Japan and The Northern Territories Dispute - Past, Present, Future

Japan and the Northern Territories Dispute: Past, Present, Future
Author(s): Richard deVillafranca

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 6, Japan: Redefining Its International Role (Jun., 1993), pp.
610-624
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JAPANAND THE NORTHERN
TERRITORIES DISPUTE
Past, Present,Future
RicharddeVillafranca
The idea thatthe UnitedStatesscuttledthe 1956 So-

viet-Japanese peace treatytalksto ensureJapan'sCold War loyaltygener-
allyis acceptedby scholarsand otherexpertsin Japaneseaffairs.A recent
analysisof theNorthernTerritories disputeby prominent academicsfrom
Russia, Japan,and the U.S., forexample,suggeststhatthe U.S. deliber-
atelyfrustrated Japan'sattemptsto settletheterritorial disputein the 1956
negotiations.This idea probablyoriginatedin a commentby Secretaryof
StateDulles in August1956in whichhe toldForeignMinisterShigemitsu
that if Japan recognizedSoviet sovereignty over Kunashiriand Etorofu
(then consideredby both the United Statesand Japanto be part of the
southernKuriles),theUnitedStateswould have the rightto claim sover-
eigntyover Okinawa and the RyukyuIslands. The assumptionof U.S.
culpability ignorestheperfectlyreasonableidea thatJapanmighthavehad
something to do withtheoutcomeof negotiations in whichit,and notthe
UnitedStates,was engaged. It ignoresthe factthatTokyo had as strong
an interestin remainingsecurewithintheU.S. Cold War camp as Wash-
ingtonhad in keepingit there. Most importantly, it disregardsthe tradi-
tionallystronglinkagebetweenJapanesedomesticpoliticsand foreign
policy,and therebypasses overan essential-and stillvalid-lesson about
thelongstanding disputebetweenJapanand Russia. The specif-
territorial
ics of the 1955-56 negotiationsare worthillustrating because the linkage
betweendomesticpoliticsand foreignpolicyhas notlessenedand remains
todaythe mostimportantelementaffecting the searchfora resolutionof
the dispute.
Richard deVillafrancais a U.S. ForeignService Officerwho has

servedin bothJapanand theSovietUnion and is a Specialistin Russo-Japanese De-
affairs,
partment of State. The viewsexpressedhereinare theauthor'sand do notnecessarilyreflect
the viewsof the U.S. Government.
? 1993 by The Regentsof the University
of California
610

RICHARD DEVILLAFRANCA 611
The 1955-56 Negotiations
Motive is a poor substituteforevidence;a carefullook at the contextof
Dulles's remarkto Shigemitsurevealsthatthe U.S. had littleto do with
the failureof the territorial
negotiations.The talks failedbecause con-
servativefactionswithinJapanwereunableto agreeon whatconstituted a
desirableoutcome. From the outset of Japan's negotiationswith the
USSR in 1955, the questionof Japanese-Soviet relationswas identified
with,and almostwhollyobscuredby personalbattlesin advance of the
Liberal-Democratic mergerof 1955, and subsequentlyforcontrolof the
new LiberalDemocraticParty. These battlespittedformerLiberalsunder
Yoshida's leadershipagainst formerDemocrats under Prime Minister
Hatoyama. Spin-off fromthispoliticalclash caused Japan'sbasic position
to change on severaloccasions over the sixteenmonthsof negotiations
withMoscow fromJune1955 to October 1956.
Japan's Two-IslandPosition,19S1-19S5
In the 1951 San FranciscoPeace Treaty,Japanrenouncedits sovereignty
overtheKuriles,thoughwhichislandsconstituted thechainwas not spe-
cificallydefined.The rights,title,and claimrenouncedby Japanwerenot
transferred to any countrybut wereleftforfutureinternational decision.
While government and partypositionsat timesseemedat odds withone
another,therewas generalagreementin Japan that Shikotanand the
Habomais were not part of the Kurile Islands. In 1951 PrimeMinister
Yoshida statedthat Etorofuand Kunashiriwere part of the Kuriles-a
positionalso clearlystatedin the ForeignMinistry'sAugust 1955 pam-
phlet,"The NorthernIslands." The Japanesedid not claim thatEtorofu
and KunashiriwerenotpartoftheKurilesat anytimeduringthenegotia-
tionswiththe Soviets,and did not asserttheirhistoricalrightsto them
priorto August 1955.
PrimeMinisterYoshida and his Liberal Party-advocates of a strong
U.S.-Japanrelationship and waryof DemocraticPartyleaderHatoyama's
desiresto normalizerelationswiththeUSSR-fell frompowerin Decem-
ber 1954. Hatoyamasucceededas primeminister, and in January1955,
the USSR requestednegotiationsfor normalizingrelationswith Japan.
Talks openedin London in June.
The Japanesestrategy at theoutsetin London was to seekthereturnof
all territoryseized by the USSR duringthe war, includingSouthernSa-
khalin,the entireKurile chain, and ShikotanIsland and the Habomai
groupof isletsthatJapandid not considerpartof the Kurile chain. Ja-

