Social Structure, Crime and Criminalization-An Empirical Examination of The Conflict Perspect

Social Structure, Crime and Criminalization: An Empirical Examination of the Conflict
Perspective
Author(s): Kirk R. Williams and Susan Drake
Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 563-575
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
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The Sociological Quarterly 21 (A utumn 1980):563-575
Social Structure,Crimeand Criminalization:

An EmpiricalExaminationof the Conflict
Perspective*
Kirk R. Williams, Memphis State University
Susan Drake, Memphis State University
Using available data from a variety of secondary sources, this research examines the
empirical validity of arguments maintained by conflict theorists about the interrela-
tionsamongeconomicinequality,the incidenceof crime,and the officialcriminaliza-
tion of people through arrest. The reported findings, although not definitive, suggest
that official criminalizationmay be a function of the structure of dominant/subordi-
nate relations within populations, rather than the incidence of crime. These findings
are dependent, however, on whether the incidence of crime is measured by official or
unofficialstatistics on criminal activity. The implications of the findingsare discussed,
and we conclude that they lend some support to conflict criminology and suggest that
furtheraggregatetests using structuralvariables are desirable.
A major theoretical development during the past decade has been the application
of the conflict perspective to the sociological study of deviance and control (e.g.,
Turk, 1969; Taylor et al., 1973, 1975; Chambliss, 1974, 1975; Quinney, 1974,
1977, 1979; Spitzer, 1975; Thio, 1978; or Davis, 1980). As commonly recog-
nized, that perspective is grounded on a variety of assumptions which clearly
challenge those of the traditional functional perspective, with the emphasis being
on the importance of exploitation, power, and coercion in the maintenance of
social order (e.g., Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Turk, 1976; Chambliss, 1976;
Michalowski and Bohlander, 1976). Hence, conflict theorists are more interested
in the structural sources of rule-making and rule-sanctioning than rule-breaking
per se. In the sociological study of crime that interest translates into an analysis
of the creation, content, and enforcement of criminal law (e.g., Hopkins, 1975).
In response to the theoretical development of a "conflict criminology," investi-
gators have conducted studies which purportedly assess the empirical validity of
that perspective. Some researchers have conducted historical analyses of the
structural conditions which produced legal institutions (e.g., Platt, 1974; Hagan
and Leon, 1977), while others have assessed the extent of normative consensus
or dissensus among categories of a population (e.g., Rossi et al., 1974; Thomas
et al., 1976; Hagan et al., 1977). Most studies, however, have focused on dis-
crimination in the process of criminal sentencing (e.g., Chiricos and Waldo,
1975; Lizotte, 1978), and those studies have been reviewed elsewhere (Hagan,
1974).
At first glance, studies of discriminatory sentencing might appear quite rele-
vant for conflict criminology, but that is simply not the case. Regardless of the
?1980 by The Sociological Quarterly. All rights reserved. 0038-0253/80/ 1500-0563$00.75

*Kirk R. Williams' address is: Department of Sociology/Social Work, Memphis State University, Mem-
phis, Tennessee 38152.

564 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY
findings of those studies (i.e., whether they are construed as confirming or refut-
ing that perspective), critics have repudiated them as legitimate tests of conflict
criminology because, among other reasons, such research has been restricted to
"within class" comparisons among individuals in terms of socioeconomic status
and sentencing severity (e.g., Greenberg, 1977; Hopkins, 1977; Reasons, 1977;
Jankovic, 1978). Although conflict theorists from Marx to the present have dis-
agreed about how structural divisions within a population are generated, virtually
all of those theorists have been concerned about structural relations of domi-
nance and subordination, not individualistic gradations along some status con-
tinuum (e.g., Turner, 1978). That concern is no more clearly illustrated than in
recent research on class, status, and segmented labor markets (e.g., Vanneman
and Pampel, 1977; Wright and Perrone, 1977; Robinson and Kelley, 1979; Beck
et al., 1978; Hodson, 1978). Hence, "between class" analyses or some sem-
blance thereof are paramount for examining the empirical validity of conflict
criminology.
Of course, measuring the structure of dominant/subordinate relations within
populations requires research at the aggregate level, meaning that populations are
the appropriate units of analysis, not individual persons. Interestingly enough,
aggregate empirical examinations of conflict criminology have been conspicu-
ously rare, even though such examinations promise to be quite instructive. As a
case in point, Jacobs (1978, 1979) and Jacobs and Britt (1979) examined the
relationship between economic inequality and three aspects of coercive control
(the likelihood of imprisonment, police use of deadly force, and police strength)
among population units (states and SMSAs) on the assumption that
... the more there are inequalitiesin the distributionof economic power and eco-
nomic resources, the more one can expect that the social control apparatusof the
state will conform to the preferencesof monied elites (Jacobs. 1979:914).
The findings reported were consistent with the foregoing assumption, and that
was so even when other correlates of coercive control (e.g., the incidence of vio-
lence or the percent black) were held constant.
Research Problem and Procedures

