Weapon Effectiveness

A Tool for Evaluating the Effectiveness of a
Warship’s Weapons Outfit
By
Peter Barnard
Thesis submitted for the degree of

Master of Science in Naval Architecture
Faculty of Engineering, University College London, University of London
Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering

University College London,
University of London
September 2005
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Abstract
This report sets out to describe the development, evaluation and testing of an early stage
concept design tool to assist in the topside layout of weapons systems on a warship. By
optimising the weapons layout in an objective fashion it is hoped to reduce the
susceptibility of a vessel to damage especially from the anti – shipping missile threat.
Concept design is never an unbounded problem there are always significant cost, space
or weight constraints. This software aims to help the naval architect develop an
optimum solution combined with a better appreciation of the nature of the design
constraints.
To allow the application of this tool to a ship with arbitrary weapons fit each weapon
system is defined in terms of its range, speed and probability of kill. Using a Paramarine
model of the ship and a three dimensional coordinate for the weapon, the software can
automatically calculate the appropriate blockage diagrams. Blockage diagrams can also
be calculated and entered by hand if Paramarine data is not available.
The simulation uses a model based on an idealised and automated Type 42 anti air
warfare section to engage a user defined threat scenario. The simulation is capable of
engaging multiple targets simultaneously and selecting the most appropriate weapon for
each engagement. Targets may be engaged repeatedly and by different systems so long
as they are in range, unblocked and have ammunition.
The simulation has been found to reach similar solutions to those achieved by a human
conducting the same engagement. The simulation generally returns slightly poorer
absolute capability values than would be achieved by a human due to the limitations on
software decision making. Of far greater importance to this study is the consistency and
speed of decision the computer allows this permits direct comparison of many weapons
fits.
To allow the naval architect a complete appreciation of the design the simulation can be
run a number of times with the threat scenario being rotated around the ship to test the
ships defences from all directions. It should be understood that a ship may not require
good all round defences, this will depend on the envisaged operations, ship’s
manoeuvrability and value.
Though weapons positioning is important in upper deck layout there are often a number
of arrangements that can provide similar capability. The steady refinement of vertical
launch missile systems and phased array radars both almost immune to blockage effects,
has pushed the issue of coverage arcs lower down the list of constraints than ever
before. It appears that electromagnetic issues must now be considered the governing
factor in selecting weapons systems locations.
It is proposed that the development work on this tool is halted as it is sufficiently

maturity to allow effective optimisation of coverage arcs. It is proposed that topside
design research should continue and investigate a concept stage tool to assist the naval
architect in the electromagnetic aspects of both weapons system placement and
superstructure – sensor interaction.
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Acknowledgements
Particular thanks are due to David Fellows, Professor Rusling and Professor Andrews
for their assistance and counsel. A number of other staff have contributed to this work
including Richard Pawling, Tim McDonald and Triston Smith. Many others both staff
and student have provided moral and technical support all of which is greatly
appreciated.
I am also greatly indebted to Mark Downer (Naval Architecture Team Leader) and Jim
Fraser (Topside Design Manager) of BAE Systems Type 45 project office who gave
generously both of their time and knowledge.
Authors Note
This dissertation is concerned with a number of areas that are potentially militarily
sensitive. It should be noted all data presented in this report is from openly published
work.
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Table of Contents
Nomenclature ....................................................................................................................9
List of Figures .................................................................................................................10
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................10
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................11
1.1 Aims ................................................................................................................12
2 Combat Modelling ..................................................................................................12
2.1 Modelling of Naval Command and Control Systems .....................................12
2.1.1 Type 42 Destroyer...................................................................................13
2.1.2 Aegis System...........................................................................................14
2.1.3 Application of Model to Simulation .......................................................14
2.2 Review of UCL Engagement Analysis Teaching Tool...................................15
2.2.1 Outline of Method ...................................................................................15
2.2.2 Simplifications for Hand Calculation......................................................16
2.2.3 Layers......................................................................................................17
2.2.4 Saturation Attacks ...................................................................................17
2.2.5 Naval Guns..............................................................................................17
2.3 Existing Models of Air Defence .....................................................................18
2.4 Engagement Scenarios ....................................................................................19
2.4.1 Blue Water Scenario ...............................................................................19
2.4.2 Littoral Scenario......................................................................................20
2.4.3 Scale of Threat ........................................................................................20
2.4.4 Axis of Threat .........................................................................................21
3 Optimisation Criteria...............................................................................................21
4 Software Design ......................................................................................................23
4.1 Language Selection .........................................................................................23
4.2 System Architecture ........................................................................................23
4.3 Simulation Process ..........................................................................................23
4.3.1 Initial Setup .............................................................................................23
4.3.2 Targeting the Threat................................................................................24
4.3.3 Engaging the Threat ................................................................................25
4.3.4 Simulation Continuation .........................................................................26
4.4 Missile Targeting ............................................................................................26
4.5 Weapons Systems ...........................................................................................27
4.6 Blockage Assessment......................................................................................27
4.6.1 Automated Blockage Assessment ...........................................................27
5 Simulation testing ...................................................................................................29
5.1 Blockage Assessment......................................................................................29
5.2 Assumptions....................................................................................................29
5.3 LPD 17 ............................................................................................................30
5.4 Validation........................................................................................................30
5.5 Optimal Weapon Selection .............................................................................32
5.6 Weapon Repositioning ....................................................................................36
5.7 Multiple Threat Axis Analysis ........................................................................36
5.7.1 Numerical Results ...................................................................................36
5.7.2 Graphical Results ....................................................................................37
5.7.3 Practicalities ............................................................................................39
5.7.4 Conclusion ..............................................................................................39
6 Limitations of Simulation .......................................................................................40
6.1 Limited Scope of Work...................................................................................40
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6.2 Passing Missiles ..............................................................................................40
6.3 Dedicated AAW Ship Design .........................................................................40
6.4 Decision Making .............................................................................................41
6.5 Sea Clutter Effects...........................................................................................41
6.6 Blockage Effects .............................................................................................42
6.6.1 Uncertainty..............................................................................................42
6.6.2 Mutual Blockage .....................................................................................42
6.7 Run Time.........................................................................................................43
7 Conclusions .............................................................................................................43
7.1 Early Stage Design..........................................................................................43
7.2 Teaching..........................................................................................................44
7.3 Further Work...................................................................................................44
8 References ...............................................................................................................45
Appendix A Taught Scenario ......................................................................................47
Appendix B Software Flow Diagrams ........................................................................51
Appendix C Simulation User Guide............................................................................71
Appendix D Paramarine DXF File Format..................................................................79
Appendix E Blockage Assessment Validation............................................................81
Appendix F LPD 17 ....................................................................................................87
Appendix G Validation Calculation ............................................................................91
Appendix H LPD 17 Analysis ...................................................................................103
Appendix I Simulation Code and Executables.........................................................114
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Nomenclature
The worlds of both Naval architecture and weapons systems are notorious for their
abbreviation and acronyms, every effort has been made to avoid unnecessary usage , the
unavoidable or useful are detailed below.
AAW Anti – Air Warfare

AAWO Anti – Air Warfare Officer
ADAWS Action Data Automated Weapons System
ADMS Area Defence Missile System
AEGIS US Navy Aegis Weapon System
APAR Advanced Phased Array Radar.
APT Air Picture Team
C2 Command and Control
CI Capability Index
CIWS Close In Weapons System
CS Coordinate System
DXF AutoCAD File Format
EM Electro Magnetic
EMI Electro Magnetic Interference
EO Electro Optical
Exocet Anti Shipping Missile, MM38, MBDA Missiles
FAC Fast Attack Craft
Harpoon AGM -84 Harpoon Missile
IR Infra Red
MDG (Lockheed Martin) Millennium Gun
Ottomat Anti Shipping Missile, manufacturer: Otto Melara & Matra
PAAMS Principal Anti Air Missile System
Paramarine Naval Architecture Software by GRC Ltd
PDMS Point Defence Missile System
Phit Probability of one or more missiles hitting ship
PK Probability of Kill
RAM (Raytheon) Rolling Airframe Missile. Also Radar Absorbent
Material.
SurfCon Surface Ship Early Stage Design (Part of Paramarine)
Type 42 UK Royal Navy Type 42 Destroyer
UCL University College London
UCS Universal Coordinate System
Vickers Mk 8 Vickers MK8 4.5in Naval Gun
VLS Vertical Launch (Missile) System
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - Type 42 AAW Section Model........................................................................13
Figure 2 - Simulation Model ...........................................................................................15
Figure 3 - Blue Water Scenario.......................................................................................19
Figure 4 - Littoral Flight Profile......................................................................................20
Figure 5 - Capability Frontier ........................................................................................22
Figure 6 – UCS Frame of Reference...............................................................................24
Figure 7 - Radar Horizon ................................................................................................25
Figure 8 - Sample Blockage Diagram.............................................................................28
Figure 9 - Weapons Coordinate ......................................................................................29
Figure 10 - Cost Capability study for LPD 17 ................................................................33
Figure 11 - Low Cost Systems: Cost - Capability ..........................................................34
Figure 12 - Multiple Weapon System Cost Capability ...................................................35
Figure 13 - Capability of Different Weapon Locations ..................................................36
Figure 14 - Weapons Configurations ..............................................................................38
Figure 15 - Probability of Detection as Function of Range ............................................41
Figure 16 - Uncertainty Caused by Obstructions............................................................42
Figure 17 - LPD 17, 3D Blockage Model .......................................................................63
List of Tables
Table 1 – Missiles allocated per ship ..............................................................................21
Table 2 - Summary of Validation Testing ......................................................................31
Table 3 - Summary of Probabilities ................................................................................31
Table 4 – System Costs ...................................................................................................33
Table 5 - Best Four Weapons Configurations.................................................................37
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1 Introduction
When designing a warship the key aim is to deliver a ship which maximises the fighting
capability for a given cost. Conventional naval architecture considers a ship in terms of
its ability to float, move and fight, generally in that order. “Float, Move, Fight” is also
considered to be the order of priority when considering damage control activities, to be
effective each function must be supported by those that go before it.
Naval architects are well trained to consider both the initial design and survivability of a
ship in terms of its float and move functions. This means that the naval architect often
takes decisions early in the design phase regarding hydromechanics, structure and
architecture without fully appreciating the consequences the decision will have on the
ships ability to fight.
In restricting the ships fighting ability (all be it accidentally) the naval architect has
seriously compromised the ships overall survivability. Survivability is a broad concept
that encompasses three aspects:
• Susceptibility – how likely the ship is to be hit by a threat
• Vulnerability – how likely the ship is to be disabled once hit
• Recoverability – how likely is it that the ship can be repaired after being hit.
This report is concerned purely with the vessels susceptibility to attack. Susceptibility
can be further broken down in to specific areas for consideration:
• Signatures. The designer seeks to minimise the ships visual, thermal and radar
signatures to reduce the probability of detection, or delay it as long as possible.
This area is presently receiving a lot of attention. Modern ships such as the
Swedish Visby Corvette and the US DDX program are indicative of the progress
made in this area.
• Defensive weapons and systems selection. Once the ship has been detected it
must be able to defend itself. A lot of work presently goes in to selecting the
appropriate combination of active and passive defensive systems.
• Weapon and sensor disposition. This is complex to assess at the concept design
stage. Present work is largely qualitative and highly dependent on the experience
and knowledge of the naval architect.
It is on the last two areas that this work is focused. It is hoped that the development of a
quantitative tool will assist weapon selection and more importantly allow weapon
disposition to be addressed in a genuinely objective fashion.
UCL currently illustrates how a ships susceptibility to a given threat scenario can be
assessed using a hand calculation method [1]. This method was developed primarily as
a teaching aid based on similar exercise run by MIT [2]. The exercise takes
approximately 6 hours to complete for a single weapons fit, position and threat scenario.
In the context of concept design decision making this period of time is prohibitively
long, particularly given the number of configurations that can be trialled on a blank
canvass ship.
Previous work has been conducted at UCL by Skarda [3] in addressing the susceptibility
issue however it has not progressed beyond the stage of a single missile engagement.
This work also still requires a human decision maker and this leads to a slower and less
consistent analysis than a computer based algorithm can achieve.
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1.1 Aims
The aim of this work is to address the shortfall in UCL’s range of tools described in
Section 1. It is intended to develop, validate and demonstrate a software solution to
allow selection of the optimum weapons outfit and disposition.
Using engagement scenario modelling the simulation will be able to assess the
effectiveness of the weapons fit and disposition taking full account of the capabilities of
the weapons systems involved. The simulation will also include the effects of physical
constraints placed on the weapons by the arrangement of the upper deck and the
resulting blind arcs.
This tool will be applicable from the earliest stages of design but will allow
incorporation of more data as it becomes available later in the design process.
UCL has a secondary requirement to provide a teaching tool for use during a variety of
courses, this should allow students to appreciate the relative benefits of different
weapons fits, and locations. Presently during such exercises students only have the
opportunity to try one weapons configuration due to the time constraints on the exercise
and the length of time required for hand calculations.
2 Combat Modelling
In attempting to model the combat effectiveness of a ship there a number of areas to be
considered beyond the technicalities of weapons ranges and speeds.
2.1 Modelling of Naval Command and Control Systems

In simulating the response to a threat the simulation must encompass decisions and
actions of both man and machine as it is still rare for even the most advanced weapons
systems to be allowed to operate autonomously. Cooper et al [4] present a number of
models of naval command and control systems (C2 systems) including both the human
and computer elements, of particular interest to this work is their consideration of a
Royal Navy Type 42 anti – air warfare section (AAW) and a more modern Aegis
weapons system as fitted to the US Navy Ticonderoga (CG – 47) class ship. The
pertinent points from Cooper et al [4] are presented in the remainder of this sub section,
and Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.
Cooper et al’s [4] model describes each system in terms of its functional structure rather
than the more obvious physical entities (e.g. radar or radar operator). Thus system
components identified may not exist as a separate physical entity within the model but
their functions must be performed. The model divides in to five types of components:
Sensor – e.g. Radar or sonar sensors. This may be considered at a higher level for
example on Type 42 the entire Air Picture Team constitutes a sensor for the AAW
Section.
Memory – including the rules of engagement, any previously agreed tactics, individual
experience and computerised display systems used to present a picture of the battle
space.
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Decision Maker – This is the hub of the system model. Acting on all the available
information the decision maker directs the response to a threat.
Goals – These are generally pre agreed and as such are a special kind of memory. This
is the result that the decision maker seeks to bring about.
Effecter – The effecter acts on the environment at the request of the decision maker. In
warship terms this is typically a weapon system.
2.1.1 Type 42 Destroyer