612 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXIII,NO. 6, JUNE1993
pan's bottomline was the returnof Shikotanand the Habomais1without
recognition ofSovietsovereigntyoveranyoftheterritory it relinquished
in
theSan FranciscoPeace Treaty.2The Sovietstrategy was to seekthemili-
taryneutralizationof Japan,but ultimatelyto returnShikotanand the
Habomais as part of a total settlement includinga peace treaty.There
were otherimportantcomponentsto thesenegotiations, amongthemJa-
pan's insistenceon the returnof its POWs, its effortto obtainSovietsup-
port forits entryinto the United Nations,and bilateralagreementson
fishingrights. Over the course of the 1955-56 talks,these issues were
rarelysourcesof seriousdispute. Instead,theywere used by the Soviets
fromtimeto timeas a sortof thermostat to raiseor lowerleverageon the
Japaneseas circumstances warranted.
EmergenceofJapan'sFour-IslandPosition:
Justicevs.Law
By August 1955,both sides had statedtheirfinalconditions;the USSR
offered Shikotanand theHabomaisas partof a totalagreement, including
a peace treaty. Given his instructions, the Japanesenegotiator,Mat-
sumoto,assumed that prospectsfor a settlementwere bright,3but two
weeks later the ForeignMinistry(MOFA) publisheda pamphlet,"The
NorthernIslands," effectively expandingJapan'sclaim againstthe USSR
fromtwo to fourislands. Acknowledgingthat Etorofuand Kunashiri
werepartofthe Kurilesand thatJapanhad renouncedits claimsto them
underArticle2 oftheSan FranciscoPeace Treaty,thepamphletneverthe-
less focusedon Japan'shistoricalclaims to the Kuriles and southernSa-
khalin,withspecialemphasison Etorofuand Kunashiri.The MOFA then
supplieda drafttreatyincludingthe returnof all fourislandsand propos-
ing thatthedispositionof southernSakhalinand the Kurile chainbe set-
tled at an internationalconference. Moscow refusedto permit the
Japaneseto pocketthe Soviet "concessions"of earlyAugust (returnof
Shikotanand the Habomais) and then re-opentalks for Etorofuand
Kunashiri. The London talksbrokeoffshortlythereafter.
It is quite likelythat Yoshida, a formerdiplomatusing his excellent
workingrelationship withthe ForeignMinistry'sseniorofficials,playeda
rolein theemergenceofJapan'snewfourislandclaim. AlthoughYoshida
recognizedthatEtorofuand Kunashiriwerepartof the Kurilesto which
Japanhad legallyrenouncedits claims,theJapanese,withsomejustifica-
1. Donald Hellmann,JapaneseForeignPolicyand DomesticPolitics(Berkeley:University

of CaliforniaPress, 1969),pp. 34, 59.
2. ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,1955-57, vol. 23, part 1, pp. 11-12.
3. Hellmann,JapaneseForeignPolicy,p. 35.

tion,believedtheirhistoricalclaimto thosetwoislandswas justifiable-in
fact undeniable-based on amicable treatiessignedwithRussia in 1855
and 1875. Yoshida and Shigemitsu, a Hatoyamaappointee,sharedviews
on the need for a "tough" stance on normalizationwith the USSR.
WhetherYoshida actedout ofa desireto reclaimwhatwas rightfully Jap-
aneseterritory,out ofconcernfortheimplications ofJapan-USSRnormal-
izationon theU.S.-Japanrelationship, or to bolstertheLiberalpositionin
therun-upto theLDP mergeris notclear. Quitepossibly,all threefactors
wereat play.
In October1955,Hatoyamareiterated to U.S. AmbassadorAllisonthat
Japanhad relinquishedits rightto the Kurilesat San Franciscoin 1951,
butwouldinsiston thereturnof Shikotanand theHabomaisin talkswith
theUSSR.4 Whateverthereason,Hatoyama'sremarks,thoughconsistent
withhis own personalviewsand thoseof theDemocraticParty,werenot
consistentwithJapan'spolicywhichhad advancedthe four-island claim
almosttwo monthsearlier. His commentreflects continuedfriction with
Yoshida in theweeksjust beforetheNovember1955 LDP merger;it may
also reflect
a gradualdeclinein Shigemitsu's influence.Nevertheless,when
theLiberalsand Democratsmergedto formtheLDP thefollowing month,
the new party'splatformcalled forthe returnof all fourislands. At this
point,boththeLDP and thegovernment, includingHatoyama,soughtthe
returnof the fourislands.
In January1956theLondontalksre-opened, withtheSovietsproposing
an "Adenauer"-likesettlementwherebyresolutionof territorialissues
would be postponeduntilaftera peace treatywas signed. Japandid not
retreatfromits four-islandpositionwiththeSovietsand rejectedthepro-
posal. The talksweresuspendedon March 20, 1956,and thenextday the
USSR announcedsevererestrictions on Japanesefishingvesselsoperating
in USSR waters,effectiveMay 15, 1956. AgricultureMinister(and
Hatoyama factionsenior)Kono wentto Moscow and signeda fisheries
agreementon May 15, to take effect upon the resumption of peace treaty
negotiations. Concerned about the implicationsof this agreement,
Yoshida and Shigemitsuboth criticizedKono's arrangementwith the
USSR and called formaintaining Japan'sfour-island claim.
The peace treatytalks resumedin Moscow on July31, 1956, with
Shigemitsuas negotiator.Accordingto Kono, Shigemitsu'sinstructions
fromthe LDP wereto seek,at a minimum,Sovietrecognition of Japan's
residualsovereignty overEtorofuand Kunashiri.5The talksstalledagain,
not onlyover the territorialissue but also over an earlierSovietdemand
4. ForeignRelationsof the US, p. 128.

