Chapter 2

Methodology of Risk
Assessment
Quantitative risk assessment consists of the following steps;

9 Hazard Identification

- Identify the hazards and define the failure cases.

9 Consequence Assessment/MCA analysis

- Model the consequences of failures.

9 Frequency Analysis

- Estimate the frequencies with which these failures occur.

9 Risk Evaluation

- Analysis & evaluation of the risks.

Depending on the area of risk, the second and third steps may be
identified slightly differently (for example in a chemical exposure QRA, the
steps are called toxicity assessment and exposure assessment), but they
still deal with consequence and frequency of occurrence.

Hazard identification always comes first and risk characterization

always occurs last in the process, but consequence and frequency are
typically evaluated simultaneously. The whole methodology of QRA is
presented in Fig2.1.
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Fig.2.1: Methodology of QRA

2.1 Hazard Identification

Hazard identification is the first step in the risk assessment
process, it is very important as it leads to the generation of accidental
scenarios. Formal approaches exist to identify hazards and top events
including Hazard Identification (HAZID) (by the calculation of hazard
indices), Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), and Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis (FMEA). However, the most powerful tools for identification
of events that may create incidents are imagination combined with
experience. For this reason, a brainstorming session with those personnel
involved in the design and operation of a process is often effective in
determining a list of top events. In this identification step it is important
to list all hazardous events and not start rejecting them on the basis of

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their rare occurrence or small effects. All of the hazard identification

techniques including Safety reviews, Checklist analysis, What-If analysis,
FMEA and HAZOP can be adapted to identify hazards within the scope of
the MIACC guide. All are recognized and accepted techniques for which
reference texts, papers, and training are available. In identification of
major hazardous units is based on Manufacture, Storage and Import of
Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 of Government of India (as amended in
2000); and by relative ranking technique i.e. Fire and Explosion Index
(FEI).

2.1.1 Fire and Explosion Index (FEI)

Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) is useful in identification of areas
in which the potential risk reaches a certain level. It estimates the global
risk associated with a process unit and classifies the units according to
their general level of risk. FEI covers aspects related to the intrinsic
hazard of materials, the quantities handled and operating conditions. This
factor gives index value for the area which could be affected by an
accident, the damage to property within the area and the working days
lost due to accidents. The method for evaluation of FEI involves following
stages.

• Selection of pertinent process unit which can have serious

impact on plant safety

• Determination of Material Factor (MF): This factor for a given

substance in the process unit gives intrinsic potential to release energy in
case of fire or an explosion. Material Factor can be directly obtained from
Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index Hazard classification Guide of American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York. The factor can also be
evaluated from NFPA indices of danger, health, flammability and
reactivity.

• Determination of Unit Hazard Factor: The Unit Hazard Factor

is obtained by multiplication of General Process Hazard (GPH) factor and
Special Process Hazard (SPH) factor. GPH factor is computed according to
presence of exothermic reactions and loading and unloading operations.

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The penalties due to each of these reactions / operations are summed up

to compute GPH factor. Similarly, SPH factor can be evaluated for the
operations close to flammable range or pressures different from
atmospheric. Penalties of these operations for both factors can be
obtained from Dow’s FEI index form.

Fire and explosion index is then calculated as,

F&EI = MF x [GPH] x [SPH]

Degree of hazards based on FEI is given in the following

Table 2.1.

Table 2.1
Degree of Hazards Based on FEI

FEI Range Degree of Hazard

0 – 60 Light
61-96 Moderate
97 - 127 Intermediate
128 - 158 Heavy
159 and Above Severe

Preventive and protective control measures are recommended

based on degree of hazard. Therefore, FEI indicates the efforts to be
taken to reduce risks for a particular unit.

2.1.2 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)

The hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a rigorous analytical
method to identify deviations from the design intent through a detailed
analysis of the facility design. A multi-disciplined team, lead by a risk
specialist, rigorously analyzes the design, normally using Piping &
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID’s). The analysis is structured around a
systematic review of the design using “guidewords” applied to pre-
selected system nodes. The “guidewords” (no, more, less, as well as, part
of, reverse, other than) are applied to parameters such as flow, level, or
pressure at the specific design nodes. The “guidewords” provide structure

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to ensure a systematic approach. The HAZOP technique can be viewed as

a structured brainstorming session.