Anti – Air warfare is the primary role of the Type 42 destroyer. The functional structure
of the AAW section can be seen in Figure 1, in terms of the above described functions.
The system’s sensor, the Air Picture Team (APT) identifies the raw data and feeds this
to the Action Data Automated Weapons System (ADAWS) thus ADAWS constitutes a
memory component for this system. The Anti – Air Warfare Officer (AAWO) uses the
information presented by ADAWS, his experience and knowledge of the tactical
objectives to decide on the appropriate threat response.
Having reached a decision the AAWO will then instruct any number of the available
effectors, including the fire control teams for onboard weapons systems and any aircraft
under the operational control of the ship. The AAWO may also request a change of ship
heading or speed via a reporter.
APT
S
ADAWS
M
Tactical
AAWO Experience
Objectives
D M
G
On Board
Aircraft AAWO Reporters
Weapons
E E E
E
[4]
Figure 1 - Type 42 AAW Section Model
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2.1.2 Aegis System
The Aegis system is often considered to be the first of the modern generation of
computerised Command and Control (C2) systems. Aegis is a combat management
system designed primarily to fight air threats but also capable against sub surface and
surface targets. This does not result in a fundamental change to the system described for
the Type 42 however it does increase the complexity of the system when all the possible
sensors and weapons are included.
Aegis gathers far more data than ADAWS and as such sensor systems are now extended
to include off board systems supplying information via data link. Aegis has also
increased the range of effectors to include off board weapon systems. It is possible to tie
several off board weapon systems in to a single Aegis system [5] to achieve a
coordinated response to a multi threat situation.
Aegis can operate in a simple mode acting much like ADAWS, only presenting data for
human decisions or it can be programmed with the rules of engagement and placed in a
fully automated mode. Typically real operations are conducted between these two
extremes with human approval being given to computer generated optimum decisions.
2.1.3 Application of Model to Simulation

The Aegis system is the result of an extended development programme underpinned by
many years of experience and trials. Though this is the direction that a number of naval
forces are heading it is not practical to simulate a system handling such a wide array of
threats in the course of this work. In some respects the simulation developed will be a
very distant cousin of the Aegis system providing fully automated engagements
however it is not intended to consider a system capable of handling such a wide array of
threats.
Cooper et al’s [4] model of a Type 42 AAW section presents the key aspects that must
be included in the simulation of a ship’s response to just about any threat. The acronyms
will differ according to whether the threat is above water, below or airborne but the
process will remain largely the same. The system must contain a sensor system, a
decision making component and weapons as effectors. The rules of engagement (free
fire) are simple but are still implicitly present as a memory item as is the tactical goal of
destroying all threats. Figure 2 presents a model of the simulation based on Cooper et
al’s [4] method Figure 2 formed the foundation of the simulation developed during this
work, its legacy can still be seen in the software’s design.
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Figure 2 - Simulation Model
2.2 Review of UCL Engagement Analysis Teaching Tool

As the simulation will draw on the current approach taught at UCL it is pertinent to
review the existing method and consider improvements that can be made. It is also vital
to understand the limitations of the process, as in interpreting the simulation outputs the
constraints must always be appreciated.
The current procedure only considers defence against a missile attack. In modern
warfare this is one of the most likely and dangerous scenarios for a ship to defend
against. It was decided that the simulation will only consider airborne threats however
the software has been designed to allow simple expansion to the consideration of
surface and shore base targets if this should prove desirable. Any target can be
established using common criteria and the various flight profiles. Discrimination
between surface to air and surface to surface weapons systems can be achieved through
the use of the weapon type line in the weapon selection sheet.
There are no plans to attempt to simulate the subsurface theatre as it is felt that the level
of simplification applied to this simulation would render any results meaningless. Anti
submarine warfare is far more dependent on the environmental conditions making the
probability of a successful detection and engagement a highly complex matter.
2.2.1 Outline of Method

At the beginning of the exercise the student is briefed on the ship they must defend, the
weapons systems available to them and their capabilities. Each weapon’s definition
includes the physical restrictions of range and elevation along with reloading and
reaction times. Most importantly each weapon is assigned a probability of kill; this
describes the likelihood that a single round will destroy an inbound missile. Finally to
constrain the exercise a none too generous budget is allocated. At this time no
information is given regarding the threat scenario to be defended against, though the
basic principals of 360˚ layered defence is introduced.
Using blockage diagrams provided for 32 possible weapons locations the student is
asked to select a weapons fit that is in budget, (usually) provides three layers of defence
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and 360˚ coverage. Two dimensional, plan view coverage diagrams are constructed
from the supplied data by the student to assist in the weapon disposition process.
Having selected a weapons fit the students are then provided with the threat scenario
which they must defend against. The Scenario is a coordinated attack by four missiles
arriving from three different directions. The missiles do not arrive simultaneously but
the time separation is small.
The student must now fight their ships defences in an attempt to achieve the highest
probability of killing all the attacking missiles. Engagement will begin as soon as the
missiles enter the weapons envelope and will continue until the time the weapons reach
the ship. The student must select the most appropriate weapons system to engage with,
based on the weapons probability of killing the target, the engagement range, blockage
effects, past activities of the weapon concerned and plans for future engagements. This
process almost invariably takes several time consuming attempts until the student has
reached the highest probability of destroying all the missiles for the selected weapons
outfit.
In describing the method taught by UCL it is important to remember that at present all
calculations are performed by hand. Similarly all the decisions and solutions to this
multiple path problem must be pursued using pen and paper. This requires a huge
amount of information to be processed which this outline does not do justice to.
2.2.2 Simplifications for Hand Calculation

The complexity of the taught method has already been noted, to ease the problem a
number of simplification are introduced. These have all been maintained in this
simulation primarily to allow direct comparison between results for validation purposes.
• All velocities are constant [6]. The simulation has been designed to allow use of
missiles that change speed however this feature has not been trialled and was
primarily included to allow later expansion if required.
• Functional response times are constant [6]. This means that regardless of the
training angle or elevation weapons retargeting will require the same time.
• Time must be allowed for kill assessment [6]. This is consistent with the need to
husband ammunition reserves in any combat situation.
• Missiles are launched in salvos of two [6]. This appears to be consistent with
most western naval policy as it dramatically increases the chance of a kill.
• Providing the missile is detected sufficiently early weapons systems can be
trained on to a target prior to the target being either in range or engaged by that
system. This is extended to include medium and close range systems; these can
be trained to the target prior to engagement. Simultaneous engagement is not
possible as reflected radar energy would likely burn out one or more designators.
• The ship is considered to maintain a constant heading throughout the
engagement. In reality a ship would almost certainly manoeuvre to present the
minimum radar cross section and maximise weapons coverage. This is of course
intended to mask the weak points in the ships defences, the very thing we are
interested in here, therefore this is not included in the simulation.
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2.2.3 Layers
The UCL course material notes the need to provide a layered air defence scheme or
defence in depth as described by Kiely [7]. The intention is to create a bubble of
controlled airspace around the ship, with threats being engaged as far from the ship as
possible. The implication for the simulation is that it will often have to choose not only
between two designators of the same type but also between dissimilar weapons. This
process is discussed further in Section 4.4 of this report.
2.2.4 Saturation Attacks

In modern integrated warfare it would be unusual for a warship to be engaged by a
single anti shipping missile. The attackers will be aware that the ships defences will
almost certainly destroy a single missile. More realistic is the saturation attack. This is
an attempt to briefly overwhelm the defences by launching a number of missiles to
arrive simultaneously and often from different directions [7], thereby allowing at least
one missile to slip through. This is noted implicitly in the UCL scenario (See Appendix
A for scenario) and is the style of attack that is considered with this model. Section 2.4
considers further the most appropriate threat scenario.
2.2.5 Naval Guns

For the purpose of the teaching exercise [6] UCL does not include any anti air
contributions from non dedicated AAW weapons. This is suitable for the large ship
being considered in the exercise. In considering the general case the exclusion of naval
guns and indeed small arms may not be appropriate. This is particularly true of small
displacement or low budget ships it was therefore decided that it should be at the
discretion of the designer to include these weapons systems as they see fit.
Small calibre manually operated guns such as the Oerlikon 20 & 30mm can make a
small but none the less significant contribution to air defence. Records of the Falklands
War suggest that small calibre weapons were responsible for a number of both hard and
mission kills [8, 9]. It must be remembered that the hand fired weapon is relatively
ineffective against small missile sized targets and the probability of kill value allocated
reflects this fact. It should be noted that due to the functioning of the simulation,
engagement by a simple hand operated weapon could prevent engagement by a CIWS
system with a higher probability of kill. It is therefore suggested that hand fired
weapons are only included if they represent the only means of close in defence.
More modern Electro Optical (EO) and Infra Red (IR) guided small calibre weapons
achieve single shot probabilities of kill similar to that of a burst of fire from a CIWS
system even against missile targets, and therefore should be included accordingly.
Medium calibre guns are often fitted to warships as general purpose armament able to
contribute to naval gunfire, land support, policing and air defence. Unlike a CIWS
system which relies on quantity to kill a target, a medium calibre gun will fire only a
few high explosive rounds. Each round can contain 2.5kg of high explosive giving a
very large blast radius, and hence an overall probability of kill similar to CIWS systems
[7]. Trials of the Vickers MK8 against sea skimming missiles are claimed to be highly
successful [7]. In a number of western navies the medium calibre gun has fallen out of
favour for the AAA role especially on larger ships. A significant number of navies do
make use of a variety of medium calibre guns for AAA particularly on corvette class
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ships where dedicated armament may not be practical. Thus in deciding whether to
include medium calibre weapons the designer must consider not only the technical
aspect but also the operational preference of their customer.
The probability of kill values used in this simulation are based largely on anecdotal
evidence rather than absolute data and kill probabilities for guns are particularly
problematic. In automatic mode general purpose guns are typically far less accurate than
in single shot mode. This is not as true for CIWS systems where millimetre wave radar
is used to “walk” bullets on to the incoming missile. The chance of a hit is also
dramatically affected by the stiffness of the gun mount, this must be particularly borne
in mind for sponson mounted weapons or small ships.
The probability of kill equation used in this simulation for gunnery based systems is the
same as that used for missile systems i.e.:
PK = 1 − (1 − PK single ) n
Equation 1
Where the overall PK is a function of the single round PK and the number of rounds
fired (n). This was preferred to the equation used for gun fire probability in the teaching
method as if large numbers of rounds are fired at a target this can result in a probability
of kill greater than one.
2.3 Existing Models of Air Defence

For obvious reasons published work on air defence is comparatively scarce but two
authors have published papers that have influenced the development of this work.
Ghose et al [10] consider the defence of a land site using modern anti aircraft missile
batteries. This work encompasses consideration of terrain masking, an intelligent
enemy, weapons overlap and variations in the probability of kill. This work is well
developed and the application of an intelligent enemy is a useful development. Modern
missiles can exhibit a degree of “intelligence” however it is rarely possible to program a
missile to penetrate down a defensively weaker route. In the naval environment both the
target and its defences (in the form of other ships) possess some ability to manoeuvre
and therefore bring more effective weapons to bear along the most likely threat axis.
Soland [11] specifically looks at the optimal selection of point and area defence for a
simultaneous missile attack by an informed enemy on the basis of minimum cost.
Though interesting by using a simultaneous engagement for both point and area defence
missiles Soland’s work effectively masks the benefits of a layered defence with the
possibility of multiple engagements of a single missile.
It is noted that Soland [11] implicitly assumes that the problem of the number of
defensive weapons available is unbounded as indeed might be considered the case of a
land based anti – ballistic missile defence system (which it is believed this model was
developed for). In the context of a single ship where limitations are placed on both
physical size and weight of the weapons system this assumption is clearly not valid.
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2.4 Engagement Scenarios
To effectively test a vessels combat capability it is necessary to test against the
scenarios that the ship in question is most likely to experience. Clearly a frigate
conducting independent operations in the littoral would experience a very different
threat scenario to an aircraft carrier deployed with a battle group in blue waters.
2.4.1 Blue Water Scenario

The existing teaching method assumes both launch and detection at long range
combined with an attempt to overwhelm the ships defences with a saturation attack.
This scenario represents the classic cold war blue water engagement scenario.
The vessel under examination is attacked by four missiles that arrive nearly
simultaneously but from different directions as would be expected of a coordinated
attack. An outline of the scenario is presented in Figure 3, larger, clearer diagrams can
be found in Appendix A. All missiles are launched at time zero.
Missile A is a high altitude near Mach 3 missile. This type of missile is characteristic of
the early Russian anti shipping missiles, though not sophisticated the combination of
high speed and large warhead means that these missiles are still a potent threat today.
Due to the missiles high speed it arrive 300 seconds in to the simulation.
Missiles B1 and B2 are moderately typical of second generation air launched weapons,
these missiles use a high – low flight path. This allows a moderately efficient cruise to
the target area. The subsequent drop to sea skimming altitude makes the missile
considerably harder to hit in the terminal phase. Missiles B1 and B2 arrive at the ship at
304 and 309 seconds respectively.
Missile C is typical of a modern subsonic sea skimming missile such as, and is launched
at much shorter range than the other missiles. This missile is probably the greatest threat
to the ship and due to its close proximity launch arrives first at 297 seconds.
[6]
Figure 3 - Blue Water Scenario
The UCL scenario is useful in that it test the depth of the vessels defence. Some
research was conducted in to past missile actions and no records were found of this kind
of engagement; more common is the shorter range engagement typically in the littoral
environment.
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2.4.2 Littoral Scenario
As the focus of operations moves towards the littoral there are a variety of new
scenarios to be considered. The anti – shipping missile is no longer the preserve of the
super power, almost any navy in the world is capable of operating Fast Attack Craft
(FAC) carrying anti – shipping missiles. In other words any navy is potentially capable
of sinking a frigate or larger ship (e.g. Sinking of INS Eilat ref. [12]). Similar comments
can be applied to the advent of the truck mounted anti – shipping missile. Finally the
airborne launch threat still exists and the problem of detecting an airborne target is
complicated by ground clutter in the littoral leading to a reduced detection range. The
loss of HMS Sheffield represents a text book airborne threat (even if the Argentinean
Super Etendards likely had no idea exactly which ship they had fired upon [13]).
The implication of these developments is that any ship operating close inshore must be
able to respond to unexpected threats launched from inside the radar horizon with
minimal warning. Based in part on the above noted engagements, details of FAC missile
tactics provided by Chant [14] and weapons systems data from Jane’s [15] a second
threat scenario has been constructed for inshore operations.
For the purpose of this scenario missiles are launched in pairs along the same bearing
from the ship. Both launches occur at a range of 19,000m (roughly 12 miles) with a gap
of 5 seconds between launches. Upon launch the missiles pop up to 300m and then at
18,000m begins descent to an altitude of 3 meters by 17,000m. The profile can be seen
in Figure 4. Throughout a constant speed of 300ms-1 is assumed. This scenario could
represent an Exocet or Ottomat missile launched from any of the above detailed
weapons platforms.
Figure 4 - Littoral Flight Profile
The value of the target will govern the total number of missiles launched against it as
described in Section 2.4.3. Additional missile pairs are separated by 20˚ from all other
pairs. This being indicative of a well spread aircraft flight or FAC squadron.
The littoral scenario has been trialled against a variety of weapons configurations. It was
found to be possible to engage the scenario with a classic layered defensive scheme, but
it was also found that significantly better results could be achieved by a bias towards
faster reaction systems often with shorter ranges.
2.4.3 Scale of Threat

The littoral scenario and indeed the blue water scenario should be modified to reflect the
type of ship being considered and the operational requirements for air defence. Chant
[14] supplies data on the typical number of missiles used to engage various ship types
by Soviet Bloc forces. These numbers appear consistent with reports of sinkings made
using Harpoon missiles [15].
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Ship Type Number of Missiles
Cruiser 8
Destroyer 4
Escort/FAC 2/4
Small Transport/ 2
Landing Craft
Table 1 – Missiles allocated per ship
Larger warships typically operate as part of a task group and therefore a significant
percentage of missiles launched would be engaged by dedicated area air defence ships
(e.g. Type 42, CG 47). It is suggested that the maximum number of missiles a non
AAW ship would engage is limited to four. An attacker will always be able to
overwhelm any ship’s defences if enough missiles are available; the designer can not
and should not attempt to design for this.
2.4.4 Axis of Threat