5. Ibid., p. 191.

614 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXIII,NO. 6, JUNE1993
thatwarshipsof non-riparian powersbe excludedfromthe Sea of Japan.
This demandservedto tableonce again theneutralization issuethatMos-
cow had shelvedin August 1955, since Japaneseagreementwould have
undercutJapan'ssecuritytreatyarrangements withtheUnitedStates. The
Sovietmove-which Moscow clearlyunderstoodwas unacceptableto Ja-
pan-probably came in responseto theescalationofJapanesedemandsfor
residualsovereigntyover Etorofuand Kunashiri.
On August 10, 1956, Shigemitsumet withKhrushchevand Bulganin
and apparentlycame away convincedthatthe USSR would not meetJa-
pan's demandforresidualsovereignty over the two islands.6 That same
day, Hatoyama announcedin Tokyo that he would retireafterJapan-
Sovietrelationsweresettledand a successorchosen. This statementinten-
sifiedthe ongoingstruggleforcontrolof the LDP and further deepened
the submersionof Japan'sSovietpolicywithinLDP factionalpolitics. It
also reopenedthequestionofwhatJapan'snegotiating positionshouldbe.
Shigemitsu'sGambleand Dulles's Views

Shigemitsu was aware ofHatoyama'sstatement, and at a pressconference
in Moscow on August 13 he advocatedconclusionof a treatyon Soviet
terms.7This constituted an abruptand totalchangeof approachby the
foreignminister, who had beenperhapsthemostoutspokenadvocateof a
toughJapanesestancetowardthe Soviets. He may have been convinced
by Bulganinand Khrushchev's"take it or leave it" message,but Hato-
yama'sannouncement is a morebelievablemotivator forShigemitsu's con-
version. No otherexplanationfor his remarkablechange of approach
makessense. Althoughhis influencehad been waning,Shigemitsunever-
thelessseemedto believe,and had been told by close associates,8thatthe
successfulconclusionof negotiationscould makehimthenextLDP presi-
dent. Hatoyama'sannouncement set him in motion. Shigemitsu, jockey-
ingto shoreup his LDP credentials, disregardeda statement to Ambassa-
dor Allisona yearearlierthatJapanwouldnotdeviatefromitsfour-island
positionand would not recognizeSoviet sovereignty over Etorofuand
Kunashiri.9He also steppedoutsidethe consensusprocessthendevelop-
ing withinthe partyon Soviet policy. But his timingwas bad. Within
hoursof Shigemitsu'sAugust 13 announcement, Hatoyamaand his cabi-
and on August 17, 1956, Shigemitsu
net chose to rejectthe Sovietoffer,
6. Hellmann,JapaneseForeignPolicy,p. 37.
7. ForeignRelationsof the U.S., p. 202.
8. Togawa Isamu, Showa Gendaishi[Contemporary
historyof the Showa era] (Tokyo:
Kobunsha, 1959),p. 304.
9. ForeignRelationsof the US., p. 123.

was instructed to breakoffthetalks.10 Hatoyamaannouncedhe wouldgo
personallyto Moscow to get thejob done.
It was at this pointthat Shigemitsu-twodays afterhe had been in-
structedbyTokyonotto agreeto theSoviettwo-islandproposaland in the
midstofa majorcrisisin his own politicallife-met withSecretaryDulles,
on August 19 and again on August 24, in London. He told Dulles the
Sovietswereseekinga two-islanddeal, drawinga boundaryline northof
Shikotanand the Habomais; he did not tell Dulles thathe had proposed
that Tokyo accept this approach,and he did not say he had been in-
structedto breakoffthe talksand returnhome.11
Dulles's overridingconcernwas that Japan do nothingto "perfect"
Moscow's claims to territory thatthe San FranciscoTreatyhad specifi-
callyleftunassigned.His viewson thesovereignty oftheKurileswerenot
new to theJapanese. In a telegramsentfromWashingtonalmosta year
earlier,in September1955,just afterthe ForeignMinistryengineeredthe
switchof Japan'sclaims fromtwo islandsto four,Dulles instructedAl-
lison to informthe Japanesegovernment thatWashingtonhoped "Japan
would do nothingimplyingrecognitionof Soviet sovereignty over the
Kuriles and South Sakhalin,finaldispositionof whichshouldbe leftfor
futureinternational decision,althoughof courseacceptingJapan'srenun-
ciationof sovereignty overthe Kuriles." Allisonconveyedtheseviewsto
Shigemitsuon September22, 1955, and was told that the U.S. views
presentedexpressedthe Japanesepositionexactly. Shigemitsualso told
Allisonemphatically, thatJapanwouldnotchangethisposi-
ifincorrectly,
tionin itsnegotiations of the"Kuriles"
withtheSoviets.12 The definition
is oftencited as the sourceof confusionat thispoint-August 1956. In
fact,therewas generalagreementamong all parties-probablyeven the
Soviets-that Shikotanand the Habomai group were not part of the
Kurilesand thatKunashiriand Etorofuwere. Contemporary publicopin-
ion polls amplydemonstrate thencommonin Japan
the clear distinction
betweenthesouthernKuriles(Kunashiriand Etorofu),and Shikotanand
the Habomais.
WhiletheJapanesepositionwas in flux,theU.S. viewwas notand had
beenconveyedconsistently to TokyofromtheonsetofthetalkswithMos-
cow. U.S. interestswere protectedso long as Japantook eitherof two
courses: settleforthereturnof Shikotanand theHabomai groupwithout
recognizing Sovietsovereignty overEtorofuand Kunashiri,as Tokyohad
set out to do in 1955; or maintainits insistenceon residualsovereignty
10. Hellman,JapaneseForeignPolicy,p. 37; also, Asahi Shimbun,August20, 1956.

