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Problemas filosóficos del análisis del lenguaje: Bloque 2

Robert Kelly
rkelly1@alumno.uned.es

March 22, 2011

General Terms and Mass Terms


1 Introduction
This essay discusses an externalist semantics of general terms and mass terms1 . A general
term is a term like ‘apple’, ‘computer’ or ‘bachelor’ that usually refers to a countable kind,
and a mass term is a term like ‘water’, ‘furniture’ or ‘money’ that usually refers to a non-
countable kind. Within the class of general terms and mass terms a distinction is usually
made between natural kind terms (‘apple’ and ‘water’), artifact kind terms (‘computer’ and
‘furniture’) and social kind terms (‘bachelor’ and ‘money’). These terms differ from proper
names (‘Rob’) or other singular terms (‘This student’), and also from definite descriptions
(‘The author of this article’)2 .

2 The Traditional Description Theory


The traditional description theory of reference for general terms3 posits that each term picks
out its referent or extension via an associated intension. The semantics of general terms
is then a matter of determining the exact nature of the intension, and how it determines
extension.
The simplest such semantic theory (attributable to Locke) maintains that each speaker
associates a concept with each general term in his or her private vocabulary. In this theory
a concept is something like a list of features or properties that provide the necessary and
sufficient conditions for including a candidate in the extension of a general term. For
example, a speaker might associate with the term ‘apple’ the concept consisting of the
properties edible, red, and grows on an apple tree. When the speaker uses the term ‘apple’
1
The organization and text of this essay is based on [12].
2
The entry for “Generality” in Tanesini’s Philosophy of Language A–Z identifies the difference between
general and mass terms and singular terms in their role in predication: “Unlike singular terms, general
terms can appear in the predicative position prefixed by the copula” [13].
3
Following [12] I will use ‘general term’ to mean ‘general term and mass term’ in the remainder of this
essay, except where the distinction is relevant.

1
he or she refers to a thing that is edible, red and grows on apple trees, and all things that
are edible, red and grow on apple trees fall within the extension of the term ‘apple’. Thus,
knowing the meaning of the general term ‘apple’ is knowing the associated concept, and
this concept determines what objects are included in the extension of the term.
While Locke himself never actually used these terms, his semantic theory can be inter-
preted as making a clear distinction between intension and extension (see the discussion
in [4, § V], for example). However, it is not always clear whether the intension in Locke’s
theory is not wholly subjective since the idea associated with a term in the mind of a
given speaker derives from distinctly subjective perceptions on the part of that speaker.
Frege, on the other hand, sharply distinguished the private mental representations that
individual speakers associate with terms from the sense and reference of those terms. In
Frege’s semantic theory each term expresses a definite sense that is independent of the
subjective ideas that different speakers associate with that term. This objective sense is,
however, “grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language. . . to which
it belongs” [3, p. 24]. The intension of a general term is then roughly aligned with its objec-
tive sense, although different speakers may grasp the sense in different ways. Importantly,
the sense of a term contains the “mode of presentation” of the term, a means of identifying
the reference (extension) of the term. In summary, for a given term “the reference. . . is
the object itself which we designate by its means; the idea, which we have in that case, is
wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the
idea, but is not yet the object itself” [3, p. 26].
Other variations on the description theory approach were developed by Carnap and
Wittgenstein (see the references given in [12, p. 276]). Carnap considered the intension of
a general term as a criterion, i.e. a method based on the “immediately given” for verifying
if a given object falls within the extension of the term or not. This criterion is again
something that is grasped by individual speakers. Wittgenstein proposed a ‘cluster’ theory
whereby the intension is a loose cluster of features. An object is included in the extension
of a term if it has sufficiently many of these features.
In the various description theories described here the intension of a general term can be
thought of as akin to a concept (albeit an objective concept to be grasped by the speakers of
a language). The description theory approach can then neatly explain necessary truth and
a prioricity in terms of analyticity. Thus, “All apples are edible” is an analytic truth, i.e.
true by virtue of the conceptual “definition” of the term ‘apple,’ and therefore a necessary
truth and knowable a priori. The description theory approach also neatly resolves the
question of essence: the essence of a kind (whether natural, artificial or social) is the
concept associated with the general term that picks out that kind4 . However, despite the
4
Locke distinguished between the real essence of a kind: the real constitution of its hidden and unknown
parts that gives rise to its observable properties, and the nominal essence of a kind: the association of those
observable properties with the kind in the human mind. The former essences being tied to individuals
are impermanent and subject to change, while the latter essences being abstract ideas in the mind are
permanent and incorruptible. Further, Locke was sceptical that real essences could be known by the mind.