The outcome of a HAZOP study includes the identification of

hazards and operability problems. A study may lead to recommendations
to change the design or operating procedures or identify the need for
further information and study. It is important to note that the prime
purpose of the study is to identify hazards, not to redesign the process
and develop solutions. Although originally conceived as a process for
identifying hazards and operability problems in new, untested designs,
HAZOP has been shown to be an effective method to review existing
operations. It should be recognized that a HAZOP study is a rigorous
review of detailed design, and, as such, requires extensive resources, both
manpower and time. A typical study team may comprise five to seven
multi-disciplined specialists for a number of weeks.

2.2 Consequence Analysis

Once the hazardous events are identified, the next step in the
risk analysis is to analyze their consequences, i.e., estimate the
magnitude of damage to the receptors of interest should those hazardous
events occur.

Consequence estimation can be accomplished by:

9 Comparison to past incidents,

9 Expert judgement, or

9 Using mathematical models (consequence modelling),

which can be used at various levels of detail and
sophistication.

Consequence Modelling is an analytical approach used to

determine the possible physical effects resulting from the release of a
hazardous substance. The inputs to this analysis include the physical,
chemical and toxicological characteristics of the hazardous substance and
the characteristics of the system in which it is contained (e.g., pressurized
vessel, pipe, reactor, bulk carrier container).

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Consequence modeling generally involves following steps:

9 estimation of the source term (source term modeling), i.e.,

how much material in what form (gas/ liquid/two-phase) is
being released from containment as a function of time,
and development of the release scenarios or possible
outcomes (fire, explosion, etc.) following the release;

9 hazard level estimation (hazard modelling) as a function of

time and at selected process unit, i.e., estimation of

- Ambient concentrations for a toxic or flammable gas

release (for modelling the effects of a toxic cloud or
flash fire),

- Thermal radiation flux for fires (for a jet fire, pool

fire, or fireball),

- Overpressure for explosions (for a confined

explosion, boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
[BLEVE], or vapour cloud explosion [VCE]),

Hazardous substance, on release can cause damage on a large

scale. The extent of the damage is dependent upon the nature of the
release and the physical state of the material. In consequence analysis the
consequences for flammable hazards are considered and the damages
caused due to such releases are assessed.

2.2.1 Fire Scenarios

Combustible materials within their flammable limits may ignite
and burn if exposed to an ignition source of sufficient energy. On process
plants, this normally occurs as a result of a leakage or spillage. Depending
on the physical properties of the material and the operating parameters,
the combustion of material in a plant may take on a number of forms like
jet fire, flash fire and pool fire.

Flammable mixtures can only be formed if the concentration of

the material is within the flammability limits i.e. lower flammability limit
(LFL) & upper flammability limit (UFL). The Lower flammability limit
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corresponds to minimum proportion of combustible vapor in air for

combustion. The Upper flammability limit Correspond to maximum
proportion of combustible vapor in air for combustion and the
concentration range lying between the lower and the upper limit is called
as flammable range, below LFL, vapor is too lean to burn (lacks fuel) &
above UFL, vapor is too rich to burn (lacks oxygen).

2.2.1.1 Jet Fire

Jet fire typically results from the combustion of a material as it is
being released from a pressurized process unit. It can also occur when
flammable material of a high exit velocity ignites. Ejection of flammable
material due to a leak in vessel, pipe or pipe flange if ignited immediately
may give rise to a jet fire and in some instances the jet flame could have
substantial “reach”. Depending on wind speed, the flame may tilt and
impinge on pipeline, equipment or structures. The main concern from pool
fire is due to the thermal radiation effects. The thermal radiation from
these fires may cause injury to people or damage equipment some
distance from the source of the flames.