11. ForeignRelationsof the U.S., pp. 202-4.
12. Ibid., p. 123.

overEtorofuand Kunashiri,as it set out to do in 1956. As it turnedout,
Shigemitsuadvocatedneitherof thesein his Augustvolte-face, insteades-
pousinga positionthathe knewbeforehandwas counterto Japan'slegal
commitments underthe 1951 San FranciscoTreaty,Japan'sassertionsto
theUnitedStatesofJanuary28, 1955,13and evenShigemitsu's own asser-
tionto Allisonof September22, 1955. In themeetingson August19 and
24, Dulles, who had draftedmuch of the San Francisco Treaty,told
Shigemitsuit wouldbe difficultto claimthatEtorofuand Kunashiriwere
not part of the Kuriles.14 He reiteratedthe U.S. view that sovereignty
over Kunashiriand Etorofu,therefore, had been renouncedby Japanin
1951,and Japancould notnow acknowledgeSovietsovereignty overthem
as partof a normalizationagreement.
ShigemitsuadmittedthatJapan had givenup Etorofuand Kunashiri
undertheSan FranciscoTreatyand thatthe"legal question"was clear.15
Dulles said thatif Japanagreedto recognizeSovietsovereignty over the
Kuriles,theU.S. wouldhave an equal claimon theRyukyuIslandsbased
on Article26 of the San FranciscoTreaty,whichstatedthat if a non-
signatorypower(e.g., USSR) extractedtermsmorefavorablefromJapan
thanthoseaccordedto thesignatory powers,theU.S. could demandsimi-
lar terms.Shigemitsu, who had just proposedto Tokyo thatJapansettle
on Sovietterms-presumablyincludingrecognition of Sovietsovereignty
oversouthernSakhalinand theKurilesand acceptanceof treatylanguage
definingthe internationalboundaryto the northof Shikotanand the
Habomais-perceivedthatWashingtonwouldnotalteritsposition,and so
soughtto pressDulles on the idea of holdingan international conference
to resolvethe disputealong lines envisionedin the 1951 Peace Treaty.16
Dulles wondered,rightly, whetherShigemitsuspokeforhimselfor forhis
government.But in any event,the U.S. did not findthisidea appealing
because of otherregionalterritorialissues,includingChina/Taiwan.
Dulles laterexplainedthathe had raisedArticle26 withShigemitsu as a
negotiating tool forJapan'suse withthe Soviets. While thisexplanation
seemsoverlyfacile,Dulles did in factsuggestthistacticto Shigemitsuin
theirAugust 19 meeting,17 adding that the Eisenhoweradministration
would not followthroughon Article26. Afterthe August 24 meeting,
Dulles evencabled the StateDepartmentto see whethera historicalcase
13. Ibid., p. 128.

14. Ibid., p. 208.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 204.
17. Ibid., p. 203.

could be made for consideringEtorofuand Kunashirinot part of the
Kuriles.18
But Shigemitsuhad whathe needed. Having publiclysupporteda set-
tlementon Soviettermsthathis government had thenrejected,Shigemitsu
had losttremendous faceand was in direpoliticalstraits.Dulles's remarks
on Article26 were leaked on Shigemitsu'sreturnto Tokyo,wherethey
generatedconsiderable"furor."For thetimebeing,theyobscuredthefor-
eignminister'smisstepin Moscow, at least frompublicscrutiny, and put
theUnitedStatesat thecenterof thebilateraldispute,a positiontheU.S.
had been at pains to avoid.19 On September7, to defusethe situation,
Washingtonpresentedan aide-memoire clarifying its positionto theJapa-
nese. Made public only on September12, it statedthat Japan had re-
nouncedsovereignty overtheKurilesin theSan FranciscoTreatyand thus
did not have the rightto transfersovereigntyover them. The aide-
memoirealso statedthenew U.S. positionacknowledging Japan'shistori-
cal claimsto Etorofuand Kunashiri,but it stoppedshortof statingthat
Etorofuand Kunashiriwerenot partof the Kuriles.
Back to TwoIslands
Two dayslater,on September9, 1956,theLDP again reverseditsstrategy
fordealingwithMoscow. The LDP, withHatoyama'sannouncement that
he wouldretireafterresolvingthenormalization issuewiththeUSSR driv-
ing the agenda,approvedan "Adenauer" formulaformanagingthe dis-
puteoverEtorofuand Kunashiri.This decisionwas linkedto Hatoyama's
pendingretirement and to interfactional
agreementto retainthe existing
cabinet,includingShigemitsu.The consensusneededforthisdecisionwas
almostcertainlyeasierto achievewiththeU.S. now publiclyon recordas
opposingJapaneserecognitionof Soviet sovereignty over Etorofuand
Kunashiri. Responsibilitycould now be chargedto Washington's gaiatsu
(outsidepressure)ratherthanthe LDP's own machinations.
Now everything fellinto place. The LDP politicalstrugglehad been
resolvedby Hatoyama's promiseto retire,and in return,the territorial
termsfornegotiating wereadjustedin Hatoyama'sfavor,bringing theJap-
anese positionfullcircleto whatit had been in August 1955 whenMat-
sumoto thoughthe'd made a deal. The followingmonth,Hatoyarna
himselfwentto Moscow and signedthe JointDeclarationin whichthe
Sovietsagreed to "transfer"Shikotanand the Habomai group to Japan
upon the signingof a peace treaty.Hatoyama relinquishedhis post as
18. Ibid., p. 209.

