G.R. No.
142848 June 30, 2006 respondents were not only inadmissible in evidence but also failed to establish
EUGENE C. YU, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR JOSE M. VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
RODOLFO OCHOA and REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A.
"Engine," Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In the evening of 14 November 1994, Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were
abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in
Cavite where they were both shot to death. At about 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of 17 November 1994, the bodies of the two victims were dug up in a
shallow grave at Barangay Malinta, Sampaloc 2, Dasmariñas Cavite. 1 Charged to
investigate the abduction and killing was the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC). After having conducted a thorough investigation of the
case, the PACC filed charges before the Department of Justice (DOJ) entitled,
"Task Force Cabakid v. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon,
Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and John Does." The same was docketed as I-S.
No. 94-557 and was assigned to a panel of Senior State Prosecutors of the DOJ.
Later events that transpired as narrated by herein petitioner Eugene Yu are not
disputed.
On December 13, 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Resolution
(Annex "C", ibid.) in the preliminary investigation of the case, docketed as I.S.
No. 94-557 finding probable cause against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Rojas,
Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto Mirasol, Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio
Hizon and private respondents de los Santos and Ochoa for the kidnapping and
murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, Eduardo Constantino.
Petitioner and his wife, Patricia Lim-Yu, were also named respondents in I.S.
No. 94-557. The charges against them however were dropped for lack of
evidence to establish probable cause. Thereafter, an information was filed against
several accused, namely private respondents Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los
Santos among others, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay
City presided by respondent judge. On December 16 and 17, 1994 after the
information was filed and while under custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), private respondents Ochoa and de los Santos executed
separate sworn statements (Annexes "D" and "E,", ibid.) implicating petitioner in
the abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and Eduardo Constantino. The
PACC re-filed the complaint docketed as I.S. No. 94-614 for murder and
kidnapping against petitioner. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the charges, citing that the sworn statements of private
1
probable cause against him. On January 30, 1995, the DOJ investigating panel
composed of Senior State Prosecutors Henrick Guingoyon and Ferdinand
Abesamis denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss (Annex "F", ibid.). Thereafter,
three (3) separate informations were filed against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay City. Simultaneously, petitioner filed with
the aforesaid court an omnibus motion to determine probable cause, to deny
issuance of warrant of arrest and to quash information (Annex "G", ibid.).
On December 8, 1995, respondent judge issued a resolution (Annex "H," ibid.),
the dispositive portion reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds that probable
cause exists against accused Eugene Yu as an accomplice in the instant cases,
and the prosecution is accordingly directed to amend the informations filed in
these cases for the inclusion of the same accused as an accomplice within ten
(10) days upon receipt of a copy hereof. As a consequence, let a warrant for the
arrest of Eugene Yu be issued in these cases and bail for his provisional liberty is
hereby fixed at P60,000.00 each in theses cases.
"x x x x
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 6; 118-119)
Both the prosecution and the petitioner filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the aforequoted resolution. The prosecution sought to
maintain the original informations charging petitioner as principal, while the
latter sought the dismissal of the cases against him for lack of probable cause.
Both motions were denied in an order of the court a quo dated February 6, 1996
(Annex "I", ibid.).
In a petition for certiorari, docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No.
124380 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, et al.,"
the prosecution impugned the Resolution dated December 8, 1995 and the Order
dated February 6, 1996. The petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court in its
Resolution dated May 14, 1996. The prosecution refiled the same titled petition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42208, "where it is
currently pending, entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eleuterio F.
Guerrero, et al."
In the meantime, the prosecution filed a "Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses
and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos" on April
17, 1996 (Annex "J"). Petitioner opposed the motion. On March 6, 1997,
respondent judge issued the impugned order, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this
Court hereby resolves to GRANT the Petition (to Discharge as State Witnesses &
Exclude from the Information Accused Ochoa & de los Santos) filed by the
prosecution for being impressed with merit, and, accordingly, the same accused
are hereby ordered discharged and excluded from the information filed in these
cases as State Witnesses.
"SO ORDERED." (Annex "A", p. 31)
Petitioner, who is one of the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases,
claims that the orders were issued by public respondent judge with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, claiming that there is
no legal basis or justification to discharge as state witnesses accused Rodolfo
Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos (hereinafter referred to as private
respondents).2
From the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18
dated 6 March 1997, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals.3 In a decision4 dated 30 September 1999, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated 4 April
2000.5
Essentially, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no necessity for a
hearing to determine a person’s qualification as a state witness after the DOJ had
attested to his qualification. Republic Act No. 6981, 6 Witness Protection and
Security Benefit Program (WPSBP), conferred upon the DOJ the sole authority
to determine whether or not an accused is qualified for admission into the
program. The appellate court held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No.
6981, upon the filing by the prosecution of a petition to discharge an accused
from the information, it is mandatory for the court to order the discharge and
exclusion of the accused.7
From this adverse decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
filed the instant petition.
The following issues are raised for resolution8 :
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED IS NOT A
JUDICIAL FUNCTION.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISCHARGED THE ACCUSED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS.
Petitioner maintains that since the private respondents were already charged
along with the other accused including him (petitioner) before they were
admitted to the WPSBP, their admission is a judicial prerogative which requires
prior determination by the trial court of their qualification as state witnesses, in
accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Petitioner further asserts that the case of Webb v. De Leon, 9 which the RTC
relied on in granting the discharge of the private respondents and their admission
to the WPSBP, does not apply. In that case, Jessica Alfaro was not charged as a
respondent before her application and admission to the WPSBP. Thus, the issue
2
of whether or not she can be discharged from the information upon the filing of
the petition for discharge never arose. On the other hand, petitioner contends in
this case that the private respondents were already charged along with the other
accused, including him, before they were admitted to the WPSBP and discharged
as an accused to be utilized as a state witness. Petitioner argues that if this were
to be allowed, the same is tantamount to permitting the prosecution to supplant
with its own the court’s exercise of discretion on how a case over which it has
acquired jurisdiction, will proceed.
The argument of petitioner fails to persuade.
Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6981 employed by the prosecution in the
discharge of the private respondents reads:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. – Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before
any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special
laws;
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily
injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated,
harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely,
or evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying
against other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the
immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the
protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is
convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the
Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue
the proper certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the
Program shall be known as the Witness.
xxxx
SEC. 10. State Witness. – Any person who has participated in the commission of
a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as
determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special
laws;
 b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed;
d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in
order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program
if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall
prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness
under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the other hand, Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, upon which petitioner relies reads:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of
the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge,
the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of
the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the
prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and separate from the
discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is
only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a state
witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is
another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No.
6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court.
3
Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates
a situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been
arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this
rule may be ordered upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that
is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time
the defense starts to offer any evidence.10
On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981,
only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure11 is required but not the requirement of Rule 119,
Section 17.
More to the point is the recent case of Soberano v. People12 where this Court
held:
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one
of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the
accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought
on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the
accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness
at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is
because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of
who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function,
not a judicial one. x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)
In this connection, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 13 provides that the
issuance of a certification of admission into the program shall be given full faith
by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in
the criminal complaint or information, and if included, to petition for his
discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state witness. This provision
justifies the regularity of the procedure adopted by the prosecution for the
discharge of the private respondents.
The case of Webb v. De Leon,14 reiterated in the subsequent case of People v.
Peralta,15 is quite elucidating in this regard.
Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts
and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of
crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute
their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power
to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be
granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the
proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent
judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to
discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over
the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of
jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover,
the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by
legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A.
No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its
uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of
witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of
Justice, viz: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic disclocation, usually
refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal
complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been
dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective
administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting
witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their
appearance in investigative bodies/courts. Petitioner Webb’s challenge to the
validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Anent the second issue, petitioner argues that the petition to discharge is not
supported by any proof or evidence. He claims that the prosecution did not
establish that the private respondents have complied with the requisites of
Republic Act No. 6981 because the certificate of admission from the DOJ
showing that the private respondents were qualified, and the memorandum of
agreement between the DOJ and private respondents, as required by Section
516 of Republic Act No. 6981, were not presented before the trial court.
We reject the argument for being vacuous.
As found by the DOJ, based on the extrajudicial statements executed by the
private respondents regarding their participation in the abduction and killing of
Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, it appears that they were included in an alleged
military operation and unaware that the persons they abducted were innocent
civilians because they were misled by their military superiors into believing that
these individuals were unnamed communist rebels. From their account, private
respondents claim to have been oblivious that the persons subject of their
surveillance were to be abducted and subsequently killed.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be
utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty, is
highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this
factual issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion,17 which we find not present in the case at bar.
On the issue of failure of the prosecution to present the sworn statement and
memorandum of agreement between the private respondents and the DOJ, there
4
is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6891 that the same be first presented
in court before an accused may be admitted to the WPSBP. Moreover, the DOJ
which is tasked to implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981, has
determined that the private respondents have satisfied the requirements for
admission under the WPSBP. This interpretation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6981 by the DOJ deserves the respect of the court under the principle
that the determination of a government agency tasked to implement a statute is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.18
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 1999 and 4 April 2000, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, for continuation of hearing to
its conclusion with deliberate dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154629 October 5, 2005
SPO4 MARINO SOBERANO, SPO3 MAURO TORRES and SPO3 JOSE
ESCALANTE, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador
"Bubby" Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along
Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their charred remains, consisting of burnt
bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna Lejos,
Indang, Cavite. They were positively identified by their dentists and by forensic
pathologists from the University of the Philippines. 1 Both victims were killed by
strangulation.2
A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
through a panel of prosecutors made up of State Prosecutor II Ruben B. Carretas,
State Prosecutor Geronimo L. Sy and Prosecution Attorney Juan Pedro C.
Navera.
On 11 May 2001, an Information3 was filed by the panel of prosecutors with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), City of Manila.4 The following were charged with
double murder:
Jimmy L. Lopez
Alex B. Diloy
William L. Lopez
(all detained)
SPO4 Marino Soberano
SPO3 Mauro Torres
SPO3 Jose Escalante
Crisostomo M. Purificacion
Digo De Pedro
Renato Malabanan
Jovencio Malabanan
Margarito Cueno
Rommel Rollan
(all under the custody of PNP-CIDG Camp Crame, Quezon City)
P/Supt. Glen Dumlao
P/C. Insp. Vicente Arnado
P/Insp. Roberto Langcauon
SPO4 Benjamin Taladua
SPO1 Rolando Lacasandile
P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva
SPO1 Mario Sarmiento
SPO1 William Reed
PO2 Thomas J. Sarmiento
SPO1 Ruperto A. Nemeno
John Does and James Does
(all at large)
The Information reads:
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom
are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao,
P/C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1
Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1 Nemeno),
with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and
remoteness of the place and with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring,
confabulating and confederating with one another, the accused police officers
using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and
EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was the immediate cause of
their death, and thereafter dispose of their body (sic) by incineration, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter’s respective heirs.
The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 41, Manila, presided by Judge Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada.
On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information5 which was granted and the Amended Information was admitted by
the trial court.
The Amended Information6 reads:
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom
are public officers, being then members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame,
5
Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt. Dumlao,
P/ C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1
Sarmiento, SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1
Nemeno), abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL
CORBITO at the corner of Osmeña Highway (formerly South Super
Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to
Indang, Cavite, and with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior
strength, nighttime and remoteness of the place and with deliberate intent to kill,
conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, the accused police
officers using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill said SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and
EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was the immediate cause of
their death, and thereafter dispose of their body by incineration, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter’s respective heirs.
On 24 May 2001, Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan,
Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan moved to quash the Information.
Accused P/Supt. Glen Dumlao was subsequently arrested. He later executed a
sworn statement implicating other police officers to the Dacer-Corbito double
murder, specifically P/Supt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, P/Supt. Cesar Mancao, PO3
Larry Ambre and a certain Rigor, 7 all former members of the defunct Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in
the double murder. He stressed that it was not him but a certain "SPO3 Allan
Cadenilla Villanueva" who was previously identified by several witnesses as one
of the culprits.8 This was granted by the trial court.
On 26 June 2001, in view of the sworn statement executed by Dumlao, the
prosecution filed a Motion for Reinvestigation 9 which was granted by the trial
court in its Order10 dated 04 July 2001. The prosecution was ordered to terminate
the reinvestigation and submit its findings within twenty (20) days. The
arraignment was set on 30 July 2001.
On 28 June 2001, the trial court denied the joint Motion to Quash the
Information earlier filed by Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato
Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan.
On 02 August 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a new complaint
with the DOJ against a new suspect in the same case, by the name of P/Sr. Supt.
Teofilo Viña, who was also a member of the PAOCTF.
After the reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge dated 13
August 2001, praying that P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva 11 be discharged from the
Information, and that he be immediately released from detention. In its
Order12 dated 16 August 2001, the trial court granted the motion.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information 13 dated 17
September 2001 was filed by the prosecution. The Amended Information ---
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and
Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar
Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio
Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information in an Opposition 14 dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the
Motion to Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused Dumlao,
Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied.
In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Admit
Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied in an Order15 dated 24 October 2001.
On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved in open court to inhibit Judge
Ponferrada from hearing the case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on
22 November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio.
On 04 January 2002, the prosecution filed a special civil action
for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order before the
Supreme Court praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01 and 24
October 2001 be annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of
Branch 18 be restrained, in the meantime, from proceeding with the case in
accordance with said orders. In a Resolution 16 dated 21 January 2002, this Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
On 04 April 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, 17 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the present petition is
hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED.
The assailed Orders dated October 01, 2001 and October 24, 2001 which were
issued by JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in Criminal Case No. 01-
191969, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Lopez, et al." are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR. or any person or persons acting in his stead, is/are hereby ORDERED to
ADMIT the Amended Information dated September 17, 2001 substituting SPO3
ALLAN CADENILLA VILLANUEVA for P/Insp. DANILO VILLANUEVA as
accused, and charging P/Senior Supt. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, P/Senior Supt.
CEZAR MANCAO II and P/Senior Supt. TEOFILO VIÑA as additional
accused, and discharging or excluding only the accused JIMMY L. LOPEZ,
WILLIAM L. LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY and to CONTINUE with the
proceedings therefrom with utmost deliberate dispatch. Needless to state, the
original information filed on May 11, 2001 stands insofar as P/Senior Supt.
GLEN(N) G. DUMLAO is concerned.18
6
Accused Soberano, Escalante and Torres moved for the reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals Decision. In a Resolution19 dated 12 August 2002, the motion
was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order20 dated 28 August 2002 filed by Soberano, Torres and Escalante where
they assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE
PONFERRADA GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
ADMISSION OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF
THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RRCP) IN
ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DILOY AND THE LOPEZ
BROTHERS.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT
AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF THE RRCP.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECTION 17 OF RULE
119 OF THE RRCP IN THE DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED.
V
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE APPLICATION OF
SECTION 17 OF RULE 119 OF THE RRCP TO A SITUATION WHERE THE
ACCUSED HAS ALREADY BEEN ARAIGNED AND UNDERGOING
TRIAL.
Gathered from the above assignment of errors, the fundamental issue that must
be resolved concerns the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a
motion to admit amended information excluding some of the accused named in
the original information for utilization as witnesses for the State. The key lies in
the correct interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information
and Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of
the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge,
the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of
the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The trial court, in denying the prosecution’s motion to admit amended
information discharging some accused, ratiocinated that to admit said amended
information would be violative of Section 17, Rule 119, thus:
After study, it appearing that the Amended Information not only includes new
accused, namely, SPO3 Allen Villanueva, P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt.
Cezar Mancao and P/Supt. Teofilo Viña but excludes or discharges certain
accused, namely, Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Diloy and Glenn
Dumlao from the original Information to be used as state witnesses, the Court is
not inclined to grant the motion as it believes and so holds that in the discharge
of the accused to be state witnesses the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be observed and/or complied with.
Stated otherwise, to grant the motion and admit the Amended Information
outright would violate said section which is quoted as follows. . . .21
The Court of Appeals held the contrary view. It reasoned that Section 14, Rule
110 is applicable in the instant case and not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
To begin with, it is undeniable, and it is necessary to point out, that Criminal
Case No. 01-191969 has already been filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila on May 11, 2001. The Motion to Admit was filed later or on September
18, 2001.