2.2.1.2 Flash Fire

A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapour cloud
resulting from a release of flammable material into the open air, which
after mixing with air, ignites. A flash fire results from the ignition of a
released flammable cloud in which there is essentially no increase in
combustion rate. The ignition source could be electric spark, a hot surface,
and friction between moving parts of a machine or an open fire.

The main dangers of flash fire are due to direct flame contact
because most of the time, flash combustion lasts for not more than a few
seconds and thermal radiation generated outside of the burning cloud will
generally not cause significant damage due to the short duration. The
size of the flammable cloud determines the area of possible direct flame
contact effects.

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2.2.1.3 Pool Fire

Vapors of flammable liquids when spilled outside due to leak in
the storage tank or process unit can give rise to a flammable mixture with
air which when ignited is called as pool fire. Burning of the spilled liquid
can affect the other process units. Main hazards of pool fire are due to the
heat radiations generated.

2.2.2 Explosion Scenarios

An explosion occurs due to a sudden increase in volume and
release of energy in a violent manner, generating high temperatures. An
explosion causes pressure waves in the local medium in which it occurs.
Explosion is a sudden & violent release of energy, when a large amount of
flammable vaporizing liquid or gas is rapidly released, a vapor cloud forms
and disperses with the surrounding air. The release can occur from a
storage tank, process, transport vessel or pipeline, this when ignited
within the explosive limits can cause an explosion, generally explosions
are of two types confined & unconfined.

A confined explosion can be produced when a gas cloud is ignited

within a confined volume such as a building. As the flame propagates
through the gas cloud it produces hot combustion products. The
confinement prevents expansion of these combustion products and as a
consequence, the pressure increases, this continues until the confining
structure fails, in some cases catastrophically. When the vapor cloud is
not confined it is unconfined explosion also known as vapor cloud
explosion. When a liquid stored above its boiling point under pressure is
instantaneously released undergoes rapid vaporization results in Boiling
Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

2.2.2.1 Vapor Cloud Explosion

The Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) begins with a release of a
large quantity of flammable vaporizing liquid or gas from a storage tank,
transport vessel or pipeline producing a dangerous overpressure. There
are two known mechanisms for generating an explosion in an unconfined
vapor cloud. One is a deflagration, where the flame accelerates to high

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speed, which requires a mechanism for generating the flame acceleration.

It can be provided by turbulence generated as the explosion propagates
through pipework congestion typical of process plant. The second
mechanism is a detonation, which can be much more damaging than
deflagration. It may arise from the coalescence of a strong shock wave
and a fast-moving chemically reacting front. Together, this can undergo a
transition to propagation faster than the speed of sound and produce
over-pressures at the front in excess of 10 bar. It can also arise from the
high temperatures and pressure generated by a shock wave in a confined,
high flame speed deflagration or directly from strongly focused shock
waves in a very reactive mixture.

2.2.2.2 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

If the liquid is stored under pressure at a temperature above its
boiling point, the initial physical explosion that breaks the receptacle
produces a sudden decompression giving rise to a massive evaporation of
the saturated liquid. This is known as Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor
Explosion (BLEVE). These explosions are of great destructive power due to
the high increase in pressure caused by the sudden incorporation of liquid
into the gas phase. Historically, BLEVEs have been produced with some
frequency and have almost caused human casualties. The ignition of
BLEVE produces a mass of gases at high temperature known as ‘fireball’
with significant thermal effects. The fireball grows larger and moves
upward continuously because of buoyancy. The duration of the fireball is
small (< 40 sec), but the radiation levels are very intense. Within the
radius of the fireball there is severe damage to process equipment and
buildings. Beyond this, the danger is mainly for the people that may be
affected by the radiation.

2.2.3 Damage Criteria for Heat Load and Pressure Waves

If a flammable gas or liquid is released, damage occurred by fire
is due to the heat radiation generated and in case of explosion it is due to
the overpressure waves generated.