2
apparent simplicity and elegance of the traditional description theory approach, Putnam
observes that it rests on two unchallenged assumptions that cannot be jointly satisfied by
any theory of meaning [8, p. 135–136]:

1. Knowing the intension of a term is a matter of being in a subjective psychological


state

2. The intension of a term determines its extension, i.e. two terms cannot have a
different extension and have the same intension since the intension of a term specifies
a necessary and sufficient condition for determining the extension of the term.

3 Putnam: The Meaning of “Meaning”


If psychological states are understood in a disembodied or “narrow” sense (cf. [8, p. 136–
137]) then knowing the intension of a term A with extension exta is a different psychological
state from knowing the intension of a term B with extension extb . Similarly, knowing that
the intension of the term A is inta1 is a different psychological state from knowing that
the intension of A is inta2 . This implies, however, that the unique subjective psychological
state that corresponds to knowing that the intension of the term A is some intension inta
must determine the extension of the term A, at least as much as the intension itself does
(from the second unchallenged assumption above). Equivalently, it is impossible for two
speakers to be in the exact same psychological state and for one speaker to know that
the intension of the term A is inta1 while the second speaker knows that the intension of
the same term A is inta2 . In The Meaning of “Meaning” Putnam flatly rejects this last
consequence, and accordingly rejects the consequence that subjective psychological states
determine extensions.
Putnam invites us to consider Twin Earth, a place exactly like Earth except that the
liquid there called “water” is not a substance with chemical composition H2 O, but one with
composition XYZ. Importantly, what is called “water” on Twin Earth is indistinguishable
from water, i.e. it fills the lakes and oceans of Twin Earth, falls as rain there, etc. On
discovering that what the inhabitants of Twin Earth call “water” is actually XYZ, a visitor
from Earth would conclude that the term ‘water’ on Twin Earth means XYZ, but that it
is definitely not water. Similarly, on discovering that what the inhabitants of Earth call
“water” is actually H2 O, a visitor from Twin Earth would conclude that the term ‘water’
on Earth means H2 O, but that it is definitely not water. Since the extension of the term
‘water’ is different on Earth and Twin Earth, the term has two meanings.
Despite the fact that a more advanced science than that which existed in Locke’s day may reveal the
presumed real essences of kinds, essence in the description theory approach is very much nominal essence:
it is the concept associated with a term that picks out the reference of the term, not something essential to
the objects thus picked out. The kinds picked out in the description theory approach are therefore nominal
kinds. Note, however, that nominal essence may coincide with real essence for certain sorts of things (cf.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter III).

3
However, consider Oscar on Earth before the rise of modern chemistry, and his dopp-
legänger Twin Oscar on Twin Earth before the rise of modern Twin Earth chemistry. Since
both Oscar and Twin Oscar are identical they are in the same psychological state as regards
what they know about the intension of the term ‘water.’ But since the extension of the
term as used by Oscar on Earth is different from the extension of the term as used by Twin
Oscar on Twin Earth they must somehow understand the term ‘water’ differently. The
rise of modern chemistry has made explicit that difference, but the extension of the term
‘water’ on Earth and on Twin Earth has remained the same. Thus, concludes Putnam,
“the extension of the term ‘water’ (and in fact, its ‘meaning’ in the intuitive preanalytical
usage of that term) is not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by itself” [8,
p. 141].
With the rise of modern chemistry a visitor to Twin Earth can know that the liquid
that resembles water there is not water since a chemical analysis of that liquid will reveal
that the composition of the liquid is not H2 O. However, the required analysis cannot be
performed by any visitor for the simple reason that the relevant techniques are known only
to certain specialists (chemists in this case). Thus, a non-chemist visitor must rely on
and trust the opinion of such an expert regarding the chemical composition of the liquid
resembling water. Further, it is not necessary that the non-chemist visitor even know that
water is H2 O. Putnam maintains that such a division of labour in a society entails a
division of linguistic labour whereby the society considered as a whole fixes the extension
(and therefore the meaning) of certain terms. This fixing of extension is based on the actual
nature of the thing(s) referred to and, as for the non-chemist visitor to Twin Earth, it is
not necessary for every speaker to know what that actual nature is. Putnam conjectures
that this division of linguistic labour is universal, i.e. common to all linguistic communities
[8, p. 146].
The fact that modern chemistry allows a visitor to Twin Earth to identify that “water”
on Twin Earth is in fact XYZ leads Putnam to the conclusion that XYZ is simply not
water, and that the term ‘water’ has a different meaning on Earth and Twin Earth. But
Putnam goes further: “once we have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as
a possible world in which water doesn’t have that nature” [8, p. 150]. Putnam claims
that an ostensive definition or an operational definition of a term like ‘water’ has a hidden
indexical component. Thus, the term ‘I’ in the phrase “I like philosophy” is indexical in
that the extension of the token ‘I’ changes depending on the speaker that actually says “I
like philosophy.” Similarly, when a speaker gives an ostensive definition or an operational
definition of a term like ‘water’ the extension of the term changes depending on who gives
the definition. For example, when a person gives the ostensive definition “This is water”
(and points) then something else is water if and only if it bears a certain sameness relation
to the stuff pointed at, i.e. something else is water if and only if it bears a certain sameness
relation to what the person has locally identified as water. Thus, taking this locality
into account, the extension of the term ‘water’ on earth is necessarily different from the
extension of the term on Twin Earth, and therefore the meaning of the term is necessarily