While it is true that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires
complete jurisdiction over it, We are not unmindful of the well-settled ruling of
7
the Supreme Court that the determination of who should be criminally charged in
court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, reads –
"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed
in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial."
Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the
Amended Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient
support therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet.
Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the
motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a
prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to
conduct the same, substantially complying with such requirement under the
second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined
a "permission obtained from a court to take some action which, without such
permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an amended
pleading, to plead several pleas."
In the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Court’s pertinent ruling,
which We now reiterate, finds application in the case at bench, i.e., where a
judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in this case], he is deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider
the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to determine whether the
information it has filed should stand, and that the final disposition on the
reinvestigation should be the sole and only valid basis for the judge’s final action
with respect to the reinvestigation.
Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA’s "sole and only basis" for the inclusion (or
exclusion, for that matter) of the additional accused should be the final
disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State Prosecutors of the
Department of Justices.
Consistent with the foregoing disquisition, We hold the opinion that Section 17,
Rule 119 (Trial), . . . is not applicable under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bench, although in the case of Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, We are
mindful of the Supreme Court’s clarification that only when an information,
charging two (2) or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in
court will Section 9, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Rules of Court [now 100% restated
under Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure]
"come into play."
Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), contemplates a situation wherein the Information is
already filed, the accused is already arraigned, undergoing trial and the
prosecution has not rested its case.
Here, although the original Information has already been filed, the four (4)
accused sought to be discharged or excluded from the Amended Information
have not been arraigned and no trial has been commenced. Thus, the discharge or
exclusion being sought by the petitioner may come under the purview
of Republic Act No. 6981, a special law which the Department of Justice is
called upon to enforce and implement. Considering that the State Prosecutor’s
disposition on the investigation in Criminal Case No. 01-191969 should be the
sole and only valid basis of respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA
in considering whether the Amended Information sought to be admitted should
stand or not, it follows that the discharge/exclusion of the four (4) accused
under Republic Act No. 6981 must be directed by the Department of Justice, not
by the court a quo. Needless to say, Section 9, Rule 119 [of the Rules of Court]
does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be state
witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. It is not constitutionally
impermissible for Congress to enact Republic Act No. 6981vesting in the
Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the
program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. 22 (Emphasis in
original)
The petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 14 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on amendment of
complaints. Instead, what should have been applied was Section 17 of Rule 119
on the discharge of an accused as witness for the state. The petitioners further
aver that even if it is only a simple discharge under Section 14 of Rule 110, it is
still necessary to seek prior leave of court. The prosecution simply filed an
Amended Information excluding Jimmy and William Lopez, Alex Diloy and
Glen Dumlao, without prior leave of court, and moved for its admission. 23
The petitioners also argue that while the determination of who should be
criminally charged is essentially an executive function, the discharge of an
accused when an Information had already been filed lies with the court. 24Further,
the petitioners assert that the Motion For Reinvestigation which was approved by
the trial court is not tantamount to a Motion For Leave to File an Amended
8
Information as required under Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.25
In answer to all these, the prosecution contends that the admission of the
Amended Information was not violative of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, contrary to the opinion of the trial court.26
The prosecution insists that Judge Ponferrada should have just required it to
present evidence in support of the discharge for had this procedure been
followed, the fact of admission of the accused sought to be discharged into the
Witness Protection Program (WPP) would have come to light.27
The prosecution likewise professes that Section 14, Rule 110 should be applied,
and not Section 17, Rule 119 for the following reasons: first, while the case was
already filed in court, the accused therein have not yet been arraigned; second,
the trial court ordered the reinvestigation of the case; and third, new evidence
dictate the necessity to amend the Information to include new accused and to
exclude other accused who will be utilized as state witnesses.28
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an
amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the same is
made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable
which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems
to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically
sought for the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the State. The
consequential question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused as
state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional
requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only
one provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals ( i.e.,
Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one
of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule
110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the
accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought
on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the
accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness
at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is
because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of
who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function,
not a judicial one.29 The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute
vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether,
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.30 By virtue of the trial court
having granted the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is
deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the
Government.31 Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the
prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching – regarding
the disposition thereof.
The foregoing discussion is qualified by our decision in the seminal case
of Crespo v. Mogul,32 wherein we declared that:
. . . Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has
the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused
or the right of the People to due process of law.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or
infinite. The prosecution must satisfy for itself that an accused excluded from the
information for purposes of utilizing him as state witness is qualified therefor.
The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the information
but his discharge as state witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it
rests its case, in which event, the procedural (in addition to the substantive)
requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 apply. Otherwise stated, when no
amendment to the information is involved as a by-product of reinvestigation and
trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the accused falls squarely and solely
within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119. It is fitting then to re-state the rule
in Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals33 that –
. . . [T]he decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in
character. Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a
certain offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9 34 of the
Rules of Court, come into play. . . .
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is in a situation where the accused to be
discharged is included in the information that the prosecution must present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge in order to convince the judge, upon whom discretion
rests, as to the propriety of discharging the accused as state witness.
Having thus ruled, it now behooves upon this Court to determine whether the
Court of Appeals was correct in admitting the amended information insofar as
the discharge of JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY is
concerned.
9
It is undisputed that the motion to admit amended information seeking the
exclusion of the above-named accused (together with P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G.
DUMLAO) was with notice to the offended party and was set for hearing. The
Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s grant of the prosecution’s motion for
reinvestigation operates as leave of court to amend the information, if the
situation so warrants.
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we agree with the Court of Appeals
considering that we do not perceive here any impairment of the substantial rights
of all the accused or the right of the people to due process.
As we have discussed earlier in this decision, the trial court is with discretion to
grant or deny the amendment of the information. In general, its discretion is
hemmed in by the proscription against impairment of the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law. In this case, in denying
the motion to admit amended information, the trial court simply said that the
same was violative of Section 17, Rule 119 without stating the reasons therefor.
And for this lapse, the trial court has indeed erred.
One final point. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, it held that the
discharge or exclusion of P/Sr. Supt. Glen Dumlao from the Amended
Information finds no legal basis under Republic Act No. 6981 35 for he is a law
enforcement officer. The original information, according to the Court of Appeals,
should stand insofar as Dumlao is concerned.
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 6981 provides:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. – Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before
any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or
there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or
corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively,
because or on account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against
other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of
his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is
convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the
Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue
the proper certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the
Program shall be known as the Witness.
It must be stressed that Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 6981 enumerates the
requirements before a person may be admitted to the WPP. It does not state that
if an accused cannot be admitted to the WPP, he cannot be discharged as a
witness for the state. Admission to the WPP and being discharged as an accused
are two different things. Dumlao’s being a law enforcement officer and, thus,
disqualified to be under the WPP, do not in any way prohibit him to be
discharged from the information.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 04 April 2002 and 12 August 2002, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION to include P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G.
DUMLAO as one of the accused excluded from the Amended Information dated
17 September 2001. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 153304-05 February 7, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), IMELDA R. MARCOS,
JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and GILBERT C. DULAY,* Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines
(petitioner) assailing the decision dated March 22, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan 1 in
Criminal Case Nos. 20345 and 20346 which granted the demurrers to evidence
filed by Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez (respondents) and Rafael
Zagala.
The Facts
The petition stemmed from two criminal informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging the respondents with the crime of malversation of
public funds, defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The charges arose from the transactions that
the respondents participated in, in their official capacities as Minister and Deputy
Minister of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) under the MHS’ Kabisig
Program.
In Criminal Case No. 20345, respondents, together with Gilbert C. Dulay, were
charged with malversation of public funds, committed as follows:
That on or about April 6, 1984 or sometime and/or [subsequent] thereto, in Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, all public officers charged with the administration of
10
public funds and as such, accountable officers, Imelda R. Marcos being then the
Minister of Human Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez being then the Deputy
Minister of Human Settlements and Gilbert C. Dulay being then [the] Assistant
Manager for Finance, Ministry of Human Settlements, while in the performance
of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions, acting in concert
and mutually helping one another thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in a series of anomalous
transactions, abstract the total amount of ₱57.954 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine
Currency from the funds of the Ministry of Human Settlements in the following
manner: accused Conrado Benitez approved the series of cash advances made
and received by Gilbert C. Dulay, and made it appear that the funds were
transferred to the University of Life, a private foundation represented likewise by
Gilbert C. Dulay when in truth and in fact no such funds were transferred while
Imelda R. Marcos concurred in the series of such cash advances approved by
Jose Conrado Benitez and received by Gilbert C. Dulay and in furtherance of the
conspiracy, in order to camouflage the aforesaid anomalous and irregular cash
advances and withdrawals, Imelda R. Marcos requested that the funds of the
KSS Program be treated as "Confidential Funds"; and as such be considered as
"Classified Information"; and that the above-named accused, once in possession
of the said aggregate amount of ₱57.954 Million Pesos (sic), misappropriated
and converted the same to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice
of the government in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours]2
In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents together with Zagala were charged
with malversation of public funds under these allegations:
That on or about April 6 to April 16, 1984 3 and/or sometime or subsequent
thereto, in Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers charged with the
administration of public funds and as such, accountable officers, Imelda R.
Marcos being then the Minister of Human Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez
being then the Deputy Minister of Human Settlements[,] and Rafael Zagala
being then [the] Assistant Manager for Regional Operations and at the same time
Presidential Action Officer, while in the performance of their official functions,
taking advantage of their positions, acting in concert and mutually helping one
another thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith[,] did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in a series of anomalous transactions,
abstract from the funds of the Ministry of Human Settlements the total amount of
₱40 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency, in the following manner: Jose
Conrado Benitez approved the cash advances made by Rafael Zagala and Imelda
R. Marcos concurred in the series of cash advances approved by Jose Conrado
Benitez in favor of Rafael G. Zagala; and in furtherance of the conspiracy,
Imelda R. Marcos in order to camouflage the aforesaid anomalous and irregular
cash advances, requested that funds of the KSS Program be treated as
"Confidential Funds"; and as such be considered as "Classified Information"; and
the above-named accused, once in possession of the total amount of ₱40 Million
Pesos (sic), misappropriated and converted the same to their own use and benefit
to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours]4
Only the respondents and Zagala were arraigned for the above charges to which
they pleaded not guilty; Dulay was not arraigned and remains at large. On March
15, 2000, Zagala died, leaving the respondents to answer the charges in the
criminal cases.
After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The
prosecution’s chief evidence was based on the lone testimony of Commission of
Audit (COA) Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used in
the audit examination of the subject funds.5
The gist of COA Auditor Cortez’ direct testimony was summarized by the
Sandiganbaya, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 20345 –
[s]he was appointed on March 31, 1986 by then COA Chairman Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. to head a team of COA auditors. Upon examination of the
documents, she declared that an amount of ₱100 Million Pesos (sic) from the
Office of Budget and Management was released for the KSS Project of the
Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) by virtue of an Advice of Allotment for
Calendar Year 1984. Also, an amount of ₱42.4 Million Pesos (sic) was separately
disbursed for the Kabisig Program of the Ministry of Human Settlements. With
regard to the amount of ₱100 Million Pesos (sic) received by the MHS, ₱60
Million Pesos (sic) [was] disbursed through cash advances. Of the ₱60 Million
Pesos (sic) in cash advances, accused Zagala received ₱40 Million Pesos (sic) in
four (4) disbursements while accused Dulay received the remaining ₱20 Million
Pesos (sic) in two disbursements.
With respect to accused Rafael Zagala, the cash advances consist of four (4)
disbursement vouchers in the amount of ₱5 Million Pesos (sic), ₱10 Million
Pesos (sic), ₱10 Million Pesos (sic) and ₱15 Million Pesos (sic). All of these
vouchers are in the name of accused Zagala as claimant and accused Benitez as
approving officer and are accompanied by their corresponding Treasury Warrants
that were countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by accused Dulay.
In contrast, x x x a disbursement voucher in the amount of ₱10 Million Pesos
(sic) was drawn in favor of accused Gilbert Dulay and approved by accused
Benitez. Pursuant to this, a Treasury Warrant was issued to the order of accused
Dulay, countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by accused Zagala.
Another voucher was drawn in favor of accused Dulay in the amount of ₱10
Million Pesos (sic) and approved by accused Benitez. Again, a Treasury Warrant
was issued to the order of accused Dulay in the amount of ₱10 Million Pesos
(sic), which was countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by accused
Zagala.
11
x x x [A]ccused Marcos sent a letter to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
requesting that the fund intended for the KSS Project in the amount of ₱100
Million Pesos (sic) be deemed as "Confidential Fund".
x x x [T]he liquidation of accused Zagala’s account, which was contained in a
Journal Voucher dated November 27, 1984, was without any supporting
documents. Upon this discovery, witness requested and secured a certification
from the Manager of the National Government Audit Office to the effect that the
COA did not receive any document coming from the MHS. However, this
liquidation voucher which contained figures in the total amount of ₱50 Million
Pesos (sic), comprised the entire cash advances of accused Zagala in the amount
of ₱40 Million Pesos (sic) and the ₱10 Million Pesos (sic) cash advance made by
accused Dulay. Since the amount of ₱10 Million Pesos (sic) was already
contained in Zagala’s Journal Voucher, the witness and her team of auditors tried
to locate the remaining ₱10 Million Pesos (sic) and found out that accused Dulay
had liquidated the same amount.6 (footnotes omitted)
According to COA Auditor Cortez, Zagala’s cash advances were supported by a
liquidation report and supporting documents submitted to the resident auditor
even before the ₱100 Million Kilusang Sariling Sikap (KSS) fund was made
confidential.7 The witness also testified that the COA resident auditor found no
irregularity in this liquidation report.8
COA Auditor Cortez stated that since the ₱100 Million KSS fund was classified
as confidential, the liquidation report should have been submitted to the COA
Chairman who should have then issued a credit memo. No credit memo was ever
found during the audit examination of the MHS accounts. 9 COA Auditor Cortez
admitted that she did not verify whether the supporting documents of Zagala’s
cash advances were sent to the COA Chairman.10
Respondent Marcos was prosecuted because of her participation as Minister of
the MHS, in requesting that the ₱100 Million KSS fund be declared confidential.
Respondent Benitez was prosecuted because he was the approving officer in
these disputed transactions.
In Criminal Case No. 20346 –
Regarding the Kabisig Program of the MHS, the COA team of auditors
examined the vouchers of the MHS, which upon inspection revealed that there
were at least three (3) memoranda of agreements entered into between the MHS
and University of Life (UL). With reference to the first Memorandum of
Agreement dated July 2, 1985, an amount of ₱21.6 Million Pesos (sic) was
transferred by the MHS to the UL to pay for the operations of the Community
Mobilization Program and the Kabisig Program of the MHS. Accused Benitez as
the Deputy Minister of the MHS and accused Dulay as Vice President of the UL
were the signatories of this agreement. Although there is no disbursement
voucher in the records, it is admitted that a Treasury Warrant was drawn in the
sum of ₱21.6 Million Pesos (sic). The second Memorandum of Agreement dated
July 10, 1985 provided for a fund transfer in the amount of ₱3.8 Million Pesos
(sic) for the Human Resources Development Plan of the MHS. Accordingly, a
Disbursement Voucher certified by accused Dulay and approved by accused
Benitez was drawn in the sum of ₱3.8 Million Pesos (sic). The third
Memorandum of Agreement in the sum of ₱17 Million Pesos (sic) was granted
for the acquisition of motor vehicles and other equipment to support the Kabisig
Program of the MHS. For that reason, a Disbursement Voucher pertaining thereto
accompanied by a Treasury Warrant was drafted.
Similarly, the witness declared that although they did not examine any of the
records of the UL, the abovementioned sums were not received by the UL based
on the affidavit of the UL Comptroller named Pablo Cueto. In the same way, an
affidavit was executed by the UL Chief Accountant named Ernesto Jiao attesting
that there is no financial transaction on record covering the purchase of motor
vehicles. Again, witness Cortez admitted that they did not examine the books of
the UL on this matter but only inquired about it from Mr. Jiao. The affidavit of
Mr. Jiao with respect to the nonexistence of the purchases of motor vehicles was
further corroborated by the affidavit of one Romeo Sison, who was the
Administrative Assistant of the Property Section of the UL.