The threat scenario defined in the taught exercise is fixed with respect to the ships
heading as this is the only practical way to perform a hand calculation. Though well
distributed this scenario leaves several arcs of the ships defences untested. The problem
is even worse using the littoral scenario described in Section 2.4.2 as this represents a
near single threat axis scenario.
Due to the speed of computer simulation it is proposed to offer the operator the ability
to run the scenario a number of times, with each run the bearings for all incoming
missiles would be increased by a user definable amount. This would effectively allow
the ship to be engaged from all directions, thereby allowing the designer and ship
operator an appreciation of the relative strong and weak regions of the ship’s defences.
It is felt that a deterministic approach to this problem will allow direct comparison to be
made between different configurations; a probabilistic approach would require a user to
collect an inevitably non identical but statistically valid sample. This would make direct
comparisons very difficult.
It should be noted that except in the instance of an isolated vessel with no ability to
manoeuvre (e.g. a seabase concept) a perfectly balanced all round defence is not
required. The areas of weakness must be considered with due regard for the crafts type,
manoeuvrability and likely operating scenario. A FAC will likely have a highly
directional defence capability but possesses the manoeuvrability to bring this to bear
rapidly. An aircraft carrier though far less manoeuvrable will operate in conjunction
with a number of other vessels which may be positioned to help balance out any poor
coverage areas in the carrier’s point defence systems.
3 Optimisation Criteria
The taught method has traditionally used a probability based criteria to determine the
effectiveness of a given weapons outfit. Each weapons systems is assigned a probability
of kill value and based on simple probability theory a probability of the ship being hit
by one or more missiles is obtained. This method has three significant short comings in
terms of an optimisation process.
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1. For a number of good fits the user is forced to deal with the third or fourth
decimal place in a number of the order of 0.1 or less. For many people this is not
an intuitive process nor does it lend itself well to graphical representation.
2. The numbers claim to some extent to represent real world probability. The
reality of the situation is far more complex and dependent on a huge range of
factors.
3. The probability measure becomes meaningless when one or more missiles are
not engaged as the probability of a hit occurring automatically becomes one, and
no distinction can be made between weapon fits.
It was desired to produce a measure that was both more intuitive and highlighted the
relative difference in performance even if a system did not successfully engage all the
targets in the scenario. To this end a Capability Index (CI) was set out.
1
CI =
(No. of Missiles - ΣPk m ) No. of Missiles
Equation 2
For this equation to work missiles that are not engaged must be assigned a probability of
kill of zero. In the event of all missiles not being engaged the minimum capability index
value is 1. If all missiles are engaged perfectly (ie all PKm = 1) then theoretically the
capability index is infinite. In the event that one or more missile is not engaged the CI
will discriminate between a system that engages the other missiles with a high or low
PK. Though Equation 2 is simple it allows the presentation of a classical style capability
frontier as shown by the dashed line of Figure 5. The optimum point is determined to be
the point where the gradient of the capability frontier begins to fall. At this point that the
law of diminishing returns is seen to set in. A very clear cut case is shown in Figure 5
however the optimum is not always this obvious.
Figure 5 - Capability Frontier
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4 Software Design
Key points of the development are detailed here to provide an understanding of the
workings of the simulation and to aid in future continuation of this work if required.
User instructions for the simulation can be found in Appendix C.
4.1 Language Selection

The simulation must be useable for three different purposes:
1. The UCL ship design exercise
2. UCL engagement analysis tutorial
3. UCL short course design exercises.
For both the UCL short course and the Ship design exercise it is common for work and
analyses to be conducted using non UCL computers, consequently it is not necessarily
possible to install software on these machines. All these exercises are time limited thus
the learning required to operate the software must be minimal. It was therefore decided
to work within the confines of Microsoft Excel 2000 and Visual Basic for Applications
version 10 as this is compatible with a very wide range of computers and requires no
installation.
4.2 System Architecture

It is intended to use modular rather than monolithic code through out this project; this
will have three long term advantages:
1. As slightly different solutions are required for each of the different uses these
can be implemented using a common core with different interface modules as
required.
2. Future development will be considerably eased by allowing modules to be
plugged in as required.
3. Code can be reused readily and run from a number of different locations within
the simulation.
4.3 Simulation Process

Section 2 has discussed in quite some detail the foundations and assumptions of the
simulation process, it is now appropriate to discuss the simulation process itself in
greater detail. It is intended to discuss a single iteration of use primarily from the aspect
of software, analyses of outputs will be discussed in Sections 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.
4.3.1 Initial Setup

Before the simulation can begin the user must first make a number of decisions. The
most important of which is undoubtedly which weapons systems are to be considered
for the ships outfit. This will result in a short list of weapons that are possible on the
basis of size, cost and political considerations.
Having selected a short list of systems the designer must consider whether to include
blockage effects in this particular simulation. This will depend on the desired outcome
of the simulation. If a designer is seeking the cost, weight or space optimum weapons fit
then it is suggested that the designer should exclude the effects of blockages to
guarantee a direct comparison between outfits. At later design stages to establish the
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optimum locations for a given weapons fit blockage effects will of course need to be
included. For the purpose of this discussion it is intended to include blockage effects.
To establish blockage effects the naval architect defines the weapons x, y, z location
within the Universal Coordinate System (UCS), this is the ship wide coordinate system
used for design, an example UCS can be seen in Figure 6. Note the simulation assumes
the arrangement of axes shown, with the positive directions as indicated by the arrows.
Figure 6 – UCS Frame of Reference
Having defined the ship fit it remains to define the ship. For this purpose a number of
Paramarine DXF files are used (See Section 4.6.1), this can be accomplished with as
much or as little definition as is available. The simulation will conduct the laborious
process of constructing the blockage diagrams. If Paramarine data is not available then
the user can enter manually derived blockage data.
The final item of ships design is the primary radar height. This is of importance because
of its effect on the distance to the radar horizon, and therefore the warning that the ship
receives of an air attack. It should be noted that as the simulation does not include any
ship movement (as noted in Section 2.2.2) that as long as the radar horizon is
significantly further out than the maximum weapons range its exact value is of little
consequence.
It remains for the naval architect to decide on the threat scenario that the ship will be
tested against. This choice has been discussed in Section 2.4. The initial setup of the
simulation is now complete.
4.3.2 Targeting the Threat

It had been hoped to develop the simulation as event driven software, in the belief that
this would be more efficient. It was discovered that due to the complex number of often
mutually exclusive decisions it was significantly easier to drive the simulation using
time. Thus the software operates in a fashion that would be immediately familiar to any
AAWO and which can be readily followed by the inexperienced.
Time within the simulation is discertised into units of one second this represents a
compromise between accuracy and computational time. At the beginning of each time
interval the simulation must first determine the location of each of the missiles that have
been launched at the ship. Each missile’s data is only made available to the ships
defensive system if the missile is either inside the range of the radar horizon, or above it
if over the horizon as in Figure 7.
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Figure 7 - Radar Horizon
Once one or more missiles are within the ships radar bubble then information is passed
on to the key decision making component of the simulation (Sub Routine WepSel). This
subroutine takes the place of the AAWO in Coopers model (c.f. Figure 1). The AAWO
substitute must determine for each missile within radar range and not already being
engaged whether there is a weapon system capable of engaging the missile. This process
is discussed fully in Section 4.4, if no weapon is available for any of the missiles then
the simulation will move forward a second in time. If a weapon is allocated to engage a
missile the simulation will continue within that second.
4.3.3 Engaging the Threat

It is at this point that the simulation diverges slightly from the simple time stepping
process. It was found to be computationally less intensive to describe an entire
engagement in one step rather than piece meal over a number of time intervals. To
achieve this the sub routine Engage must work in the future from the present simulation
time.
The engagement begins in the same second as the decision to engage is made. First the
weapon allocated must be aimed at the missile to be engaged. Providing that the missile
has been within radar range long enough, and the weapon system has not been used to
engage another target the weapon system is considered to be pointing at the new target.
This was discussed in Section 2.2.2 and is intended to simulate the element of
preplanning that the human operator can achieve. This preplanning has been allowed for
in the allocation of the weapons system to the missile target so impact will occur at the
correct range and time.
Having slewed to the target missile the first round is fired and the event recorded.
Further rounds follow the first at the specified interval providing that the missile has not
now passed out of range, behind a blockage or the weapon exhausted its ammunition.
Finally the weapon must wait for a period to represent target kill evaluation time, this
time begins at the time of the last round reaching the missile.
Each event is recorded at the correct time and range; however the main simulation time
remains at the same value as at the start of the engagement, a secondary timer is used to
calculate times in the future. Each firing weapon is marked as busy, and therefore
unavailable for targeting until the simulation clock catches up with when the weapon
will complete its firing and assessment cycle. If for any reason the missile passes out of
the weapons envelope the weapon is free to be targeted to a different missile
immediately without the need for kill evaluation.
The final task before ending any engagement is to calculate the probability that the
missile engaged has not been destroyed, this is a function of the basic probability of kill
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and the number of rounds fired in that engagement cycle. The probability of not killing
the missile is used as it is mathematically easier to keep a running score.
The engagement process will be repeated for any other missiles that have been selected
for engagement at that time interval.
4.3.4 Simulation Continuation

Having engaged all missiles for which the engagement decision was made that second
and assuming the simulation still has missiles in flight the simulation clock is advanced.
The whole process described in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 is then repeated.
The simulation is continued until such time as the final missile would reach the ship, at
this point the simulation is completed and the probability and capability index values
can be written to the excel file. The event log is written to the excel file during the
simulation and this can be sorted in to a chronological or engagement order depending
on the users personal choice.
This section has presented a brief outline of the simulation process which should be
sufficient for most readers. Appendix A carries details of the system design in the form
of flow charts. These cascade down from the top level in increasing detail for all key
sub routines. It is suggested that readers may find this easier to follow in electronic
format. Electronic documentation is hyperlinked to allow the reader to follow the
process exactly as the software runs. Copious in code notes complete the technical
documentation. A complete code listing and executable files can be found in Appendix
I.
4.4 Missile Targeting

Target selection is governed by the linear nature of the software behind the simulation.
Each missile is examined in an order of priority and then weapon allocation is made
based on the most suitable weapon for that missile. Thus the first task is to supply the
weapon selection process with the missiles in the correct order of priority.
Prioritisation is achieved through two methods. Until one or more missiles have been
fired upon the missiles are supplied to the weapon allocation routine in the order that
they will arrive at the ship in. Once a missile has been engaged the simulation changes
the sorting process such that the weapon selection is conducted first for the missile with
the lowest probability of kill. This change in prioritisation was found to be necessary as
otherwise the last missile to arrive at the target would often receive no defensive fire at
all, thereby guaranteeing a hit. In sorting by probability a close approximation is made
to Soland’s [16] optimal defensive strategy for missile interception, that of spreading
the available interceptors as uniformly as possible across all the missiles.
The selection procedure whereby an individual weapon system is allocated to a missile

is initially quite simple. Weapons that are other wise engaged, out of range or
ammunition are all eliminated leaving a short list of candidate systems. From this short
list it is then necessary to select the optimum weapons system, this is judged to be the
weapon system that engages the missile at the closest point to the weapons maximum
range. This is designed to keep the engagement as far removed from the vessel as
possible and provide maximum opportunities for reengagement thereby increasing the
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probability of kill. Where two identical weapons systems are available the choice is
arbitrary.
4.5 Weapons Systems

A number of weapons systems have been included within the simulation as pre
programmed entries. These are placed here primarily for teaching purposes. In practice
the concept designer will no doubt wish to enter their own weapons data. Manual data
entry is possible (see Appendix C) and it is suggested that the designer consider the new
weapons capabilities relative to the sample systems when assigning probability of kill
values as well as any factual data available.
4.6 Blockage Assessment

Generalised blockage analysis is one of the key aspects of this simulation. Blockage
assessment is undertaken in two ways:
1. Manual blockage assessment can be undertaken for use in exercises or where no
Paramarine data is available.
2. Fully automated three dimensional blockage assessment is achieved using DXF
files exported from Paramarine.
Simple blockage assessment is undertaken by the user and the resulting weapon/sensor
blockage assessment diagram is entered in to the simulation as bearings and elevations
in the relevant weapons blockage sheet as described in Appendix C.
4.6.1 Automated Blockage Assessment

Three dimensional blockage assessments are undertaken in Visual Basic code. To begin
the operator generates a number of DXF files using Paramarine. These files represent
the solid objects that make up the ship. The simulation can read in any number of files
to establish the full picture of the ship. This considerably eases interface with complex
models (especially SurfCon based) where there is very rarely a single solid object
created to represent the ship.
A DXF file is an AutoDesk file format designed for graphics interchange with
AutoCAD. Paramarine DXFs are made up of a large number of triangles that facet the
surface of the exported solid. Paramarine uses a special case of the 3DFACE entity
which is normally quadrilateral. By placing two points at coincident coordinates the
special case of a triangle is created. Complete details of the DXF file format can be
found in Appendix D.
To assess the blockage effect it was initially hoped to use only the data points of the
DXF file. This was found to provide a very poor approximation for objects close to the
weapon system where the blockage effect is greatest; this was due to the apparent wide
angular separation of the points being used.
It was therefore necessary to reconstruct each triangular facet that makes up the ship.
The process is described briefly here, software flow charts can be found in Appendix B
and the software code can be found in Appendix I.
Initially each point of a single 3DFACE entity is read in to the code. The first step is to
eliminate the fourth redundant point such that only a triangle can be created from the
remaining points. The three UCS Cartesian coordinates are then converted to spherical
Page 27
coordinates in each weapons frame of reference. Based on the required resolution
(normally 1 degree) and the angular difference between the three corners of the triangle
additional coordinates are calculated along each side of the triangle using a parametric
description of each side. Finally each of these interpolated points is assessed for their
blockage effect.
The resulting blockage profile is stored within the Excel file to avoid the need to re run
the blockage assessment process each time the simulation is run. Output is very simple,
the primary form is a list of bearings around the weapons position and blockage
elevations. A graphical representation is also provided to assist the user in checking the
results (Figure 8), the line denotes the blockage threshold. Targets below the blockage
threshold are blocked by structure, targets above the threshold are clear and can be fired
on.
Figure 8 - Sample Blockage Diagram
This method has resulted in a generalised system that will always produce the required
resolution and is moderately efficient as points distantly removed from the weapon’s
zero location require minimal calculation where as points close to the origin that are
more significant to the blockage effects are accurately represented.
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5 Simulation testing
5.1 Blockage Assessment
Blockage assessment is very important to the later stages of this work, to confirm the
accuracy of the process a geometrically simple test piece was created in Paramarine, this
has features which can be easily analytically checked for validation purposes. A detailed
comparison can be found in Appendix E, it suffices to say that results were found to be
accurate to well within the 1 angular degree of resolution expected. A number of more
complex models were also examined in a less rigorous fashion, these were compared to
the three dimensional models and found to correlate very well.
Some discontinuities are noted at the zero or 360 degree position, this is the inevitable
consequence of conducting mathematics in base 10 as opposed to base 360 however it
was felt that the development time required to completely eliminate this issues was not
justified in light of the ease with which it can be checked for and corrected if required.
The only limitation of this method is that if the coordinates defining a weapons location
are exactly on a surface (typically a deck) described by the Paramarine DXF file, erratic
results are obtained. This is overcome by specifying the weapons position coordinates
such that they are at the height of the weapons barrel or launcher, as illustrated in Figure
9.
Figure 9 - Weapons Coordinate
DXF representations of weapons should not be included as if a weapon coordinate is