4
different on the two planets. Moreover, given that water has been discovered to be H2 O
on Earth, nothing counts as water for earthlings that is not H2 O; and being H2 O is the
sameness relation that something must bear to water if it is to in fact be water5 .
If the Twin Earth argument is correct then Oscar and Twin Oscar can be in an identical
psychological state, and yet each may assign a different extension to the general terms they
use. In other words, a difference in the meaning of a general term does not necessarily imply
a difference in the concept associated with that term in the mind of a speaker. Putnam
argues that the first unchallenged assumption of the traditional description theory given
at the end of section 2 must therefore be given up—the psychological state of a speaker
does not determine the intension of a general term. Regarding the second unchallenged
assumption, Putnam maintains that the meaning of a general term does determine its
extension; however, meaning is no longer identified with a necessary and sufficient condition
for determining the extension. Putnam instead hypothesizes that the extension of a general
term—and therefore its meaning—is determined in part socially via a division of linguistic
labour, and in part by the world via the indexical nature of general terms. In other words,
“knowledge of meanings is not something that is possible for a thinker in isolation. . . it
presupposes both interactions with the world and interactions with other language users”
[9, p. xvi].

4 Kripke: Naming and Necessity


In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke discusses a semantic theory that has many points
of contact with the indexical thesis described in the last section. Kripke’s theory is based
on what he calls rigid designators, where a rigid designator is defined as follows [5, p. 48]
(emphasis in original):

Let’s call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates


the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of
course we don’t require that the objects exist in all possible worlds. . . When we
think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of
that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a
necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

Kripke insists that a particular object cannot be identified with a bundle of qualities, or
even with the subset of its essential qualities, i.e. those properties the object has in every
5
Note, however, that the sameness relation that determines membership in the extension of a natural
kind term—or, indeed, in the extension of an artificial kind term since Putnam claims his semantics extends
to these terms as well [8, p. 160–164]—need not necessarily rely on a given hidden structure. As Putnam
makes clear: “if there is a hidden structure, then generally it determines what it is to be a member of the
natural kind, not only in the actual world, but in all possible worlds” [8, p. 160]. On the other hand, if
there is no single identifiable hidden structure then hidden structure “becomes irrelevant, and superficial
characteristics become the decisive ones” [8, p. 160].