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2.2.3.1 Heat loads

A flammable liquid in a pool burns with a large turbulent diffusion
flame. This releases heat based on the heat of combustion and the
burning rate of the liquid/gas. A part of the heat is radiated while the rest
is converted away by rising hot air and combustion products. The
radiations can heat the contents of neighboring process units above its
ignition temperature and can trigger secondary fires. The radiations can
also cause severe burns or fatalities of workers or firefighters located at a
certain distance. Thus, it is important to know the damage potential of a
fire likely to be created due to a leakage or catastrophic rupture of a
process equipment or storage tank. This helps in deciding the the location
of other of other process equipments, type of protective clothing needed
for workers/firefighters, the duration of time for which they can be in the
affected zone, fire extinguishing measures needed and also the protection
needed for other equipments. Damage effect on equipment and people
due to thermal radiation intensities is given Table 2.2.

Table 2.2
Damage effects due to various heat loads
Sr. Heat Type of damage intensity
No. loads Damage to equipment Damage to people
(kW/m²)
1 37.5 Damage to process 100% lethality in 1 min.
equipment 1% lethality in 10 sec
2 25.0 Minimum energy required 50% Lethality in 1 min.
to ignite wood Significant injury in 10 sec
3 19.0 Maximum thermal --
radiation intensity allowed
on thermally unprotected
equipment
4 12.5 Minimum energy required 1% lethality in 1 min
to melt plastic tubing
5 4.0 -- First degree burns, causes
pain for exposure longer
than 10 sec
6 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on
long exposures

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2.2.3.2 Overpressure waves

Explosion is accompanied by the generation of overpressure
wave and a loud noise. The rate of energy released due to explosion is
very large and can cause serious injuries to the people and damage to
property. The effect of overpressure can result into deaths to those
working in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. The pressure wave
may be caused by a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) or
Vapor Cloud explosion.

Table 2.3
Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves

Peak over pressure

Type of damage
(bar)
0.3 90% of houses seriously damaged
0.1 10% of houses seriously damaged
0.03 Damage by flying fragments of glass
0.01 Window smashed

2.2.4 Atmospheric conditions used for RA studies

The main atmospheric parameters used for estimating the
downwind extent of hazard zones are atmospheric stability, wind speed,
and wind direction. These parameters are in terms of in terms of:

9 The six Pasquill-Gifford stability classes (A-F);

9 A selected number of wind speed classes, including calms

(typically five);

9 36 or 16 wind direction classes.

Damage distances due to release of hazardous materials depend

on atmospheric stability and wind speed. It is important to visualize the
consequence of the release of hazardous substances and the damage
caused to the surrounding areas. Computation of damage distances are
carried out at various atmospheric stability conditions for various wind
velocities and the result is tabulated. Pasquill-Giffard atmospheric stability
classes with corresponding weather conditions are listed in Table 3.3.

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Table 2.4
Pasquill – Giffard Atmospheric Stability
Sr. Stability
Weather Conditions
No. Class
1. A Very unstable – sunny, light wind
2. A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy
3. B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy
4. B/C Moderately unstable – moderate sunny and moderate
wind
5. C Moderately unstable – very windy / sunny or overcast /
light wind
6. C/D Moderate unstable – moderate sun and high wind
7. D Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast / windy
night
8. E Moderately stable – less overcast and less windy night
9. F Stable – night with moderate clouds and light /
moderate wind
10. G Very stable – possibly fog
In this report Atmospheric conditions used for consequence
analysis are

9 Stability F and wind speed 2 m/s (2D)

9 Stability D and wind speed 3 m/s (3D)
9 Stability D and wind speed 5 m/s (5D)

2.2.5 Modelling Software

In order to perform an effective Risk Assessment study it is
essential that maximum credible accident scenarios are taken account of,
so that potential sources of high risk are not omitted from the overall risk
picture. This means that RA rely on large quantities of accurate data and
the performance of many repetitive calculations and risk summations.
Also, in order for the RA results to be as accurate as possible, well
developed state-of-the-art mathematical models must be used to calculate
the consequences of each scenario and feed into the overall risk
calculations. Hence use of software is essential in RA studies. In this
report consequence analysis is performed by using DNV based software
PHAST 6.51 (Process hazard analysis software Tool). PHAST is a
comprehensive hazard analysis software tool for all stages of design and

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operation. PHAST software has often been used to model design options
for proposed new facilities and for operational changes in existing ones.
PHAST is designed to comply with the regulatory requirements of many
countries. For example, specific modules have been included to ensure
compliance with the Dutch Yellow Book, US EPA and UK HSE regulations.

