Baloch Separatist Movement
Sheikh con-
‘A Self-fulfilling Prophecy for Pakistan’
Meena Menon
I
n his book, The Genesis of Baloch Na-
tionalism: Politics and Ethnicity in
Pakistan, 1947–1977, Pakistani schol-
ar Salman Rafi Sheikh attempts to ex-
plain what he calls the “least understood
political problem of Pakistan.” Puncturing
several myths and falsehoods in the offi-
cial narrative about the insurgency in Ba-
lochistan and using archival material and
secret documents, including bulletins from
the Baloch insurgent groups, he proceeds
to give readers a fairly sound understand-
ing of the nature of the problem. Chief
among the myths promoted by the state of
Pakistan is that this is a rebellion fomented
by India and other powers. Sheikh’s analysis
demolishes this myth, along with the other
one that secessionist sentiments are fuelled
by the “stubborn sardars” of Balochistan.
The movement in Balochistan is not only
an old one but also began with the aim of
getting full recognition under a federated
system of government. The demand for
secession from Pakistan only grew with the
increasing and multiple military interven-
tions and actions to repress the move-
ment and sideline the region which was
not given full provincial status till 1970.
Root of the Conflict
The author believes that the overwhelm-
ing emphasis on projecting the problem as
simply being an Indian-funded conspiracy
against Pakistan has sent into oblivion the
fundamental reasons that have been the
driving force behind Balochistan’s plunge
into ethno-nationalism since the creation
of Pakistan in 1947. In a systematic manner,
he proceeds to unravel the Baloch question
using archival material that was difficult
to access, and goes back to its roots and
progression, and its trajectory into secession-
ism by the 1970s. Quoting Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto’s book Rumour and Reality, Sheikh
refers to how the military had started to
operate independently of the civilian
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JUNE 15, 2019
book reviewS
The Genesis of Baloch Nationalism: Politics and
Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1947–1977 by Salman Rafi
Sheikh, Routledge India, 2019; pp 254, `895.
government and how it was involved (as
alleged by Bhutto) in the murder of Asadul-
lah Mengal, though Bhutto himself cannot
boast of a clean slate in the province.
The author locates the struggle in
the context of colonial times and post-
independence Pakistan’s unchanging high-
handedness in dealing with it right up to
1977, where the Baloch movement has as
he says “degenerated from a progressive
movement for national emancipation
within Pakistan to a retrogressive and re-
actionary nationalist cusp” (p 186). While
the later lack of coherence of the move-
ment is not the thrust of the book, its his-
torical inception, evolution, and current
dynamics, apart from the role of the Paki-
stani state in the movement, are the sub-
jects of study. It also closely examines
the reasons for the changing focus from
provincial autonomy to separatism.
Since the annexation of Balochistan
from the erstwhile Kalat state, there has
been unrest and turmoil in this large
province, the most impoverished and
the most troubled region of Pakistan. The
author places the root of the conflict in the
postcolonial state’s official nationalism and
its penchant for suppressing social and
ethnic diversity.
And the parallels to Bangladesh could
not help but be drawn when Baloch
leader Sardar Akhtar Mengal presented six
points to the Supreme Court in 2012, bring-
ing back memories of Sheikh Mujibur
Rehman’s six points and the eventual
secession of East Pakistan. The momentum
for the current phase of the Baloch
struggle came after the killing of Akbar
Bugti, the head of the Bugti tribe, in a
vol lIV no 24
military operation in 2006.
cludes that the movement has grown
steadily in response to the increasing mili-
tary interventions. The situation in the
province has continued to deteriorate
from 1976 when Asadullah Mengal
became the first Baloch to be kidnapped
and killed. Since then, there are thousands
gone missing or in detention camps.
Question of Identity
An important point Sheikh makes is that
the Baloch question is neither an excep-
tion nor altogether a recent phenomenon
as the Baloch were the first to resist the
Pakistani state after the merger of Kalat
state into Pakistan. Aspirations of the Baloch
people have been consistently crushed and
along with that there is a systematic con-
struction of the official discourse of seces-
sion and conspiracy. It was used to deny
them their rightful status as a province and
finally when it was granted, it was taken
away on often- cited pretexts, giving them
only a glimpse of decentralised power.
The author emphasises the fact that
Baloch nationalism is not an exception
by giving examples of other communities
like the Pashtun, Sindhi and Bengalis
when they came up against a powerful
and interventionist state. Also the idea
of Baloch and the nationalism of other
communities goes against the very grain
of the idea of Pakistan—which envisaged
room only for religion but not ethnic
diversity as a unifying factor.