With a view to evaluating conflict criminology on the basis of aggregate empiri-
cal evidence, the present study tests the assumption described by Jacobs (1979);
or as Chambliss and Seidman (1971:33) put the matter: "The more economi-
cally stratified a society becomes, the more it becomes necessary for the domi-
nant groups in that society to enforce through coercion the norms of conduct
which guarantee their supremacy." Hence, this research examines the relation-
ships between economic inequality, the relative size of historically subordinate
groups, and criminalization (defined as the process of labeling people as crimi-
nal). The units of analysis are Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs)
of 500,000 population or more, and the focus is on arrest. Official criminaliza-
tion through arrest is important for research on conflict criminology because it
marks the initial point of coercive state intervention to control members of a
population.
Measurement of relevant variables. Three structural variables are central to

Social Structure, Crime, and Criminalization 565
this research. Economic inequality is measured by computing a Gini index which

summarizes the distribution of personal income among income categories (Shry-
ock and Siegel, 1975). A score of zero represents perfect equality in the distri-
bution among those categories, while a score of one represents complete inequal-
ity. Data on the distribution of personal income in SMSAs were obtained from
the 1970 Census of Population and Housing. Two measures of historically sub-
ordinate groups are used, percent black and percent unemployed. Data on per-
cent black within SMSAs were also obtained from the 1970 census statistics, but
data on unemployment were derived from the 1977 County and City Data Book.
Assuming that the assumption stated by Jacobs (1979) as well as Chambliss and
Seidman (1971) is valid, a positive relationship is expected between these three
structural variables and official criminalization.
The initial point of official criminalization is measured by computing arrest
rates for each of the seven major felonies presented in the Uniform Crime Re-
ports. Unpublished arrest statistics by type of crime were obtained from the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, and only statistics for SMSAs of 500,000 popula-
tion or more were available at that agency (i.e., arrest data for smaller SMSAs
or cities were unavailable). Given those statistics, the rate of arrest is computed
by using the following formula:
(A75 + A76 + A77)/(P75 + P, + P,) (100,000)
where A represents the total number of crime-specific arrests, and P represents

the FBI population estimate.
Control variables. The procedure of measuring official criminalization could

be criticized for ignoring the incidence of criminal behavior within designated
SMSAs. Specifically, instead of expressing the rate of official criminalization as
the number of crime-specific arrests per 100,000 population, that rate could be
computed as the ratio of total arrests for a particular type of crime to total offi-
cial incidence of that crime (i.e., a certainty of arrest ratio). Jacobs (1978) used
a similar computational procedure in his study of economic inequality and im-
prisonment, and others have computed such certainty ratios in studies of the de-
terrent efficacy of arrest (e.g., Geerken and Gove, 1977 or Brown, 1978). Crime-
specific arrest rates rather than certainty ratios are computed, however, because
the former are more consistent with the present view of criminalization: that is,
the labeling of persons (not behavior) as criminal. Thus, the total population
within an SMSA constitutes a reservoir of potential candidates for criminaliza-
tion.
The central question then is this: what factors increase the rate with which
those candidates are officially criminalized? The structural variables we discussed
are three such factors relevant to conflict criminology, but the incidence of
criminal behavior itself is clearly an alternative factor that may promote such an
increase. Hence, official crime rates for the seven major felonies are computed
using data from the Uniform Crime Reports. The computational procedure is
identical to the calculation of arrest rates, with this formula:
(C5 + CS,;+ + P,; + (100,000)

C7)/(P7- P..)

