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 womenburytheirvoterregistrationcardsina cemeteryto protestthereferendum
Algerian onnationalreconciliation, LARBI/REUTERS/LANDOV
September29, 2005. LOUAFI

States in North Africa

of Fragmentation
Paul Silverstain

Nearly50 yearsafterindependence,
Morocco tensionsinthe
andAlgeriacontinueto strugglewithunresolved
Declarations
of thenation-state.
definition of nationalunitybyideologicalfiat,evenwhenenforcedbymilitary
might,havebeeninadequate forethnicandregionalautonomy.
to silencethe questionsraisedbymovements

early o50years after independence, the North African
states of Algeria and Morocco face challenges to their
N national unity and territorial integrity. In Algeria, a
contentious referendumon a "Peaceand National Reconcili-
ation" charter proposed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
passed on September 29, 2005, in spite of opposition calls
for a boycott. The charter,which will grant members of the
Paul Silverstein is an associateprofessorofanthropologyat Reed Collegeand vice chair
of the editorial committeeof Middle East Report.
military and Islamist militias immunity from prosecution
for all but the most heinous crimes committed during the
country's I3-year civil war, was vigorously criticized by lo-
cal and global human rights organizations for sidestepping
victims' rights in the name of regime consolidation and
military impunity. Meanwhile, Morocco, also in the final
stages of "turning the page" on its "years of lead"-the
period of human rights abuse in the name of state security
under the deceased King Hassan II-has found itself the

26 EASTREPORT
MIDDLE 237 WINTER
2005
object of international scrutiny for its strong-arm handling
ofsub-SaharanAfrican trans-migrantsattempting desperate
crossings into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in
October. Reports of brutality by Moroccan security forces
(at least 14 migrants lost their lives in the attempted cross-
ings) and mass deportations from refugee centers belie overt
state attempts over the last six years to present Morocco as
a modern democratic state that guarantees human rights
writ large.
In both the Moroccan and Algerian cases, the authorities
face ethnic, racial and religious fragmentation from within
and political-demographicpressuresfrom without. These in-
ternal and external challenges are directly linked. Morocco's
increasingly close trade and diplomatic relations with the
European Union and the United States are premised on its
ability to control its bordersand prosecutejihadi groupswith
supposed links to the bombings in Madrid and London and
the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, all
the while proving itself more respectfulof human rights and
democracy. To accomplish this paradoxical task, the state
has sought an ally in the secularist Berber opposition that
has consistently looked down upon black populations-in
spite of much talk of "Africanity."The Algerian state has
struck similar alliances with Marxist and Berberist move-
ments against the Islamist opposition in its own war on ter-
ror, although this strategy has proven increasingly difficult
in light of calls for autonomy in the Berberophoneregion of
Kabyliain the wake of the regional uprising ofApril 20zoo0.A
fracturedethnic, racialand religious landscape thus persists
as the ground on which the contemporary North African
politics of violence takes place.
BerbersandArabs
To speak of fragmentation in Morocco and Algeria is to ref-
erence a set of unresolved tensions in the definition of the
nation-state following independence, achieved by Morocco
in 1956 and Algeria in I962. The nationalist movements in
Algeria and Morocco, which were subsumed by the 1950os
under the leadershipof the National LiberationFront (FLN)
and Istiqlal parties, respectively,forged national ideologies
that insisted on Islam and Arabic as the unifying features
of North Africa. Claims that Berbernesswas a foundational
identity for nationhood were countered by historical nar-
ratives that insisted on the prior and voluntary fusion of
Arabs and Berbers under the mantle of Islam.' Although
self-described Berber leaders were central to the national
revolutions, and Berberophone regions were made to pay
a heavy price by the French colonial army for their sup-
port of the fighters, these people and places were largely
marginalized (sometimes violently) from the nationalist
movements which eventually looked to the Arabophone
centers of Algiers, Oran and Fez for the direction of the
nascent states.2
MIDDLE
EAST
REPORT
237* WINTER
2005
Upon assuming power, the ruling parties made it official:
in the Moroccan constitution and the Algerian national
charter,Islam and Arabic were named the national religion
and language.The Algerian document decried Berberclaims
to cultural difference as "feudalsurvivals"and "obstaclesto
national integration." Such national unity through ideo-
logical fiat was in and of itself insufficient, however. The
repeated use of military might was required to suppress a
variety of movements for regional autonomy and ethnic
self-determination that arose in the immediate aftermathof
independence. In Algeria, the Kabyle revolutionary leader
Hocine Ait Ahmed led a ten-month insurrection begin-
ning in September 1963 against the "ethnic fascism"of the
single-party FLN government. Violently suppressed by the
Algerian national army,Ait Ahmed's Socialist Forces Front
(FFS) remained active as an oppositional force in European
exile until it was legalized as a political party after the 1989
liberalization. In the interim, the army remained ever vigi-
lant of Kabyle regionalism, intervening with force during
the student unrest and labor strikes of March-April1980
(the "BerberSpring")and October 1988.