5
counterfactual world in which it exists. Moreover, the essential properties of an object are
not even necessarily used to identify the object in the actual world.
Kripke’s argument for his position echos Putnam’s ostensive definitions [5, p. 52–53]
(emphasis in original):
Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by
its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask
whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about
it. . . We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it.
Thus, pointing at a table in the actual world and saying “this table here” is, using Putnam’s
term, an ostensive definition whereby the reference of ‘this table’ is fixed for all possible
worlds, i.e. it is a rigid designator. Similarly, the definition “The king’s desk is the table
in the study” fixes the referent for the phrase ‘The king’s desk’ for all possible worlds
by stipulating that ‘The king’s desk’ is to be a rigid designator of the table that in the
actual world is in the study. Note, however, that that particular table could have been in
a different room in a different possible world. ‘The king’s desk’ should not therefore be
interpreted as an abbreviation for, or synonymous with, the description ‘the table in the
study’ if the purpose of the description is to fix the referent; the fact that that particular
table is in the study is an accidental property of that table, but one which is used in the
definition to designate that particular table. And, in fact, any accidental property could
have been used to fix the referent for ‘The king’s table’, e.g. the table with the coffee stain,
etc. However, no such property of the table should be interpreted as “essential” in any way
since in a different possible world that property might not hold of the table. On the other
hand, the actual table picked out by a definition based on an accidental property will be
the same table in every possible world.
Thus, for Kripke, the “[i]mportant properties of an object need not be essential . . . and
an object could have had properties very different from its most striking actual properties,
or from the properties we use to identify it [in the actual world]” [5, p. 77] (emphasis in
original). The implication for natural kind terms is that, similar to Putnam’s position,
the reference of a term is not determined by a unique description, or even by a collection
or “cluster” of descriptions, known by the speaker to hold of the referent. The reason is
that in a different possible world any property specified by a given description need not
apply to the object(s) of the reference, i.e. such descriptions do not necessarily act as rigid
designators. In the case of water, for example, the description “fills the lakes and seas of
the world” is a contingent fact about the world, i.e. an alternative possible world can be
stipulated whereby mercury, and not water, fills the lakes and seas of the world, and so the
description is not a rigid designator. On the other hand, this description, which represents
a contingent fact, can be used in a definition to fix the referent of the term ‘water’—as
distinct from giving the meaning—as in the example of ‘The king’s table’ above. In this
case, ‘water’ does act as a rigid designator since no possible world can be stipulated in
which ‘water’ does not refer to the stuff that fills the lakes and seas of the actual world,

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i.e. water. Further, if we discover that the lakes and seas of the actual world are not in
fact filled with water, but are filled with something else, e.g. XYZ as on Twin Earth, then
under this theory the conclusion is not that there is no water at all, as would seem to be
implied by the description theory (since part of the description aligned to the term ‘water’
was that it fill the lakes and seas, and if nothing now satisfies that description then the
term does not refer). Rather, the conclusion is that it has turned out that water does not
fill the lakes and seas after all, and that for whatever reason we were blind to this fact up
to the present. This latter conclusion agrees with intuition about what we would say faced
with cases of this type.
In Kripke’s theory, the referent of a proper name is determined via a “baptism,” and
the name spreads via a chain of communication such that there is always a route back to
the original referent [5, p. 91]:

Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name [an
initial ‘baptism’]. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet
him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as
if by a chain. A speaker who is at the far end of this chain, who has heard
about, say Richard Feynman. . . may be referring to Richard Feynman even
though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman. . . a chain of
communication going back to Feynman himself has been established, by virtue
of his membership in a community which passed the name on from link to link.

Such baptismal ceremonies, and the corresponding chains of communication, can be ex-
tended to general terms: a given substance or entity is baptised using a term, and as the
term spreads among speakers of the language community the link to the original referent is
maintained. Further, it is understood that all substances or entities of the same underlying
kind are to be referred to using that term. Of course, the baptisers of a term need not
understand precisely how to decide whether a given substance or entity is to be included in
the referent of the term, and the underlying essence of the referent may only be discovered
later. Crucially, the essence of the referent of a term is discovered empirically rather than
being specified via a definition. Thus, while the underlying essence of a kind will provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for determining the referent of a term, essence is dis-
covered empirically, and these conditions cannot be known a priori, nor do they generate
analytic truths. Furthermore, these conditions are not exempt from revision: continuing
empirical investigation could lead to a revision of the currently valid scientific theories
which determine whether something is to be included in the referent of most natural kind
terms. Note, however, that a change in theory is not a change in meaning. Rather, it is
a change in those conditions used to determine whether a given substance or entity is in
the reference of a term. This is implied by the rigidity of general terms. Once discovered,
however, an underlying essence will generate necessary truths.

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5 Criticism
The semantic theories outlined in sections 3 and 4 can be considered as two versions of
a single “direct reference theory” for the purposes of this essay. Both theories reject the
traditional description theory account of reference whereby the reference of a general term
is determined by some cluster of “non-rigid” descriptions. Instead, reference is fixed via
direct causal contact with the referent via a baptism, or ostensive definition. Criticism of
the direct reference theory can be grouped into four broad categories [12, § IV]: restricted
applicability, the Qua problem, the non-rigidity of general terms, and the lack of an essential
underlying trait for natural kinds6 .