566 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
where C represents the total number of specific crimes known to the police and P
represents the FBI population estimate. A positive relationship is expected be-
tween the official crime rates and the arrest rates.
The use of official statistics on crime raises a perplexing problem for this re-
search. As reviewed in any criminology text (e.g., Sutherland and Cressey, 1978
or Reid, 1979), the validity of those statistics as measures of the "true" incidence
of crime has been debated unceasingly through the years; but the problem goes
beyond questions about the validity of official crime data. At least since the intro-
duction of labeling theory, those data have been viewed as representing some-
thing other than criminal behavior itself (e.g., Kitsuse and Cicourel, 1963;
Wheeler, 1967), with some investigators seeking to identify the extrabehavioral
factors which produce official crime statistics (e.g., Black, 1970). That orienta-
tion is clearly consistent with conflict criminology, as demonstrated by Quinney's
(1979) commentary on the matter. He contends that official crime statistics can
be viewed as an index of the official response to crime or the "socially recognized
volume of crime" in which case, questions about whether they reflect accurately
the "true" crime rate are irrelevant. Accordingly, the production of official inci-
dents figures may be influenced by the same structural conditions within a popu-
lation that influence the official criminalization of people through arrest.
In short, official crime rates and arrest rates may be equivalent, theoretically,
from the standpoint of conflict criminology. Yet, to add to the complexity, Quin-
ney recognizes that variation in the official crime rate may be a function, at least
to some extent, of variation in actual behavior alleged to be criminal. Unfor-
tunately, that function (and hence the validity of official crime statistics) cannot
be specified empirically in a conclusive way because the "true" incidence of crime
is unknown and unknowable. Hence, it seems the only defensible strategy of
dealing with this measurement problem is to use an alternative source of infor-
mation on crime, in addition to official statistics, which is less contaminated by
the official reaction process. As described subsequently, conflict criminology
anticipates different empirical results depending on the measure of crime em-
ployed; therefore, the use of official and unofficial criminal statistics yields addi-
tional evidence bearing on the empirical validity of that theoretical perspective.
The only available unofficial statistics on crime are the victimization data col-
lected during 1971-1974 in 26 cities (25 of which are included here) for the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Given
such data, victimization rates are computed as follows:
(V/P) (100,000)
where V represents the total number of victimizations of persons 12 years of age
or older for a particular type of crime, and P represents the total number of such
persons within a designated city. As with the official crime rates, a positive rela-
tionship is expected between the victimization rates and the arrest rates.
One other control variable is employed in this research, total population size
of each SMSA, because of the impact it may have on the general process of social
control. Briefly stated, as population size increases, the effectiveness of informal
controls (e.g., conventional value systems or intimate interpersonal relations)
may decrease, which in turn may increase the likelihood that legal-coercive con-

trols-such as, official criminalization-will be invoked (e.g., Schwartz, 1964 or

Black, 1976). Hence, a positive relationship between population size and arrest
rates is expected.
Findings
After computing the measures discussed above, bivariate correlation coefficients
were calculated to determine if the empirical relationships were consistent with
the expectations. Because a random sample of SMSAs was not drawn, tests of
significance are not technically appropriate, but they are used nonetheless merely
as a "rule of thumb" to determine if a relationship exists.
Bivariate analysis. Consider the correlation coefficients presented in Table 1.

Notice that with the exception of motor vehicle theft, economic inequality is
positively and significantly correlated with the arrest rates for each of the major
felonies. Those correlations suggest that economic inequality may have greater
ramifications for legal-coercive control than Jacobs (1978) believed was the
case. He argued that economic inequality should have a significant impact on
the enforcement of property laws but not necessarily laws pertaining to crimes of
violence. These findings suggest that economic inequality may result in higher
rates of official criminalization for both types of laws.
Conversely, it appears that the relative size of the black population within
SMSAs has little to do with the legal "defense" of property codes, as indicated by
the statistically insignificant correlations between the percent black and arrest
rates for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. It appears, however, that the
percent black has a significant positive effect on the arrest rate for robbery, a
finding which is more difficult to interpret in this light because some investigators
consider that offense as primarily a property crime (e.g., Normandeau, 1968),
while others consider it as a violent crime (e.g., Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1969).
At the very least, the act of robbery entails the potential for, if not actual, vio-
lence yet it still represents a form of theft (e.g., Thio, 1978). Nonetheless, the
correlations between the percent black and the arrest rates for the other more un-
ambiguous violent offenses are statistically significant and in the direction ex-
pected. Those correlations suggest that the larger the black population among
SMSAs, the more coercive control is invoked through official criminalization,
which is consistent with conflict criminology.
None of the correlations between the percent unemployed and the arrest rates
for the seven felonies are statistically significant. That finding is somewhat sur-
prising because conflict criminologists have emphasized the importance of unem-
ployment or "surplus populations" in connection with crime and coercive control
(e.g., Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939; Quinney, 1977; Spitzer, 1975). Concern-
ing population size, only the correlations between that variable and the arrest
rates for robbery and motor vehicle theft are statistically significant and positive
as expected.
Finally, observe that all of the correlations between the official crime rates and
the arrest rates are statistically significant, in the direction expected, and mod-