The respective treasury warrants representing the various sums of ₱21.6 Million
Pesos (sic), ₱17 Million Pesos (sic) and ₱3.8 Million Pesos (sic) were
subsequently deposited with the United Coconut Planters’ Bank (UCPB), Shaw
Blvd. Branch, Mandaluyong, under various accounts. Soon after, several checks
were drawn out of these funds as evidenced by the Photostat copies recovered by
the COA auditors. In the course of the testimony of the witness, she revealed that
her team of auditors classified said several checks into different groups in
accordance with the account numbers of the said deposits.
x x x [T]he amount of ₱3.8 Million Pesos (sic), the same was intended for the
Human Resource Development Plan of the UL. x x x [T]he aforesaid amount is
not a cash advance but rather paid as an expense account, which is charged
directly as if services have already been rendered. Hence, UL is not mandated to
render liquidation for the disbursement of ₱3.8 Million Pesos (sic).
The sums of ₱21.6 Million Pesos (sic) and ₱17 Million Pesos (sic) were
deposited under x x x the name of the UL Special Account. Out of these deposits,
the following first sequence of withdrawals of checks 11 payable either to its order
or to cash x x x reached a total sum of ₱5,690,750.93 Million Pesos (sic).
The second list of checks12 [which] consists of numerous [Manager’s] Checks x x
x reached the amount of ₱18,416,062.15.
A third set of checks allegedly consists of nine (9) ordinary checks and two (2)
manager’s checks in the sum of ₱1,971,568.00 and ₱4,566,712.18[,]
respectively. x x x
Moreover, [a] witness confirmed that as regards the amount of ₱17 Million Pesos
(sic) intended for the acquisition of motor vehicles, ₱10.4 Million Pesos (sic)
was spent for the purchase of some five hundred (500) units of motorcycles
while ₱2.1 Million Pesos (sic) was used to procure eight (8) brand new cars. The
balance of ₱4.5 Million Pesos (sic) was later refunded to the MHS. As regards
the five hundred (500) units of motorcycle, the Presidential Task Force furnished
12
the witness documents attesting to the transfers of some two hundred seventy-
one (271) units of motorcycles from the UL to the MHS by virtue of Deed of
Assignments allegedly executed on February 17, 1986. However, of the two
hundred seventy-one (271) units of motorcycle, only one hundred ninety (190)
units were covered with complete documents. With respect to the eight (8) brand
new cars, the team of auditors did not see any registration papers. (footnotes
omitted; underscorings ours)13
COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a physical
inventory of these motor vehicles; it based its report on the information given by
the Presidential Task Force.14 She emphasized that the audit team found it highly
irregular that the motor vehicles were registered in the name of University of
Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this reason, she believed that no
proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS.15
After COA Auditor Cortez’ testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer
of evidence and rested its case.
Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of
demurrers to evidence, were filed by Zagala and the respondents on November
15, 1997, January 5, 1998 and January 28, 1998; on January 27, 1998, the
prosecution filed a Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the demurrers
to evidence.16
The Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the
respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22, 2002. The dispositive
portion of this decision reads:
Wherefore, the Demurrers to Evidence are hereby granted. Accused Imelda R.
Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez and Gilbert C. Dulay are hereby acquitted of the
crime of Malversation in Criminal Case No. 20435 for insufficiency of evidence
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused Imelda R. Marcos, Jose
Conrado Benitez and Rafael G. Zagala are likewise acquitted of the offense of
Malversation in Criminal Case No. 20346 for insufficiency of evidence in
proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.17
In dismissing these criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of
misappropriation of the subject funds in the two criminal cases considering the
unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report.18
The Issues
The issues for our consideration are:
1. Whether the prosecutor’s actions and/or omissions in these cases
effectively deprived the State of its right to due process; and
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting
the demurrers to evidence of the respondents.
The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because of the
nonfeasance committed by the special prosecutor in failing to present sufficient
evidence to prove its case. It claims that the prosecutor failed to protect the
State’s interest in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To support its
position, petitioner cites the case of Merciales v. Court of Appeals 19 where the
Court nullified the dismissal of the criminal cases due to the serious nonfeasance
committed by the public prosecutor.
The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted in a
miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the State’s interest when it took the
demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of
additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds
involved and the special prosecutor’s failure to oppose the demurrers to
evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
We do not find the petition meritorious.
We are called to overturn a judgment of acquittal in favor of the respondents
brought about by the dismissal, for insufficiency of evidence, of the malversation
charged in the two criminal cases. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer,
the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. 20 Notably, the
proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of
judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds
where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; 21and/or (ii) where there
is a denial of a party’s due process rights.22
A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial
of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both
grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void
judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an
acquittal.23 Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.24
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an
accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 25 Mere allegations of grave
abuse of discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also,
mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient. 26 On the petitioner lies the burden of
demonstrating, plainly and distinctly, all facts essential to establish its right to a
writ of certiorari.27
In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion
on the Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring
the presentation of additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant
traceable to the special prosecutor’s conduct. The special prosecutor’s conduct
allegedly also violated the State’s due process rights.
There is grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in the exercise of its judgment. 28 An act is done without jurisdiction
13
if the public respondent does not have the legal power to act or where the
respondent, being clothed with the power to act, oversteps its authority as
determined by law,29 or acts outside the contemplation of law. For the grant of the
present petition, the petitioner must prove, based on the existing records, action
in the above manner by the Sandiganbayan.
I. State’s right to due process
In People v. Leviste,30 we stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is entitled
to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and
represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal
prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest. 31 The State’s right to be
heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the public prosecutor properly
undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for the punishment of the
guilty.32
The prosecutor’s role in the administration of justice is to lay before the court,
fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist,
without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of
the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on
what the judge may or is disposed to do. 33 The prosecutor owes the State, the
court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his
disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and
filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the court’s mind may
not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty
may not escape unpunished.34 In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the
prosecutor has ample discretionary power to control the conduct of the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose
what evidence to present or who to call as witness.35
The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give
effective legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case against
the respondents, citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals36 where we considered the
following factual circumstances - (1) the public prosecutor rested the case
knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was insufficient; (2) the refusal of
the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take the stand; (3)
the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence
when the demurrer to evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial court’s failure
to require the presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer
to evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the
State’s right to due process, attributable to the inaction of the public prosecutor
and/or the trial court.
Merciales was followed by Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, 37 where we recognized
the violation of the State’s right to due process in criminal proceedings because
of sufficient showing that the special prosecutor haphazardly handled the
prosecution. In upholding the prosecution’s right to present additional evidence
under the circumstances, Valencia took into account the fact that the former
special prosecutor rested his case solely on the basis of a Joint Stipulation of
Facts that was not even signed by the accused.
These two cases, to our mind, not only show the existing factual
considerations38 that led to the conclusion that the public prosecutor willfully and
deliberately failed to perform his mandated duty to represent the State’s interest,
but stress as well that there must be sufficient facts on record supporting this
conclusion. In the absence of these supporting facts, no conclusion similar to the
Merciales and Valencia outcomes can be reached.
The requirement for supporting factual premises finds complement in the general
rule founded on public policy39 that the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds
the client. While this rule admits of exceptions 40 (as when the gross negligence of
a counsel resulted in depriving the client of due process), the application of the
exception likewise depends on a showing of facts on record demonstrating a
clear violation of the client’s due process rights.
II. The factual premises cited in the petition and the issue of due process
In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special
prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that
other evidence could be secured. For purposes of clarity, we shall address the
instances cited in the petition as alleged proof of the denial of the State’s due
process rights, and our reasons in finding them inadequate.
First. The petitioner bewails the alleged lack of efforts by the special prosecutor
to ascertain the last known addresses and whereabouts, and to compel the
attendance of Pablo C. Cueto, Ernesto M. Jiao and Romeo F. Sison, UL officers
who executed affidavits in connection with the alleged anomalous fund transfers
from MHS to UL.
The special prosecutor likewise allegedly did not present the records of the UL to
show that the sums under the Memoranda of Agreement were not received by
UL (based on the affidavit of UL Comptroller Cueto) and that no financial
transactions really took place for the purchase of the motor vehicles (based on
the affidavit of UL Chief Accountant Jiao, as corroborated by the affidavit of UL
Administrative Assistant Sison).
We note that, other than making a claim that these instances demonstrate the
serious nonfeasance by the special prosecutor, the petitioner failed to offer any
explanation showing how these instances deprived the State of due process. An
examination of the records shows that the affidavits of Cueto, 41 Jiao and Sison
surfaced early on to prove the alleged anomalous fund transfers from MHS to
UL. The records further show that during the hearing of December 5, 1995 -
when the special prosecutor was asked by the presiding judge what she intended
to do with these affidavits – the special prosecutor replied that she planned to
present Jiao and Cueto who were the chief accountant and the designated
comptroller, respectively, of UL.42 The same records, however, show that, indeed,
an attempt had been made to bring these prospective witnesses to court; as early
as April 20, 1994, subpoenas had been issued to these three individuals and these
14
were all returned unserved because the subjects had RESIGNED from the
service sometime in 1992, and their present whereabouts were unknown.43
We consider at this point that these individuals executed their respective
affidavits on the alleged anomalous transactions between MHS and UL
sometime in 1986; from that period on, and until the actual criminal prosecution
started in 1994, a considerable time had elapsed bringing undesirable changes –
one of which was the disappearance of these prospective witnesses.
Significantly, no evidence exists or has been submitted showing that the special
prosecutor willfully and deliberately opted not to present these individuals. The
petitioner also failed to show that the whereabouts of these individuals could
have been located by the exercise of reasonable diligence in order to prove that
the special prosecutor had been remiss in performing her duties. We can in fact
deduce from the allegations in the petition that even at present, the petitioner has
not and cannot ascertain the whereabouts of these prospective witnesses.
Further, the records show that the affidavits of these individuals (who denied the
transfer of the funds in the amounts of ₱21.6 Million, ₱3.8 Million and ₱17
Million from MHS to UL) were refuted by contrary evidence of the prosecution
itself. The records indicate that the special prosecutor presented treasury
warrants and disbursement vouchers issued in the name of UL, bearing the
respective amounts for transactions between MHS and UL.44
The special prosecutor admitted that the audit team failed to examine the records
of UL to support the prosecution’s allegation of an anomalous fund transfer.
COA Auditor Cortez admitted, too, that the amounts (₱21.6 Million and ₱3.8
Million) were transferred45 to UL46 and that a portion of the amount of ₱17
Million, i.e., ₱12.5 Million, was used to purchase 500 motorcycles and eight
cars, while the remaining amount of ₱4.5 Million was refunded by UL to MHS.47
Under these facts, and in the absence of indicators too that other persons could
have testified, we cannot give weight to the petitioner’s allegation that no efforts
were exerted by the special prosecutor. On the contrary, we find under the
circumstances that the special prosecutor exerted reasonable efforts to present
these individuals in court, but failed to do so for reasons beyond her control. One
of these reasons appears to be the simple lack of concrete evidence of
irregularities in the respondents’ handling of the MHS funds.
Second. The petitioner alleged that the special prosecutor failed to present the
resident auditor to testify on the physical inventory of the vehicles, or to produce
documents showing that an inspection was conducted on the vehicles.
The prosecution’s theory, as the records would show, was to prove that there had
been misappropriation of funds since the motor vehicles were registered in UL’s
name instead of the MHS. 48 In this regard, the special prosecutor presented COA
Auditor Cortez who testified that the audit team did not assail the existence of
the motor vehicles and she also did not dispute that the amount of ₱12.5 Million
(out of ₱17 Million) was used to purchase 500 motorcycles and eight cars. The
witness stated that the audit team was more concerned with the documentation of
the disbursements made rather than the physical liquidation (inventory) of the
funds.49 The witness further explained that it was the Presidential Task Force
which had the duty to keep track of the existence of the motor vehicles. 50 She
reiterated that the audit team was only questioning the registration of the
vehicles; it never doubted that the vehicles were purchased. 51
More importantly, COA Auditor Cortez stated that at the time the team made the
audit examination in April 1986, 500 registration papers supported the purchase
of these motorcycles;52 none of the audit team at that time found this
documentation inadequate or anomalous.53 The witness also stated that the
Presidential Task Force gave the audit team a folder showing that ₱10.4 Million
was used to purchase the motorcycles and ₱2.1 Million was used to purchase the
cars.54 Checks were presented indicating the dates when the purchase of some of
the motor vehicles was made.55 COA Auditor Cortez also testified that 270 of
these motorcycles had already been transferred by UL in the name of MHS. 56 She
stated that all the documents are in order except for the registration of the motor
vehicles in the name of UL.57
Given these admissions regarding the existence of the motor vehicles, the
presentation of the resident auditor who would simply testify on the physical
inventory of the motor vehicles, or that an inspection had been conducted
thereon, was unnecessary. Her presentation in court would not materially
reinforce the prosecution’s case; thus, the omission to present her did not deprive
the State of due process. To repeat, the prosecution’s theory of misappropriation
was not based on the fact that the funds were not used to purchase motor
vehicles, in which case, the testimony of the resident auditor would have had
material implications. Rather, the prosecution’s theory, as established by the
records, shows that the imputed misappropriation stemmed from the registration
of the motor vehicles in UL’s name – an administrative lapse in light of the
relationship of UL to MHS simply as an implementing agency.58
Third. Despite the Sandiganbayan’s warning on June 7, 1996 that the various
checks covering the cash advances for ₱40 Million were "photostatic" copies, the
special prosecutor still failed to present the certified copies from the legal
custodian of these commercial documents.
The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for failing to present the original
copies of the checks drawn out of the ₱21.6 Million and ₱17 Million
combination account from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), as well as
the ₱3.8 Million expense account with the same bank. The presentation would
have allegedly proven the misappropriation of these amounts.59
Records show that instead of presenting the original copies of these checks, the
special prosecutor tried to establish, through the testimony of COA Auditor
Cortez, that these checks were photocopied from the original checks in the
possession of UCPB, which were obtained through the assistance of the UL
management.60 Thus, while the originals of these checks were not presented,
COA Auditor Cortez testified that the photostatic copies were furnished by the
UCPB which had custody of the original checks. 61 Further, the witness also
testified that at the time she made the examination of these documents, the
15
entries thereon were legible.62 She also presented a summary schedule of the
various micro film prints of the UCPB checks that she examined.63
At any rate, we observe that the defense never objected 64 to the submission of the
photostatic copies of the UCPB checks as evidence, thus making the production
of the originals dispensable. This was our view in Estrada v. Hon.
Desierto65 where we ruled that the production of the original may be dispensed
with if the opponent does not dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose would be served by requiring its production. In such case, we
ruled that secondary evidence of the content of the writing would be received in
evidence if no objection was made to its reception. 66 We note, too, that in
addition to the defense’s failure to object to the presentation of photostatic copies
of the checks, the petitioner failed to show that the presentation of the originals
would serve a useful purpose, pursuant to our ruling in Estrada.
We reiterate in this regard our earlier observation that other than enumerating
instances in the petition where the State was allegedly deprived of due process in
the principal case, no explanation was ever offered by the petitioner on how each
instance resulted in the deprivation of the State’s right to due process warranting
the annulment of the presently assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
Fourth. The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for making no effort to
produce the "final audit report" dated June 6, 1986, referred to in the last
paragraph of the Affidavit67 dated June 10, 1987 of COA Auditor Cortez.
The records show that although this final audit report dated June 6, 1986 was not
presented in court, the prosecution questioned her on the contents of this audit
report since she had a hand in its preparation. COA Auditor Cortez directly
testified on the audit team’s findings and examination, which took three hearings
to complete; the cross-examination of COA Auditor Cortez took two hearings to
complete; and subsequently, the Sandiganbayan ordered that a clarificatory
hearing be held with respect to COA Auditor Cortez’ testimony. In addition to
her testimony, the special prosecutor did present, too, other pieces of
documentary evidence (from which the final audit report was based) before the
Sandiganbayan.
Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to consider the special prosecutor’s
omission as significant in the petitioner’s allegation of serious nonfeasance or
misfeasance.
Fifth. The petitioner presents the special prosecutor’s failure to oppose the
demurrer to evidence as its last point and as basis for the applicability of the
Merciales ruling.
The failure to oppose per se cannot be a ground for grave abuse of discretion.