5.1 Restricted Applicability


In his original discussion of indexicality, Putnam concedes that the framework of indexical-
ity cannot be extended to all general terms. Thus, “one-criterion” terms such as ‘bachelor’
are analytically defined, e.g. “unmarried man,” and so are not indexical (cf. [7, p. 295–
296]). However, Putnam does argue that pencils, for example, are indexical. Putnam
again invites us to imagine a Twin Earth that is exactly like Earth, except that pencils
are in fact living, reproducing organisms, and that this fact about pencils is unknown to
the inhabitants of Twin Earth. A visitor from Earth, on discovering this state of affairs
with respect to “pencils,” would not then conclude that some pencils are organisms, but
instead conclude that the things called “pencils” on Twin Earth are not really pencils, but
organisms. Thus, “whether the ‘pencil-organisms’ on Twin Earth (or in another possible
universe) are really pencils or not is a function of whether or not the local pencils are or-
ganisms or not. . . That pencils are artifacts is necessary in the sense of true in all possible
worlds. . . ‘Pencil’ is just as indexical as ‘water’ or ‘gold’ ” [8, p. 161–162].
Contrary to Putnam, Schwartz has argued that indexicality cannot be sensibly extended
to artifact kind terms at all [10]. Continuing with Putnam’s example, Schwartz concedes
that what passes for pencils on Twin Earth would not be pencils, but points out that this
thought experiment considers only the restricted case of pencil-organisms. On the other
hand, “something can fail to be an artifact and yet not be an organism. . . it is not sufficient
to show that there could not be organism counterexamples. One must show that given that
local pencils are artifacts there could not be any nonartifactual pencils” [10, p. 570–571].
Schwartz is of the opinion that such nonartifactual pencils are conceivable, e.g. a pencil
created ex nihilo by a lightning bolt. Further, in order to decide if a given object is to
be included in the reference of an artifact kind term, some underlying essence must be
available that identifies the local artifacts picked out by that term. Schwartz denies that
6
Note that for reasons of brevity objections to the direct reference theory based on an internalist phi-
losophy of language are not diccussed here. The version of internalism defended by Noam Chomsky, for
example, rejects any externalist semantics as inconsistent, incoherent and ultimatley irrelevant for a sci-
entific understanding of language. See [1] for a detailed discussion of Chomsky’s position with respect to
these issues.

8
such an underlying essence exists for any artifact. In the case of pencils, “[w]hat makes
something a pencil are superficial characteristics such as a certain form or function. There
is nothing underlying about these features. They are analytically associated with the
term ‘pencil,’ not disclosed by scientific investigation” [10, p. 571]. Thus, without any
underlying essence, these “superficial characteristics” determine if a given object is to be
included in the reference of the artifact kind term. Schwartz concludes that many, if not all,
artifact kind terms cannot be indexical as claimed by Putnam, and that the semantics of
such nonindexical general terms can be accounted for by the traditional description theory
approach. Shwartz suggests that his analysis also extends to social kind terms, e.g. ‘pet’.

5.2 The Qua Problem


The Qua problem concerns the manner in which a baptism actually fixes the reference for
a general term. In the case of an ostentive definition, in particlar, it is difficult to see how
pointing at a sample and declaring “This is gold” can actually “hook up” ([7]) the term
‘gold’ to its reference. In the absence of an underlying essence, which is not usually known
at the time of the baptism, there are innumerable features that the baptizer could use to
identify what things are to be included in the reference for the term. In the case of the
term ‘gold,’ for example, the baptizer might want an external physical quality to count,
e.g. lustre, colour, etc. or perhaps the location of the sample, e.g. found in rivers, or
the time of year when it was discovered, e.g. autumn. However, the baptizer of a term
must pick out one of these features, i.e. “the baptizer must think that he is baptizing the
object qua one of these features” [12, p. 282], and it is difficult to imagine how this is done
in the absence of descriptions. It is true that Kripke, more so than Putnam, explicitly
discusses the use of descriptions that represent accidental properties of objects in order
to fix the reference of a term. On the other hand, Kripke seems always to imply that
such descriptions are superflous, and that baptisms can take place in their absence. In
the absence of such descriptions, it is not clear how the idea of a baptism could extend to
artificial kind terms.

