, knows atleast one thiag—Bs fhe doubts * On the other hand, Henry presents arch cls ‘on of arguments from anclent and Augustinian sous 2 Knowledge Is altogether impossible for human bela mong these, there the argument of the Academio Oi ‘Rrowledge is impossible, because there are no infil sit means of which to discriminate the tue som the le‘) nother group maintains that knowidge 1 imposible Kt fhuman beings, because all human perception bess i emer and the sees cannot bea source of certain cosine = rel (CERTAINTY AND SCEPTICISM, 83 toc oe thing, knowledge ofthe unadulerted tthe, & ‘Sr, able, ttalile grasp ofthe this oto be expected foot sensea gai, the sence prctve x mot tn sea Gites of things, nt ther cacao. Wore sil emble Sp trpcarot eros laine tims and cecomtances or 9 ferent pesclvrs athe sme time? Hence, the irellect forced to rey onthe senses would tureven acquire crtsiaty abou the sense pate of tings (Sai another aru finds knowledge imposnble for hamsn ‘he, aot cause of defects nour faculties of cogaon, but Sense mindindcpendent sable things af unknowable: Some held tha sc things have mo determinate peoperies® ‘her awcrcd that only wt sumable Kwa, ba sense hing change Tens defense of the possibilty of human knowledge con- ces something to many of hese arguments. Ax if snsing that Srcements mths mater ca often erie back to ang ‘dds of ceriony Heney tents four cern aking ERE cognitions a freedom from doubt and roe () ‘iyo che knows object and knowing sabes) alba rand) clanty. He them dtngles four ways in which Thowidge mate taken the degrees of ertany coerespand: grea, and how ts pone for human begs KNOWLEDGE IN THE BROAD SENSE exe's fst main distinction is between knowledge in the bosdsense which icles every certain cognition by which igi cognize ast iy apart from every fallacy and decep- ion fom knowledge propeey speaking by which the con- fomay of» thing with ke exemplar i ecognizd. From this Seeripdom and’ comment he makes in the next article}se would seem that every errorfee cognition counted i erage inthe broad sense. But other remarks an eas row hat ony error-free cognitions that we do 0, cam ae not daub ae incloded,'8 and indeed only ops or shoal ersiny making featre (2) and no) 6} and. at yeti als iypie by the fact ha Henry rept are division becween knowledge inthe Bron es Knowledge property speaking as exclsive vieneyttnke that knowledge in the broad sensei cle pons foe human Beings inthis ie by che payed mete fue ves ero srt of eases in which We ane Ppa tnt it "by exterior or alien vestimony”—. yi cane ch’s word fori Following Augustine’ katt aoe aor cademicon, Henry sesses the importance of Contr eet ithe says, we should be ignorant fe rary of many cebrated lands and cites, which wee Sean a for ourselves, We also depend upon the tstimons iter for our knowledge of the paste that hana es cease in de past." (2) The second is the testimony fam cae i nce. Henry insists that both we and the bet “eoms sometimes perceive things as they a apt fama area or deception, by means of Our senses In defen falaey ores to concede the Aristoelian claim that le Tae Rove a proper activiey sm wich sey engane wns in Menace rom doing s0 by someting ce He anges but, ofcourse, we may doubt errorfree sensory cogs te cample, we doubt whether oF not the sense fly 1 ati matural operation. Henry offers te folowing ar ol the reablic ofthe senses: nena piven deliverance af my sense of sight is tot con Aan Bremner race dciverances ofthe sense of sight of of ced by ove rete in me or someone els) or by a act A nr ing aed on other truer dativerances of the et fo cake that a sense of sight TePAENS see EE as ney are this ocason. “Nor.” Heney ads Ne Ps goubted that what we perceive in tis way We serie ts Nor sr aecessary 1 sexk any free sa inane cases in which the deiverance of 2 Bes 7 hoc contradicted at all, eter by other sensations Of PY Seat cognitions, As one of the angen again te ra ey often contradict each other and/or those of stones tenons sees, And even where this ig 80 actualy $7 wr robert 90, Hence, awe are vo make sil ESE Teer era we must he able to determine Ses (eareeocer of ur scnoe re eranr has od SIR Hees eins vs possiblity of human inow/edee Same dar eee ane semes contradict one another the femes Demure provide ur with ao erterion for choosing amon setae produced ina faculky whose operation is SSS