The real issue, to our mind, is whether the special prosecutor had basis to act as
she did. As the point-by-point presentation above shows, the dismissal of the
criminal cases cannot be attributed to any grossly negligent handling by the
special prosecutor. To begin with, the prosecution’s case suffered from lack of
witnesses because, among others, of the time that elapsed between the act
charged and the start of the actual prosecution in 1994; and from lack of
sufficient preparatory investigation conducted, resulting in insufficiency of its
evidence as a whole. In sum, in the absence of circumstances approximating the
facts of Merciales and Valencia, which circumstances the petitioner failed to
show, no basis exists to conclude that the special prosecutor grossly erred in
failing to oppose the demurrer to evidence.
Neither are we persuaded by the petitioner’s position that the special
prosecutor’s Manifestation of non-opposition to the demurrer needed to be
submitted to, and approved by, her superiors. 68 The petitioner’s argument
assumes that the special prosecutor lacked the necessary authority from her
superiors when she filed her non-opposition to the demurrers to evidence. This
starting assumption, in our view, is incorrect. The correct premise and
presumption, since the special prosecutor is a State delegate, is that she had all
incidental and necessary powers to prosecute the case in the State’s behalf so that
her actions as a State delegate bound the State. We do not believe that the State
can have an unbridled discretion to disown the acts of its delegates at will unless
it can clearly establish that its agent had been grossly negligent 69 or was guilty of
collusion with the accused or other interested party, 70 resulting in the State’s
deprivation of its due process rights as client-principal.
Gross negligence exists where there is want, or absence of or failure to exercise
slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It involves a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 71 As the
above discussions show, the State failed to clearly establish the gross negligence
on the part of the special prosecutor (or to show or even allege that there was
collusion in the principal case between the special prosecutor and the
respondents) that resulted in depriving the petitioner of its due process rights;
and, consequently prevent the application of the rule on double jeopardy. If at all,
what the records emphasized, as previously discussed, is the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence as a whole rather than the gross negligence of the special
prosecutor. In these lights, we must reject the petitioner’s position.
III. Grave abuse of discretion
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is under no
obligation to require the parties to present additional evidence when a demurrer
to evidence is filed. In a criminal proceeding, the burden lies with the
prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt, as the constitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily
stands in favor of the accused. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the
course of the prosecution of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction,
competence and discretion, provided that its actions do not result in the
impairment of the substantial rights of the accused, or of the right of the State
and of the offended party to due process of law.72
A discussion of the violation of the State’s right to due process in the present
case, however, is intimately linked with the gross negligence or the fraudulent
action of the State’s agent. The absence of this circumstance in the present case
16
cannot but have a negative impact on how the petitioner would want the Court to
view the Sandiganbayan’s actuation and exercise of discretion.
The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the
prosecution to present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a
motion) after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise, however, must be for
good reasons and in the paramount interest of justice. 73 As mentioned, the court
may require the presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer to
evidence would patently result in the denial of due process; it may also allow the
presentation of additional evidence if it is newly discovered, if it was omitted
through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct the evidence
previously offered.74
In this case, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan
when it exercised restraint and did not require the presentation of additional
evidence, given the clear weakness of the case at that point. We note that under
the obtaining circumstances, the petitioner failed to show what and how
additional available evidence could have helped and the paramount interest of
justice sought to be achieved. It does not appear that pieces of evidence had been
omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or that these pieces of evidence are
intended to correct evidence previously offered. More importantly, it does not
appear that these contemplated additional pieces of evidence (which the special
prosecutor allegedly should have presented) were ever present and available. For
instance, at no point in the records did the petitioner unequivocally state that it
could present the three UL officers, Cueto, Jiao and Sison. The petitioner also
failed to demonstrate its possession of or access to these documents (such as the
final audit report) to support the prosecution’s charges – the proof that the State
had been deprived of due process due to the special prosecutor’s alleged
inaction.
IIIa. Grave abuse of discretion and the demurrers to evidence
In Criminal Case No. 20345 that charged conspiracy for abstracting ₱57.59
Million out of the ₱100 Million KSS fund, the prosecution’s evidence showed
that ₱60 Million of this fund was disbursed by respondent Benitez, as approving
officer, in the nature of cash advances to Zagala (who received a total amount of
₱40 Million) and Dulay (who received ₱20 Million).
To prove the misappropriation, the prosecution tried to establish that there was
an irregularity in the procedure of liquidating these amounts on the basis of COA
Auditor Cortez’ testimony that the liquidation should have been made before the
COA Chairman (not to the resident auditor of the MHS) because these funds
were confidential.75
Quite evident from the prosecution’s position is that it did not dispute whether a
liquidation had been made of the whole amount of ₱60 Million; rather, what it
disputed was the identity of the person before whom the liquidation should have
been made. Before the directive of former President Marcos was made which
declared the KSS funds (of which the ₱60 Million formed part) to be
confidential, the liquidation of this amount must be made before the resident
auditor of the MHS. With the issuance of the directive, liquidation should have
been made to the COA Chairman who should have then issued a credit memo to
prove proper liquidation.76
To justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has to
prove that the accused received public funds or property that they could not
account for, or was not in their possession and which they could not give a
reasonable excuse for the disappearance of such public funds or property. 77 The
prosecution failed in this task as the subject funds were liquidated and were not
shown to have been converted for personal use by the respondents.
The records reveal that the amounts of ₱50 Million and ₱10 Million were
liquidated by Zagala and Dulay, respectively. 78 On Zagala’s part, the liquidation
of ₱50 Million (₱10 Million of which was the cash advance given to Dulay) was
made to resident auditor Flerida V. Creencia on September 25, 1984 or before the
directive of former President Marcos (declaring the said funds confidential) was
issued on November 7, 1984.79 Hence, at the time the liquidation of the amount
was made, the liquidation report submitted to the resident auditor was the proper
procedure of liquidation. Respondent Benitez, for his part, submitted Journal
Voucher No. 4350208 dated November 27, 1984 stating, among others, that as
early as June 22, 1984, the supporting papers for the liquidation of the ₱50
Million had already been submitted to the COA.80
Moreover, even if the liquidation should have been made in compliance with the
former President’s directive, the prosecution’s evidence did not sufficiently
establish the non-existence of a credit memo. As admitted by COA Auditor
Cortez, certain documents they were looking for during the audit examination
(including the credit memo) could no longer be located after the (EDSA)
revolution.81 She further declared that she did not know if COA Chairman
Alfredo Tantingco complied with the required audit examination of the
liquidated ₱60 Million.82
In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents are sought to be held liable under the
criminal information for converting ₱40 Million (subdivided to ₱21.6 Million,
₱3.8 Million and ₱17 Million or a total of ₱42.4 Million) to their own use given
that these funds were never allegedly transferred to UL, the intended beneficiary.
Records show that the disputed amount allegedly malversed was actually
₱37,757,364.57 Million because of evidence that an amount of ₱4.5 Million was
returned by respondent Benitez.83 As previously mentioned, the documentary
evidence adduced reveals the existence of treasury warrants and disbursement
vouchers issued in the name of UL bearing the amounts of ₱21.6 Million, ₱3.8
Million and ₱17 Million.84 Documentary evidence also exists showing that these
amounts were deposited in the UCPB and drawn afterwards by means of checks
issued for purchases intended for the Kabisig Program of the MHS.
Except for the appropriated ₱17 Million, the petitioner’s evidence does not
sufficiently show how the amounts of ₱21.6 Million and ₱3.8 Million were
converted to the personal use by the respondents. The testimony of COA Auditor
Cortez revealed that documents showing the disbursements of the subject funds
17
were in possession of one Flordeliz Gomez as the Records Custodian and
Secretary of UL. For undisclosed reasons, however, COA Auditor Cortez failed
to communicate with Gomez but merely relied on the documents and checks,
which the audit team already had in its possession.85
This omission, in our view, raises doubts on the completeness and accuracy of
the audit examination pertaining to the ₱21.6 Million and ₱3.8 Million funds.
Such doubt was further strengthened by COA Auditor Cortez’ testimony showing
that ₱3.8 Million was listed in the books of the MHS as a direct expense account
to which UL is not required to render an accounting or liquidation. 86 Also, she
admitted that the amount of ₱21.6 Million was contained in a liquidation
voucher submitted by Dulay, which was included in the transmittal letter signed
by the respondents to the COA and accompanied by a performance report on the
Kabisig Program. This performance report showed that the total amount of ₱21.6
Million was exhausted in the Kabisig Program.87
With respect to the ₱17 Million, evidence adduced showed that 270 units of the
motorcycles have already been transferred in the name of MHS by UL. 88 There is
also evidence that the audit team initially found nothing irregular in the
documentation of the 500 motorcycles during the audit examination conducted in
April 1986; the same goes for the eight cars purchased.
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that registration of
these vehicles in UL’s name alone did not constitute malversation in the absence
of proof, based on the available evidence, to establish that the respondents
benefited from the registration of these motor vehicles in UL’s name, or that
these motor vehicles were converted by the respondents to their own personal
use.89 In the end, the prosecution’s evidence tended to prove that the subject
funds were actually used for their intended purpose.1âwphi1
IV. Conclusion
In dismissing this petition, we observe that the criminal cases might have been
prompted by reasons other than injury to government interest as the primary
concern.90 These other reasons might have triggered the hastiness that attended
the conduct of audit examinations which resulted in evidentiary gaps in the
prosecution’s case to hold the respondents liable for the crime of
malversation.91 As matters now stand, no sufficient evidence exists to support the
charges of malversation against the respondents. Hence, the Sandiganbayan did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it granted the demurrers to evidence and, consequently,
dismissed the criminal cases against the respondents.
We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is as much a
judge in behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the
judge in behalf of the State, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of
society.92 Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates, through evidence and
records, that its case falls within the narrow exceptions from the criminal
protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the finality-
of-acquittal rule.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140904 October 9, 2000
RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C.
AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, wherein petitioners, accused before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, charge said court with having
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied their demurrer to evidence.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine for
P362,000.00 from the Solid Cement Corporation. When she went to the
corporation's Antipolo plant, however, no machine could be given to her, it
appearing that the machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor, who,
unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein petitioners offered to
return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a
criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground that liability, if any,
would be civil and not criminal in nature. This dismissal was, however, reversed
by the Department of Justice.
On October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit based on Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the MeTC of Makati City. After
pre-trial, the prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso.
The prosecution then formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its
case. The admissibility of these documents was questioned by petitioners.
The disputed documents are alleged photo copies of (1) the approval of the sale
of the paper bag-making machine supposedly signed by petitioners; (2) an
official receipt of Solid Cement Corporation evidencing payment of
P362,000.00; (3) a plant gate pass from one J.P. Valencia dated February 16,
1993 for entry into the Antipolo compound and pull-out of the machine; (4) a
letter from one Atty. Maximino Robles demanding delivery of the machine to the
complainant; (5) a letter of Solid Cement's Rene S. Ong offering to return
P362,000.00 plus interest; (6) a letter from Atty. Robles informing Solid Cement
of complainant's refusal to accept the refund of the P362,000.00; (7) a
memorandum from five officers or employees of Solid Cement Corporation
recommending the sale of the paper bag-making-machine; (8) another gate-pass
dated December 3, 1992 from one Ramon Enriquez allowing the pull out of the
machine; (9) a letter from one Lorenzo P. Ligot thanking Solid Cement, through
one Peter Aaliwin, for the former's grant of a right of first refusal; and (10) a
copy of the resolution dated July 26, 1993 of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
18
of Rizal. The defense objected to the admission of these pieces of evidence,
claiming that the same were only unauthenticated photocopies of the originals.
On July 12, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence, attaching thereto their demurrer. In their pleading, petitioners stressed
that all the above-mentioned documents being uncertified photocopies bearing
unidentified or unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in evidence. Without
ruling on the motion for leave to file demurrer, the MeTC, on August 19, 1996,
held:
WHEREFORE, the instant demurrer is hereby denied and the motion to hold
departure order of all accused Granted. Let a copy of this Order be sent to the
Commissioner of Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for proper disposition
and implementation against the accused RENE ONG, MAGDALENO
ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J.O. NERIT of Solid
Cement Corporation, No. 168 Salcedo Street, 3rd Floor, Golden Rock Building,
Makati City.
(pp. 113-114, Rollo.)
In its Order denying the demurrer to evidence, MeTC Judge Felicidad Y.
Navarro-Quiambao summarized private complainant's testimony as follows:
The prosecutor presented the private complainant Zeny Alfonso who testified
that on February 8, 1993, she was awarded by the accused the sale of a Paper
Bag Making Machine including its spare parts. On February 16, 1993, she paid
in full the purchase price of the machine including the charges for its freight to
Cebu in the amount of P362,000.00 and as a consequence of said payment she
was issued a Plant Gate Pass for the pull out of shipment of the machine to Cebu;
that the following day, she proceeded to the plant site of the Solid Cement
Corporation in Antipolo where she was told that accused Rene S. Ong has
ordered to stop and discontinue with the shipment of the machine; that on the
same day, she rushed to see Mr. Ong in Makati and she was told to wait for a
week; that on March 1, 1993, she went again to Mr. Ong who informed her to go
back to the plant site for final arrangement regarding the shipment of the paper
bag machine so she proceeded to the plant only to be told that the machine
cannot be released on order of Mr. Ong; that upon the demand of her lawyer to
the Solid Corporation for its compliance with their obligation under the
transaction, Mr. Ong offered a compromise which was turned down by her.
(pp. 112-113, Rollo.)
The MeTC, in fact, found that there was a prima facie case against petitioners on
the basis of the documents submitted by the prosecution, stating:
The Court noted from the documentary evidence on record that the machine
subject of the transaction between the complainant and the accused is mortgaged
to another creditor, who, incidentally, refused to release the mortgage on said
subject machine. Indeed, this strongly suggest (sic) the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant a trial on the merits. Accordingly, the motion for
hold departure order is hereby Granted.
(p. 113, Rollo.)
Acting on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the accused, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, per Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr., reversed the above
ruling in its order dated May 19, 1997, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted. The
Order dated August 19, 1996 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and the Order
dated September 18, 1996, insofar as it declares the existence of cause to hold
the petitioners for further trial, are hereby set aside and declared null and void.
The respondent judge is hereby ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 157290
entitled People of the Philippines v. Rene Ong, et al.
(p. 159, Rollo.)
The Guadiz resolution was raised to the Court of Appeals by the People. On
April 8, 1999, the 13th Division thereof (Mabutas [P], Aquino, and Rivera, JJ.)
rendered a reversal decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED - and the
assailed resolution (dated May 19, 1997) and order (dated October 16, 1997) of
the respondent judge SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by
this Court on June 5, 1998 is made permanent. The private respondents herein
are given the option to either present their evidence (in Criminal Case No.
157290 which is reinstated) before the trial court below (Metropolitan Trial
Court) or to submit the case for decision based solely on the prosecutor's
evidence.
(p. 71, Rollo.)
Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence and committed grave abuse of discretion in:
1) finding that appeal and not certiorari was the remedy that should
have been availed of by petitioners;
2) finding that RTC Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. erred in evaluating the
prosecution's evidence for sufficiency and inadmissibility;
3) not finding that the RTC resolution dated May 19, 1997 was an
acquittal and not applying double jeopardy in their favor;
The petition is meritorious.
In setting aside the regional trial court's decision which ordered the MeTC to
dismiss the criminal case filed against petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioners, after the denial by the MeTC of their demurrer to evidence, should
not have filed a petition for certiorari with the regional trial court. In its words:
As pointed out, the Supreme Court, in the case of Joseph v. Villaluz (89 SCRA
324), held that it would not annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to
dismiss in a criminal case. Appeal is the proper remedy of the petitioners in order
to have the findings of fact reviewed by a superior court (Manalo v. Mariano, 69
SCRA 80). Such ruling was a reiteration of an earlier one in People v.
Romero (22 Phil. 565) wherein the Highest Tribunal stressed that the question of
whether or not the evidence by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, rests
entirely within the sound judgment of the trial court. The error, if any is
19
committed by the denial of the demurrer to evidence, can only be corrected by
appeal (Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677).
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in People v. Court of Appeals (119 SCRA
162) that it has been the long settled rule that certiorari does not lie to challenge
the trial court's interlocutory order denying the accused's motion to dismiss. "The
appellate courts will not review in such special civil action the prosecution's
evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure
prescribed by the Rules of Court is for the accused to present his evidence after
which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence submitted by both
the prosecution and defense, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal
or conviction. If the verdict is one of acquittal, the case ends there. But if it is
one of conviction, then appeal is the proper recourse (Cruz v. People, supra).
(pp. 64-65, Rollo.)