5.3 Non-rigitidy of General Terms


It turns out on reflection that the majority of general terms might not in fact be rigid
designators after all. The reason is that, if the reference of a term is the set of all objects
or substances to which the term applies, then this set of objects and substances will be
different in different possible worlds. The set of all water molecules, for example, will vary
from one possible world to another, and so the reference of the term ‘water’ must also vary.
Therefore, the term cannot be a rigid designator.
A proposal which aims to address this criticism is to replace the object references of
general terms with kinds. According to this proposal, terms rigidly designate kinds, and
not individual objects or substances. In LaPorte’s words: “a kind designator designates the

9
same abstract kind (or other entity) in every possible world, even if the concrete individuals
instantiating the respective kind, and comprising the term’s extension, vary from world to
world” [7, p. 294] (emphasis in original).
It has been alleged that this conception of general terms as kind designators trivializes
the notion of rigidity by making all designators of kinds rigid, and so the value of rigidity is
lost. LaPorte [7] argues that the kind designator approach naturally accomodates artifical
kind terms as rigid designators since they no longer face the objections discussed by Shwartz
in the previous section. More striking, however, is LaPorte’s argument that “one-criterion”
terms, which also come out rigid on this approach, should in fact be rigid. Thus, the term
‘bachelor,’ for example, rigidly designates the bachelor kind under the kind designator
approach. LaPorte argues that there is no reason for denying these terms rigidity status,
and that the criticism of trivializing rigidity is based on a confusion about what rigidity
actually is: a rigid designator is simply one which designates the same entity in all possible
worlds, and it says nothing about how reference is fixed. The latter task is achieved for
names and natural kind terms via the initial baptisms that form the basis of the causal
theory of reference (cf. section 4). On the other hand, the reference of artificial and social
kind terms are typically fixed by a set of a priori conditions derived from the properties
that speakers associate with the particular kind, e.g. the reference of ‘bachelor’ is fixed by
the two conditions of being male and unmarried. However, the particular way in which the
reference of a term is fixed does not prevent that term from rigidly designating. Thus, the
different terms are correctly distinguished on the basis of how their references are fixed,
and not on the basis of rigidity [7, p. 304]. In any case, descriptions do not come out rigid
on the kind designator approach so it cannot be argued that all designators of kinds come
out rigid.
LaPorte further argues that a conception of general terms rigidly designating kinds
does not shut out designators that should come out rigid, and rejects outright a number
of arguments that question the rigidity of terms such as H2 O that are typically analyzed
as rigid. Thus, under the kind designator approach proposed by LaPorte only those terms
that should come out rigid do in fact come out rigid.
Schwartz, in a reply to LaPorte, argues that the kind designator approach is a failed
attempt to recast general terms as singlular terms, and summarizes the “deep issues” at
play in LaPorte’s approach as follows: “The problem with LaPorte’s position is that, as
standardly understood, in possible worlds there aren’t any kinds at all. . . kinds may have
an important role in our common sense understanding of the world and even in science
but they don’t have a metaphysical status that is useful to formal semantics” [11, p. 268].
But apart from these metaphysical problems, Schwartz argues that the approach does in
fact trivialize rigidity after all. The issue, as Swartz sees it, is that one-criterion terms,
for example, simply do not fit the bill of rigid designators: “The fact that LaPorte does
not offer any candidates for necessarily true but a posteriori identities with terms like
‘soda’, ‘bachelor’, or ‘hunter’ – and none spring to mind – strongly suggests that LaPorte’s
preferred account is no solution at all” [11, p. 271]. According to Schwartz, the truth of

10
identities involving these terms is based on meaning and not on empirical discovery, i.e.
they are analytic truths. Schwartz extends his argument to natural kind terms naming
species, and claims that the truth of identities involving these terms is based on decision
rather than discovery, and thus that as truths they are “rather analytic.” The root of the
problem, according to Schwartz, is that LaPorte’s proposal reduces rigidity to consistency
of meaning of words across all possible worlds. But this means that virtually all general
terms will come out rigid since words trivially keep their meaning across possible worlds
and so LaPorte’s solution must be abandoned as rigidity has become an empty concept [11,
p. 273]. Schwartz goes further and claims that, while the rigid/non-rigid distinction helps
to illuminate the semantics of names and singular terms, “we have no clear explanation
of what it means for a general term to be rigid and the notion of rigidity with respect to
general terms does no work that cannot be done better by clearer notions” [11, p. 275].
The implication is clear: the notion of rigidity should be abandoned in the case of general
terms since it does “no work at all.”