In Morocco, the earlyyearsafterindependencewitnesseda
similar use of state violence to ensure national unity, particu-
larly in the peripheral Berberophoneregions that had been
historically characterizedas constituting (and continued to
self-identify as) a "landof dissidence"(bilad al-siba) against
the authority of the central state (al-makhzen).In I957, the
armyof Crown PrinceMoulayHassanwas forcedto intervene
in the southeasternTafilaletprovincewhen the local governor,
Addi ou Bihi, refusedto accept the Rabat-basedMinistry of
Interior'snomination of provincialgaids,jailedlocal members
of the Istiqlalparty and took direct control over the towns of
Midelt and Rich. In December of the following year,a num-
ber of Berbertribes in the northern Rif mountains fought a
three-month rebellion against central state rule. The revolt
followed the government'sarrestof leadersof the rural-based
Mouvement Populaire political movement, and the insur-
gents demanded neutral (non-Istiqlal) local administrators
as well as more state investment in the region. The eventual
repressionby Moulay Hassan'sforceswas brutal,with artillery
fire and aerialbombardmentsof the dissident regions result-
ing in severecasualties,and the near decimation of the Beni
Ouriaghel tribe.3In 1972-1973, in conjunction with the at-
tempted assassinationof King Hassan II by armyforcesloyal
to GeneralMohammed Oufkir, Berbergroups in the Middle
Atlas, High Atlas and pre-Saharansoutheast amassed arms
and attempted a revolutionarysecession. Likewise severely
repressed,hundreds of the participantswere jailed, and over
20zo were sentenced to death and subsequently shot.4
In spite of the failure of these particularmovements, the
memory of these threats to the territorial integrity of the
state continues to haunt the Algerianand Moroccan regimes.
In response, increasinglypowerful Interior Ministries have
pursued the centralization of political authority, the sur-
27
veillance of dissent, the ongoing economic marginalization
of Berberophone regions in favor of more loyal areas, and
explicit processes of cultural assimilation through the Ara-
bization of the media and the school system. Until the late
The Algerian national charter
decried Berber claims to cultural
difference as "feudal survivals"
and "obstacles to national inte-
gration."
1980s, advocatesof Berberculture were consistently accused
of colonial toadyism and sectarianismby the national media,
and were on occasion arrestedfor sedition, if not forced into
exile. Indeed, nationalistideologuesdismissedthe very notion
of Berberethnic particularityas a colonial invention.
In spite of these efforts, a Berbercultural renaissancehas
transpiredsince the late 196os, with activistsoperating origi-
nally in the diaspora(primarilyin France)and increasinglyin
North Africa proper to make Berbernessan object of politi-
cal struggle,createa standardizedlanguage (Tamazight),and
disseminatenotions of a pan-Berberidentity throughcultural
associations,newspapersand political song. In Algeria,these
activities were directed by the Berber Cultural Movement
formedin the wake of the 1980 BerberSpring,and laterby the
rival,Kabylia-basedFFSand Rallyfor Cultureand Democracy
(RCD), partieslegalizedafterI989. By the mid-199os,the state
had largelyacceded to the demands, agreeingto incorporate
Tamazight into the national media and the school system,
establishinga High Commission on Amazighit6(Berberness)
and recognizingTamazightas "one of the foundations of na-
tional identity"in the November 1996 constitutionalreform.5
The RCD even joined coalition governmentsin the late I990s
under the elected presidentsLiamine Zdroualand Bouteflika,
both of whom were primarilybacked by the military.