2.3 Frequency Analysis

The risk presented by a facility is dependent on the frequency at
which an undesired event can be expected to occur and the adverse
consequences which could result from the event. The undesired events
identified using the techniques outlined in the Hazard Identification section
are analyzed to determine their expected frequency. A number of different
techniques are available to estimate the frequency of a given type of
major hazardous event occurring at a specific facility, on a transportation
corridor, or along a pipeline. These vary in complexity and type of
information they yield. Their selection depends on the desired outcome,
amount of time, and effort available.

Some of the techniques available are

9 Historical data analysis/Generic frequency analysis

9 Fault tree analysis,

2.3.1 Historical data analysis/Generic frequency analysis

Use of historical/Standard data in the estimation of hazardous
event frequencies is a suitable approach if the operating experience of the
equipment is sufficient to produce a statistically meaningful database,
historical data can be used. Historical/Generic data can be used in two
different ways

9 To estimate directly the frequency of the hazardous event

of interest (“top event”) identified in the Hazard
Identification step of the risk analysis;

9 To estimate frequency of events or causes that contributes

to the occurrence of the top event. This is generally done
in Fault tree analysis.
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There are common types of equipment that are used in the

various industries (e.g., pumps, valves, pipelines). Industry average
failure frequency rates are available for these pieces of equipment.
However, not all facilities experience failures at the same rate. These
rates can vary considerably depending on site or company conditions.
Therefore, it is best to use site- or company-specific release data if it is
available. However, any given site or company will not generally
experience a significant number of major events to form a statistically
significant database. In this case, it will be necessary to use standard
industry data for overall failure rates as a first approximation. In this
report standard frequency data is used for frequency analysis.

2.3.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

When failure rate data is not available for the undesired event or
the top event, or its accuracy is not judged to be sufficient, it is possible
to estimate the event frequency using analytical methods, specifically
Fault Tree Analysis. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a tool employed in the
analysis of complex systems. It uses a “backward logic” which begins with
an undesired event (e.g., a release of a hazardous material from
containment), analyzes the system to determine the basic cause of the
undesired event, and enables the user to quantify the likelihood of the top
event. This is done through a “top down” tree whose branches identify the
main causes and influencing factors contributing to the top event. The
tree-like or branching investigation of each scenario gives rise to the
name ‘fault trees’. Since the method is deductive, it focuses attention on
the particular event in question, thereby eliminating time spent following
trains of thought which do not lead to hazardous situations. With this
method, all material, personnel, and environmental factors of a complex
system can be systematically presented.

FTA starts with a particular undesired top event, such as a

flammable material release and fire or explosion from a particular system.
It then breaks down the causes of an accident into all the identifiable
contributing sequences, and each sequence is separated into all necessary
components or events. The presentation of all this information is
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facilitated by the use of a logic diagram, or ‘fault tree’. The fault trees are
generally developed only as far as necessary down to a level where failure
or event frequencies are known with a reasonable degree of accuracy
from past experience or historical data. The elemental parts of a fault tree
at the bottom level are known as "basic events". These events are
connected by means of logic gates, if one or more events together are
responsible for causing a failure then AND gates are used and if one or
more events alone are responsible for causing a hazard then OR gates are
used.

2.4 Risk Evaluation

Once the consequences and frequencies of identified hazardous
events are estimated, these are combined to evaluate the risk associated
with the process method. As discussed earlier risk is the function of
consequence of hazards and probability of occurrence. Risk is the measure
of economic loss, human injury or environmental damage in terms of both
the likelihood and the magnitude of the loss, injury or damage.