The Baloch nation itself is not a homo-
geneous linguistic identity and there are
many tribes which speak Brauhi, though
the author points out that differences
between the two languages mitigated
somewhat due to Pakistan’s refusal to
recognise its own diverse ethnic compo-
sition. The struggle itself was not based
on a linguistic demand. The primary
conflict was centred on the question of
Pakistan’s “intransigence” in not allow-
ing “political accommodation on a demo-
cratic basis” and throughout the book,
the arguments support this premise that
the conflict was shaped around the ideas
of Pakistiniyat and Balochness.
In order to consolidate power centrally,
the One Unit scheme was formulated
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BOOK REVIEW
which divided Pakistan into East and West
Pakistan in 1955. Sheikh says that scheme
was not only meant to create a larger West
Pakistan identity but to also bring the
resources of Sindh’s land, electricity from
the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
and natural resources of Balochistan
under the domination of Punjab.
The One Unit scheme denied not only
cultural diversity, as the author estab-
lishes, but also any separate identity of
other ethnic communities. Unlike other
ethnic groups, what also sets apart the
Baloch is that they were not given their
own province till 1970 on flimsy excuses,
such as lack of capacity or trained per-
sonnel to administer the province, as men-
tioned earlier, and there was no Baloch
leadership in the National Assembly till
1962. This tussle also exploded the myth
of cultural unity put out by Pakistan’s
establishment and went against the core
theory of the Muslim League’s propaga-
tion of religion as the only enduring
force that could wield Muslims together,
according to Sheikh.
The conflict in Balochistan is largely
shaped on the question of identity, and
Pakistan’s insistence on a common iden-
tity could be counterproductive as Sheikh
demonstrates in the book. Pakistan’s
political system denied its diverse socio-
political composition in the name of
uniting under one religion and even
after losing Bangladesh, the country seems
not to have learnt any lesson on power
sharing and recognising ethnic and
linguistic diversity. Baloch leader Ghaus
Baksh Bizenjo articulated these aspira-
tions in the National Assembly—of the
need to recognise the fact that Pakistan
is a multinational state and it should set
up a federal parliamentary state and
give the federating units their due rights.
There was no attempt to formulate a
political system based on the consensus
of all ethnic or subnational groups.
Monolith of Nation–Religion
Pakistan infused the idea of one nation
based on an Islamic religious identity in
all walks of life, including in its textbooks,
and the case for one unified nation was
made to counter “the ills of provincialism”
which was referred to as being narrow
and pernicious by the first education
26
minister Fazlur Rehman. He also glossed
over the need to respect and accept mul-
tiple ethnic identities and felt that
Islamic ideology was enough to sustain a
Muslim nation. This question of identity
was to remain a thorn in the framework
of the new state which has not been
resolved till now. As a result, demands
for rights by subnational groups would be
equated to provincialism or not being
patriotic and lead to the state confront-
ing these groups with all forms of repre-
ssion. Sheikh argues that all this set the
tone for the establishment of an inter-
ventionist state which would create con-
ditions to the building of a truly Islamic
society. Along with the Unit scheme, the
Objectives Resolution too reinforced this
rhetoric of a unified nation.
The book delves into the early post-
partition history of Balochistan and the
attempts to appropriate its tribal leaders
or sardars. Even the British excluded the
Baloch from the army and it was only in
1929 when they decided to recruit them
in a bid to co-opt them and “convert their
enmity into an alliance of interests.”
Talking of different nationalities was tan-
tamount to being a traitor and indeed
many Baloch leaders were accused of
this signal crime. The question of seces-
sion came up in 1980 when Baloch leaders
like Ataullah Mengal became aware of
their “third class” situation and felt that
they could not break through the state’s
denial of their rights and exclusion from
political and economic structures.
The author traces many of the problems
facing Pakistan not only to the first decade
after independence but earlier to the
colonial rule. The continuing opposition
of the Baloch people to joining Pakistan
was used to make out that they were not
patriotic and secessionist and were con-
spiring to disintegrate Pakistan. And he
explains how the loss of political power,
combined with organised exclusion from
the structures of economic and political
power, precipitated the national move-
ment in Balochistan.