Table 1. Bivariate Correlations (r) between Three Structural Variables Relevant to Co
Population Size, as well as the Official Crime Rate and the Arrest Rate for Seven Maj
SMSAs of 500,000 Population or More (N = 69)
Arrest Rates
Murderand
Non-Negligent Forcible Aggravated
Manslaughter Rape Robbery Assault Burglary
Independent
Variables Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5
Economic Inequality .43* .32* .26* .46* .37*
% Black .75* .46* .45* .28* .14
% Unemployed -.06 .06 .03 .06 .15
Population Size .22 .19 .50* .19 .12
OfficialCrime Rate .84* .62* .72* .70* .58*
Victimization Rate** - -.06 .38 -.28 .00
* P < .05
** N = 25

erate to substantial in magnitude. In contrast, none of the correlations between

the victimization rates and the arrest rates are statistically significant, suggesting
that for all practical purposes those two variables are unrelated.
Unless one is willing to assume that the "true" rate of criminal behavior is
more accurately measured by the official crime rate than the victimization rate,
which is indeed a rather precarious assumption, those two sets of correlations are
quite consistent with conflict criminology. From that perspective, the official
crime rate is an indicator of the legal response to the behavior of the "power-
less" who are subsequently criminalized through arrest; consequently, a correla-
tion between that rate and the arrest rate should not be surprising. Moreover,
because victimization statistics are produced independently of the legal response
to crime, the correlation between the victimization rate and the arrest rate should
be attenuated. The finding of essentially no correlation, however, is surprising,
even though conflict criminologists have repeatedly argued that it is not so much
individuals' behavior per se that results in official criminalization, but the social
structural position of those individuals within a population that generates such a
result. Speaking directly to the point, Chambliss (1975:66) contends that:
The argumentthat criminal acts, are more often committed by membersof the
lower classes is not tenable. Criminal.... acts are widely distributedthroughoutthe social
classes in capitalist societies. .... It is in the enforcementof the law that the lower
classes are subjectto the effects of ruling class dominationover the legal system, and
which results in the appearanceof a concentrationof criminal acts among the lower
classes in the officialrecords.
Given Chambliss' view, one can argue plausibly that the greater the economic
inequality or the larger the relative size of potentially threatening subordinate
groups, the more the police may pursue crimes committed by members of subor-
dinate (not dominant) groups. That produces a significant correlation between
those conditions and the official crime rate because they generate the official or
"social reality" of crime, not the "true" incidence of criminal behavior. Research
findings bearing on that argument (see Table 2) include the correlations between
economic inequality, percent black, as well as percent unemployed and the offi-
cial crime rates, in addition to the correlations between those structural variables
and the victimization rates for the seven major felonies. Insofar as the argument
is valid, one would expect significant positive correlations between each of the
structural variables identified (in Table 2) and the official crime rates, but one
would expect no correlation between those variables and the victimization rates.
The coefficients in Table 2 tend to be consistent with the argument. Five of the
coefficients in column 1 of that table (expressing the relationship between eco-
nomic inequality and the official crime rate) are statistically significant and posi-
tive, while such correlations also obtain in four instances for the percent black
(see column 3) and two instances for the percent unemployed (see column 5).
Conversely, the correlations between the structural variables and the victimiza-
tion rates are statistically insignificant, except the correlation between economic
inequality and the victimization rate of aggravated assault (see column 2); and
that coefficient is negative which is contrary to expectations.
In summary, the correlations presented in Tables 1 and 2 provide some pre-
liminary support for conflict criminology in at least two important respects. First,