These gains on the cultural front have not, however,
translated into the institutional self-determination that
many Kabyles have demanded-at times, violently. Dur-
ing the civil war that began in 1992 but reached its nadir
in the late I990s, Kabylia was a battleground where asser-
tions of de facto autonomy were countered by measures to
centralize government control. In general, while the civil
war destabilized local authority in much of the country, the
violence allowed the military to reassertits absolute control
of the Algerian state, canceling much of the electoral pro-
cesses and democratic openings achieved in the late I980s.6
Among other efforts, the state sought to expand its power
locally through the formation of civilian "patriot"militias-
28
officially "Self-Defense Groups"-intended to fight a proxy
war against Islamist forces. Whatever the effectiveness of
these organizations, with many coming to serve essentially
as private armies for local mayors, their presence in Kabylia
ironically provided certain villages an aura of control over
their borders and internal affairs.
Nonetheless, this sense of self-determination proved to
be superficial and ultimately fragile. The assassination of
political singer LounitsMatoub in June 1998 at the hands of
unknown assailants, and the killing of teenager Massinissa
Guermah in April zool by military gendarmes, underlined
for many Kabyles the extant conditions of hogra, an ex-
pression referring to socio-economic marginalization and
inequality, a lack of transparent justice and treatment as
"second-class citizens" (citoyensde secondezone). Accusing
the Algerian government of ultimate responsibility for the
two deaths, young Kabyle men took to the streets of the
provincial capitals ofTizi Ouzou and Bejaia, as well as other
towns throughout the region, chanting "Government, As-
sassin"(Pouvoir,Assassin),attackinglocal government offices
and confronting government security forces.While the 1998
demonstrations died down aftera week with minimal casual-
ties, the 200ooI"BlackSpring"proved much more deadly,with
at least 60 young men killed and over 300 injured by state
troops, and aftershocks continuing throughout the year.7
The violence in Kabylia provoked a number of politi-
cal ramifications that have furthered the effective regional
and ethnic fragmentation of the country. In the first place,
the FFS-RCD impasse that had hamstrung Kabyle poli-
tics was broken down, with the RCD breaking from its
coalition with Bouteflika's ruling party, and both parties
participating in joint efforts to promote a peaceful settle-
ment. Moreover, these parties were transcended by a new
political actor, the Coordination of'Aarouch, Dairas and
Communes (CADC), which united a series of non-govern-
mental, village-based decision-making bodies into a single
negotiating partner with the state. If the RCD and FFS
had been discredited in the eyes of the general populace
due to their inability to achieve a minimum of security,
social welfare and economic expansion in Kabylia-and
indeed local offices of the two parties were directly at-
tacked in the two sets of demonstrations-the CADC
managed to mobilize 500,000 people in a "black march"
in Tizi Ouzou on May zI, 200ooIthat marked the end of
the major violence. Alongside the CADC, several other
new regional actors emerged: a nebulous Armed Berber
Movement (MAB) and a France-based Movement for the
Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK). If the MAB-which vowed,
in the wake of Matoub's assassination, to rid Kabylia of
Islamists by any means necessary-provided the state
with an excuse to maintain an armed presence in the re-
gion (and thus has been cited by conspiracy theorists as a
government Trojan horse), the MAK has proved to be an
enduring voice in the present conflict.
MIDDLE
EAST 237* WINTER
REPORT 2005
Awoman
whosesonswerekilledduring
thecivilwarstandsinhergardenontheoutskirts
Disavowing the violence of the MAB, the MAK nonethe-
less advocatesthe creation of autonomous local government
bodies and security forces that would replace the Algiers-
directed communal assembliesand gendarmerie.While the
MAK recognizesthe rights of the national (and, to its mind,
future federal) state to maintain an army, regulate inter-re-
gional commerceand providea single currency,it nonetheless
proposesa separateKabyleflag that would be hung alongside
the Algerian one. In fact, throughout its Proposition for a
Project of Autonomy for Kabylia, it consistently presents
Kabyliaand Algeriaas parallelentities: "Kabyliawill be more
open to Algerians, and Algeria to Kabyles."8
Given the pressuresfor regionalautonomy and the ethnic
dimensions of the violence, Bouteflika'srecent Charter for
Peace and National Reconciliation should be read as more
than simply an attempt to encouragethe remaining1,000 or
so Islamist fighters to give up their arms and thus mark the
end of a civil war that has been substantiallyover since 1999.
In the firstplace, Algeriaremainsan importantpartnerto the
US in its global "waron terror,"so any indemnificationof Is-
lamistmilitiamembersis necessarilybalancedby the increasing
surveillanceand "uprooting"of groupslike the SalafistGroup
for Prayerand Combat (GSPC) with declaredties to al-Qaeda.