5.4 Essential Underlying Traits


The first objection to the direct reference theory discussed above claimed that artificial
and social kind terms do not have any distinguishing underlying trait, and so cannot
be indexical. However, John Dupré claims that even natural kind terms for biological
organisms do not have any obvious underlying biological essence that can be discovered
empirically, and so these terms are not indexical either [2].
Dupré argues that even in the case of “taxanomic realism”, i.e. assuming that a single
and unambiguously correct taxonomic theory exists, whereby each organism would have
the essential properties of the taxa to which it belongs, the extension of a prescientific
natural kind term fixed via a baptism need not necessarily have any distinct taxonomic
correlate [2, p. 73]. In other words, the extension of a natural kind term from ordinary
language may not be coextensive with any branch of the taxonomic system. Further,
due to the hierarchical structure of a taxonomic system there are a number of logically
possible sameness relations that can be used to determine if a new organism falls within
the extension of a particular term, but no sensible way to select any single such relation
as the definitive one to use. In any case, continues Dupré, taxonomic realism is untenable:
“whereas there is an interesting case to be made for the reality of the species, there seems to
be almost no case for taxonomic realism at any higher level of classification. . . higher taxa
are assumed to be arbitrarily distinguished and do not reflect the existence of real kinds” [2,
p. 78]. Given that those ordinary language terms for organisms that do have an approximate
taxonomic correlate generally coincide with taxa higher than the level of species, and that
such higher taxa do not reflect real kinds, it is not clear that any sameness relation can
be identified for picking out the reference of these ordinary language terms. Even where
an ordinary language term for an organism does have an approximate taxonomic correlate
at the species level, Dupré argues that no appropriate sameness relation is possible in this

11
case either since species lack essential properties to ground such a relation. Dupré discusses
how different expert groups have proposed different strategies to demarcate the species:
by shared genetic material, by reproductive isolation and by evolutionary history. None of
these strategies can be thought of as definitive or “privileged.” Rather, each simply picks
out equally real but different sameness relations. Dupré does not claim that species do
not exist, but only that “the assignment of individuals to species may be only partially
determinate” [2, p. 90].
Dupré is not alone in doubting real essences in the case of species. LaPorte, for exam-
ple7 , in the concluding paragraphs of the article discussed in the previous section states:
“Countless pages have been devoted since Darwin to the search for the nature of biological
species. . . And the reason for the competition seems to be that there simply is no answer as
to what the defining properties of the prescientific category ‘species’ are.” [7, p. 310]. La-
Porte has also questioned the existence of real essences for chemical kind terms like ‘water’
and ‘gold’ [6], the principal examples used by Putnam and Kripke to argue for the direct
reference theory. Similar to Dupré’s argument for the indeterminacy of biological species,
LaPorte argues that a paradigmatic sample of a chemical substance will have numerous
microstructural and macrostructural properties that give rise to numerous corresponding
sameness relations. However, no single such relation can be objectively identified as the
“definitive” sameness relation. Thus, even if the range of relations is restricted to the mi-
crostructural level, the choice of definitive sameness relation is largely indeterminate, and
consequently “[t]here is no right or wrong choice between competing, perhaps overlapping
microstructural features, as to which distinguishes water or another kind” [6, p. 116]. The
extension of ‘opal,’ for example, is based on the feature of chemical composition despite
the fact that there are differences between opals with respect to microstructural features
[6, p. 121]. Conversely, the extension of ‘jade’ is not based on chemical or mineralogical
composition, but on the microstructural feature of having a distinct fibrous structure [6,
Note 7].
In any case, LaPorte argues, there is more to the semantics of natural kind terms than
microstructure alone. The extension of ‘topaz’ includes all those substances that share a
common chemical composition despite the fact that there are colour variations between
different types of topaz. On the other hand, the extension of ‘ruby’ excludes certain
substances that share a common chemical composition because those substances do not
share the colour red [6, p. 122]. Similarly, the extension of ‘topaz’ excludes substances
that closely resemble topaz, e.g. citrine, because those substances do not share a similar
microstructure, and yet ‘jade’ crosses microstructural boundaries since it refers to two
completely different mineral types, i.e. jadeite and nephrite [6, p. 124]. Such variation
indicates that the choice of sameness relation for a kind is ultimately arbitrary, and is not
necessarily based on a microstructure that represents the underlying essence of the kind.
7
See also the references given by Wilkerson in his brief review of relatively recent work that examines the
nature of biological species and the traditional claim that they correspond to natural kinds [14, p. 229–230].