The One Unit programme seemed to
be an extension of a colonial mindset
where planning and policy were meant
to keep the Baloch out of any meaning-
ful role in their governance. He states
that the accession of Kalat state to
JUNE 15, 2019
Pakistan was by no means voluntary
nor due to the overarching belief in
Muslim unity as school textbooks make
it out to be. Kalat had already witnessed
a nationalist movement since the 1930s
when the Quit Balochistan movement
was launched and the forcible accession
after the army was called in, also resulted
in the arrest of many of the leaders. The
author criticises the referendum held in
Balochistan in 1947 and quotes several
documents and notes from the Shahi
Jirga to prove that it was not in any way
unanimous or consensual as popularly
projected, and also touches upon the
divide and rule policy in the region. There
is a detailed analysis based on official
documents of the deliberate exclusion
of Balochistan from power structures
using various excuses, including lack of
finance and how unrealistic it was to
give the Baloch autonomy due to their
lack of experience in governing.
Baloch leaders spoke of concentration
camps right from President Ayub Khan’s
time where the torture was compared to
that found in Auschwitz and the perni-
cious role of the Pakistan army in sup-
ressing their rebellion. The region was
excluded in Ayub Khan’s famous decade
of development and people were har-
assed and arrested for their perceived
crime of articulating democratic aspira-
tions. Even Zulfikar Bhutto’s “democratic”
era did not change the situation for the
Baloch people as it was under him that
the first elected government was dis-
missed in 1973. The 1971 war and the
eventual formation of Bangladesh taught
Pakistan little about ideology and power
sharing in Pakistan. The attempts of the
Baloch to demand provincial autonomy
was called out as an attempt to disinte-
grate Pakistan and behind this rhetoric
was a thinly veiled attempt to squeeze
the region dry of its resources and give
little in return. A resource-rich region
was reduced to one that was dependent
on aid and that too, a pittance compared
to what was being taken out.
Armed Resistance and Secession
Finally, the resort to armed resistance
is set out in a 1974 bulletin from
the Popular Front of Armed Resistance
(PFAR)—“All talks of a political settlement
vol lIV no 24 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

in Baluchistan are destined to end up
nowhere as the primary issue is not iden-
tified and recognised. And the primary
issue is that whatever the future set-up,
the people of Baluchistan want to be
masters in their own province” (p 123).
Sheikh adds that the insurgency did not
immediately begin after the dismissal
of the provincial government in 1973. It
began after the military operation against
the National Awami Party, whose members
were dubbed as traitors. He concludes
that armed resistance was, therefore, a
direct aftermath of ideological and
political interventions.
By logically setting out the trajectory
of Balochistan’s annexure to Pakistan, its
deliberate exclusion from power, and
the extraction of resources that did not
benefit the people of the region, the author
makes a case for the Baloch insurgency.
But the change to an armed secessionist
movement as a logical fallout of that
complex narrative does not hold up. The
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JUNE 15, 2019
Pakistan state eventually became “an
implacable enemy of the entire Baloch
nation,” says Jabal, a bulletin of the
Baluchistan People’s Liberation Front in
1977 (p 136). It is the fourth chapter on
military intervention that illustrates the
transition to violence and the conclusion
that it was military action that led to
armed resistance.
Balochistan is part of a strategic route
to Iran and Afghanistan and also an area
rich in natural resources. The military
budget for the province exceeded the
development allocation as a 1975 report
quoted from the Guardian indicates.
According to the evidence presented, the
insurgency grew from defending tribal
independence and honour initially, to
opposing the One Unit scheme and the
army action, and finally culminated in a
nationalist secessionist movement since
1977. The Baloch are now proposing a
systemic change and the movement
remains Pakistan’s biggest challenge as
vol lIV no 24
BOOK REVIEW
it questions the country’s democratic
transition of recent years, when such a
large province is roiled in ethnic conflict.
The book is an invaluable addition to
the literature on Balochistan and its
movements, and clearly enunciates the
role of the state in the insurgency and
the demand for separation. The future of
the movement seems fraught with ideo-
logical and leadership issues but the
goal of separatism seems clear enough.
As for the state of Pakistan, its role has
been oppressive throughout and it seems
to have learnt nothing from the far-reach-
ing events of 1971. Further research
could well bear in mind the detailed
archival material discussed in this book
which is timely and destroys many pop-
ular perceptions about the struggle and
its evolution.
Meena Menon (meenamenon@gmail.com) is an
independent journalist and author based
in Mumbai.
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