In other words, the position of the Court of Appeals is to the effect that after the
denial of their demurrer to evidence, petitioners instead of filing a petition
for certiorari with the regional trial court, should have presented their evidence
and in case of an adverse decision, appealed the same to the regional trial court.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioners' invocation of their
right against double jeopardy, stating that the order of the regional trial court
dismissing the criminal case filed against petitioners did not amount to their
acquittal. Held thus the appellate court:
As aptly posited by the petitioner (The People) the requisites that must concur
for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court
of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused (People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481, De
la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499). The fourth requisite is lacking,
because respondent court's resolution of May 19, 1997 is a "fruit" emerging from
a grave abuse of discretion - thus it cannot ripen to an acquittal of the private
respondents, whose demurrer to evidence had been denied by the trial court
below. It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. However, after the prosecution has adduced evidence,
the constitutional presumption of innocence must yield to what has been so
amply and persuasively demonstrated (People v. Andal, 70 SCRA 30). The
respondent judge could not decide in the special civil action before him whether
or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners (private respondents herein), because
factual matters are not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either as
an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari (Insular Bank of
Asia and America v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 420; Navarro v. Commission
on Elections, 228 SCRA 596). It is, therefore, incumbent on the part of the
accused (private respondents herein) to neutralize the evidence of the State in
order to maintain the presumption of their innocence of the crime of which they
were charged. If convicted, appeal will be their (private respondents') proper
remedy to have the findings of fact by the trial judge reviewed by a superior
court (Manalo v. Mariano, et al., 69 SCRA 80).
Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a
trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which
is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had presented
its evidence and rested its case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is
interlocutory. It is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition
for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 [1998])."
However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer to
evidence), appeal in due time is the proper remedy, not certiorari, in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise
of judicial authority."
Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave
abuse of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.
This exception was explicitly recognized by the Court in Cruz v. People (303
SCRA 533 [1999]), where we stated that:
The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to
challenge (the denial of the demurrer to evidence) may be subject to exceptions.
When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with
grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.
Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]), we declared that
"the rule is not absolute and admits of an exception. Thus where, as in the instant
case, the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved
party may assail the order of denial on certiorari."
The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy
of certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners' demurrer to
evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to
sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt (Gutib v. CA, supra).
In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by
petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted by the private complainant were
uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the signatures on which were
either unidentified or unauthenticated.
20
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the identity and
authenticity of the document sought to be presented must first be reasonably
established. Where there is no proof as to the authenticity of the executor's
signature appearing in a private document, such private document should be
excluded (Paz v. Santiago, 47 Phil 334 [1925]).
The documentary evidence submitted by the complaining witness are private
instruments, being instruments executed by private persons without the
intervention of a public notary or of other persons legally authorized, by which
document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced, or set forth (U.S.
v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 [1907]).
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness
and authenticity must first be established, either by the testimony of any one who
saw the writing executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of
the maker hereof.
A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals,
however, that the due execution and authenticity of these documents were never
proved. In fact, the prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and
authenticity of these documents during the presentation of their sole witness.
Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. It is
elementary that this Court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of
an unverified and unidentified document; much less, accord it evidentiary value
(People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). In People v. Gamiao (240 SCRA
254 [1995]), we declared, "[p]arenthetically, appellant failed to present in
evidence the originals or the xerox copies of the documents hereinbefore
discussed. The requirements for the admission of such secondary evidence in
court were not satisfied. The Rules of Court provide that private documents
require proof of their due execution and authentication before they can be
received in evidence. When there is no such proof, the substitutionary documents
may be excluded."
Moreover, the documents submitted are mere photocopies of the originals. Thus,
they are secondary evidence and as such are not admissible unless there is ample
proof of the loss of the originals (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court).
However, the loss of the originals have not been proved by the prosecution,
neither have they shown that the original is a public record in the custody of a
public office or is recorded in a public office, nor that the same is in the custody
or under the control of petitioners.
The due execution and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented not
having been proved, and since these are mere photocopies, the loss of the
originals of which was not previously established, the same are clearly
inadmissible in evidence. Being incompetent evidence, the only evidence the
prosecution could rely on to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony
of the private complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony is
insufficient to sustain a finding of culpability.
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such
evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or
official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered
sufficient, therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime,
and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. In the instant
case, the prosecution miserably failed to establish by sufficient evidence the
existence of the crime of estafa and other deceit.
Aside from complainant's testimony, the only evidence of petitioners' supposed
complicity in the alleged offense is the photocopy of the approval of the sale of
the paper bag-making machine, said document containing the names of
petitioners Ong, Nerit, Aaliwin, and Albarracin. As stated earlier, however, said
document is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, there is no evidence as to their
participation in the crime.1âwphi1 In fact, among the petitioners, private
complainant had personal contact only with Ong, whom she met only after the
alleged approval of the sale of the machine. Having met Ong after the sale, Ong
could not have misrepresented anything to complainant to induce her to part with
her money. As to the others, not having had personal dealings with private
complainant, it boggles one's mind to even entertain the speculation that they
could have misrepresented anything to the latter.
With our ruling that the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution is
inadmissible in evidence, the prosecution's evidence against petitioners is grossly
and patently insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Withal, it was grave abuse
of discretion for the MeTC to consider that there was a prima facie case against
petitioners warranting a trial on the merits given the paucity of evidence against
petitioners.
Had said court been more punctilious and thorough in its study and preparation
of the case, it could have fully appreciated the weakness of the state evidence
against petitioners, and that it was useless, not to say a waste of time and money,
but most of all unfair to the accused, to proceed with the tedious process of trial
and direct petitioners to adduce evidence in their defense, since it was obvious
from the beginning that petitioners could not be convicted of the crime charged.
In ruling against petitioners, the appellate court also held that petitioners could
not avail of their constitutional right against double jeopardy, allegedly because
the regional trial court's reversal of the MeTC denial of their demurrer to
evidence is a "fruit" emerging from grave abuse of discretion. It declared that
Judge Guadiz could not decide in the special civil action filed before him
whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners, factual matters not being proper for
consideration in certiorari proceedings.
21
It is true that the prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie to correct every
controversial interlocutory order but is confined merely to questions of
jurisdiction. Its function is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to
relieve persons from arbitrary acts, meaning acts which courts or judges have no
power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct procedural
errors or the court's erroneous findings and conclusions (De Vera v. Pineda, 213
SCRA 434 [1992]).
However, certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings
complained of are not supported by the evidence on record (Congregation of the
Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, 291 SCRA 385 [1998]). As earlier observed,
with the inadmissibility of the prosecution's documentary evidence, the trial
court's finding of a prima faciecase against petitioners is glaringly unsupported
by the sole testimony of private complainant, hence the RTC resolution reversing
the MeTC's denial of the demurrer to evidence cannot be said to be the "fruit" of
grave abuse of discretion. Since the factual findings of the MeTC are devoid of
support in the evidence on record, it was proper for the RTC to review said
findings. Moreover, in order to determine whether or not there was grave abuse
of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence, the RTC had to inquire into
the admissibility and sufficiency of the documentary and testimonial evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
With the grant by the RTC of the demurrer to evidence, the same constituted a
valid acquittal and any further prosecution of petitioners on the same charge
would expose them to being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. A
dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is not
appealable as the accused would thereby be placed in double jeopardy
(See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 441).
Lastly, it has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of
justice in certiorari proceedings. The cases in which certiorari will issue cannot
be defined, because to do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus.
In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice
may require." So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice (Gutib v. CA, supra).
The case at bar presents one such instance calling for this appropriate remedy. As
discussed elsewhere, petitioners have satisfactorily demonstrated in their
demurrer that the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against them,
hence, there remains no reason to hold them for trial. Indeed, an accused is
always presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Parenthetically,
petitioners have the right to be protected against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecution; to be secure from an open and public accusation of a crime; and,
from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. Similarly situated is the
State, which must be shielded at all times from useless and expensive litigations
that only contribute to the clogging of court dockets and take a heavy toll on its
limited time and meager resources.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1999 setting aside the Regional Trial
Court's resolution dated May 19, 1997, as well as respondent appellate court's
Resolution dated November 16, 1999 denying reconsideration of its decision, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 157290
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rene S. Ong, et al. is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189754 October 24, 2012
LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision1
elated May 19, 2009 and Resolution2 dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, entitled Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan
v. lion. Rizalina T Capco-Urnali, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, Lito Bautista, and
Jimmy Alcantara, which granted the
petition for certiorari of respondent Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan. TheCA
Decision reversed and set aside the Order 3 dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, but only insofar as it pertains
to the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence filed by petitioners Lito Bautista
(Bautista) and Jimmy Alcantara (Alcantara), and also ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 19, 2002, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City
filed two (2) informations, both dated February 4, 2002, with the RTC, Branch
212, Mandaluyong City, against Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and
petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed by
publishing defamatory articles against respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in
the tabloid Bandera.
In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002
reads:
That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officer[s] of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera,
whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another,
with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into
22
public dishonor, shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid),
with circulation in Metro Manila, which among others have the following
insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!
Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-
dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na
ganyan siya.
Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng
Central Institute of Technology at ni isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa
and all throughout the article, we’ve maintained our objectivity, pero sa
interview sa aparadoric singer- actress in connection with an album launching,
ay buong ningning na sinabi nitong she’s supposedly looking into the item that
we’ve written and most probably would take some legal action.
xxx
Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.
Ang hindi lang namin nagustuhan ay ang pagbintangan kaming palagi naman
daw namin siyang
sinisiraan, kaya hindi lang daw niya kami pinapansin, believing na part raw
siguro yun ng aming trabaho.
Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries
about her katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge
the good reviews we’ve done on her.
xxx
Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress who’s desperately trying to sing
even if she truly can’t, itanggi mo na hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung
nagkasama raw kayo ng tatlong araw sa mother's house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu
more than a month ago, in connection with one of those political campaigns of
your husband.
xxx
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputations
of a vice, condition or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor,
discredit or contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002
reads:
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officers of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera,
whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping, and aiding one another,
with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into
public dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid),
with circulation in Metro Manila, which, among others, have the following
insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARYANG
SUPPORTER NI KIKO!
FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko
Pangilinan na si Pettizou Tayag, a multi-millionaire who owns Central Institute
of Technology College in Sampaloc, Manila (it is also one of the biggest schools
in Paniqui, Tarlac).
xxx
Which in a way, she did. Bagama't busy siya (she was having a meeting with
some business associates), she went out of her way to give Sharon security.
So, ang ginawa daw ni Ms. Tayag ay tinext nito si Sharon para mabigyan ito ng
instructions para kumportable itong makarating sa Bulacan.
She was most caring and solicitous, pero tipong na-offend daw ang megastar at
nagtext pang "You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for me, I’ll be fine."
Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega nagtatarang daw ito at
binadmouth si Pettizou. Kesyo ang kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at
kung anu-ano pang mga derogatory words na nakarating siyempre sa
kinauukulan.
Anyhow, if it’s true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially supportive of
Kiko, how come Sharon seems not to approve of her?
"She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that
happens, mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya," our caller opines.
Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp.
"In public," our source goes on tartly, "pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa-embrace-embrace
pero kung silang dalawa na lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si
Kiko."
My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really intelligent as compared to
Sharon who appears to be brain dead most of the time.
Yung text message niyang "You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for
me," hindi ba’t she was being redundant?
Another thing, I guess it’s high time that she goes on a diet again. Jesus, she
looks 6’11 crosswise!
xxx
Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si Sharon daw ay
talagang mega-brat, mega-sungit. But who does she think she is? Her wealth,
dear, would pale in comparison with the Tayag’s millions. Kunsabagay, she’s
brain dead most of the time.
xxx
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputation
of a vice, condition or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor,
discredit or contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
23
Upon arraignment, petitioners, together with their co-accused Ampoloquio, each
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the case
ensued.6
Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit7 alleged that Bautista and Alcantara
were Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera, and
their co-accused, Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged libelous articles
which were published therein, and subject of the two informations. According to
respondent, in April 2001, she and her family were shocked to learn about an
article dated March 27, 2001, featured on page 7 of Bandera (Vol. 11, No. 156),
in the column Usapang Censored of Ampoloquio, entitled Naburyong sa
Kaplastikan ni Sharon ang
Milyonaryang Supporter ni Kiko, that described her as plastic (hypocrite),
ingrate, mega-brat, mega-sungit, and brain dead, which were the subject of
Criminal Case No. MC02-4875.8 Another article, with the same title and similar
text, also featured on the same date, appeared on page 6 of Saksi Ngayon, in the
column Banatan of Ampoloquio.9Moreover, respondent averred that on April 24,
2001, Ampoloquio wrote two follow-up articles, one appeared in his column
Usapang Censored, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon!, stating that she bad-mouthed
one Pettizou Tayag by calling the latter kulit-kulit (annoyingly persistent),
atribida (presumptuous), mapapel (officious or self-important), and other
derogatory words; that she humiliated Tayag during a meeting by calling the
latter bobo (stupid); that she exhibited offensive behavior towards Tayag; and
that she was a dishonest person with questionable credibility, which were the
subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-4872.10 Another article, entitled Magtigil
Ka, Sharon Cuneta!!!!, also featured on the same date with similar text, and
appeared on page 7 of Saksi Ngayon (Vol. 3, No. 285), in the column Banatan of
Ampoloquio,11 with the headline in bold letters, Sharon Cuneta, May Sira? on the
front page of the said issue.12 Respondent added that Ampoloquio’s articles
impugned her character as a woman and wife, as they depicted her to be a
domineering wife to a browbeaten husband. According to Ampoloquio,
respondent did not want her husband (Senator Francis Pangilinan) to win (as
Senator) because that would mean losing hold over him, and that she would treat
him like a wimp and sampid (hanger-on) privately, but she appeared to be a
loving wife to him in public. Respondent denied that Tayag contributed millions
to her husband’s campaign fund. She clarified that Tayag assisted during the
campaign and was one of the volunteers of her husband’s Kilos Ko Movement,
being the first cousin of one Atty. Joaquinito Harvey B. Ringler (her husband’s
partner in Franco Pangilinan Law Office); however, it was Atty. Ringler who
asked Tayag to resign from the movement due to difficulty in dealing with her.
After presenting respondent on the witness stand, the prosecution filed its Formal
Offer of Documentary Exhibits dated October 11, 2006, which included her
undated Complaint-Affidavit.13
On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the
Attached Demurrer to Evidence.14 In their Demurrer to Evidence, 15 which was
appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the
prosecution's evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and
Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not
properly identified by respondent herself during her testimony; and that the
subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of
malice.
On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order 16 granting petitioners’ Demurrer to
Evidence and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. MCO2-4872 and MCO2-4875. The
trial court opined, among others, that since the prosecution did not submit its
Comment/Opposition to the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, the averments
therein thus became unrebutted; that the testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced by the prosecution failed to prove the participation of petitioners as
conspirators of the crime charged; and that during the direct examination on July
27, 2004 and cross-examination on August 1, 2006, respondent neither identified
them, nor was there any mention about their actual participation.
As a consequence, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit17 dated May 29, 2008,
with the attached Comment (to Accused Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara's
Demurrer to Evidence)18 dated March 24, 2008, stating that during the pendency
of the trial court's resolution on the petitioners' Motion for Leave of Court to File
the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence, the
prosecution intended to file its Comment, by serving copies thereof, through
registered mail, upon counsels for the petitioners, including the other accused,
and the respondent; however, said Comment was not actually filed with the trial
court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the State Prosecutor handling the
case.19 Claiming that it was deprived of due process, the prosecution prayed that
its Comment be admitted and that the same be treated as a reconsideration of the
trial court's Order dated April 25, 2008.
In an Order dated June 3, 2008, the RTC granted the prosecutions' Motion to
Admit, with the attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be admitted to
form part of the court records.
On August 19, 2008, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA,
seeking to set aside the RTC Orders dated April 25, 2008 (which granted
petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against
them) and June 3, 2008 (which noted and admitted respondent's Comment to
form part of the records of the case).
In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby
reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008, but only insofar
as it pertains to the grant of petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that
the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009
which, however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28,
2009.
Hence, petitioners filed this present petition, raising the following arguments:
I.
