COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE (POLSCI)

Submitted by:

Capulong Vincent Paulo I

4BLM

Submitted to:

Atty. Alden Luna

Professor in POLSCI

Date of Submission: April 23, 2019

AGLIPAY VS. CRUZ

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of

postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic

Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of

the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente

Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the

protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United

Statesthe designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part

thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not

a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith ton active power that binds and elevates

man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its

influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their

Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody

their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to

themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,”

they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who

guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as

elsewhere. Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the

discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the
Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the

violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or

support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any

sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for

the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that

church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international

importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead

of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of

Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-

7, 1937.” The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs

ENGEL VS. VITALE

Facts: A New York State law required public schools to open each day with the Pledge of

Allegiance and a nondenominational prayer in which the students recognized their dependence

upon God. The law allowed students to absent themselves from this activity if they found it

objectionable. A parent sued on behalf of his child, arguing that the law violated the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue: Whether school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public schools violates the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Ruling: Yes, the majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer violates the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority stated that the provision allowing

students to absent themselves from this activity did not make the law constitutional because the
purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent government interference with religion. The

majority noted that religion is very important to a vast majority of the American people. Since

Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the government to endorse

any particular belief system. The majority noted that wars, persecutions, and other destructive

measures often arose in the past when the government involved itself in religious affairs.

Concurrence: In his concurrence, Justice Douglas took an even broader view of the

Establishment Clause, arguing that any type of public promotion of religion, including giving

financial aid to religious schools, violates the Establishment Clause.

Dissent: Justice Stewart argued in his dissent that the Establishment Clause was only meant to

prohibit the establishment of a state-sponsored church, such as the Church of England, and not

prohibit all types of government involvement with religion. In particular, he found that the

nondenominational nature of the prayer and the "absentee" provision removed constitutional

challenges.

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a

man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s

husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,

respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the

Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a

couple to legalize their union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free

exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put

it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be

merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at

bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against

respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced

prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept

in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room

for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could

allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state

has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to

achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an

exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

Facts: For Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 8042, does not magnify the contributions of OFWs to national development, but exacerbates the
hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary

either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract “or for three months for every year of the unexpired

term, whichever is less” (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs’ constitutional

rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.

Issue: Does the 5th paragraph of Section 10, RA 8042 violate the non-impairment of contract clause of the

Constitution?

Held: NO. The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective

operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their

provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10,

Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or

contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the

employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042,

particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed

their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No.

8042.

CHAVEZ VS GONZALES

Facts: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the

conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005,

Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played

before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man.
Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second

compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June

2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause

for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June

2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas

(KBP), to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to

press freedom

Issue: WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior

restraint on freedom of expression

Held: When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of

expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and

danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint Expression not subject to prior

restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected

expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely

protected from censorship Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or

idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed

at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action

restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the

Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful

misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based The

public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing

categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a

COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections. The content of the Garci

Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a

protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral

process is one of the highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever

there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which

recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this

ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of

a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected

expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject

matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of

the State. The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on

the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that

includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four

recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any

of these categories of unprotected expression.

ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to

impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line

which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said

law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal

prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness”

of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the

petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial

challenge.

Held: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s

contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be

plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since

ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that

specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot

be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity.

Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute

precision or mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by

means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict

scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because

of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take

chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount

successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are

analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the

established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on

the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its

application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.

It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’ decision to

include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder

law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

Issues: 1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are

subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended

information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the

offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination”

and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the

petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him

the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental

right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of

the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common

intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is

repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially

the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in

carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of

possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected

speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and

perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal

law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore

violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be

necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to

amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of

overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the

presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by

proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life

to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of

every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged—the element of the offense.

Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that “pattern” is a

“very important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of

evidence and a substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder
 We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and

understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a

rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4

does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a

remedy.

What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude

exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of

Congress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are

mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended

information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges

guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens

rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada

made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733

Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not

prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond

reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far

as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the

requisite mens rea must be shown.

 The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions

under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of

responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in

the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion

perpetua to death.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,

either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to

completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.

There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal

acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling

to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in

se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not

matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are

mainly mala in se.

MTRCB VS ABS-CBN

Facts: On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of

the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female

students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program,

student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s

University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at
Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The showing of "The Inside Story"

caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the

PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Acting on the letter-

complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee,

alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and (2)

exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and

Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations respondents explained

that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing

of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly,

petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.

Issue: WON the “inside story” is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the

press

Held: Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the constitutional provision on

freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the

Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did

not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason,

there is no justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to respondents, is protected by

the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status. The

only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No.

1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments

and agencies, and (2) newsreels.

GMA VS BUSTOS

Facts: A libel complaint was filed against GMA NETWORK, INC and newscaster, Rey Vidal. The issue started

from the Petition for Mandamus filed by the unsuccessful examinees of the physician’s licensure examinations

before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the

test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test

questions vitiated the results of the examinations.

As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts,

among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy

of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for the ten o'clock evening news edition of GMA's

Channel 7 Headline News, quoting thereof the allegations of the unsuccessful examiners that the gross, massive,

haphazard, whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped

once and for all. Simultaneous with the news, was an old video footage showing physicians wearing black

armbands.

Along these lines, respondents claimed that the said report was false, malicious and one-sided. Vidal and

GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual

presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7. They added that, the showing of the unrelated old footage was

done purposely so as to make a forceful impact on their audience making it appear that other doctors were

supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees.

In defense of the alleged libel, GMA Network argued that the same was but a privileged communication.