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Thus, against the direct reference theory, if a new substance is discovered that has the same
chemical composition as rubies, it may not be be included in the reference of that term
unless it has a sufficiently reddish-pinkish colour. Failing that, it may yet be included in
the reference of the term ‘jade’ if it sufficiently resembles other jades. So surface properties
are important for the semantics of natural kind terms even where chemical microstructure
is fully known.
Putnam recognized that cases like those discussed here could arise whereby microstruc-
tural properties were not enough to determine reference, and that superficial characteristics
would then become decisive. In this context Putnam even briefly discussed the case of jade
[8, p. 160]. However, what Putnam perhaps failed to recognize was the arbitrary nature of
the sameness relation for determining the reference of a natural kind term, whether this
relation is based on microstructural or macrostructural properties. This negates the thesis
that one of the many possible sameness relations is privileged, and so denies that sameness
relations reflect underlying essences for kinds.

6 Conclusion
The work of Putnam and Kripke provide compelling arguments for the position that the
real world plays a crucial role in the semantics of general terms. Further, the division
of linguistic labour discussed by Putnam argues that the social environment of speakers
forms a crucial part of that real world within which language and communication take place.
The division of linguistic labour reflects a division of labour whereby community experts
are charged with unequivocally fixing the reference of certain terms based on knowing or
discovering the essential underlying traits of the objects or substances referred to. However,
this division of linguistic labour is subject to the objection that it places an unjustified
faith in the ability of those experts to find those essential properties. That such essential
properties exist has been doubted by both Dupré and LaPorte, both of whom argue that,
from all the possible similarities and differences that exist between objects and substances,
no single relation is privileged, and that different experts working with the same stuff will
single out different relations depending on their needs or interests. This is convincingly
illustrated, for example, by Dupré for the term ‘species’ [2, § V], and by LaPorte for various
terms related to gemstones [6]. If the reference of general terms in general is indeterminate
in the way Dupré and LaPorte claim then it is difficult to see how general terms can be
indexical. General terms may still be rigid, however, if LaPorte is correct that general
terms refer to abstract kinds rather than individuals [7]. Thus, even though a term may
refer to different kinds at different times, e.g. before and after the rise of modern science, it
would at all times refer rigidly to a kind, if it referred at all [7, p. 309]. Whether or not this
is the correct analysis, the direct reference approach has decisively deposed the traditional
description theory in the philosophy of language—although it may still be relevant in other
disciplines that have not rejected outright an internalist conception of meaning (cf. [1]).

13
References
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[2] John Dupré. Natural kinds and biological taxa. The Philosophical Review, 90(1):66–90,
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[3] Gottlob Frege. On sense and reference. In A.W. Moore, editor, Meaning and Reference,
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[4] Norman Kretzmann. The main thesis of Locke’s semantic theory. The Philosophical
Review, 77(2):175–196, 1968.

[5] Saul Kripke. Naming and Necessity. Basil Blackwell, 1980.

[6] Joe LaPorte. Chemical kind term reference and the discovery of essence. Nous,
30(1):112–132, 1996.

[7] Joseph LaPorte. Rigidity and kind. Philosophical Studies, 97(3):293–316, 2000.

[8] Hilary Putnam. The meaning of “meaning”. In Herbert Freigl and Grover Maxwell,
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[9] Hilary Putnam. Introduction. In Andrew Pessin and Sanford Goldberg, editors, The
Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam’s “The Meaning
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[10] Stephen P. Schwartz. Putnam on artifacts. The Philosophical Review, 87(4):566–574,


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[11] Stephen P. Schwartz. Kinds, general terms, and rigidity: A reply to LaPorte. Philo-
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[12] Stephen P. Schwartz. General terms and mass terms. In Michael Devitt and Richard
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Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

[13] Alessandra Tanesini. Philosophy of Language A–Z. Edinburgh University Press, 2007.

[14] T.E. Wilkerson. Recent work on natural kinds. Philosophical Books, 39(4):225–233,
1998.

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