570 THESOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations (r) between Three Structural Variables Relevant

for Conflict Criminology and the Official Crime Rates and the Correlations
between Those Variables and the Victimization Rates,
among SMSAs of 500,000 Population or More a
StructuralVariables
Economic Inequality Percent Black Percent Unemployed
Victimi- Victimi- Victimi-

Official zation Official zation Official zation
Types of Crimes Col. 1 Col. 2 Col.3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6
Murder,Non-negligent
Manslaughter .53* - .78* - -.12 -
Forcible Rape .44* -.18 .41* -.36 .34* .27
Robbery .22 -.03 .46* .31 .06 -.14
AggravatedAssault .56* -.43* .40* -.36 .17 .10
Burglary .52* -.17 .03 -.29 .28* .01
Larceny Theft .29* .02 .03 -.34 .15 -.02
Motor Vehicle Theft .00 -.27 -.01 -.31 .08 .12
* p < .05.
a For the official crime rates, N = 69; and for the victimization rates. N - 25.
with the possible exception of unemployment, the relationships between the

structural variables relevant for conflict criminology and official criminalization
tend to be consistent with that perspective. Second, the differences between the
correlations employing the official crime rates and those employing the victimiza-
tion rates are consistent with the meaning conflict criminologists give to official
criminal statistics; that is, those data reflect the official reaction to behavior al-
leged to be criminal and thus are generated by the same structural conditions
that influence the process of official criminalization.
Multivariate analysis. A more rigorous empirical assessment of conflict crimi-

nology is to determine whether the observed relationships between the structural
variables and the arrest rates hold when population size and the incidence of
crime are statistically controlled. Given the theoretical equivalence of the official
crime rate and the arrest rate from the standpoint of conflict criminology, it
seems redundant to conduct a multivariate analysis using official "crimes known"
statistics as a measure of criminal activity. Moreover, because the correlations
between the official crime rate and the arrest rate tend to be substantial, it is
unlikely that a multivariate analysis will reveal statistically significant indepen-
dent effects of the structural variables on the arrest rate when the official crime
rate is controlled. Although not reported here, such an analysis was conducted
nonetheless, and, as expected, the official crime rate was the only variable that
consistently had a significant impact on the arrest rate. To reiterate, however,
that finding is consistent with conflict criminologists' view of official crime data.
In light of these findings, we decided to proceed with the multivariate analysis
using victimization data to measure criminal activity. In this analysis, the number

of SMSAs was limited to the 25 for which victimization data were available in
order to enhance the comparability of the regression coefficients (see Table 3).
In light of the insignificant correlations between the victimization rates and
the arrest rates reported in Table 1, and those between the structural variables
and the victimization rates reported in Table 2, a significant independent effect
of the victimization rates on the arrest rates was not expected. The coefficients in
Table 3 indicate that the findings are consistent with that expectation. None of
those coefficients is statistically significant. Moreover, because the structural
variables relevant for conflict criminology tended to be significantly correlated
with the arrest rate (see Table 1), significant independent effects of those struc-
tural variables were anticipated, controlling for the victimization rates. Observe
that economic inequality has such an effect on the arrest rate for aggravated
assault (see column 3), and the percent black has a significant independent ef-
fect on the arrest rate for forcible rape and robbery (see columns 1 and 2, re-
spectively). Hence the findings are only minimally consistent with conflict
criminologists' arguments about the structural (not behavioral) conditions within
populations that increase the use of legal-coercive control (i.e., criminalization
through arrest).
Summary and Conclusion

Using various assumptions posited by conflict criminologists about the structural
basis of legal-coercive control, the present research addressed the following
Table 3. Standardized Regression Coefficients of the

Multiple Regression Analysis with the Arrest Rate Regressed on
Three Structural Variables Relevant to Conflict Criminology,
Population Size, and Victimization Rates, Among SMSAs of
500,000 Population or more (N = 25)*
Motor
Forcible Aggravated Larceny Vehicle
Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Theft Theft
Independent
Variables Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Vol. 6
Economic Inequality -.18 .09 .54 .13 .07 .02