placed inside a DXF representation as in Figure 9 the blockage analysis process will see
a blockage covering 360˚ from vertically below to vertically above.
5.2 Assumptions
For the purposes of this study two key assumptions will be made. These are primarily to
simplify the evaluation process and avoid (as far as possible) other aspects of naval
architecture interfering with the evaluation of the simulation.
1. Weapons with broadly similar weight power and cooling requirements are to be
considered to be wholly interchangeable. For example a RAM launcher and
Phalanx can be considered interchangeable, as would a VLS silo and a Vickers
Mk8 Gun. A Phalanx and a VLS silo would not be considered interchangeable.
Page 29
2. Alterations in weapons layout whilst maintaining the fit of weapons will be both
technically and cost neutral. This is a reasonable assumption when working at
the concept design stage.
5.3 LPD 17
LPD 17 is the new and yet to be commissioned USS San Antonio. For a number of
years a ship of this type has been the subject of the UCL excercise. It seems likely that
this vessel was selected partly as students will have few preconceptions about how a
weapons system should be laid out on this class of ship (unlike a frigate or destroyer).
Secondly due to the asymmetric and slightly unusual nature of the superstructure it
should be possible to demonstrate significant benefits to certain weapons
configurations. 32 potential weapons sites spread around the ship are defined and these
will be used for this study to narrow down what is otherwise an almost infinite choice of
locations. Details of the weapons positions can be found in Appendix F. The Paramarine
model used to generate the blockage diagrams can be found in Appendix I.
For reference the real LPD 17 will be fitted with a pair of RAM launchers and has space
and weight allocated for a vertical launch Standard Missiles system in the forward end
[5]. LPD 17 is also fitted with the Advanced Enclosed Mast/Sensor System.
LPD 17 is designed to operate in the littoral environment with the full support of an
amphibious battle group; consequently area defence should be well taken care of. LPD
17 is most at risk when conducting landing operations; at this point she is susceptible to
attack due to the need to hold station and her high value. It would therefore seem that
the most likely scenario is a four missile scenario based on the littoral scenario
described in Section 2.4.2. For the purpose of this validation exercise it is intended to
use the UCL scenario as described in Appendix A, as there is a large amount of
historical data available and more importantly it will force a more complex layered
defence scheme to be implemented.
5.4 Validation
The validation process was conducted in two stages; the first simple mathematical stage
was conducted during the programming process. Each numerical function or “if
statement” was tested to ensure the correct numerical or Boolean response was
obtained. This work is not presented here as individual calculations are largely trivial.
Of greater interest is ascertaining whether the simulation achieves the same or similar
solution to a human attempting the problem.
For the validation process the blue water scenario described in Section 2.4.1 was
experimented with. The simulation was run both with and without blockage effects, for
comparison a complete hand calculation was also completed (Appendix G). Even using
MathCAD this process took approximately five hours to complete and a number of
attempts were made at achieving the lowest probability of sustaining one or more hits.
Though this may not be the optimum engagement solution to what is a complex multi
path problem it is believed to be close for this particular weapons fit. This work was
conducted without consideration of blockage effects in an attempt to somewhat simplify
the process. For comparative purposes a missile based summary is presented here.
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Missile A
Hand No Blockage With Blockage
Time Event Time Event Time Event
0 Detected 0 Detected 0 Detected
274 Engaged by Sea Wolf 284 Engaged by Sea Wolf 284 Engaged by Sea Wolf
296 Engaged by Phalanx
Missile B1
286 Engaged by RAM 277 Engaged by Sea Wolf 277 Engaged by Sea Wolf
299 Engaged by Sea Wolf 299 Engaged by Sea Wolf
Missile B2
284 Engaged by Sea Wolf 292 Engaged by RAM 292 Engaged by RAM
297 Engaged by Sea Wolf
Missile C
244 Engaged by Sea Wolf 244 Engaged by Sea Wolf 244 Engaged by Sea Wolf
267 Engaged by RAM 267 Engaged by RAM 267 Engaged by RAM
286 Engaged by RAM 286 Engaged by RAM 286 Engaged by RAM
290 Engaged by Phalanx 290 Engaged by Phalanx
Table 2 - Summary of Validation Testing
The human processed simulation did not use exactly the same judgement process in
reaching the solution yet there are distinct similarities between the three scenarios. The
only difference between the two computer based simulations (not shown in the
summary) is the choice of Phalanx system to engage Missile C. Examination of the run
procedure indicated that this was due to the later inclusion of blockages obstructing one
of the Phalanx systems.
The consistency of results is clearly demonstrated in the probability values obtained

from the two methods, the computer obtained identical results from both runs.
Probability
Item Hand Computer
Pk Missile A 0.961 0.932
Pk Missile B1 0.922 0.982
Pk Missile B2 0.995 0.922
Pk Missile C 0.999 0.999
P of > 1 hit on Ship 0.12 0.156
Table 3 - Summary of Probabilities
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Two weapon allocations cause the difference in final overall probability shown in Table
3. Phalanx fire is employed against Missile A by the human operator but against Missile
C by the computer (Table 2). Due to the computer selecting to engage missile B1
instead of B2 with Sea Wolf the computer is only able to fire three rounds at missile B1
as against the four rounds the human manages on B2 (Table 2). Missile B1 does of
course enter the Sea Wolf envelope first and as such the computer is “correct” in this
engagement decision. The human decision maker has evidently planned rather than
reacted, whilst this produces a better result it is much harder to achieve in a simulated
environment than the more reactionary model used.
During this simulation the discrete nature of the computers time simulation also
becomes clear. Whilst the human can begin engaging a target in the same second it
becomes free, due to the discrete time interval and cyclical nature of the simulated
environment the computer has to wait till the following second to engage. Though not
significant at long range, at Phalanx range where one second represents a significant
time and hence number of rounds this limitation begins to become more evident.
As a demonstration of the simulation’s ability to achieve similar results to a human

decision maker this demonstration was considered a success. Though the human is more
successful than the computer this is due to abilities that are very difficult to achieve in a
software environment. For this purpose the consistency of the decision making process
and direct comparability of results is more important than the absolute result achieved.
For a combat system such as Aegis a formulaic response such as that used here is not
desirable, as once an enemy becomes familiar with the formula they will find its weak
spot. Thus a modern combat system must incorporate the ability to make highly
complex decisions, plan ahead and even learn from experience. This pursuit of human
qualities at computer speeds no doubt goes some way to explain the very high cost of
combat systems in modern ships.
5.5 Optimal Weapon Selection

As in any other field of design the warship designer is forced to work within constraints.
Typically at concept stage a space, weight and cost budget is established for the
different headline areas such as structure, propulsion and weapon system. Given these
constraints the designer must aim to deliver the maximum capability. The designer may
believe their choice to be primarily limited by one of cost, space or weight; however it
is recommended that the designer plot cost capability frontiers for each measure. By
doing so the designer can achieve a objective rather that intuitive assessment of the true
limitations on the system. It is intended to focus on the cost constraints of a design as
data is available from past UCL ship designs however weight or space could equally
have been used. The budgetary limit used is £35 million which is the same as that used
for the taught exercise.
For the purpose of this test it is intended to limit the range of weapons systems that will
be considered to just three: Sea Wolf, RAM and Phalanx. Details of the systems
respective costs can be seen in Table 4. This test will be conducted using the LPD 17
model detailed in Section 5.3.
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System Cost (£ Million)
Phalanx 2.3
RAM 7.3
Sea Wolf Designator 5.3
Sea Wolf Silo 4.5
Table 4 – System Costs
Initially 27 cases were examined ranging from single type weapons systems to true
defence in depth systems. Complete details of the weapons fits examined along with
results obtained are presented in Appendix H. Figure 10 presents a summary of the
capability index results. Data series such as “Sea Wolf Only” were generated for
systems consisting solely of one type of weapon with between 1 and five systems
embarked. Data series designated “n Weapon Systems” consist of a mix of Sea Wolf,
Phalanx and RAM systems to provide a defence in depth scheme.
Figure 10 - Cost Capability study for LPD 17
The effectiveness of a long range missile defence system with multiple trackers is
clearly demonstrated by Region 2 of Figure 10. A four tracker Sea Wolf system
provides by far the highest capability index in this study as well as the optimum
weapons outfit. Doubtless if more missiles were added to the scenario then the optimum
tracker count would increase accordingly. Once a sufficiently large number of trackers
is reached it then becomes an obvious step to a phased array radar system such as that
incorporated in to PAAMS which is capable of engaging up to sixteen targets
simultaneously [5]. Given the apparent effectiveness of a phased array VLS system and
the ineffectiveness of CIWS systems, the results of this analysis go a long way to
indicating why though Type 45 is fitted for two Phalanx systems these will not be
installed at launch [5].
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Generally single type weapons fits provided a significant capability against the scenario
only when a minimum of three weapons were fitted. This is a hardly surprising function
of this specific missile scenario. All the single type, 3 weapon fits are contained within
Region 1 of Figure 10, for clarity this region has been blown up and is shown as Figure
11.
Region 1 also contains all the Phalanx only weapons fits. This clearly illustrates the
folly of relying on a CIWS only system for missile defence. Even when four weapons
are fitted to the ship the capability index barely exceeds 1, the minimum possible value.
Figure 11 - Low Cost Systems: Cost - Capability
Continuing the examination of the lower end of the cost – capability domain (Figure 11)
it is possible to discriminate between the relative merits of systems that provide an anti
– air capability but may not necessarily be able to engage all the missiles in this
scenario. For example Point A of Figure 11 represents a five Phalanx weapons fit, all
the missiles are engaged however the individual probabilities of destroying any one
missile do not inspire confidence being 0.423, 0.382, 0.356 and 0.542. By contrast Point
B represents a system composed of only two RAM launchers. Against this scenario the
outfit is only capable of engaging three of the four inbound missiles but each of the
missiles is engaged with a 0.92 probability of kill. As ships rarely operate in isolation,
nor without the benefit of chaff decoys or electronic counter measures the ability to
reliably destroy three missiles is surely better than the ability to just possibly destroy
four missiles. It should also be noted that in reality when missiles are successfully
engaged by CIWS there is still a real risk of missile debris hitting the ship due to the
close range engagement and huge kinetic energy of the missile.
In reality ships fitted with a relatively large number of weapons systems typically will
carry a variety of weapons there are two key reasons for this:
1. Electro Magnetic interference (EMI): A vessel carrying many trackers of the
same type will be unable to achieve enough physical and EM separation
between trackers to prevent major difficulties in controlling EMI.
Page 34
2. Vulnerability: A ship carrying many weapons of one type is likely to have more
single point vulnerabilities where damage will render the ship combat
ineffective. By developing a layered multi system approach the overall criticality
of each the single point vulnerabilities is reduced.
To develop a more probable selection of weapons fits it was decided to remove all the
weapons systems from Figure 10 that contained more than two of the same weapon
type. This resulted in a revised cost capability frontier as seen in Figure 12. For the
purposes of this figure the outfits have been grouped purely by the number of weapons
systems fitted.
Figure 12 - Multiple Weapon System Cost Capability
The reader should note the significantly lower maximum capability index of 24.5
attained in this portion of the study compared to 38.8 seen in Figure 10. The cost
optimum point in Figure 12 is very well defined; the optimum point is a four weapon
system (1 Phalanx, 1 RAM, 2 Sea Wolf). In general the naval architect will have
restrictions other than cost placed on their choice of system. The naval architect must
make a number of judgements about the size, type and role of ship for which this fit is
being considered. It is reasonable to expect that this solution could be fitted to a large
LPD where large separations can be achieved between weapons systems and top weigh
is not a major constraint. A frigate however may not be able to carry such a complex
weapons fit as the topside weight would require an unacceptable increase in
displacement and hence overall cost. This may force the naval architect to consider a
three weapon system as the best attainable.
It is instructive to note the difference between outfits shown in Figure 12 both costing
£28 Million. These weapons systems use exactly the same equipment in different
locations. In the less effective scenario the RAM launcher is placed on the foredeck,
moving the launcher to the hanger roof results in a 4 fold increase in effectiveness for
no additional cost in weapons system. This strongly supports the contention of Section
4.3.1 that initial weapons system selection should be conducted without blockage
effects to ensure a direct comparison is always achieved.
Page 35
5.6 Weapon Repositioning
Having determined a notional optimum four weapons configuration in Section 5.5 the
next step is demonstrate the capability of the simulation to discriminate between
different system locations. A variety of locations were selected for the systems; the Sea
Wolf Silo was maintained at position 4 throughout (See Appendix H for details). As it is
intended to test the tools capabilities fully it is not suggested that all the weapons
locations used are either practical or sensible.
Figure 13 - Capability of Different Weapon Locations
Examination of Figure 13 makes it clear that though the simulation can distinguish
some differences between weapons fits, especially the really poor ones (Fits 2 & 14)
there are still a large number of locations that offer potentially the same level of
effectiveness. This result is of course next to no use to the naval architect seeking to
select an optimum weapons layout. It must be remembered that these weapons fits are
being considered against only one missile scenario. In Section 5.7 it is intended to
assess the capabilities of the same fits by varying the primary threat axis through all
possible bearings.
5.7 Multiple Threat Axis Analysis

On the basis of the single threat scenario used in Section 5.6 no distinction can be made
between many of the weapons configurations used. The very narrow nature of the above
analysis has been acknowledged and the development of this multi threat axis testing
was a direct result.
5.7.1 Numerical Results

For the purpose of this section the UCL scenario was rotated around the ship at ten
degree intervals for the weapons fits used in Section 5.6. It was considered that given
the concerns expressed in Section 5.3 the LPD 17 would require a high level of all
round coverage, combined with as high a minimum capability index as possible for the
worst threat direction.
Page 36
Numerical results are presented in Appendix H, Table 5 presents the four configurations
achieving the highest mean CI value and the highest (i.e. least bad) minimum CI value.
The reader will note from Table 5 that there is no practical difference in mean CI
between Fits 12 and 4, however Fit 4 maintains a considerably higher minimum
capability.
Fit Mean CI Max CI Min CI
12 21.82 24.13 3.49

4 21.74 35.98 5.68
5 19.84 24.10 5.28
9 18.04 24.13 5.05
Table 5 - Best Four Weapons Configurations
5.7.2 Graphical Results