19. Ibid.

618 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXIII,NO. 6, JUNE1993
primeministeron December23, 1956. Moscow renegedon the transfer
provisionin 1960.
It seemsclearthatit was theUnitedStates,notJapan,thatwas takenby
surprisein August1956. The U.S. was givenno warningthatShigemitsu
would, apparentlyon his own, advocate a settlement withMoscow that
was substantially different fromeitherJapan's 1955 positionor the one
Shigemitsuhad taken to Moscow with him in July. When Shigemitsu
presentedDulles withthisrogueapproach,Dulles remindedhim of why
the U.S. could supporteitherJapan's 1955 positionor its 1956 position,
but not theone Shigemitsuwas thensuggesting.Tokyo obviouslyagreed
with Dulles, havingrejectedShigemitsu'ssuggestionstwo days earlier.
Even so, the timingof these two events(Tokyo's rejectionfollowedby
Dulles's rejection)is less important
in understanding theeventsof August
1956 thanis the recognition thatJapan'snegotiating positionswithMos-
cow were in fluxand were drivenby considerations that had less to do
withtheNorthernTerritories thanwithdomesticpoliticalbattles.Never-
theless,Dulles's leaked commentsto Shigemitsuremainthe source of
speculationthattheUnitedStateswas responsibleforthebreak-off of ne-
gotiations.Hatoyamadid not stepforwardto take theU.S. offthehook,
forto do so would have jeopardizedthe LDP consensusthenforming in
supportof his originalapproachforhandlingthe territorial disputewith
Moscow.
Responsibility for the failureof the 1955-56 peace treatytalks rests
solelyin Tokyo and Moscow. It does not belongin Washington.Japan
was out-negotiated by theSovietsin 1955-56,mostlybecause thefocusof
Japaneseattentionand energywas on the evolutionof domesticpolitics
and only secondarilyon the international issues involved. The originof
each diplomaticmoveby Japanover the two-yearnegotiation-fromthe
government's suddenswitchto a four-island positionin August 1955, to
Shigemitsu'sstartlingchange of approach in August 1956, to the LDP
decisionto accept an "Adenauer" formulaforEtorofuand Kunashiriin
September1956-can be traced to developmentsin conservativeparty
politicsin Tokyo.
The Dispute Today

Not muchhas changedsince 1955-56. The Japanesepositionhas returned
to whatit was in late August1955;theRussianposition,whilemorediffi-
cult to pin down,lies somewherebetweenthe Gromykomemorandum of
1960 and the Sovietpositionof October 1956. Althoughtherehas been
someprogress, oflate,thesearchfora solutionhas beencircu-
particularly
lar, markedby successiveorbitsof the disputearoundthe bilateralrela-
tionship. Most of the importantcollateral issues of the 1955-56

negotiationsremain,includingthe questionof Japan's U.N. aspirations
(thistimefora SecurityCouncilratherthana GeneralAssemblyseat) and
Russian securityconcernsin the Sea of Okhotsk.
The observationthat those who do not studyhistoryare doomed to
repeatit applies here. While the United States is not an impartialob-
server-it supportstheJapanesepositionin thedispute-it maybe able to
help as bothsideslook fora solutionin the 1990s,and it is uniquelyposi-
tionedto do so. But it is important to understand thattheongoingRusso-
Japanesetalksare stillso enmeshedin domesticpolitics-perhapsmoreso
today than in 1956-that neitherside can act solely to achieve foreign
policyadvantages. This should give pause to thosein the United States
and elsewhereto advocatea moreactiveand immediateU.S. role-with its
inherentrisks-in resolvingthedispute. And evenifit provedpossibleto
resolvethedisputein theabsenceofdomesticpoliticalconstraints, thereis
no reasonto expectthattheopportunity could be seizedsuccessfully.His-
toricalenmitydies hard,and bothsideshave demonstrated an inabilityto
overcomeadvantagesin relativepower that make it difficult to identify
solutionsrootedin equityand compromise.UntilTokyoand Moscow can
developmorecommongroundforthisendeavor,thereis littleroom for
optimismthatthe UnitedStatescan developit forthem.
The pictureis not completely black,however.A new rationality is evi-
dentin thetreatment ofthedisputein bothcapitals,makingit possiblefor
thefirsttimeto adjustthevariouscomponentsof thedisputein a positive
way. Mostly,thishas meantagreeingon what will not work,not a bad
approachgiventhe difficulty of agreeingon what willwork. The atmos-
phereofgeneralcooperationin thePeace TreatyWorkingGroups,so long
as it continues,could facilitatemoreprogressalong theselines. This pro-
cess of removingobstaclesto a solutionand replacingthemwithmore
positiveapproaches,however,is notlikelyto be of sufficient scale to bring
the disputeto closureuntilthedomesticpoliticalbenefits of a solutionin
Japanand Russia justifyfurther compromise.
The Demise of "Victor-Vanquished";