As well, the enduring challenge to state national rule is the
low-intensitywarfarebetweenmilitarygendarmesand Kabyle
civilians,markedby the widespreaddemandsfor the removal
of the gendarmesfrom Kabylia.In this respect,the charteron
MIDDLE
EASTREPORT
237* WINTER
2005
ofAlgiers, 27,2005.
September ZOHRA
BENSEMRA/REUTERS/LANDOV
"nationalreconciliation"signals an attempt by the regime to
reinforcethe "nation"as the super-ordinatevector of political
practiceand citizen loyalty,and to legitimate its leadershipof
saidnationthrougha popularvote of approval.The importance
of such symbolicsupportis paramount,not only so that the re-
gime can promoteits policies acrossthe countryin the wakeof
the hotly contested 200oo4presidentialelection, but also so that
it can proveto an internationalaudienceits respectfor human
rights.Such stakesarenot lost on Kabylepolitical movements
and parties, which have roundly condemned the charterfor
being simply a means for the regime to "auto-amnesty"and
to continue to pursue violent means with near impunity. As
FerhatMehenni of the MAK insisted at a July 25, 200oo5press
conference, Kabyleswill not so easily forget their fallen com-
rades,whetherthose killed duringthe I963 uprising,the Black
Spring, or during any point in between.
RacialPolitics
Relatively speaking, Morocco has experienced a calm transi-
tion from authoritarian rule to a regime of moderate trans-
parency,with no protractedcivil war or ethnic violence such
as afflicted Algeria. Yet it too has been pursuing a process
of national reconciliation designed to re-suture a nation
ideologically and regionallyfragmentedby the state violence
that persisted through the 1970s. While Berberassociations
have been an active element of urban civil society since the
29
Amigrant
in theforestwherehe andothershidewaitingfor the rightmoment
to try to climboverthe borderfencebetweenMorocco
of Melilla.
mid-1980s,they were subjectto heavystate surveillance,with
six members of the southeastern association Tilelli arrested
as late as 1994 for displaying signs written in Tamazight
during a May Day paradein Errachidia.Responding to the
internationaloutcry protestingthese arrests,the government
promised a series of reforms that have subsequently led to
the 200oo1establishment of a Royal Institute of Amazigh
Culture (IRCAM) and the introduction of Tamazight into
the media and primary school classrooms.'9
To a large extent, the opening of a dialogue between
the state and the secularist Amazigh movement, while a
sea change from even a decade before, has been part of a
longer monarchical politics of cooptation. This cooptation
has proven especially urgent in light of two contemporary
factors:first, the very realchallengesto state rule in the form
of Islamist movements and jihadi groups, whose emerging
presence in Morocco was made dramaticallyclear with the
May 2003 bombings in Casablanca; second, the success
of Berber associations (like the Rabat-basedTamaynut) in
redefining Berberness as a cultural right and in mobiliz-
ing UNESCO, various EU commissions and international
NGOs in support of such a claim. In this respect, IRCAM
should be understood as part and parcel of both the
30
andthe Spanish
enclave
MARCODI LAURO/GETTY
IMAGES
Moroccan state's efforts to "turnthe page" on the past and
its larger "waron terror."
Moroccan Berbergroups are understandablywary of this
politics of cooptation. While many association members
joined IRCAM as researchersor members of its advisory
board, many others have remained on the periphery and
have been vocally critical of its actions. The latter accuse
the Moroccan state of trying to "folklorize"Berberculture,
viewing IRCAM'sdecision to adopt the Tifinagh script over
the Latin one, and to standardizethree regional dialects in-
stead of a single Tamazight, as clear attempts to cut off the
Moroccan Berbercommunity from those in Algeria and the
diaspora. Moreover, they argue that the exclusive focus on
language and culture has sidelined more important issues
over the control of local land and resources.As earlyas 1996,
Tamaynut had advocated for Berber regional autonomy as
defined by the self-determination of economic, social and
cultural affairs.'0Such issues remain squarelyon the agenda
for those taking part in the amorphousAmazigh Movement
(who have explicitly dropped the term "Culture"from their
self-appellation), a group based in Rabat but made up of
Berberophonesfrom the southern and southeasternregions,
most of whom had been members of Tamaynut before it
MIDDLE
EASTREPORT
237 WINTER
2005
joined IRCAM. These activists keep in close contact with
Kabylemilitants over the Internet, host the latterwhen they
visit Morocco and plot their own visions of Berberautonomy
through the discourse of the MAK and other such groups.