24
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS IS BARRED BY THE PETITIONERS' RIGHT
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT LIE TO CORRECT ALLEGED
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
GRANTING PETITONERS' DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the
Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution
can no longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double
jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA
should not have prospered, because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the
trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that
the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not
correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Petitioners aver that although the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had not
been denied due process, however, it erred in ruling that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting petitioners' Demurrer to
Evidence, on the basis that the prosecution failed to prove that they acted in
conspiracy with Ampoloquio, the author of the questioned articles. They added
that what the prosecution proved was merely their designations as Editor and
Associate Editor of the publication Bandera, but not the fact that they had either
control over the articles to be published or actually edited the subject articles.
Respondent counters that petitioners failed to show special and important
reasons to justify their invocation of the Court's power to review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. She avers that the acquittal of petitioners does not preclude
their further prosecution if the judgment acquitting them is void for lack of
jurisdiction. Further, she points out that contrary to petitioners’ contention, the
principle of double jeopardy does not attach in cases where the court's judgment
acquitting the accused or dismissing the case is void, either for having
disregarded the State's right to due process or for having been rendered by the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and not merely errors of judgment.
Respondent also avers that even if the prosecution was deemed to have waived
its right to file a Comment on the petitioners’ Motion for Leave of Court to File
the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, this did not give the trial court any reason to
deprive the prosecution of its right to file a Comment on the petitioners’
Demurrer to Evidence itself, which was a clear violation of the due process
requirement. By reason of the foregoing, respondent insists that petitioners
cannot invoke violation of their right against double jeopardy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and
the view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in
appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested
in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to
represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. 20 The OSG is
the law office of the Government.21
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf
of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such
acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again espoused and
maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, 22 it was categorically stated
that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal,
the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor
General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to
question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case.
The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company v. Veridiano II.23 In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v.
Bangayan,24 the Court again upheld this guiding principle.
Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago, 25 wherein the Court had the
occasion to bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the
civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
25
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he
may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in name of said complainant.26
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the
offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case
is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal
aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through
the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant
may not undertake such appeal.27
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially
questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the
case. Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the
OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of
the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA.
Respondent lacked the personality or legal standing to question the trial court’s
order because it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring
actions on behalf of the State in criminal proceedings, before the Supreme Court
and the CA.28 Thus, the CA should have denied the petition outright.
Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it
should be stressed that the granting of petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence already
amounted to a dismissal of the case on the merits and a review of the order
granting the demurrer to evidence will place the accused in double jeopardy.
Consequently, the Court disagrees with the CA’s ruling reversing the trial court’s
order dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners.
Under Section 23,29 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence,
after the prosecution terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its case,
the trial court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
upon the filing of a Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with or without leave
of court. If the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court
and the same is denied, he may adduce evidence in his defense. However, if the
Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the accused without prior leave of court and the
same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer
to Evidence, the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented
by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is
not sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an
adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and
may no longer be appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal would, thus, violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.30
Anent the prosecution’s claim of denial of due process. As correctly found by the
CA, the prosecution was not denied due process. Suffice it to state that the
prosecution had actively participated in the trial and already rested its case, and
upon petitioners' filing of their Demurrer to Evidence, was given the opportunity
to file its Comment or Opposition and, in fact, actually filed its Comment
thereto, albeit belatedly. The CA emphasized that the word "may" was used in
Section 23 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states
that if leave of court is granted, and the accused has filed the Demurrer to
Evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, the
prosecution "may" oppose the Demurrer to Evidence within a similar period
from its receipt.1âwphi1 In this regard, the CA added that the filing of a
Comment or Opposition by respondent is merely directory, not a mandatory or
jurisdictional requirement, and that in fact the trial court may even proceed with
the resolution of the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence even without the
prosecution's Comment.
One final note. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code specifies the persons that
can be held liable for libel. It provides:
ART. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who shall publish, exhibit or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of
a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamation contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.31
From the foregoing, not only is the person who published, exhibited or caused
the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing shall be responsible
for the same, all other persons who participated in its publication are liable,
including the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, who shall be equally responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The liability
which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in nature.
In Fermin v. People,32 therein petitioner argued that to sustain a conviction for
libel under Article 360 of the Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly
participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous
article. She also averred that she had adduced ample evidence to show that she
had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending article, nor in the
review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip
Tabloid. The Court struck down her erroneous theory and ruled that therein
petitioner, who was not only the Publisher of Gossip Tabloid but also its
President and Chairperson, could not escape liability by claiming lack of
participation in the preparation and publication of the libelous article.
26
Similarly, in Tulfo v. People,33 therein petitioners, who were Managing Editor,
National Editor of Remate publication, President of Carlo Publishing House, and
one who does typesetting, editing, and layout of the page, claim that they had no
participation in the editing or writing of the subject articles which will hold them
liable for the crime of libel and, thus, should be acquitted. In debunking this
argument, the Court stressed that an editor or manager of a newspaper, who has
active charge and control over the publication, is held equally liable with the
author of the libelous article. This is because it is the duty of the editor or
manager to know and control the contents of the paper, and interposing the
defense of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the articles or
publication definitely will not prosper.
The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article
360 was already elucidated as early as in the case of U.S. v. Ocampo,34 to wit:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the
printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason
of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof.
With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher
but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection
with its publication are liable as publishers.35
Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara,
being the Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing
Corporation, answerable with Ampoloquio, for the latter’s alleged defamatory
writing, as if they were the authors thereof. Indeed, as aptly concluded by the
court a quo:
The aforestated provision is clear and unambiguous. It equally applies to an
editor of a publication in which a libelous article was published and states that
the editor of the same shall be responsible for the defamation in writing as if he
were the author thereof. Indeed, when an alleged libelous article is published in a
newspaper, such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business
manager with the guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author
of said article is based on the principle that editors and associate editors, by the
nature of their positions, edit, control and approve the materials which are to be
published in a newspaper. This means that, without their nod of approbation, any
article alleged to be libelous would not be published.
Hence, by virtue of their position and the authority which they exercise,
newspaper editors and associate editors are as much critical part in the
publication of any defamatory material as the writer or author thereof.36
Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural
infirmity that the petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but
instead by respondent in her personal capacity. Although the conclusion of the
trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the
demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right
against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court
could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in convicting petitioner Andre L. D’Aigle of the crime of Estafa. Likewise
seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC. assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated August 17, 2006 denying the Motion for
The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with Reconsideration5 thereto.
caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the Factual Antecedents
right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under
against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private the following Information:
complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in the Municipality of
the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect Honorable Court, the said accused being then the Managing Director of
in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in Samfit Phils. received from said Samfit, Phils. for management, care and
mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who custody the following company properties:
come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be a) Electric transformer worth ₱16,500.00
possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate b) Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of computer
actions against them. boxes worth ₱490,000.00
Perforce, the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch c) Machine spare parts consisting of
212, Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, - set of rack and pinion
which dismissed the actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy - pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30
Alcantara, should be reinstated. - pair of meter gears 42 teeth
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 - set of gears 32 teeth
and Resolution dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. - gear bith bearing inserted
SP No. 104885, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The portion of the Order - 3 SL 20 bearings "V" plate
dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong - one-way clutch
City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the - one-way bearing CSK 20HC5
actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, is - 8 of LJ 34 bearings "V" type
REINSTATED. - roller bearing 1 x 0
SO ORDERED. - 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value of
₱12,765.35
Republic of the Philippines d) [Equipment] and raw materials – valued at ₱162,400.00
SUPREME COURT with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED
Manila SIXTY FIVE PESOS & 35/100 (₱681,665.35)
FIRST DIVISION under the express obligation to use the same for a particular purpose[,] that
G.R. No. 174181 June 27, 2012 is, exclusively for the machinery of Samfit Phils. but accused far from
ANDRE L. D' AIGLE, Petitioner, complying with his obligation with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon
vs. him by his employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid corporate properties to
DECISION his own personal use and benefit and despite several demands made upon
DEL CASTILLO, J.: him, accused refused and failed and still refuses and fails to return or
The "failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is account for the same to the damage and prejudice of Samfit, Phils.,
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation."1 represented by its President, Mr. Arturo Parducho, in the aforesaid sum of
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ₱681,665.35.
Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision2 dated March 31, 2006 of CONTRARY TO LAW.6
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed with Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-
modification the Decision3 dated January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial trial and trial on the merits.
Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL
27
During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo
Parducho (Parducho), Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc.
(SPI), a corporation primarily engaged in the manufacture of underwires for
brassieres. According to him, petitioner was the former managing director of
SPI tasked with the management of the company as well as the
management, care and custody of SPI’s personal properties. At the time that
he was holding said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder
of TAC Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the
fabrication of wire bending machine similar to that being used by SPI.7
Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and
responsibilities as SPI’s managing director8due to alleged conflict of
business interest. Because of this, Parducho conducted an audit and
inventory of SPI’s properties and reviewed its financial statements,
vouchers, books of account and other pertinent records. He also interviewed
some of SPI’s employees.9 These revealed that several properties of SPI such
as wire materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes,
machine spare parts, while still under the management, care and custody of
petitioner, went missing and were left unaccounted for. 10 Further
investigation revealed that some of SPI’s wire bending machines, computer
and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. This was confirmed
by Daniel Gutierrez, a former employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that
TAC copied the wire bending machines of SPI.11
In a letter dated January 14, 1997,12 SPI’s counsel formally demanded upon
petitioner to turn over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody.
Ignoring the demand, petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. SPI
also filed a replevin case against him for the recovery of the electronic and
computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue of the Writ of Replevin,13 an
electronic box found inside TAC’s premises was recovered from petitioner
while a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.
In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated
spare parts for SPI on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and
maintenance of SPI’s machines. He also claimed that he had an
understanding with SPI that TAC would support SPI’s operation until its
business standing improves. And since petitioner only had a 10% share in
SPI, TAC would fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00
each so that he could get additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up,
Samfit UK would provide the micro stepping motors and motor drives as
well as the control panels. However, petitioner was not able to finish
fabricating the bending machines as he was dismissed by SPI. As a
consequence, he filed a labor case against it before the Department of Labor
and Employment.
Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the
repairs of its machines. While he admitted that SPI’s electronic transformer,
28
computer boxes and motor drives were recovered while in his possession
thru a writ of replevin, he reasoned out that he did not return them to SPI
after his dismissal because he intended to exercise his right of lien over
them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI,
collectibles amounting to ₱900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary of
₱80,000.00. Finally, he denied having appropriated the computer boxes for
his own benefit.14
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of
petitioner for the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 15 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of
petitioner to account for and deliver to SPI, upon demand, the properties
entrusted to his care, custody and management is sufficient evidence of
actual conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision16rendered on January 15, 2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D’ AIGLE to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusio[n] temporal as maximum; to indemnify private
complainant in the amount of ₱191,665.35 and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision18 dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and
affirmed with modification the trial court’s Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna
(Branch 93), dated January 15, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL, is
modified to the effect that appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The decision is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration20 was likewise denied in a
Resolution21 dated August 17, 2006.
Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner-accused’[S] Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of valid reasons/justification.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the lower court,
(RTC-Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna), and at the same TIME modifying the
extent of the penalty [imposED] for the crime allegedly committed.22
Our Ruling
After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the
petitioner vis-à-vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines
(respondent), and in the light of the practically parallel finding of facts and
conclusions of the courts below, this Court finds the instant petition partly
meritorious.
Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to
sustain petitioner’s claim that the appellate court erred in denying his
Motion for Reconsideration without valid reason or justification. The reason
for the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is
clear and simple, that is, after it made a thorough evaluation of the issues
and arguments proffered in the said motion, the CA found that same were
already passed upon and duly considered in its assailed Decision. This is
very plain from the contents of the August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied due to a valid reason and justifiable
cause.
Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial
court’s Decision did not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a
judgment is not rendered defective just because of the absence of a
declaration of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the dispositive portion. The
ratio decidendi of the RTC Decision extensively discussed the guilt of the
petitioner and no scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained by the
courts below. Indeed, petitioner’s guilt was duly proven by evidence of the
prosecution. In any event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient if it states: "1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused
and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its
commission; 2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and 4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived." We find that all of these are sufficiently stated in
the trial court’s Decision.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in
affirming the said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon
him since the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of estafa. He argues that Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC
requires that the person charged was given juridical possession of the thing
misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical possession of the things
allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPI’s properties was only
by virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on
29
whose behalf he has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said
properties.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand
counters that the prosecution’s evidence has fully established all the
elements of the crime charged. Based on SPI’s records, petitioner received
from it various equipment of SPI on several occasions for the sole purpose of
manufacturing underwires for brassieres. However after the conduct of an
audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to properly account therefor.
Petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade.
Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return, the same;
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.23
All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.
Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a
business transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines
and spare parts for the latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the
necessary components to be used in the fabrication as well as the electronic
devices while work would be done at petitioner’s premises. Pursuant to this,
petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an electronic transformer,
electronic box and a computer box.24 When petitioner, however, was not able
to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter
demanded for the return of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed
the demand and simply kept the properties as lien for his claims against
SPI.25
From petitioner’s own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the
aforementioned elements is very clear. SPI’s properties were received by the
petitioner in trust. He received them for a particular purpose, that is, for the
fabrication of bending machines and spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made
a demand for their return after petitioner’s alleged dismissal therefrom,
petitioner deliberately ignored the same.
The Court cannot agree with petitioner’s postulation that he did not acquire
juridical possession of SPI’s properties since his relation with the same was
only by virtue of his official function as SPI’s corporate officer. As borne out
by the records, the equipment subject matter of this case were received in
trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in the fabrication of bending
machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to use them without
any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only
physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the
Court held in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals:26
When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the
offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3)
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x
With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the
prosecution was able to prove this through circumstantial evidence.
"Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence."27 The "failure to account
upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation."28 As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon
demand, the properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This
already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or
conversion of said properties to petitioner’s own personal use. Even if
petitioner merely retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his
right of lien over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate, failure to
return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is
tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly
noted by the CA:
We are not impressed by appellant’s excuse. We note that SPI’s demand for
the return of the properties subject of this case was made on January 14,
1997. At that time, appellant was no longer the managing director of SPI, he
having been terminated from his position on November 19, 1996. This
observation, coupled with SPI’s demand for the return of its equipment and
materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said properties
and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for them raises the
presumption of misappropriation and conversion. x x x29
Lastly, it is obvious that petitioner’s failure to return SPI’s properties valued
at ₱191,665.35 caused damage and prejudice to the latter.
In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the controversy
between him and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he
was a stockholder of the latter. Such being the case, he avers that his
conviction for estafa has no basis.
Contrary, however to petitioner’s stance, by no stretch of imagination can
the Court consider the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-
corporate controversy. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
30
Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would support
appellant’s allegation that the acts complained of in this case were corporate
acts. His allegation without more that he had an agreement with Mr. Bernie
Kelly of SPI to the effect that his (appellant’s) share in SPI would be
increased to 40% in exchange for two bending machines does not give his
act of retaining the properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also
no evidence that he acted on behalf of TAC Manufacturing Corporation,
much less of SPI. Premises considered, we do not agree that appellant’s
actuation should be considered as a corporate act, for which he claims he
could not be held personally liable. x x x30
Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said
witnesses to be credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith
and credence. The CA for its part, did not disturb the trial court’s
appreciation of the same. It is a well-entrenched doctrine "that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court,
are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive
between the parties."31Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious
exceptions, none of them obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of
the challenged Decision. Thus, the Court accords deference to the trial
court’s appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly, the RTC’s finding of
petitioner’s guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.
The proper imposable penalty
The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the
RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over ₱12,000.00 but does not
exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the same
paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period
with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00
but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years
imprisonment.
In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount
involved which is ₱191,665.35.1âwphi1 Since said amount is in excess of
₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years
of prision mayor.32 "[A] period of one (1) year shall be added to the penalty
for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no
case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20)
years."33 Hence, sixteen (16) years must be added to the maximum term of
the penalty of prision mayor. And since same exceeds twenty (20) years, the
maximum term should be pegged at twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its
maximum to prision mayor in its minimum is prision correccional in its
minimum to medium periods. "Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x."34
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA
correctly pegged the penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal but erred in imposing the minimum term of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is beyond the lawful range. Thus,
the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly, petitioner is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and August
17, 2006, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and
DIAGA ALONTO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A.