The numerical results detailed in Table 5 provide a snap shot of the capabilities of the
system, it is informative to inspect the results in a more holistic manner. By plotting the
capability index results on a radar plot the designer can examine the strong and weak
areas of coverage and their causes very easily. Radar plots for the fits in Table 5 have
been placed in Appendix H due to their large size. Each plot shows the capability index
plotted against the bearing of Missile A from the ship.
Each of the radar plots is very different of particular interest is the regions which
provide very low coverage. To find the reason behind the poor value for each of these
areas an acetate overlay was created (provided in slip wallet in Appendix I). This
overlay allows the user to easily visualise the direction all the missiles by orientating the
acetate on plan views of the weapons outfit (e.g. Figure 14). This allows the reasons
behind the low CI values to become clear. A series of notes is provided here (c.f.
annotations on radar plots) that explains the reason behind the worst coverage arcs.
These notes should be read with reference to Figure 14 which illustrates the different
weapons arrangements under discussion.
In Figure 14 triangles denote Phalanx systems, squares are RAM launchers and circles
represent Sea Wolf trackers. The Sea Wolf silo is in the box unit just forward of the
bridge superstructure.
Page 37
Figure 14 - Weapons Configurations
Fit 12
Note A: This is due to blockage by the superstructure against which the aft Sea Wolf
designator is placed preventing the designator from being brought to bear on Missiles
B1 and B2.
Fit 4
In this outfit the Sea Wolf designators are placed on pedestals such that they are raised
to the same height as the forward superstructure.
Note B: This is due to obstruction of the starboard Sea Wolf designator by the aft stack
this prevents the designator being brought to bear on Missiles B1 and B2.
Note C: This is due to the port Sea Wolf designator being prevented from tracking
missiles B1 and B2 due the combined effect of the two stacks.
Fit 5
In this fit the RAM and Phalanx units are mounted on the superstructure roof. Pedestal
mounts would almost certainly result in an undesirable decrease in mounting stiffness
which would be reduce weapon accuracy particularly for the Phalanx.
Note D: This is due to the port forward Sea Wolf designator being unable to engage
Missiles B1 and B2 due to the combined blockage effects of the two stacks.
Note E: This is due to the RAM launcher being prevented from engaging missiles B1
and B2 due to the blockage of the aft attack.
Page 38
Fit 9
The designator placed at the aft end of the ship is mounted atop the aft superstructure,
not on a pedestal.
Note F: This is a composite effect of the forward stack and more importantly the fact
that the forward portion of the superstructure is higher than the aft portion, thus the
designator sees a continuous blockage from about 280˚ through zero to about 80˚. It
seems clear that if this designator was placed on a pedestal to raise it to the height of the
forward superstructure a massive improvement could be achieved at minimal cost. Due
to this large blockage region the aft designator is not able to engage any sea skimming
missiles in this arc.
Note G: This is due to blockage of the aft Sea Wolf designator by the forward stack
thereby preventing engagement of Missiles B1 & B2.
The radar plots and notes make it clear that the brief summary presented in Table 5 does
not tell the whole story. It is still up to the naval architect to understand and interpret the
results of any simulation. By understanding the root cause of an issue it may be possible
as in the case of Note F be improve the capability at virtually no additional cost. Certain
items of ships fit such as the stacks are unavoidable obstructions and must be worked
round with great care.
5.7.3 Practicalities
It is informative to examine the weapons fits layouts described in Section 5.7.1 in a
more practical fashion. Weapons layouts are shown in Figure 14.
Fit 12 would almost certainly be considered impractical and dangerous. The fit calls for
one of the delicate Sea Wolf trackers to be placed on the ships foredeck, almost
certainly resulting in damage to the tracker in the first heavy weather encountered. This
location has major radiation hazard implications for personnel on both the foredeck and
bridge. Further examination reveals that the second Sea Wolf tracker is actually placed
on the aft flight deck. The radiation hazard to personnel and relatively sensitive avionics
and munitions can not be understated. Consequently this weapons layout is certainly
impractical.
Further examination of the other fits detailed in Table 5 reveals that Fits 4, 5 and 9 are
probably practical from an electromagnetic perspective. The relatively clustered layout
are possibly undesirable in terms of ship survivability as they cluster four weapons
systems together in only two relatively small areas, resulting in a higher degree of
vulnerability than ideal. This weapons layout does however remove all the dangerous
and sensitive weapons to the upper deck where there is rarely a need for access in
normal operations. Selection between these arrangements would be determined by
issues such as structure and weapons efflux zones.
5.7.4 Conclusion
Though it would appear that none of the layouts described so far are optimum it is clear
that the naval architect now has a tool that allows direct and analytic comparisons to be
made in a timely fashion. This makes the prospect of developing the weapons fit
towards an optimum a realistic prospect.
Page 39
6 Limitations of Simulation
As with any simulation there are inevitable limitations to the representation of reality,
some stem from the basic assumptions made and detailed in Section 2.2 others are less
transparent and will be dealt with here.
6.1 Limited Scope of Work

This work on weapons layout is part of the much larger jigsaw of topside design.
Examining this single aspect of topside design so closely is much like attempting this
jigsaw wearing monochromatic glasses, whilst it may look correct in terms of this single
aspect the designer has lost sight of the whole picture and an impossibility results from
one of the other key areas. This has been fairly well illustrated throughout the
discussions of Section 5. Bayliss [1] provides a more well rounded look at the various
aspects of topside design
6.2 Passing Missiles

The simulation is not capable of handling passing missiles. Implicit within the
mathematics of this simulation is the assumption that the ship is a point at which all
inbound missiles are aimed. In mathematical terms each weapon system rests atop that
point and therefore all missile bearings are constant. By the same token the simulation
can not consider manoeuvring missiles. This limitation helps to maintain a simple to use
simulation. It should also be appreciated that the probability of intercepting a passing
missile is very different to one closing on a constant bearing and requires significantly
more complex calculations inevitably resulting in a slower simulation.
6.3 Dedicated AAW Ship Design

The simulation does not consider passing missiles; however it is questionable whether
the design of a dedicated area air defence asset would benefit from the application of
this simulation anyway. Since the advent of Aegis systems there has been a steady trend
for new build AAW ships to feature phased array radars and vertical launch silos as
their primary weapon systems. Both these systems suffer little or no blockage effects so
their position within the ship is primarily governed by considerations such as structure
and ships motion.
This simulation would still have application in the sitting of CIWS and other direct fire
systems however in laying these systems out it might be beneficial to simulate the ship
without the presence of the VLS system. The very high effectiveness of a phased array
VLS system may serve to mask differences in inner defence layouts.
More general purpose ships must strike a more even cost and capability balance. Phased
array radars and VLS cells are still expensive and relatively large, this can drive the ship
towards a larger design than would otherwise be required. Consequently these systems
are sometimes traded for cheaper conventional radar and trainable PDMS to achieve a
broader balance of capabilities.
Page 40
6.4 Decision Making
As has already been noted in Section 5.4 of this report the overall effectiveness
achieved by a human attempting the same scenario is somewhat better than the
computer. This loss in “absolute performance” is considered to be an acceptable trade
off in light of the consistency of decision making and the direct comparability of the
capability index values obtained. The purpose of this work is not to provide definitive
real world solutions but to provide a valid comparative optimum and this is still
achieved.
6.5 Sea Clutter Effects
Sea clutter is a particular problem in detecting targets below the altitude of the radar
scanner. In practice this means both the sea skimming missile and the small boat,
probably the most dangerous and prolific threats are also the hardest to detect. This is of
course compensated for as far as possible by advanced mathematical algorithms
however work presented by Ryan and Johnson [17] still suggests that detection
probability and presumably by extension weapon probability of kill is dependent on
target range.
[17]
Figure 15 - Probability of Detection as Function of Range
By contrast the simulation assumes perfect radar coverage from the radar horizon all the
way to the ship. In practice especially in rough weather or cluttered littoral regions the
ship may loose the target for brief periods seriously reducing the probability of
successfully engaging the target. Inclusion of a range dependent radar performance was
considered. In terms of the comparative solution being sought it would offer no benefit
and would be very unlikely to accurately reflect the performance of the wide array of
systems being modelled here.
Page 41
6.6 Blockage Effects
6.6.1 Uncertainty
Blockage effects are considered in this model as a binary effect with a specific bearing
and elevation being either blocked or clear. In the real world this distinction is not so
clear cut, near obstructions a degree of uncertainty results as to the position of the
target. Judging by work presented by Macey [18] this error is both probabilistic and
dependent on the nature of the obstruction as illustrated in Figure 16.
[18]
Figure 16 - Uncertainty Caused by Obstructions
Incorporating this effect in to the simulation would introduce a random element to the
simulation that is highly undesirable as it would make direct comparison between two
individual results impossible. The user would be forced to collect a statistically valid
sample for each configuration thereby vastly increasing the processing time required.
Since this uncertainty effect is not included, it is possible for a weapon system to fire a
round to pass within one degree clearance of an obstruction, or potentially down a one
degree wide clear bearing. This is of course unrealistic however it was not envisaged
that defining safety margins around an obstruction would alter the relative merits of
different configurations.
6.6.2 Mutual Blockage

The simulation is unable to recognise the blockage effects caused by the weapons
systems themselves. For example if a RAM and Phalanx are placed close together
(ignoring EM issues) there will inevitably result significant blockage effects between
the two weapons, once a safety margin is added this region could be substantial. This
effect is a by product of the necessity to exclude the weapons representation from the
blockage analysis.
This limitation could be overcome by the use of a more complex system for blockage
analysis whereby the system is instructed which DXF files represent which weapons
system. It would then be possible to exclude the file weapon’s file when calculating that
weapons blockage. This process would significantly increase the run time required to
Page 42
conduct the analysis furthermore the benefit is questionable when the weapons systems
are sufficiently well spaced to allow for radiation hazard issues.
6.7 Run Time

The run time for the simulation is typically under 30 seconds, however the run time
required by the blockage analysis process is still quite considerable (5 minutes or more).
It has been found possible to reduce the run times somewhat by using a finer faceting
size within Paramarine when exporting the DXF file; however this does not solve the
fundamental problem.
Examining the whole blockage analysis process, Paramarine is used to convert

parametric data (used by the Parasolids engine) to discrete data contained in the DXF
file. The blockage analysis process must then convert this discretised data back in to a
parametric form to allow effective blockage analysis. This is a long winded process that
could easily be short circuited by allowing the generation of blockage analyses directly
within Paramarine.
By allowing the Paramarine user to explicitly define a six dimensional view point (x, y
,z, roll, pitch, yaw) within Paramarine the software will calculate the required solids
data for display on screen. It is suggested that this data could be used to directly
generate the blockage analyses data.
A user definable six dimensional view point within Paramarine could have a number of
other uses particularly in terms of sight lines and human factors design.
7 Conclusions
7.1 Early Stage Design
In Section 5.4 of this report the simulation has demonstrated the ability to achieve a
solution very similar to that obtained by a human in a fraction of the time. This has
made practical the assessment on a cost, weight or space vs capability basis the relative
capability of any number of different weapons outfits as described in Section 5.5. Not
only do these results accord with mathematical theory but they also underline much of
the present naval thinking on matters such as missile defence and the direction of
weapons development.
Section 5.6 and 5.7 have shown that the simulation can distinguish between different
weapons locations and their relative capabilities, however the limitations of the
simulation were clearly demonstrated in that it does not consider either the safety or
practicality of the layout. This will always remain a task for the naval architect who
must bear the ultimate responsibility for the decisions made. Due to this non
judgemental approach the simulation does allow the naval architect freedom to compare
traditional and novel solutions to the weapons layout without prejudice by any other
factors.
As a tool for early stage design, this simulation technique allows the naval architect to
evaluate a number of different options rapidly and with a guarantee of direct
comparability between the results obtained for both weapons fit and layout.
Page 43
This tool is not intended to be a substitute for original thinking; it is not a design rule
but a development tool. As such there is certainly application within the sort of rapid
concept design work conducted at UCL. It is recommended that a polished version of
the tool is provided for the UCL ship design exercise 2006 on a semi – experimental
basis.
7.2 Teaching
As a teaching tool this simulation certainly has application. Section 5.5 has shown the
ability to demonstrate to the student the benefits of layered defence, 360˚ coverage and
why many navies are moving to VLS systems. Within the limitations described in
Sections 5.6, 5.7 and 6.6 a number of different weapons configurations can be trialled
and an optimum numerical solution derived.
By removing much of the laborious calculation from the exercise considerable time is
freed up that could be well used for consideration of the other aspects that effect
weapon selection and layout. Most notable amongst these is the EMI issue which was
discussed briefly in Section 5.7. EMI considerations play at least as large a role in the
layout of a modern warship as the arcs of fire. It is suggested that the paper presented by
Broadbent [19] would make a good basis for a general introduction to electro magnetic
considerations.
7.3 Further Work

It is clear from the discussions outlined in Section 5 that the arcs of fire is far from the
whole story in terms of upper deck layout, and there is rarely only one fit which allows
a high degree of coverage to be achieved.
Discussion with experts in topside design strongly support this conclusion, and suggest
that for modern warships at least as many potential pitfalls exist in concept design due
to electromagnetic issues.
It is proposed that work on weapons fire arcs should not be progressed any further. As
vertical launch systems and phased array radars become more prevalent the importance
of this work will steadily diminish. The work presented here combined with the work
presented by Bayliss [1] has reached a sufficiently evolved state to allow the naval
architect to establish the best weapons outfit locations. End users would benefit from
some revisions to this simulation, most notably the user interface. It would also be a
comparatively trivial task to combine the output of the blockage analysis developed here
in a similar manner to that described by Bayliss [1] to allow production of system
blockage diagrams (e.g. combined plot for all Sea Wolf systems). These would further
help the naval architect to appreciate the key obstructions.
Attention should now be focused on a concept tool or knowledge base that allows the
concept designer to consider the electromagnetic characteristics of a ships weapons
system and their interaction with the ships structure at as early a stage as possible. EMI
issues are now the single biggest constraint topside arrangement and as systems become
more complex this problem will only increase. The intention would be to prevent the
locking in of architectural features at the concept stage that are known to create EMI
issues. It is hoped that this will reduce the need for expensive problem resolution and
design revision at later stages.
Page 44
8 References
1. Bayliss, J.A., A Methodology for Topside Design and Integration in Preliminary
Warship Design, in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering. 2003,
University College London: London. p. 380.
2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Surface Ship Combat Systems Design

Integration. in Summer School Course. 1996. Boston, Massachusetts.
3. Skarda, R.K., Weapon Arc Evaluation Program, in Naval Architecture and

Marine Engineering. 1998, University College London: London.
4. Cooper, D.F., J. Holt, and J.H. Klein, Models of naval command and control
systems. European Journal of Operational Research, 1986. 26(2): p. 217 - 228.
5. Jane's Fighting Ships, ed. S. Saunders, Commodore RN. 2003, Coulsdon,

Surrey: Jane's Information Group Ltd.
6. University College London, Engagement Scenario Course Notes. 2005, London.
7. Kiely, D.G., Dr, Naval Surface Weapons. 1 ed. Brassey's Sea Power: Naval
Vessels, Weapons Systems and Technology Series, ed. G. Till, Dr. Vol. 6. 1998,
London: Brassey's Defence Publishers Ltd. 116.
8. Smith, G., Argentine Aircraft Lost, 2005, http://www.naval-

history.net/F64argaircraftlost.htm
9. Speed, K., Sea Change. 1982, Bath: Ashgrove Press. 194.
10. Ghose, D., U. Prasad, R, and K. Guruprasad, Missile battery placement for air
defene:A dynamic programming approach. Applied Mathematical Modelling,
1993. 17(9): p. 450 - 458.
11. Soland, R., Minimum - cost mixtures of area and point defenses assuming
simultaneous attack. Naval Research Logistics, 1987. 34(3): p. 337-363.
12. Kojukharov, A., Lt Cdr Bulgaian Navy, In Retrospect: The employment of