Rise ofLaw and Justice
The USSR's long-heldinsistencethatthedisputehad beenresolvedon the
basisofJapan'sdefeatin WorldWar Two (victorand vanquished)was one
of the firstof the traditionalset pieces of the disputeto be jettisoned,
althoughRussia has stillnot quitepartedwiththeidea oftheinviolability
of post-WorldWar Two borders. The reform-minded USSR under
Gorbachevrecognizedtheincompatibility of"victor-vanquished" withthe
U.N. charterand international law, whichit believedwas the foundation
uponwhichthepost-ColdWar worldwouldestablishmandatory normsof

behavior.The problem(formerly an asset) with"victor-vanquished" was
that its purpose was to deny the possibilityof compromise. It dealt
harshlywiththe aspirationsfornational"wholeness"of the vanquished.
Between1960 and 1990,thismeantthatJapanhad lost WorldWar Two
and had to livewiththeconsequences.Since 1991,it has meantthatRus-
sia wouldhave to adjustto new politicalrealities.To Japan'scredit,even
as the "victor-vanquished" pendulumhas swungin its favor,Tokyo has
publiclyeschewedthisprincipleand embracedthe new Russian idea of a
solutionbased on law and justice.
The agreement to seeksuch a solutionis an important stepforward, but
unfortunately, theconceptsoflaw andjusticedo notnecessarily workhar-
moniouslytowardthe same conclusion. In justice,the islandsshouldbe
returnedto Japan;the historicalevidenceis overwhelmingly in Japan's
favor. But the case in law is less clear. Thus, the idea of resolvingthe
disputeon thebasisoflaw andjusticebyitsnaturesuggeststhepossibility,
and perhapsthe necessityof compromise.
Not surprisingly, Japan'scontinuingdemandforthe returnof all four
islandsemphasizesjustice and ignoreslaw. To sidestepthe legal uncer-
taintiesof its position,Tokyo claimsthatEtorofuand Kunashiriare not
part of the Kuriles. Japan,of course,did not have the advantageof a
revolution to lubricatea transition
fromorthodoxy to objectiveanalysis,or
a shiftfromflatconfrontation to a positioncapable of accommodating
compromise, as occurredin Russia. In any case, theredoes notappearto
have been an alternative Japaneseapproachhangingin thewings. Tokyo
musthave feltthatthe nuancedchangeembodiedin its decisionto forgo
the immediatereturnof all fourislandssimultaneously was an adequate
responseto Moscow's changeof perspective.
To say that Japan's legal claim to the two northernmost islands is
weakerthanitshistoricalclaimsshouldnotbe takento meanJapanhas no
legalbasis forclaimingthoseislands. A hostofcomplicating legal factors
existsto further becloud the legal issue,among themRussia's failureto
sign the 1951 peace treatyand the linearconnectionbetweenthe Cairo
Declarationand the 1951 peace treatywith regardto the forfeiture of
lands seized by aggression(not the case withJapan'suncontestedsover-
eigntyover Etorofuor Kunashiripriorto August 1945). Whateverthe
meritsofJapan'scase in law, theU.S. aide-memoire of 1956 incorporated
recognitiononly of Japan's historicalclaim, notingthat Etorofuand
Kunashirishould,in justice,be acknowledgedas underJapanesesover-
eignty.
Japanand Russia have examinedexhaustively the complexlegal issues
surrounding theterritorialdispute. Not surprisingly,no mutuallyaccept-
able conclusionhas been reachedin the Peace TreatyWorkingGroups