More than simply an agenda item, Berber regional au-
tonomy in Morocco has been an object of recent conflicts
that have pitted local activists against state officialsand their
legal resourcesacross a geographic spread that recapitulates
the earlierstruggles of the late 1950s and early 1970S,if at a
lower scale of intensity. Since the establishment of IRCAM,
many Berberculturalassociationsfrom the High Atlas moun-
tains, the southern Sous valley and the pre-Saharansouth-
east have recenteredtheir activities around socio-economic
development, environmental protection and community
education-treating these arenas as equivalently subject to
a universaldiscourse of human rights. In recent years, these
groups have been involved in protests against state efforts to
expropriatetribal lands for municipal, national or even pri-
vate use. In February-March2004, the AverrobsFoundation
for Education and Development based in the pre-Saharan
town of Goulmima launched a sustained protest against the
provincial governor'sattempt to procure the cession of five
hectares of collective land to a non-local private investor in
compensation for the latter'sloss of business following the
construction of a new bridge acrossthe riverbed. Five mem-
bers of the association were interrogated by the municipal
police and threatened with arrestand criminal prosecution
beforethe associationwas able to call on connections in Rabat
to pressurethe governor to drop the case. A smaller conflict
erupted during the same period in neighboringTinjdad over
the state electric company's attempts to secure local land
for the building of an electrical relay station, with similar
threatsof prosecution narrowlyaverted. Members of the As-
sociation for Integration and Durable Development of the
High Atlas region of the Tasemmit massif were not so lucky
when they attempted to block the state'sestablishment of a
nature preserve for wild mouflon sheep that would cut off
village inhabitants from their grazing lands and easy access
to local market and educational centers. Threewomen from
the areawere sentenced to two months in prison for having
cut a hole in the reserve'sboundary fence to gain access to a
water source, and the president of the association was corre-
spondingly put on trial for his role in "inciting racialhatred,
tribalism,inciting destructionof public property,threatening
the public order."11
If state accusationsof "racialhatred"and "tribalism"were
clearlyexaggerated,in all threecases,the conflict was between
state efforts at national development and the attempts of lo-
cal groups to control resourcesthat they identified in Berber
tribal terms. In other words, the struggle is not merely tak-
ing place within the framework of ethnicity-between an
Arabized state apparatus and a Berberophone "indigenous
people" seeking regional autonomy-but also on a racial-
ized terrain of contestation over the definition and control
MIDDLE
EAST 237* WINTER
REPORT 2005
of the "local."Berberactivists'claims to indigeneity in given
localities are premised on a timeline that begins with the
arrival of French colonizers. While Berberophones clearly
antedatedArabophonesin Morocco, they belonged generally
State conflict with Berbers in Mo-
rocco has recentered on control of
resources.
to transhumanttribalconfederationsthat battled each other
for pastoral grazing rights and the ability to control local
agriculture.What made this livelihood possible, particularly
in the pre-Saharanregions, was the existence of an agrarian
class of black sharecroppers,the Berber-speakingHaratine,
who tilled the oasis fields as dependent clients of the Berber
tribes,enjoying neither legal rightsnor the ability to own and
inherit land. The arrivalof the French and the "pacification"
of the biladal-siba fixed the tribes and landholding relations
in their place, with the Frenchrecognizingthe Berbers'tribal
land claims.
The independent Moroccan state inherited this colonial
legal architecture recognizing tribal claims, but simultane-
ously granted the Haratine citizenship, thus freeing them
from their legal dependence on the Berber tribes and en-
abling the possibility of mobility and private land owner-
ship. No longer able to benefit from an enforced Haratine
labor regime, and subject to practicesof partibleinheritance
whereby land was equally divided between the sons of the
deceased, Berberresidentsof the pre-Saharanperipheryhad
to seek additional means of livelihood, either through the
establishment of small businesses, or through the upward
social mobility enabled by the national educational system.
In the 1960s and 197Os,young Berber men from the areas
around Goulmima and Tinjdad achieved disproportion-
ate success on national exams, moving into high positions
within the state apparatus and the army as engineers and
high-level functionaries. However, this success primarily re-
sulted in the further fragmentation of local notable families,
with migrated men setting up households in Casablancaor
Rabat and keeping their distance from local affairs.