Antiship Missiles. 1997, Naval War College: Newport, Rhode Island. p. 4.
13. Brown, D., The Royal Navy and The Falklands War. 1988, London: Heinemann.
14. Chant, C., Small Craft Navies. 1992, London: Arms and Armour Press. 160.
15. Jane's Naval Weapon Systems. 38 ed, ed. E.R. Hooton. 2003, Coulsdon, Surrey:
Jane's Information Group Ltd.
16. Soland, R., Optimal Terminal Defense Tactics When Several Sequential
Engagements Are Possible. Operations Research, 1987. 35(4): p. 537 - 542.
17. Ryan, J. and M. Johnson. Radar Performance Prediction for Target Detection at
Sea. in Radar 92. 1992. Brighton, Uk: IEE.
18. Macey, I.D. Measurements of SSR Bearing Errors due to Site Obstructions. in
Radar 92. 1992. Brighton, Uk: IEE.
Page 45
19. Broadbent, C. International Conference on Interaction between Naval Weapon
Systems and Warship Design. in NAVTEC '90. 1990. London: Royal Institution
of Naval Architects.
20. AutoDesk Ltd, Chapter 6 -- ENTITIES Section -- 3DFACE, 2005,

http://www.autodesk.com/techpubs/autocad/acad2000/dxf/3dface_dxf_06.htm
Page 46
Appendix A Taught Scenario
Page 47
Page 48
Threat Scenario at
Time Zero
350O
270,000m
A approx 145nm
80,000m
approx 43nm
258,000m
approx 140nm
C 262,000m
B1 approx 142nm
B2
240O 125O
not to scale
NARG UCL
Page 49
Threat Missile Profiles
tips over at
horizontal range Missile A 900 m/s
of 75,000m Altitude 10,000m
tips over at
horizontal range Missile B 850 m/s
of 100,000m Altitude 7,500m
radar horizon
Missile C 270 m/s

3m
36.1Km
not to scale
43Km
NARG UCL
Page 50
Appendix B Software Flow Diagrams
Key to Symbols
Page 51
Page 52
Overall
Begin Set Initial Call

Get Radar Range.
Here conditions and Scenario
Inc elevation effect
parameters
Dimension How many

Weapon arrays weapons does the
appropriately ship carry?
Call
WepInfo
Calculate max
time to target, i.e.
how long
simulation runs for
Where are
Calculate
Missiles?
Check which Is time less Final
Call Missile Yes No
weapons are free than max? Probabiility
Posn.
Call
Time
Radar MsgBox “Done”
Advance
All Complete
Is at least one
Advance time by
missile within No
time Res
radar range?
Overall
Continues
Page 53
Add Missiles in Evaluate time to Reinitialise
Overall
Radar Range to target for each Selector with zero
Continues
Selector missile in Range values in all cells
Has missile Log

Set Missile as
detection already No Event
detected
been logged?
Plot
Missiles on
Yes Radar
Sort Sort Missiles

Have one or in to arrival
missiles
Yes more missile No order
by Pnk
been engaged
All Missiles Select next missile

No
Done? from sorted list
Select
Weapon for
Yes
Missile
Time
Advance
Has weapon
system been No
allocated?
Is missile
Yes presently being No
engaged?
Yes
Engage
Yes Is range > 0 No
Page 54
Scenario
Begin
Here
User defined no. of

missiles and profiles
Select Missile m
No
Is Missile
Used?
Yes
Call mprofile
MissileData mlaunch
Yes
Read in Missile Mloc(1,miss

Bearing ile)
Read in Missile
mtype
Flight Type
Is there
another
missile?
No
Return to Overall
Page 55
wepinfo
Begin
Here
Which Weapon
therefore which
column?
Weapon Range Store Range Info WepRange

info
Store Elevation
Weapon Elevation WepElev
Info
info
Weapon Firing Store Firing Info WepFire

info
Store Time info WepTime

Weapon Time info
Return to Overall
Page 56
MissilePosn
Define missile
range, altitude and
speed at launch
Begin
Select Next
Here
Missile
Launch
Time
Is there Has Missile Been

another No launched Yet?
missile? Time vs Launch Time
After Launch Time
Return to Overall
Update Missile
No, i.e. has reached ship Is Missile
Yes Position. Function
range > 0
MisRange
Level Flight, Which Flight

No Change Profile?
Is range Inside
No, High - High
tip over point?
No values Change
Yes
Calculate Altitude.
Function: Altitude High - Low
Speed = Constant
What stage of
flight?
Stage 3
Stage 1 Stage 2
Calculate Altitude
No change in Update Altitude
Function: Altitude.
values Update Speed
Update Speed
Page 57
MissileData
Begin
Here
mLanuch
Read In Missile
Data for each
missile used in
SImulation
mProfile
Return to Scenario
Page 58
Radar
Begin
Here
Is Missile range within Set Radar =

Yes
Radar Range? True
No
Is Missile
Set Radar =
Above Radar Yes
True
Horizion
No
Set Radar =
Return to Overall
False
Page 59
EventLog
Begin
Here
Write EventDes,
Time, Missile
Range and
EventNo to Radar
Sheet
Colour Cells
According to
Missile being
reported on
Return to Previous
Sub
Page 60
Sort
Begin
Here
NoExchanges=
True
Do for each row

until no more
swaps.
Is Selector (i,2)>
selector(i+1,2)
No
Swap two rows in

Do Nothing
martix
Does
NoExchages =
True?
Yes
Return to Overall
Page 61
WepSel
Begin
Here
Add free weapons

to WepAlloc
Remove Weapons
that are out of
Ammo
Eliminate
Weapons outside
range basket
Eliminate
Blocked
Weapons
Is there a weapon that

can be allocated to the No Return to Overall
missile?
Yes
Calculate distance
inside maximum
range
Sort Weapon in to
order of closest to
maximum range
(WepSort)
Find Weapon with

lowest no zero Set MisWep(m)
value
Page 62
Engage
Begin
Set Weapon Mark Target as
Here
indicator as busy engaged
Is Launcher
No response
time>0?
Is this the first

missile the weapon Yes Yes
No has fired on?
Does Weapon
Yes Bearing = Missile
Bearing?
Log Event. Add reaction time

No
Trained on Missile to WepClock
Reduce Calculate Time to

Increase Prob
Remaining Ammo Log Firing Event Impact
Count
by 1 (AmmoAudit) (TimeAtIntercept)
Log Event
Interception
Page 63
Has Weapon
For each round Is Salvo Size
No run out of Yes
remaining Greater that 1?
ammo?
Has Missile moved in to

blocked region or
outside elevation limits?
Yes
Yes
Update Probability
Free up weapon Return to Overall
(RunninProb) No
No
Yes
Reduce
Is Missile now Advance Counter
No Remaining Ammo
inside min range by firing interval
(AmmoAudit)
Is time between
rounds > time No
resoluion
Increase Prob.
Count
Yes
Yes
Is Missile now
inside min range
Is Counter > Time
Resolution?
Reduce
Remaining Ammo Zero Counter Yes
(AmmoAudit)
Calculate Time to
Increase Prob. Log Event
Log Firing Event Impact
count Interception
(TimeAtIntercept)
Log Time Weapon Update Time

Return to Overall Update Probability
Free Weapon Free
Page 64
RadarPlot
Begin
Here
Is Missile in
No Return to Overall
Range
Yes
Which Missile
is being
plotted?
Output Range and

Bearing
Coordinates
Page 65
FinalProb
Begin
Here
Probability of not
being hit Pnhs= 1
Is Missile no
<=6
Write Probability Select Which

All Missiles
of at least one hit Missile being
Complete
on ship to cell examined
Next Missile
Write Expected
No. of hits to cell
Is Missile Write “Missile not

included in No included in Sim” to
Simulation? appropriate cell
Return to Overall Yes
Increase count of
number of missiles
in scenario by 1
Is probability of
killing missile Pk(m) No
> 0?
Write “Missile not

fired upon” to
Yes appropriate cell
Calculate
Write Pk to
probability of ship Next Missile
appropriate cell
not being hit
Page 66
Blockage
Begin Based on resolution Calculate altitude

Here calculate no. of points of missile in
in Blockage LIst Weapon CS
Calculate angle Below Select Relative Above Calculate angle

below level Level Elevation Level above level
Level
Elevation = 0
Is Elevation
Set Elevation = 10 Is Weapon a
Yes Below + 10 Yes
degrees missile?
degrees
No
No
Is Elevation >
Weapon max Yes
Limit?
No Blockage = True
Is Elevation <
Yes
Weapon min limit
No
Find bearing on
which missile is.
No
Is missile elevation
above blockage
elevation?
Yes
Return to Previous
Blockage = False
Sub
Page 67
PnkSort
Begin
Here
NoExchanges=
True
Do for each row

until no more
swaps.
Is Selector (i,2)>
selector(i+1,2)
No
Swap two rows in

Do Nothing
martix
Does
NoExchages =
True?
Yes
Return to Overall
Page 68
Triangles
How many What Angular Calculate the

Dimension all
weapons systems Resolution is required size for
matrices
are fitted? Required? blockage matrix
Select files to be Input number of files

read in to make up ship
Write Blockage
Is file being read less Matrices to
No
than total number of files appropriate Sheets
Call (WriteBlockage)
Yes
MsgBox All
Done
Open New File.
Close File. (Reset
Count total
line posn)
number of lines
No, Next File
Next
Line Blockage Analysis
Complete
Open file to be
read
Is line to be read less than

number of lines in file?
Yes
No, Next Line
Does Line = Does Line =

EOF “3DFACE” ?
Yes, Next File

Yes
Read in x,y,z Populate Triangle

Eliminate 4th
coords for four Matrix with 3 x,y,z
redundant point
points of 3DFACE coord sets
Page 69
Traingle 2
Convert Triangle
to weapon CS
Establish
Parametric
Equations for each
side of triangle
Convert Triangle
positions to Spherical
Coords. Functions:
Range, Bearing,
Elevation
Check blockage
effect of these 3
Sphere points
Next
Select Side to
All Sides Checked Line
be checked
Calculate number Is angular difference Set number of

of point to be Yes between ends of side > No divisions to be
created Angular resolution? created as 2
Dimension
Detailed matrices
appropriatly
Calculate x,y,z
posns of detailed
points in each
Weapon CS
Convert detailed
points to spherical
coordinates
Check blockage
effect of
Repeat for next side DetailedSphere
points
Page 70
Appendix C Simulation User Guide
It is intended to provide a brief outline of how the simulation is used to enable a future
user to begin work. It is strongly suggested that the user does not have any other
programs open whilst running the simulation, and if they must that all work is saved
before using the simulation.
At the time of writing the simulation has not been error trapped and the user interface is
still largely prototypical as such this software should be considered to still be in the beta
stage. Of far greater concern during this work were the actual processes behind the
simulation.
Start Up
Upon opening the simulation file in Excel the user will almost certainly be asked if the
they wish to enable macros or that due to their security settings macros have been
disabled. To use this simulation macros must be enabled within Excel. Please see
Excel’s help if assistance is required.
Once the file has loaded the user will be presented with the Master screen (Screen Shot
1). This is the main page to which we will return frequently.
Screen Shot 1 - Master Screen
Page 71
Before doing anything else the user should save the file under a different name, this will
ensure that results obtained can be retained. Once the save is complete the user should
click the initialise sheet button. This creates a number of in sheet menus and erases the
previous results in the sheet.
Once returned to the master screen the user should proceed to setup the weapons fit.
Setting up the Simulation

Weapons Outfit
By clicking the “Select Weapons Fit” button the user will be taken to the weapons outfit
page.
The user must now enter details of the primary search radar. The information required is
the basic range of the radar and the altitude of the radar scanner above sea level. Based
on this the worksheet will calculate the theoretical distance to the radar horizon,
displayed in the grey cell at the top left of sheet (Screen Shot 2).
Screen Shot 2 - Weapons Definition Screen
The user must now define how many weapons systems are to be fitted to the ship. It
should be noted that a designator constitutes a system as does a VLS Silo, hence the
example in Screen Shot 2 is a 5 weapons system outfit. Upon clicking “Generate
Weapons Systems” the appropriate number of drop down lists will be generated across
the screen. There is presently a limit of 12 weapons systems, though if required this
could easily be extended at a later date.
If the user wishes to use one of the predefined weapons systems then they should simple
select this from the relevant drop down list. If the user wishes to define a different
system they must first select “Other” from the drop down list of weapons.
Though it strictly doesn’t matter it is suggested that weapon 1 should always be the
shortest range system, and weapon n the longest range system. This will make reading
results easier. (Users may of course find their own preferred logic).
Page 72
It finally remains to define the weapons location in the global coordinate system. If the
user is going to manually define blockage arcs then this step is not necessary. If the user
wishes to use a Paramarine DXF then these coordinates must be defined in the global
coordinate system as used in Paramarine. Do not place the coordinates exactly on a
Paramarine surface, place the coordinates at the height of the weapon barrel or missile
launcher, this prevents a potential error. VLS silos can be ignored if desired as the
simulation assumes no blockage effects on the silo.
Once all the weapons are completely defined the user should return to the Master
Screen.
Blockage Diagrams
Blockage diagrams can be entered in to the simulation via one of two methods. If
blockage effects are to be excluded from the simulation then all the relevant blockage
diagrams should be set with a blockage elevation value of -90˚ else the simulation will
assume the blockage elevation is 0˚ which may result in unwanted blockage effects. See
Manual Generation for details on how to achieve this.
Automatic Generation
Hopefully by this point the user has created a number of DXF files using Paramarine to
represent the ship. All items that go on or above the upper deck must be exported as
DXFs. It may be possible to exclude the hull depending on how the Paramarine model
is built up, if so this will greatly reduce the computational time required. It is suggested
that users set the faceting tolerance in Paramarine to 2.5m as this appears to provide the
quickest calculation. It may be possible to write a Paramarine macro to assist with the
export process if the model’s architecture changes frequently.
Once the user returns to the Master screen, the “Define Blockage Arcs” button should
be clicked. A pop up box will be displayed (Screen Shot 3) asking how many DXF files
make up the entire ship. This is the total number of files exported from Paramarine.
Screen Shot 3 - Pop Up
Upon clicking OK the user will be presented with the standard Microsoft file dialog
box, using this select the first DXF file to be used and click ok. The user will be
presented with a small acknowledgement dialog. This process will repeat for the
number of files to be used. Upon acknowledging the successful entry of the final file the
blockage analysis process will begin. Depending on the number of files, complexity f
the shapes and the number of weapons this can take ten to fifteen minutes. Standard
operating procedure calls for the user to go in search of a cup of tea (or similar) at his
point as the computer will be fully occupied by the blockage analysis process.
Page 73
The blockage analysis procedure is usually reliable, so enjoy your tea as upon
completion a small dialog box will be displayed. It is suggested that the user save the
file at this stage, as all the blockage data is stored in the Excel file and can be reused so
long as weapons locations do not change.
The user can review the blockage diagrams created by navigating to the appropriately
numbered Sheet, e.g. “Weapon 1 Blockage” as seen in Screen Shot 4. The graph line
represents the top of the blocked region as seen from the perspective of the weapon
system. If a direction of fire to a missile is below the elevation defined by this line then
this weapon system will be unable to engage.
Screen Shot 4 - Blockage Sheet
The reader will note that there is an apparent discontinuity at the 359˚ location. This
results from the computers confusion over the 0˚ = 360˚ issue. To correct this the user
should scroll down the sheet and set the value based on the 359˚ and 0˚ value.
Once the user has inspected all the relevant blockage diagrams they should return to the
Master screen.
Manual Generation
To manually enter the blockage diagrams the user should navigate their way to the
relevant blockage sheets and enter the details of the blockage manually in the form of
elevations from the barrel or launcher position.
Once all the required sheets have been completed the user should return to the Master
screen.
Page 74
Threat Scenario
The user defined threat scenario is accessed through the “Define Threat Scenario”
button.
Screen Shot 5 -Threat Scenario Definition
Threat scenario selection is discussed in Section 2.4 of this report and will not be
repeated here.
Once the number of missiles has been determined (maximum 6), the relevant “include
missile in scenario” box must be ticked. The simulation will only consider missiles that
are ticked to be included.
For each missile the user should select the appropriate flight profile from the drop down
box.
• High – High: Missile approaches at high altitude until making a terminal dive
into the target from close range.
• High – Low: The missile approaches at high altitude and then drops to a lower
altitude over a user specified distance to then make its final run
• Level Flight: The missile maintains a constant altitude until it reaches the ship.
Typically used for sea skimming missiles.
The software will automatically grey out cells according to the selection made; these
require no data to be entered. Boxes containing “var” indicate that this quantity varies as
a function of the missiles range from the ship and they should not be altered by the user.
Once threat definition has been completed for all missiles the user should return to the
Master Screen.
Page 75
Running the Simulation
The user has now defined all the parameters required by the simulation. Clicking on the
“Run Simulation” button will run the simulation, this typically takes less than a minute
and a dialog box will be displayed when the run is completed.
Results
Results are presented in two key forms, a listing of the engagement events and a
probability summary. To date the capability index value is not generated automatically.
Run History
On the “Radar Sheet” (so named for historical development reasons) the user will find a
detailed list of all the events that occurred during the simulation. This can be sorted
either by time or event number depending on which the user finds easier. The output is
colour coded according to the missile it refers to. For clarity the colours have been
omitted from Screen Shot 6.
Screen Shot 6 - Event Log
Page 76
Probability
The probability outputs (Screen Shot 7) from the simulation are stored in the
“Probability” sheet. The outputs are largely self explanatory. The simulation will
distinguish between weapons not included in the simulation and those not fired upon.
Screen Shot 7 - Probability Output
Multi Axis Simulation