Abellana could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA
Decision set aside the May 21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. CBU-51385 and
acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public document by a
private individual because the Information charged him with a different
offense which is estafa through falsification of a public document.4 However,
the CA still adjudged him civilly liable.5
Factual Antecedents
31
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga
and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto),6secured by a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently,
or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots
to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in Manila.
However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto
appearing before the notary public.8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the
transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with
Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, and with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a
public document consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land
consisting of 803 square meters executed before Notary Public Gines N.
Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the
latter’s Notarial Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga
Alonto sold their parcel of land located at Pardo, Cebu City, for a
consideration of ₱130,000.00 in favor of accused by imitating,
counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be imitated or counterfeited the
signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their
typewritten names in said document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact
as the accused very well knew that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga
Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed property and that the
signature[s] appearing in said document are not their signature[s], thus
causing it to appear that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto
participated in the execution of said document when they did not so
participate[. Once] said document was falsified, accused did then and there
cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said
falsified document, to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto
and Diaga Alonto in the amount of ₱130,000.00, the value of the land .
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".12 After the
termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for
resolution was whether petitioner committed the crime of estafa through
falsification of public document.13 Based on the evidence presented by both
parties, the trial court found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the
spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay their obligation, petitioner
prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the spouses Alonto actually signed;
but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto
personally appearing before the notary public. From these, the trial court
concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public
Document by a private individual under Article 172(1)14 in relation to
Article 171(2)15 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not estafa through
falsification of public document as charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto
Abellana GUILTY of the crime of falsification of public document by private
individuals under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him
to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
Prision Correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6)YEARS, as maximum.
He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership
and possession of the real properties in question in favor of private
complainants. After private complainants shall have acquired full ownership
and possession of the aforementioned properties, they are directed to pay
the accused the sum of ₱130,000.00 [with] legal interest thereon reckoned
from the time this case was instituted.
Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of
the private complainants [of] the real properties in question within a period
of six (6) months from the time this decision becomes final and executory,
he is directed to pay said complainants the sum of ₱1,103,000.00
representing the total value of the properties of the private complainants.
He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:
1. ₱15,000.00 for nominal damages;
2. ₱20,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
3. ₱50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;
4. ₱30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was
acquitted of the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another
crime or offense not specifically charged and alleged and which is not
necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The CA, in its Decision
dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the negative.17 It held that petitioner who
was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public
document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of
Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual under Article
172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification
committed in Article 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting,
signature or rubric while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when the
offender caused it to appear in a document that a person participated in an
act or proceeding when in fact such person did not so participate. Thus, the
32
CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in
the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.18 Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial court’s
finding with respect to petitioner’s civil liability. The dispositive portion of
the CA’s February 22, 2006 Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision
dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch
13, Cebu City only insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is
different from that charged in the Information. The civil liability
determinations are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the
Resolution dated August 15, 2006.
Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising the lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly
liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court and the CA.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.20 In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. 21 When the
exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor
of the offended party in the same criminal action.22 In other words, the
"extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not
exist."23
Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted
petitioner of an offense different from or not included in the crime charged
in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged with estafa through
falsification of public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses
Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally
appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead
convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA
held that petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.24 The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil liability of
petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.25
We do not agree.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused
despite his exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives
rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason
of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not
the same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.
Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven
that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed
by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear
that the spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale
thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor.
However, after the presentation of the parties’ respective evidence, the trial
court found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed
signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear
before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’
transaction.27 Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. "To
overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing
evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the
[deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld." 28 And since
the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner
remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale,
petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance
of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons,
no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.1avvphi1
Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the
petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of
spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it
has absolutely no basis in view of the trial court’s finding that the signatures
of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not
forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the alternative. There is
nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the
alternative."29 While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another
33
penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative.30 "He must fix positively
and with certainty the particular penalty."31
In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the
trial court and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership
and possession of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay
them ₱1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties and to pay
them nominal damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006
Resolution are AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the
petitioner for the crime of falsification of public document. The portion
which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the
restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of ₱1,103,000.00
representing the value of the property, and the payment of nominal and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, is deleted for
lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 121175 November 4, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARILYN RAFAEL VILLAMAR, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and
frustrated murder in an information dated November 9, 1993, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That in or about and during the period beginning 7:00 a.m.
of June 5, 1993 to 9:00 a.m. of the same day, in Barangay
Cabalantian, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, MARILYN RAFAEL-
VILLAMAR, suspecting that Maria Luz Cortez would not
return her daughter Jonalyn Villamar whom she entrusted
to said Maria Luz Cortez, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously surreptitiously enter the house of
Maria Luz Cortez and by means of force and intimidation
and with threats to kill take said Maria Luz Cortez, a woman
 of 20 years old as the latter entered her house whom said
accused detained and kept locked inside the house from
7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 or a period of two (2)
hours, more or less, under restraint and against the will of
the said Maria Luz Cortez and said accused during the
period of detention maltreated and refused to release said
Maria Luz Cortez until her demand for a sum of money and
a getaway vehicle was given to her and on the occasion
thereof, accused with evident premeditation and with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and strike with a deadly weapon to wit: a
knife and a chisel, one Maria Luz Cortez who as a result
thereof, suffered various lacerated wounds on the head
which ordinarily would cause the death of the said Maria
Luz Cortez, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely
arrival of the authorities who rescued Maria Luz Cortez
which prevented her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On November 23, 1993, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits proceeded.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended
party Cortez and inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her
daughter, explaining that her offer was due her husband's hasty departure.
Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and immediately prepared a
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the adoption. Unfortunately, on June 5,
1993, Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the house of
Cortez and decided to take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of
course, not taken lightly by Cortez, who vehemently refused to relinquish
custody of the girl to Villamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar
managed to hit Cortez with a chisel on the head rendering the latter weak
and immobilized, after which she threatened her with a pair of scissors.
Villamar was demanding that Cortez reveal where the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was located. Meanwhile, attracted by the commotion, a curious
crowd was already gathering outside the Cortez residence. Sensing
imminent danger, Villamar demanded money and a get-away vehicle to
extricate herself from her predicament. However, on her way to the car, a
melee ensued resulting in her immediate arrest by the responding
policemen.
34
The defense, on the other hand, narrates a different scenario.
Villamar admits that a struggle did occur between her and Cortez, after the
latter refused her request for the return of her child. However, while she
acknowledged that she brandished a pair of scissors before Cortez, this was
motivated more out of fear of the crowd assembled outside the house which
might harm her. In other words, in order to protect herself, she had to use
Cortez as a "human shield" to keep the crowd at bay.
The trial court, not having been convinced with Villamar's version of the
incident, convicted her for serious illegal detention and less serious physical
injuries, but at the same time acquitted her on the charge of frustrated
murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
Accordingly, finding the accused Marilyn Rafael Villamar to
be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious
Illegal Detention and Less Serious Physical Injuries, the
Court hereby sentences her as follows:
1) On the Serious Illegal Detention — for the accused to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and all the
accessory penalties as provided by law;
2) On the Less Serious Physical Injuries — for the accused
to suffer a four (4) months imprisonment and any accessory
penalty as maybe provided by law.
The accused is entitled to credit of her preventive
imprisonment in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED. 1
Insisting on her innocence, Villamar has interposed the instant appeal.
The focal point of Villamar's thesis is that she cannot be guilty of serious
illegal detention since she had no intention to deprive or detain Cortez of
her liberty.2
Before a conviction for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code can be sustained, the following
elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual, (b)
kidnaps or detains another that will deprive the victim of his liberty, (c) the
act of detention is illegal and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances are present — the detention lasts for more than five
(5) days; it is committed by simulating a public authority, serious physical
injuries are inflicted or threats to kill are made and the person kidnapped is
a minor, female or public officer. 3 It is important that indubitable proof be
presented that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of his/her liberty,4 and not when such restraint of liberty was
merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended
by the offender. 5
Contrary therefore to the prosecution's assertions, we are of the opinion
that Villamar had no intention to kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal
liberty. This is clearly demonstrated in the tesimony of Villamar herself:
Q — Were you able to reach at their house,
the spouses Maria Luz Cortez?
A — Only the wife, sir.
Q — Upon reaching Maria Luz Cortez at
their house, what happened next?
A — I talked to her, sir.
Q — When you talked to her what did you
talk about?
A — I told her again that I wanted to regain
custody of my daughter, sir.
Q — What did she tell you when you told
her about that?
A — She told me again that I don't have to
go back to their place because there was no
more baby that I could get, sir.
Q — Upon hearing that, what did you do?
A — I still pleaded to (sic) her, sir. 6
The actuations of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother's
desperation and distraught mind when her plea for the return of her child
was refused by Cortez, unmindful of the consequences which her reckless
outburst would cause to the latter. In a celebrated case, this Court rejected
the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for
the crime.7 In other words, what actually transpired was the rage of a
woman scorned. The undeniable fact that the purpose of Villamar was to
seek the return of her child was never assailed by the prosecution. Until the
defendant's purpose to detain the offended party is shown, a prosecution for
illegal detention will not prosper.
Still, the prosecution insists that assuming that Villamar had no intention to
deprive Cortez of her liberty, the fact that she demanded and received One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) from Cortez constitutes a ransom within the
contemplation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. 8 Again, we cannot
agree with the prosecution's theory.
Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.9 In the
instant case, there is no showing whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort
money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.
When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of the
"Sinampaang Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act
merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised
Penal Code. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any
35
person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law,
or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong;
(b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by
material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and,
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in
other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right. 10
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it
must be stressed that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal
detention. Still, when Villamar was erroneously charged for illegal detention,
such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for the crime of grave
coercion. In the early case of U.S. v. Quevengco, 11 and, recently, in People v.
Astorga, 12 we ruled that the offense of grave coercion is necessarily included
in illegal detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar
the accused from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original
charge. 13
Regarding the imposable penalty, while we are aware that on February 20,
1995, Republic Act No. 7890 14was passed increasing the penalty for crimes
involving grave coercion from arresto mayor to prision correccional, such
amendatory law will not be applicable in the instant case, for the simple
reason that the offense was committed on June 5, 1993 two years before the
said law was enacted. Villamar should not, therefore, be unduly prejudiced
by the imposition of a more severe penalty than that provided in the law
then in
force. 15
Hence, we hold that the penalty of arresto mayor, which is from one month
and one day to six months, is the proper penalty imposable for the offense of
grave coercion. Considering that Villamar has been in detention since July
1995 to the present — a period of three years and three months — which is
well beyond the six-month maximum period provided for in the old law,
there is no more legal justification for her continued confinement. She has
served for a longer period than she should.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Appellant is convicted only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6)
months of arresto mayor. Unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause, her immediate RELEASE is hereby ordered, considering that she has
served beyond the maximum penalty imposed by law. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168103 August 3, 2010
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 155930-32]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO RELLOTA Y TADEO, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth.1
For this Court's consideration is an appeal from the Decision2 dated April 14,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00117, affirming,
with modification, the Decision3 dated August 8, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, in Criminal Case Nos. 94-10812, 94-
10813 and 94-10814, and finding appellant Alejandro T. Rellota, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of consummated rape and one
(1) count of attempted rape.
The antecedent facts are the following:
AAA,4 the offended party, was born on July 16, 1981 in XXX, Eastern Samar
and was a little over twelve (12) years old when the incidents allegedly
happened.
Together with her siblings, BBB and CCC, AAA lived with her aunt, DDD, and
the latter's second husband, appellant, in Antipolo City, Rizal from
September 1992 to January 1994. Also living with them were two (2) of
AAA's cousins. During that period, DDD and appellant were sending AAA,
BBB and CCC to school. At the time the incidents took place, DDD was
working overseas.
Based on the testimony of AAA, appellant had been kissing her and touching
her private parts since September 1993. She claimed that appellant raped
her several times between September 1993 and January 1994. She narrated
that appellant would usually rape her at night when the other members of
the family were either out of the house or asleep. AAA stated that she
resisted the advances of appellant, but was not successful. Appellant,
according to her, would usually place a bolo beside him whenever he would
rape her. She added that appellant would threaten AAA by telling her that he
would kill her brother and sister and that he would stop sending her to
school.
Around noon of December 20, 1993, AAA took a bath at an artesian well
near their house and after bathing, she wrapped her body with a towel
before going inside their house. Appellant followed her to the bedroom,
pulled down her towel and laid her on the bed. He tied her hands with a
rope before forcibly inserting his penis inside her vagina. AAA fought back
by kicking and scratching appellant, but the latter was not deterred.
Thereafter, appellant untied the hands of AAA and left the room. A few
moments later, appellant returned in the bedroom and raped her again.
36
On January 31, 1994, the same incident happened. AAA went inside their
room after taking a bath, not knowing that appellant was inside. Upon
seeing her, appellant snatched the towel around her body and laid her down
on the sofa. He kissed her and touched her private part, while AAA kicked
him and scratched his arms. She was able to push him. After which,
appellant ran out the door.
AAA, after that incident, told her older sister about the repeated deeds of the
appellant. Afterwards, her sister accompanied AAA to the police station. On
February 3, 1994, three (3) separate complaints for rape were filed against
appellant with the trial court and was raffled in different branches. 5
The Complaints read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 94-10812
That on or about and sometime during the month of December, 1993 in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of
force and intimidation, have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant AAA, a minor 12 years of age, against the latter's will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 94-10813
That on or about the month of September, 1993 in the Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation, have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant
AAA, a minor twelve years of age, against the latter's will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 94-10814
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1994 in the Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation, have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant
AAA, a minor 12 years of age, against the latter's will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.
Complainant AAA filed a Motion for the Consolidation9 of the three
complaints, which was eventually granted.10
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecutor presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Rosaline Onggao, a
medico-legal officer.
On the other hand, the defense presented the testimony of appellant who
denied the charges against him. According to him, he could not think of any
reason why the complainant filed the complaints. He also claimed that his
sister-in-law, who helped the complainant file the charges was mad at him
for not giving her a loan.
The trial court, in a Decision11 dated August 8, 2002, found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape as alleged in the
complaints, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ALEJANDRO RELLOTA y TADEO
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each count in Criminal Case Nos.
94-10812, 10813 and 10814.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of
₱50,000.00 for each of the three (3) Criminal Cases, or a total of
₱150,000.00.
SO ORDERED.12
In not imposing the penalty of death, the trial court reasoned out that AAA
was already over 12 years old at the time the incidents happened and that
although she was below 18 years old, the relationship of AAA and the
appellant had not been sufficiently established as the marriage between
AAA's aunt and the appellant was not supported by any documentary
evidence.
A Notice of Appeal was filed and this Court accepted13 the appeal on July 16,
2003. However, in a Resolution14dated September 6, 2004, this Court
transferred the case to the CA in conformity with People of the Philippines v.
Efren Mateo y Garcia,15 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule
122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar
as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to this
Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated
September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases
similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to
promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VIII, Section 5 of
the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals before such cases are elevated to this Court.
In a Decision16 dated April 14, 2005, the CA affirmed, with modification, the
Decision of the trial court, disposing it as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as
appellant is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of consummated rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 94-
10812 and 94-10813. The Decision is however MODIFIED as follows:
37
1. In Criminal Case No. 94-10814, appellant is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape and is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum. He is
also ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil
indemnity and ₱15,000.00 as moral damages.
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 94-10812 and 94-10813, appellant is
ordered to pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for
each count in addition to the amount of ₱50,000.00 already imposed
as civil indemnity for each count.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal.
In his Brief17 dated October 24, 2003, appellant assigned this lone error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN
[APPELLANT] DESPITE THE FACT THAT AAA'S TESTIMONY WAS
INCONSISTENT AND FULL OF FALSEHOODS.
Appellant claims that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA in
September 1993 because his wife only left for Jeddah on October 21, 1993.
He points out that AAA herself testified that he only kissed her, touched her
breast and private parts, but failed to mention that he inserted his penis to
her vagina. He also denied raping AAA on January 31, 1994 and December
20, 1993. He further claims that the filing of the criminal charges were
instigated by AAA's aunt for his refusal to lend her money. In short, appellant
assails the credibility of AAA's testimony as shown by its inconsistencies and
falsehoods.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Brief18 dated November 27, 2003, averred that the prosecution was able to
satisfactorily prove that appellant raped the offended party in September
and December 1993. It further stated that appellant used his moral
ascendancy over the victim in having carnal knowledge of her against her
will. The OSG also argued that the medical report bolsters the victim's claim
that she was repeatedly raped by appellant and that the latter's defense of
denial is weak and deserves scant consideration.