Issue: 1. Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged communication

2. Whether the said narration of the news reporter and the use of video footage were libelous

Held: 1. Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition for

Mandamus filed by the medical examinees making the same fall within the protected ambit of privileged
communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for damages claimed by respondents for simply bringing to

fore information on subjects of public concern. Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely

privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged

communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to

the action. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability

for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The

second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the

prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private communications"

and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article

354 of the Revised Penal Code.

However, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege

communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the

privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest. The news telecast in question clearly falls

under the second kind of privileged matter.

2. No, the statement in the news report falls within the ambit of privileged communication. For, although

every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered

privileged. Furthermore, neither the insertion of the file video constitute malice on the part of the petitioners.

Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying character-generated words "file video" appeared to have been

superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of tele viewers of the idea that a particular footage is

current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent

misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the observation that "the use of

file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice." the absence of the accompanying character-generated

words "file video" would not nevertheless, change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-
video publication complained of is concerned. In view of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in

disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing

derogatory in nature.

Sanidad Vs COMELEC

Facts: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a

national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary

purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are to be

asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to

continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in

October 16. Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin

the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without

force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the

power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to

the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of

Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the

incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a

referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

 The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the

plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-

.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those

citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political

in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the

transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-

plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

Issue: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).

Held: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of

political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is

because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution

resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to

propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course

has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly,

the president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a

Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a

contestable issue
BORJAL VS CA

Facts: During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the

House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference

on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and

government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More

importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land

transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was

estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as

government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. 2 On 28

February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected

Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of

the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on

different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of

a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the

conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates

they were published.

Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel

Held: A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely

privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An

example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability

for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged

communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without

any comments or remarks to reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute

a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every

discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is

judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation

is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such

discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a

comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then

it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts

there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. A reading of the imputations of

petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official

conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his

position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order to generate

interest in the conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of the conference

demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters about which the public has the

right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference itself. Generally, malice can be

presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of

malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must

bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct
BINAY VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Facts: In the April 15-21, 2001 issue of Pinoy Times Special Edition, an article entitled "ALYAS

ERAP JR." was published regarding the alleged extravagant lifestyle of the Binays and the assets

that they acquired while in public office. Paragraph 25 of the article reads: Si Joanne Marie

Bianca, 13 ang sinasabing ampong anak ng mga Binay, ay bumibili

ng panty na nagkakahalaga ng P1,000 ang isa, ayon sa isang writer ni Binay. Magarboang

pamumuhay ng batang ito dahil naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama. Based on this article, Elenita

S. Binay, mother of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca, filed a complaint for libel against private

respondents Vicente G. Tirol as publisher, and Genivi V. Factao as writer of the article, with the

Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati. Petitioner claims that the article is defamatory as it tends

to, if not actually, injure Joanna’s reputation and diminish the esteem, respect, and goodwill that

others have of her. Petitioner alleges that there is no good intention or justifiable motive in

publishing Joanna’s status as an adopted child which is essentially a private concern and the

purchase of an expensive intimate apparel, but to ridicule and to induce readers to lower their

perception of Joanna. On the other hand, private respondents allege that they did not harp on

Joanna’s status as an adopted child as the same was mentioned only once in the article; that they

did not intend to injure her reputation or diminish her self-esteem; that they referred to the price

of the underwear not for the purpose of maligning her or to make her look frivolous in the

public’s eyes, but to show that petitioner and hisfamily lead lavish and extravagant lives; and

that this matter is within the realm of public interest given that petitioner is an aspirant to a

public office while his wife is an incumbent public official.

Issue: The issue to be resolved is whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject

article was libelous.

Held: Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, libel is defined as "a public and malicious

imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,

status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or

juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." Its elements are as follows: (a)

an imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c)

identity of the person defamed; and (d) the existence of malice.

Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, it must be defamatory, malicious, published, and

the victim is identifiable.

The elements of publication and identity of the person defamed are present in this case.

Thus, in resolving the issue at hand, we limit our discussion on whether paragraph 25 of the

subject article contains the two other elements of libel, to wit:(a) imputation of a discreditable act

or condition to another, i.e. , whether the paragraph is defamatory; and (b) existence of malice. In

determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety

and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by

persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.

Tested against the foregoing, we find that there is prima facie showing that paragraph 25 of the

subject article is defamatory. It is opprobrious, ill-natured, and vexatious as it has absolutely

nothing to do with petitioner's qualification as mayoralty candid ate or as a public figure. It

appears that private respondents’ only purpose in focusing on Joanna’s status as an adopted child

and her alleged extravagant purchases was to malign her before the public and to bring her into

disrepute. This is a clear and simple invasion of her privacy. The Court also disagrees that the

same constitutes privileged communication because it was a fair comment on the fitness of

petitioner to run for public office, particularly on his lifestyle and that of his family as accused
argues. He claims that as such, malice cannot be presumed. It is now petitioner’s burden to prove

malice in fact. According to the court, paragraph 25 does not qualify as a conditionally or

qualifiedly privileged communication, which Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code limits to the

following instances: (1) A private communication made by a person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) A fair and true report, made in good

faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings

which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said

proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. To

qualify under the first category of a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication,

paragraph 25 must fulfill the following elements: (1) the person who made the communication

had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to

protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the

communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in

the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the

communication are made in good faith and without malice. Whichever way we view it, we

cannot discern a legal, moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna's status as an adopted daughter.

Neither is there any public interest respecting her purchases of panties worth P1, 000.00.

Whether she indeed bought those panties is not something that the public can afford any

protection against. With this backdrop, it is obvious that private respondents' only motive in

inserting paragraph 25 in the subject article is to embarrass Joanna before threading public. In

addition, the claim that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication is a matter of

defense, which is can only be proved in a full-blown trial. It is elementary that "a preliminary

investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is
for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an

offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Moreover, under Article

354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even

if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. It is thus

incumbent upon private respondents to prove that "good intention and justifiable motive"

attended the publication of the subject article.