Using
From the Master screen click on the “Multi Axis” button. The user will be faced with a
brief warning regarding the potentially long run times that can result if a very small
angular increment is used. The default setting is 10˚ and this should provide sufficient
resolution for most cases.
Upon clicking OK the simulation will run for the number of times required to complete
one full revolution round the ship with the angular increment specified. Upon
completion (2 – 3 minutes) a dialog will notify the user.
Results
Results from the multi axis analysis are presented on the sheet called “Roulette”. Only
an extract is presented in Screen Shot 8, however using the summary provided at the
extreme right of the screen the user should easily be able to identify scenarios which
have significantly lower Capability Index values.
Screen Shot 8 - Multi Axis Results
It is suggested that the user may wish to display the data as radar plots as per Section
5.7.2 of this report.
Page 77
Page 78
Appendix D Paramarine DXF File Format
This reference work is included here as it proved quite hard to track down.
Paramarine uses a much simplified version of the full DXF file format. This is detailed
here. This interpretation is based on reference [20] and a certain amount of trial and
error. The DXF file is a text file with a special designation (.dxf) and as such can be
opened by almost any generic text editor.
The code presented below represents the minimum requirements for a file containing
one 3DFACE item.
It is worth noting that Paramarine uses a special case of the 3DFACE entity with
(usually) point 3 and 4 coincident, this results in a triangle instead of a quadrilateral.
This is permissible under the format specification.
All blank lines are required if the file is to be read by a CAD program.
Page 79
0 Blank Line Indicator
SECTION Section Header
2
ENTITIES
999 Section Identifier
unified
3DFACE 3DFACE object begins
5
1
8 Data relating to entitie's layer
x coordinate of point 1
10 identifier
-3.33333 x coordinate value
y coordinate of point 1
20 identifier
-2.92893 y coordinate value
z coordinate of point 1
30 identifier
0.00 z coordinate value
11 identifier
-3.33333 x coordinate value
21 identifier
-10 y coordinate value
31 identifier
12 identifier
3.333333 x coordinate value
22 identifier
32 identifier
13 identifier
3.333333 x coordinate value
23 identifier
33 identifier
0 z coordinate value
ENDSEC End of Section Indicator
EOF End of File Indicator
Page 80
Appendix E Blockage Assessment Validation
Page 81
Page 82
Blockage Validation Calculation
For the purpose of this validation exercise a simple geometry has been created to test the
blockage analysis sub routine against.
Point 1 - Beginning of Round Column
x := 9.65 y := −8.24 z := 5
2 2
Range := x +y Range = 12.689
Bearing := atan⎛⎜ ⎞ ⋅ rad

y
⎟ Bearing = 0.707
⎝ x ⎠
⎛ 360 ⎞ ⋅ Bearing
Degree := ⎜ ⎟ Degree = 40.494
⎝ 2π ⎠
Elevation := atan⎛⎜
z ⎞ ⎛ 360 ⎞
⎟ ⋅⎜ ⎟ Elevation = 21.506
⎝ Range ⎠ ⎝ 2π ⎠
Point 2 - Middle of Round Column

x := 8.29 y := −8.29 z := 5
2 2

y
⎟ Bearing = 0.785
⎝ x ⎠
Degree := ⎜ ⎟ Degree = 45
⎝ 2π ⎠
z ⎞ ⎛ 360 ⎞
⎟ ⋅⎜ ⎟ Elevation = 23.097
⎝ Range ⎠ ⎝ 2π ⎠
Point 3 - End of Round Column

x := 8.24 y := −9.65 z := 5
2 2

y
⎟ Bearing = 0.864
⎝ x ⎠
⎝ 2π ⎠
z ⎞ ⎛ 360 ⎞
⎟ ⋅⎜ ⎟ Elevation = 21.506
⎝ Range ⎠ ⎝ 2π ⎠
The discrepancy between the elevations derived for the edges of the round column is noted, this
is believed to be due to the way that the data for the hand calculation was obtained. Due to the
density of the DXF file it was impossible to discern the exact point to be used. It has believed
that this has resulted in a slight inaccuracy in the distance to the point and hence the elevation
value.
Point 4 - Begining of Square Column

x := −8 y := −10 z := 10
2 2
Page 83
Bearing := atan⎛⎜ ⎞ + π ⋅ rad
x
⎟ Bearing = 2.246
⎝ y ⎠ 2
⎝ 2π ⎠
z ⎞ ⎛ 360 ⎞
⎟ ⋅⎜ ⎟ Elevation = 37.985
⎝ Range ⎠ ⎝ 2π ⎠
Point 5 - Middle of Square Column

x := −8 y := −8 z := 10
2 2

x
⎟ Bearing = 2.356
⎝ y ⎠ 2
Degree := ⎜ ⎟ Degree = 135
⎝ 2π ⎠
z ⎞ ⎛ 360 ⎞
⎟ ⋅⎜ ⎟ Elevation = 41.473
⎝ Range ⎠ ⎝ 2π ⎠
Point 6 - End of square column

x := −10 y := −8 z := 10
2 2

x
⎟ Bearing = 2.467
⎝ y ⎠ 2
⎝ 2π ⎠
z ⎞ ⎛ 360 ⎞
⎟ ⋅⎜ ⎟ Elevation = 37.985
⎝ Range ⎠ ⎝ 2π ⎠
All the values obtained for the square column are within rounding error of those obtained through
the DXF reading software.
Conclusion
The DXF reading software is functioning correctly and returning the correct numerical answers.
Note: Complete blockage diagram and DXF reader output for relevant sections is shown overleaf
Page 84
Results of Blockage Test
Bearing (Deg) Elevation Resolution
38.5 -0.446186262 1
39.5 -0.442341098
40.5 22.21505831
41.5 22.67536594
Blockage Profile For Validation
42.5 22.91977787
43.5 23.04846648
44.5 23.09015123 90
45.5 23.09001091
46.5 23.04846648 75
47.5 22.91977787 60
48.5 22.67536594
49.5 22.21505831 45
50.5 -0.439036988 30
51.5 -0.445601743
15
Page 85
0
126.5 -0.460253849 -15 0 45 90 135 180 225 270 315 360
127.5 -0.452676039
Elevation (Deg)
128.5 37.98516729 -30
129.5 38.58811151 -45
130.5 39.19808164
131.5 39.81420447 -60
132.5 40.43546794 -75
133.5 40.95320696
134.5 41.21287174 -90
135.5 41.4729343 Bearing (Deg)
136.5 40.95320696
137.5 40.43546794
138.5 39.7080987
139.5 39.19808164
140.5 38.74428369
141.5 37.98516729
142.5 -0.453920015
143.5 -0.457803746
Page 86
Appendix F LPD 17
Figure 17 - LPD 17, 3D Blockage Model
Weapon Locations 3D Coordinates.

Origin is located at the transom, on ships centreline at deck level.
LPD Weapon Locations
Point x y z
1 184.151 -7.72 1
2 184.151 0 1
3 184.151 7.72 1
4 173.302 0 4
5 173.302 5.766 4
6 173.302 -5.766 4
7 165.9 13.175 12
8 163.105 16 9
9 165.9 0 12
10 165.9 -13.175 12
11 163.105 -16 9
12 145.84 13.178 12
13 145.84 0 12
14 145.84 -13.178 12
15 126.774 13.178 12
16 126.774 -13.178 12
17 115.102 -12.117 4
18 115.102 0 4
19 115.102 12.117 4
20 98.991 0 9
21 85.675 -12.117 9
22 68.216 -12.117 9
23 68.216 0 9
24 68.216 12.117 9
25 68.216 -12.117 12
26 68.216 12.117 12
27 61.565 -14.746 1
28 61.565 14.746 1
29 29.945 -14.746 1
30 29.945 14.746 1
31 1.475 -14.746 1
32 1.475 14.746 1
Page 87
Page 88
Page 89
Page 90
Appendix G Validation Calculation
Page 91
UCL Engagement Scenario Hand Calculation
For the purpose of this calculation all weapons systems and trackers will be assumed to be free
from blockages.
The weapons fit will be as follows:

• Two off Seawolf designators sharing one 32 round silo.
• Two off RAM systems.
• Two off Phalanx systems.
The purpose of this calculation is not to demonstrate the correct mathematical performance of
the simulation, but to demonstrate that the simulation produces a result that is equal or close to
that achieved by a human attempting the problem
Radar
The search radar is placed at an elevation of 30m above the waterline. The radar horizon is
therefore at:
3
h := 30m Rearth := 6378⋅ 10 m
Horizon := 2 ⋅ Rearth⋅ h
4
Horizon = 1.956 × 10 m
However targets beyond this range may be detected if they are above the altitude of the radar
horizon. h2 is the minimum altitude at which a target will be detected.
Missile A
At launch (t=0) the missile location is as follows:
2
3 ( Range − Horizon) 3
Range := 270 ⋅ 10 m h2 := h2 = 4.917 × 10 m
2 ⋅ Rearth
Since the missile is at an altitude of 10,000m, significantly higher than the minimum altitude for
detection the missile is detected at t = 0.
Missile B1
2
Range := 258 ⋅ 10 m h2 := h2 = 4.457 × 10 m
2 ⋅ Rearth
Missile B2
2
Range := 262 ⋅ 10 m h2 := h2 = 4.608 × 10 m
2 ⋅ Rearth
Missile C
Page 92
2
3 ( Range − Horizon)
Range := 80⋅ 10 m h2 := h2 = 286.354 m
2 ⋅ Rearth
The missile is at an altitude of three meters therefore is not detected. The missile will be
detected when
h2 := 3m
4
Range := 2 ⋅ Rearth⋅ h2 + Horizon Range = 2.575 × 10 m
−1 3
For Missile C with mSpeed := 270m⋅ s Launch := 80⋅ 10 ⋅ m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 200.932 s
mSpeed
Engagement Time
The first criteria for selecting targets is the order that they will enter the engagement envelope.
Due to the different speeds and starting ranges of each missile this will be different for each
missile.
Seawolf Envelope
Missile A
For the Seawolf missile system to engage at the maximum range
−1
wepSpeed := 650 ⋅ m⋅ s wepRange := 10000m
−1 3
mSpeed := 900 ⋅ m⋅ s Launch := 270 ⋅ 10 ⋅ m
Range := ( wepRange ÷ wepSpeed ) ⋅ mSpeed + wepRange

4
Range = 2.385 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 273.504 s
mSpeed
Missile B1
−1 3

4
Range = 2.308 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 276.38 s
mSpeed
Missile B2
−1 3

4
Range = 2.308 × 10 m
Page 93
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 281.086 s
mSpeed
Missile C
−1 3
mSpeed := 270 ⋅ m⋅ s Launch := 80⋅ 10 ⋅ m

4
Range = 1.415 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 243.875 s
mSpeed
Missile C enters the engagement envelope first and consequently will be engaged by Seawolf
Designator 1. As the simulation uses a time resolution of 1 second the engagement process will
begin at time = 244s.
RAM Envelope
Missile A
−1
wepSpeed := 650 ⋅ m⋅ s wepRange := 6500m
−1 3

4
Range = 1.55 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 282.778 s
mSpeed
Missile B1
−1 3

4
Range = 1.5 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 285.882 s
mSpeed
Missile B2
−1 3

4
Range = 1.5 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 290.588 s
mSpeed
Missile C
Page 94
−1 3

3
Range = 9.2 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 262.222 s
mSpeed
Phalanx Envelope
Missile A
−1
wepSpeed := 1000⋅ m⋅ s wepRange := 2000m
−1 3

3
Range = 3.8 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 295.778 s
mSpeed
Missile B1
−1 3

3
Range = 3.7 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 299.176 s
mSpeed
Missile B2
−1 3

3
Range = 3.7 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 303.882 s
mSpeed
Missile C
−1 3

3
Range = 2.54 × 10 m
Launch − Range
Time := Time = 286.889 s
mSpeed
Page 95
Engagement 1:
Seawolf 1 vs Missile C
Each weapon systems has a reaction time, however since the command system has been
aware of the missiles approach for over forty seconds it is safe to assume that the weapon
would already be trained on the appropriate bearing.
Note: Seawolf is assumed to fire rounds in a salvo of two.