In agreement with the CA Decision, the OSG posited that there is inadequate
proof that the offended party was actually raped on January 31, 1994 and
that the penalties imposed by the trial court should be adjusted in
accordance with the crimes proved.
After a careful study of the arguments presented by both parties, this Court
finds the appeal bereft of any merit.
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences both for the
appellant and the complainant; hence, utmost care must be taken in the
review of a decision involving conviction of rape.19 Thus, in the disposition
and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles: first, the
prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable
doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces
conviction; second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of
the defense; third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial
courts, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal; fourth, an accusation of rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; and, fifth, in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution.20
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of AAA. He claims that he could not have possibly raped AAA in
September 1993 because, first, his wife was still in the Philippines and left
for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia only on October 21, 1993; and second, based on the
testimony of AAA, appellant merely kissed and touched her breasts and
private parts, but never did she mention that he inserted his penis into her
vagina.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The claim of appellant that he could not have raped AAA because his wife
was still in the country during the alleged period when the rape was
committed is so flimsy that it does not deserve even the slightest
consideration from this Court. It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of
time or place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence of other
people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient
and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.21 There have been
too many instances when rape was committed under circumstances as
indiscreet and audacious as a room full of family members sleeping side by
side.22 There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in seclusion.23
As to the contention of appellant that the testimony of AAA was barren of
any statement that the former's penis was inserted in the latter's vagina is
not quite accurate. AAA categorically stated during her testimony that she
was raped, thus:
This Court is also not swayed by the claim of appellant that the testimony of
AAA is full of inconsistencies and falsehoods. As accurately propounded by
the CA:
Appellant further contends that the testimony of AAA regarding the rape
that took place on December 20, 1993 is full of lies and falsehood. He points
out as lie and inconsistent AAA's statement that he removed her shorts and
panty when she was raped on December 20, 1993. He argues that this could
not have been possible because, as earlier testified to by AAA, she merely
wrapped her body with a towel having just taken a bath. He also points out
38
as lie and inconsistent AAA's statement that after he pulled her to the bed,
raped her and then left, she immediately put on her panty and t-shirt. He
argues that such putting on her panty and t-shirt could not have been also
possible because, as testified to by her, her hands were tied with a rope.
Again, the contentions are without merit.
In her testimony, AAA narrated that she was raped twice on December 20,
1993: the first time was when she came from her bath, wrapped only with a
towel and appellant pulled her to the bed, tied her hands and ravished her,
and the second time was when she had already dressed up and appellant
returned to the room to rape her again. When AAA testified that appellant
removed her shorts and panty before raping her, she was referring to the
second time she was raped on that day. Hence, her statements were not
inconsistent. There was a lapse of time between the first and the second
rape. Likewise, when AAA testified that she put on her t-shirt and panty, she
was referring to the first time of the rape where, after ravishing her,
appellant untied her hands and left only to return to rape her once more.
There was enough time for AAA to dress up.27
Nevertheless, the said inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor
ones which do not affect the credibility of AAA nor erase the fact that the
latter was raped. The inconsistencies are trivial and forgivable, since a
victim of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of the
previous incidents, since these may just be but mere fragments of a
prolonged and continuing nightmare, a calvary she might even be struggling
to forget.28 As this Court pronounced in People v. Delos Reyes:29
It is established jurisprudence that testimony must be considered and
calibrated in its entirety inclusive and not by truncated or isolated passages
thereof. Due consideration must be accorded to all the questions
propounded to the witness and her answers thereto. The whole impression
or effect of what had been said or done must be considered and not
individual words or phrases alone. Moreover, rape is a painful experience
which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. It causes deep psychological
wounds, often forcing the victim’s conscience or subconscious to forget the
traumatic experience, and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her
psyche for life. A rape victim cannot thus be expected to keep an accurate
account and remember every ugly detail of the appalling and horrifying
outrage perpetrated on her especially since she might in fact have been
trying not to remember them. Rape victims do not cherish in their memories
an accurate account of when and how, and the number of times they were
violated. Error-free testimony cannot be expected most especially when a
young victim of rape is recounting details of a harrowing experience, one
which even an adult would like to bury in oblivion deep in the recesses of
her mind, never to be resurrected. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the
presence of strangers, face to face with her tormentor and being cross-
examined by his hostile and intimidating lawyer would be benumbed with
tension and nervousness and this can affect the accuracy of her testimony.
Often, the answers to long-winded and at times misleading questions
propounded to her are not responsive. However, considering her youth and
her traumatic experience, ample margin of error and understanding should
be accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape.30
Anent the other instances that appellant was able to force himself and had
carnal knowledge of AAA, the latter testified as follows:
Hence, the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimony of AAA. The
unbroken line of jurisprudence is that this Court will not disturb the
findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses, considering that
it is in a better position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness
stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude,
especially under cross-examination. Its assessment is respected unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case.35 Furthermore, the above testimonies of
AAA positively identifying appellant as the one who defiled her were all the
more strengthened by the Medico-Legal Report36 conducted by Dr. Rosaline
Onggao, who also testified that:
It is settled that when the victim’s claim of rape is corroborated by the
physical findings of penetration, there exists sufficient basis for concluding
that sexual intercourse did take place.38
For his defense, appellant merely denied having raped AAA. However, denial,
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes
negative self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value
than the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative
matters.39 In the present case, the records are devoid of any clear and
convincing evidence that would substantiate appellant's denial. In the same
manner, appellant's claim that the filing of the criminal charges against him
was instigated by AAA's aunt because he failed to lend the latter money is
uncorroborated by any evidence. Thus, when there is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify falsely against
the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the
logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 40
With regard to the modification of the trial court's decision by the CA as to
the latter's findings that only an attempted rape was committed on January
31, 1994, this Court disagrees. AAA's testimony belies the consummation, as
well as the attempt to rape her on the said date. She said that:
Attempted rape requires that the offender commence the commission of
rape directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
39
desistance.43 The prosecution must, therefore, establish the following
elements of an attempted felony:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance.44
The above elements are wanting in the present case. Appellant’s act of
removing the towel wrapped in the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and
kissing and touching her private parts does not exactly demonstrate the
intent of appellant to have carnal knowledge of AAA on that particular date;
thus, dismissing the mere opinion and speculation of AAA, based on her
testimony, that appellant wanted to rape her. Even so, the said acts should
not be left unpunished as the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness,
as defined in the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5,45 Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,46 AAA, being a minor when the incident
happened, are present. In People v. Bon:47
The elements of the crime of acts lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done: (a) by
using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under
12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either
sex.
Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7610 or the Child Abuse Law defines lascivious conduct, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. 48
Clearly, all the elements of the offense are present. The actions of appellant
on January 31, 1994, i.e., laying AAA on the sofa and kissing and touching
her private parts are, by definition, lascivious or lewd, and based on AAA's
testimony, the intimidation from appellant was in existence and apparent.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being
abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious
conduct through coercion or intimidation.49 As case law has it, intimidation
need not necessarily be irresistible.50 It is sufficient that some compulsion
equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of
the offended party.51 This is especially true in the case of young, innocent
and immature girls who could not be expected to act with equanimity of
disposition and with nerves of steel.52 Young girls cannot be expected to act
like adults under the same circumstances or to have the courage and
intelligence to disregard the threat.53
Incidentally, under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.54 As explained by this Court
in People v. Abulon:55
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation
to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found
guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. 1avvphi1
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily
included in rape.56
In People v. Candaza,57 this Court ruled that the penalty for acts of
lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua; thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should thus fall within the range of prision
mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 14, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals finding appellant Alejandro of Rellota y Tadeo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of two (2) counts rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the same appellant is
also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
as defined in the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
40
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and per previous ruling58 of this Court,
must also indemnify the victim in the amount of ₱15,000.00 as moral
damages and pay a fine in the same amount.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124171 March 18, 2002
LETICIA R. MERCIALES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, JOSELITO NUADA, PAT. EDWIN MORAL, ADONIS
NIEVES, ERNESTO LOBETE, DOMIL GRAGEDA, and RAMON "POL"
FLORES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37341, denying her petition to annul the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8,2 in Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312,
which dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on a demurrer to
evidence filed by private respondents, accused therein.
The antecedent facts as succinctly synthesized by the respondent court are
as follows:
On August 12, 1993, Criminal Case Nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310,
6311, and 6312, for rape with homicide, in connection with the
death of one Maritess Ricafort Merciales, were filed against the
private respondents, Joselito Nuada, Pat. Edwin Moral, Adonis
Nieves, Ernesto Lobete, Domil Grageda and Ramon "Pol" Flores,
before the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Legaspi City.
The said cases were consolidated in Branch 8, presided over by the
respondent judge.
During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the public
prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of accused Joselito
Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state witness. However,
the prosecution contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter
had already been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge
denied the motion for discharge, for failure of the prosecution to
present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On December 22, 1993, the prosecution filed a petition3 for
certiorari [G.R. No. 113273-78] before the Supreme Court,
questioning the respondent judge's denial of the motion to
discharge the accused Nuada. Despite the fact that the petition did
 not contain a prayer for a temporary restraining order, the trial
judge did not set the case for further hearing so as to give the
prosecution time to secure such temporary restraining order from
the Supreme Court.
On July 13, 1994, herein private respondents filed a motion to set
the case for hearing, invoking their constitutional right to speedy
trial. The respondent judge granted the motion, and set the case for
hearing on July 29, 1994.
On the said date, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,
instead of presenting further evidence. The respondent Judge
postponed the hearing and reset the same for August 9, 1994.
On August 9, 1994, again the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, invoking its pending petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The private respondents, thru counsel, objected to
any further resetting as this would constitute a violation of their
right to a speedy trial. The respondent judge called for a recess so as
to let the prosecution decide whether or not to present an NBI
agent, who was then present, to prove the due execution of the
accused Nuada's extrajudicial confession.
However, after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to present
the NBI agent, and instead manifested that he was not presenting
any further evidence. The defense then moved that the cases be
deemed submitted for decision, and asked leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence.
On August 29, 1994, the Solicitor General filed [in G.R. No. 113273-
78] a motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court, to enjoin the
respondent judge from proceeding with the resolution of the case.
However, on September 19, 1994, the motion was denied by the
Supreme Court.
In due time, the accused filed their demurrer to evidence x x x.4
On October 21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
For lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, all the accused in all these cases are
hereby ACQUITTED and the cases filed against them are hereby
DISMISSED. The accused in all these cases, being detention
prisoners, are hereby ordered RELEASED from detention, unless
they are being detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the said
criminal cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a petition to
41
annul the foregoing Order of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on October 4, 1995.
A motion for reconsideration was denied on March 6, 1996. Hence, the
instant petition based on the ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT REFUSED TO NULLIFY THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 21,
1994 OF THE TRIAL COURT FOR BEING NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE TOLERATED AND/OR
COMMITTED INJUSTICE BY FAILING TO REQUIRE THE
PROSECUTION TO PRESENT ALL THEIR EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF
SUPPRESSING THEM APPARENTLY TO FAVOR THE ACCUSED IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
DUE PROCESS, OUSTING THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION.6
The case was set for oral argument on December 11, 2001. Counsel for
petitioner and the Solicitor General appeared. During the oral argument, the
Solicitor General manifested that he was joining the cause of petitioner in
order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda in amplification of the points raised
during the oral argument.
Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will not violate
the accused's right to double jeopardy. More particularly, she ascribes
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue haste which attended the
prosecution's premature resting and the trial court's grant of the demurrer
to evidence when the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has
not been completed.
Private respondent Ramon Flores filed his Memorandum, arguing that
petitioner, being the private complainant in the criminal case below, has no
legal standing to appeal the acquittal of private respondents; that there was
no extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect to warrant
either a petition for annulment of judgment or certiorari; and that the
reopening of the criminal case will violate the accused's right against double
jeopardy.
It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning a
judgment of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case
is concerned.7 In the case at bar, we agree with petitioner that this issue was
rendered moot when the Solicitor General, in representation of the People,
changed his position and joined the cause of petitioner, thus fulfilling the
requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor.8
In any event, petitioner has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal
prosecution, being the mother of the deceased rape victim. The right of
offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of
due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they
cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in
double jeopardy.9
The criminal case below was for rape with homicide. Although the public
prosecutor presented seven witnesses, none of these actually saw the
commission of the crime. It was only Joselito Nuada, one of the accused, who
came forward and expressed willingness to turn state witness. His testimony
was vital for the prosecution, as it would provide the only eyewitness
account of the accused's complicity in the crime. The trial court required the
public prosecutor to present evidence to justify Nuada's discharge as a state
witness, but the latter insisted that there was no need for such proof since
Nuada had already been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice. The public prosecutor's obstinate refusal to
present the required evidence prompted the trial court to deny the motion
to discharge Nuada.
The prosecution elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiorari. Meanwhile, the accused moved to set the case for hearing,
invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The trial court granted the
motion. The public prosecutor moved for a continuance, and the trial court
acceded. At the next scheduled hearing, however, the trial court denied a
similar motion by the prosecution in view of the objection of the accused.
The trial court directed the public prosecutor to present Atty. Carlos S.
Caabay, the NBI Agent who took Nuada's extrajudicial confession. At the
resumption of the hearing, the public prosecutor declared that he was
resting the prosecution's case, knowing fully well that the evidence he has
presented was not sufficient to convict the accused. Consequently, the
ensuing demurrer to evidence filed by the accused was granted by the trial
court.
It is clear from the foregoing that the public prosecutor was guilty of serious
nonfeasance. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to bring the criminal
proceedings for the punishment of the guilty.10 Concomitant with this is the
duty to pursue the prosecution of a criminal action and to represent the
public interest. A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is
prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. For this reason,
Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that "all criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal x x x." As the representative of the State, the public
prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps to protect the rights of
the People in the trial of an accused.11 If the public prosecutor commits a
nonfeasance in refusing to perform a specific duty imposed on him by law,
he can be compelled by an action for mandamus.12
In the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not presented
sufficient evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated moves by
the accused for the trial court to continue hearing the case, he deliberately
42
failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed the court to
declare that the prosecution has rested its case. In this sense, he was remiss
in his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties. More specifically,
the public prosecutor in this case was guilty of blatant error and abuse of
discretion, thereby causing prejudice to the offended party. Indeed, the
family of the deceased victim, Maritess Merciales, could do nothing during
the proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the case in the hands of the
said prosecutor. All they could do was helplessly watch as the public
prosecutor, who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on their
behalf, renege on that obligation and refuse to perform his sworn duty.
Indeed, Rule 119, Section 9 (now Section 17) of the Rules of Court expressly
requires the presentation of evidence in support of the prosecution's prayer
for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness, viz:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission
of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge, xxx xxx xxx.
By refusing to comply with the trial court's order to present evidence, the
public prosecutor grossly violated the above-quoted rule. Moreover, the
public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect the interest of the
offended party, at least insofar as the criminal aspect is concerned. After the
trial court denied his motion to discharge Nuada as a state witness, he
should have proceeded to complete the evidence of the prosecution by other
means. Instead, he willfully and deliberately refused to present an available
witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on that date and time.
The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs to
establish the guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for their offense
against the injured party.
Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court. Notwithstanding
its knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to
convict, especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on
utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial court passively watched as the
public prosecutor bungled the case. The trial court was well aware of the
nature of the testimonies of the seven prosecution witnesses that have so far
been presented. Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu
proprio, should have called additional witnesses for the purpose of
questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to
particular facts or issues involved in the case.13
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day
in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that
is entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the
accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law,
the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same
cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.14
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the accused
against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy
attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused
are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction;
(3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they
are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their
consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused
would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction.
Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.15
Otherwise put, the dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a
fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process.16 In rendering the judgment
of dismissal, the trial judge in this case acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for lack of due process is
equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction.17Indeed, "jurisdiction" is the right
to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing.18
Lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial
Courts.19 Hence, the remedy taken by petitioner before the Court of Appeals
was correct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37341 is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 6307-6312
is ANNULLED, and this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 8, for further proceedings. The public prosecutor
is ORDERED to complete the presentation of all available witnesses for the
prosecution.
SO ORDERED.

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