Haratine (or Iqbliyen, as former Haratine refer to them-
selves) mobility, in contrast, remained directly tied to local
concerns. Lacking similar access to the state apparatusdue
to embedded racismand a relativedistance from educational
facilities, the Iqbliyen pursuedmigrant construction and fac-
torywork in the northernMoroccancities and in Europe.Not
only did they remit a large percentageof their income, they
also for the most part returned to their oasis communities,
transformingtheir economic capital into local social capital
31
in the form of land acquisition and the purchase of politi-
cal influence. In this respect, both privateland and political
power began to pass from diminishing Berberhouseholds to
demographicallyexpanding Iqbliyen families, with Iqbliyen
demanding and gaining representation on informal com-
The continued silence of Berber
activists on Western Sahara
why the government negotiates
with them over cultural and
guistic rights.
munity councils and displacing Berbersas elected heads of
municipal boards and assemblies.12
This shift in the racializedpolitical economy-what Hsain
Ilahiane calls the "retribalizationof the village space"13-of
southern and southeasternMorocco has only deepened the
divide between Berber and Iqbliyen Moroccan citizens. In
general,Iqbliyen, while Berber-speakersthemselvesand full
participantsin much of the ritual life that the Amazigh cul-
tural movement highlights as markersof Berberculture, are
suspicious of Berber associations and land-claim struggles
as mere props for a tribalistpolitics for local resourcedomi-
nance. Iqbliyen feel excluded from the social and economic
promotion that claims to Berberculturalrightshave enabled,
whether for membersof IRCAM or for the varietyof associa-
tion leaders,journalistsand other engaged intellectuals now
living and working in Rabat and abroadwho have profited
from the marketingof Berbercultureto the governmentand
diasporic consumers. In the meantime, the Iqbliyen'slack
of active engagement in Berberpolitics has fostered further
resentment from the majority of Berber activists from the
region,who regardthem as self-hatingBerber-speakers, if not
direct supportersof the makhzen.This resentmentfeeds into
a larger racism that draws on an older form of ideological
justificationfor Haratinedisenfranchisement,that blacksare
without honor or asl (pastoralancestry),merely"flies"(izzen)
who reproducetoo much. Such racismpersistsamong many
Berber members of cultural and human rights associations,
in spite of their avowal of universalistprinciples and detail-
ing of "Africanity"as an element of Berber and Moroccan
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32
identity.Occasionally,this racializedideologicaltension plays
out violently, as occurredon the campus of the Universityof
Errachidiain December 200oo3, when Iqbliyen members of a
Marxist student group and Berberstudents in the Amazigh
CulturalMovement physicallyfought overwhether or not to
supportan examboycott in supportof the Palestinianintifada,
resulting in severalhospitalizationsand one near fatality.
The Berber-Iqbliyendivide is matched by a lack of solidar-
ity between the Amazighmovement and the fight for Sahrawi
self-determinationin the disputedWesternSahara.To a great
is extent, the wide participationof southern Berbersin the 1975
GreenMarch-in which HassanII mobilized 350,000 Moroc-
can citizensin an auto-da-feoccupationof landsleft behind by
lin- the departing Spanish colonial regime-relegitimated them
as loyal citizens in the eyes of the monarchy.Many of them
have remained in the Sahara,benefiting from government
living and educational subsidies. The continued silence of
Berber activists on the Saharaquestion remains the condi-
tion of possibility for their ongoing negotiations with the
government for cultural and linguistic rights. Such silence,
combined with persistent racism, marks a black-Berberra-
cial divide that parallelsand occasionallyreinforcesongoing
Arab-Berberethnic fragmentation.
Borders
andNations
It is literallyupon this fragmentedethnic and raciallandscape
that the currentcrisisoverAfricantrans-migrationtakesplace.
On the one hand, the unresolvedSaharaquestion, in conjunc-
tion with relaxedvisa requirementsfor sub-SaharanAfricans,
createsa porous southernborderzone under the paralleland
competing administrationsof the Moroccan state, the Sah-
rawi POLISARIO Front and the UN peacekeeping opera-
tion, all allowingsouthernmigrantsrelativelyeasyentranceto
Morocco. As migrant remittancesand smuggling contribute
substantiallyto the Moroccan economy, the Moroccan state
appearsunwillingto devote greatresourcesto dismantlingthe
migrationcircuit in toto,thus keeping Morocco a prominent
transit point on the African migration route. On the other
hand, a heavily reinforcednorthern border (particularlyinto
Melilla and Ceuta), made all the more impermeableby new
EU imperativesto restrictundocumented migration and pa-
trol againstthe movement of suspectedterrorists,trapstrans-
migrantsin Morocco.