(.85) (.49) (2.61) (.56) (.28) (.08)
% Black .75 .56 .11 .36 .05 -.10
(3.37) (2.75) (.55) (1.42) (.19) (.39)
% Unemployed .24 .27 .27 .40 .06 .25
(1.23) (1.55) (1.48) (1.84) (.24) (1.13)
Population Size .05 .20 .18 .04 -.31 .30
(.23) (1.12) (.64) (.20) (1.45) (1.47)
Victimization Rate .13 .17 .01 .16 -.20 .16
(.61) (.93) (.04) (.76) (.84) (.75)
R2 .39 .52 .46 .29 .14 .23
* t-Values are in parentheses below the standardized regression coefficients. With 23 degrees of freedom,
if t > 2.069, then p < .05.

question: Do structural variables such as economic inequality, percent black, or

percent unemployed have a significant independent effect on official criminaliza-
tion, as indicated by the rate of arrest; or is that rate simply a function of what
people do (i.e., the incidence of criminal activity)? If the official crime rate is
used to measure the incidence of crime, multivariate analysis reveals that it is the
only variable significantly associated with the arrest rate. Such a finding ques-
tions the empirical validity of conflict criminology only to the extent that the
official crime rate is accepted uncritically as a valid measure of the "true" crime
rate, which is quite dubious. Hence, when an alternative unofficial measure of
criminal activity (i.e., the victimization rate) was used, no evidence was found
that the arrest rate is merely a function of the incidence of criminal behavior.
Moreover, the relationships between economic inequality and the arrest rate for
aggravated assault, as well as those between the percent black and the rate of
arrest for forcible rape and robbery, held when the victimization rate was con-
trolled. Those findings are consistent with the assumption drawn from conflict
criminology that the frequency or intensity of legal-coercive control increases as
the degree of stratificationwithin populations increases.
The difference in the reported findings seemingly depends on the measure-
ment of crime itself, which underscores the importance of that overriding issue
for criminology. Our findings corroborate a related study of Booth et al. (1977)
in disputing the conclusion that official crime rates and victimization rates pro-
vide similar estimates of the relative distribution of crime across geographical
areas (e.g., Skogan, 1974; Hindelang, 1974).
In any case, the difference between the two sets of findings is not purely a
methodological footnote. That difference takes on theoretical significance in
light of conflict criminologists' arguments about the meaning of official statistics
on crime; specifically, those data are indicative of the official reaction to crime
rather than the "true" incidence of criminal activity. Therefore, the official crime
rate may be a function of the same structural variables that produce the arrest
rate, not because they necessarily generate more criminal activity but because
they have an impact on the official law enforcement process. In support of those
arguments, economic inequality, percent black, and percent unemployed tended
to be more significantly correlated with the official crime rate than the victimiza-
tion rate. Of course, such an analysis assumes that the victimization rate is a
more valid measure of the "true" incidence of crime, and that assumption is
both debatable and empirically unverifiable. Moreover, there are at least three
problems of comparability between the official crime rate and the victimization
rate: (1) the victimization data are for the period 1971-1974, while the official
data cover the period 1975-1977; (2) the victim surveys asked only about vic-
timizations to persons of 12 years of age or older, while there is no age limita-
tion concerning the official data; and (3) the victim surveys were limited to
victimizations within the city limits, while the official data represent crimes com-
mitted in the entire SMSA. Nevertheless, these victimization statistics were the
only unofficial data on crime available for the present research; and yet, they
were clearly derived from a process that is quite different from the compilation
of official data on crime. Thus, to argue that the structural variables noted above
affect that process in the same way that they affect the construcion of the official
crime rate is simply not convincing.

In summary, the findings of this research agree with the arguments of conflict
criminologists about the interrelationshipsbetween the structure of dominant and
subordinate relations within a population, the official recognition of crime (i.e.,
the official crime rate), and the official criminalization of persons (i.e., the arrest
rate). The research is far from a critical test of that perspective, however; so the
findings of this exploratory study should be viewed as suggestive. That is the case
if only because the correlations reported are by no means substantial, and the
research focus is limited in terms of types of crimes, units of analysis, and avail-
ability of data for more refined measurement of relevant variables. The findings
at least lend some credence to the overall perspective of conflict
criminology and
suggest that further specification and testing of fundamental propositions of that
perspective, especially at the aggregate level, should be informative.
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