Risk to people can be expressed in two main forms

9 Individual risk

- The risk associated to an individual person

9 Societal risk

- The risk associated to the whole group of people

exposed to the hazard. It is used to encompass
both public and worker risk

2.4.1 Individual Risk (IR)

Individual Risk is the frequency at which an individual may be
expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of specified
hazards. Individual risk measures are single numbers or a set of risk
estimates for various individuals or geographic locations. In general they
consider the risk to an individual who may be in the effect zone of an
accident. The size of the people in terms of number of people impacted by
a single event, does not affect individual risk.
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Individual risk criteria are intended to show that workers or

members of the public are not exposed to excessive risk. They are
independent of the number of people exposed and hence can be applied to
the broad range of activities. Individual Risk is calculated by identifying all
sources of fatality risk to a given individual, deriving the contribution from
each source and then summing these to give the overall risk. For typical
oil, gas and petrochemical workers the primary sources of risk are
occupational e.g. slips & falls, transport e.g. road traffic accidents,
hydrocarbon related e.g. loss of containment leading to fire & explosions.

Individual risk is the risk that an individual would face from a

facility if they remained fixed at one spot 24 hours a day 365 days per
year, expressed as chances per year. IR is expressed as chances per year
and it is displayed as a 2 dimensional plot over the plot plan of the facility
this is called as iso-risk contour. Common forms of presentation of
individual risk are risk contour plots and risk transects. The risk contour
plot shows individual risk at specific points on the map; it connects points
of equal risk around the facility. Risk transect is a plot of individual risk as
a function of distance from the risk source, this is a simplification of the
risk contour plot

2.4.2 Societal Risk (SR)

Societal Risk is the relationship between the frequency and the
number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given
population from the realization of specified hazards. SR is depicted on a
cumulative graph called an F/N curve. The horizontal axis is the number of
potential fatalities (N). The vertical axis is the frequency per year that N
or more potential fatalities could occur (F). Societal risk measures are
single number measures, tabular sets of numbers, or graphical summaries
which estimate risk to group of people located in the effect zone of an
accident. Account of protection by buildings, people’s response, alarms,
evacuation systems can also be considered.

All fatal accidents are a cause for regret, but society generally
tends to be more concerned about multiple fatalities in a single event.

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While these low frequency high-consequence events might represent very

small risk to an individual, they are unacceptable when a large number of
people are exposed. Two different hazardous situations having equal
individual risk can have different societal risk depending on the number of
people exposed. A common form of presenting tolerable societal risk is on
the FN-curve. When two criteria lines can divide the space into three
regions – where risk is intolerable, where it is broadly acceptable and
where it requires further risk reduction as far as reasonably practicable
(ALARP). FN curve shows the relationship between frequency & size of the
accident.

2.4.3 ALARP & Risk criteria

The ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) technique is one
method used in the establishment of risk criteria. The ALARP is
represented by the three tier system in Fig 2.2.

Fig.2.2: ALARP framework for the risk acceptability criteria

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The ALARP principle is applied to the intermediate region

between the unacceptable and acceptable bounds where further individual
and societal risk reductions are required to achieve a level considered “as
low as reasonably practicable”. Risk associated with most facilities lie in
the middle band of the risk tolerability criteria i.e. in the ALARP region.

The most common framework used for risk criteria divides risks
into three bands

9 An unacceptable region, where risks are intolerable except

in extraordinary circumstances, and risk reduction
measures are essential.

9 An ALARP region, where risk reduction measures are

undesirable, but may not be implemented if their cost is
disproportionate to the benefit achieved.

9 A broadly acceptable region, where no further risk

reduction measures are needed.

Risk evaluation is done by using DNV based SAFETI 6.51

(Software for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and Toxic Impacts)
which is a core tool for process risk studies. This was developed by DNV in
partnership with the Dutch Government in the early 1980s and, since
then, it has been expanded and enhanced to a very high degree. It is now
regarded as by far the most comprehensive quantitative tool for assessing
process plant risks. SAFETI incorporates PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis
Software Tools) for consequence modeling.

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