Within this ambivalentcontext,sub-Saharantrans-migrants
aresociallyand politicallyinvisible,falling underthe purview
of neithercitizen rightsnor refugeeprotection,neitherbenefit-
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2005
ing from the tacit support of corruptborderofficialsnor sub- state as marked by the control of the internal and ex-
jected to intense police surveillanceas in Europe.Numbering ternal borders of the nation. U

as many as 30,000 and ignored by all but a few international Endnotes

NGOs, they inhabit Morocco in a state of permanenttransit,
camped in the forests of the Rif mountains, or occupying 1 James McDougall, "Myth and Counter-Myth:'The Berber'as National Signifierin
makeshiftholding centerson the fringesofOujda in the north Algerian Historiographies,"RadicalHistoryReview86 (2004). I use the term "Berber"to
referenceBerber-speakers in North Africaand the diaspora.Berberactivists,particularly
and Guelmine in the south, with no formal institutions or in Morocco, deploy the term "Amazigh."In Algeria, the ethno-linguistic appellation,
"Berber,"strongly overlapswith the regional designation, "Kabyle,"as Kabylia is the
advocacy groups of their own. While internationalhuman center home to the majorityof Algeria'sBerber-speakers
of Berberactivism.
and has historicallybeen the strongest

rightsgroupshave decriedthe living conditions as deplorable 2 Although Algiers and Fez in fact have large populations of Berber-speakers,Arabic
and accused the Moroccan police of brutality in the recent remainsthe dominant language,monopolizing the public sphere.
3 John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful (New York: Columbia University Press,
killings and roundups, domestic human rights and cultural 1970), pp. 239-243;SusanSlyomovics,"Self-Determinationas Self-Definition:The Case
associations-manned primarilyby urbanand/or Berberintel- of(Lanham,
Morocco," in Hurst Hannum and Eileen Babbitt, eds. Negotiating Self-Determination
MD: LexingtonBooks, forthcoming),p. I45.
lectuals-have remained,for the most part, silent. In the end, 4 See the compelling account of the revolt by the son of one of its leaders, Mohamed
Bennouna. Mehdi Bennouna, Hlros sans gloire: Echec d'une rivolution, 1963-1973
and in spite of promisesof protectionfrom the monarchwho (Casablanca: Tarik Editions, 2002).
sets himself above racialand ethnic divisions as "commander 5 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Contested Identities: Berbers, 'Berberism' and the State in
of the faithful,"these blacktrans-migrantsremainpermanent North Africa,"Journalof NorthAfricanStudies6/3 (2001), pp. 39-40.
6 See Luis Martinez, TheAlgerian Civil War, I99ppo-I99pp8(New York: Columbia University
outsidersto the Moroccannation,whoseveryforeclosurefrom Press, 2000) for an analysis of the role of violence in underwriting state authority. See also
Paul Silverstein, "Regimes of (Un)Truth: Conspiracy Theory and the Transnationalization
political visibility or human rights protections makes future of the Algerian Civil War," Middle East Report 214 (Winter 2ooo).
national reconciliationpossible. 7 Paul Silverstein, "Martyrs and Patriots: Ethnic, National and Transnational Dimensions
of KabylePolitics,"Journalof NorthAfricanStudies8 (Spring200oo3),pp. 101-107.
In this respect, state-directed movements for national 8 The text is available online at: http://www.makabylie.info/article.php3?id_article=147.
reconciliation in North Africa index a de facto state of 9 See Paul Silverstein and David Crawford, "Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State,"
ethnic fragmentation and low-intensity racial conflict Middle East Report 233 (Winter 200o4).
10 Slyomovics,"Self-Determinationas Self-Definition,"p. 149.
that defines the boundaries of national membership and 11 Details are available online at: http://asidd.teamfr.com/.
loyalty. In both movements for regional autonomy in Al- 12 Hsain Ilahiane, Ethnicities, Community Making and Agrarian Change: The Political
Ecologyofa MoroccanOasis (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 200oo4), pp.
geria and the conflict over trans-migration in Morocco, 172-196.
what remains at issue is the territorial integrity of the 13 Ibid., p. '95.

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