thathave metperiodicallysince 1988,and it is fairto concludethaton the
legal examinationof thedispute,thetwo sideshave foughtto a draw. Or
perhapsbetterthanthat,theymayseparatelyhave reachedtheconclusion
thatthe disputecannotbe resolvedsolelyin a legal matrix.
RussianDomesticPolitics.New Factor
In tandemwiththeemergenceof thelaw and justiceparadigm,and partly
responsibleforit,was an intellectualchangein perspective on theissuein
Russia,or perhapsmoreaccurately,theemergenceunderglasnostofideas
that had long been present. This new approach firstemergedpublicly
about 1990in theRussianForeignMinistryand evenearlieramongJapan
expertsin some of Russia's top researchinstitutes.In sum,thisperspec-
tiverecognizedthatJapanhad a just historicalcase forclaimingall four
islands,but at the same timerecognizeda clear distinctionbetweenJa-
pan's historicalclaimsand itslegalclaimsto thetwonorthernmost islands.
Even as it emerged,thischangein Russian foreignpolicyperspectives
was eclipsedby domesticconsiderations.But it did lead ultimately to the
bilateralagreementto publishhistoricaldocumentsjointly,among them
the 1855and 1875treatiesthatunderscored Japan'shistoricalclaimsto all
fourislands. This was an important, butin retrospecta Pyrrhicvictoryfor
advocatesofa resolutionofthe territorial disputein bothTokyoand Mos-
cow; the publicationof the documentshas had littlepracticaleffectand
may have contributed to the growthof anxietyamongnationalistparlia-
mentarians in Russia abouttheForeignMinistry'smanagement of theJa-
pan relationship.
The Parliament'sconcernwas spurredbyrumorsin thesummerof 1992
thattheForeignMinistryhad recommended thatYeltsinreturnShikotan
and the Habomais to Japan,and in late July,the SupremeSovietopened
hearingson Russian-Japanese relations.I do not knowwhetherthe For-
eignMinistrymade such a recommendation, but had it done so, it would
have been consistentwiththe emergenceof the law and justiceparadigm
and Russian recognition of the validityof Japan'shistoricalclaims. It is
possiblethatthe ministry, despiteconsiderableodds, was able to defend
withsome successits viewthatShikotanand the Habomaisshouldbe re-
turnedto Japanbased on the 1956 Soviet-Japanese JointDeclaration. It
seemsunlikelythatthe ministry could have coaxed muchmorethanthe
1956formulaout ofthathostileforum.Thus,evenaftertheparliamentary
hearings,significant progressleadingto a provisionaltwo-islandarrange-
mentmighthave been possibleduringYeltsin'splannedvisitto Japanin
September1992.
Speculationabout the offerYeltsin would take to Tokyo continued
throughout August,kindledby Russian commentsabout the ten,twelve,

or fifteenoptionsthe Russian leaderhad at his disposal. Many observers
believedthe mostlikelyoptionwas an offerof the two islands,probably
along the lines of the 1956 JointDeclaration. Based on theirpublic re-
marks,however,the Japanesedid not want the Russiansto cast an offer
thatwould returnmattersto 1956. This may have been out of concern
that it would thenbe impossibleto move Russia beyondsuch a stance.
But also at playmayhavebeenthevulnerabilities in theJapanesepositions
bothin August1956,whenShigemitsu had advocatedacceptanceofSoviet
termsincludingdemarcating theborderjust northof Shikotan,and in the
later decisionto accept two islandsfora peace treaty.SeniorJapanese
officials,
anxiousto avoidtoo close a comparisonwiththeweakerJapanese
positionsof the past,notedpubliclythata "returnto 1956" was not ac-
ceptable,and thatthe two sides neededto go "beyond1956."
These commentsmay or may not have been understoodfullyin Mos-
cow, but cannothave been well-received since a two-islandofferhad not
beenmade. At best,theyrepresent publicdiplomacyofquestionableeffec-
tiveness,matchedonlyby Russian remarksabout the plethoraof options
Yeltsinhad forresolvingthedispute.At worst,such commentsmayhave
evoked memoriesof Tokyo's tacticsin August 1955 when the Japanese
pocketedtheRussianoffer oftwoislandsand thensoughtto resumenego-
tiationsfortheothertwo. Moscow,witha considerabledomesticpriceto
pay foreven a two-islandarrangement, could ill-affordto allow Japanto
"steal" a concessionnotyetmade and thenask formore. Yeltsinquickly
canceledhis visit.
Thereis some evidenceto suggestthatJapanintendedanything but the
tough,uncompromising stancethe Russians thoughttheysaw. In a re-
markablestatement to NHK News just afterthe cancellationof Yeltsin's
trip,ForeignMinisterWatanaberevealedthatTokyohad toldMoscow in
advance that a Russian reconfirmation of the 1956 Declarationand an
agreement to discussthefutureofEtorofuand Kunashiriwouldhavebeen
enoughto unleash"full-scale"Japaneseassistance,hitherto withhelduntil
the fullresolutionof the territorial
dispute. There was no hintof thisin
Japanesepublic statements priorto the cancellation.If true,thiswould
have been a farmoresubstantive effortat compromiseby Tokyo thanits
earlierdecisionto forgoa simultaneousreturnof all fourislands. Never-
theless,even thiscompromiseby Tokyo was apparentlymorethanMos-
cow could accept. Yeltsin's cancellation signaled the break-offof
discussionsand theend ofanotherorbitofthedisputearoundtherelation-
ship,whichthen,predictably, wentdormantfrommid-September 1992.
Thereis alwaysthe possibility thatmiscommunication and poor public
diplomacyon both sides so dominatedthe chargedatmospherein the
weekspriorto the YeltsinvisitthatRussia did not recognizethatTokyo