Weapon Data:
−1
wepSpeed := 650m⋅ s wepRange := 10000m FireTime := 244s
Salvo := 2 Pk := 0.74 Reload := 1s Kill := 6s
Missile Data:
−1
mSpeed := 270m⋅ s Launch := 80000m
Impact 1
4
Range := Launch − FireTime⋅ mSpeed Range = 1.412 × 10 m
Range
TTI := TTI = 15.348 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed
ImpactTime := FireTime + TTI ImpactTime = 259.348 s

3
ImpactRange := Launch − ImpactTime⋅ mSpeed ImpactRange = 9.976 × 10 m
Impact 2
4
Range := Launch − ( FireTime + Reload) ⋅ mSpeed Range = 1.385 × 10 m
Range
TTI := TTI = 15.054 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed
ImpactTime := FireTime + Reload + TTI ImpactTime = 260.054 s

3
Kill Assessment Complete
WeaponFree := ImpactTime + Kill WeaponFree = 266.054 s
Probability
The probability of destroying Missile 4 with engagement 1 (Pkm4e1).
Rounds := 2
Rounds
PkmCe1 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmCe1 = 0.932
Engagement 2:
RAM 1 vs Missile C
Weapon pretargeted, no engagement lag
Weapon Data:
−1
Missile Data:
−1
mSpeed := 270m⋅ s Launch := 80000m
Page 96
Impact 1
3
Range
TTI := TTI = 8.598 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Impact 2
3
Range
TTI := TTI = 7.13 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Probability
Rounds := 2
Rounds
PkmCe2 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmCe2 = 0.922
Engagement 3:
Seawolf 2 vs Missile A
Weapon Data:
−1
Missile Data:
−1 3
mSpeed := 900m⋅ s Launch := 270 ⋅ 10 m
Impact 1
4
Range
TTI := TTI = 15.097 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Impact 2
4
Page 97
Range
TTI := TTI = 14.516 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Probability
Rounds := 2
Rounds
PkmAe1 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmAe1 = 0.932
Engagement 4:
Seawolf 1 vs Missile B2
Weapon Data:
−1
Missile Data:
−1 3
Impact 1
4
Range
TTI := TTI = 13.733 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Impact 2
4
Range
TTI := TTI = 13.167 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Probability
Rounds := 2
Page 98
Rounds
PkmB2e1 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmB2e1 = 0.932
Engagement 5:
RAM 1 vs Missile C
Weapon Data:
−1
Missile Data:
−1 3
mSpeed := 270m⋅ s Launch := 80⋅ 10 m
Impact 1
3
Range
TTI := TTI = 3.022 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Impact 2
3
Range
TTI := TTI = 1.554 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Probability
2nd round of salvo is inside minimum range. Therefore will not be fired. Weapon is free after
impact of first round at 290s
Rounds := 1
Rounds
PkmCe3 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmCe3 = 0.72
Engagement 6:
RAM 2 vs Missile B1
Weapon Data:
−1
Missile Data:
Page 99
−1 3
Impact 1
4
Range
TTI := TTI = 9.933 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Impact 2
4
Range
TTI := TTI = 7.1 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Probability
Rounds := 2
Rounds
PkmB1e1 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmB1e1 = 0.922
Engagement 7:
Phalanx 1 vs Missile A
Weapon Data:
−1
Salvo := 325 Pk := 0.0024 Reload := 0.016667s Kill := 5s
Missile Data:
−1 3
Impact 1
3
Range
TTI := TTI = 1.895 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Final Impact
Range := Launch − [ FireTime + ( Reload⋅ 227 ) ] ⋅ mSpeed Range = 194.932 m
Page 100
Range
TTI := TTI = 0.103 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed
ImpactTime := FireTime + ( Reload⋅ 227 ) + TTI ImpactTime = 299.886 s
ImpactRange := Launch − ImpactTime⋅ mSpeed ImpactRange = 102.596 m
Probability
Rounds := 227
Rounds
PkmAe2 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmAe2 = 0.42
Engagement 8:
Seawolf 1 vs Missile B2
Weapon Data:
−1
Missile Data:
−1 3
Impact 1
3
Range
TTI := TTI = 6.367 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Impact 2
3
Range
TTI := TTI = 5.8 s
mSpeed + wepSpeed

3
Probability
Rounds := 2
Page 101
Rounds
PkmB2e2 := 1 − ( 1 − Pk) PkmB2e2 = 0.932
Overall Probability of killing missiles
Probability of at least one sucessful kill for a given missile
Missile A
PkmA := 1 − [ ( 1 − PkmAe1 ) ⋅ ( 1 − PkmAe2 ) ] PkmA = 0.961
Missile B1
PkmB1 := 1 − ( ( 1 − PkmB1e1) ) PkmB1 = 0.922
Missile B2
PkmB2 := 1 − [ ( 1 − PkmB2e1) ⋅ ( 1 − PkmB2e2) ] PkmB2 = 0.995
Missile C
PkmC := 1 − [ ( 1 − PkmCe1) ⋅ ( 1 − PkmCe2) ⋅ ( 1 − PkmCe3) ] PkmC = 0.999
Probability of at least one missile hitting the ship

PkHit := 1 − PkmA⋅ PkmB1⋅ PkmB2⋅ PkmC PkHit = 0.12
Page 102
Page 103
Appendix H LPD 17 Analysis
Page 104
Page 105
Optimal Weapons Fit Study
Total Cost P one Capability
Fit Line Cost (£) Location Pk A Pk B1 Pk B2 Pk C Comments
(£) Hit Index
Fit 1 2.300E+06 0.000 0.000 0.356 0.542 1.000 1.289
1 off Phalanx 2.300E+06 9
Fit 2 4.600E+06 0.423 0.000 0.356 0.542 1.000 1.493
2 off Phalanx 4.600E+06 9,23
Fit 3 6.900E+06 0.423 0.382 0.356 0.542 0.969 1.741
3 off Phalanx 6.900E+06 7,10,23
Fit 4 9.200E+06 0.423 0.382 0.356 0.542 0.969 1.741
4 off Phallanx 9.200E+06 7,10,24,22 4th Phalanx is redundent
Fit 5 1.150E+07 0.423 0.382 0.356 0.542 0.969 1.741 due missil arrival times
5 off Phallanx 1.150E+07 7,10,24,22,20
Fit 6 7.300E+06 0.922 0.000 0.000 0.922 1.000 1.855
1 off RAM 7.300E+06 9
Fit 7 1.460E+07 0.922 0.922 0.000 0.922 1.000 3.238
Page 106
2 off RAM 1.460E+07 9,23
Fit 8 2.190E+07 0.922 0.922 0.720 0.994 0.392 9.030
3 off RAM 2.190E+07 7,10,23
Fit 9 2.920E+07 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.994 0.222 16.574
4 off RAM 2.920E+07 7,10,24,22
Fit 10 3.650E+07 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.994 0.222 16.574 No Change
5 off RAM 3.650E+07 7,10,24,22,20
Fit 11 1.160E+07 0.932 0.000 0.000 0.932 1.000 1.873
1 off Seawolf 9
Fit 12 1.690E+07 0.932 0.000 0.932 0.995 1.000 3.509 No weapon free in time to
engage B2 before hits.
2 off Seawolf 1.690E+07 9,23 Confirmed by hand
Fit 13 2.220E+07 0.932 0.982 0.932 0.995 0.150 25.422
3 off Seawolf 2.220E+07 7,10,23
Fit 14 2.750E+07 0.932 0.982 0.982 1.000 0.100 38.812
4 off Seawolf 2.750E+07 7,10,24,22
Fit 15 3.280E+07 0.932 0.982 0.982 1.000 0.100 38.812
5 off Seawolf 3.280E+07 7,10,24,22,20
Fit 16 9.600E+06 0.922 0.000 0.356 0.964 1.000 2.275
1 off RAM 7.300E+06 23
Total Cost P one Capability
Fit Line Cost (£) Location Pk A Pk B1 Pk B2 Pk C Comments
(£) Hit Index
Fit 17 1.890E+07 0.932 0.922 0.000 0.995 1.000 3.474
1 off RAM 7.300E+06 9
1 off Seawolf 1.160E+07 23
Fit 18 1.390E+07 0.000 0.932 0.356 0.969 1.000 2.295
Fit 19 2.120E+07 0.932 0.922 0.356 0.998 0.695 5.046
1 off RAM 7.300E+06 23
Fit 20 1.620E+07 0.932 0.382 0.356 0.969 0.877 2.939
2 off Phalanx 4.600E+06 9,23
Fit 21 2.620E+07 0.932 0.922 0.922 0.995 0.212 17.414
Page 107
2 off RAM 1.460E+07 9,23
Fit 22 3.150E+07 0.932 0.982 0.922 1.000 0.156 24.392
2 off RAM 1.460E+07 7,22
2 off Seawolf 1.690E+07 10,24
Fit 23 2.150E+07 0.932 0.382 0.932 0.998 0.669 5.293
2 off Phallanx 4.600E+06 7,22
2 off Seawolf 1.690E+07 10,24
Fit 24 2.650E+07 0.932 0.982 0.922 0.998 0.158 24.096
1 off Phallanx 2.300E+06 7
1 off RAM 7.300E+06 22
2 off Seawolf 1.690E+07 10,24
Fit 25 2.880E+07 0.932 0.382 0.932 0.998 0.669 5.293
2 off Phallanx 4.600E+06 9,23 RAM launcher useless
1 off RAM 7.300E+06 4 due to position
2 off Seawolf 1.690E+07 20,13
Fit 26 2.880E+07 0.932 0.985 0.922 0.998 0.155 24.551 Moved RAM launcher
2 off Phallanx 4.600E+06 9,24
1 off RAM 7.300E+06 22
2 off Seawolf 1.690E+07 20,13
Fit 27 3.380E+07 0.932 0.982 0.922 0.999 0.156 24.352
2 off RAM 1.460E+07 9,24
2 off Seawolf 1.690E+07 20,13
Optimum Fit - Weapons Repositioning, Single Axis Analysis
Capability
Fit Phalanx RAM Seawolf 1 Seawolf 2 Pk A Pk B1 Pk B2 Pk C P one Hit
Index
1 7 22 10 24 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
2 2 18 9 23 0.9324 0 0.9324 0.997907 1 3.517124043
3 18 2 9 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.9947 0.160277 23.68604058
4 9 23 20 13 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
5 12 14 26 25 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
6 24 22 12 14 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
7 2 32 9 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
8 32 2 9 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
9 16 15 9 20 0.9324 0.985498 0.9216 0.9947 0.15765 24.12514876
10 7 10 13 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
11 19 17 24 10 0.982424 0.9216 0.9324 0.997907 0.15757 24.14455211
12 1 3 13 23 0.9324 0.958194 0.9324 0.999584 0.167321 22.54522781
13 23 9 2 28 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076
Page 108
14 8 11 17 19 0.9216 0.9324 0.9324 0.999763 0.198978 18.70587214
30
25
20
15
10
Capability Index
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Fit No
Page 109
Optimum Fit - Weapons Repositioning, Multi Axis Analysis
Seawolf Seawolf Capability
Fit Phalanx RAM Pk A Pk B1 Pk B2 Pk C P one Hit Mean CI Max CI Min CI
1 2 Index
12 23 9 2 28 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 21.82148 24.12515 3.489311
4 12 14 26 25 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 21.73886 35.98486 5.681199
5 24 22 12 14 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 19.8447 24.09592 5.275679
Page 110
9 7 10 13 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 18.03859 24.12515 5.046434
10 19 17 24 10 0.982424 0.9216 0.9324 0.997907 0.15757 24.14455211 17.1072 24.14455 1.934389
6 2 32 9 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 17.04715 24.12515 5.046434
11 1 3 13 23 0.9324 0.958194 0.9324 0.999584 0.167321 22.54522781 16.13899 24.12515 5.046434
8 16 15 9 20 0.9324 0.985498 0.9216 0.9947 0.15765 24.12514876 15.83874 24.12515 3.474334
7 32 2 9 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 15.18512 24.12515 3.489311
3 9 23 20 13 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 15.04471 29.54577 3.474334
1 7 22 10 24 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.997573 0.157852 24.09592076 14.68317 25.99991 1.940714
2 18 2 9 23 0.9324 0.982424 0.9216 0.9947 0.160277 23.68604058 14.68317 25.99991 1.940714
Page 111
Radar Plots of Capability Index
The bearing to Missile A is used as the reference angle. Accetate overlay for other missiles can be found in slip wallet in Appendix H.
Fit 12 Fit 4
359 359
349 25 9 349 25 9
339 19 339 19
329 29 329 29
319 20 39 319 20 39
309 49 309 49
15 15
299 59 299 59
10 10
289 69 289 69
Page 112
279 5 79 279 5 79
269 0 89 269 0 89
259 99 259 99
249 109 249 109
239 119 239 119

Note A
Note C
229 129 229 129
Note B
219 139 219 139
209 149 209 149
199 159 199 159
189 169 189 169
179 179
Fit 5 Fit 9
359 359
349 25 9 349 25 9
339 19 339 19
329 29 329 29
319 20 39 319 20 39
309 49 309 49
15 15
299 59 299 59
10 10
289 69 289 69
Page 113
Note D
5 279 Note G 5 79
279 79
269 0 89 269 0 89
259 99 259 99
249 109 249 109
239 119 239 119
229 Note E 129 229 Note F 129
219 139 219 139
209 149 209 149
199 159 199 159
189 169 189 169
179 179
Appendix I Simulation Code and Executables
Page 114
Page 115

Weapon Effectiveness

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Weapon Effectiveness

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A Tool for Evaluating the Effectiveness of a

Warship’s Weapons Outfit

Thesis submitted for the degree of

Faculty of Engineering, University College London, University of London

Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering

It is proposed that the development work on this tool is halted as it is sufficiently

AAW Anti – Air Warfare

2.1 Modelling of Naval Command and Control Systems

2.1.1 Type 42 Destroyer

2.1.3 Application of Model to Simulation

2.2 Review of UCL Engagement Analysis Teaching Tool

2.2.1 Outline of Method

2.2.2 Simplifications for Hand Calculation

2.2.4 Saturation Attacks

2.2.5 Naval Guns

2.3 Existing Models of Air Defence

2.4.1 Blue Water Scenario

Figure 4 - Littoral Flight Profile

2.4.3 Scale of Threat

2.4.4 Axis of Threat

Figure 5 - Capability Frontier

4.1 Language Selection

4.2 System Architecture

4.3 Simulation Process

4.3.1 Initial Setup

Figure 6 – UCS Frame of Reference

4.3.2 Targeting the Threat

4.3.3 Engaging the Threat

4.3.4 Simulation Continuation

4.4 Missile Targeting

The selection procedure whereby an individual weapon system is allocated to a missile

4.5 Weapons Systems

4.6 Blockage Assessment

4.6.1 Automated Blockage Assessment

Figure 8 - Sample Blockage Diagram

Figure 9 - Weapons Coordinate

DXF representations of weapons should not be included as if a weapon coordinate is

The consistency of results is clearly demonstrated in the probability values obtained

Table 3 - Summary of Probabilities

As a demonstration of the simulation’s ability to achieve similar results to a human

5.5 Optimal Weapon Selection

Figure 10 - Cost Capability study for LPD 17

Figure 11 - Low Cost Systems: Cost - Capability

Figure 12 - Multiple Weapon System Cost Capability

Figure 13 - Capability of Different Weapon Locations

5.7 Multiple Threat Axis Analysis

5.7.1 Numerical Results

Fit Mean CI Max CI Min CI

12 21.82 24.13 3.49

5.7.2 Graphical Results

6.1 Limited Scope of Work

6.2 Passing Missiles

6.3 Dedicated AAW Ship Design

6.5 Sea Clutter Effects

6.6.2 Mutual Blockage

6.7 Run Time

Examining the whole blockage analysis process, Paramarine is used to convert

7.3 Further Work

2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Surface Ship Combat Systems Design

3. Skarda, R.K., Weapon Arc Evaluation Program, in Naval Architecture and

5. Jane's Fighting Ships, ed. S. Saunders, Commodore RN. 2003, Coulsdon,

6. University College London, Engagement Scenario Course Notes. 2005, London.

8. Smith, G., Argentine Aircraft Lost, 2005, http://www.naval-

9. Speed, K., Sea Change. 1982, Bath: Ashgrove Press. 194.