was preparedto offera majorcompromise.But whilecommunication was
reportedlydifficult
duringthisperiod,it seemsunlikelythatRussian and
Japaneseforeignpolicyprofessionals
could have failedto communicateor
receivesuch an importantmessage.
The Future
Russia's rejectionof theJapaneseoffertellsus two important things.The
firstis that,giventhecurrentpoliticalcrisisin Russia and itsclose linkage
to theterritorialdispute,Moscow has virtuallyno roomformaneuveron
theissue. This does notmeanthatTokyomustdo all thecompromising if
the disputeis to be resolved,or thatTokyo should accept anythingless
than all fourislands. But it does implythat somethingbeyondadjust-
mentsto thecurrentsetofcomponentsofthedisputemaybe necessary.It
mightmeanthatTokyowouldbe betterservedby removingsomeofthose
establishedcomponents.A good candidateis the policyof "non-separa-
tion" of politicsand economics,because the second lesson to be drawn
fromthe Russian rejectionis thattheeconomicleversat Japan'sdisposal
may have less influenceon the territorial disputethan is understoodin
Tokyo.
The Russians,and beforethemthe Soviets,have said consistently that
economicreformin Russia will neithersucceednor failbased on Japan's
input. This mayonce have been a negotiating position,but it is probably
truenonetheless.Certainly, non-separation no longerholdsthepromiseof
a single,massiveJapanesepaymentfortheislandsas mightonce havebeen
considered.In defenseof its refusalto extend"full-scale"assistance,To-
kyo has said frequently and publiclythat expenditureof such fundsto
Russia mustbe understandable to Japanesetaxpayers-theimplicationbe-
ing thatwithoutacknowledgement of Japanesesovereignty over the four
islands,Japanesetaxpayerswould not understand.Taxpayersin all the
otherG-7 countriesseem to understandthe provisionof aid to Russia in
nationalsecurity, nothistoricalterms,despitethefactthatRussia's prede-
cessormay have inflictedeconomicand humanhardshipson themon a
scale exceedingthe seizureof fourislands.
Ironically,non-separation preventsJapanfromgettingsufficient credit
forthe substantialassistanceit is alreadyprovidingto Russia, whichis
about $2.6 billion,with actual disbursements runningunder 10% but
likelyto risequicklyas exportlicensesare issuedforRussiangas produc-
tion upgrades. The only significant categoryof assistancethat "non-
separation" precludesis ODA (OfficialDevelopmentAssistance),for
whichMoscow does not qualifyanywayundertheOECD's Development
AssistanceCommittee(DAC) guidelines.ThoughTokyohas beencareful
to avoid defining "full-scale"assistance,theremaybe naturallimits,par-

ceilingforMITI trade
ticularlyin the Russian Far East, on the effective
insurance,JapanEXIM Bank loans, and otherfundsthatwould prevent
Japan's"full-scale"assistanceprofilefromexpandingexponentially from
what it already is today. Given the decliningnegotiatingvalue of non-
separation,the naturaland technicalconstraintson expandedeconomic
assistance,and the correspondingly minor budgetaryconsequencesof
movingawayfromthepolicy,Japanmightbe betterservedby lookingfor
an opportunity to jettisonthe policyand earn itselfsome publicrelations
credit.
Full Circle: DomesticPoliticsand ForeignPolicy

Tokyo's eliminationof the "non-separation" policywould take the prob-
lem aboutas fartowarda solutionas currentdiplomacycan takeit. That
is to say, significantlygreatercompromiseby eitherside would require
morepoliticalpowerthaneitherforeignministry has at its disposal,and
musttherefore await the emergenceof a strongpoliticalconstituency fo-
cused directlyon thedisputeand dedicatedto itsresolution.But it is diffi-
cult to foreseesuch a constituency developinganytimesoon in Russia. It
is morepossiblein Japan,but heretoo are seriousconstraints.Strategic
argumentssupporting fullynormalizedrelationswithRussia do not seem
to have convincedLDP leaders,who may be more concernedwiththe
uncertaineffect of such relationswithMoscow on theU.S.-Japanalliance
thanwiththe strategicconsequencesof the failureof reformin Russia.
Whilethereare welcomeindicationsfromseveralpointsin the current
Japanesepoliticalspectrumof new,international perspectives forthecon-
duct of Japan'sforeignpolicy,it will be awhilebeforewe see whetherthe
Japaneseelectoratefindsthesepreferable to the statusquo. Conservative
politicalfactionsappearfocusedmoreon theevolutionofdomesticpolitics
in the wake of politicalscandals than on foreignpolicy. The Northern
Territoriesissue is not now, as it was in 1956,a fulcrumforcontending
politiciansto levertheirpoliticalfortunes, and it is notthesourceof suffi-
cientoutsidepressureto generatea consensusamongLDP factionsthatits
resolutionis a firsttierpriority.It seems likelythat major compromise
willbe difficultto comeby in theabsenceof thesefactors,and thata solu-
tionto theNorthernTerritories disputewillhave to waituntilone or both
of themis presentin Tokyo.


Japan and The Northern Territories Dispute - Past, Present, Future

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Japan and the Northern Territories Dispute: Past, Present, Future

Author(s): Richard deVillafranca

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The idea thatthe UnitedStatesscuttledthe 1956 So-

Richard deVillafrancais a U.S. ForeignService Officerwho has

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1. Donald Hellmann,JapaneseForeignPolicyand DomesticPolitics(Berkeley:University

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4. ForeignRelationsof the US, p. 128.

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Shigemitsu'sGambleand Dulles's Views

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10. Hellman,JapaneseForeignPolicy,p. 37; also, Asahi Shimbun,August20, 1956.

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13. Ibid., p. 128.

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18. Ibid., p. 209.

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The Dispute Today

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The Demise of "Victor-Vanquished";

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Full Circle: DomesticPoliticsand ForeignPolicy

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